In November 2024, following discussions on shielded voting and conflicts of interest policy, the DAO adopted a 6.5-month trial of a Code of Conduct and procedural updates. After taking in community feedback, observing outcomes, and discussions with the Arbitrum Foundation, Entropy is proposing the following changes and a 2nd trial period through the end of January 2026:
With the initial trial period now concluded, Entropy is seeking to reignite the Code of Conduct & DAO Procedures conversation and welcomes further input from the community.
Contributor: An individual or entity who willingly engages in Arbitrum governance and/or is compensated via a DAO-approved program.
DAO-approved program: A structured initiative that is funded and/or authorized by the Arbitrum DAO through a formal governance vote (Tally or Snapshot) and designed to achieve defined objectives. Examples include the Arbitrum Audit Program, the Arbitrum D.A.O. Grant Program, and other comparable initiatives that receive DAO treasury funding or delegated authority.
Community Guidelines: The rules of engagement for the Arbitrum DAO forum as outlined and enforced by the Arbitrum Foundation.
Conflict of Interest (COI): A situation where a contributor, or any entity with which a contributor has a direct professional or financial relationship, stands to directly benefit from the outcome of a proposal or election.
Responsible Voting: The practice of an election candidate casting votes for oneself and other candidates in a neutral manner to fill all open positions.
Shielded Voting: On Snapshot, votes are kept private during the voting process, but made public after the conclusion of the vote.
The Code of Conduct and Procedural Updates were introduced in late 2024 as a trial to establish clear expectations around delegate and contributor behavior and formalize certain aspects of how the DAO operated. At the time, Entropy envisioned that the Code of Conduct could be added to the Arbitrum Constitution to serve as a cultural anchor. However, after further deliberation with the Arbitrum Foundation, our team is in agreement that codifying the Code of Conduct at this stage is premature.
Constitutional amendments are purposefully a high-stakes process that requires strong consensus from delegates and contributors, and thus, we feel it is unwise to push the Code of Conduct forward until it is in a near-final state.
If the refined Code of Conduct proves effective through continued use, it can be revisited for constitutional inclusion in the future following the conclusion of the 2nd trial period in January 2026. As a reminder, Entropy also proposed adding the DAO’s Mission, Vision, and Purpose to the Constitution. When it comes time to make the amendment, we think it is best to combine all proposed changes into a single constitutional proposal.
Lastly, the language from the first proposal implied that both the Code of Conduct and Procedural Updates would be included in the Arbitrum Constitution. After consideration, Entropy now firmly believes procedural policies such as voting schedules or shielded elections should remain outside the Constitution as a social contract given the DAO’s constantly evolving nature, thus reserving the document for high-level principles that guide the DAO. Instead, these procedures can be revisited once a year in January following the Holiday Break and changed with a Snapshot vote if needed, with the quorum set at the active non-constitutional quorum level.
In November 2024, the Arbitrum DAO approved the trial of a Code of Conduct via Snapshot vote, establishing shared expectations around civility, integrity, transparency, and responsible participation. That code has since served as a behavioral baseline during the initial governance trial.
The revised Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures will be in effect following its ratification with a Snapshot vote through January 31st, 2026. At the conclusion of this 2nd trial, the DAO can revisit its procedures and discuss if it is time to formalize the Code of Conduct into the Arbitrum Constitution on an annual basis. To ensure that the DAO has ample time to discuss such matters without the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures losing its validity, the Arbitrum Foundation reserves the right to extend their effectiveness by up to two months through March 31st, 2026 as long as a new version has not yet been officially ratified.
When it comes time to add the Code of Conduct to the Arbitrum Constitution, we envision it as a new Section 7, following the existing Section 6: Community Values. In order to keep the included language sufficiently high level, the following quoted block contains the 5 sub-sections to be included:
7.1 Values Alignment
Arbitrum contributors should always strive to uphold the seven community values stated above in Section 6:
- Ethereum-aligned: Arbitrum is part of the Ethereum ecosystem and community
- Sustainable: Focus on long-term health of the protocol over short-term gains
- Secure: Arbitrum is security minded
- Socially inclusive: Open and welcoming to all constructive participants
- Technically inclusive: Accessible for ordinary people with ordinary technology
- User-focused: Managed for the benefit of all users
- Neutral and open: Foster open innovation, interoperation, user choice, and healthy competition
7.2 Good Faith and Best Interest
- Contributors should conduct themselves with honesty, integrity, and transparency, fostering trust and confidence among community members.
