FINAL DRAFT EDITS
Non-Constitutional
Abstract TLDR: This proposal funds a coalition led by Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits in order to aid in turning Arbitrum DAO members’ ideas into reality for a term of 12 months.
The Arbitrum Coalition is an organization initially made up of Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits. The Coalition aims to execute turnkey R&D work on behalf of the Arbitrum DAO. The Coalition's mandate is to help steer the path from ideation in the forum to the optimal, efficient, and safe execution of proposals. In other words, being a steward in making the DAO’s visions a reality. The coalition will provide the necessary resources so that the DAO can make informed decisions.
Motivation The Arbitrum forum includes many worthwhile suggestions, but often lacks the required research, coordination, design, and risk assessment to move forward optimally. For example, iterating on proposals, drumming up delegate awareness, and finding the necessary partners to execute an idea are often difficult tasks. The Arbitrum Coalition’s mandate is to help distill information and accelerate governance decision-making so DAO participants can make informed decisions.
The Coalition has best-in-class experience/specialized expertise and personnel to execute on this venture and are all already notable contributors to the DAO. Areas of expertise include but are not limited to research, framework creation, risk assessment, secure code reviews, threat modeling, and testing enhancements.The Coalition will take the necessary steps to ensure the Arbitrum DAO has the resources it needs to accomplish its goals.
As a case study demonstrating the need for the Coalition, there was a lot of discussion around returning tokens accidentally sent to the airdrop address back to the recipients. However, there was no one to call on to look at the landscape of how other protocols deal with this issue, design and implement a mechanism, or take it through the governance process. Likewise, the DAO has seen multiple grant programs suggested but has not been able to assess what has worked or not worked for similar programs in the past from an objective perspective. A multitude of such cases can be seen over Arbitrum DAO's short tenure. These are the exact roles the coalition will undertake for ideas that gain traction among DAO stakeholders.
Had the coalition existed during the time of the STIP proposal, it would have played a pivotal role in alleviating many of the inefficiencies and challenges delegates faced in the process. Blockworks Research and Gauntlet would have been prepared to develop comprehensive resources in support of the program end-to-end. From simplifying the evaluation of proposals with concise explanations and quantitative analysis to simplifying the voting process for delegates, and ultimately eliminating the need for a second process aimed at finding a service provider to monitor and analyze the program once live, by doing it ourselves. While we did make modest contributions in this regard [2], our commitment would have been backed by substantially greater resources. In addition, the Coalition would (and will, should this proposal pass) do its own analysis of how this STIP program performed (after the fact) and provide feedback and recommendations on how to improve it in the future. The Coalition would have advocated for streamlined voting methods in place of 105 separate votes and created efficient voting dashboards, reducing the reliance on last-minute community-funded solutions. While it's a missed opportunity, it highlights the potential for future value.
Additionally, complex mechanism designs like creating a permissionless validator set (BOLD) and sequencer design (timeboost) can be made more easily understandable for ARB delegates with support from the Coalition and researched impartially versus other potential solutions when proposals of this nature inevitably go on the forum.
The Coalition will help community stakeholders make the best possible decisions when it comes to AIPs. For example, Trail of Bits will aim to review each onchain proposal’s source code to ensure it achieves what is stated. This code review ability is a feat many delegates cannot achieve on their own and will be extremely useful to enable competent voting. Blockworks Research will distill the competitive landscape and underlying technology and Gauntlet will be able assess potential risks to the Arbitrum ecosystem.
An example that demonstrates the value the Coalition will provide relates to support decision-making for the Arbitrum Plutus DAO proposal to Activate ARB Staking. Adding an inflation rate to the token poses concerns around risks to the token, new independently created staking contracts would need to be audited, and it would be helpful if delegates had access to quantitative research surrounding how inflation has impacted other tokens in the past. The Coalition can work together to provide objective analysis, quantitative research, and, if desired by the community, audits and execution for this proposal and others like it.
The Arbitrum Coalition will help the DAO reduce friction and operate effectively. Having three of the most experienced service providers in crypto best positioned and resourced to act at the behest of the DAO will be a tremendous value add.
Rationale One key difference between Arbitrum and many other protocols is the immense power given to the DAO at token generation, which makes the DAO fully responsible for the coordination and growth of the protocol.
Arbitrum’s impressive decentralization demonstrates that the DAO can’t rely on single entities such as Offchain Labs or the Arbitrum Foundation. Any steps taken to help create a robust decentralized ecosystem of service providers so that the DAO is not dependent on any single entity is a step in the right direction. This way if any one organization falls, is negatively regulated, or otherwise encumbered, the protocol continues to march forward. The Arbitrum Coalition is the first initiative toward this overarching goal.
Additionally, the Coalition will aid in bringing more service providers subservient to the DAO. For example, it can be a steward in creating a methodology for other budgeted entities to come into existence.
Other DAOs have a diverse ecosystem of service providers who help the DAO operate efficiently. The Coalition will be the first entity working towards this overarching structure such that over time the DAO will have an ecosystem of service providers executing on key roles like grants, development, growth, risk, legal, and more. This is a necessity in maintaining a truly decentralized and efficiently operating DAO.
Two additional benefits to funding the coalition will be the professionalization of DAO undertakings and growth for Arbitrum. All representatives of the coalition are professional and will bring competent and effective work and communication into the DAO that should help proposals move along with less friction. Additionally, the entities involved have a combined audience of far over 500,000 and will be sure to produce public content on the work we do for the DAO to hopefully drive more users and developers into the ecosystem.
The Coalition’s purpose is not to replace delegates, but rather to support, serve, and empower both them and the community as a whole with tools and deep insights to streamline effective decision making.
Introduction to The Coalition Trail of Bits: Since 2012, Trail of Bits has helped secure some of the world's most targeted organizations and devices. They combine high-end security research with a real-world attacker mentality to reduce risk and fortify code. They have worked extensively with Offchain Labs and performed over 1,800 hours of security review of Arbitrum through four focused engagements, including Nitro and Arbitrum V2. Many firms in DeFi, including Optimism, Balancer, Uniswap, and Compound trust Trail of Bits expertise to help secure their code, and you can find many more in their Publications repository. They’ve succeeded in finding vulnerabilities in highly verified systems and providing the best solutions regardless of whether they invented them. They are relentless about raising the baseline in the communities they work, and have developed and made freely available some of the most-used security tools, reference guides, and security research in the industry.
Gauntlet: Gauntlet’s quantitative optimization solutions drive rapid and sustainable growth for DeFi’s top protocols, DAOs, and ecosystems through research, reports, products, and bespoke engagements. Gauntlet has the longest track record in DeFi risk management, with a managed peak at $40+B for DeFi protocols such as Aave and Compound.
Blockworks Research: Blockworks Research is a team of analysts that delivers institutional-grade data-driven research and analysis for L1s, L2s, DeFi, and gaming/consumer applications. Our team is well-known in the industry for producing high-quality, actionable research reports and data dashboards covering various topics, including L2s, dApps, tokenomics, technical upgrades, emerging trends, governance, MEV, and market analysis. The team is divided into protocol-specific coverage so that our analysts are experts in their respective niches. Blockworks Research is a branch of Blockworks, a media company hosting conferences, podcasts, and an editorial site.
Key Terms The Arbitrum Coalition (“the Coalition”): A group initially made up of Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits whose mandate is to empower delegates with resources for making the most informed decisions possible.
DAO Advocate: A single designated entity that maintains the ability to direct the coalition’s efforts. Functions as a referee between the DAO and the coalition. We suggest L2BEAT fulfill the role of the Advocate as a proven good actor for the Arbitrum DAO given their contributions and status in the DAO. The advocate will receive a stipend of $8,000 per month for their work. The advocate’s main responsibility is ensuring the DAO’s best interests are met by the Coalition.
Coalition Member Termination: Ultimately, and above all, this Coalition will exist to serve the Arbitrum DAO. As such, individual members of the Coalition can be considered for replacement if their service does not meet the standards of this proposal or the DAO’s expectation. In the scenario a Coalition Member is considered for replacement, the DAO will need to examine the list of alternative vendors as well as any new market entrants eligible for consideration and pass a vote through a Snapshot vote (reaching quorum) to stop the following payments to the vendor and replace said entity with a counterpart. The Coalition member will be considered terminated upon the vote passing. The same process may be executed in order to terminate and stop the stream of funds for the entirety of the Coalition and/or the DAO Advocate.
Coalition Member Exit: As a malleable entity, if a member of the Arbitrum Coalition wishes to exit for any reason, they may do so by providing a two week lead time of departure and offer a list of viable replacements. Payments to the Member will stop 14 days after notice is given.
Specifications The advocate will have the ability to call on the coalition for R&D efforts at their discretion and act as the DAO’s representative to ensure that the Coalition is working on the most value-added initiatives and providing beyond satisfactory value. The advocate will solely act on the DAO’s behalf and function as a facilitator. From analysis, to modeling, to payload the Coalition will tackle and streamline workstreams together.
The roles of the Coalition include but are not limited to:
Trail of Bits: Reviewing onchain upgrade proposals to ensure that they align with the design and specification of the proposal through whitebox source code reviews. This role is particularly important given the prevalence of governance attacks, as seen with Tornado Cash. When no proposal requires a code review, Trail of Bits will focus on building content to help review further proposals, including tools (dedicated Slither detectors, fuzzing harness, proposal state diff visualizer, … ) and educational material (tutorial, checklist, code walkthrough, ...)
Gauntlet: Will empower the Arbitrum DAO with an understanding of the optimal path for growth through our quantitative work. Decisions in ecosystems, specifically DeFi, benefit from design, research, and modeling to determine how to incentivize usage, maximize economic efficiency, protect systemic health, and plan for the future with rigorously validated insights. Examples of some recent work include Aave Killswitch, Uniswap incentive design, ongoing Arbitrum USDC migration, and Cost of MEV: Quantifying Economic (un)Fairness in the Decentralized World.
Blockworks Research: Will provide objective data-driven research surrounding proposals to help delegates understand the context, competitive environments, and make more informed decisions. These reports may also be used as a tool for those writing proposals to improve their work. Additionally, Blockworks Research will function as the project manager handling logistics such as communication with the DAO and speaking with delegates. BWR is also able to input on mechanism design.
The Advocate is not a part of the coalition and exists purely to facilitate the DAO’s interests and direct the coalition. The Advocate is a representative of the DAO.
We believe it pertinent to get The Coalition stood up with haste and that Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits make up ideal initial members. That said, The Coalition is a malleable entity that can change, expand, and contract in domains and members as the DAO wishes. The Advocate as L2BEAT, likewise, should be looked at as a temporary seat that is always open to change. At the end of the 12 month period the domains and members should be reevaluated based on performance, lessons learned, and the adapting needs of the DAO as expected for the following 12 months.
Projects The Arbitrum Coalition aims to provide the following services as a first priority
Once the first priority services are met, the Arbitrum Coalition can provide the following. Though these are examples of activities that can be executed on, the DAO, through The Advocate, will have decision making power over the scope of the coalition’s work.
Tooling Creation and Enhancement [Trail of Bits]
Educational material [Trail of Bits]
Research New Mechanisms [BWR]
Delegate Engagement [BWR]
Growth Initiatives [BWR]
Costs The total cost of the coalition for the 1-year term will be based on the 30-day VWAP price of ARB on the day prior to the onchain proposal. One quarter of payment will be paid upfront to each Coalition Member, with a 274 day stream of the following ¾ starting 91 days from the AIP’s execution. The stream of funds will remain in DAO control and can be cut off at any time through an onchain DAO proposal. As of the ARB price on October 25th, this proposal is estimated to cost the DAO approximately 2.2M ARB over the year.
Trail of Bits
Gauntlet
Blockworks Research
$195,000 will be paid upon the AIP passing, with the remaining $585,000 streamed over 274 days to Blockworks Research starting on the 91st day thereafter. The stream will remain in DAO-control.
The Advocate - L2BEAT
The COALITION 3/5 multisig is being created. The funds in the multisig belong to the DAO and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Signers, excluding Gauntlet and Blockworks Research, will receive 1,000 ARB per month for their contribution. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in DAO governance including delegation. The multisig includes:
The COALITION multisig includes two features to ensure accountability of signers and grantees:
Streaming of funds to the multisig every second week for the Coalition’s term using Hedgey. The DAO will maintain control over this stream and have the ability to cut it off with an onchain vote.
Clawback capability so the DAO can retrieve funds if the multisig violates the agreement via an offchain vote.
Engagement expectations The duration of the engagement will be of 12 months (4 quarters) from the moment the first on-chain proposal is approved. This list is subject to change, based on the DAOs shifting priorities as determined in real time by the Advocate. The Coalition may seek to identify and complete other initiatives for the Arbitrum ecosystem, depending on the changing needs of the ecosystem, at the discretion of the Advocate.
Conflict of Interest Policy Disclosure: Any conflicts of interest (investment, involvement, or personal relationship with other projects/members of projects) should be disclosed and made public upon joining the Committee and maintained up-to-date in the Committee members database.
Recusal: Members with a conflict of interest involving a project being reviewed by the Committee should recuse themselves from participating in the evaluation and should vote Abstain if a proposal directly related to the Coalition is submitted. Additionally, Coalition members will abstain from commenting or voting on proposals made by any company that can be deemed a direct competitor.**
Self-Dealing: Participants should refrain from voting on sending funds to themselves or organizations where any portion of those funds is expected to flow to them, their other projects, or anyone they have a close personal or economic relationship with.
Ethical Trading: Members are required to follow ethical trading standards in regard to ARB and any other relevant digital assets.
Ecosystem Risk Dashboard Mocks
FINAL DRAFT EDITS
Non-Constitutional
Abstract TLDR: This proposal funds a coalition led by Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits in order to aid in turning Arbitrum DAO members’ ideas into reality for a term of 12 months.
The Arbitrum Coalition is an organization initially made up of Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits. The Coalition aims to execute turnkey R&D work on behalf of the Arbitrum DAO. The Coalition's mandate is to help steer the path from ideation in the forum to the optimal, efficient, and safe execution of proposals. In other words, being a steward in making the DAO’s visions a reality. The coalition will provide the necessary resources so that the DAO can make informed decisions.
Motivation The Arbitrum forum includes many worthwhile suggestions, but often lacks the required research, coordination, design, and risk assessment to move forward optimally. For example, iterating on proposals, drumming up delegate awareness, and finding the necessary partners to execute an idea are often difficult tasks. The Arbitrum Coalition’s mandate is to help distill information and accelerate governance decision-making so DAO participants can make informed decisions.
The Coalition has best-in-class experience/specialized expertise and personnel to execute on this venture and are all already notable contributors to the DAO. Areas of expertise include but are not limited to research, framework creation, risk assessment, secure code reviews, threat modeling, and testing enhancements.The Coalition will take the necessary steps to ensure the Arbitrum DAO has the resources it needs to accomplish its goals.
As a case study demonstrating the need for the Coalition, there was a lot of discussion around returning tokens accidentally sent to the airdrop address back to the recipients. However, there was no one to call on to look at the landscape of how other protocols deal with this issue, design and implement a mechanism, or take it through the governance process. Likewise, the DAO has seen multiple grant programs suggested but has not been able to assess what has worked or not worked for similar programs in the past from an objective perspective. A multitude of such cases can be seen over Arbitrum DAO's short tenure. These are the exact roles the coalition will undertake for ideas that gain traction among DAO stakeholders.
Had the coalition existed during the time of the STIP proposal, it would have played a pivotal role in alleviating many of the inefficiencies and challenges delegates faced in the process. Blockworks Research and Gauntlet would have been prepared to develop comprehensive resources in support of the program end-to-end. From simplifying the evaluation of proposals with concise explanations and quantitative analysis to simplifying the voting process for delegates, and ultimately eliminating the need for a second process aimed at finding a service provider to monitor and analyze the program once live, by doing it ourselves. While we did make modest contributions in this regard [2], our commitment would have been backed by substantially greater resources. In addition, the Coalition would (and will, should this proposal pass) do its own analysis of how this STIP program performed (after the fact) and provide feedback and recommendations on how to improve it in the future. The Coalition would have advocated for streamlined voting methods in place of 105 separate votes and created efficient voting dashboards, reducing the reliance on last-minute community-funded solutions. While it's a missed opportunity, it highlights the potential for future value.
Additionally, complex mechanism designs like creating a permissionless validator set (BOLD) and sequencer design (timeboost) can be made more easily understandable for ARB delegates with support from the Coalition and researched impartially versus other potential solutions when proposals of this nature inevitably go on the forum.
The Coalition will help community stakeholders make the best possible decisions when it comes to AIPs. For example, Trail of Bits will aim to review each onchain proposal’s source code to ensure it achieves what is stated. This code review ability is a feat many delegates cannot achieve on their own and will be extremely useful to enable competent voting. Blockworks Research will distill the competitive landscape and underlying technology and Gauntlet will be able assess potential risks to the Arbitrum ecosystem.
An example that demonstrates the value the Coalition will provide relates to support decision-making for the Arbitrum Plutus DAO proposal to Activate ARB Staking. Adding an inflation rate to the token poses concerns around risks to the token, new independently created staking contracts would need to be audited, and it would be helpful if delegates had access to quantitative research surrounding how inflation has impacted other tokens in the past. The Coalition can work together to provide objective analysis, quantitative research, and, if desired by the community, audits and execution for this proposal and others like it.
The Arbitrum Coalition will help the DAO reduce friction and operate effectively. Having three of the most experienced service providers in crypto best positioned and resourced to act at the behest of the DAO will be a tremendous value add.
Rationale One key difference between Arbitrum and many other protocols is the immense power given to the DAO at token generation, which makes the DAO fully responsible for the coordination and growth of the protocol.
Arbitrum’s impressive decentralization demonstrates that the DAO can’t rely on single entities such as Offchain Labs or the Arbitrum Foundation. Any steps taken to help create a robust decentralized ecosystem of service providers so that the DAO is not dependent on any single entity is a step in the right direction. This way if any one organization falls, is negatively regulated, or otherwise encumbered, the protocol continues to march forward. The Arbitrum Coalition is the first initiative toward this overarching goal.
Additionally, the Coalition will aid in bringing more service providers subservient to the DAO. For example, it can be a steward in creating a methodology for other budgeted entities to come into existence.
Other DAOs have a diverse ecosystem of service providers who help the DAO operate efficiently. The Coalition will be the first entity working towards this overarching structure such that over time the DAO will have an ecosystem of service providers executing on key roles like grants, development, growth, risk, legal, and more. This is a necessity in maintaining a truly decentralized and efficiently operating DAO.
Two additional benefits to funding the coalition will be the professionalization of DAO undertakings and growth for Arbitrum. All representatives of the coalition are professional and will bring competent and effective work and communication into the DAO that should help proposals move along with less friction. Additionally, the entities involved have a combined audience of far over 500,000 and will be sure to produce public content on the work we do for the DAO to hopefully drive more users and developers into the ecosystem.
The Coalition’s purpose is not to replace delegates, but rather to support, serve, and empower both them and the community as a whole with tools and deep insights to streamline effective decision making.
Introduction to The Coalition Trail of Bits: Since 2012, Trail of Bits has helped secure some of the world's most targeted organizations and devices. They combine high-end security research with a real-world attacker mentality to reduce risk and fortify code. They have worked extensively with Offchain Labs and performed over 1,800 hours of security review of Arbitrum through four focused engagements, including Nitro and Arbitrum V2. Many firms in DeFi, including Optimism, Balancer, Uniswap, and Compound trust Trail of Bits expertise to help secure their code, and you can find many more in their Publications repository. They’ve succeeded in finding vulnerabilities in highly verified systems and providing the best solutions regardless of whether they invented them. They are relentless about raising the baseline in the communities they work, and have developed and made freely available some of the most-used security tools, reference guides, and security research in the industry.
Gauntlet: Gauntlet’s quantitative optimization solutions drive rapid and sustainable growth for DeFi’s top protocols, DAOs, and ecosystems through research, reports, products, and bespoke engagements. Gauntlet has the longest track record in DeFi risk management, with a managed peak at $40+B for DeFi protocols such as Aave and Compound.
Blockworks Research: Blockworks Research is a team of analysts that delivers institutional-grade data-driven research and analysis for L1s, L2s, DeFi, and gaming/consumer applications. Our team is well-known in the industry for producing high-quality, actionable research reports and data dashboards covering various topics, including L2s, dApps, tokenomics, technical upgrades, emerging trends, governance, MEV, and market analysis. The team is divided into protocol-specific coverage so that our analysts are experts in their respective niches. Blockworks Research is a branch of Blockworks, a media company hosting conferences, podcasts, and an editorial site.
Key Terms The Arbitrum Coalition (“the Coalition”): A group initially made up of Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits whose mandate is to empower delegates with resources for making the most informed decisions possible.
DAO Advocate: A single designated entity that maintains the ability to direct the coalition’s efforts. Functions as a referee between the DAO and the coalition. We suggest L2BEAT fulfill the role of the Advocate as a proven good actor for the Arbitrum DAO given their contributions and status in the DAO. The advocate will receive a stipend of $8,000 per month for their work. The advocate’s main responsibility is ensuring the DAO’s best interests are met by the Coalition.
Coalition Member Termination: Ultimately, and above all, this Coalition will exist to serve the Arbitrum DAO. As such, individual members of the Coalition can be considered for replacement if their service does not meet the standards of this proposal or the DAO’s expectation. In the scenario a Coalition Member is considered for replacement, the DAO will need to examine the list of alternative vendors as well as any new market entrants eligible for consideration and pass a vote through a Snapshot vote (reaching quorum) to stop the following payments to the vendor and replace said entity with a counterpart. The Coalition member will be considered terminated upon the vote passing. The same process may be executed in order to terminate and stop the stream of funds for the entirety of the Coalition and/or the DAO Advocate.
