TLDR: THIS IS VERY MUCH A WIP, BUT LETS START THE DISCUSSION :smiling_face_with_three_hearts:
Creating an Operation Company (OpCo) laser-focused on driving growth, fostering collaboration, and creating onchain experiences, will supercharge the Arbitrum ecosystem's growth, lower coordination costs, and cement its position as the leading L2.
The OpCo's mandate is ambitious yet achievable: attract and nurture top-tier talent, boost agility and efficiency, catalyze ecosystem expansion, amplify brand presence, forge strategic alliances, engage and support the vibrant Arbitrum community, and continuously adapt to the ever-changing needs of the ecosystem. Guided by an elected board's wisdom and unwavering commitment to transparency, the OpCo will serve as a powerful catalyst for innovation and value creation.
With a well-defined roadmap and a budget of 25 million $ARB over two years, the OpCo is poised to unlock the boundless potential of the Arbitrum DAO. 🚀✨
To start, we are going deep into the mandates the OpCo will have. Then, we will roll up to generics as we get closer to the company charter, but I think it's important we agree on responsibilities first. We have included the higher-level mandates in-line, but for further drill-down, I recommend starting here.
Thanks!
The Arbitrum ecosystem has witnessed remarkable growth and adoption since its genesis, highlighting the immense potential of layer 2 scaling solutions in facilitating fast, cost-effective, and secure transactions on the Ethereum network. As the ecosystem expands, the Arbitrum DAO encounters increasingly complex challenges in managing operations, driving innovation, and ensuring sustainable growth. To tackle these challenges head-on and unlock new frontiers of opportunity, this AIP proposes the creation of an Operation Company (OpCo) to support the Arbitrum DAO and complement the Foundation.
The OpCo will serve as the execution arm of the Arbitrum DAO, collaborating closely with the Arbitrum Foundation to bring to life the strategies and initiatives set forth by the DAO's governance process. By establishing a dedicated entity singularly focused on operational excellence, the Arbitrum DAO can significantly enhance its agility, efficiency, and impact on the ecosystem.
The OpCo's primary objectives include attracting and retaining top talent, improving operational agility, scaling the DAO's impact, enhancing visibility and influence, and ensuring accountability and alignment with the Arbitrum DAO's goals. By leveraging the OpCo's streamlined decision-making processes and dedicated resources, the Arbitrum DAO can quickly adapt to emerging opportunities, proactively address challenges, and maintain its competitive edge in the rapidly evolving blockchain landscape.
Creating an OpCo is a strategic imperative for the Arbitrum DAO to navigate the complexities and capitalize on the opportunities of a dynamic ecosystem. By synergizing the agility and efficiency of a focused operational entity with the collective wisdom and inclusivity of decentralized governance, the Arbitrum DAO can unlock its full potential and drive meaningful, long-term value for its community and the broader blockchain industry.
This AIP proposes the creation of an Operation Company (OpCo) to support the Arbitrum DAO and Foundation in fostering the growth and development of the Arbitrum ecosystem. The OpCo, led by an elected board of ecosystem participants, will hire full-time contributors, improve operational agility, and scale the DAO's impact through enhanced collaboration, resource allocation, and visibility. The AIP requests a budget of 25 million $ARB to cover the OpCo's setup costs and operational expenses for the first two years.
Motivation:
Creating an Operation Company (OpCo) is a strategic imperative to drive the Arbitrum DAO forward in an increasingly competitive landscape. This comprehensive framework empowers the OpCo to identify and target critical areas or mandates where it can deliver maximum value to the Arbitrum DAO and its community.
The Arbitrum DAO faces several challenges today, which the OpCo aims to address:
The OpCo's agile structure catalyzes growth, fostering synergies across the ecosystem and attracting a diverse array of stakeholders united by a shared vision. By forming the Arbitrum Protocol Guild, the OpCo will coordinate and support the core protocol teams building the Arbitrum technology stack, driving innovation, and solidifying Arbitrum's current position.
The OpCo's mandate to implement robust on-chain performance tracking and transparent reporting mechanisms will significantly enhance the Arbitrum DAO's accountability and credibility. By leveraging data analytics and clear metrics, the OpCo will provide stakeholders with unparalleled insights into the DAO's activities, performance, and use of funds, strengthening trust within the community and attracting a wider pool of contributors and investors.
The OpCo's unwavering focus on community engagement, onchain experiences, and support will be the bedrock of Arbitrum's long-term success. By delivering comprehensive onboarding resources, fostering a vibrant and inclusive community, and actively seeking and implementing feedback, the OpCo will cultivate a loyal and passionate user base that is genuinely invested in the future of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
In essence, the OpCo represents a transformative leap forward for the Arbitrum DAO, empowering it to navigate the challenges and seize the opportunities of a rapidly evolving landscape. By combining the OpCo's operational prowess with the DAO's decentralized governance, Arbitrum will be poised to thrive in the Web3 era.
The establishment of an Operation Company (OpCo) is perfectly aligned with the Arbitrum community's mission and guiding values, serving as a catalyst for growth, inclusivity, and innovation within the ecosystem.
Transparency and Accountability: The OpCo ensures transparency, accountability, and effective decision-making at scale, harmonizing seamlessly with Arbitrum's ethos of decentralization.
Inclusivity and Accessibility: By fostering diversity and inclusion, the OpCo creates a vibrant and welcoming community that empowers users from all backgrounds to participate in the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem actively.
User-Centric Focus: The OpCo's unwavering commitment to serving the needs and interests of users ensures that the Arbitrum ecosystem remains user-centric at its core, fostering trust and loyalty among the community.
Open Collaboration and Innovation: By maintaining a neutral stance and promoting open collaboration, the OpCo cultivates an environment where groundbreaking projects and partnerships can thrive, pushing the boundaries of decentralized finance.
Alignment with Ethereum: The OpCo's efforts to drive adoption, collaboration, and innovation within the Arbitrum ecosystem ultimately benefit Ethereum as a whole, contributing to the growth and success of the broader Ethereum community.
Sustainable Growth: The OpCo enables the Arbitrum DAO to make strategic, long-term decisions and investments that promote the ecosystem's sustainable growth, ensuring that initiatives are designed for lasting impact.
The creation of the OpCo is not merely aligned with the Arbitrum community's mission and values – it is a natural and necessary extension of them. By providing a dedicated entity to drive the DAO's operational and ecosystem growth initiatives, the OpCo will serve as a powerful tool for helping the Arbitrum community achieve its goals while staying true to its core principles of decentralization, inclusivity, and innovation.
TBD - Still working on this graphic (Click Here to Expand)

If you want to play with the mermaid :wink: Markdown Here

1. Talent Acquisition and Program Management
Talent Acquisition and Program Management
2. Arbitrum Ecosystem Coordination
Arbitrum Ecosystem Coordination
3. On-Chain Performance Tracking
On-Chain Performance Tracking
4. Transparency & Analysis
Transparency & Analysis
5. Decentralized Objective Setting
Decentralized Objective Setting
6. Marketing and Brand Awareness (Memetics)
Marketing and Brand Awareness (Memetics)
7. Governance Engagement
Governance Engagement
8. Open & Competitive Service Provider Selection
Open & Competitive Service Provider Selection
9. Growth and Collaboration (Betting on Builders)
Growth and Collaboration (Betting on Builders)
10. Community Engagement and Support (Onboarding)
Community Engagement and Support (Onboarding)
- **Overview**: Build and maintain an engaged, inclusive, and well-supported Arbitrum community
- **Objectives**: Develop community engagement strategies, provide support and resources, gather and analyze feedback, help new members navigate opportunities, and foster a culture of experimentation and innovation
- **Strategies**: Implement a multi-faceted approach focusing on onboarding, education, technical assistance, feedback analysis, and fostering a culture of experimentation and innovation
- **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)**: Number of new members onboarded, participation rates in educational initiatives, resolution time and satisfaction scores for technical support, volume and sentiment of community feedback, and number and quality of community-driven innovations and contributions
- **Roadmap**: Develop and launch the onboarding process and initial educational content, establish technical support channels and feedback gathering mechanisms, implement initiatives to foster experimentation and innovation, and analyze and refine community engagement and support strategies
- **Resources**: Dedicated community management and support team within the OpCo, budget allocation for educational content development and events, and technical infrastructure for onboarding and experimentation platforms
11. Strategic Partnerships (Business Development)
Strategic Partnerships (Business Development)
- **Overview**: Identify and pursue strategic partnerships to drive growth and innovation within the Arbitrum ecosystem
- **Objectives**: Identify and pursue partnerships, negotiate and manage agreements, and collaborate on joint initiatives
- **Strategies**: Implement a structured approach to identifying, negotiating, and managing partnerships that align with the ecosystem's goals and values
- **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)**: Number and quality of partnerships established, value generated through partnerships, successful execution of joint initiatives, partner satisfaction and retention rates, and contribution to the overall growth and success of the ecosystem
- **Roadmap**: Develop partnership criteria and best practices, identify and pursue initial partnerships, collaborate on joint initiatives with established partners, and expand and refine partnership strategies
- **Resources**: Dedicated business development team with expertise in partnership management and blockchain technology, budget allocation for industry events and joint initiatives, and collaboration tools and platforms
12. Administration & Sustainability
Administration & Sustainability
- **Overview**: Ensure the OpCo maintains the internal capabilities and talent required to deliver on its commitments to the Arbitrum ecosystem
- **Objectives**: Operate under the guidance of the Transitory Congress, maintain internal capabilities and talent, and maintain transparency through regular reporting
- **Strategies**: Implement a well-structured governance body, focus on talent management and internal capabilities, and commit to transparency through regular reporting
- **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)**: Diversity and expertise of the Transitory Congress members, alignment of OpCo activities with the DAO's objectives, talent retention rate and employee satisfaction, efficiency gains from streamlined processes, and timely and accurate reporting
- **Roadmap**: Establish the Transitory Congress and governance structure, assess and enhance internal capabilities and talent, develop and implement a comprehensive reporting framework, and evaluate and refine administration and sustainability practices
- **Resources**: Dedicated team within the OpCo focused on governance, talent management, and reporting, budget allocation for talent acquisition and professional development, and collaboration tools and blockchain-based accounting systems
By focusing on these core mandates, the Arbitrum OpCo will be well-positioned to support the growth, sustainability, and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem, while remaining accountable to the Arbitrum DAO and its community.
1. Legal Entity Structure (TBD)
2. Recruit OpCo Leadership (2-4 weeks)
3. Establish OpCo Policies and Procedures (2-4 weeks)
4. Engage DAO for Role Identification (2-4 weeks)
5. Conduct Recruitment and Onboarding (8-12 weeks)
6. Establish OpCo Governance and Reporting (4-6 weeks)
7. Continuously Assess and Optimize OpCo Performance (Ongoing)
The total cost to implement the AIP and establish the Operation Company (OpCo) is estimated to be 25 million $ARB covering 2 years. This budget covers both the initial setup costs and the recurring operating expenses for the first two years. The breakdown of the costs is as follows:
Totally threw some High-Level Numbers here - This will need revision indefinitely
Line Item Breakdown 📊
Total Fixed Costs: 4,000,000 $ARB
Total Recurring Costs (Two Years): 21,000,000 $ARB
Grand Total (Two Years): 25,000,000 $ARB
This two-year budget allocation allows the OpCo to establish a strong foundation, maintain operational stability, and adapt to the evolving needs of the Arbitrum ecosystem over an extended period. The Arbitrum DAO can reassess the OpCo's performance and budget requirements after the initial two years to ensure ongoing alignment with the ecosystem's growth and the DAO's objectives.