- Contributors should act and vote in accordance with what they see is in the best interests of Arbitrum, which encompasses but is not limited to all of the following: Arbitrum One, Arbitrum Nova, the Orbit Ecosystem, and any future Arbitrum DAO-governed chains as outlined above in Section 1.
7.3 Due Care and Attention
- Contributors should remain knowledgeable of developments in regard to Arbitrum DAO’s initiatives and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem.
- Contributors should strive to make a professional and unbiased review of each proposal before submitting their vote.
- Contributors are advised to vote abstain when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand the proposals.
7.4 Civility and Professionalism
- While separate from the Code of Conduct, contributors are expected to uphold the community guidelines for activity on the Arbitrum DAO forum and de facto understood gathering places for the Arbitrum DAO, whether online or in-person.
- Contributors should seek to create a respectful and inclusive environment for all community members, free from harassment and discrimination.
- Unacceptable behavior includes, but is not limited to:
- Publicly or privately harassing or intimidating others
- Sharing someone's private information without their consent
- Using sexualized language or imagery, or making unwanted advances
- Making insulting or derogatory comments about others
- Contributors should strive to provide constructive feedback that is well-researched and respectful, focusing on the proposal's merits. Personal attacks are never acceptable.
- Contributors should be open-minded and respectful of differing viewpoints, even if they disagree with them. Disagreements are an inevitable part of healthy debate, but they often yield positive results when approached in a civil manner.
- Contributors should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels and avoid taking discussions to social media in a manner that could tarnish Arbitrum DAO’s brand and reputation.
- Contributors should avoid making unsubstantiated accusations that imply malice without proper evidence. They should conduct proper due diligence before making any public accusations via social media, public forums, or any other recognized communication channels. This includes exhausting all available avenues, such as seeking clarification privately, before issuing any public statement that contains an unsubstantiated accusation about another DAO contributor.
7.5 Responsibility
- Maintaining a culture of productive debate, integrity, and transparency requires a sense of collective responsibility. As entrusted leaders of the Arbitrum community, contributors should take responsibility in fostering and maintaining a culture that promotes the principles outlined herein.
- Best practices of responsible contributors:
- Participation: Contributors should make an effort to vote (even if they vote abstain) on all proposals.
- Communication: Contributors should clearly communicate their rationale behind votes and discussions to the Arbitrum community.
- Accountability: Contributors should maintain knowledge of all DAO initiatives and hold managing parties or elected representatives accountable.
- Responsiveness: Contributors should use their best efforts to connect with the Arbitrum community and be accessible to answer questions or concerns.
From the previous iteration, the following language changes have been made to the Code of Conduct:
Sections 7.1 through 7.5 outline enduring values and expectations appropriate for constitutional inclusion, while the clauses regarding Conflicts of Interest, Enforcement, and Conflict Resolution are more operational in nature. We envision that Conflicts of Interest disclosure policies, as well as enforcement and conflict resolution mechanisms may need to adapt over time based on active programs, contributor behavior, and evolving community standards. Embedding these specifics into the Constitution would limit the DAO’s flexibility to make changes if necessary. Instead, both Entropy and the Arbitrum Foundation agree that it is more appropriate for these sections to live outside the Constitution in a similar manner to the agreed-upon Procedural Updates.
In the following sections, mentions of the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) have been generalized so that the terminology encompasses compensation from any DAO program that incentivizes voting or participation activity. Overall, the main changes have been made to the Enforcement & Appeal Process section. As the DAO’s structure is currently rapidly evolving, we foresee that most paid executors will either be directly hired by the DAO as AAEs, working as service providers or contractors under an AAE, or elected into a council overseeing an AAE, with each structure having bespoke checks and balances in place to ensure that executors are behaving professionally and ethically.
Disclosure and Transparency Policy: If a conflict of interest exists, it is expected that the contributor discloses the nature and extent of the conflict in writing on the forum before voting. Proposal authors should disclose potential conflicts in the COI section of the recommended proposal template as outlined in the “How to Submit a DAO Proposal” by the Arbitrum Foundation. While it may not always be clear if an individual/entity stands to gain “directly” or “indirectly”, contributors and proposal authors are recommended to lean on the side of over-communication in the name of transparency.
Contributors who disclose a conflict of interest are not expected to alter their voting in any way. Self-voting is not currently banned outright for the reasons stated in previous DAO-wide discussions and based on sentiment gathered from a subsequent temperature check. However, a contributor who repeatedly fails to disclose a conflict of interest before voting risks being removed from their compensated governance role.