Coalition Member Exit: As a malleable entity, if a member of the Arbitrum Coalition wishes to exit for any reason, they may do so by providing a two week lead time of departure and offer a list of viable replacements. Payments to the Member will stop 14 days after notice is given.
Specifications The advocate will have the ability to call on the coalition for R&D efforts at their discretion and act as the DAO’s representative to ensure that the Coalition is working on the most value-added initiatives and providing beyond satisfactory value. The advocate will solely act on the DAO’s behalf and function as a facilitator. From analysis, to modeling, to payload the Coalition will tackle and streamline workstreams together.
The roles of the Coalition include but are not limited to:
Trail of Bits: Reviewing onchain upgrade proposals to ensure that they align with the design and specification of the proposal through whitebox source code reviews. This role is particularly important given the prevalence of governance attacks, as seen with Tornado Cash. When no proposal requires a code review, Trail of Bits will focus on building content to help review further proposals, including tools (dedicated Slither detectors, fuzzing harness, proposal state diff visualizer, … ) and educational material (tutorial, checklist, code walkthrough, ...)
Gauntlet: Will empower the Arbitrum DAO with an understanding of the optimal path for growth through our quantitative work. Decisions in ecosystems, specifically DeFi, benefit from design, research, and modeling to determine how to incentivize usage, maximize economic efficiency, protect systemic health, and plan for the future with rigorously validated insights. Examples of some recent work include Aave Killswitch, Uniswap incentive design, ongoing Arbitrum USDC migration, and Cost of MEV: Quantifying Economic (un)Fairness in the Decentralized World.
Blockworks Research: Will provide objective data-driven research surrounding proposals to help delegates understand the context, competitive environments, and make more informed decisions. These reports may also be used as a tool for those writing proposals to improve their work. Additionally, Blockworks Research will function as the project manager handling logistics such as communication with the DAO and speaking with delegates. BWR is also able to input on mechanism design.
The Advocate is not a part of the coalition and exists purely to facilitate the DAO’s interests and direct the coalition. The Advocate is a representative of the DAO.
We believe it pertinent to get The Coalition stood up with haste and that Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits make up ideal initial members. That said, The Coalition is a malleable entity that can change, expand, and contract in domains and members as the DAO wishes. The Advocate as L2BEAT, likewise, should be looked at as a temporary seat that is always open to change. At the end of the 12 month period the domains and members should be reevaluated based on performance, lessons learned, and the adapting needs of the DAO as expected for the following 12 months.
Projects The Arbitrum Coalition aims to provide the following services as a first priority
Once the first priority services are met, the Arbitrum Coalition can provide the following. Though these are examples of activities that can be executed on, the DAO, through The Advocate, will have decision making power over the scope of the coalition’s work.
Tooling Creation and Enhancement [Trail of Bits]
Educational material [Trail of Bits]
Research New Mechanisms [BWR]
Delegate Engagement [BWR]
Growth Initiatives [BWR]
Costs The total cost of the coalition for the 1-year term will be based on the 30-day VWAP price of ARB on the day prior to the onchain proposal. One quarter of payment will be paid upfront to each Coalition Member, with a 274 day stream of the following ¾ starting 91 days from the AIP’s execution. The stream of funds will remain in DAO control and can be cut off at any time through an onchain DAO proposal. As of the ARB price on October 25th, this proposal is estimated to cost the DAO approximately 2.2M ARB over the year.
Trail of Bits
Gauntlet
Blockworks Research
$195,000 will be paid upon the AIP passing, with the remaining $585,000 streamed over 274 days to Blockworks Research starting on the 91st day thereafter. The stream will remain in DAO-control.
The Advocate - L2BEAT
The COALITION 3/5 multisig is being created. The funds in the multisig belong to the DAO and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Signers, excluding Gauntlet and Blockworks Research, will receive 1,000 ARB per month for their contribution. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in DAO governance including delegation. The multisig includes:
The COALITION multisig includes two features to ensure accountability of signers and grantees:
Streaming of funds to the multisig every second week for the Coalition’s term using Hedgey. The DAO will maintain control over this stream and have the ability to cut it off with an onchain vote.
Clawback capability so the DAO can retrieve funds if the multisig violates the agreement via an offchain vote.
Engagement expectations The duration of the engagement will be of 12 months (4 quarters) from the moment the first on-chain proposal is approved. This list is subject to change, based on the DAOs shifting priorities as determined in real time by the Advocate. The Coalition may seek to identify and complete other initiatives for the Arbitrum ecosystem, depending on the changing needs of the ecosystem, at the discretion of the Advocate.
Conflict of Interest Policy Disclosure: Any conflicts of interest (investment, involvement, or personal relationship with other projects/members of projects) should be disclosed and made public upon joining the Committee and maintained up-to-date in the Committee members database.
Recusal: Members with a conflict of interest involving a project being reviewed by the Committee should recuse themselves from participating in the evaluation and should vote Abstain if a proposal directly related to the Coalition is submitted. Additionally, Coalition members will abstain from commenting or voting on proposals made by any company that can be deemed a direct competitor.**
Self-Dealing: Participants should refrain from voting on sending funds to themselves or organizations where any portion of those funds is expected to flow to them, their other projects, or anyone they have a close personal or economic relationship with.
Ethical Trading: Members are required to follow ethical trading standards in regard to ARB and any other relevant digital assets.
Ecosystem Risk Dashboard Mocks
i support the idea but i believe there could be a better decentralized way to format and execute this idea
Coalition is asking too much and it would cause a power imbalance
i support the idea but i believe there could be a better decentralized way to format and execute this idea
Coalition is asking too much and it would cause a power imbalance
We support the idea of a coalition, but think the centralization risk is significant. A less exclusionary, RFP approach is preferable.
https://twitter.com/CarlZielinski/status/1722845915973665158
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145/71?u=krst
Per policy, Gauntlet abstains given our conflict of interest in the outcome.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145/68
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145/69?u=coinflip
https://twitter.com/ercwl/status/1722264112162603224 Archive link: https://archive.is/zeCjd
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145/66?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145/55?u=camelot
Too risky to give any group this much power in the DAO https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145/47
https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x1ac6079871dc4af55b7d67eae130e4c1bbcbabd9bb35405bc1733ef2efe45875
We support the idea of a coalition, but think the centralization risk is significant. A less exclusionary, RFP approach is preferable.
https://twitter.com/CarlZielinski/status/1722845915973665158
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145/71?u=krst
Per policy, Gauntlet abstains given our conflict of interest in the outcome.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145/68
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145/69?u=coinflip
https://twitter.com/ercwl/status/1722264112162603224 Archive link: https://archive.is/zeCjd
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145/66?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145/55?u=camelot
Too risky to give any group this much power in the DAO https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145/47
https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x1ac6079871dc4af55b7d67eae130e4c1bbcbabd9bb35405bc1733ef2efe45875
Сontinuation of the Gauntlet saga
https://gov.near.org/t/near-governance-house-of-stake-proposal-by-gauntlet/39768
The idea of dedicated DAO resources has merit. However, we share the concerns raised about the current proposal.
The financial commitment the coalition is asking from the DAO is substantial. Such a proposal should have a better-defined mandate, granular scoping, and clear success KPIs. Furthermore, systems of checks and balances are essential to ensure that this isn't a pathway towards gatekeeping and entrenchment. These elements are crucial for transparency, accountability, and, ultimately, for the confidence of the DAO.
The idea of dedicated DAO resources has merit. However, we share the concerns raised about the current proposal.
The financial commitment the coalition is asking from the DAO is substantial. Such a proposal should have a better-defined mandate, granular scoping, and clear success KPIs. Furthermore, systems of checks and balances are essential to ensure that this isn't a pathway towards gatekeeping and entrenchment. These elements are crucial for transparency, accountability, and, ultimately, for the confidence of the DAO.
Several teams have reached out directly, asking if we'd be willing to be involved. Chaos Labs is happy and well-positioned to contribute significantly. Our active role on the Security Council and our direct engagement with leading Arbitrum protocols, such as GMX, underscore our deep involvement and commitment to the ecosystem. However, we believe the proposal in its current format is set up for failure from a service provider perspective. Massive contracts with hand-wavy goals and unclear value propositions are the type of engagements that create backlash, misalignment, and, ultimately, disappointment. All service providers should be long-term focused, and this doesn't seem like a good first step in that direction.
A structured RFP process would bring clarity and definition to the proposal, allowing additional service providers to present comprehensive and competitive offerings. The DAO stands to gain immensely from a transparent and competitive RFP process, especially at the price points presented.
Looking forward to further discussions and refining this proposal into a solid plan of action that aligns with the DAO's objectives and resources.
We (ToB) recognize the concerns about the proposed financial commitment and want to provide some context regarding the value inherent in our team's offering.
Although the proposed investment may initially appear significant, it represents a cost-effective option when viewed within the broader market context. Importantly, our pricing is discounted from our standard rates. Furthermore, our long-standing partnership with Offchain Labs has provided us with unique insights into their tech stack, positioning us as the optimal choice for reviewing proposals and offering insightful recommendations. This proposal is not simply about "hiring one engineer for X months"; it is about gaining access to a team of industry leading engineers with unique expertise, knowledge, and experience.
We (ToB) recognize the concerns about the proposed financial commitment and want to provide some context regarding the value inherent in our team's offering.
Although the proposed investment may initially appear significant, it represents a cost-effective option when viewed within the broader market context. Importantly, our pricing is discounted from our standard rates. Furthermore, our long-standing partnership with Offchain Labs has provided us with unique insights into their tech stack, positioning us as the optimal choice for reviewing proposals and offering insightful recommendations. This proposal is not simply about "hiring one engineer for X months"; it is about gaining access to a team of industry leading engineers with unique expertise, knowledge, and experience.
Upskilling the community is at the core of our mission. The cost of our proposal reflects not just the work to be done but also the creation and distribution of tools and educational resources. These are designed to empower the community with knowledge and skills that foster innovation and self-reliance. By investing in these resources, we are reducing the need for future external assistance, ultimately saving costs for the community in the long term. Over the years, we have demonstrated the impact of our long term community projects, like with our open-source tools Slither or Echidna, that have been widely adopted and praised for their initial and continuing impact on the industry.
We believe our proposal represents a strategic investment into not just the immediate project needs but also the broader ecosystem. By choosing the coalition, you are not only funding a project but also investing in a partnership dedicated to delivering long-term value and continuous improvement to the DAO.
We recognize the importance and value of having dedicated teams to provide ongoing support in research, coordination, design, and risk assessment! However, we would prefer to receive separate proposals for each team to justify their respective costs and allow for independent voting decisions, similar to the process used for STIP voting.
We acknowledge the teams' proven track record in the space and their significant contributions to Arbitrum DAO. We are confident that these teams will continue to receive the necessary support while simultaneously addressing community concerns about systemic risk.
I like the idea of a coalition as it can accelerate the DAO over the next 12 months and help stir delegates in the right direction by providing valuable feedback and analysis. However, I have concerns regarding the centralization of vendors, pricing, and the need for clear Coalition KPIs goals. Concerning centralization, multiple vendors should be considered for each vertical.
For example, Chaos Labs is a leader in the risk space as well and already works with many Arbitrum protocols and applications. Similarly, I do believe we can find another research firm that could provide hourly costs and share the workload together with BWR. This is a big financial commitment for the DAO and can be impactful. A more thorough diligence process will result in better service packaging at a more competitive price point for the Arbitrum community. With multiple vendors competing, we will get more diverse feedback and more than one perspective / opinions on specific deliverables. I've reached out to Chaos Labs to provide hourly costs on contributing to Coalition efforts. Last thing our ecosystem needs is to become laughingstock on CT by the way we handle vendors procurement.
No, just no.
First, can the organizations involved demonstrate their time is worth $650-$1500/ hour? Those are the requested amounts. That seems exorbitant … as in “more than I pay for Harvard lawyers” exorbitant, literally.
No, just no.
First, can the organizations involved demonstrate their time is worth $650-$1500/ hour? Those are the requested amounts. That seems exorbitant … as in “more than I pay for Harvard lawyers” exorbitant, literally.
Second, if the advocate is supposed to be an independent voice for the DAO, the advocate should be elected separately. There’s not even a veneer of independence if the advocate is proposed in the same breath as the council, never mind being actually nominated by the candidates for the council.
The fact the council candidates thought this was a good idea is disqualifying in my opinion. I’m voting no and urge others to do the same.
Сontinuation of the Gauntlet saga
https://gov.near.org/t/near-governance-house-of-stake-proposal-by-gauntlet/39768
The idea of dedicated DAO resources has merit. However, we share the concerns raised about the current proposal.
The financial commitment the coalition is asking from the DAO is substantial. Such a proposal should have a better-defined mandate, granular scoping, and clear success KPIs. Furthermore, systems of checks and balances are essential to ensure that this isn't a pathway towards gatekeeping and entrenchment. These elements are crucial for transparency, accountability, and, ultimately, for the confidence of the DAO.
The idea of dedicated DAO resources has merit. However, we share the concerns raised about the current proposal.
The financial commitment the coalition is asking from the DAO is substantial. Such a proposal should have a better-defined mandate, granular scoping, and clear success KPIs. Furthermore, systems of checks and balances are essential to ensure that this isn't a pathway towards gatekeeping and entrenchment. These elements are crucial for transparency, accountability, and, ultimately, for the confidence of the DAO.
Several teams have reached out directly, asking if we'd be willing to be involved. Chaos Labs is happy and well-positioned to contribute significantly. Our active role on the Security Council and our direct engagement with leading Arbitrum protocols, such as GMX, underscore our deep involvement and commitment to the ecosystem. However, we believe the proposal in its current format is set up for failure from a service provider perspective. Massive contracts with hand-wavy goals and unclear value propositions are the type of engagements that create backlash, misalignment, and, ultimately, disappointment. All service providers should be long-term focused, and this doesn't seem like a good first step in that direction.
A structured RFP process would bring clarity and definition to the proposal, allowing additional service providers to present comprehensive and competitive offerings. The DAO stands to gain immensely from a transparent and competitive RFP process, especially at the price points presented.
Looking forward to further discussions and refining this proposal into a solid plan of action that aligns with the DAO's objectives and resources.
We (ToB) recognize the concerns about the proposed financial commitment and want to provide some context regarding the value inherent in our team's offering.
Although the proposed investment may initially appear significant, it represents a cost-effective option when viewed within the broader market context. Importantly, our pricing is discounted from our standard rates. Furthermore, our long-standing partnership with Offchain Labs has provided us with unique insights into their tech stack, positioning us as the optimal choice for reviewing proposals and offering insightful recommendations. This proposal is not simply about "hiring one engineer for X months"; it is about gaining access to a team of industry leading engineers with unique expertise, knowledge, and experience.
We (ToB) recognize the concerns about the proposed financial commitment and want to provide some context regarding the value inherent in our team's offering.
Although the proposed investment may initially appear significant, it represents a cost-effective option when viewed within the broader market context. Importantly, our pricing is discounted from our standard rates. Furthermore, our long-standing partnership with Offchain Labs has provided us with unique insights into their tech stack, positioning us as the optimal choice for reviewing proposals and offering insightful recommendations. This proposal is not simply about "hiring one engineer for X months"; it is about gaining access to a team of industry leading engineers with unique expertise, knowledge, and experience.
Upskilling the community is at the core of our mission. The cost of our proposal reflects not just the work to be done but also the creation and distribution of tools and educational resources. These are designed to empower the community with knowledge and skills that foster innovation and self-reliance. By investing in these resources, we are reducing the need for future external assistance, ultimately saving costs for the community in the long term. Over the years, we have demonstrated the impact of our long term community projects, like with our open-source tools Slither or Echidna, that have been widely adopted and praised for their initial and continuing impact on the industry.
We believe our proposal represents a strategic investment into not just the immediate project needs but also the broader ecosystem. By choosing the coalition, you are not only funding a project but also investing in a partnership dedicated to delivering long-term value and continuous improvement to the DAO.
We recognize the importance and value of having dedicated teams to provide ongoing support in research, coordination, design, and risk assessment! However, we would prefer to receive separate proposals for each team to justify their respective costs and allow for independent voting decisions, similar to the process used for STIP voting.
We acknowledge the teams' proven track record in the space and their significant contributions to Arbitrum DAO. We are confident that these teams will continue to receive the necessary support while simultaneously addressing community concerns about systemic risk.
I like the idea of a coalition as it can accelerate the DAO over the next 12 months and help stir delegates in the right direction by providing valuable feedback and analysis. However, I have concerns regarding the centralization of vendors, pricing, and the need for clear Coalition KPIs goals. Concerning centralization, multiple vendors should be considered for each vertical.
For example, Chaos Labs is a leader in the risk space as well and already works with many Arbitrum protocols and applications. Similarly, I do believe we can find another research firm that could provide hourly costs and share the workload together with BWR. This is a big financial commitment for the DAO and can be impactful. A more thorough diligence process will result in better service packaging at a more competitive price point for the Arbitrum community. With multiple vendors competing, we will get more diverse feedback and more than one perspective / opinions on specific deliverables. I've reached out to Chaos Labs to provide hourly costs on contributing to Coalition efforts. Last thing our ecosystem needs is to become laughingstock on CT by the way we handle vendors procurement.
No, just no.
First, can the organizations involved demonstrate their time is worth $650-$1500/ hour? Those are the requested amounts. That seems exorbitant … as in “more than I pay for Harvard lawyers” exorbitant, literally.
No, just no.
First, can the organizations involved demonstrate their time is worth $650-$1500/ hour? Those are the requested amounts. That seems exorbitant … as in “more than I pay for Harvard lawyers” exorbitant, literally.
Second, if the advocate is supposed to be an independent voice for the DAO, the advocate should be elected separately. There’s not even a veneer of independence if the advocate is proposed in the same breath as the council, never mind being actually nominated by the candidates for the council.
The fact the council candidates thought this was a good idea is disqualifying in my opinion. I’m voting no and urge others to do the same.
I like the idea of a coalition as it can accelerate the DAO over the next 12 months and help stir delegates in the right direction by providing valuable feedback and analysis. However, I have concerns regarding the centralization of vendors, pricing, and the need for clear Coalition KPIs goals. Concerning centralization, multiple vendors should be considered for each vertical.
For example, Chaos Labs is a leader in the risk space as well and already works with many Arbitrum protocols and applications. Similarly, I do believe we can find another research firm that could provide hourly costs and share the workload together with BWR. This is a big financial commitment for the DAO and can be impactful. A more thorough diligence process will result in better service packaging at a more competitive price point for the Arbitrum community. With multiple vendors competing, we will get more diverse feedback and more than one perspective / opinions on specific deliverables. I've reached out to Chaos Labs to provide hourly costs on contributing to Coalition efforts. Last thing our ecosystem needs is to become laughingstock on CT by the way we handle vendors procurement.
In terms of length of commitment I believe we shouldn't commit to anything longer than 6 months. I understand this proposal was a direct reaction to overwhelming workload that delegates were put through during STIP 1 however I believe in the next 6 months a lot of processes that are being put in place will diminish the need for coalition services over time.
Coaltion Proposal CT reference links: https://x.com/bytes032/status/1721504964055347213?s=20 https://x.com/DeFi_Made_Here/status/1721499800711860452?s=20 https://x.com/PermaGGG/status/1721791626966634505?s=20 https://x.com/cryptofishx/status/1721516774909259933?s=20
Regarding the concentration of voting power among the parties (and Trail of Bits: Unknown), I realized that we haven't made it explicit, but Trail of Bits will not hold ARB tokens and therefore will not participate to any on-chain voting.
It's refreshing to see OpenBlock Labs willing to contribute at a reduced rate for the benefit of the community and get at firesale discount Coallition proposal at very cheap floor offer.
Hi everyone, it’s Paul from OpenBlock Labs. Thank you to the teams behind this thoughtful proposal. It is great to see talented contributors harness their expertise to assist the Arbitrum DAO in realizing its vision.
At OpenBlock Labs, we are currently engaged in providing grant efficacy analysis for the Arbitrum STIP, utilizing a team of analysts and quantitative researchers to delve into topics that are related to those in this proposal. We will be developing a robust data intelligence layer across 30 Arbitrum projects, which we expect will serve as an essential baseline for future growth initiatives.
I like the idea of a coalition as it can accelerate the DAO over the next 12 months and help stir delegates in the right direction by providing valuable feedback and analysis. However, I have concerns regarding the centralization of vendors, pricing, and the need for clear Coalition KPIs goals. Concerning centralization, multiple vendors should be considered for each vertical.
For example, Chaos Labs is a leader in the risk space as well and already works with many Arbitrum protocols and applications. Similarly, I do believe we can find another research firm that could provide hourly costs and share the workload together with BWR. This is a big financial commitment for the DAO and can be impactful. A more thorough diligence process will result in better service packaging at a more competitive price point for the Arbitrum community. With multiple vendors competing, we will get more diverse feedback and more than one perspective / opinions on specific deliverables. I've reached out to Chaos Labs to provide hourly costs on contributing to Coalition efforts. Last thing our ecosystem needs is to become laughingstock on CT by the way we handle vendors procurement.