Will update and revise often as this is just the beginning of what this could become!
TLDR: THIS IS VERY MUCH A WIP, BUT LETS START THE DISCUSSION :smiling_face_with_three_hearts:
Creating an Operation Company (OpCo) laser-focused on driving growth, fostering collaboration, and creating onchain experiences, will supercharge the Arbitrum ecosystem's growth, lower coordination costs, and cement its position as the leading L2.
The OpCo's mandate is ambitious yet achievable: attract and nurture top-tier talent, boost agility and efficiency, catalyze ecosystem expansion, amplify brand presence, forge strategic alliances, engage and support the vibrant Arbitrum community, and continuously adapt to the ever-changing needs of the ecosystem. Guided by an elected board's wisdom and unwavering commitment to transparency, the OpCo will serve as a powerful catalyst for innovation and value creation.
With a well-defined roadmap and a budget of 25 million $ARB over two years, the OpCo is poised to unlock the boundless potential of the Arbitrum DAO. 🚀✨
To start, we are going deep into the mandates the OpCo will have. Then, we will roll up to generics as we get closer to the company charter, but I think it's important we agree on responsibilities first. We have included the higher-level mandates in-line, but for further drill-down, I recommend starting here.
Thanks!
The Arbitrum ecosystem has witnessed remarkable growth and adoption since its genesis, highlighting the immense potential of layer 2 scaling solutions in facilitating fast, cost-effective, and secure transactions on the Ethereum network. As the ecosystem expands, the Arbitrum DAO encounters increasingly complex challenges in managing operations, driving innovation, and ensuring sustainable growth. To tackle these challenges head-on and unlock new frontiers of opportunity, this AIP proposes the creation of an Operation Company (OpCo) to support the Arbitrum DAO and complement the Foundation.
The OpCo will serve as the execution arm of the Arbitrum DAO, collaborating closely with the Arbitrum Foundation to bring to life the strategies and initiatives set forth by the DAO's governance process. By establishing a dedicated entity singularly focused on operational excellence, the Arbitrum DAO can significantly enhance its agility, efficiency, and impact on the ecosystem.
The OpCo's primary objectives include attracting and retaining top talent, improving operational agility, scaling the DAO's impact, enhancing visibility and influence, and ensuring accountability and alignment with the Arbitrum DAO's goals. By leveraging the OpCo's streamlined decision-making processes and dedicated resources, the Arbitrum DAO can quickly adapt to emerging opportunities, proactively address challenges, and maintain its competitive edge in the rapidly evolving blockchain landscape.
Creating an OpCo is a strategic imperative for the Arbitrum DAO to navigate the complexities and capitalize on the opportunities of a dynamic ecosystem. By synergizing the agility and efficiency of a focused operational entity with the collective wisdom and inclusivity of decentralized governance, the Arbitrum DAO can unlock its full potential and drive meaningful, long-term value for its community and the broader blockchain industry.
This AIP proposes the creation of an Operation Company (OpCo) to support the Arbitrum DAO and Foundation in fostering the growth and development of the Arbitrum ecosystem. The OpCo, led by an elected board of ecosystem participants, will hire full-time contributors, improve operational agility, and scale the DAO's impact through enhanced collaboration, resource allocation, and visibility. The AIP requests a budget of 25 million $ARB to cover the OpCo's setup costs and operational expenses for the first two years.
Motivation:
Creating an Operation Company (OpCo) is a strategic imperative to drive the Arbitrum DAO forward in an increasingly competitive landscape. This comprehensive framework empowers the OpCo to identify and target critical areas or mandates where it can deliver maximum value to the Arbitrum DAO and its community.
The Arbitrum DAO faces several challenges today, which the OpCo aims to address:
The OpCo's agile structure catalyzes growth, fostering synergies across the ecosystem and attracting a diverse array of stakeholders united by a shared vision. By forming the Arbitrum Protocol Guild, the OpCo will coordinate and support the core protocol teams building the Arbitrum technology stack, driving innovation, and solidifying Arbitrum's current position.
The OpCo's mandate to implement robust on-chain performance tracking and transparent reporting mechanisms will significantly enhance the Arbitrum DAO's accountability and credibility. By leveraging data analytics and clear metrics, the OpCo will provide stakeholders with unparalleled insights into the DAO's activities, performance, and use of funds, strengthening trust within the community and attracting a wider pool of contributors and investors.
The OpCo's unwavering focus on community engagement, onchain experiences, and support will be the bedrock of Arbitrum's long-term success. By delivering comprehensive onboarding resources, fostering a vibrant and inclusive community, and actively seeking and implementing feedback, the OpCo will cultivate a loyal and passionate user base that is genuinely invested in the future of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
In essence, the OpCo represents a transformative leap forward for the Arbitrum DAO, empowering it to navigate the challenges and seize the opportunities of a rapidly evolving landscape. By combining the OpCo's operational prowess with the DAO's decentralized governance, Arbitrum will be poised to thrive in the Web3 era.
The establishment of an Operation Company (OpCo) is perfectly aligned with the Arbitrum community's mission and guiding values, serving as a catalyst for growth, inclusivity, and innovation within the ecosystem.
Transparency and Accountability: The OpCo ensures transparency, accountability, and effective decision-making at scale, harmonizing seamlessly with Arbitrum's ethos of decentralization.
Inclusivity and Accessibility: By fostering diversity and inclusion, the OpCo creates a vibrant and welcoming community that empowers users from all backgrounds to participate in the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem actively.
User-Centric Focus: The OpCo's unwavering commitment to serving the needs and interests of users ensures that the Arbitrum ecosystem remains user-centric at its core, fostering trust and loyalty among the community.
Open Collaboration and Innovation: By maintaining a neutral stance and promoting open collaboration, the OpCo cultivates an environment where groundbreaking projects and partnerships can thrive, pushing the boundaries of decentralized finance.
Alignment with Ethereum: The OpCo's efforts to drive adoption, collaboration, and innovation within the Arbitrum ecosystem ultimately benefit Ethereum as a whole, contributing to the growth and success of the broader Ethereum community.
Sustainable Growth: The OpCo enables the Arbitrum DAO to make strategic, long-term decisions and investments that promote the ecosystem's sustainable growth, ensuring that initiatives are designed for lasting impact.
The creation of the OpCo is not merely aligned with the Arbitrum community's mission and values – it is a natural and necessary extension of them. By providing a dedicated entity to drive the DAO's operational and ecosystem growth initiatives, the OpCo will serve as a powerful tool for helping the Arbitrum community achieve its goals while staying true to its core principles of decentralization, inclusivity, and innovation.
TBD - Still working on this graphic (Click Here to Expand)

If you want to play with the mermaid :wink: Markdown Here

1. Talent Acquisition and Program Management
Talent Acquisition and Program Management
2. Arbitrum Ecosystem Coordination
Arbitrum Ecosystem Coordination
3. On-Chain Performance Tracking
On-Chain Performance Tracking
4. Transparency & Analysis
Transparency & Analysis
5. Decentralized Objective Setting
Decentralized Objective Setting
6. Marketing and Brand Awareness (Memetics)
Marketing and Brand Awareness (Memetics)
7. Governance Engagement
Governance Engagement
8. Open & Competitive Service Provider Selection
Open & Competitive Service Provider Selection
9. Growth and Collaboration (Betting on Builders)
Growth and Collaboration (Betting on Builders)
10. Community Engagement and Support (Onboarding)
Community Engagement and Support (Onboarding)
- **Overview**: Build and maintain an engaged, inclusive, and well-supported Arbitrum community
- **Objectives**: Develop community engagement strategies, provide support and resources, gather and analyze feedback, help new members navigate opportunities, and foster a culture of experimentation and innovation
- **Strategies**: Implement a multi-faceted approach focusing on onboarding, education, technical assistance, feedback analysis, and fostering a culture of experimentation and innovation
- **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)**: Number of new members onboarded, participation rates in educational initiatives, resolution time and satisfaction scores for technical support, volume and sentiment of community feedback, and number and quality of community-driven innovations and contributions
- **Roadmap**: Develop and launch the onboarding process and initial educational content, establish technical support channels and feedback gathering mechanisms, implement initiatives to foster experimentation and innovation, and analyze and refine community engagement and support strategies
- **Resources**: Dedicated community management and support team within the OpCo, budget allocation for educational content development and events, and technical infrastructure for onboarding and experimentation platforms
11. Strategic Partnerships (Business Development)
Strategic Partnerships (Business Development)
- **Overview**: Identify and pursue strategic partnerships to drive growth and innovation within the Arbitrum ecosystem
- **Objectives**: Identify and pursue partnerships, negotiate and manage agreements, and collaborate on joint initiatives
- **Strategies**: Implement a structured approach to identifying, negotiating, and managing partnerships that align with the ecosystem's goals and values
- **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)**: Number and quality of partnerships established, value generated through partnerships, successful execution of joint initiatives, partner satisfaction and retention rates, and contribution to the overall growth and success of the ecosystem
- **Roadmap**: Develop partnership criteria and best practices, identify and pursue initial partnerships, collaborate on joint initiatives with established partners, and expand and refine partnership strategies
- **Resources**: Dedicated business development team with expertise in partnership management and blockchain technology, budget allocation for industry events and joint initiatives, and collaboration tools and platforms
12. Administration & Sustainability
Administration & Sustainability
- **Overview**: Ensure the OpCo maintains the internal capabilities and talent required to deliver on its commitments to the Arbitrum ecosystem
- **Objectives**: Operate under the guidance of the Transitory Congress, maintain internal capabilities and talent, and maintain transparency through regular reporting
- **Strategies**: Implement a well-structured governance body, focus on talent management and internal capabilities, and commit to transparency through regular reporting
- **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)**: Diversity and expertise of the Transitory Congress members, alignment of OpCo activities with the DAO's objectives, talent retention rate and employee satisfaction, efficiency gains from streamlined processes, and timely and accurate reporting
- **Roadmap**: Establish the Transitory Congress and governance structure, assess and enhance internal capabilities and talent, develop and implement a comprehensive reporting framework, and evaluate and refine administration and sustainability practices
- **Resources**: Dedicated team within the OpCo focused on governance, talent management, and reporting, budget allocation for talent acquisition and professional development, and collaboration tools and blockchain-based accounting systems
By focusing on these core mandates, the Arbitrum OpCo will be well-positioned to support the growth, sustainability, and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem, while remaining accountable to the Arbitrum DAO and its community.