All contributors are expected to abide by the Code of Conduct. Enforcement will take place through any program that financially compensates performing governance activities, such as rewards for voting/forum activity, or participation in DAO-approved programs where contributors are directly elected to facilitate the programs.
The program manager, council, or comparable facilitator in charge of the program is the one responsible for determining violations of the Code of Conduct and reserves the right to take what it deems as appropriate action, which may include but is not limited to, issuing a warning, suspension, or removal from the program. Any community member can raise a concern to the party responsible for managing the program with respect to a contributor failing to uphold the Code of Conduct. While the responsible party is required to acknowledge receipt of the concern and investigate the matter, the final determination and resulting course of action, which may include dismissing the concern, will depend on the underlying program’s structure.
If there are contradictions between the Code of Conduct and the specific program that is compensating a contributor, then the policies of the program shall take precedence. It is assumed that a program will define its own appeal process, but if it does not, then the conflict resolution section (next) will be the default appeal approach.
Resolution of conflicts between contributors (and between contributors and programs) will be entrusted to the Arbitrum Foundation, which will act as a neutral mediator. It is recommended that contributors first seek to resolve conflict issues in good faith and privately. If the matter is unable to be resolved for any reason, or if the behavior is threatening or harassing, the matter can be raised to the Arbitrum Foundation using this form. The Arbitrum Foundation will have the final say on the issue and reserves the right to determine if the issue should be brought to the attention of the community as a whole.
In the future and once OpCo is fully operational, responsibility for the resolution of conflicts can be transferred to the OpCo at the Arbitrum Foundation’s discretion. The Arbitrum Foundation will acknowledge when this transfer can take place and make it public on the governance forum when it goes into effect.
Entropy proposes an extended pilot of the DAO's procedures through the end of January 2026 to evaluate three adjustments/additions: Removing the Responsible Voting policy due to the presence of vote-buying services and, if not defined in the original proposal, processes for both the replacement of a DAO-elected committee/council member that voluntarily steps down and the termination of an ongoing DAO initiative.
Remaining unchanged from the previous iteration are the predictable voting schedule, the use of shielded voting for elections, and the inclusion of a Holiday Break at the end of the year. These changes reflect areas of feedback and allow the DAO to generate data across another trial period before making final decisions.
Entropy recognizes that the complexity of the original policy created confusion for some participating candidates, especially in situations where there was only a single seat being filled through the election. Additionally, since the introduction of the policy, vote-buying services have become more common, and notably, LobbyFi has received substantial delegation. After observing the impact on the OAT election in particular, Entropy has concluded that enforcing the Responsible Voting Policy is no longer feasible. Participating candidates can effectively bypass the policy by sending funds to a fresh address to purchase or bid for additional votes, thus circumventing the original policy’s intentions and putting other candidates strictly following the policy at a disadvantage.
Therefore, Entropy is proposing to sunset the Responsible Voting Policy and return to the DAO’s original standards of allowing participating candidates to self-vote with their full voting power. Staying consistent with the Disclosure and Transparency Policy, candidates who plan to self-vote should still disclose the action to the DAO. Remaining unchanged from the previous trial, contributors not participating in the election are free to vote however they wish, but if a conflict of interest exists, it should be disclosed on the forums before voting.
Due to the recent instances of elected members stepping away from positions, it became apparent that not having a pre-defined process for replacing DAO-elected committee members can lead to possible friction and uncertainty. In these instances, several paths were proposed by contributors, including a new DAO-wide election, taking the runner-up individual, the proposal author nominating a new member, or consolidating/elevating the responsibilities of an existing member.
To prevent the aforementioned uncertainty from arising in the future, Entropy is proposing the following process for the replacement of elected members who step down from a program when no process has been defined in the primary proposal passed to initiate an initiative:
Whichever party ultimately makes the decision on the best course of action, they are expected to provide a short update with rationale and basic information for the DAO.
For the purposes of clarity, we are proposing the above process only for positions that are filled by a DAO-wide election, and no dedicated process to replace a member has been defined in the original proposal. If an initiative has a program manager/council-appointed position that needs replacement or filling, due to either an individual stepping down or underperforming, it will be left up to the discretion of the initiative owner/manager.
Recently, several contributors have raised the question of whether a proposal to clawback funds or terminate an active DAO program should require a Snapshot with a certain quorum threshold (unconstitutional or constitutional) or an onchain vote. If not defined in the original proposal, we propose the following wind-down requirements as the default.