In terms of length of commitment I believe we shouldn't commit to anything longer than 6 months. I understand this proposal was a direct reaction to overwhelming workload that delegates were put through during STIP 1 however I believe in the next 6 months a lot of processes that are being put in place will diminish the need for coalition services over time.
Coaltion Proposal CT reference links: https://x.com/bytes032/status/1721504964055347213?s=20 https://x.com/DeFi_Made_Here/status/1721499800711860452?s=20 https://x.com/PermaGGG/status/1721791626966634505?s=20 https://x.com/cryptofishx/status/1721516774909259933?s=20
Regarding the concentration of voting power among the parties (and Trail of Bits: Unknown), I realized that we haven't made it explicit, but Trail of Bits will not hold ARB tokens and therefore will not participate to any on-chain voting.
It's refreshing to see OpenBlock Labs willing to contribute at a reduced rate for the benefit of the community and get at firesale discount Coallition proposal at very cheap floor offer.
Hi everyone, it’s Paul from OpenBlock Labs. Thank you to the teams behind this thoughtful proposal. It is great to see talented contributors harness their expertise to assist the Arbitrum DAO in realizing its vision.
At OpenBlock Labs, we are currently engaged in providing grant efficacy analysis for the Arbitrum STIP, utilizing a team of analysts and quantitative researchers to delve into topics that are related to those in this proposal. We will be developing a robust data intelligence layer across 30 Arbitrum projects, which we expect will serve as an essential baseline for future growth initiatives.
Hi everyone, it’s Paul from OpenBlock Labs. Thank you to the teams behind this thoughtful proposal. It is great to see talented contributors harness their expertise to assist the Arbitrum DAO in realizing its vision.
At OpenBlock Labs, we are currently engaged in providing grant efficacy analysis for the Arbitrum STIP, utilizing a team of analysts and quantitative researchers to delve into topics that are related to those in this proposal. We will be developing a robust data intelligence layer across 30 Arbitrum projects, which we expect will serve as an essential baseline for future growth initiatives.
It's worth noting that the compensation we agreed upon for our services is significantly lower than what is currently being proposed here. This discrepancy in cost can be attributed to the RFP process we participated in, which encouraged providers like us to submit detailed proposals, outlining clear milestones, deliverables, and competitive pricing. It would be inconsistent for an organization to purchase services at a specific rate for one initiative, and pay several times more for similar work in another initiative.
With the intention of progressing this forward, OpenBlock Labs would like to participate and contribute analysts and quantitative researchers for the sake of additional accountability at a significantly reduced rate. We trust that the coalition remains open to evaluating new working groups, particularly when it presents a more cost-effective option for the DAO. We also encourage other providers to submit proposals that improve the fairness and sustainability of this endeavor.
I'm glad I'm not the only person who sees what this is attempting.
This is a great proposal from all the team. Really appreciate the breakdown of projects the coalition will cover and inclusion of a DAO advocate.
I hear some of the concerns around pricing in the comments, but generally believe high quality work can be hard to define and requires top talent. With that mindset and the provided project scopes, the budgets seem reasonable.
I love the clarity and thoughtfulness put into this proposal. Collaboration is key with a mission this huge.
Thanks @cliffton.eth for directing me here and for suggesting I introduce myself. I'm Iggy, the founder of Squad, a curated community for crypto-native engineers. Our members (ex-Ethereum Foundation, Polygon, Starknet, Coinbase, WorldCoin, etc.) have deep experience in the space and team-up together to do cool projects. We'd be happy to support in any way possible, for example with additional engineer hours for proposal reviews and/or dev work.
I am a huge fan of this proposal.
To be frank, there's a lot of big brain shit that happens on Arbitrum that takes a lot of effort from delegates to understand. The coalition can lend a much needed helping hand in that department.
It is my view that the teams that the make up the coalition are some of the highest quality teams in the space with diverse expertise and deep subject matter expertise.
I am a huge fan of this proposal.
To be frank, there's a lot of big brain shit that happens on Arbitrum that takes a lot of effort from delegates to understand. The coalition can lend a much needed helping hand in that department.
It is my view that the teams that the make up the coalition are some of the highest quality teams in the space with diverse expertise and deep subject matter expertise.
Having such a coalition is a massive win for the Arbitrum DAO and ecosystem.
Arbi Ants in control.
Great innitiative! During the process of STIP, we definitely witnessed the room to improve regarding supports to delegates, well-informed dashboards/statistic etc. The coalition is right to the point of solving the current problems.
Hi everyone, it’s Paul from OpenBlock Labs. Thank you to the teams behind this thoughtful proposal. It is great to see talented contributors harness their expertise to assist the Arbitrum DAO in realizing its vision.
At OpenBlock Labs, we are currently engaged in providing grant efficacy analysis for the Arbitrum STIP, utilizing a team of analysts and quantitative researchers to delve into topics that are related to those in this proposal. We will be developing a robust data intelligence layer across 30 Arbitrum projects, which we expect will serve as an essential baseline for future growth initiatives.
It's worth noting that the compensation we agreed upon for our services is significantly lower than what is currently being proposed here. This discrepancy in cost can be attributed to the RFP process we participated in, which encouraged providers like us to submit detailed proposals, outlining clear milestones, deliverables, and competitive pricing. It would be inconsistent for an organization to purchase services at a specific rate for one initiative, and pay several times more for similar work in another initiative.
With the intention of progressing this forward, OpenBlock Labs would like to participate and contribute analysts and quantitative researchers for the sake of additional accountability at a significantly reduced rate. We trust that the coalition remains open to evaluating new working groups, particularly when it presents a more cost-effective option for the DAO. We also encourage other providers to submit proposals that improve the fairness and sustainability of this endeavor.
I'm glad I'm not the only person who sees what this is attempting.
This is a great proposal from all the team. Really appreciate the breakdown of projects the coalition will cover and inclusion of a DAO advocate.
I hear some of the concerns around pricing in the comments, but generally believe high quality work can be hard to define and requires top talent. With that mindset and the provided project scopes, the budgets seem reasonable.
I love the clarity and thoughtfulness put into this proposal. Collaboration is key with a mission this huge.
Thanks @cliffton.eth for directing me here and for suggesting I introduce myself. I'm Iggy, the founder of Squad, a curated community for crypto-native engineers. Our members (ex-Ethereum Foundation, Polygon, Starknet, Coinbase, WorldCoin, etc.) have deep experience in the space and team-up together to do cool projects. We'd be happy to support in any way possible, for example with additional engineer hours for proposal reviews and/or dev work.
I am a huge fan of this proposal.
To be frank, there's a lot of big brain shit that happens on Arbitrum that takes a lot of effort from delegates to understand. The coalition can lend a much needed helping hand in that department.
It is my view that the teams that the make up the coalition are some of the highest quality teams in the space with diverse expertise and deep subject matter expertise.
I am a huge fan of this proposal.
To be frank, there's a lot of big brain shit that happens on Arbitrum that takes a lot of effort from delegates to understand. The coalition can lend a much needed helping hand in that department.
It is my view that the teams that the make up the coalition are some of the highest quality teams in the space with diverse expertise and deep subject matter expertise.
Having such a coalition is a massive win for the Arbitrum DAO and ecosystem.
Arbi Ants in control.
Great innitiative! During the process of STIP, we definitely witnessed the room to improve regarding supports to delegates, well-informed dashboards/statistic etc. The coalition is right to the point of solving the current problems.
Thanks for the detailed proposal. The biggest concern here is how we can anti sybil attack. Based on the previous experiences, majority of the participants are not real users, but robots, which has very low retention rate. I believe the arbitrum ecosystem and all protocols are expecting real users to onboard instead of just robots. If some anti sybil attack strategies can de executed, will be great.
The DAO Advocate plays a significant role in directing the Coalition's efforts. How will the DAO ensure that the Advocate acts in the best interest of the entire DAO, remains unbiased, and doesn't give undue favor to specific Coalition members?
will there be transparency around the actual number of analyst hours spent as part of this commitment? I think the payment stream should be coupled to this number rather than quoting almost $800k if your own baseline assumption is that one FTE will be working on this
great proposal. what does "13 analyst weeks per quarter" mean? does this basically translate into one FTE working on this at full capacity?
Thanks for the detailed proposal. The biggest concern here is how we can anti sybil attack. Based on the previous experiences, majority of the participants are not real users, but robots, which has very low retention rate. I believe the arbitrum ecosystem and all protocols are expecting real users to onboard instead of just robots. If some anti sybil attack strategies can de executed, will be great.
The DAO Advocate plays a significant role in directing the Coalition's efforts. How will the DAO ensure that the Advocate acts in the best interest of the entire DAO, remains unbiased, and doesn't give undue favor to specific Coalition members?
will there be transparency around the actual number of analyst hours spent as part of this commitment? I think the payment stream should be coupled to this number rather than quoting almost $800k if your own baseline assumption is that one FTE will be working on this
great proposal. what does "13 analyst weeks per quarter" mean? does this basically translate into one FTE working on this at full capacity?
Hi all,
We’ve been notified that some delegates are concerned that this proposal, The Arbitrum Coalition, may interfere with the activities of the Arbitrum Foundation.
I want to highlight that, in my perspective, the Arbitrum DAO has two key roles:
Hi all,
We’ve been notified that some delegates are concerned that this proposal, The Arbitrum Coalition, may interfere with the activities of the Arbitrum Foundation.
I want to highlight that, in my perspective, the Arbitrum DAO has two key roles:
In the pursuit of the above goals, it will be necessary for the Arbitrum DAO to engage service providers, whose expertise can be leveraged to fully achieve a desirable outcome for both roles.
One can argue that a key measure of the Arbitrum DAO’s success is its ability to enable horizontal scaling of capable organizations who can execute initiatives on its behalf. To achieve this, it is crucial for the Arbitrum DAO to establish robust frameworks, streamlined processes, and effective committees that seamlessly facilitate the onboarding experience for service providers or even new startups that emerge from the Arbitrum DAO.
With the above in mind, the Arbitrum Foundation has always taken the stance to complement the efforts of the Arbitrum DAO. We are here to assist when requested by authors of the proposal, and we will work with authors to understand the exact nature of assistance. We view the level of support that we can offer as a balancing act - where we aim to empower (and not direct) community members with the utmost goal of allowing them to run initiatives in an independent and effective manner.
The motivation is twofold:
With regards to proposals like The Arbitrum Coalition.
The Arbitrum Foundation has engaged and entered contractual relationships with service providers to help further develop the Arbitrum ecosystem - but we don't see ourselves as a sole provider for procuring and onboarding new service providers. We want to encourage the Arbitrum DAO to put processes in place to enable service providers to join our ecosystem with a focus on supporting and enabling the execution of proposals by community members. It may be the case that authors request our assistance as the Arbitrum DAO is still young, but long term, we hope to see an Arbitrum DAO that requires minimal support from the Arbitrum Foundation (as we focus on our mission statements).
Like always, we do not endorse any pending proposal including The Arbitrum Coalition. We are just adding to the discussion to help assure all delegates that initiatives like this proposal do not interfere with our activities, we are always willing to help when needed, and hope to see processes/frameworks eventually emerge that make it seamless to onboard new service providers who can assist the Arbitrum DAO with proposals from the community.
After discussing with a few community members, I have changed my mind on this proposal and support it. This is under the new idea that sparked from conversation that this should in fact encourage more SP competition by letting other SPs also put up their own proposals for overlapping services to compete on price/quality.
I see this as blend of what @DisruptionJoe proposed with RFP - Abitrum Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP) Data Monitoring and Reporting (compete on a SP) and the new idea that multiple SPs should be chosen to encourage open competition.
Brian here from RabbitHole.
While these service providers are great individually, I believe this proposal could be improved.
One of the lessons the crypto community has learned from the experiences of DAOs like Aave and Nouns is that when we lock in service providers for too long, we might inadvertently curb the spirit of accountability and hinder the innovation that's vital for long term growth.
Brian here from RabbitHole.
While these service providers are great individually, I believe this proposal could be improved.
One of the lessons the crypto community has learned from the experiences of DAOs like Aave and Nouns is that when we lock in service providers for too long, we might inadvertently curb the spirit of accountability and hinder the innovation that's vital for long term growth.
In my view, there are alternative approaches this proposal can take:
Encourage service providers to make their own individual proposals to propose their specialized services aimed at concrete objectives. This laser focus will make it simpler to weigh the advantages and financial implications for the DAO, and discourages mega proposals like this.
Let's identify service provider roles we need (quantitative analysis, research, auditing) and hold elections for these roles. By holding periodic elections for these roles, we can ensure that there's a continual infusion of fresh ideas and a competitive drive that keeps service providers motivated to drive the best results for the DAO.
Both strategies align with Arbitrum's ethos of promoting relentless improvement and move towards decentralization, which I believe will lead to longer-term sustainability for the DAO.
For the current proposal to Activate ARB staking, if deemed important enough by the advocate, The Coalition would have stepped up to provide comprehensive research on the potential impacts of token inflation, how much of a supply sink ARB staking could potentially be, how this would be implemented, whether it could carry over to potential future profit distribution channels, and more.
Hi all,
We’ve been notified that some delegates are concerned that this proposal, The Arbitrum Coalition, may interfere with the activities of the Arbitrum Foundation.
I want to highlight that, in my perspective, the Arbitrum DAO has two key roles:
Hi all,
We’ve been notified that some delegates are concerned that this proposal, The Arbitrum Coalition, may interfere with the activities of the Arbitrum Foundation.
I want to highlight that, in my perspective, the Arbitrum DAO has two key roles:
In the pursuit of the above goals, it will be necessary for the Arbitrum DAO to engage service providers, whose expertise can be leveraged to fully achieve a desirable outcome for both roles.
One can argue that a key measure of the Arbitrum DAO’s success is its ability to enable horizontal scaling of capable organizations who can execute initiatives on its behalf. To achieve this, it is crucial for the Arbitrum DAO to establish robust frameworks, streamlined processes, and effective committees that seamlessly facilitate the onboarding experience for service providers or even new startups that emerge from the Arbitrum DAO.
With the above in mind, the Arbitrum Foundation has always taken the stance to complement the efforts of the Arbitrum DAO. We are here to assist when requested by authors of the proposal, and we will work with authors to understand the exact nature of assistance. We view the level of support that we can offer as a balancing act - where we aim to empower (and not direct) community members with the utmost goal of allowing them to run initiatives in an independent and effective manner.
The motivation is twofold:
With regards to proposals like The Arbitrum Coalition.
The Arbitrum Foundation has engaged and entered contractual relationships with service providers to help further develop the Arbitrum ecosystem - but we don't see ourselves as a sole provider for procuring and onboarding new service providers. We want to encourage the Arbitrum DAO to put processes in place to enable service providers to join our ecosystem with a focus on supporting and enabling the execution of proposals by community members. It may be the case that authors request our assistance as the Arbitrum DAO is still young, but long term, we hope to see an Arbitrum DAO that requires minimal support from the Arbitrum Foundation (as we focus on our mission statements).
Like always, we do not endorse any pending proposal including The Arbitrum Coalition. We are just adding to the discussion to help assure all delegates that initiatives like this proposal do not interfere with our activities, we are always willing to help when needed, and hope to see processes/frameworks eventually emerge that make it seamless to onboard new service providers who can assist the Arbitrum DAO with proposals from the community.
After discussing with a few community members, I have changed my mind on this proposal and support it. This is under the new idea that sparked from conversation that this should in fact encourage more SP competition by letting other SPs also put up their own proposals for overlapping services to compete on price/quality.
I see this as blend of what @DisruptionJoe proposed with RFP - Abitrum Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP) Data Monitoring and Reporting (compete on a SP) and the new idea that multiple SPs should be chosen to encourage open competition.
Brian here from RabbitHole.
While these service providers are great individually, I believe this proposal could be improved.
One of the lessons the crypto community has learned from the experiences of DAOs like Aave and Nouns is that when we lock in service providers for too long, we might inadvertently curb the spirit of accountability and hinder the innovation that's vital for long term growth.
Brian here from RabbitHole.
While these service providers are great individually, I believe this proposal could be improved.
One of the lessons the crypto community has learned from the experiences of DAOs like Aave and Nouns is that when we lock in service providers for too long, we might inadvertently curb the spirit of accountability and hinder the innovation that's vital for long term growth.
In my view, there are alternative approaches this proposal can take:
Encourage service providers to make their own individual proposals to propose their specialized services aimed at concrete objectives. This laser focus will make it simpler to weigh the advantages and financial implications for the DAO, and discourages mega proposals like this.
Let's identify service provider roles we need (quantitative analysis, research, auditing) and hold elections for these roles. By holding periodic elections for these roles, we can ensure that there's a continual infusion of fresh ideas and a competitive drive that keeps service providers motivated to drive the best results for the DAO.
Both strategies align with Arbitrum's ethos of promoting relentless improvement and move towards decentralization, which I believe will lead to longer-term sustainability for the DAO.
For the current proposal to Activate ARB staking, if deemed important enough by the advocate, The Coalition would have stepped up to provide comprehensive research on the potential impacts of token inflation, how much of a supply sink ARB staking could potentially be, how this would be implemented, whether it could carry over to potential future profit distribution channels, and more.
For the current proposal to Activate ARB staking, if deemed important enough by the advocate, The Coalition would have stepped up to provide comprehensive research on the potential impacts of token inflation, how much of a supply sink ARB staking could potentially be, how this would be implemented, whether it could carry over to potential future profit distribution channels, and more.
Have you considered creating an isolated proposal for "comprehensive research" and outlining the expenses and key performance indicators (KPIs) involved for each needed work, instead of allocating a large budget for the entire year without a clear indication of demand enough for such services? In my opinion, this approach would be more efficient and enhance the competitive landscape among service providers.
Blockworks Research: Will provide objective data-driven research surrounding proposals to help delegates understand the context, competitive environments, and make more informed decisions. These reports may also be used as a tool for those writing proposals to improve their work. Additionally, Blockworks Research will function as the project manager handling logistics such as communication with the DAO and speaking with delegates. BWR is also able to input on mechanism design.
Blockworks Research: Will provide objective data-driven research surrounding proposals to help delegates understand the context, competitive environments, and make more informed decisions. These reports may also be used as a tool for those writing proposals to improve their work. Additionally, Blockworks Research will function as the project manager handling logistics such as communication with the DAO and speaking with delegates. BWR is also able to input on mechanism design.
It is difficult for me to distinguish the contributions of these entities. It would be helpful to have a more detailed description of the range and scope of all research types, which could help to identify the overlap between the two parties.
Blockworks Research understands the gravity of the responsibility we are taking on, but also knows there is uncertainty around the time commitments associated with this work. In our proposal to the DAO, we specifically proposed a not-to-exceed price to eliminate the possibility of overspend on the DAO, with Blockworks Research taking on the risk of having to dedicate any additional resources in order to fulfill our mandate without receiving additional compensation. We believe this is a fair trade-off for both parties and shows Blockworks Research’s commitment to Arbitrum’s success
For the current proposal to Activate ARB staking, if deemed important enough by the advocate, The Coalition would have stepped up to provide comprehensive research on the potential impacts of token inflation, how much of a supply sink ARB staking could potentially be, how this would be implemented, whether it could carry over to potential future profit distribution channels, and more.
Have you considered creating an isolated proposal for "comprehensive research" and outlining the expenses and key performance indicators (KPIs) involved for each needed work, instead of allocating a large budget for the entire year without a clear indication of demand enough for such services? In my opinion, this approach would be more efficient and enhance the competitive landscape among service providers.
Blockworks Research: Will provide objective data-driven research surrounding proposals to help delegates understand the context, competitive environments, and make more informed decisions. These reports may also be used as a tool for those writing proposals to improve their work. Additionally, Blockworks Research will function as the project manager handling logistics such as communication with the DAO and speaking with delegates. BWR is also able to input on mechanism design.
Blockworks Research: Will provide objective data-driven research surrounding proposals to help delegates understand the context, competitive environments, and make more informed decisions. These reports may also be used as a tool for those writing proposals to improve their work. Additionally, Blockworks Research will function as the project manager handling logistics such as communication with the DAO and speaking with delegates. BWR is also able to input on mechanism design.
It is difficult for me to distinguish the contributions of these entities. It would be helpful to have a more detailed description of the range and scope of all research types, which could help to identify the overlap between the two parties.
Blockworks Research understands the gravity of the responsibility we are taking on, but also knows there is uncertainty around the time commitments associated with this work. In our proposal to the DAO, we specifically proposed a not-to-exceed price to eliminate the possibility of overspend on the DAO, with Blockworks Research taking on the risk of having to dedicate any additional resources in order to fulfill our mandate without receiving additional compensation. We believe this is a fair trade-off for both parties and shows Blockworks Research’s commitment to Arbitrum’s success
Blockworks Research understands the gravity of the responsibility we are taking on, but also knows there is uncertainty around the time commitments associated with this work. In our proposal to the DAO, we specifically proposed a not-to-exceed price to eliminate the possibility of overspend on the DAO, with Blockworks Research taking on the risk of having to dedicate any additional resources in order to fulfill our mandate without receiving additional compensation. We believe this is a fair trade-off for both parties and shows Blockworks Research’s commitment to Arbitrum’s success
Additionally, the DAO will have our entire team at its disposal which spans in expertise with a wide array of skills that include technical research in many crypto native niches, onchain analytics, and more. We expect the actual workload to achieve our projects and scope of work to be far higher, but have outlined a minimum amount of hours to cap a max spend by the DAO.