1. Legal Entity Structure (TBD)
2. Recruit OpCo Leadership (2-4 weeks)
3. Establish OpCo Policies and Procedures (2-4 weeks)
4. Engage DAO for Role Identification (2-4 weeks)
5. Conduct Recruitment and Onboarding (8-12 weeks)
6. Establish OpCo Governance and Reporting (4-6 weeks)
7. Continuously Assess and Optimize OpCo Performance (Ongoing)
The total cost to implement the AIP and establish the Operation Company (OpCo) is estimated to be 25 million $ARB covering 2 years. This budget covers both the initial setup costs and the recurring operating expenses for the first two years. The breakdown of the costs is as follows:
Totally threw some High-Level Numbers here - This will need revision indefinitely
Line Item Breakdown 📊
Total Fixed Costs: 4,000,000 $ARB
Total Recurring Costs (Two Years): 21,000,000 $ARB
Grand Total (Two Years): 25,000,000 $ARB
This two-year budget allocation allows the OpCo to establish a strong foundation, maintain operational stability, and adapt to the evolving needs of the Arbitrum ecosystem over an extended period. The Arbitrum DAO can reassess the OpCo's performance and budget requirements after the initial two years to ensure ongoing alignment with the ecosystem's growth and the DAO's objectives.
Will update and revise often as this is just the beginning of what this could become!
initially i echoed the concern regarding duplication of OpCo down the line, but i think the OpCo actually helps prevent that by effectively managing stakeholders and consolidating efforts from a bird’s eyeview.
initially i echoed the concern regarding duplication of OpCo down the line, but i think the OpCo actually helps prevent that by effectively managing stakeholders and consolidating efforts from a bird’s eyeview.
I agree with this change in perspective. In response to @0xidm 's concern too - do you worry about the duplication work if the outputs aggregate to ultimately the same shareholders? Having multiple orgs work within the same mandate can instill urgency, competition, and accountability to Arbitrum.
To help @dk3's vision on an OpCo get started, my experience is such that the DAO can focus on:
initially i echoed the concern regarding duplication of OpCo down the line, but i think the OpCo actually helps prevent that by effectively managing stakeholders and consolidating efforts from a bird’s eyeview.
initially i echoed the concern regarding duplication of OpCo down the line, but i think the OpCo actually helps prevent that by effectively managing stakeholders and consolidating efforts from a bird’s eyeview.
I agree with this change in perspective. In response to @0xidm 's concern too - do you worry about the duplication work if the outputs aggregate to ultimately the same shareholders? Having multiple orgs work within the same mandate can instill urgency, competition, and accountability to Arbitrum.
To help @dk3's vision on an OpCo get started, my experience is such that the DAO can focus on:
thanks for getting started on this - super comprehensive in terms of tasks and goal setting that merge decentralization (decision making) nicely with centralization (organization). at the same time, this is probably the easy part, and hard part would be the communication (with DAO, OCL, AF) and coordination to further streamline the scope and priorities.
initially i echoed the concern regarding duplication of OpCo down the line, but i think the OpCo actually helps prevent that by effectively managing stakeholders and consolidating efforts from a bird's eyeview.
thanks for getting started on this - super comprehensive in terms of tasks and goal setting that merge decentralization (decision making) nicely with centralization (organization). at the same time, this is probably the easy part, and hard part would be the communication (with DAO, OCL, AF) and coordination to further streamline the scope and priorities.
initially i echoed the concern regarding duplication of OpCo down the line, but i think the OpCo actually helps prevent that by effectively managing stakeholders and consolidating efforts from a bird's eyeview.
personally feel strongly about the work you're doing and that it should be the direction that the DAO should go towards, so happy to help out!
thanks for getting started on this - super comprehensive in terms of tasks and goal setting that merge decentralization (decision making) nicely with centralization (organization). at the same time, this is probably the easy part, and hard part would be the communication (with DAO, OCL, AF) and coordination to further streamline the scope and priorities.
initially i echoed the concern regarding duplication of OpCo down the line, but i think the OpCo actually helps prevent that by effectively managing stakeholders and consolidating efforts from a bird's eyeview.
thanks for getting started on this - super comprehensive in terms of tasks and goal setting that merge decentralization (decision making) nicely with centralization (organization). at the same time, this is probably the easy part, and hard part would be the communication (with DAO, OCL, AF) and coordination to further streamline the scope and priorities.
initially i echoed the concern regarding duplication of OpCo down the line, but i think the OpCo actually helps prevent that by effectively managing stakeholders and consolidating efforts from a bird's eyeview.
personally feel strongly about the work you're doing and that it should be the direction that the DAO should go towards, so happy to help out!
This is a great proposal and a great idea. If this works, it will maintain consistency across proposals and initiatives, enabling persistence of vision on a medium-term basis. In line with the objectives stated at the outset of the proposal, I'd hope a successful outcome could meet the following criteria:
This is a great proposal and a great idea. If this works, it will maintain consistency across proposals and initiatives, enabling persistence of vision on a medium-term basis. In line with the objectives stated at the outset of the proposal, I'd hope a successful outcome could meet the following criteria:
I think I share some concerns with others regarding non-essential tasks. One side-quest I've seen often enough is for teams to invest resources into its own overhead/maintenance, with hopes of gaining operational efficiencies. Even so, it's worth the risk.
One minor thing; could it be called the CoOp? :slight_smile: I think it captures the spirit of the objectives.
The big advantage of a centralised decision making body is that internal communications is "cheap" resulting in faster decisions. The downside is the lack of contestability, how do you know the decision is the "best" given the available information at that time? BigCo sits at the bottom right of the legal structures post I had at top ... sure you can have a bidding run-off but that doesn't address he issue of all eggs in one basket (hypothetically speaking).
An alternative is to move more towards left, open up a token-curated registry (timelocked) for say 10 mini-OpCo wih the requirement of a % being common use facility and a blind-trust commitment to sell down in the future so if individual mini-OpCo do well, they'd buy back more of the initial capital investment as it'd be profitable for them. having 10 or so mini-OpCo allows sufficient diversification to address less explored parts of the ecosystem giving more surface area to possible blue-ocean opportunities.
Hey there, CoachJ here from Gitcoin :wave: First time poster, though have been lurking for the last couple of months :slight_smile:
This proposal seems similar to the direction that Gitcoin headed in recently. To create focus around Gitcoin's technology, Gitcoin created a new business unit called Grants Lab who is 100% focused on product adoption and managing a P&L. Concurrently, a new unit called the Ecosystem Collective was launched to steward Gitcoin's brand, community and governance initiatives (with similar functions to the proposed OpCo).
i like the idea - Arbitrum DAO is one of the largest DAOs by most metrics (treasury value, projects in the ecosystem, TVL, users, etc.) and OpCo in charge of more top-down strategic thinking and agility to execute the plan will help Arbitrum ecosystem in the long-run. It's too much of random ideas flying around in the DAO right now, and we need an entity that can take a step back and think of the bigger picture and help coordinate the piecemeal actions.
OffChain Labs does already have most of the teams though (ecosystem, partnerships, marketing, community, etc.), so a problem could be how to not have duplication of work (i.e. operational inefficiency), but i guess this can be solved and aligned with a bit of work.
i like the idea - Arbitrum DAO is one of the largest DAOs by most metrics (treasury value, projects in the ecosystem, TVL, users, etc.) and OpCo in charge of more top-down strategic thinking and agility to execute the plan will help Arbitrum ecosystem in the long-run. It's too much of random ideas flying around in the DAO right now, and we need an entity that can take a step back and think of the bigger picture and help coordinate the piecemeal actions.
OffChain Labs does already have most of the teams though (ecosystem, partnerships, marketing, community, etc.), so a problem could be how to not have duplication of work (i.e. operational inefficiency), but i guess this can be solved and aligned with a bit of work.
Taking a step back, what do you think about having an overall structure for the DAO, that incorporates existing committees (ARDC, Procurement Committee)?
This is a great proposal and a great idea. If this works, it will maintain consistency across proposals and initiatives, enabling persistence of vision on a medium-term basis. In line with the objectives stated at the outset of the proposal, I'd hope a successful outcome could meet the following criteria:
This is a great proposal and a great idea. If this works, it will maintain consistency across proposals and initiatives, enabling persistence of vision on a medium-term basis. In line with the objectives stated at the outset of the proposal, I'd hope a successful outcome could meet the following criteria:
I think I share some concerns with others regarding non-essential tasks. One side-quest I've seen often enough is for teams to invest resources into its own overhead/maintenance, with hopes of gaining operational efficiencies. Even so, it's worth the risk.
One minor thing; could it be called the CoOp? :slight_smile: I think it captures the spirit of the objectives.
The big advantage of a centralised decision making body is that internal communications is "cheap" resulting in faster decisions. The downside is the lack of contestability, how do you know the decision is the "best" given the available information at that time? BigCo sits at the bottom right of the legal structures post I had at top ... sure you can have a bidding run-off but that doesn't address he issue of all eggs in one basket (hypothetically speaking).
An alternative is to move more towards left, open up a token-curated registry (timelocked) for say 10 mini-OpCo wih the requirement of a % being common use facility and a blind-trust commitment to sell down in the future so if individual mini-OpCo do well, they'd buy back more of the initial capital investment as it'd be profitable for them. having 10 or so mini-OpCo allows sufficient diversification to address less explored parts of the ecosystem giving more surface area to possible blue-ocean opportunities.
Hey there, CoachJ here from Gitcoin :wave: First time poster, though have been lurking for the last couple of months :slight_smile:
This proposal seems similar to the direction that Gitcoin headed in recently. To create focus around Gitcoin's technology, Gitcoin created a new business unit called Grants Lab who is 100% focused on product adoption and managing a P&L. Concurrently, a new unit called the Ecosystem Collective was launched to steward Gitcoin's brand, community and governance initiatives (with similar functions to the proposed OpCo).
i like the idea - Arbitrum DAO is one of the largest DAOs by most metrics (treasury value, projects in the ecosystem, TVL, users, etc.) and OpCo in charge of more top-down strategic thinking and agility to execute the plan will help Arbitrum ecosystem in the long-run. It's too much of random ideas flying around in the DAO right now, and we need an entity that can take a step back and think of the bigger picture and help coordinate the piecemeal actions.
OffChain Labs does already have most of the teams though (ecosystem, partnerships, marketing, community, etc.), so a problem could be how to not have duplication of work (i.e. operational inefficiency), but i guess this can be solved and aligned with a bit of work.
i like the idea - Arbitrum DAO is one of the largest DAOs by most metrics (treasury value, projects in the ecosystem, TVL, users, etc.) and OpCo in charge of more top-down strategic thinking and agility to execute the plan will help Arbitrum ecosystem in the long-run. It's too much of random ideas flying around in the DAO right now, and we need an entity that can take a step back and think of the bigger picture and help coordinate the piecemeal actions.
OffChain Labs does already have most of the teams though (ecosystem, partnerships, marketing, community, etc.), so a problem could be how to not have duplication of work (i.e. operational inefficiency), but i guess this can be solved and aligned with a bit of work.
Taking a step back, what do you think about having an overall structure for the DAO, that incorporates existing committees (ARDC, Procurement Committee)?
The big advantage of a centralised decision making body is that internal communications is "cheap" resulting in faster decisions. The downside is the lack of contestability, how do you know the decision is the "best" given the available information at that time? BigCo sits at the bottom right of the legal structures post I had at top ... sure you can have a bidding run-off but that doesn't address he issue of all eggs in one basket (hypothetically speaking).
An alternative is to move more towards left, open up a token-curated registry (timelocked) for say 10 mini-OpCo wih the requirement of a % being common use facility and a blind-trust commitment to sell down in the future so if individual mini-OpCo do well, they'd buy back more of the initial capital investment as it'd be profitable for them. having 10 or so mini-OpCo allows sufficient diversification to address less explored parts of the ecosystem giving more surface area to possible blue-ocean opportunities.