A Snapshot vote where the number of FOR votes to wind down the initiative meets 3% of the votable supply. If there are more voting options than the basic FOR/AGAINST/ABSTAIN, the option with the largest number of votes will be applied, given that the options to modify/cancel an initiative together exceed the 3% of votable supply level. For the purpose of clarity, if a proposal only seeks to modify an existing initiative, this voting requirement will not apply.
The individual/entity that brings forward the proposal to cancel an ongoing initiative is expected to provide sufficient information and rationale to help inform the DAO of their intentions. Any individual/entity with the adequate 500k ARB of voting power to post a vote on Snapshot may move the proposal forward.
We believe that such a structure elevates the requirements for canceling an initiative in a manner that provides comparable legitimacy to an actual onchain vote.
Entropy has conducted an analysis of shielded voting, seeking to understand if participation rates or voting behavior changed. We have created a dashboard that contributors can reference. It is important to note that several factors can impact the voting behavior of an election, including the number of seats, candidates, and its importance. We felt that the ARDC elections were the most appropriate instance to directly compare non-shielded and shielded elections. The following summarizes our findings:
Overall, Entropy believes an extension of shielded voting will let us validate and examine the effects of shielded voting further. In Part 3 of the dashboard, contributors are welcome to pick an Arbitrum DAO election to explore its activity.
As was the case during the 1st trial, shielded elections will only apply to those conducted on Snapshot and will not apply to the Security Council elections held on Tally.
Similar to last year, the purpose of a Holiday Break is to ensure that voters have a break and can return refreshed for the new year.
Proposal authors should be cognizant of timelines and aim to have all voting wrapped up by Thursday, December 18th if possible. To ensure this, temperature checks would have to start no later than Thursday, December 11th, 2025, and onchain votes scheduled by Monday, December 1st, 2025.
Differing from last year’s holiday break, we believe it is acceptable for new proposals to be posted to the forum, but the DAO should aim to only put emergency proposals to vote during the period.
Entropy recognizes that several proposals were delayed due to last year’s holiday break, so it is our recommendation that a certain level of flexibility be accepted by contributors in the event some voting is not wrapped up exactly by December 18th. The primary motivation of such a timeline is to ensure no voting occurs during the especially busy holiday period of December 24th - January 1st.
In November 2024, following discussions on shielded voting and conflicts of interest policy, the DAO adopted a 6.5-month trial of a Code of Conduct and procedural updates. After taking in community feedback, observing outcomes, and discussions with the Arbitrum Foundation, Entropy is proposing the following changes and a 2nd trial period through the end of January 2026:
With the initial trial period now concluded, Entropy is seeking to reignite the Code of Conduct & DAO Procedures conversation and welcomes further input from the community.
Contributor: An individual or entity who willingly engages in Arbitrum governance and/or is compensated via a DAO-approved program.
DAO-approved program: A structured initiative that is funded and/or authorized by the Arbitrum DAO through a formal governance vote (Tally or Snapshot) and designed to achieve defined objectives. Examples include the Arbitrum Audit Program, the Arbitrum D.A.O. Grant Program, and other comparable initiatives that receive DAO treasury funding or delegated authority.
Community Guidelines: The rules of engagement for the Arbitrum DAO forum as outlined and enforced by the Arbitrum Foundation.
Conflict of Interest (COI): A situation where a contributor, or any entity with which a contributor has a direct professional or financial relationship, stands to directly benefit from the outcome of a proposal or election.
Responsible Voting: The practice of an election candidate casting votes for oneself and other candidates in a neutral manner to fill all open positions.
Shielded Voting: On Snapshot, votes are kept private during the voting process, but made public after the conclusion of the vote.
The Code of Conduct and Procedural Updates were introduced in late 2024 as a trial to establish clear expectations around delegate and contributor behavior and formalize certain aspects of how the DAO operated. At the time, Entropy envisioned that the Code of Conduct could be added to the Arbitrum Constitution to serve as a cultural anchor. However, after further deliberation with the Arbitrum Foundation, our team is in agreement that codifying the Code of Conduct at this stage is premature.
Constitutional amendments are purposefully a high-stakes process that requires strong consensus from delegates and contributors, and thus, we feel it is unwise to push the Code of Conduct forward until it is in a near-final state.