Blockworks Research understands the gravity of the responsibility we are taking on, but also knows there is uncertainty around the time commitments associated with this work. In our proposal to the DAO, we specifically proposed a not-to-exceed price to eliminate the possibility of overspend on the DAO, with Blockworks Research taking on the risk of having to dedicate any additional resources in order to fulfill our mandate without receiving additional compensation. We believe this is a fair trade-off for both parties and shows Blockworks Research’s commitment to Arbitrum’s success
Additionally, the DAO will have our entire team at its disposal which spans in expertise with a wide array of skills that include technical research in many crypto native niches, onchain analytics, and more. We expect the actual workload to achieve our projects and scope of work to be far higher, but have outlined a minimum amount of hours to cap a max spend by the DAO.
While we are disappointed to see L2BEAT step down from the role of The Advocate, we acknowledge that this decision aligns with the feedback we received from the DAO. Initially, we had a strong belief that L2BEAT was the ideal candidate for this role, and we still hold that view. However, it has become evident that many voices within the DAO community are calling for a more open and democratic process for selecting its Advocate.
In response to this feedback, we find it important to heed these suggestions. To facilitate a more inclusive selection process, we plan to implement the following steps if The Coalition proposal is approved through Snapshot:
While we are disappointed to see L2BEAT step down from the role of The Advocate, we acknowledge that this decision aligns with the feedback we received from the DAO. Initially, we had a strong belief that L2BEAT was the ideal candidate for this role, and we still hold that view. However, it has become evident that many voices within the DAO community are calling for a more open and democratic process for selecting its Advocate.
In response to this feedback, we find it important to heed these suggestions. To facilitate a more inclusive selection process, we plan to implement the following steps if The Coalition proposal is approved through Snapshot:
Creation of a dedicated forum post: We will create a forum post that provides information about the role of The Advocate and includes a nomination template. This will allow individuals or organizations interested in the role to nominate themselves.
Nomination period: There will be a one-week period during which nominations can be submitted. We encourage L2BEAT to participate in this process, along with other potential candidates.
Snapshot vote: Following the seven days of open nominations, we will conduct a seven day Snapshot vote. This vote will determine who will ultimately assume the position of The Advocate.
Once the Advocate has been elected through this democratic process, The Coalition will move forward with onchain voting. This approach aims to ensure that the DAO's voice is represented in the selection of The Advocate, fostering a more inclusive and community-driven decision-making process.
The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.
We believe the proposal accurately identifies the needs of an emerging DAO that requires driving third-party proposals and providing assistance to delegates to make informed decisions.
The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.
We believe the proposal accurately identifies the needs of an emerging DAO that requires driving third-party proposals and providing assistance to delegates to make informed decisions.
The post begins by stating that the Arbitrum forum includes many worthwhile suggestions, but often lacks the research, coordination, design, and risk assessment necessary to move forward in an optimal manner.
Now, the question is, should it be the DAO's responsibility to fund the research, coordination, or design of third-party proposals seeking Arbitrum funding? Shouldn't it be its own responsibility to submit optimal proposals for approval? Who has an interest in having these proposals approved?
One could argue that the DAO does have an interest in financially supporting teams to deploy on its network, as this will create incentives for users to join the network, generating positive network effects that ultimately benefit the DAO and the value of the ARB token.
So what is the best way to achieve this?
First step: Establish a clear process or framework for projects to present their proposals. Even though there currently exists a template, we think it’s still to simple and might benefit from having some more details. Therefore, the first step should be to agree on a template or framework for those projects submitting proposals. This should include, at least:
Why? We agree that there may be cases where projects or just good ideas, as the Arbitrum Coalition proposal states, may not have the capacity to conduct the research, coordination, design, and risk assessment to move forward optimally on their own. And we are fine with projects asking for it.
How to financially support projects? This can be achieved in various ways:
We talked about this role some time ago but the DAO did not have the maturity and activity that it has today. This role encompasses what has been proposed here for The Advocate and makes it much more comprehensive, being key in assisting any participant in the governance of Arbitrum.
The Arbitrum Coalition would act as a service provider. How can we ensure that this provider is neutral, does not favor particular projects, and does not conflict with the interests of the DAO?
One option is to bar this position to delegates or large ARB holders.
But this unfairly disadvantages the proponents, who have the reputation and track record to provide high-quality and efficient services to the DAO. Therefore, in line with what @dk3 said, we need to build trustless systems that don’t allow collusion or censorship. (we share the concerns described by him in his post)
What can be done? Utilize existing systems: Use the temperature check as a filter to decide which projects will receive the resources for the research, design, and risk assessment service provider to move forward optimally.
As it happens now, proposals that are approved via temperature checks are not necessarily complete or defined. Sometimes the approval comes from delegates supporting an idea or project, but with the condition that the proposal is strengthened.
This same system can be used for the DAO to express the intention that the project should receive assistance from the service provider. By this, before the on-chain vote delegates will have the necessary tools (research, risk assessment, etc.) to decide whether to approve that proposal or not.
Whom to hire as a service provider? As @pedrob argues in the Security Enhancement Fund proposal, the DAO could opt for approving a budget dedicated to subsidizing research and risk assessment, subsequently allowing each protocol to apply for the subsidy they deem necessary for deployment on Arbitrum. Complementing this, a list of recommended—or potentially mandatory—service providers could be voted on. This ensures that, when evaluating each application, the research and risk assessment are guaranteed to be conducted by a reputable and proficient service provider (such as Blockworks, Gauntlet, & Trail of Bits).
Lastly, as we mentioned before, offering financial compensation will incentivize delegates to conduct their research and make decisions with a stronger foundation.
DAOs like MakerDAO incentivize their delegates with substantial resources, and their responsibilities extend beyond merely voting and communicating their vote—they also carry out sensitive tasks such as auditing spells and other activities related to governance security.
The expected tasks for the delegates could be specified, and a work regulation outlined that the facilitator will verify before executing payments.
Which do we believe is the best approach?
In our view, a resilient and decentralized system should feature a combination of the three strategies. A facilitator is contracted to support in the initial stage, the possibility of requesting funds prior to the final approval of the proposal, and providing delegates with greater resources so they can study the proposals in depth and with quality time.
We would like to thank Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits for the detailed proposal and, most importantly, for bringing this discussion to the table. We agree that the DAO should allocate resources to ensure that the proposals are well-supported and assist delegates in making informed decisions. In this case, we don’t agree with the proposed mechanism.
In this regard, we will support future proposals that include a detailed framework for how various service providers can present themselves to offer their services, rather than a specific allocation proposal for a single provider. There should also be specific milestones outlining the objectives to be pursued and KPIs that allow for the measurement of the results achieved.
Also, we agree with L2BEAT that the current delegate situation is not long-term sustainable.
We believe that a proposal of this nature, which aims to alleviate the workload of delegates and support them in their decision-making processes, should aim for a multi-faceted system. Resources should be allocated to a mixed solution where not just one concentrated point is incentivized, thereby mitigating all the risks and concerns detailed in this forum thread. To this end, we think it prudent to revisit the discussion about hiring a facilitator, the incentives for delegates, and ultimately, the framework for the contracting of service providers.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
TL;DR: We are stepping down from the pre-appointed role of the Advocate, and we’ll be abstaining from the vote but we still support the overall idea as we’ve seen first hand that there’s an actual need for what it tries to accomplish in the ecosystem.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
TL;DR: We are stepping down from the pre-appointed role of the Advocate, and we’ll be abstaining from the vote but we still support the overall idea as we’ve seen first hand that there’s an actual need for what it tries to accomplish in the ecosystem.
First, we'd like to clarify that while our name is directly mentioned in the proposal as a pre-appointed DAO Advocate, we are not part of the coalition and did not co-author this proposal. However, we have been involved in consulting the proposal, providing our thoughts and feedback, and we support the spirit of the proposal.
As delegates, and especially with the amount of voting power we have, we feel an immense responsibility for the management of both the treasury as well as the protocol itself. Given that, we believed that having the ability to assess different proposals with feedback from people more knowledgeable in specific domains to be beneficial not just for us, but also for other delegates who face time, resources, or knowledge constraints on certain issues.
Currently delegates are willingly committing time and resources to process all the proposals that hit the forum, do the thorough research and analysis, engage in the discussions with proposers and provide constructive feedback, all as a voluntary work driven by an internal sense of responsibility for the protocol. It becomes more and more evident that this is not sustainable long-term.
The best example was STIP voting where we had to evaluate and vote for almost 100 proposals in just a week. If a single delegate spent just 30 minutes on each proposal (and just reading with understanding through most of them took more than 15 minutes) they would need a total of almost 50 hours during that week to just go through all the proposals. This does not allow for in-depth research, back and forth, or constructive feedback. And no delegate is a domain expert in each project category that we’ve seen in the STIP program, it would be great to be able to get some advice from others in the ecosystem that have more experience and knowledge in particular topics.
Of course STIP is an extreme example, but the example that illustrates that meaningful engagement in DAO management requires both time and resources. Many delegates were also actively engaged in the discussions preceding STIP, including workshops. We are already facing the issues of some ideas not even making it past the forum due to lack of interest and inability of the proposers to get the attention of the delegates, or the inability of the delegates to properly asses and evaluate the proposals.
There were several ideas being discussed on how to address this problem, including delegate compensation (so delegates can devote the necessary time for the engagement in DAO governance), a delegate budget so each delegate could pay for consultation/research services, and, of course, the idea of the coalition, where three well-known entities prepare a proposal to the DAO for providing their services on a recurring basis so they can assist delegates with forming an opinion on different proposals by presenting them with unbiased facts. We feel that all these ideas are worth exploring.
When we first heard about the idea of the coalition, we too were sceptical, and shared similar concerns with the ones raised by other delegates in the responses of the proposal, as well as during the call that was held on Monday last week. In particular, we recognise the risk that the coalition will effectively have additional powers, especially it will be able to filter which proposals are even considered for voting, as those that aren't covered may not receive the necessary attention from delegates. On the other hand, there is a risk that the coalition will waste man-hours on meaningless proposals, and that projects will abuse this mechanism to post proposals to the forum just to get coverage from the entities that make up the coalition.
In response to those concerns Matt from Blockworks suggested the idea of a DAO Advocate - someone that will be keeping the Coalition accountable and will ensure that the Coalition does not have censorship powers. In our view this role is kind of a "DAO proxy" (which we derive from "product owner proxy" role in product management) between the DAO and the Coalition, that facilitates the communication, oversees the smooth execution of services, prevents any of the two sides from getting clogged due to lack of decision-making, and ensures that resources don't go to waste for meaningless activities.
This mechanism is obviously not perfect, as it still places a lot of responsibility and power in the hands of a few entities. However, this risk is quite transparent and easy to challenge, as both the Coalition and the DAO Advocate are still responsible to the DAO, and the DAO has all the means to easily stop them (by cutting off funding) if they are not effectively helping the delegates or replace them. And if we assume that the DAO Advocate is honestly serving the DAO and representing the DAO's best interests, then this oversight is not just assumed, it is ingrained in this structure.
We were then asked to participate in the proposal as the pre-appointed advocate for the setup. Initially we had our reservations as we thought this role should rather be electable, but Matt presented reasonable argument that in order to make the coalition effective from day one it would be better to have this role filled by someone who feels the need for the coalition to exists and understands its’ goals.
Overall, we believe this initiative to be a net benefit for the DAO and something much needed. Furthermore we trust in the good intentions of the entities behind the coalition and we believe that this proposal would be a good experiment.
Perhaps the right approach should be determined and agreed upon by the whole DAO before voting on a specific proposal and introducing specific partners, and if that’s the right way to go, we’ll happily participate in ideating and structuring of such a proposal.
However, as our pre-appointment as DAO Advocate has been (understandably) controversial and our role not well understood, we have decided to step down from the pre-appointed Advocate position and we’ll suggest that this position be opened up for election. We believe that if the DAO Advocate were elected by the DAO, he or she would have a much stronger mandate to represent the DAO as a Coalition overseer. If this role is opened up for election, we don't rule out the possibility of running in those elections.
Even though we will no longer be directly involved in this proposal we have decided that we’ll be abstaining from voting to avoid any controversy or any potential conflicts of interests down the line.
Michigan Blockchain is voting FOR the proposal to Fund the Arbitrum Coalition on the Snapshot Temperature Check.
The proposal establishes a coalition of three respected entities to provide their services on a recurring basis for the benefit of the Arbitrum DAO. This will serve to assist the large, active body of delegates in making informed decisions by providing unbiased analysis on a diverse set of proposals.
Michigan Blockchain is voting FOR the proposal to Fund the Arbitrum Coalition on the Snapshot Temperature Check.
The proposal establishes a coalition of three respected entities to provide their services on a recurring basis for the benefit of the Arbitrum DAO. This will serve to assist the large, active body of delegates in making informed decisions by providing unbiased analysis on a diverse set of proposals.
The Arbitrum Coalition is a concept we believe will provide major benefits to the community and enable a more efficient DAO governance process. The members of the coalition have continued to communicate with delegates and address concerns regarding the proposal and its potential shortcomings. We feel the coalition is strongly aligned with the future of the Arbitrum ecosystem and funding the coalition for one year, with the DAO maintaining the ability to change the service providers and reevaluate future frameworks, enables for a transparent and effective trial of a new form of governance structure.
We believe the Coalition provides the Arbitrum DAO with leading service providers in the space and addresses many of the complexities and inefficiencies we have faced to this point as a DAO. We appreciate the teams for their effort and look forward to working with them to ensure that the Coalition delivers substantial benefits to the Arbitrum DAO and the ecosystem as a whole.
Firstly, thank you for your proposal and keen interest in the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Proposal Outline and Importance
Firstly, thank you for your proposal and keen interest in the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Proposal Outline and Importance
Team Effectiveness
Concerns
Recommendations
Final Judgment
We hope that our feedback is received as a constructive contribution, aiding the further enhancement and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
I will be voting against. I'll echo others, in that my against vote isn't a reflection of my opinion on the actual members of the coalition, but the proposal itself. The budget is a concern, but my my main issue is conflict of interest.
We are asking a group that has a large amount of voting power + security council influence to also have a major input in the proposal process across all projects. I think the only way a proposal like this would be palatable would be a stronger separation of these powers, or they are tied to more specific proposals (i.e., they run the STIP project, or get paid to review items already passed). I know Blockworks has indicated they do not have a goal of influencing or persuading the community, but I don't see how this can be reasonably done outside of trust.
I think there has not been enough of an answer to all of these (right) points laid down by @dk3.
To recap we have a council that:
After reviewing the Arbitrum Coalition's proposal and has decided to vote in favor of it, recognizing its ambition to enhance the DAO's capacity for research, development, and execution. The coalition's comprehensive skill set, spearheaded by reputable entities in the crypto space, is poised to bring substantial advancements to the DAO's operations.
However, we do so with an air of caution, as we have some reservations that need to be addressed. Specifically, the analysts' budget requires more transparency, and we need assurance that the wide scope of the coalition will not conflict with ongoing proposals, such as the one focused on security support. Furthermore, the potential for power capture within the coalition presents a risk that warrants a strategy to provide check and balance for the coalition.
Our experience and various DAO’s attempts at delegation migration have proven mostly inelastic to redelegation
Thanks for your reply!
I can’t think of another case where the most powerful delegates have applied to be a service provider, so we are all breaking new ground here :smiley:
Voting Against the Proposal
I have reservations regarding this proposal and may continue to provide additional feedback over time.
Voting Against the Proposal
I have reservations regarding this proposal and may continue to provide additional feedback over time.
There's no denying the reputation and commitment of the three service providers, and I genuinely hope they will continue to serve and support the DAO. TOB has been closely associated with Arbitrum for years as the primary auditor under Offchain Labs. Gauntlet has contributed significantly to the foundation, particularly in relation to the ongoing USDC migration. Additionally, Blockworks has been an active voice in governance, notably leading the effort to block AIP 1.
However, I have substantial concerns that, whether intentional or not, this proposal could result in a concerning concentration of power within the DAO, particularly with certain aspects of Blockworks' role in managing vendor onboarding. The way it is structured could result in significant conflicts of interest, and effective gatekeeping for other vendors to potentially replace or supplant any of the Coalition members as a principal provider for the DAO.
To be clear I think these were not maliciously done but the practical effect of an eagerness to contribute in many ways, the proposal might have unintentionally created these risks associated with centralization and gatekeeping. A more prudent approach would have targeted scopes to minimize this risk and instead have the DAO focus on the framework aspects of how the DAO onboards and manages vendors and not these coalition members themselves proposing to do that as well.
I hope that either the Coalition will consider revising the proposal or, preferably, that these vendors will actively engage in an open framework if one is proposed since the DAO seems clearly destined for a multi-vendor model.
Suggestions for Improvement:
Appreciate the effort that has gone into this proposal. Whether it succeeds or fails, I hope it can be viewed as a victory because it helped to highlight the DAO's acute focus on the importance of onboarding world-class service providers to support its ambitious vision.
With this urgency in mind, I hope to soon have a proposal up to have the DAO prefund a multisig so that if and when we have a committee, coalition, consortium, combine or caucus to support onboarding vendors we don't have to wait a long period to get them mobilized and funded.
While we are disappointed to see L2BEAT step down from the role of The Advocate, we acknowledge that this decision aligns with the feedback we received from the DAO. Initially, we had a strong belief that L2BEAT was the ideal candidate for this role, and we still hold that view. However, it has become evident that many voices within the DAO community are calling for a more open and democratic process for selecting its Advocate.
In response to this feedback, we find it important to heed these suggestions. To facilitate a more inclusive selection process, we plan to implement the following steps if The Coalition proposal is approved through Snapshot:
While we are disappointed to see L2BEAT step down from the role of The Advocate, we acknowledge that this decision aligns with the feedback we received from the DAO. Initially, we had a strong belief that L2BEAT was the ideal candidate for this role, and we still hold that view. However, it has become evident that many voices within the DAO community are calling for a more open and democratic process for selecting its Advocate.
In response to this feedback, we find it important to heed these suggestions. To facilitate a more inclusive selection process, we plan to implement the following steps if The Coalition proposal is approved through Snapshot:
Creation of a dedicated forum post: We will create a forum post that provides information about the role of The Advocate and includes a nomination template. This will allow individuals or organizations interested in the role to nominate themselves.
Nomination period: There will be a one-week period during which nominations can be submitted. We encourage L2BEAT to participate in this process, along with other potential candidates.
Snapshot vote: Following the seven days of open nominations, we will conduct a seven day Snapshot vote. This vote will determine who will ultimately assume the position of The Advocate.
Once the Advocate has been elected through this democratic process, The Coalition will move forward with onchain voting. This approach aims to ensure that the DAO's voice is represented in the selection of The Advocate, fostering a more inclusive and community-driven decision-making process.
The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.
We believe the proposal accurately identifies the needs of an emerging DAO that requires driving third-party proposals and providing assistance to delegates to make informed decisions.
The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.
We believe the proposal accurately identifies the needs of an emerging DAO that requires driving third-party proposals and providing assistance to delegates to make informed decisions.
The post begins by stating that the Arbitrum forum includes many worthwhile suggestions, but often lacks the research, coordination, design, and risk assessment necessary to move forward in an optimal manner.
Now, the question is, should it be the DAO's responsibility to fund the research, coordination, or design of third-party proposals seeking Arbitrum funding? Shouldn't it be its own responsibility to submit optimal proposals for approval? Who has an interest in having these proposals approved?
One could argue that the DAO does have an interest in financially supporting teams to deploy on its network, as this will create incentives for users to join the network, generating positive network effects that ultimately benefit the DAO and the value of the ARB token.
So what is the best way to achieve this?
First step: Establish a clear process or framework for projects to present their proposals. Even though there currently exists a template, we think it’s still to simple and might benefit from having some more details. Therefore, the first step should be to agree on a template or framework for those projects submitting proposals. This should include, at least:
Why? We agree that there may be cases where projects or just good ideas, as the Arbitrum Coalition proposal states, may not have the capacity to conduct the research, coordination, design, and risk assessment to move forward optimally on their own. And we are fine with projects asking for it.
How to financially support projects? This can be achieved in various ways:
We talked about this role some time ago but the DAO did not have the maturity and activity that it has today. This role encompasses what has been proposed here for The Advocate and makes it much more comprehensive, being key in assisting any participant in the governance of Arbitrum.
The Arbitrum Coalition would act as a service provider. How can we ensure that this provider is neutral, does not favor particular projects, and does not conflict with the interests of the DAO?
One option is to bar this position to delegates or large ARB holders.
But this unfairly disadvantages the proponents, who have the reputation and track record to provide high-quality and efficient services to the DAO. Therefore, in line with what @dk3 said, we need to build trustless systems that don’t allow collusion or censorship. (we share the concerns described by him in his post)
What can be done? Utilize existing systems: Use the temperature check as a filter to decide which projects will receive the resources for the research, design, and risk assessment service provider to move forward optimally.
As it happens now, proposals that are approved via temperature checks are not necessarily complete or defined. Sometimes the approval comes from delegates supporting an idea or project, but with the condition that the proposal is strengthened.
This same system can be used for the DAO to express the intention that the project should receive assistance from the service provider. By this, before the on-chain vote delegates will have the necessary tools (research, risk assessment, etc.) to decide whether to approve that proposal or not.
Whom to hire as a service provider? As @pedrob argues in the Security Enhancement Fund proposal, the DAO could opt for approving a budget dedicated to subsidizing research and risk assessment, subsequently allowing each protocol to apply for the subsidy they deem necessary for deployment on Arbitrum. Complementing this, a list of recommended—or potentially mandatory—service providers could be voted on. This ensures that, when evaluating each application, the research and risk assessment are guaranteed to be conducted by a reputable and proficient service provider (such as Blockworks, Gauntlet, & Trail of Bits).