If you head northwards (legal structure-wise), it'll be something akin to public-private partnership which has different dynamics.
Hey there, CoachJ here from Gitcoin :wave: First time poster, though have been lurking for the last couple of months :slight_smile:
This proposal seems similar to the direction that Gitcoin headed in recently. To create focus around Gitcoin's technology, Gitcoin created a new business unit called Grants Lab who is 100% focused on product adoption and managing a P&L. Concurrently, a new unit called the Ecosystem Collective was launched to steward Gitcoin's brand, community and governance initiatives (with similar functions to the proposed OpCo).
Having co-led the recently spun down Merch, Memes and Marketing workstream at Gitcoin and currently co-leading the Ecosystem Collective, I wanted to offer my thoughts and comments in hopes that you'll find these helpful as you navigate the development of this kind of net new organization.
Cross-stream Collaboration
Scoping Challenges
Marketing Questions
What @jengajojo cited (another legal) entity spinning up and cloning has already happened. I cite the Curve-Saddlesore IP appropriation ...
The problem with open source is that people attempt to front-run trying to get big b4 getting out. There is little one can due if the defendent is a JohnDoe (court hate this) and don't even ask about JaneDoe plaintiffs (some rare situations where need to protect the victim but otherwise the existing system throws a sissy fit).
What @jengajojo cited (another legal) entity spinning up and cloning has already happened. I cite the Curve-Saddlesore IP appropriation ...
The problem with open source is that people attempt to front-run trying to get big b4 getting out. There is little one can due if the defendent is a JohnDoe (court hate this) and don't even ask about JaneDoe plaintiffs (some rare situations where need to protect the victim but otherwise the existing system throws a sissy fit).
Trying to scale up DAOs is harder than people think ... look at the Bankless backdraft and what used to be a vibrant community feels like a ghost town (comparatively). Lights might be on but nobody's home.
The big advantage of a centralised decision making body is that internal communications is "cheap" resulting in faster decisions. The downside is the lack of contestability, how do you know the decision is the "best" given the available information at that time? BigCo sits at the bottom right of the legal structures post I had at top ... sure you can have a bidding run-off but that doesn't address he issue of all eggs in one basket (hypothetically speaking).
An alternative is to move more towards left, open up a token-curated registry (timelocked) for say 10 mini-OpCo wih the requirement of a % being common use facility and a blind-trust commitment to sell down in the future so if individual mini-OpCo do well, they'd buy back more of the initial capital investment as it'd be profitable for them. having 10 or so mini-OpCo allows sufficient diversification to address less explored parts of the ecosystem giving more surface area to possible blue-ocean opportunities.
If you head northwards (legal structure-wise), it'll be something akin to public-private partnership which has different dynamics.
Hey there, CoachJ here from Gitcoin :wave: First time poster, though have been lurking for the last couple of months :slight_smile:
This proposal seems similar to the direction that Gitcoin headed in recently. To create focus around Gitcoin's technology, Gitcoin created a new business unit called Grants Lab who is 100% focused on product adoption and managing a P&L. Concurrently, a new unit called the Ecosystem Collective was launched to steward Gitcoin's brand, community and governance initiatives (with similar functions to the proposed OpCo).
Having co-led the recently spun down Merch, Memes and Marketing workstream at Gitcoin and currently co-leading the Ecosystem Collective, I wanted to offer my thoughts and comments in hopes that you'll find these helpful as you navigate the development of this kind of net new organization.
Cross-stream Collaboration
Scoping Challenges
Marketing Questions
What @jengajojo cited (another legal) entity spinning up and cloning has already happened. I cite the Curve-Saddlesore IP appropriation ...
The problem with open source is that people attempt to front-run trying to get big b4 getting out. There is little one can due if the defendent is a JohnDoe (court hate this) and don't even ask about JaneDoe plaintiffs (some rare situations where need to protect the victim but otherwise the existing system throws a sissy fit).
What @jengajojo cited (another legal) entity spinning up and cloning has already happened. I cite the Curve-Saddlesore IP appropriation ...
The problem with open source is that people attempt to front-run trying to get big b4 getting out. There is little one can due if the defendent is a JohnDoe (court hate this) and don't even ask about JaneDoe plaintiffs (some rare situations where need to protect the victim but otherwise the existing system throws a sissy fit).
Trying to scale up DAOs is harder than people think ... look at the Bankless backdraft and what used to be a vibrant community feels like a ghost town (comparatively). Lights might be on but nobody's home.

Firstly, can we agree on some terminology? DAOs originated from MMORPG (see gnosis pre-history) and got traction with Ethereum ... Vitalik himself distinguishes DAC (what I call digital automated comparies) from DAOs.
There are as many governance patterns as there are countries ... with smart contracts you can implement whatever you want.

Firstly, can we agree on some terminology? DAOs originated from MMORPG (see gnosis pre-history) and got traction with Ethereum ... Vitalik himself distinguishes DAC (what I call digital automated comparies) from DAOs.
There are as many governance patterns as there are countries ... with smart contracts you can implement whatever you want.
If people are unaware of work done in society axis (impact) I draw attention to Szabo early work on social titles
Another form of wealth, hidden from the archaeologist, were titles to offices. Such social positions were more valuable than the tangible forms of wealth in many hunter-gatherer cultures. Examples of such positions included clan leaders, war party leaders, hunting party leaders, membership in a particular long-term trading partnership (with a particular person in a neighboring clan or tribe), midwives, and religious healers. Often collectibles not only embodied wealth, but also served as a mnemonic, representing the title to a clan position of responsibility and privilege. Upon death, to maintain order, the heirs to such positions had to be quickly and clearly determined. Delays could spawn vicious conflicts. Thus, a common event was the mortuary feast, in which the deceased was feted while both his tangible and intangible forms of wealth were distributed to descendants, as determined by custom, clan decision-makers, or the will of the deceased.
The unique point about DAOs vs traditional firms is the "absence" of fixed titles/positions. Instead you might have
would be putting on the accounting role in divy up tokens and budgettingThe problem with big grants like Arbitrum Foundation is that is like waving juicy meat to hungry sharks ... everyone wants a piece of the action b4 the $$$ runs out. This comes back to the purpose .... a) is it a VC style gamble to pick winners? b) is it a co-op which identifies common-use facility, and seeds initial trials awaiting industry to uptake? c) is it a tax/tithe disbursing public goods (restrospective or anticipatory if see a big pain-point)
The OpCo can be positioned (and funded) as all 3 depending on configuration
I don't have a horse in this race, but some clarity as to where the OpCo sits on the charitable-4profit scale might help steer the conversation.

Firstly, can we agree on some terminology? DAOs originated from MMORPG (see gnosis pre-history) and got traction with Ethereum ... Vitalik himself distinguishes DAC (what I call digital automated comparies) from DAOs.
There are as many governance patterns as there are countries ... with smart contracts you can implement whatever you want.

Firstly, can we agree on some terminology? DAOs originated from MMORPG (see gnosis pre-history) and got traction with Ethereum ... Vitalik himself distinguishes DAC (what I call digital automated comparies) from DAOs.
There are as many governance patterns as there are countries ... with smart contracts you can implement whatever you want.
If people are unaware of work done in society axis (impact) I draw attention to Szabo early work on social titles
Another form of wealth, hidden from the archaeologist, were titles to offices. Such social positions were more valuable than the tangible forms of wealth in many hunter-gatherer cultures. Examples of such positions included clan leaders, war party leaders, hunting party leaders, membership in a particular long-term trading partnership (with a particular person in a neighboring clan or tribe), midwives, and religious healers. Often collectibles not only embodied wealth, but also served as a mnemonic, representing the title to a clan position of responsibility and privilege. Upon death, to maintain order, the heirs to such positions had to be quickly and clearly determined. Delays could spawn vicious conflicts. Thus, a common event was the mortuary feast, in which the deceased was feted while both his tangible and intangible forms of wealth were distributed to descendants, as determined by custom, clan decision-makers, or the will of the deceased.
The unique point about DAOs vs traditional firms is the "absence" of fixed titles/positions. Instead you might have
would be putting on the accounting role in divy up tokens and budgettingThe problem with big grants like Arbitrum Foundation is that is like waving juicy meat to hungry sharks ... everyone wants a piece of the action b4 the $$$ runs out. This comes back to the purpose .... a) is it a VC style gamble to pick winners? b) is it a co-op which identifies common-use facility, and seeds initial trials awaiting industry to uptake? c) is it a tax/tithe disbursing public goods (restrospective or anticipatory if see a big pain-point)
The OpCo can be positioned (and funded) as all 3 depending on configuration
I don't have a horse in this race, but some clarity as to where the OpCo sits on the charitable-4profit scale might help steer the conversation.
Heading in this direction seems like a smart decision. It could significantly enhance the impact of the Arbitrum DAO.
However, there are a few things I'm worried about:
Heading in this direction seems like a smart decision. It could significantly enhance the impact of the Arbitrum DAO.
However, there are a few things I'm worried about:
Sometimes, it's just more efficient to clearly define what's needed, pay someone, and have them get it done.
Considering Arbitrum's size, though, we might not have a lot of alternatives.
Would love to hear your thoughts on this.
Heading in this direction seems like a smart decision. It could significantly enhance the impact of the Arbitrum DAO.
However, there are a few things I'm worried about:
Heading in this direction seems like a smart decision. It could significantly enhance the impact of the Arbitrum DAO.
However, there are a few things I'm worried about:
Sometimes, it's just more efficient to clearly define what's needed, pay someone, and have them get it done.
Considering Arbitrum's size, though, we might not have a lot of alternatives.
Would love to hear your thoughts on this.
Although this topic has been around for a while now, the landscape has not really change enough for me to support it. Regulatory scrutiny is only bound to grow in the coming years, and committing to the OpCo proposal for such a long time frame might not be the best, especially with such a high budget.
Despite the clear benefits behind creating a separate legal entity, this should ideally be tested on a smaller scale to increase its chances of passing with a proven track record of efficiency that can off balance most voters apprehensions towards it.
After some considerable reflection, I do not think the proposal is a good idea and plan to vote against if taken to snapshot. At the present juncture, I believe it is much better suited for a Plurality Labs grant program than being its own standalone entity.
Some reasons;
After some considerable reflection, I do not think the proposal is a good idea and plan to vote against if taken to snapshot. At the present juncture, I believe it is much better suited for a Plurality Labs grant program than being its own standalone entity.
Some reasons;
It's always scary for delegates to transfer large amounts to a single entity when there hasn't been a pilot already done. Would inspire more confidence to allocate these large figures if a pilot is first undertaken with PL Bridge proposal !
We should be extremely wary of setting up entities that seek to represent or embody arbitrum dao in any way. I would much rather an equivalent of a super PAC be setup (external to a politician but still advocating for them) than something framing itself as an operating company for the dao (especially when we already have the foundation doing an admirable job).
its unclear if we can have onchain governance for the OpCo. I would rather have the DAO be completely onchain and have different allied structures supporting it than create some legal entity for the dao that would suffer from the same traps of the conventional world.