If the refined Code of Conduct proves effective through continued use, it can be revisited for constitutional inclusion in the future following the conclusion of the 2nd trial period in January 2026. As a reminder, Entropy also proposed adding the DAO’s Mission, Vision, and Purpose to the Constitution. When it comes time to make the amendment, we think it is best to combine all proposed changes into a single constitutional proposal.
Lastly, the language from the first proposal implied that both the Code of Conduct and Procedural Updates would be included in the Arbitrum Constitution. After consideration, Entropy now firmly believes procedural policies such as voting schedules or shielded elections should remain outside the Constitution as a social contract given the DAO’s constantly evolving nature, thus reserving the document for high-level principles that guide the DAO. Instead, these procedures can be revisited once a year in January following the Holiday Break and changed with a Snapshot vote if needed, with the quorum set at the active non-constitutional quorum level.
In November 2024, the Arbitrum DAO approved the trial of a Code of Conduct via Snapshot vote, establishing shared expectations around civility, integrity, transparency, and responsible participation. That code has since served as a behavioral baseline during the initial governance trial.
The revised Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures will be in effect following its ratification with a Snapshot vote through January 31st, 2026. At the conclusion of this 2nd trial, the DAO can revisit its procedures and discuss if it is time to formalize the Code of Conduct into the Arbitrum Constitution on an annual basis. To ensure that the DAO has ample time to discuss such matters without the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures losing its validity, the Arbitrum Foundation reserves the right to extend their effectiveness by up to two months through March 31st, 2026 as long as a new version has not yet been officially ratified.
When it comes time to add the Code of Conduct to the Arbitrum Constitution, we envision it as a new Section 7, following the existing Section 6: Community Values. In order to keep the included language sufficiently high level, the following quoted block contains the 5 sub-sections to be included:
7.1 Values Alignment
Arbitrum contributors should always strive to uphold the seven community values stated above in Section 6:
- Ethereum-aligned: Arbitrum is part of the Ethereum ecosystem and community
- Sustainable: Focus on long-term health of the protocol over short-term gains
- Secure: Arbitrum is security minded
- Socially inclusive: Open and welcoming to all constructive participants
- Technically inclusive: Accessible for ordinary people with ordinary technology
- User-focused: Managed for the benefit of all users
- Neutral and open: Foster open innovation, interoperation, user choice, and healthy competition
7.2 Good Faith and Best Interest
- Contributors should conduct themselves with honesty, integrity, and transparency, fostering trust and confidence among community members.
- Contributors should act and vote in accordance with what they see is in the best interests of Arbitrum, which encompasses but is not limited to all of the following: Arbitrum One, Arbitrum Nova, the Orbit Ecosystem, and any future Arbitrum DAO-governed chains as outlined above in Section 1.
7.3 Due Care and Attention
- Contributors should remain knowledgeable of developments in regard to Arbitrum DAO’s initiatives and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem.
- Contributors should strive to make a professional and unbiased review of each proposal before submitting their vote.
- Contributors are advised to vote abstain when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand the proposals.
7.4 Civility and Professionalism
- While separate from the Code of Conduct, contributors are expected to uphold the community guidelines for activity on the Arbitrum DAO forum and de facto understood gathering places for the Arbitrum DAO, whether online or in-person.
- Contributors should seek to create a respectful and inclusive environment for all community members, free from harassment and discrimination.
- Unacceptable behavior includes, but is not limited to:
- Publicly or privately harassing or intimidating others
- Sharing someone's private information without their consent
- Using sexualized language or imagery, or making unwanted advances
- Making insulting or derogatory comments about others
- Contributors should strive to provide constructive feedback that is well-researched and respectful, focusing on the proposal's merits. Personal attacks are never acceptable.
- Contributors should be open-minded and respectful of differing viewpoints, even if they disagree with them. Disagreements are an inevitable part of healthy debate, but they often yield positive results when approached in a civil manner.
- Contributors should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels and avoid taking discussions to social media in a manner that could tarnish Arbitrum DAO’s brand and reputation.
- Contributors should avoid making unsubstantiated accusations that imply malice without proper evidence. They should conduct proper due diligence before making any public accusations via social media, public forums, or any other recognized communication channels. This includes exhausting all available avenues, such as seeking clarification privately, before issuing any public statement that contains an unsubstantiated accusation about another DAO contributor.
7.5 Responsibility
- Maintaining a culture of productive debate, integrity, and transparency requires a sense of collective responsibility. As entrusted leaders of the Arbitrum community, contributors should take responsibility in fostering and maintaining a culture that promotes the principles outlined herein.