Lastly, as we mentioned before, offering financial compensation will incentivize delegates to conduct their research and make decisions with a stronger foundation.
DAOs like MakerDAO incentivize their delegates with substantial resources, and their responsibilities extend beyond merely voting and communicating their vote—they also carry out sensitive tasks such as auditing spells and other activities related to governance security.
The expected tasks for the delegates could be specified, and a work regulation outlined that the facilitator will verify before executing payments.
Which do we believe is the best approach?
In our view, a resilient and decentralized system should feature a combination of the three strategies. A facilitator is contracted to support in the initial stage, the possibility of requesting funds prior to the final approval of the proposal, and providing delegates with greater resources so they can study the proposals in depth and with quality time.
We would like to thank Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits for the detailed proposal and, most importantly, for bringing this discussion to the table. We agree that the DAO should allocate resources to ensure that the proposals are well-supported and assist delegates in making informed decisions. In this case, we don’t agree with the proposed mechanism.
In this regard, we will support future proposals that include a detailed framework for how various service providers can present themselves to offer their services, rather than a specific allocation proposal for a single provider. There should also be specific milestones outlining the objectives to be pursued and KPIs that allow for the measurement of the results achieved.
Also, we agree with L2BEAT that the current delegate situation is not long-term sustainable.
We believe that a proposal of this nature, which aims to alleviate the workload of delegates and support them in their decision-making processes, should aim for a multi-faceted system. Resources should be allocated to a mixed solution where not just one concentrated point is incentivized, thereby mitigating all the risks and concerns detailed in this forum thread. To this end, we think it prudent to revisit the discussion about hiring a facilitator, the incentives for delegates, and ultimately, the framework for the contracting of service providers.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
TL;DR: We are stepping down from the pre-appointed role of the Advocate, and we’ll be abstaining from the vote but we still support the overall idea as we’ve seen first hand that there’s an actual need for what it tries to accomplish in the ecosystem.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
TL;DR: We are stepping down from the pre-appointed role of the Advocate, and we’ll be abstaining from the vote but we still support the overall idea as we’ve seen first hand that there’s an actual need for what it tries to accomplish in the ecosystem.
First, we'd like to clarify that while our name is directly mentioned in the proposal as a pre-appointed DAO Advocate, we are not part of the coalition and did not co-author this proposal. However, we have been involved in consulting the proposal, providing our thoughts and feedback, and we support the spirit of the proposal.
As delegates, and especially with the amount of voting power we have, we feel an immense responsibility for the management of both the treasury as well as the protocol itself. Given that, we believed that having the ability to assess different proposals with feedback from people more knowledgeable in specific domains to be beneficial not just for us, but also for other delegates who face time, resources, or knowledge constraints on certain issues.
Currently delegates are willingly committing time and resources to process all the proposals that hit the forum, do the thorough research and analysis, engage in the discussions with proposers and provide constructive feedback, all as a voluntary work driven by an internal sense of responsibility for the protocol. It becomes more and more evident that this is not sustainable long-term.
The best example was STIP voting where we had to evaluate and vote for almost 100 proposals in just a week. If a single delegate spent just 30 minutes on each proposal (and just reading with understanding through most of them took more than 15 minutes) they would need a total of almost 50 hours during that week to just go through all the proposals. This does not allow for in-depth research, back and forth, or constructive feedback. And no delegate is a domain expert in each project category that we’ve seen in the STIP program, it would be great to be able to get some advice from others in the ecosystem that have more experience and knowledge in particular topics.
Of course STIP is an extreme example, but the example that illustrates that meaningful engagement in DAO management requires both time and resources. Many delegates were also actively engaged in the discussions preceding STIP, including workshops. We are already facing the issues of some ideas not even making it past the forum due to lack of interest and inability of the proposers to get the attention of the delegates, or the inability of the delegates to properly asses and evaluate the proposals.
There were several ideas being discussed on how to address this problem, including delegate compensation (so delegates can devote the necessary time for the engagement in DAO governance), a delegate budget so each delegate could pay for consultation/research services, and, of course, the idea of the coalition, where three well-known entities prepare a proposal to the DAO for providing their services on a recurring basis so they can assist delegates with forming an opinion on different proposals by presenting them with unbiased facts. We feel that all these ideas are worth exploring.
When we first heard about the idea of the coalition, we too were sceptical, and shared similar concerns with the ones raised by other delegates in the responses of the proposal, as well as during the call that was held on Monday last week. In particular, we recognise the risk that the coalition will effectively have additional powers, especially it will be able to filter which proposals are even considered for voting, as those that aren't covered may not receive the necessary attention from delegates. On the other hand, there is a risk that the coalition will waste man-hours on meaningless proposals, and that projects will abuse this mechanism to post proposals to the forum just to get coverage from the entities that make up the coalition.
In response to those concerns Matt from Blockworks suggested the idea of a DAO Advocate - someone that will be keeping the Coalition accountable and will ensure that the Coalition does not have censorship powers. In our view this role is kind of a "DAO proxy" (which we derive from "product owner proxy" role in product management) between the DAO and the Coalition, that facilitates the communication, oversees the smooth execution of services, prevents any of the two sides from getting clogged due to lack of decision-making, and ensures that resources don't go to waste for meaningless activities.
This mechanism is obviously not perfect, as it still places a lot of responsibility and power in the hands of a few entities. However, this risk is quite transparent and easy to challenge, as both the Coalition and the DAO Advocate are still responsible to the DAO, and the DAO has all the means to easily stop them (by cutting off funding) if they are not effectively helping the delegates or replace them. And if we assume that the DAO Advocate is honestly serving the DAO and representing the DAO's best interests, then this oversight is not just assumed, it is ingrained in this structure.
We were then asked to participate in the proposal as the pre-appointed advocate for the setup. Initially we had our reservations as we thought this role should rather be electable, but Matt presented reasonable argument that in order to make the coalition effective from day one it would be better to have this role filled by someone who feels the need for the coalition to exists and understands its’ goals.
Overall, we believe this initiative to be a net benefit for the DAO and something much needed. Furthermore we trust in the good intentions of the entities behind the coalition and we believe that this proposal would be a good experiment.
Perhaps the right approach should be determined and agreed upon by the whole DAO before voting on a specific proposal and introducing specific partners, and if that’s the right way to go, we’ll happily participate in ideating and structuring of such a proposal.
However, as our pre-appointment as DAO Advocate has been (understandably) controversial and our role not well understood, we have decided to step down from the pre-appointed Advocate position and we’ll suggest that this position be opened up for election. We believe that if the DAO Advocate were elected by the DAO, he or she would have a much stronger mandate to represent the DAO as a Coalition overseer. If this role is opened up for election, we don't rule out the possibility of running in those elections.
Even though we will no longer be directly involved in this proposal we have decided that we’ll be abstaining from voting to avoid any controversy or any potential conflicts of interests down the line.
Michigan Blockchain is voting FOR the proposal to Fund the Arbitrum Coalition on the Snapshot Temperature Check.
The proposal establishes a coalition of three respected entities to provide their services on a recurring basis for the benefit of the Arbitrum DAO. This will serve to assist the large, active body of delegates in making informed decisions by providing unbiased analysis on a diverse set of proposals.
Michigan Blockchain is voting FOR the proposal to Fund the Arbitrum Coalition on the Snapshot Temperature Check.
The proposal establishes a coalition of three respected entities to provide their services on a recurring basis for the benefit of the Arbitrum DAO. This will serve to assist the large, active body of delegates in making informed decisions by providing unbiased analysis on a diverse set of proposals.
The Arbitrum Coalition is a concept we believe will provide major benefits to the community and enable a more efficient DAO governance process. The members of the coalition have continued to communicate with delegates and address concerns regarding the proposal and its potential shortcomings. We feel the coalition is strongly aligned with the future of the Arbitrum ecosystem and funding the coalition for one year, with the DAO maintaining the ability to change the service providers and reevaluate future frameworks, enables for a transparent and effective trial of a new form of governance structure.
We believe the Coalition provides the Arbitrum DAO with leading service providers in the space and addresses many of the complexities and inefficiencies we have faced to this point as a DAO. We appreciate the teams for their effort and look forward to working with them to ensure that the Coalition delivers substantial benefits to the Arbitrum DAO and the ecosystem as a whole.
Firstly, thank you for your proposal and keen interest in the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Proposal Outline and Importance
Firstly, thank you for your proposal and keen interest in the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Proposal Outline and Importance
Team Effectiveness
Concerns
Recommendations
Final Judgment
We hope that our feedback is received as a constructive contribution, aiding the further enhancement and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
I will be voting against. I'll echo others, in that my against vote isn't a reflection of my opinion on the actual members of the coalition, but the proposal itself. The budget is a concern, but my my main issue is conflict of interest.
We are asking a group that has a large amount of voting power + security council influence to also have a major input in the proposal process across all projects. I think the only way a proposal like this would be palatable would be a stronger separation of these powers, or they are tied to more specific proposals (i.e., they run the STIP project, or get paid to review items already passed). I know Blockworks has indicated they do not have a goal of influencing or persuading the community, but I don't see how this can be reasonably done outside of trust.
I think there has not been enough of an answer to all of these (right) points laid down by @dk3.
To recap we have a council that:
After reviewing the Arbitrum Coalition's proposal and has decided to vote in favor of it, recognizing its ambition to enhance the DAO's capacity for research, development, and execution. The coalition's comprehensive skill set, spearheaded by reputable entities in the crypto space, is poised to bring substantial advancements to the DAO's operations.
However, we do so with an air of caution, as we have some reservations that need to be addressed. Specifically, the analysts' budget requires more transparency, and we need assurance that the wide scope of the coalition will not conflict with ongoing proposals, such as the one focused on security support. Furthermore, the potential for power capture within the coalition presents a risk that warrants a strategy to provide check and balance for the coalition.
Our experience and various DAO’s attempts at delegation migration have proven mostly inelastic to redelegation
Thanks for your reply!
I can’t think of another case where the most powerful delegates have applied to be a service provider, so we are all breaking new ground here :smiley:
Voting Against the Proposal
I have reservations regarding this proposal and may continue to provide additional feedback over time.
Voting Against the Proposal
I have reservations regarding this proposal and may continue to provide additional feedback over time.
There's no denying the reputation and commitment of the three service providers, and I genuinely hope they will continue to serve and support the DAO. TOB has been closely associated with Arbitrum for years as the primary auditor under Offchain Labs. Gauntlet has contributed significantly to the foundation, particularly in relation to the ongoing USDC migration. Additionally, Blockworks has been an active voice in governance, notably leading the effort to block AIP 1.
However, I have substantial concerns that, whether intentional or not, this proposal could result in a concerning concentration of power within the DAO, particularly with certain aspects of Blockworks' role in managing vendor onboarding. The way it is structured could result in significant conflicts of interest, and effective gatekeeping for other vendors to potentially replace or supplant any of the Coalition members as a principal provider for the DAO.
To be clear I think these were not maliciously done but the practical effect of an eagerness to contribute in many ways, the proposal might have unintentionally created these risks associated with centralization and gatekeeping. A more prudent approach would have targeted scopes to minimize this risk and instead have the DAO focus on the framework aspects of how the DAO onboards and manages vendors and not these coalition members themselves proposing to do that as well.
I hope that either the Coalition will consider revising the proposal or, preferably, that these vendors will actively engage in an open framework if one is proposed since the DAO seems clearly destined for a multi-vendor model.
Suggestions for Improvement:
Appreciate the effort that has gone into this proposal. Whether it succeeds or fails, I hope it can be viewed as a victory because it helped to highlight the DAO's acute focus on the importance of onboarding world-class service providers to support its ambitious vision.
With this urgency in mind, I hope to soon have a proposal up to have the DAO prefund a multisig so that if and when we have a committee, coalition, consortium, combine or caucus to support onboarding vendors we don't have to wait a long period to get them mobilized and funded.
I will be voting against. I'll echo others, in that my against vote isn't a reflection of my opinion on the actual members of the coalition, but the proposal itself. The budget is a concern, but my my main issue is conflict of interest.
We are asking a group that has a large amount of voting power + security council influence to also have a major input in the proposal process across all projects. I think the only way a proposal like this would be palatable would be a stronger separation of these powers, or they are tied to more specific proposals (i.e., they run the STIP project, or get paid to review items already passed). I know Blockworks has indicated they do not have a goal of influencing or persuading the community, but I don't see how this can be reasonably done outside of trust.
I'll add, I'm not opposed to the general idea of having some type of committee that handles these items.
I think there has not been enough of an answer to all of these (right) points laid down by @dk3.
To recap we have a council that:
I don't know specifically where the line should be drawn about the mix of voting power + critical roles + advocacy roles, but for sure is in my opinion way beyond what we have right here. And I think we should do a further step to specify, in the constitution, that certain roles comes with the caveat of not having as a delegate more than X% voting power and the inability to take other roles that could create a conflict of interest.
I want also to specify the following: I don't have any specific reserve about the people involved in this coalition. Matter of the fact, I feel like most of them are well suited for the role. But, as a DAO, we need to ensure that even just potential situation of conflicts of interests don't arise. Because today we have "good guys". Tomorrow we might not be this lucky.
After reviewing the Arbitrum Coalition's proposal and has decided to vote in favor of it, recognizing its ambition to enhance the DAO's capacity for research, development, and execution. The coalition's comprehensive skill set, spearheaded by reputable entities in the crypto space, is poised to bring substantial advancements to the DAO's operations.
However, we do so with an air of caution, as we have some reservations that need to be addressed. Specifically, the analysts' budget requires more transparency, and we need assurance that the wide scope of the coalition will not conflict with ongoing proposals, such as the one focused on security support. Furthermore, the potential for power capture within the coalition presents a risk that warrants a strategy to provide check and balance for the coalition.
By casting our vote in support, we affirm our positive outlook for the coalition's potential while emphasizing the necessity for these outstanding concerns to be addressed. We believe that with these adjustments, the Arbitrum Coalition will be in an even stronger position to support the DAO's vision and contribute to a decentralized and thriving future.
Our experience and various DAO’s attempts at delegation migration have proven mostly inelastic to redelegation
Thats an interesting point, really great to draw upon your experience in governance across chains! Delegation is mostly sticky but with the upcoming ARB unlocks in March, I do see a nonzero amount finding its way to active delegates.
Regarding a delegate race to the bottom, we are curious if you have an example(s) of this occurring.
I can't think of another case where the most powerful delegates have applied to be a service provider, so we are all breaking new ground here :smiley:
My larger concern is with the vortex of power / flywheel that is being created through this proposal.
Revenue earned as service provider --> Hiring Staff --> Greater capacity to undertake delegate duties --> More ARB delegated
Gauntlet can not pay employees in ARB or any other token including stablecoins.
I understand it may not be a direct payment, but Gauntlet can offset payments to their employees with the revenue being earned via this proposal.
A neutral and transparent process is a priority before locking in million-dollar commitments
Overall i echo camelot's point of creating an RFP before issuing million dollar contracts, to create a level playing field & ascertain needs assessment before getting into a financial comittments.
Thanks for your reply!
I can’t think of another case where the most powerful delegates have applied to be a service provider, so we are all breaking new ground here :smiley:
Yeah service providers are still few and far between. Unfortunately many are pivoting away from DAO work given the difficulty of managing fluid counterparties and stakeholders.
Revenue earned as service provider → Hiring Staff → Greater capacity to undertake delegate duties → More ARB delegated
I understand it may not be a direct payment, but Gauntlet can offset payments to their employees with the revenue being earned via this proposal.
Speaking for Gauntlet, proposing this scope of work was more of a battle internally (Finance, Ops) than the objections we have received in public discourse. The market is turning and we are busier than ever. Our team believes Arbitrum is a strategically important ecosystem that can lift and spearhead all of DeFi, rollups, and crypto into another growth cycle.
We would first like to emphasise that we appreciate the individual coalition members' involvement and contributions to the DeFi ecosystem so far.
However, we believe that this proposal presents major flaws that are not aligned with the DAO:
We would first like to emphasise that we appreciate the individual coalition members' involvement and contributions to the DeFi ecosystem so far.
However, we believe that this proposal presents major flaws that are not aligned with the DAO:
Following the work and collective DAO action that has taken place for STIP, we strongly believe that a security framework is necessary in order to align the best interest of Arbitrum with the various SPs. A neutral and transparent process is a priority before locking in million-dollar commitments, and we hope that SPs will use this as an opportunity to show their general alignment with Arbitrum.
We will be voting against.
Speaking for Gauntlet, if we didn't feel that we as a delegate could benefit from deploying more resources, then how could we expect other delegates to benefit?
Regarding a delegate race to the bottom, we are curious if you have an example(s) of this occurring. We have not seen this in the numerous DAOs we operate. Our experience and various DAO's attempts at delegation migration have proven mostly inelastic to redelegation.
Speaking for Gauntlet, if we didn't feel that we as a delegate could benefit from deploying more resources, then how could we expect other delegates to benefit?
Regarding a delegate race to the bottom, we are curious if you have an example(s) of this occurring. We have not seen this in the numerous DAOs we operate. Our experience and various DAO's attempts at delegation migration have proven mostly inelastic to redelegation.
to prevent Blockworks, Gauntlet and L2Beat getting a lead on the other delegates by having their staff paid out of this budget.
Can you say more? We aren't sure we understand. Gauntlet can not pay employees in ARB or any other token including stablecoins.
err maybe these are some stupid questions at this point but... here it goes: what is the motivation for making this a coalition? why didn’t these service providers just applied by themselves, each one in their own niche and expertise? is it easier to pass a proposal to fund all of them as a group by combining all their reputational power at once? have they ever worked all together before? can we trust their ability to coordinate effectively themselves?
I would rather see a group propose a budget for a very specified context (like STIP) and then as a council they would make the decisions in that context, and hold the groups accountable to execute on their promises.
I would rather see a group propose a budget for a very specified context (like STIP) and then as a council they would make the decisions in that context, and hold the groups accountable to execute on their promises.
I largely echo griffs sentiment on this one, the coalition have strong voting power & many delegators.
I see the tasks in this proposal as also helping them be better delegates. I fear this will set off a race to the bottom where every large delegate on arbitrum tries to get paid for their work, which will also get them more delegators through efforts compensated in this grant
I'd suggest keeping $5-10 million as an incentive program open to those that have more than X amount delegated to them along the lines of stip, to prevent Blockworks, Gauntlet and L2Beat getting a lead on the other delegates by having their staff paid out of this budget.
Just wanted to chime in on this important discussion as well on behalf of the UADP, @AbdullahUmar and I. We voted in support of the coalition, and our reasoning is below!
We'll continue to be keeping track of this proposal for the days to come.
Most importantly, the systemic risk that passing proposals like this could have, can’t be overstated. We should avoid hiring service providers with such a wide scope IMO. They will gain undue influence over the DAO, which is against the sprit of DAOs in general.
Most importantly, the systemic risk that passing proposals like this could have, can’t be overstated. We should avoid hiring service providers with such a wide scope IMO. They will gain undue influence over the DAO, which is against the sprit of DAOs in general.
Your wide-scope intuition is similar to ours when we first entered servicing DAOs. We stated service level agreements (SLAs) for a tight scope (risk parameters only) that targeted KPIs (risk-adjusted yield for depositors, capital efficiency for borrowers, mitigate depositor losses) with a variable fee tied to that success. What we found, not only Aave or Compound, is that priorities change quickly.
Our experience has been that every engagement has top priorities at the beginning that are changed, deprioritized, or scrapped. For just a couple of recent public examples, we didn't scope Synchronicity Price Adapter “Killswitch” Functionality for LST Emode and LST Oracle risk and Chainlink Synchronicity Price Adapter 2.0 for Aave. Our work with the Uniswap Foundation, is consistently thrashed by Uniswap DAO and Labs priorities. We now capacity plan for Senior/Staff data scientist/ML/Sim engineers to be available to JIT requests. We've scoped our engagement here to do the same.
One of the lessons the crypto community has learned from the experiences of DAOs like Aave and Nouns is that when we lock in service providers for too long, we might inadvertently curb the spirit of accountability and hinder the innovation that’s vital for long term growth.
One of the lessons the crypto community has learned from the experiences of DAOs like Aave and Nouns is that when we lock in service providers for too long, we might inadvertently curb the spirit of accountability and hinder the innovation that’s vital for long term growth.
As the first Aave DAO service provider, we have seen the roles expand (treasury, dev), add redundancy (risk mgmt.), and churn. Vendor lock-in is a real and often stated consideration in that forum.
As the oldest DAO service provider of the initial service providers, we are putting our track record and good will on the line. We fully intend to police ToB and BWR (and them us) and facilitate rapid expansion or churn of service providers whenever required.
Additionally, all members of The Coalition are companies with long-standing reputations in crypto and have trust in the industry.