We are voting AGAINST on this proposal.
Our reasoning is that such an initiative should start smaller and with a smaller budget, allowing time to iterate and make clear objectives, see results then scale up the program over time.
We should take example from other successful DAOs where service providers have small budgets and are aligned with the overall growth of the DAO, then paid for results.
We are voting AGAINST on this proposal.
Our reasoning is that such an initiative should start smaller and with a smaller budget, allowing time to iterate and make clear objectives, see results then scale up the program over time.
We should take example from other successful DAOs where service providers have small budgets and are aligned with the overall growth of the DAO, then paid for results.
For example, 25 million ABR is over $10 million. That is more than all of the non-technical service providers at Aave DAO are paid combined.
While we are quite supportive of initiatives that help to set strategic direction for the DAO, we believe these do not need to be expensive coordination programs run by a single group. Instead, they should be lower budget programs over shorter time periods that can prove success.
Thank you everyone for the comments the past week, I am in token2049 this week and will respond to posts next week.
In terms of timelines, will probably post to snapshot sometime the first week of may, and progress from there as amendments are needed.
Thanks, DK
I recognise the problems this proposal seeks to address (big issues!), but despite trying to keep quite and focus in other things, I can't help but have concerns too.
Mostly, I'm thinking, how do you see the role for non-employees and other service providers and contributors moving forward?
I recognise the problems this proposal seeks to address (big issues!), but despite trying to keep quite and focus in other things, I can't help but have concerns too.
Mostly, I'm thinking, how do you see the role for non-employees and other service providers and contributors moving forward?
For context, my biggest concern with the OpCo is that by providing a traditional approach to address many of the painpoints, it results in centralised top-down management of ArbitrumDAO. Now, I'm not demonising centralisation (I see value in coordination and speed, and centralisation offers some of that). My concern is the risk the OpCo poses to disincentivise bottom-up contributions through information and power asymmetry.
For example: Jane (community member) sees a gap in the DAO for a knowledge hub. She assembles a team and works for weeks to develop a proposal. They're not paid for this work and do it at risk, hoping a proposal will be approved. In the meantime, the OpCo directors hire someone and Jane loses all her time. Alternatively, Jane could have checked with the OpCo directors before doing any work, but before everyone else is trying to get time from the OpCO directors too and they're overwhelmed. The OpCo directors find community members unreliable and so give them limited time, instead preferring to hire people they can control. Others hear of Jane's story and soon the OpCo is the only entity contributing to ArbitrumDAO.
Now, the above example doesn't need to be how things play out. I'm just pointing out that it's a major risk.
A few ideas to mitigate bottleneck and contribution desincentivisation risks: (ideally, a few strategies are combined)
I'm curious if you resonate with the risk assessment (and if so with any of the proposed strategies to mitigate said risk).
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
The discussion on whether we should establish an OpCo entity boils down to the question of whether we want Arbitrum DAO to be reactive or proactive.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
The discussion on whether we should establish an OpCo entity boils down to the question of whether we want Arbitrum DAO to be reactive or proactive.
As it stands, the DAO is currently mostly reactive in the sense that delegates are called to vote on initiatives that are being developed individually by different contributors and do not necessarily co-exist in a coherent, structured way. A good analogy would be a series of unique puzzle pieces being fitted together, without however an end image to guide the process. Each initiative is working to establish its structure with different processes as there’s a lack of standard practices on that front — and no initiative can create a standard practice without heavily deviating from its original purpose.
This situation creates operational hurdles that burden each proposer separately and also puts a strain on the DAO. From having no standard operational process to distribute money (e.g. we have so many different multi-sigs that each costs money to run) to the inability of the DAO to straight-up hire people to do work, to the lack of standard operational structures and processes, everything points to a need to have an entity responsible for the DAO’s operations.
Simply put, the DAO needs an Operating Company (OpCo).
Even things that have been partially and temporarily resolved, such as the need to procure service providers through the ADPC, or the need to have domain experts review and provide feedback to proposals through the ARDC, would be significantly easier to set up and run under an OpCo.
Having the ability to drive initiatives forward without having to worry about the operational burden of execution will empower contributors to expend all their efforts towards the success of their initiative, and not towards trivial (to their cause) things such as setting up a multisig or figuring out how they should be reporting their progress.
On top of assisting with the operations of ongoing initiatives, through an OpCo, the DAO would have the ability to tackle needs as they arise by hiring the right people and assigning them the appropriate tasks. For example, if there’s a need for an oversight committee to oversee different initiatives that have been funded by the DAO, the OpCo could hire people and set up a team to carry out that work.
Having said that, while there might be details around the proposed OpCo that still need to be defined, the overall concept of establishing an Operating Company is something that we’re supportive of and believe is very much needed.
We’d like to help push the OpCo proposal forward in a way that inspires confidence among delegates and with the appropriate checks and balances to ensure that it’s the DAO that ultimately remains in control, without however suffocating the OpCo’s ability to operate.
Thank you @dk3 for putting them together. We are certain that you and the contributors put so much effort into the proposal.
This reminds us of dYdX Ops subDAO with the similar actors like its Foundation and other sub DAOs. They have specifically focused on executions and as an example, taken on the operational duty of the dYdX chain. While Arbitrum doesn't have its own chain or technical elements to be managed by the DAO (yet), the management of the future components can be carried out by an organization tied to the DAO, not by the Foundation.
Likewise. I just wanted to add that there is no evidence that management through OpCo will be more effective than through existing tools.
Solving the problems of a new space with old methods can be a dead-end solution.
Although this topic has been around for a while now, the landscape has not really change enough for me to support it. Regulatory scrutiny is only bound to grow in the coming years, and committing to the OpCo proposal for such a long time frame might not be the best, especially with such a high budget.
Despite the clear benefits behind creating a separate legal entity, this should ideally be tested on a smaller scale to increase its chances of passing with a proven track record of efficiency that can off balance most voters apprehensions towards it.
After some considerable reflection, I do not think the proposal is a good idea and plan to vote against if taken to snapshot. At the present juncture, I believe it is much better suited for a Plurality Labs grant program than being its own standalone entity.
Some reasons;
After some considerable reflection, I do not think the proposal is a good idea and plan to vote against if taken to snapshot. At the present juncture, I believe it is much better suited for a Plurality Labs grant program than being its own standalone entity.
Some reasons;
It's always scary for delegates to transfer large amounts to a single entity when there hasn't been a pilot already done. Would inspire more confidence to allocate these large figures if a pilot is first undertaken with PL Bridge proposal !
We should be extremely wary of setting up entities that seek to represent or embody arbitrum dao in any way. I would much rather an equivalent of a super PAC be setup (external to a politician but still advocating for them) than something framing itself as an operating company for the dao (especially when we already have the foundation doing an admirable job).
its unclear if we can have onchain governance for the OpCo. I would rather have the DAO be completely onchain and have different allied structures supporting it than create some legal entity for the dao that would suffer from the same traps of the conventional world.
We are voting AGAINST on this proposal.
Our reasoning is that such an initiative should start smaller and with a smaller budget, allowing time to iterate and make clear objectives, see results then scale up the program over time.
We should take example from other successful DAOs where service providers have small budgets and are aligned with the overall growth of the DAO, then paid for results.
We are voting AGAINST on this proposal.
Our reasoning is that such an initiative should start smaller and with a smaller budget, allowing time to iterate and make clear objectives, see results then scale up the program over time.
We should take example from other successful DAOs where service providers have small budgets and are aligned with the overall growth of the DAO, then paid for results.
For example, 25 million ABR is over $10 million. That is more than all of the non-technical service providers at Aave DAO are paid combined.
While we are quite supportive of initiatives that help to set strategic direction for the DAO, we believe these do not need to be expensive coordination programs run by a single group. Instead, they should be lower budget programs over shorter time periods that can prove success.
Thank you everyone for the comments the past week, I am in token2049 this week and will respond to posts next week.
In terms of timelines, will probably post to snapshot sometime the first week of may, and progress from there as amendments are needed.
Thanks, DK
I recognise the problems this proposal seeks to address (big issues!), but despite trying to keep quite and focus in other things, I can't help but have concerns too.
Mostly, I'm thinking, how do you see the role for non-employees and other service providers and contributors moving forward?
I recognise the problems this proposal seeks to address (big issues!), but despite trying to keep quite and focus in other things, I can't help but have concerns too.
Mostly, I'm thinking, how do you see the role for non-employees and other service providers and contributors moving forward?
For context, my biggest concern with the OpCo is that by providing a traditional approach to address many of the painpoints, it results in centralised top-down management of ArbitrumDAO. Now, I'm not demonising centralisation (I see value in coordination and speed, and centralisation offers some of that). My concern is the risk the OpCo poses to disincentivise bottom-up contributions through information and power asymmetry.
For example: Jane (community member) sees a gap in the DAO for a knowledge hub. She assembles a team and works for weeks to develop a proposal. They're not paid for this work and do it at risk, hoping a proposal will be approved. In the meantime, the OpCo directors hire someone and Jane loses all her time. Alternatively, Jane could have checked with the OpCo directors before doing any work, but before everyone else is trying to get time from the OpCO directors too and they're overwhelmed. The OpCo directors find community members unreliable and so give them limited time, instead preferring to hire people they can control. Others hear of Jane's story and soon the OpCo is the only entity contributing to ArbitrumDAO.
Now, the above example doesn't need to be how things play out. I'm just pointing out that it's a major risk.
A few ideas to mitigate bottleneck and contribution desincentivisation risks: (ideally, a few strategies are combined)
I'm curious if you resonate with the risk assessment (and if so with any of the proposed strategies to mitigate said risk).
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
The discussion on whether we should establish an OpCo entity boils down to the question of whether we want Arbitrum DAO to be reactive or proactive.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
The discussion on whether we should establish an OpCo entity boils down to the question of whether we want Arbitrum DAO to be reactive or proactive.
As it stands, the DAO is currently mostly reactive in the sense that delegates are called to vote on initiatives that are being developed individually by different contributors and do not necessarily co-exist in a coherent, structured way. A good analogy would be a series of unique puzzle pieces being fitted together, without however an end image to guide the process. Each initiative is working to establish its structure with different processes as there’s a lack of standard practices on that front — and no initiative can create a standard practice without heavily deviating from its original purpose.
This situation creates operational hurdles that burden each proposer separately and also puts a strain on the DAO. From having no standard operational process to distribute money (e.g. we have so many different multi-sigs that each costs money to run) to the inability of the DAO to straight-up hire people to do work, to the lack of standard operational structures and processes, everything points to a need to have an entity responsible for the DAO’s operations.
Simply put, the DAO needs an Operating Company (OpCo).
Even things that have been partially and temporarily resolved, such as the need to procure service providers through the ADPC, or the need to have domain experts review and provide feedback to proposals through the ARDC, would be significantly easier to set up and run under an OpCo.
Having the ability to drive initiatives forward without having to worry about the operational burden of execution will empower contributors to expend all their efforts towards the success of their initiative, and not towards trivial (to their cause) things such as setting up a multisig or figuring out how they should be reporting their progress.
On top of assisting with the operations of ongoing initiatives, through an OpCo, the DAO would have the ability to tackle needs as they arise by hiring the right people and assigning them the appropriate tasks. For example, if there’s a need for an oversight committee to oversee different initiatives that have been funded by the DAO, the OpCo could hire people and set up a team to carry out that work.