- Best practices of responsible contributors:
- Participation: Contributors should make an effort to vote (even if they vote abstain) on all proposals.
- Communication: Contributors should clearly communicate their rationale behind votes and discussions to the Arbitrum community.
- Accountability: Contributors should maintain knowledge of all DAO initiatives and hold managing parties or elected representatives accountable.
- Responsiveness: Contributors should use their best efforts to connect with the Arbitrum community and be accessible to answer questions or concerns.
From the previous iteration, the following language changes have been made to the Code of Conduct:
Sections 7.1 through 7.5 outline enduring values and expectations appropriate for constitutional inclusion, while the clauses regarding Conflicts of Interest, Enforcement, and Conflict Resolution are more operational in nature. We envision that Conflicts of Interest disclosure policies, as well as enforcement and conflict resolution mechanisms may need to adapt over time based on active programs, contributor behavior, and evolving community standards. Embedding these specifics into the Constitution would limit the DAO’s flexibility to make changes if necessary. Instead, both Entropy and the Arbitrum Foundation agree that it is more appropriate for these sections to live outside the Constitution in a similar manner to the agreed-upon Procedural Updates.
In the following sections, mentions of the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) have been generalized so that the terminology encompasses compensation from any DAO program that incentivizes voting or participation activity. Overall, the main changes have been made to the Enforcement & Appeal Process section. As the DAO’s structure is currently rapidly evolving, we foresee that most paid executors will either be directly hired by the DAO as AAEs, working as service providers or contractors under an AAE, or elected into a council overseeing an AAE, with each structure having bespoke checks and balances in place to ensure that executors are behaving professionally and ethically.
Disclosure and Transparency Policy: If a conflict of interest exists, it is expected that the contributor discloses the nature and extent of the conflict in writing on the forum before voting. Proposal authors should disclose potential conflicts in the COI section of the recommended proposal template as outlined in the “How to Submit a DAO Proposal” by the Arbitrum Foundation. While it may not always be clear if an individual/entity stands to gain “directly” or “indirectly”, contributors and proposal authors are recommended to lean on the side of over-communication in the name of transparency.
Contributors who disclose a conflict of interest are not expected to alter their voting in any way. Self-voting is not currently banned outright for the reasons stated in previous DAO-wide discussions and based on sentiment gathered from a subsequent temperature check. However, a contributor who repeatedly fails to disclose a conflict of interest before voting risks being removed from their compensated governance role.
All contributors are expected to abide by the Code of Conduct. Enforcement will take place through any program that financially compensates performing governance activities, such as rewards for voting/forum activity, or participation in DAO-approved programs where contributors are directly elected to facilitate the programs.
The program manager, council, or comparable facilitator in charge of the program is the one responsible for determining violations of the Code of Conduct and reserves the right to take what it deems as appropriate action, which may include but is not limited to, issuing a warning, suspension, or removal from the program. Any community member can raise a concern to the party responsible for managing the program with respect to a contributor failing to uphold the Code of Conduct. While the responsible party is required to acknowledge receipt of the concern and investigate the matter, the final determination and resulting course of action, which may include dismissing the concern, will depend on the underlying program’s structure.
If there are contradictions between the Code of Conduct and the specific program that is compensating a contributor, then the policies of the program shall take precedence. It is assumed that a program will define its own appeal process, but if it does not, then the conflict resolution section (next) will be the default appeal approach.
Resolution of conflicts between contributors (and between contributors and programs) will be entrusted to the Arbitrum Foundation, which will act as a neutral mediator. It is recommended that contributors first seek to resolve conflict issues in good faith and privately. If the matter is unable to be resolved for any reason, or if the behavior is threatening or harassing, the matter can be raised to the Arbitrum Foundation using this form. The Arbitrum Foundation will have the final say on the issue and reserves the right to determine if the issue should be brought to the attention of the community as a whole.
In the future and once OpCo is fully operational, responsibility for the resolution of conflicts can be transferred to the OpCo at the Arbitrum Foundation’s discretion. The Arbitrum Foundation will acknowledge when this transfer can take place and make it public on the governance forum when it goes into effect.
Entropy proposes an extended pilot of the DAO's procedures through the end of January 2026 to evaluate three adjustments/additions: Removing the Responsible Voting policy due to the presence of vote-buying services and, if not defined in the original proposal, processes for both the replacement of a DAO-elected committee/council member that voluntarily steps down and the termination of an ongoing DAO initiative.