Mostly aspects of the proposal we have already pointed out but to reiterate:
The Coalition does not intend to influence or persuade community members to vote in any direction. Our goal is purely to provide objective tools and reports to help delegates and community members make more informed decisions more efficiently. As an example, for Arbitrum STIP, we would have created a decision matrix within a pre-built spreadsheet distributed to all delegates, so that delegates themselves could rank and evaluate different STIP proposals within a digestible matrix and arrive at their own conclusion. Once again, we will not be forcing/persuading delegates to vote a certain way, and we will not be making decisions on behalf of the community when it comes to such votes. We will solely be providing tools so that community members may make more effective decisions individually and independently of The Coalition. We cannot overstate the fact that community members will retain independent voting power in all governance matters, and it is not the case that The Coalition will be the final decision maker in any future proposal on behalf of the community. To be thorough, here is another example. For the current proposal to Activate ARB staking, if deemed important enough by the advocate, The Coalition would have stepped up to provide comprehensive research on the potential impacts of token inflation, how much of a supply sink ARB staking could potentially be, how this would be implemented, whether it could carry over to potential future profit distribution channels, and more. From there, we would merely be providing this as objective information to all community members, so that they themselves may make a more informed decision when it comes to voting. Additionally, given the members of The Coalition may have differing opinions at times we will likely offer a diverse range of opinions and perspectives to the DAO.
Blockworks Research understands the gravity of the responsibility we are taking on, but also knows there is uncertainty around the time commitments associated with this work. In our proposal to the DAO, we specifically proposed a not-to-exceed price to eliminate the possibility of overspend on the DAO, with Blockworks Research taking on the risk of having to dedicate any additional resources in order to fulfill our mandate without receiving additional compensation. We believe this is a fair trade-off for both parties and shows Blockworks Research’s commitment to Arbitrum’s success. In addition, we believe that the benefits to the ecosystem in terms of better governance processes, more informed votes, and a better distribution of resources as a result of that, fully justifies the cost of The Coalition.
In the comment you said “Distributing this much money deserves a dedicated group of thoughtful decision makers, who’s top priority is distributing the funds.” and we absolutely agree! The stakes are high and opportunity cost of doing nothing is real. The goal of The Coalition is to bring together experience from outside and within the Arbitrum ecosystem to facilitate growth and decentralization. Its primary mandate is to reduce the bandwidth requirement of a delegate with tools and detailed research so that they can make more sophisticated decisions. Additionally, we will be able to aid in decision making that allows for more efficient proposal + execution processes. For example, we would have advocated (and created) a custom voting solution in place of 105 votes for the STIP process.
Please see the "specifications" and "projects" sections in order to better understand some examples of the work that Gauntlet and Blockworks Research will provide and how they differ. Gauntlet specializes in quantitative risk analysis while Blockworks Research focuses on competitive landscape analysis and has the ability to breakdown complex subjects for delegates. Additionally, the Coalition will work as a unified group, giving reason for the single proposal.
We believe L2BEAT is uniquely qualified for The Advocate role given
Hey @Englandzz_Curia, thanks for the support.
The Coalition does not intend to influence or persuade community members to vote in any direction. Our goal is purely to provide objective tools and reports to help delegates and community members make more informed decisions more efficiently. Additionally, given the members of The Coalition may have differing opinions at times we will likely offer a diverse range of opinions and perspectives to the DAO.
The expected cost to the DAO for a year term is $2M paid in ARB based on the 30D VWAP the day prior to onchain proposal.
The Advocate will write, at a minimum, quarterly report on Coalition activities. At any time the DAO will be able to remove any member of The Coalition or replace its Advocate. Blockworks Research will communicate the Coalition’s activities at a minimum of a biweekly cadence.
Toward the end of the 12-month trial period, The Coalition may look to propose a renewal of its services, taking into account crucial lessons we learn throughout the initial period and properly iterating to best suit the needs of the DAO for the following period.
Hey everyone,
By way of a minor introduction, my name is Joseph (legal advisor, Enforcer @dYdX Operations SubDAO & a member of the TraderJoe Governance Council).
Hey everyone,
By way of a minor introduction, my name is Joseph (legal advisor, Enforcer @dYdX Operations SubDAO & a member of the TraderJoe Governance Council).
After joining the Coalition call held yesterday, here are my thoughts on the proposal above (I posted a bit of a tl;dr on my X account @immutablelawyer). By way of a precursor, I am personally in favour of this proposal and the underlying difficulties it aims to achieve - difficulties which plague most (if not all), delegate-based governance frameworks.
The proposal should include a breakdown for costs for all service providers so as to offer insight in relation to how the costs applicable to SPs forming part of this Coalition were calculated (Blockworks Research has already provided theirs, expect other SPs to follow suit);
The proposal lacks enforceable accountability mechanisms & a legal structure underpinning the establishment of such accountability mechanisms. I would personally suggest (not legal advice - not your lawyer), looking into the Guernsey Non-Charitable Special Purpose Trust structure to achieve the issues delineated above. Given that the activities of the Coalition are non-financial in nature (research/information driven in nature), it would eliminate any sort of potential regulatory implications from a VASP perspective. In addition, it would also impose legal obligation on its members (referred to as Trustees), to act in good faith, with utmost diligence, and within the Purposes of the Trust (the Purposes could be structured to mimic the mission statement of the Coalition with the Advocate - being L2Beat, acting as an Enforcer and making sure that the Coalition's members act in accordance with those purposes). This also gives the Advocate (L2Beat, a legal right to actually stop funding should Coalition members act in breach of the Purposes, in a non-diligent manner, or in bad faith).
The proposal should ideally include criteria re. what forum post would be chosen for a report and what forum post would not. Having the advocate be the link re. choosing w/Community feedback is subjective in nature. In addition, should there be a high volume of proposals with the community being split on which proposal they think ought to get a report, this will cause issues as well. I find that setting expectations is always a beneficial exercise and thus, having a set of objective criteria in place re. how a forum post is put in the 'report-bucket' would be ideal (this will also be a benefit to SPs as they can plan ahead better which would naturally result in higher quality report for delegates);
The proposal should have also been structured via a tendering process, with the community being able to vote on the different SPs that would be entrusted with the subject-area that was needed to fill the Coalition's expertise-bucket. This would have been more democratic in nature and would have included the community in the choice re. which SP they think would have contributed optimally to the respective area. In addition, albeit the proposal stipulating a 1-year term, I would personally suggest having a Coalition election after 6 months so as to not only serve as a performance review of sorts and optimise where needed, but also give space to new SPs to make their case as to why they deserve to be part of the Coalition / what they potentially can do better. Healthy discourse and competition will naturally lead to a better quality output for the DAO - always.
In line with the above, the proposal should include adequate mechanisms for onboarding and offboarding SPs to the coalition. Here, again, the Trust structure would offer much needed clarity due to its ability to integrate snapshot votes in the removal/appointment of members and thus serve as a 'legal' integration with Arbitrum's current governance framework;
On a more positive note, the underlying goals the Coalition aims to achieve are net-positive. This is due to the fact that the Ecosystem needs to be well-informed prior to making decisions re. millions of $ worth of funds. During the STIP voting process, we did see quite a bit of mistakes made when voting (for ex. there was a delegate voting NO with the reason being that he was against bridges, but the project was not a bridge to begin with). Hence, the expertise is needed;
In addition, the concept of having this 'service' offered to delegates who might have the voting power, but might not have the time to go through every proposal and give it the time it deserves, will hopefully lead to higher quality participation & voting.
All in all, I am in favour of the idea being circulated here. However, I do hope that a lot of much-needed detail is added re. accountability, COIs (having an actual enforceable policy), oversight, & setting expectations for the community re. reports, deadlines, and workstreams.
I look forward to seeing you guys iterate and optimise the proposal - great work & brilliant idea!
Kind regards, Joseph I Axis Advisory
I will be voting against. I'll echo others, in that my against vote isn't a reflection of my opinion on the actual members of the coalition, but the proposal itself. The budget is a concern, but my my main issue is conflict of interest.
We are asking a group that has a large amount of voting power + security council influence to also have a major input in the proposal process across all projects. I think the only way a proposal like this would be palatable would be a stronger separation of these powers, or they are tied to more specific proposals (i.e., they run the STIP project, or get paid to review items already passed). I know Blockworks has indicated they do not have a goal of influencing or persuading the community, but I don't see how this can be reasonably done outside of trust.
I'll add, I'm not opposed to the general idea of having some type of committee that handles these items.
I think there has not been enough of an answer to all of these (right) points laid down by @dk3.
To recap we have a council that:
I don't know specifically where the line should be drawn about the mix of voting power + critical roles + advocacy roles, but for sure is in my opinion way beyond what we have right here. And I think we should do a further step to specify, in the constitution, that certain roles comes with the caveat of not having as a delegate more than X% voting power and the inability to take other roles that could create a conflict of interest.
I want also to specify the following: I don't have any specific reserve about the people involved in this coalition. Matter of the fact, I feel like most of them are well suited for the role. But, as a DAO, we need to ensure that even just potential situation of conflicts of interests don't arise. Because today we have "good guys". Tomorrow we might not be this lucky.
After reviewing the Arbitrum Coalition's proposal and has decided to vote in favor of it, recognizing its ambition to enhance the DAO's capacity for research, development, and execution. The coalition's comprehensive skill set, spearheaded by reputable entities in the crypto space, is poised to bring substantial advancements to the DAO's operations.
However, we do so with an air of caution, as we have some reservations that need to be addressed. Specifically, the analysts' budget requires more transparency, and we need assurance that the wide scope of the coalition will not conflict with ongoing proposals, such as the one focused on security support. Furthermore, the potential for power capture within the coalition presents a risk that warrants a strategy to provide check and balance for the coalition.
By casting our vote in support, we affirm our positive outlook for the coalition's potential while emphasizing the necessity for these outstanding concerns to be addressed. We believe that with these adjustments, the Arbitrum Coalition will be in an even stronger position to support the DAO's vision and contribute to a decentralized and thriving future.
Our experience and various DAO’s attempts at delegation migration have proven mostly inelastic to redelegation
Thats an interesting point, really great to draw upon your experience in governance across chains! Delegation is mostly sticky but with the upcoming ARB unlocks in March, I do see a nonzero amount finding its way to active delegates.
Regarding a delegate race to the bottom, we are curious if you have an example(s) of this occurring.
I can't think of another case where the most powerful delegates have applied to be a service provider, so we are all breaking new ground here :smiley:
My larger concern is with the vortex of power / flywheel that is being created through this proposal.
Revenue earned as service provider --> Hiring Staff --> Greater capacity to undertake delegate duties --> More ARB delegated
Gauntlet can not pay employees in ARB or any other token including stablecoins.
I understand it may not be a direct payment, but Gauntlet can offset payments to their employees with the revenue being earned via this proposal.
A neutral and transparent process is a priority before locking in million-dollar commitments
Overall i echo camelot's point of creating an RFP before issuing million dollar contracts, to create a level playing field & ascertain needs assessment before getting into a financial comittments.
Thanks for your reply!
I can’t think of another case where the most powerful delegates have applied to be a service provider, so we are all breaking new ground here :smiley:
Yeah service providers are still few and far between. Unfortunately many are pivoting away from DAO work given the difficulty of managing fluid counterparties and stakeholders.
Revenue earned as service provider → Hiring Staff → Greater capacity to undertake delegate duties → More ARB delegated
I understand it may not be a direct payment, but Gauntlet can offset payments to their employees with the revenue being earned via this proposal.
Speaking for Gauntlet, proposing this scope of work was more of a battle internally (Finance, Ops) than the objections we have received in public discourse. The market is turning and we are busier than ever. Our team believes Arbitrum is a strategically important ecosystem that can lift and spearhead all of DeFi, rollups, and crypto into another growth cycle.
We would first like to emphasise that we appreciate the individual coalition members' involvement and contributions to the DeFi ecosystem so far.
However, we believe that this proposal presents major flaws that are not aligned with the DAO:
We would first like to emphasise that we appreciate the individual coalition members' involvement and contributions to the DeFi ecosystem so far.
However, we believe that this proposal presents major flaws that are not aligned with the DAO:
Following the work and collective DAO action that has taken place for STIP, we strongly believe that a security framework is necessary in order to align the best interest of Arbitrum with the various SPs. A neutral and transparent process is a priority before locking in million-dollar commitments, and we hope that SPs will use this as an opportunity to show their general alignment with Arbitrum.
We will be voting against.
Speaking for Gauntlet, if we didn't feel that we as a delegate could benefit from deploying more resources, then how could we expect other delegates to benefit?
Regarding a delegate race to the bottom, we are curious if you have an example(s) of this occurring. We have not seen this in the numerous DAOs we operate. Our experience and various DAO's attempts at delegation migration have proven mostly inelastic to redelegation.
Speaking for Gauntlet, if we didn't feel that we as a delegate could benefit from deploying more resources, then how could we expect other delegates to benefit?
Regarding a delegate race to the bottom, we are curious if you have an example(s) of this occurring. We have not seen this in the numerous DAOs we operate. Our experience and various DAO's attempts at delegation migration have proven mostly inelastic to redelegation.
to prevent Blockworks, Gauntlet and L2Beat getting a lead on the other delegates by having their staff paid out of this budget.
Can you say more? We aren't sure we understand. Gauntlet can not pay employees in ARB or any other token including stablecoins.
err maybe these are some stupid questions at this point but... here it goes: what is the motivation for making this a coalition? why didn’t these service providers just applied by themselves, each one in their own niche and expertise? is it easier to pass a proposal to fund all of them as a group by combining all their reputational power at once? have they ever worked all together before? can we trust their ability to coordinate effectively themselves?
I would rather see a group propose a budget for a very specified context (like STIP) and then as a council they would make the decisions in that context, and hold the groups accountable to execute on their promises.
I would rather see a group propose a budget for a very specified context (like STIP) and then as a council they would make the decisions in that context, and hold the groups accountable to execute on their promises.
I largely echo griffs sentiment on this one, the coalition have strong voting power & many delegators.
I see the tasks in this proposal as also helping them be better delegates. I fear this will set off a race to the bottom where every large delegate on arbitrum tries to get paid for their work, which will also get them more delegators through efforts compensated in this grant
I'd suggest keeping $5-10 million as an incentive program open to those that have more than X amount delegated to them along the lines of stip, to prevent Blockworks, Gauntlet and L2Beat getting a lead on the other delegates by having their staff paid out of this budget.
Just wanted to chime in on this important discussion as well on behalf of the UADP, @AbdullahUmar and I. We voted in support of the coalition, and our reasoning is below!
We'll continue to be keeping track of this proposal for the days to come.
Most importantly, the systemic risk that passing proposals like this could have, can’t be overstated. We should avoid hiring service providers with such a wide scope IMO. They will gain undue influence over the DAO, which is against the sprit of DAOs in general.
Most importantly, the systemic risk that passing proposals like this could have, can’t be overstated. We should avoid hiring service providers with such a wide scope IMO. They will gain undue influence over the DAO, which is against the sprit of DAOs in general.
Your wide-scope intuition is similar to ours when we first entered servicing DAOs. We stated service level agreements (SLAs) for a tight scope (risk parameters only) that targeted KPIs (risk-adjusted yield for depositors, capital efficiency for borrowers, mitigate depositor losses) with a variable fee tied to that success. What we found, not only Aave or Compound, is that priorities change quickly.
Our experience has been that every engagement has top priorities at the beginning that are changed, deprioritized, or scrapped. For just a couple of recent public examples, we didn't scope Synchronicity Price Adapter “Killswitch” Functionality for LST Emode and LST Oracle risk and Chainlink Synchronicity Price Adapter 2.0 for Aave. Our work with the Uniswap Foundation, is consistently thrashed by Uniswap DAO and Labs priorities. We now capacity plan for Senior/Staff data scientist/ML/Sim engineers to be available to JIT requests. We've scoped our engagement here to do the same.
One of the lessons the crypto community has learned from the experiences of DAOs like Aave and Nouns is that when we lock in service providers for too long, we might inadvertently curb the spirit of accountability and hinder the innovation that’s vital for long term growth.
One of the lessons the crypto community has learned from the experiences of DAOs like Aave and Nouns is that when we lock in service providers for too long, we might inadvertently curb the spirit of accountability and hinder the innovation that’s vital for long term growth.
As the first Aave DAO service provider, we have seen the roles expand (treasury, dev), add redundancy (risk mgmt.), and churn. Vendor lock-in is a real and often stated consideration in that forum.
As the oldest DAO service provider of the initial service providers, we are putting our track record and good will on the line. We fully intend to police ToB and BWR (and them us) and facilitate rapid expansion or churn of service providers whenever required.
Additionally, all members of The Coalition are companies with long-standing reputations in crypto and have trust in the industry.
Mostly aspects of the proposal we have already pointed out but to reiterate:
The Coalition does not intend to influence or persuade community members to vote in any direction. Our goal is purely to provide objective tools and reports to help delegates and community members make more informed decisions more efficiently. As an example, for Arbitrum STIP, we would have created a decision matrix within a pre-built spreadsheet distributed to all delegates, so that delegates themselves could rank and evaluate different STIP proposals within a digestible matrix and arrive at their own conclusion. Once again, we will not be forcing/persuading delegates to vote a certain way, and we will not be making decisions on behalf of the community when it comes to such votes. We will solely be providing tools so that community members may make more effective decisions individually and independently of The Coalition. We cannot overstate the fact that community members will retain independent voting power in all governance matters, and it is not the case that The Coalition will be the final decision maker in any future proposal on behalf of the community. To be thorough, here is another example. For the current proposal to Activate ARB staking, if deemed important enough by the advocate, The Coalition would have stepped up to provide comprehensive research on the potential impacts of token inflation, how much of a supply sink ARB staking could potentially be, how this would be implemented, whether it could carry over to potential future profit distribution channels, and more. From there, we would merely be providing this as objective information to all community members, so that they themselves may make a more informed decision when it comes to voting. Additionally, given the members of The Coalition may have differing opinions at times we will likely offer a diverse range of opinions and perspectives to the DAO.
Blockworks Research understands the gravity of the responsibility we are taking on, but also knows there is uncertainty around the time commitments associated with this work. In our proposal to the DAO, we specifically proposed a not-to-exceed price to eliminate the possibility of overspend on the DAO, with Blockworks Research taking on the risk of having to dedicate any additional resources in order to fulfill our mandate without receiving additional compensation. We believe this is a fair trade-off for both parties and shows Blockworks Research’s commitment to Arbitrum’s success. In addition, we believe that the benefits to the ecosystem in terms of better governance processes, more informed votes, and a better distribution of resources as a result of that, fully justifies the cost of The Coalition.
In the comment you said “Distributing this much money deserves a dedicated group of thoughtful decision makers, who’s top priority is distributing the funds.” and we absolutely agree! The stakes are high and opportunity cost of doing nothing is real. The goal of The Coalition is to bring together experience from outside and within the Arbitrum ecosystem to facilitate growth and decentralization. Its primary mandate is to reduce the bandwidth requirement of a delegate with tools and detailed research so that they can make more sophisticated decisions. Additionally, we will be able to aid in decision making that allows for more efficient proposal + execution processes. For example, we would have advocated (and created) a custom voting solution in place of 105 votes for the STIP process.
Please see the "specifications" and "projects" sections in order to better understand some examples of the work that Gauntlet and Blockworks Research will provide and how they differ. Gauntlet specializes in quantitative risk analysis while Blockworks Research focuses on competitive landscape analysis and has the ability to breakdown complex subjects for delegates. Additionally, the Coalition will work as a unified group, giving reason for the single proposal.
We believe L2BEAT is uniquely qualified for The Advocate role given
Hey @Englandzz_Curia, thanks for the support.
The Coalition does not intend to influence or persuade community members to vote in any direction. Our goal is purely to provide objective tools and reports to help delegates and community members make more informed decisions more efficiently. Additionally, given the members of The Coalition may have differing opinions at times we will likely offer a diverse range of opinions and perspectives to the DAO.
The expected cost to the DAO for a year term is $2M paid in ARB based on the 30D VWAP the day prior to onchain proposal.
The Advocate will write, at a minimum, quarterly report on Coalition activities. At any time the DAO will be able to remove any member of The Coalition or replace its Advocate. Blockworks Research will communicate the Coalition’s activities at a minimum of a biweekly cadence.
Toward the end of the 12-month trial period, The Coalition may look to propose a renewal of its services, taking into account crucial lessons we learn throughout the initial period and properly iterating to best suit the needs of the DAO for the following period.
Hey everyone,
By way of a minor introduction, my name is Joseph (legal advisor, Enforcer @dYdX Operations SubDAO & a member of the TraderJoe Governance Council).
Hey everyone,
By way of a minor introduction, my name is Joseph (legal advisor, Enforcer @dYdX Operations SubDAO & a member of the TraderJoe Governance Council).
After joining the Coalition call held yesterday, here are my thoughts on the proposal above (I posted a bit of a tl;dr on my X account @immutablelawyer). By way of a precursor, I am personally in favour of this proposal and the underlying difficulties it aims to achieve - difficulties which plague most (if not all), delegate-based governance frameworks.
The proposal should include a breakdown for costs for all service providers so as to offer insight in relation to how the costs applicable to SPs forming part of this Coalition were calculated (Blockworks Research has already provided theirs, expect other SPs to follow suit);
The proposal lacks enforceable accountability mechanisms & a legal structure underpinning the establishment of such accountability mechanisms. I would personally suggest (not legal advice - not your lawyer), looking into the Guernsey Non-Charitable Special Purpose Trust structure to achieve the issues delineated above. Given that the activities of the Coalition are non-financial in nature (research/information driven in nature), it would eliminate any sort of potential regulatory implications from a VASP perspective. In addition, it would also impose legal obligation on its members (referred to as Trustees), to act in good faith, with utmost diligence, and within the Purposes of the Trust (the Purposes could be structured to mimic the mission statement of the Coalition with the Advocate - being L2Beat, acting as an Enforcer and making sure that the Coalition's members act in accordance with those purposes). This also gives the Advocate (L2Beat, a legal right to actually stop funding should Coalition members act in breach of the Purposes, in a non-diligent manner, or in bad faith).