Having said that, while there might be details around the proposed OpCo that still need to be defined, the overall concept of establishing an Operating Company is something that we’re supportive of and believe is very much needed.
We’d like to help push the OpCo proposal forward in a way that inspires confidence among delegates and with the appropriate checks and balances to ensure that it’s the DAO that ultimately remains in control, without however suffocating the OpCo’s ability to operate.
Thank you @dk3 for putting them together. We are certain that you and the contributors put so much effort into the proposal.
This reminds us of dYdX Ops subDAO with the similar actors like its Foundation and other sub DAOs. They have specifically focused on executions and as an example, taken on the operational duty of the dYdX chain. While Arbitrum doesn't have its own chain or technical elements to be managed by the DAO (yet), the management of the future components can be carried out by an organization tied to the DAO, not by the Foundation.
Likewise. I just wanted to add that there is no evidence that management through OpCo will be more effective than through existing tools.
Solving the problems of a new space with old methods can be a dead-end solution.
Thank you @dk3 for putting them together. We are certain that you and the contributors put so much effort into the proposal.
This reminds us of dYdX Ops subDAO with the similar actors like its Foundation and other sub DAOs. They have specifically focused on executions and as an example, taken on the operational duty of the dYdX chain. While Arbitrum doesn't have its own chain or technical elements to be managed by the DAO (yet), the management of the future components can be carried out by an organization tied to the DAO, not by the Foundation.
We assume there should be a lot of coordinations with the existing (and newly formed) councils, working groups, OFL, and Foundation and a few coordinators should kick off the initial bootstrapping (e.g. hiring as mentioned) and that will be a critical milestone to be achieved for the success of the initiative.
In any way, at Tané, we would love to support the proposal and be willing to contribute to its further development.
One minor thing; could it be called the CoOp? :slight_smile: I think it captures the spirit of the objectives.
One minor thing; could it be called the CoOp? :slight_smile: I think it captures the spirit of the objectives.
reminds me of Index Coop, and that name always confused people was it coop like a chicken coop, was it CoOp like a cooperative, nobody knows. JK we can think about it though (however legally it will not be a Cooperative, so that may throw a wrench in things)
As some have pointed out earlier, there are already many groups trying to pull the org in different directions: foundation, PL, various committees etc… While this is a fun activity when attention and resources are abundant, this also becomes a source of friction when markets swing the other way. Hence a right balance needs to be struck between leaderless/leaderful in order to optimally navigate forward.
While I generally like this idea, I’ll reiterate my feedback from the first PL labs proposal, what stops someone else from spinning up another legal entity/committiee from implementing a slight variation of the same ‘n’ operational goals any DAO or organization needs to deliver in order to manage itself. If there is no ‘stop’ mechanism, the DAO will continue to form separate legal entities/committiee till we max. out on attention and resources necessary to support these different groups.
I have to say I'm not sure I agree with this statement. As someone who sits on the board of PL and helped establish some of those various committees, I think we are moving in the same general direction now. The foundation holds no official opinion, but a few 100% arbitrum committed groups to help foster maturity seem to be the general consensus of how we grow. Although I have my own opinions on the leaders vs leaderless organizations, I do agree we need to do better on making and setting priorities as a community, and some structure can go a long way.
My Thoughts
Thank you for your thoughtful comments, we are driving some insightful discussion.
Since the Mandates are probably the single most important topic here to agree on, started to really drill down into those. Have thrown them into HackMD Table of Contents as each one is starting to get quite expansive.
Or you can jump directly here:
Since the Mandates are probably the single most important topic here to agree on, started to really drill down into those. Have thrown them into HackMD Table of Contents as each one is starting to get quite expansive.
Or you can jump directly here:
idk why it replied to JoJo directly sorry, idk how to fix that
Thanks for the in depth and detailed responses! Broadly on board, especially like the hiring approach of a few all stars and ramping up from there as their workload starts becoming unmanageable as well as the framing of scaling up firestarters. I still think there are some important issues like governance of the OpCo that haven't been touched upon which I'd like clarified before moving to a vote (for example how do we decide who is the top dog of OpCo)
One other question i had was on the time management of OpCo staff for working on their own initiatives versus helping contributors with their proposals. Something I've seen is that after being appointed, employees identify a strategic project and then spend all their time on that.
hey devansh i appreciate you.
Interfacing with existing ARDC and Procurement Committee members: The OpCo should work closely with and complement the efforts of the ARDC and Procurement Committee. For example, I wouldn't expect OpCo to invest time or resources into anything that they could put into the ARDC's work queue. We envision regular communication and coordination between the OpCo and these existing bodies to ensure that their work is aligned and mutually supportive. Procurement, though, is a little less cut and dry. To hit economies of scale with a large-scale procurement program, we probably need to invest more resources than 3 part-time contributors. I would really like to see some tangible deliveries and milestones hit from the procurement team, but it has yet to be seen (I will give them the benefit of the doubt since they have only been live for a month), but in my eyes, we need to accelerate procurement. Also, procurement doesn't have any funding yet for what they can offer projects building in the ecosystem, once the Security Service providers have been onboarded, we are going to need to do a funding request, I can see the OpCo helping in that regard, managing funding requests so procurement can focus on onboarding and engagements. But need to think this through more.
Preventing bloat, ghost teams, and over-hiring: This is a valid concern, and we are committed to building a lean and efficient organization. Right now, the problem is the opposite, though; the demand for coordination far exceeds the supply of willing contributors. I would instead hire one all-star, pay them a lot, and load responsibilities until they are hitting capacity constraints and having to prioritize before moving to hire additional team members. Still, I guess we will have to make sure whoever runs the OpCo has a similar mentality. However, we should establish clear performance metrics and regularly assess OpCo's staffing needs to ensure we have the right people in the right roles.
welcome, welcome!
Cross-stream Collaboration
welcome, welcome!
Cross-stream Collaboration
You raise a good point about cross-stream collaboration and communication. I would imagine that by co-locating PMs within a single organization whose full-time roles are dedicated to the DAO, we would do a better job of communicating and synergizing when appropriate. As it stands currently, we do an okay job, as it's a tight-knit group of active contributors, but I definitely agree we will need something more thought-out to scale.
To address the specific example you mentioned regarding strategic partnerships, the governing board, which will likely be 7-9 elected members to act as a transitory "board" the idea is for them to kickoff the OpCo by determining priorities.
Scoping Challenges
Good points. I will think about how to best converse & set roles, responsibilities, and decision rights. I will need to make sure that is clearly outlined in the proposal.
Marketing Questions
I imagine the initial focus will be on brand marketing first and growth marketing second. But I have no strong background in marketing, so happy to take someone else's lead here. I see a world where there is an investment in both full-time marketing roles, but also hiring service providers like serotonin, creatives, content creators, researchers, etc, via an RFP process. I have started putting together Marketing outlines in hackmd, will polish them up and post them early next week.
Regarding the overlap with Offchain Labs and the Arbitrum Foundation, we will work closely with these entities to ensure that our efforts are complementary and not duplicative. Afaik OCL has a few focuses they will focus on in 2024, I believe all product related. The Foundation also just hired some members that I imagine will be brand-related campaigns; I will need to check with them. But these will both be very targeted efforts; the OpCo, I imagine, would be more widespread negotiating deals with crypto native creatives (podcasts, streamers, research firms, etc) building out a network and managing those relationships, with minimal in-house ran campaigns. Then working with builders in the space to utilize those channels when appropriate.
Appreciate your thoughtful comments and questions! Keep em coming.
Thank you @dk3 for putting them together. We are certain that you and the contributors put so much effort into the proposal.
This reminds us of dYdX Ops subDAO with the similar actors like its Foundation and other sub DAOs. They have specifically focused on executions and as an example, taken on the operational duty of the dYdX chain. While Arbitrum doesn't have its own chain or technical elements to be managed by the DAO (yet), the management of the future components can be carried out by an organization tied to the DAO, not by the Foundation.
We assume there should be a lot of coordinations with the existing (and newly formed) councils, working groups, OFL, and Foundation and a few coordinators should kick off the initial bootstrapping (e.g. hiring as mentioned) and that will be a critical milestone to be achieved for the success of the initiative.
In any way, at Tané, we would love to support the proposal and be willing to contribute to its further development.
One minor thing; could it be called the CoOp? :slight_smile: I think it captures the spirit of the objectives.
One minor thing; could it be called the CoOp? :slight_smile: I think it captures the spirit of the objectives.
reminds me of Index Coop, and that name always confused people was it coop like a chicken coop, was it CoOp like a cooperative, nobody knows. JK we can think about it though (however legally it will not be a Cooperative, so that may throw a wrench in things)
As some have pointed out earlier, there are already many groups trying to pull the org in different directions: foundation, PL, various committees etc… While this is a fun activity when attention and resources are abundant, this also becomes a source of friction when markets swing the other way. Hence a right balance needs to be struck between leaderless/leaderful in order to optimally navigate forward.
While I generally like this idea, I’ll reiterate my feedback from the first PL labs proposal, what stops someone else from spinning up another legal entity/committiee from implementing a slight variation of the same ‘n’ operational goals any DAO or organization needs to deliver in order to manage itself. If there is no ‘stop’ mechanism, the DAO will continue to form separate legal entities/committiee till we max. out on attention and resources necessary to support these different groups.
I have to say I'm not sure I agree with this statement. As someone who sits on the board of PL and helped establish some of those various committees, I think we are moving in the same general direction now. The foundation holds no official opinion, but a few 100% arbitrum committed groups to help foster maturity seem to be the general consensus of how we grow. Although I have my own opinions on the leaders vs leaderless organizations, I do agree we need to do better on making and setting priorities as a community, and some structure can go a long way.
My Thoughts
Thank you for your thoughtful comments, we are driving some insightful discussion.
Since the Mandates are probably the single most important topic here to agree on, started to really drill down into those. Have thrown them into HackMD Table of Contents as each one is starting to get quite expansive.
Or you can jump directly here:
Since the Mandates are probably the single most important topic here to agree on, started to really drill down into those. Have thrown them into HackMD Table of Contents as each one is starting to get quite expansive.
Or you can jump directly here:
idk why it replied to JoJo directly sorry, idk how to fix that
Thanks for the in depth and detailed responses! Broadly on board, especially like the hiring approach of a few all stars and ramping up from there as their workload starts becoming unmanageable as well as the framing of scaling up firestarters. I still think there are some important issues like governance of the OpCo that haven't been touched upon which I'd like clarified before moving to a vote (for example how do we decide who is the top dog of OpCo)
One other question i had was on the time management of OpCo staff for working on their own initiatives versus helping contributors with their proposals. Something I've seen is that after being appointed, employees identify a strategic project and then spend all their time on that.
hey devansh i appreciate you.