Remaining unchanged from the previous iteration are the predictable voting schedule, the use of shielded voting for elections, and the inclusion of a Holiday Break at the end of the year. These changes reflect areas of feedback and allow the DAO to generate data across another trial period before making final decisions.
Entropy recognizes that the complexity of the original policy created confusion for some participating candidates, especially in situations where there was only a single seat being filled through the election. Additionally, since the introduction of the policy, vote-buying services have become more common, and notably, LobbyFi has received substantial delegation. After observing the impact on the OAT election in particular, Entropy has concluded that enforcing the Responsible Voting Policy is no longer feasible. Participating candidates can effectively bypass the policy by sending funds to a fresh address to purchase or bid for additional votes, thus circumventing the original policy’s intentions and putting other candidates strictly following the policy at a disadvantage.
Therefore, Entropy is proposing to sunset the Responsible Voting Policy and return to the DAO’s original standards of allowing participating candidates to self-vote with their full voting power. Staying consistent with the Disclosure and Transparency Policy, candidates who plan to self-vote should still disclose the action to the DAO. Remaining unchanged from the previous trial, contributors not participating in the election are free to vote however they wish, but if a conflict of interest exists, it should be disclosed on the forums before voting.
Due to the recent instances of elected members stepping away from positions, it became apparent that not having a pre-defined process for replacing DAO-elected committee members can lead to possible friction and uncertainty. In these instances, several paths were proposed by contributors, including a new DAO-wide election, taking the runner-up individual, the proposal author nominating a new member, or consolidating/elevating the responsibilities of an existing member.
To prevent the aforementioned uncertainty from arising in the future, Entropy is proposing the following process for the replacement of elected members who step down from a program when no process has been defined in the primary proposal passed to initiate an initiative:
Whichever party ultimately makes the decision on the best course of action, they are expected to provide a short update with rationale and basic information for the DAO.
For the purposes of clarity, we are proposing the above process only for positions that are filled by a DAO-wide election, and no dedicated process to replace a member has been defined in the original proposal. If an initiative has a program manager/council-appointed position that needs replacement or filling, due to either an individual stepping down or underperforming, it will be left up to the discretion of the initiative owner/manager.
Recently, several contributors have raised the question of whether a proposal to clawback funds or terminate an active DAO program should require a Snapshot with a certain quorum threshold (unconstitutional or constitutional) or an onchain vote. If not defined in the original proposal, we propose the following wind-down requirements as the default.
A Snapshot vote where the number of FOR votes to wind down the initiative meets 3% of the votable supply. If there are more voting options than the basic FOR/AGAINST/ABSTAIN, the option with the largest number of votes will be applied, given that the options to modify/cancel an initiative together exceed the 3% of votable supply level. For the purpose of clarity, if a proposal only seeks to modify an existing initiative, this voting requirement will not apply.
The individual/entity that brings forward the proposal to cancel an ongoing initiative is expected to provide sufficient information and rationale to help inform the DAO of their intentions. Any individual/entity with the adequate 500k ARB of voting power to post a vote on Snapshot may move the proposal forward.
We believe that such a structure elevates the requirements for canceling an initiative in a manner that provides comparable legitimacy to an actual onchain vote.
Entropy has conducted an analysis of shielded voting, seeking to understand if participation rates or voting behavior changed. We have created a dashboard that contributors can reference. It is important to note that several factors can impact the voting behavior of an election, including the number of seats, candidates, and its importance. We felt that the ARDC elections were the most appropriate instance to directly compare non-shielded and shielded elections. The following summarizes our findings:
Overall, Entropy believes an extension of shielded voting will let us validate and examine the effects of shielded voting further. In Part 3 of the dashboard, contributors are welcome to pick an Arbitrum DAO election to explore its activity.
As was the case during the 1st trial, shielded elections will only apply to those conducted on Snapshot and will not apply to the Security Council elections held on Tally.
Similar to last year, the purpose of a Holiday Break is to ensure that voters have a break and can return refreshed for the new year.
Proposal authors should be cognizant of timelines and aim to have all voting wrapped up by Thursday, December 18th if possible. To ensure this, temperature checks would have to start no later than Thursday, December 11th, 2025, and onchain votes scheduled by Monday, December 1st, 2025.
Differing from last year’s holiday break, we believe it is acceptable for new proposals to be posted to the forum, but the DAO should aim to only put emergency proposals to vote during the period.