The proposal should ideally include criteria re. what forum post would be chosen for a report and what forum post would not. Having the advocate be the link re. choosing w/Community feedback is subjective in nature. In addition, should there be a high volume of proposals with the community being split on which proposal they think ought to get a report, this will cause issues as well. I find that setting expectations is always a beneficial exercise and thus, having a set of objective criteria in place re. how a forum post is put in the 'report-bucket' would be ideal (this will also be a benefit to SPs as they can plan ahead better which would naturally result in higher quality report for delegates);
The proposal should have also been structured via a tendering process, with the community being able to vote on the different SPs that would be entrusted with the subject-area that was needed to fill the Coalition's expertise-bucket. This would have been more democratic in nature and would have included the community in the choice re. which SP they think would have contributed optimally to the respective area. In addition, albeit the proposal stipulating a 1-year term, I would personally suggest having a Coalition election after 6 months so as to not only serve as a performance review of sorts and optimise where needed, but also give space to new SPs to make their case as to why they deserve to be part of the Coalition / what they potentially can do better. Healthy discourse and competition will naturally lead to a better quality output for the DAO - always.
In line with the above, the proposal should include adequate mechanisms for onboarding and offboarding SPs to the coalition. Here, again, the Trust structure would offer much needed clarity due to its ability to integrate snapshot votes in the removal/appointment of members and thus serve as a 'legal' integration with Arbitrum's current governance framework;
On a more positive note, the underlying goals the Coalition aims to achieve are net-positive. This is due to the fact that the Ecosystem needs to be well-informed prior to making decisions re. millions of $ worth of funds. During the STIP voting process, we did see quite a bit of mistakes made when voting (for ex. there was a delegate voting NO with the reason being that he was against bridges, but the project was not a bridge to begin with). Hence, the expertise is needed;
In addition, the concept of having this 'service' offered to delegates who might have the voting power, but might not have the time to go through every proposal and give it the time it deserves, will hopefully lead to higher quality participation & voting.
All in all, I am in favour of the idea being circulated here. However, I do hope that a lot of much-needed detail is added re. accountability, COIs (having an actual enforceable policy), oversight, & setting expectations for the community re. reports, deadlines, and workstreams.
I look forward to seeing you guys iterate and optimise the proposal - great work & brilliant idea!
Kind regards, Joseph I Axis Advisory
Additionally, all members of The Coalition are companies with long-standing reputations in crypto and have trust in the industry.
I want to say I trust all the teams involved in this RFP, rockstar teams with more than enough reputation at risk. And I greatly appreciate the effort it takes to engage in these discussions on the forum, it's a lot of work, and you are doing a fantastic job.
However, I don't think this structure benefits Arbitrum, I would much rather see you partner with the groups proposing to offer them these services directly, and become integrated into their proposals as needed, as opposed to having a retainer.
Most importantly, the systemic risk that passing proposals like this could have, can't be overstated. We should avoid hiring service providers with such a wide scope IMO. They will gain undue influence over the DAO, which is against the sprit of DAOs in general.
Service providers should have a much more narrow scope IMO. For instance, if you said you wanted to take on a budget of 100 M and build a STIP follow-up or something similar, with a very clear budget, and timeline for execution, I'm sure it would pass. Narrow scope, clear limits, GREAT. Large scope, vague limits, BAD.
I hope this doesn't dissuade you from continuing to participate in ARB governance and the ARB ecosystem, instead I hope you can respond like Camelot did when their proposal was denied, which resulted in STIP.
Can't wait to see what you come up with, there is a lot of opportunity here.
Mostly aspects of the proposal we have already pointed out but to reiterate:
The Coalition does not intend to influence or persuade community members to vote in any direction. Our goal is purely to provide objective tools and reports to help delegates and community members make more informed decisions more efficiently. As an example, for Arbitrum STIP, we would have created a decision matrix within a pre-built spreadsheet distributed to all delegates, so that delegates themselves could rank and evaluate different STIP proposals within a digestible matrix and arrive at their own conclusion. Once again, we will not be forcing/persuading delegates to vote a certain way, and we will not be making decisions on behalf of the community when it comes to such votes. We will solely be providing tools so that community members may make more effective decisions individually and independently of The Coalition. We cannot overstate the fact that community members will retain independent voting power in all governance matters, and it is not the case that The Coalition will be the final decision maker in any future proposal on behalf of the community. To be thorough, here is another example. For the current proposal to Activate ARB staking, if deemed important enough by the advocate, The Coalition would have stepped up to provide comprehensive research on the potential impacts of token inflation, how much of a supply sink ARB staking could potentially be, how this would be implemented, whether it could carry over to potential future profit distribution channels, and more. From there, we would merely be providing this as objective information to all community members, so that they themselves may make a more informed decision when it comes to voting. Additionally, given the members of The Coalition may have differing opinions at times we will likely offer a diverse range of opinions and perspectives to the DAO.
Blockworks Research understands the gravity of the responsibility we are taking on, but also knows there is uncertainty around the time commitments associated with this work. In our proposal to the DAO, we specifically proposed a not-to-exceed price to eliminate the possibility of overspend on the DAO, with Blockworks Research taking on the risk of having to dedicate any additional resources in order to fulfill our mandate without receiving additional compensation. We believe this is a fair trade-off for both parties and shows Blockworks Research’s commitment to Arbitrum’s success. In addition, we believe that the benefits to the ecosystem in terms of better governance processes, more informed votes, and a better distribution of resources as a result of that, fully justifies the cost of The Coalition.
Additionally, all members of The Coalition are companies with long-standing reputations in crypto and have trust in the industry. Blockworks, for example, is a media company and thus maintaining trust is the main pillar to our business. While we are dedicated to servicing Arbitrum, we are not a new entity spun up purely to service the DAO. As a long-standing (6 years) crypto media company, we are no strangers to maintaining ethical operations a business. Since inception, we have held ourselves to high standards, as outlined in our Trust and Ethics page which we follow religiously, and we will continue to maintain ourselves to such standards through The Coalition.
In the comment you said “Distributing this much money deserves a dedicated group of thoughtful decision makers, who’s top priority is distributing the funds.” and we absolutely agree! The stakes are high and opportunity cost of doing nothing is real. The goal of The Coalition is to bring together experience from outside and within the Arbitrum ecosystem to facilitate growth and decentralization. Its primary mandate is to reduce the bandwidth requirement of a delegate with tools and detailed research so that they can make more sophisticated decisions. Additionally, we will be able to aid in decision making that allows for more efficient proposal + execution processes. For example, we would have advocated (and created) a custom voting solution in place of 105 votes for the STIP process.
Yep but this is not the way i would expect it to be executed.
I would rather see a group propose a budget for a very specified context (like STIP) and then as a council they would make the decisions in that context, and hold the groups accountable to execute on their promises.
This proposal is very different, we are basically paying your coalition to have an incredible amount of political power in every decision the DAO makes... This is very dangerous and is not a solution I like very much to the problem that I specified. It still expects the whole DAO to make decisions that are often too narrowly scoped, but now we have our trusted coalition to influence our decisions... scary.
The payment is VERY large, larger than what I find reasonable and the benefit to the orgs in this coalition is not just monetary. The political power that comes with this responsibility is immense, and wide reaching.
If Gauntlet was assessing the governance risk of this proposal, the main risk being social capture of the ARB governance by this coalition, how would this proposal fare? If this proposal continues I think there will be a strong need for transparency, conflict of interest disclosures and more oversight than what just L2beat can provide to avoid backroom dealings, descriminatory power plays, etc.
I was basically offered a bribe during STIP (obv i didn't take it) but I could only imagine the offers this coalition would get given the power they would wield.
I think I will have a hard time thinking this structure can be set up in a benevolent manner as its proposed.
It could be possible if instead of getting so much liquid capital, the reward was mostly ARB vested for 5 years or more, and it could be revokable if very clear rules were violated. Then maybe incentives could be aligned.
We believe L2BEAT is uniquely qualified for The Advocate role given
Additionally, having a single point of responsibility that The Coalition reports to infers a single point of accountability to the DAO. Having a committee is to the detriment of the DAO given it adds friction and removes the single point of accountability. Though we suggest L2BEAT for this role initially, the DAO has the ability to (and should) replace them at anytime if the community is unhappy with their performance.
All members of the coalition will be abstaining from all votes related to The Coalition, as outlined in the COI policy. Notably, this does not apply to L2BEAT, who is not a member of The Coalition but rather exists to keep The Coalition in check. The DAO always maintains absolute power to remove or replace any member of The Coalition or The Advocate.
Was it a public announcement? Was it advertised somewhere?
Today, the Coalition parties and a few Delegates had a call to address this proposal openly. Generalized notes from this session can be found here
Agreements:
Today, the Coalition parties and a few Delegates had a call to address this proposal openly. Generalized notes from this session can be found here
Agreements:
Concerns:
Having the same parties review and provide opinions on proposals, cover those proposals publicly via Media Networks, vote on proposals, review the security concerns of a proposal, and then execute the Arbitrum network upgrades is fundamentally lacking separation of powers.
Below are my personal opinions, which I have shared already:
I would like a council to act as advocate, controlling how the coalition's efforts are focused. I have no concern with L2BEATs historic integrity, however, as a project building on Arbitrum, L2Beat is not, and the changes of Arbitrum do not affect them the same; their point of view may be quite limited compared to project developers. Given my concerns above, you can see how the advocate role can control all parts of Arbitrum Governance by directing what is worthy of "focus" and what is not.
I would like to see the parties considered in this proposal abstain from voting on this proposal in both the temperature check and on-chain vote.
Without proper separation of powers, the risk of collusion and censorship is too great for me to ignore. Again, I have no concern with the integrity of the parties, but the whole reason we build in this space is to build trustless systems. If the proposal is not willing to change the advocate role, then I would like to see how they plan to address conflicts of interest and separation of powers before going to Temperature Check.
Pricing: I understand the costs associated with a program like this, but I would like all parties to provide a document for Rates and Standard Costs for transparency and future negotiations if the proposal is passed. I'm sure all the projects have documents like this for traditional retainer-based agreements.
I look forward to the revision before the temperature check snapshot later this week.
Additionally, it's crucial to establish clear and robust minimum Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for this proposal to ensure accountability and measure the effectiveness of the coalition's activities. This includes defining specific, quantifiable metrics that demonstrate the value each coalition member brings to the DAO, such as the number of proposals reviewed, the quality of code reviews, the impact on proposal decision-making, and the success of risk management strategies.
Regarding concerns about potential monopolies in this space, it's essential to maintain a balance between efficiency and competition. If the coalition underperforms or if other entities express interest in providing similar support to the DAO, there should be mechanisms in place to address this.
I believe this is a great proposal with the potential to bring substantial benefits to the Arbitrum DAO. However, I do have some concerns about certain aspects of the proposal. These concerns include the potential centralization of power, the significant cost involved, questions about accountability, the lack of a clear long-term vision, and the level of community involvement. Addressing these concerns is essential to ensuring that the proposal aligns with the best interests of the DAO and its community. So my questions are: Questions:
Hey @jengajojo, appreciate the feedback and thoughtful questions!
Hey @jengajojo, appreciate the feedback and thoughtful questions!
As stated in the proposal under the Conflict of Interest Policy, all coalition members, including the DAO advocate, will make transparent all conflicts of interest in a database that will be accessible for all DAO members.
We like the idea of an independent reviewer who could create these processes and the necessary documentation. The DAO would have to source and identify this entity post-confirmation of the Coalition (if we chose the reviewer it wouldn’t be a completely independent entity). We would suggest this entity have a broad scope applicable to all councils and service providers subservient to the DAO.
The DAO Advocate is in a powerful position. Ultimately, the DAO retains the ability to replace its Advocate via a governance proposal if it believes its interests are not being served. All Coalition members shall vote Abstain if a proposal directly related to the Coalition is submitted.
Additionally, the DAO Advocate shall present a report to the DAO on a quarterly basis that outlines how the Coalition members are progressing towards the priorities set forth by the DAO. These reports are the means by which the DAO holds the Advocate accountable. If the reports are unsatisfactory, or if the DAO believes its priorities are not being effectively communicated to the members by the Advocate, then the DAO can put up a vote for removal.
We believe these quarterly reports, in addition to the regular cadence messaging with the delegates (hosted by Blockworks Research), are the best times for the DAO to discuss changes in priorities. Additionally, the Arbitrum community will have unrestricted access to both The Advocate and Coalition constituents. If changes need to be made, then the DAO advocate will notify the community via a forum post of the proposed changes and gauge community sentiment to ensure alignment.
The team definitely looks solid on this one.
I have a few questions:
The team definitely looks solid on this one.
I have a few questions:
General Feedback:
Hi Griff! You have made a great point about voter apathy, popularity contests, and gov capture previously and we appreciate your support in the need for The Coalition. In the comment you said “Distributing this much money deserves a dedicated group of thoughtful decision makers, who’s top priority is distributing the funds.” and we absolutely agree! The stakes are high and opportunity cost of doing nothing is real. The goal of The Coalition is to bring together experience from outside and within the Arbitrum ecosystem to facilitate growth and decentralization. Its primary mandate is to reduce the bandwidth requirement of a delegate with tools and detailed research so that they can make more sophisticated decisions. Additionally, we will be able to aid in decision making that allows for more efficient proposal + execution processes. For example, we would have advocated (and created) a custom voting solution in place of 105 votes for the STIP process.
Similarly, one method of thinking about potential compensation for The Coalition is the man-hours saved across governance participating stakeholders and additional value add in terms of efficient directing of resources within the ecosystem. Using the Arbitrum STIP example, had The Coalition existed during the time, we could have created a custom comprehensive framework for delegates, evaluated all the Arbitrum STIP proposals as a baseline starting point for delegates, and combined that into a more user friendly voting solution. If for example, it would have taken all delegates 50 hours each to evaluate proposals, talk to applicants, give feedback, and vote on proposals, it could have saved 46 (no of delegates with more than 1M ARB) x 50 hours = 2,300 manhours across all delegates. In addition, perhaps the end state of the Arbitrum STIP votes would have benefited the overall ecosystem more due to a more effective distribution.
Hi Griff! You have made a great point about voter apathy, popularity contests, and gov capture previously and we appreciate your support in the need for The Coalition. In the comment you said “Distributing this much money deserves a dedicated group of thoughtful decision makers, who’s top priority is distributing the funds.” and we absolutely agree! The stakes are high and opportunity cost of doing nothing is real. The goal of The Coalition is to bring together experience from outside and within the Arbitrum ecosystem to facilitate growth and decentralization. Its primary mandate is to reduce the bandwidth requirement of a delegate with tools and detailed research so that they can make more sophisticated decisions. Additionally, we will be able to aid in decision making that allows for more efficient proposal + execution processes. For example, we would have advocated (and created) a custom voting solution in place of 105 votes for the STIP process.
Similarly, one method of thinking about potential compensation for The Coalition is the man-hours saved across governance participating stakeholders and additional value add in terms of efficient directing of resources within the ecosystem. Using the Arbitrum STIP example, had The Coalition existed during the time, we could have created a custom comprehensive framework for delegates, evaluated all the Arbitrum STIP proposals as a baseline starting point for delegates, and combined that into a more user friendly voting solution. If for example, it would have taken all delegates 50 hours each to evaluate proposals, talk to applicants, give feedback, and vote on proposals, it could have saved 46 (no of delegates with more than 1M ARB) x 50 hours = 2,300 manhours across all delegates. In addition, perhaps the end state of the Arbitrum STIP votes would have benefited the overall ecosystem more due to a more effective distribution.
The members of The Coalition have full time employees with benefits, and weeks will be allocated across the best suited team. For example, within Gauntlet, it may be the Applied Research team which is currently leading various incentive proposals for Uniswap or Market Risk team doing the USDC migration on Arbitrum. We do not bring single members but rather professional organizations with diverse expertise. With BWR, our onchain analytics team, governance team, grant/incentive frameworks team, or other domain experts may be utilized to the adapting need of the project.
Additionally, as stated before, BWR takes on the risk of any additional workload beyond the minimum hours in order to achieve the scope of our work.
We are very mush in need of a proposal like this... but I'm not sure if I like the cost/value ratio.
$800,000 USD (payable in ARB) for allocating 8 engineer-weeks per quarter (total of 32 engineer-weeks for the year).
We are very mush in need of a proposal like this... but I'm not sure if I like the cost/value ratio.
$800,000 USD (payable in ARB) for allocating 8 engineer-weeks per quarter (total of 32 engineer-weeks for the year).
Is this one part time (60%) engineer for a year for 800k? (about $1.3M annual salary?)
$327,000 USD (payable in ARB) for 15 quantitative researcher weeks annually, to be used at any time.
Is this one VERY part time (30%) quant for a year for $327k (about $1M annual salary?)
$780,000 (payable in ARB) for a minimum 13 analyst weeks per quarter toward Forum Proposal Reviews, the creation of a Service Provider Onboarding Framework, Coalition Project Management, Mechanism Research, Delegate Engagement, and Growth Initiatives.
Is this one full time person for $780k a year?
I must be reading it wrong.
Please clarify.
In the mean time, seeing what I see, as much as we need the help, we can find better offers.
We at Layer3 are impressed with the scope and strategic direction of the proposal. Blockworks, Trail of Bits, and Gauntlet stand out as industry-leading teams and complement each other perfectly within this context. Echoing Nathan's sentiments, our only feedback is to outline more specific, actionable KPIs.
Otherwise, we wholeheartedly endorse the initiative and applaud the Coalition for their meticulous approach in crafting the proposal.
Throughout the short history of the Arbitrum DAO, all participants have experienced first-hand the hurdles that can present themselves in a governance process where there's multiple parties involved. Ranging from lack of time, resources, or participation from delegates, the overarching theme is a lack of objective, neutral information that participants could utilize to act as a basis for decision-making.
Blockworks, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits are all industry-leading entities in their respective verticals and thus well-positioned to take on and execute the responsibilities outlined in the proposal.
Throughout the short history of the Arbitrum DAO, all participants have experienced first-hand the hurdles that can present themselves in a governance process where there's multiple parties involved. Ranging from lack of time, resources, or participation from delegates, the overarching theme is a lack of objective, neutral information that participants could utilize to act as a basis for decision-making.
Blockworks, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits are all industry-leading entities in their respective verticals and thus well-positioned to take on and execute the responsibilities outlined in the proposal.
Objectivity and neutrality are essential to ensure that the objectives and desired outcomes outlined in the proposal are met, and we think that is well thought through in the ‘Conflict of Interest Policy’. Concerning this, the DAO can choose to halt payments in case of signs of underperformance.
Overall, the proposal is well thought out, and it would benefit the operations of the Arbitrum DAO and its participants for a reasonable cost. PlutusDAO fully supports this proposal.
Thanks for the support! Although not traditional quantitative KPIs, we believe our outline of "projects" creates a framework for evaluation of work that we can point to toward the end of our funding period.
We appreciate the feedback and support! We believe the conflict of interest policy that states we will abstain on all votes related to The Coalition should address your concern regarding the ARB delegation received by BWR and Gauntlet.
Consistent communication between BWR and the DAO gives transparency on The Coalition's ongoing initiatives. Should the DAO have reservations regarding the value of these initiatives or suspect a bias in the guidance of L2BEAT, the DAO retains the ability to replace its Advocate at any given moment. Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that the Arbitrum community will have unrestricted access to both The Advocate and Coalition constituents, giving an opportunity to influence our collective undertakings.
The composition of The Coalition is malleable and the community wields absolute authority over both its DAO Advocate and the members of The Coalition.
Blockworks Research will handle project management which includes regular communication with the DAO. We will be hyper communicative in this initiative with updates in the forum biweekly and whenever necessary. Though "Priority 1" projects are our main mandate, our work efforts / roadmap will be at DAO discretion through The Advocate once funded.
Please see the Coalition Member Termination section for details on cutting off payment to any member or the entire coalition. One quarter payment up front is standard for new service provider initiation. As detailed in the "conflict of interest" section, all coalition members will recuse themselves from voting "if a proposal directly related to the Coalition is submitted." (vote abstain)
Very much in favor, the Arbitrum DAO sorely needs to develop some of its own muscles and this is a great way of doing so without over-relying on the Foundation.
The one thing I would try to figure out early on is how you plan on judging your own work in 12 months. Often, programs like these reach their terms and some community members question their efficiency, having a couple of KPIs can make that discussion much easier.
Very much in favor, the Arbitrum DAO sorely needs to develop some of its own muscles and this is a great way of doing so without over-relying on the Foundation.
The one thing I would try to figure out early on is how you plan on judging your own work in 12 months. Often, programs like these reach their terms and some community members question their efficiency, having a couple of KPIs can make that discussion much easier.
The price seems reasonable and in-line with industry standards in terms of the skills offered.
Here is my view on how this proposal aligns to DAO priorities.
This is intended to show how this proposal aligns to our strategic priorities. (Scale: Actively against, Not aligned, Neutral, Aligned, Highly Aligned)
Additionally, all members of The Coalition are companies with long-standing reputations in crypto and have trust in the industry.
I want to say I trust all the teams involved in this RFP, rockstar teams with more than enough reputation at risk. And I greatly appreciate the effort it takes to engage in these discussions on the forum, it's a lot of work, and you are doing a fantastic job.
However, I don't think this structure benefits Arbitrum, I would much rather see you partner with the groups proposing to offer them these services directly, and become integrated into their proposals as needed, as opposed to having a retainer.