Interfacing with existing ARDC and Procurement Committee members: The OpCo should work closely with and complement the efforts of the ARDC and Procurement Committee. For example, I wouldn't expect OpCo to invest time or resources into anything that they could put into the ARDC's work queue. We envision regular communication and coordination between the OpCo and these existing bodies to ensure that their work is aligned and mutually supportive. Procurement, though, is a little less cut and dry. To hit economies of scale with a large-scale procurement program, we probably need to invest more resources than 3 part-time contributors. I would really like to see some tangible deliveries and milestones hit from the procurement team, but it has yet to be seen (I will give them the benefit of the doubt since they have only been live for a month), but in my eyes, we need to accelerate procurement. Also, procurement doesn't have any funding yet for what they can offer projects building in the ecosystem, once the Security Service providers have been onboarded, we are going to need to do a funding request, I can see the OpCo helping in that regard, managing funding requests so procurement can focus on onboarding and engagements. But need to think this through more.
Preventing bloat, ghost teams, and over-hiring: This is a valid concern, and we are committed to building a lean and efficient organization. Right now, the problem is the opposite, though; the demand for coordination far exceeds the supply of willing contributors. I would instead hire one all-star, pay them a lot, and load responsibilities until they are hitting capacity constraints and having to prioritize before moving to hire additional team members. Still, I guess we will have to make sure whoever runs the OpCo has a similar mentality. However, we should establish clear performance metrics and regularly assess OpCo's staffing needs to ensure we have the right people in the right roles.
welcome, welcome!
Cross-stream Collaboration
welcome, welcome!
Cross-stream Collaboration
You raise a good point about cross-stream collaboration and communication. I would imagine that by co-locating PMs within a single organization whose full-time roles are dedicated to the DAO, we would do a better job of communicating and synergizing when appropriate. As it stands currently, we do an okay job, as it's a tight-knit group of active contributors, but I definitely agree we will need something more thought-out to scale.
To address the specific example you mentioned regarding strategic partnerships, the governing board, which will likely be 7-9 elected members to act as a transitory "board" the idea is for them to kickoff the OpCo by determining priorities.
Scoping Challenges
Good points. I will think about how to best converse & set roles, responsibilities, and decision rights. I will need to make sure that is clearly outlined in the proposal.
Marketing Questions
I imagine the initial focus will be on brand marketing first and growth marketing second. But I have no strong background in marketing, so happy to take someone else's lead here. I see a world where there is an investment in both full-time marketing roles, but also hiring service providers like serotonin, creatives, content creators, researchers, etc, via an RFP process. I have started putting together Marketing outlines in hackmd, will polish them up and post them early next week.
Regarding the overlap with Offchain Labs and the Arbitrum Foundation, we will work closely with these entities to ensure that our efforts are complementary and not duplicative. Afaik OCL has a few focuses they will focus on in 2024, I believe all product related. The Foundation also just hired some members that I imagine will be brand-related campaigns; I will need to check with them. But these will both be very targeted efforts; the OpCo, I imagine, would be more widespread negotiating deals with crypto native creatives (podcasts, streamers, research firms, etc) building out a network and managing those relationships, with minimal in-house ran campaigns. Then working with builders in the space to utilize those channels when appropriate.
Appreciate your thoughtful comments and questions! Keep em coming.
Thanks for the in depth and detailed responses! Broadly on board, especially like the hiring approach of a few all stars and ramping up from there as their workload starts becoming unmanageable as well as the framing of scaling up firestarters. I still think there are some important issues like governance of the OpCo that haven't been touched upon which I'd like clarified before moving to a vote (for example how do we decide who is the top dog of OpCo)
One other question i had was on the time management of OpCo staff for working on their own initiatives versus helping contributors with their proposals. Something I've seen is that after being appointed, employees identify a strategic project and then spend all their time on that.
Nothing wrong with that, but it leads to a lack of general support for DAO contributors as the paid staff are all pigeonholed on their narrow issue. So I wanted to know whether the priority would be for the OpCo team to help contributors with their proposals to the DAO, come up with their own proposals or a mix of both.
Edit to also ask: @dk3 , what role if any do you specifically see for yourself in the OpCo? It's ok if you don't know that yet!
hey devansh i appreciate you.
Interfacing with existing ARDC and Procurement Committee members: The OpCo should work closely with and complement the efforts of the ARDC and Procurement Committee. For example, I wouldn't expect OpCo to invest time or resources into anything that they could put into the ARDC's work queue. We envision regular communication and coordination between the OpCo and these existing bodies to ensure that their work is aligned and mutually supportive. Procurement, though, is a little less cut and dry. To hit economies of scale with a large-scale procurement program, we probably need to invest more resources than 3 part-time contributors. I would really like to see some tangible deliveries and milestones hit from the procurement team, but it has yet to be seen (I will give them the benefit of the doubt since they have only been live for a month), but in my eyes, we need to accelerate procurement. Also, procurement doesn't have any funding yet for what they can offer projects building in the ecosystem, once the Security Service providers have been onboarded, we are going to need to do a funding request, I can see the OpCo helping in that regard, managing funding requests so procurement can focus on onboarding and engagements. But need to think this through more.
Preventing bloat, ghost teams, and over-hiring: This is a valid concern, and we are committed to building a lean and efficient organization. Right now, the problem is the opposite, though; the demand for coordination far exceeds the supply of willing contributors. I would instead hire one all-star, pay them a lot, and load responsibilities until they are hitting capacity constraints and having to prioritize before moving to hire additional team members. Still, I guess we will have to make sure whoever runs the OpCo has a similar mentality. However, we should establish clear performance metrics and regularly assess OpCo's staffing needs to ensure we have the right people in the right roles.
The biggest challenge I see currently is that top talent will not work pro-bono on these projects like half of us do, so we need to create opportunities that give economic stability for people to leave their current roles and move into full-time DAO roles. The second hurdle I foresee will be accountability, as having a full-time contributor held accountable by the DAO will be too much noise. Hence, the idea behind the governing transitory council is to be the responsible party for these full-time hires for the time being.
As we refine the OpCo proposal, we will discuss further with the Arbitrum Foundation and OCL to identify opportunities for synergy and collaboration. Our goal is to build an organization that complements and supports the work of these critical ecosystem partners rather than duplicating efforts or competing for resources.
The OpCo will also have a dedicated team and resources to support these efforts on an ongoing basis rather than relying on ad hoc initiatives or external partnerships. That said, we recognize the valuable work that Plurality Labs and other ecosystem partners are doing, and we are open to collaborating and learning from their experiences.
The OpCo will operate transparently and be accountable to the Arbitrum DAO community. Its initiatives and decisions will be made public ASAP (some NDA stipulations I could see apply while negotiations are being made). Anyone will still be able to propose new ideas and initiatives without going through the OpCo.
Also, thanks for the heads-up about the work being done by @BlockworksResearch and @MattOnChain. I'm meeting with him tomorrow.
Thanks for the in depth and detailed responses! Broadly on board, especially like the hiring approach of a few all stars and ramping up from there as their workload starts becoming unmanageable as well as the framing of scaling up firestarters. I still think there are some important issues like governance of the OpCo that haven't been touched upon which I'd like clarified before moving to a vote (for example how do we decide who is the top dog of OpCo)
One other question i had was on the time management of OpCo staff for working on their own initiatives versus helping contributors with their proposals. Something I've seen is that after being appointed, employees identify a strategic project and then spend all their time on that.
Nothing wrong with that, but it leads to a lack of general support for DAO contributors as the paid staff are all pigeonholed on their narrow issue. So I wanted to know whether the priority would be for the OpCo team to help contributors with their proposals to the DAO, come up with their own proposals or a mix of both.
Edit to also ask: @dk3 , what role if any do you specifically see for yourself in the OpCo? It's ok if you don't know that yet!
hey devansh i appreciate you.
Interfacing with existing ARDC and Procurement Committee members: The OpCo should work closely with and complement the efforts of the ARDC and Procurement Committee. For example, I wouldn't expect OpCo to invest time or resources into anything that they could put into the ARDC's work queue. We envision regular communication and coordination between the OpCo and these existing bodies to ensure that their work is aligned and mutually supportive. Procurement, though, is a little less cut and dry. To hit economies of scale with a large-scale procurement program, we probably need to invest more resources than 3 part-time contributors. I would really like to see some tangible deliveries and milestones hit from the procurement team, but it has yet to be seen (I will give them the benefit of the doubt since they have only been live for a month), but in my eyes, we need to accelerate procurement. Also, procurement doesn't have any funding yet for what they can offer projects building in the ecosystem, once the Security Service providers have been onboarded, we are going to need to do a funding request, I can see the OpCo helping in that regard, managing funding requests so procurement can focus on onboarding and engagements. But need to think this through more.
Preventing bloat, ghost teams, and over-hiring: This is a valid concern, and we are committed to building a lean and efficient organization. Right now, the problem is the opposite, though; the demand for coordination far exceeds the supply of willing contributors. I would instead hire one all-star, pay them a lot, and load responsibilities until they are hitting capacity constraints and having to prioritize before moving to hire additional team members. Still, I guess we will have to make sure whoever runs the OpCo has a similar mentality. However, we should establish clear performance metrics and regularly assess OpCo's staffing needs to ensure we have the right people in the right roles.
The biggest challenge I see currently is that top talent will not work pro-bono on these projects like half of us do, so we need to create opportunities that give economic stability for people to leave their current roles and move into full-time DAO roles. The second hurdle I foresee will be accountability, as having a full-time contributor held accountable by the DAO will be too much noise. Hence, the idea behind the governing transitory council is to be the responsible party for these full-time hires for the time being.
As we refine the OpCo proposal, we will discuss further with the Arbitrum Foundation and OCL to identify opportunities for synergy and collaboration. Our goal is to build an organization that complements and supports the work of these critical ecosystem partners rather than duplicating efforts or competing for resources.
The OpCo will also have a dedicated team and resources to support these efforts on an ongoing basis rather than relying on ad hoc initiatives or external partnerships. That said, we recognize the valuable work that Plurality Labs and other ecosystem partners are doing, and we are open to collaborating and learning from their experiences.
The OpCo will operate transparently and be accountable to the Arbitrum DAO community. Its initiatives and decisions will be made public ASAP (some NDA stipulations I could see apply while negotiations are being made). Anyone will still be able to propose new ideas and initiatives without going through the OpCo.
Also, thanks for the heads-up about the work being done by @BlockworksResearch and @MattOnChain. I'm meeting with him tomorrow.
there is a merit in clarifyin stakejolders duty/mission. In this case, offchain labs, foundation, dao. For sure some overlap will always be present but likely swith slightly different mission, vision and also elasticity in execution. Which is quite normal in a huge org like what the arbi ecosystem is becoming.
OffChain Labs does already have most of the teams though (ecosystem, partnerships, marketing, community, etc.), so a problem could be how to not have duplication of work (i.e. operational inefficiency), but i guess this can be solved and aligned with a bit of work.
OffChain Labs does already have most of the teams though (ecosystem, partnerships, marketing, community, etc.), so a problem could be how to not have duplication of work (i.e. operational inefficiency), but i guess this can be solved and aligned with a bit of work.
There def is risk of potential for duplication of work between the OpCo and the existing teams at OffChain Labs. I envision the OpCo working closely with OffChain Labs and the Foundation to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities, ensuring that efforts are complementary rather than redundant. Both OCL and AF want the DAO to play a more prominent role, especially in the mandates above, that would allow them to focus on more technological achievements as part of the constitution directives.
To make sure this occurs I would expect regular communication channels and coordination meetings between the OpCo, AF, OffChain Labs teams, as well as other groups coming into the fold. This would allow for the sharing of information, alignment of priorities, and identification of areas where collaboration can be most impactful. Additionally, the OpCo could focus on initiatives that are specifically tailored to the needs and goals of the Arbitrum DAO, while OffChain Labs continues to drive the broader development and adoption of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Regarding your question about an overall structure for the DAO that incorporates existing committees, such as the ARDC and Procurement Committee, I believe this is a crucial consideration. The OpCo should be designed to integrate seamlessly with these existing bodies, kind of like this, I imagine. Potentially, the OpCo could focus on creating the funding side of things, while procurement focuses on the vendor management and service provider onboarding side of things. Once funding has been secured, it could pass it on to the procurement team.

Depending on who you ask, a DAO is an org that either has no leaders or has several leaders. Arbitrum DAO start as a leaderless unit which is now swinging towards a leaderful org. The challange often arises in this case of which leader to follow?
As some have pointed out earlier, there are already many groups trying to pull the org in different directions: foundation, PL, various committees etc.. While this is a fun activity when attention and resources are abundant, this also becomes a source of friction when markets swing the other way. Hence a right balance needs to be struck between leaderless/leaderful in order to optimally navigate forward.
Depending on who you ask, a DAO is an org that either has no leaders or has several leaders. Arbitrum DAO start as a leaderless unit which is now swinging towards a leaderful org. The challange often arises in this case of which leader to follow?
As some have pointed out earlier, there are already many groups trying to pull the org in different directions: foundation, PL, various committees etc.. While this is a fun activity when attention and resources are abundant, this also becomes a source of friction when markets swing the other way. Hence a right balance needs to be struck between leaderless/leaderful in order to optimally navigate forward.
While I generally like this idea, I'll reiterate my feedback from the first PL labs proposal, what stops someone else from spinning up another legal entity/committiee from implementing a slight variation of the same 'n' operational goals any DAO or organization needs to deliver in order to manage itself. If there is no 'stop' mechanism, the DAO will continue to form separate legal entities/committiee till we max. out on attention and resources necessary to support these different groups.
Okay I have included a link to the mermaid diagram
I also tried to make it a little more digestible by adding accordians. I have also completely revamped the mandate section to include more relevant objectives.
Just thinking out loud, one thing that has come up this week is the separation of
Will add this as a relevant use case to implement within the OpCos remit.
someone was cooking.
Ok, first feedback: please post the graph above with a better resolution, maybe it was me but i was having an hard time reading it.
someone was cooking.
Ok, first feedback: please post the graph above with a better resolution, maybe it was me but i was having an hard time reading it.
Second, i think we have a size at this point in which we need to have something like this. Several dao have it, the one in whic I had experience was balancer dao in which there was an OpCo that basically over time hired several service providers for several roles (implementation of code, management of UX, marketing etcetera). Sometimes it ended up well sometimes it did not.
But having an entity that can decide indepdently and report to the DAO and then the DAO will evaluate every X months what is going on, is likely the agility we need to avoid to succumb to ourself. This is why I like the idea.
I think the opco should focus first on pain points area tho. AKA having a priority list could make sense. Of the mandates, i see in this orders the needs:
I appreciate all the effort put into this! This has clearly been in the works for some time now.
I have the following questions, some of which have been asked but bear repeating;
I appreciate all the effort put into this! This has clearly been in the works for some time now.
I have the following questions, some of which have been asked but bear repeating;
How would this interface with existing ARDC, Procurement Committee members?
The functions you describe require individuals who are initiative takers and self-starters. There's always the danger of bloat, ghost teams and over-hiring, how do we prevent that especially when we have to aggressively recruit over a short time period?
One of the reasons SpaceX worked as well as it did is that NASA encouraged many of their best employees to move over to their company. As an equivalent, have you spoken to Arbitrum Foundation or OCL over whether we can take over any of their existing functions or staff and perform these roles from our budget?
How is this substantively different from @DisruptionJoe work with Plurality Labs, which has hired DAO contributors through firestarters and also lured promising projects to our ecosystem..
The advantage of a separate OpCo is nimbleness and autonomy. I fear the danger will be losing what makes ArbitrumDAO special, a fully onchain, permissionless organization where anyone can propose without feeling shut out by councils, committees or organizations.
I'm not averse to the idea and it might be what we require, as the DAO is beginning to professionalize. I do remember that @BlockworksResearch and @MattOnChain were working on something similar around employees for the DAO and compensation too, so I would check with them too and try joining forces if possible.
there is a merit in clarifyin stakejolders duty/mission. In this case, offchain labs, foundation, dao. For sure some overlap will always be present but likely swith slightly different mission, vision and also elasticity in execution. Which is quite normal in a huge org like what the arbi ecosystem is becoming.
OffChain Labs does already have most of the teams though (ecosystem, partnerships, marketing, community, etc.), so a problem could be how to not have duplication of work (i.e. operational inefficiency), but i guess this can be solved and aligned with a bit of work.
OffChain Labs does already have most of the teams though (ecosystem, partnerships, marketing, community, etc.), so a problem could be how to not have duplication of work (i.e. operational inefficiency), but i guess this can be solved and aligned with a bit of work.
There def is risk of potential for duplication of work between the OpCo and the existing teams at OffChain Labs. I envision the OpCo working closely with OffChain Labs and the Foundation to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities, ensuring that efforts are complementary rather than redundant. Both OCL and AF want the DAO to play a more prominent role, especially in the mandates above, that would allow them to focus on more technological achievements as part of the constitution directives.
To make sure this occurs I would expect regular communication channels and coordination meetings between the OpCo, AF, OffChain Labs teams, as well as other groups coming into the fold. This would allow for the sharing of information, alignment of priorities, and identification of areas where collaboration can be most impactful. Additionally, the OpCo could focus on initiatives that are specifically tailored to the needs and goals of the Arbitrum DAO, while OffChain Labs continues to drive the broader development and adoption of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Regarding your question about an overall structure for the DAO that incorporates existing committees, such as the ARDC and Procurement Committee, I believe this is a crucial consideration. The OpCo should be designed to integrate seamlessly with these existing bodies, kind of like this, I imagine. Potentially, the OpCo could focus on creating the funding side of things, while procurement focuses on the vendor management and service provider onboarding side of things. Once funding has been secured, it could pass it on to the procurement team.

Depending on who you ask, a DAO is an org that either has no leaders or has several leaders. Arbitrum DAO start as a leaderless unit which is now swinging towards a leaderful org. The challange often arises in this case of which leader to follow?
As some have pointed out earlier, there are already many groups trying to pull the org in different directions: foundation, PL, various committees etc.. While this is a fun activity when attention and resources are abundant, this also becomes a source of friction when markets swing the other way. Hence a right balance needs to be struck between leaderless/leaderful in order to optimally navigate forward.
Depending on who you ask, a DAO is an org that either has no leaders or has several leaders. Arbitrum DAO start as a leaderless unit which is now swinging towards a leaderful org. The challange often arises in this case of which leader to follow?
As some have pointed out earlier, there are already many groups trying to pull the org in different directions: foundation, PL, various committees etc.. While this is a fun activity when attention and resources are abundant, this also becomes a source of friction when markets swing the other way. Hence a right balance needs to be struck between leaderless/leaderful in order to optimally navigate forward.
While I generally like this idea, I'll reiterate my feedback from the first PL labs proposal, what stops someone else from spinning up another legal entity/committiee from implementing a slight variation of the same 'n' operational goals any DAO or organization needs to deliver in order to manage itself. If there is no 'stop' mechanism, the DAO will continue to form separate legal entities/committiee till we max. out on attention and resources necessary to support these different groups.
Okay I have included a link to the mermaid diagram
I also tried to make it a little more digestible by adding accordians. I have also completely revamped the mandate section to include more relevant objectives.
Just thinking out loud, one thing that has come up this week is the separation of
Will add this as a relevant use case to implement within the OpCos remit.
someone was cooking.
Ok, first feedback: please post the graph above with a better resolution, maybe it was me but i was having an hard time reading it.
someone was cooking.
Ok, first feedback: please post the graph above with a better resolution, maybe it was me but i was having an hard time reading it.
Second, i think we have a size at this point in which we need to have something like this. Several dao have it, the one in whic I had experience was balancer dao in which there was an OpCo that basically over time hired several service providers for several roles (implementation of code, management of UX, marketing etcetera). Sometimes it ended up well sometimes it did not.
But having an entity that can decide indepdently and report to the DAO and then the DAO will evaluate every X months what is going on, is likely the agility we need to avoid to succumb to ourself. This is why I like the idea.
I think the opco should focus first on pain points area tho. AKA having a priority list could make sense. Of the mandates, i see in this orders the needs:
I appreciate all the effort put into this! This has clearly been in the works for some time now.
I have the following questions, some of which have been asked but bear repeating;
I appreciate all the effort put into this! This has clearly been in the works for some time now.
I have the following questions, some of which have been asked but bear repeating;
How would this interface with existing ARDC, Procurement Committee members?
The functions you describe require individuals who are initiative takers and self-starters. There's always the danger of bloat, ghost teams and over-hiring, how do we prevent that especially when we have to aggressively recruit over a short time period?
One of the reasons SpaceX worked as well as it did is that NASA encouraged many of their best employees to move over to their company. As an equivalent, have you spoken to Arbitrum Foundation or OCL over whether we can take over any of their existing functions or staff and perform these roles from our budget?
How is this substantively different from @DisruptionJoe work with Plurality Labs, which has hired DAO contributors through firestarters and also lured promising projects to our ecosystem..
The advantage of a separate OpCo is nimbleness and autonomy. I fear the danger will be losing what makes ArbitrumDAO special, a fully onchain, permissionless organization where anyone can propose without feeling shut out by councils, committees or organizations.
I'm not averse to the idea and it might be what we require, as the DAO is beginning to professionalize. I do remember that @BlockworksResearch and @MattOnChain were working on something similar around employees for the DAO and compensation too, so I would check with them too and try joining forces if possible.
Just thinking out loud, one thing that has come up this week is the separation of
Will add this as a relevant use case to implement within the OpCos remit.
Another question that came up is re: ownership, there is a call this week with the ecosystems legal council, so I defer to what their recommendation will be, however speculatively, I see 3 potential paths
Also regarding the important business matters surrounding the naming of the OpCo, open to DAO suggestions, but I'm partial to something referring to a Carbuncle because arb is in the name, it's cute and memorable (meme-able), and I have taken it upon myself to establish a mascot. That or Onchain Research lol.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbuncle_(legendary_creature) https://offbeat.fandom.com/wiki/Carbuncle
See, cmon, shes very marketable.

Just thinking out loud, one thing that has come up this week is the separation of
Will add this as a relevant use case to implement within the OpCos remit.
Another question that came up is re: ownership, there is a call this week with the ecosystems legal council, so I defer to what their recommendation will be, however speculatively, I see 3 potential paths
Also regarding the important business matters surrounding the naming of the OpCo, open to DAO suggestions, but I'm partial to something referring to a Carbuncle because arb is in the name, it's cute and memorable (meme-able), and I have taken it upon myself to establish a mascot. That or Onchain Research lol.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbuncle_(legendary_creature) https://offbeat.fandom.com/wiki/Carbuncle
See, cmon, shes very marketable.