Most importantly, the systemic risk that passing proposals like this could have, can't be overstated. We should avoid hiring service providers with such a wide scope IMO. They will gain undue influence over the DAO, which is against the sprit of DAOs in general.
Service providers should have a much more narrow scope IMO. For instance, if you said you wanted to take on a budget of 100 M and build a STIP follow-up or something similar, with a very clear budget, and timeline for execution, I'm sure it would pass. Narrow scope, clear limits, GREAT. Large scope, vague limits, BAD.
I hope this doesn't dissuade you from continuing to participate in ARB governance and the ARB ecosystem, instead I hope you can respond like Camelot did when their proposal was denied, which resulted in STIP.
Can't wait to see what you come up with, there is a lot of opportunity here.
Mostly aspects of the proposal we have already pointed out but to reiterate:
The Coalition does not intend to influence or persuade community members to vote in any direction. Our goal is purely to provide objective tools and reports to help delegates and community members make more informed decisions more efficiently. As an example, for Arbitrum STIP, we would have created a decision matrix within a pre-built spreadsheet distributed to all delegates, so that delegates themselves could rank and evaluate different STIP proposals within a digestible matrix and arrive at their own conclusion. Once again, we will not be forcing/persuading delegates to vote a certain way, and we will not be making decisions on behalf of the community when it comes to such votes. We will solely be providing tools so that community members may make more effective decisions individually and independently of The Coalition. We cannot overstate the fact that community members will retain independent voting power in all governance matters, and it is not the case that The Coalition will be the final decision maker in any future proposal on behalf of the community. To be thorough, here is another example. For the current proposal to Activate ARB staking, if deemed important enough by the advocate, The Coalition would have stepped up to provide comprehensive research on the potential impacts of token inflation, how much of a supply sink ARB staking could potentially be, how this would be implemented, whether it could carry over to potential future profit distribution channels, and more. From there, we would merely be providing this as objective information to all community members, so that they themselves may make a more informed decision when it comes to voting. Additionally, given the members of The Coalition may have differing opinions at times we will likely offer a diverse range of opinions and perspectives to the DAO.
Blockworks Research understands the gravity of the responsibility we are taking on, but also knows there is uncertainty around the time commitments associated with this work. In our proposal to the DAO, we specifically proposed a not-to-exceed price to eliminate the possibility of overspend on the DAO, with Blockworks Research taking on the risk of having to dedicate any additional resources in order to fulfill our mandate without receiving additional compensation. We believe this is a fair trade-off for both parties and shows Blockworks Research’s commitment to Arbitrum’s success. In addition, we believe that the benefits to the ecosystem in terms of better governance processes, more informed votes, and a better distribution of resources as a result of that, fully justifies the cost of The Coalition.
Additionally, all members of The Coalition are companies with long-standing reputations in crypto and have trust in the industry. Blockworks, for example, is a media company and thus maintaining trust is the main pillar to our business. While we are dedicated to servicing Arbitrum, we are not a new entity spun up purely to service the DAO. As a long-standing (6 years) crypto media company, we are no strangers to maintaining ethical operations a business. Since inception, we have held ourselves to high standards, as outlined in our Trust and Ethics page which we follow religiously, and we will continue to maintain ourselves to such standards through The Coalition.
In the comment you said “Distributing this much money deserves a dedicated group of thoughtful decision makers, who’s top priority is distributing the funds.” and we absolutely agree! The stakes are high and opportunity cost of doing nothing is real. The goal of The Coalition is to bring together experience from outside and within the Arbitrum ecosystem to facilitate growth and decentralization. Its primary mandate is to reduce the bandwidth requirement of a delegate with tools and detailed research so that they can make more sophisticated decisions. Additionally, we will be able to aid in decision making that allows for more efficient proposal + execution processes. For example, we would have advocated (and created) a custom voting solution in place of 105 votes for the STIP process.
Yep but this is not the way i would expect it to be executed.
I would rather see a group propose a budget for a very specified context (like STIP) and then as a council they would make the decisions in that context, and hold the groups accountable to execute on their promises.
This proposal is very different, we are basically paying your coalition to have an incredible amount of political power in every decision the DAO makes... This is very dangerous and is not a solution I like very much to the problem that I specified. It still expects the whole DAO to make decisions that are often too narrowly scoped, but now we have our trusted coalition to influence our decisions... scary.
The payment is VERY large, larger than what I find reasonable and the benefit to the orgs in this coalition is not just monetary. The political power that comes with this responsibility is immense, and wide reaching.
If Gauntlet was assessing the governance risk of this proposal, the main risk being social capture of the ARB governance by this coalition, how would this proposal fare? If this proposal continues I think there will be a strong need for transparency, conflict of interest disclosures and more oversight than what just L2beat can provide to avoid backroom dealings, descriminatory power plays, etc.
I was basically offered a bribe during STIP (obv i didn't take it) but I could only imagine the offers this coalition would get given the power they would wield.
I think I will have a hard time thinking this structure can be set up in a benevolent manner as its proposed.
It could be possible if instead of getting so much liquid capital, the reward was mostly ARB vested for 5 years or more, and it could be revokable if very clear rules were violated. Then maybe incentives could be aligned.
We believe L2BEAT is uniquely qualified for The Advocate role given
Additionally, having a single point of responsibility that The Coalition reports to infers a single point of accountability to the DAO. Having a committee is to the detriment of the DAO given it adds friction and removes the single point of accountability. Though we suggest L2BEAT for this role initially, the DAO has the ability to (and should) replace them at anytime if the community is unhappy with their performance.
All members of the coalition will be abstaining from all votes related to The Coalition, as outlined in the COI policy. Notably, this does not apply to L2BEAT, who is not a member of The Coalition but rather exists to keep The Coalition in check. The DAO always maintains absolute power to remove or replace any member of The Coalition or The Advocate.
Was it a public announcement? Was it advertised somewhere?
Today, the Coalition parties and a few Delegates had a call to address this proposal openly. Generalized notes from this session can be found here
Agreements:
Today, the Coalition parties and a few Delegates had a call to address this proposal openly. Generalized notes from this session can be found here
Agreements:
Concerns:
Having the same parties review and provide opinions on proposals, cover those proposals publicly via Media Networks, vote on proposals, review the security concerns of a proposal, and then execute the Arbitrum network upgrades is fundamentally lacking separation of powers.
Below are my personal opinions, which I have shared already:
I would like a council to act as advocate, controlling how the coalition's efforts are focused. I have no concern with L2BEATs historic integrity, however, as a project building on Arbitrum, L2Beat is not, and the changes of Arbitrum do not affect them the same; their point of view may be quite limited compared to project developers. Given my concerns above, you can see how the advocate role can control all parts of Arbitrum Governance by directing what is worthy of "focus" and what is not.
I would like to see the parties considered in this proposal abstain from voting on this proposal in both the temperature check and on-chain vote.
Without proper separation of powers, the risk of collusion and censorship is too great for me to ignore. Again, I have no concern with the integrity of the parties, but the whole reason we build in this space is to build trustless systems. If the proposal is not willing to change the advocate role, then I would like to see how they plan to address conflicts of interest and separation of powers before going to Temperature Check.
Pricing: I understand the costs associated with a program like this, but I would like all parties to provide a document for Rates and Standard Costs for transparency and future negotiations if the proposal is passed. I'm sure all the projects have documents like this for traditional retainer-based agreements.
I look forward to the revision before the temperature check snapshot later this week.
Additionally, it's crucial to establish clear and robust minimum Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for this proposal to ensure accountability and measure the effectiveness of the coalition's activities. This includes defining specific, quantifiable metrics that demonstrate the value each coalition member brings to the DAO, such as the number of proposals reviewed, the quality of code reviews, the impact on proposal decision-making, and the success of risk management strategies.
Regarding concerns about potential monopolies in this space, it's essential to maintain a balance between efficiency and competition. If the coalition underperforms or if other entities express interest in providing similar support to the DAO, there should be mechanisms in place to address this.
I believe this is a great proposal with the potential to bring substantial benefits to the Arbitrum DAO. However, I do have some concerns about certain aspects of the proposal. These concerns include the potential centralization of power, the significant cost involved, questions about accountability, the lack of a clear long-term vision, and the level of community involvement. Addressing these concerns is essential to ensuring that the proposal aligns with the best interests of the DAO and its community. So my questions are: Questions:
Hey @jengajojo, appreciate the feedback and thoughtful questions!
Hey @jengajojo, appreciate the feedback and thoughtful questions!
As stated in the proposal under the Conflict of Interest Policy, all coalition members, including the DAO advocate, will make transparent all conflicts of interest in a database that will be accessible for all DAO members.
We like the idea of an independent reviewer who could create these processes and the necessary documentation. The DAO would have to source and identify this entity post-confirmation of the Coalition (if we chose the reviewer it wouldn’t be a completely independent entity). We would suggest this entity have a broad scope applicable to all councils and service providers subservient to the DAO.
The DAO Advocate is in a powerful position. Ultimately, the DAO retains the ability to replace its Advocate via a governance proposal if it believes its interests are not being served. All Coalition members shall vote Abstain if a proposal directly related to the Coalition is submitted.
Additionally, the DAO Advocate shall present a report to the DAO on a quarterly basis that outlines how the Coalition members are progressing towards the priorities set forth by the DAO. These reports are the means by which the DAO holds the Advocate accountable. If the reports are unsatisfactory, or if the DAO believes its priorities are not being effectively communicated to the members by the Advocate, then the DAO can put up a vote for removal.
We believe these quarterly reports, in addition to the regular cadence messaging with the delegates (hosted by Blockworks Research), are the best times for the DAO to discuss changes in priorities. Additionally, the Arbitrum community will have unrestricted access to both The Advocate and Coalition constituents. If changes need to be made, then the DAO advocate will notify the community via a forum post of the proposed changes and gauge community sentiment to ensure alignment.
The team definitely looks solid on this one.
I have a few questions:
The team definitely looks solid on this one.
I have a few questions:
General Feedback:
Hi Griff! You have made a great point about voter apathy, popularity contests, and gov capture previously and we appreciate your support in the need for The Coalition. In the comment you said “Distributing this much money deserves a dedicated group of thoughtful decision makers, who’s top priority is distributing the funds.” and we absolutely agree! The stakes are high and opportunity cost of doing nothing is real. The goal of The Coalition is to bring together experience from outside and within the Arbitrum ecosystem to facilitate growth and decentralization. Its primary mandate is to reduce the bandwidth requirement of a delegate with tools and detailed research so that they can make more sophisticated decisions. Additionally, we will be able to aid in decision making that allows for more efficient proposal + execution processes. For example, we would have advocated (and created) a custom voting solution in place of 105 votes for the STIP process.
Similarly, one method of thinking about potential compensation for The Coalition is the man-hours saved across governance participating stakeholders and additional value add in terms of efficient directing of resources within the ecosystem. Using the Arbitrum STIP example, had The Coalition existed during the time, we could have created a custom comprehensive framework for delegates, evaluated all the Arbitrum STIP proposals as a baseline starting point for delegates, and combined that into a more user friendly voting solution. If for example, it would have taken all delegates 50 hours each to evaluate proposals, talk to applicants, give feedback, and vote on proposals, it could have saved 46 (no of delegates with more than 1M ARB) x 50 hours = 2,300 manhours across all delegates. In addition, perhaps the end state of the Arbitrum STIP votes would have benefited the overall ecosystem more due to a more effective distribution.
Hi Griff! You have made a great point about voter apathy, popularity contests, and gov capture previously and we appreciate your support in the need for The Coalition. In the comment you said “Distributing this much money deserves a dedicated group of thoughtful decision makers, who’s top priority is distributing the funds.” and we absolutely agree! The stakes are high and opportunity cost of doing nothing is real. The goal of The Coalition is to bring together experience from outside and within the Arbitrum ecosystem to facilitate growth and decentralization. Its primary mandate is to reduce the bandwidth requirement of a delegate with tools and detailed research so that they can make more sophisticated decisions. Additionally, we will be able to aid in decision making that allows for more efficient proposal + execution processes. For example, we would have advocated (and created) a custom voting solution in place of 105 votes for the STIP process.
Similarly, one method of thinking about potential compensation for The Coalition is the man-hours saved across governance participating stakeholders and additional value add in terms of efficient directing of resources within the ecosystem. Using the Arbitrum STIP example, had The Coalition existed during the time, we could have created a custom comprehensive framework for delegates, evaluated all the Arbitrum STIP proposals as a baseline starting point for delegates, and combined that into a more user friendly voting solution. If for example, it would have taken all delegates 50 hours each to evaluate proposals, talk to applicants, give feedback, and vote on proposals, it could have saved 46 (no of delegates with more than 1M ARB) x 50 hours = 2,300 manhours across all delegates. In addition, perhaps the end state of the Arbitrum STIP votes would have benefited the overall ecosystem more due to a more effective distribution.
The members of The Coalition have full time employees with benefits, and weeks will be allocated across the best suited team. For example, within Gauntlet, it may be the Applied Research team which is currently leading various incentive proposals for Uniswap or Market Risk team doing the USDC migration on Arbitrum. We do not bring single members but rather professional organizations with diverse expertise. With BWR, our onchain analytics team, governance team, grant/incentive frameworks team, or other domain experts may be utilized to the adapting need of the project.
Additionally, as stated before, BWR takes on the risk of any additional workload beyond the minimum hours in order to achieve the scope of our work.
We are very mush in need of a proposal like this... but I'm not sure if I like the cost/value ratio.
$800,000 USD (payable in ARB) for allocating 8 engineer-weeks per quarter (total of 32 engineer-weeks for the year).
We are very mush in need of a proposal like this... but I'm not sure if I like the cost/value ratio.
$800,000 USD (payable in ARB) for allocating 8 engineer-weeks per quarter (total of 32 engineer-weeks for the year).
Is this one part time (60%) engineer for a year for 800k? (about $1.3M annual salary?)
$327,000 USD (payable in ARB) for 15 quantitative researcher weeks annually, to be used at any time.
Is this one VERY part time (30%) quant for a year for $327k (about $1M annual salary?)
$780,000 (payable in ARB) for a minimum 13 analyst weeks per quarter toward Forum Proposal Reviews, the creation of a Service Provider Onboarding Framework, Coalition Project Management, Mechanism Research, Delegate Engagement, and Growth Initiatives.
Is this one full time person for $780k a year?
I must be reading it wrong.
Please clarify.
In the mean time, seeing what I see, as much as we need the help, we can find better offers.
We at Layer3 are impressed with the scope and strategic direction of the proposal. Blockworks, Trail of Bits, and Gauntlet stand out as industry-leading teams and complement each other perfectly within this context. Echoing Nathan's sentiments, our only feedback is to outline more specific, actionable KPIs.
Otherwise, we wholeheartedly endorse the initiative and applaud the Coalition for their meticulous approach in crafting the proposal.
Throughout the short history of the Arbitrum DAO, all participants have experienced first-hand the hurdles that can present themselves in a governance process where there's multiple parties involved. Ranging from lack of time, resources, or participation from delegates, the overarching theme is a lack of objective, neutral information that participants could utilize to act as a basis for decision-making.
Blockworks, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits are all industry-leading entities in their respective verticals and thus well-positioned to take on and execute the responsibilities outlined in the proposal.
Throughout the short history of the Arbitrum DAO, all participants have experienced first-hand the hurdles that can present themselves in a governance process where there's multiple parties involved. Ranging from lack of time, resources, or participation from delegates, the overarching theme is a lack of objective, neutral information that participants could utilize to act as a basis for decision-making.
Blockworks, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits are all industry-leading entities in their respective verticals and thus well-positioned to take on and execute the responsibilities outlined in the proposal.
Objectivity and neutrality are essential to ensure that the objectives and desired outcomes outlined in the proposal are met, and we think that is well thought through in the ‘Conflict of Interest Policy’. Concerning this, the DAO can choose to halt payments in case of signs of underperformance.
Overall, the proposal is well thought out, and it would benefit the operations of the Arbitrum DAO and its participants for a reasonable cost. PlutusDAO fully supports this proposal.
Thanks for the support! Although not traditional quantitative KPIs, we believe our outline of "projects" creates a framework for evaluation of work that we can point to toward the end of our funding period.
We appreciate the feedback and support! We believe the conflict of interest policy that states we will abstain on all votes related to The Coalition should address your concern regarding the ARB delegation received by BWR and Gauntlet.
Consistent communication between BWR and the DAO gives transparency on The Coalition's ongoing initiatives. Should the DAO have reservations regarding the value of these initiatives or suspect a bias in the guidance of L2BEAT, the DAO retains the ability to replace its Advocate at any given moment. Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that the Arbitrum community will have unrestricted access to both The Advocate and Coalition constituents, giving an opportunity to influence our collective undertakings.
The composition of The Coalition is malleable and the community wields absolute authority over both its DAO Advocate and the members of The Coalition.
Blockworks Research will handle project management which includes regular communication with the DAO. We will be hyper communicative in this initiative with updates in the forum biweekly and whenever necessary. Though "Priority 1" projects are our main mandate, our work efforts / roadmap will be at DAO discretion through The Advocate once funded.
Please see the Coalition Member Termination section for details on cutting off payment to any member or the entire coalition. One quarter payment up front is standard for new service provider initiation. As detailed in the "conflict of interest" section, all coalition members will recuse themselves from voting "if a proposal directly related to the Coalition is submitted." (vote abstain)
Very much in favor, the Arbitrum DAO sorely needs to develop some of its own muscles and this is a great way of doing so without over-relying on the Foundation.
The one thing I would try to figure out early on is how you plan on judging your own work in 12 months. Often, programs like these reach their terms and some community members question their efficiency, having a couple of KPIs can make that discussion much easier.
Very much in favor, the Arbitrum DAO sorely needs to develop some of its own muscles and this is a great way of doing so without over-relying on the Foundation.
The one thing I would try to figure out early on is how you plan on judging your own work in 12 months. Often, programs like these reach their terms and some community members question their efficiency, having a couple of KPIs can make that discussion much easier.
The price seems reasonable and in-line with industry standards in terms of the skills offered.
Here is my view on how this proposal aligns to DAO priorities.
This is intended to show how this proposal aligns to our strategic priorities. (Scale: Actively against, Not aligned, Neutral, Aligned, Highly Aligned)
Here is my view on how this proposal aligns to DAO priorities.
This is intended to show how this proposal aligns to our strategic priorities. (Scale: Actively against, Not aligned, Neutral, Aligned, Highly Aligned)
The only devrel component is a fairly small add on component. The core of this proposal is still neutral to the priority.
This proposal is not receiving highly aligned in this category because 40 million of delegate votes in a coalition could have a negative effect of locking in this group. While we see the need and identify this as a highly capable and dedicated group, it would be intellectually dishonest not to point out the clear issue. Hopefully, we would work together to solve this for the future.
This review is cost neutral. It’s only concern is alignment to strategic priorities. The DAO always reserves the right approve any proposal, aligned or not.
I like this proposal and also the teams behind it. I have some questions:
Blockworks Research understands the gravity of the responsibility we are taking on, but also knows there is uncertainty around the time commitments associated with this work. In our proposal to the DAO, we specifically proposed a not-to-exceed price to eliminate the possibility of overspend on the DAO, with Blockworks Research taking on the risk of having to dedicate any additional resources in order to fulfill our mandate without receiving additional compensation. We believe this is a fair trade-off for both parties and shows Blockworks Research's commitment to Arbitrum's success
I'm a big fan of this proposal. As a DAO, we've invested heavily in program spend to drive growth e.g. STIP incentives (which I support and would like to continue). We should complement that program spend with an investment in the operational capacity to support said growth. This proposal would enable three high-quality teams with diverse expertise to invest significant time on improving the Arbitrum DAO. It would also help support the excellent work L2Beat does in the Arbitrum DAO.
Do you want to team up? Think a lot of the aspects of this proposal fall into service provider spending introduced in the Special Operations Roundtable.
Here is my view on how this proposal aligns to DAO priorities.
This is intended to show how this proposal aligns to our strategic priorities. (Scale: Actively against, Not aligned, Neutral, Aligned, Highly Aligned)
The only devrel component is a fairly small add on component. The core of this proposal is still neutral to the priority.
This proposal is not receiving highly aligned in this category because 40 million of delegate votes in a coalition could have a negative effect of locking in this group. While we see the need and identify this as a highly capable and dedicated group, it would be intellectually dishonest not to point out the clear issue. Hopefully, we would work together to solve this for the future.
This review is cost neutral. It’s only concern is alignment to strategic priorities. The DAO always reserves the right approve any proposal, aligned or not.
I like this proposal and also the teams behind it. I have some questions:
Blockworks Research understands the gravity of the responsibility we are taking on, but also knows there is uncertainty around the time commitments associated with this work. In our proposal to the DAO, we specifically proposed a not-to-exceed price to eliminate the possibility of overspend on the DAO, with Blockworks Research taking on the risk of having to dedicate any additional resources in order to fulfill our mandate without receiving additional compensation. We believe this is a fair trade-off for both parties and shows Blockworks Research's commitment to Arbitrum's success
I'm a big fan of this proposal. As a DAO, we've invested heavily in program spend to drive growth e.g. STIP incentives (which I support and would like to continue). We should complement that program spend with an investment in the operational capacity to support said growth. This proposal would enable three high-quality teams with diverse expertise to invest significant time on improving the Arbitrum DAO. It would also help support the excellent work L2Beat does in the Arbitrum DAO.
Do you want to team up? Think a lot of the aspects of this proposal fall into service provider spending introduced in the Special Operations Roundtable.