Entropy recognizes that several proposals were delayed due to last year’s holiday break, so it is our recommendation that a certain level of flexibility be accepted by contributors in the event some voting is not wrapped up exactly by December 18th. The primary motivation of such a timeline is to ensure no voting occurs during the especially busy holiday period of December 24th - January 1st.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/28
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/28
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
I don't agree with removing the Responsible Voting Policy and the inclusion of policing language about how contributors can't publicly talk about conflicts in the DAO.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/26?u=bob-rossi
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-121): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-121
The Event Horizon Community voted FOR on this proposal (ehARB-121): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-121
For. The proposed updates, especially the transparent member replacement process and clear cancellation guidelines, ensure seamless governance and uphold our commitment to accountability within the Arbitrum ecosystem.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/25?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/24
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/23?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/22?u=0xalex
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/21
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/19?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/20
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/17?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/15?u=hawheik
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
I don't agree with removing the Responsible Voting Policy and the inclusion of policing language about how contributors can't publicly talk about conflicts in the DAO.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/26?u=bob-rossi
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-121): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-121
The Event Horizon Community voted FOR on this proposal (ehARB-121): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-121
For. The proposed updates, especially the transparent member replacement process and clear cancellation guidelines, ensure seamless governance and uphold our commitment to accountability within the Arbitrum ecosystem.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/25?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/24
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/23?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/22?u=0xalex
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/21
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/19?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/20
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/17?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/15?u=hawheik
Updating the Code of Conduct and formalising DAO‐level procedures makes Arbitrum more predictable for large token-holders and protocol treasuries that are considering delegation. Clear disclosure standards, an explicit recusal rule, and documented grievance-handling improve trust without adding material overhead. The revision borrows tested language from MakerDAO and Aave, so implementation risk is minimal. Strong governance hygiene is a prerequisite for deeper institutional participation; supporting this update signals that the DAO values transparency and accountability—exactly the environment responsible treasuries want before delegating significant ARB voting power.
Updating the Code of Conduct and formalising DAO‐level procedures makes Arbitrum more predictable for large token-holders and protocol treasuries that are considering delegation. Clear disclosure standards, an explicit recusal rule, and documented grievance-handling improve trust without adding material overhead. The revision borrows tested language from MakerDAO and Aave, so implementation risk is minimal. Strong governance hygiene is a prerequisite for deeper institutional participation; supporting this update signals that the DAO values transparency and accountability—exactly the environment responsible treasuries want before delegating significant ARB voting power.
Here is the recording of the Trial Period Extension for Code of Conduct & DAO’s Procedures: Open Discussion.
We look forward to hearing more feedback from the DAO on the latest versions of the Code of Conduct and DAO’s Procedures as we work towards a proposal to ratify any potential changes to these guiding documents.
The first governance call on the Trial Period Extension for Code of Conduct & DAO's Procedures will take place on February 6th at 14:00 UTC.
Trial Period Extension for Code of Conduct & DAO's Procedures: Open Discussion Friday, February 6 · 14:00 – 15:00pm Time zone: UTC Video call link: https://meet.google.com/zxp-mvcq-wqg
As outlined in the proposal to update the Code of Conduct and DAO’s procedures, the current versions are set to expire by the end of January 2026.
The proposal mentions that “at the conclusion of this 2nd trial, the DAO can revisit its procedures and discuss if it is time to formalize the Code of Conduct into the Arbitrum Constitution on an annual basis. To ensure that the DAO has ample time to discuss such matters without the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures losing its validity, the Arbitrum Foundation reserves the right to extend their effectiveness by up to two months through March 31st, 2026 as long as a new version has not yet been officially ratified.”
As outlined in the proposal to update the Code of Conduct and DAO’s procedures, the current versions are set to expire by the end of January 2026.
The proposal mentions that “at the conclusion of this 2nd trial, the DAO can revisit its procedures and discuss if it is time to formalize the Code of Conduct into the Arbitrum Constitution on an annual basis. To ensure that the DAO has ample time to discuss such matters without the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures losing its validity, the Arbitrum Foundation reserves the right to extend their effectiveness by up to two months through March 31st, 2026 as long as a new version has not yet been officially ratified.”
It also mentions that “in the future and once OpCo is fully operational, responsibility for the resolution of conflicts can be transferred to the OpCo at the Arbitrum Foundation’s discretion. The Arbitrum Foundation will acknowledge when this transfer can take place and make it public on the governance forum when it goes into effect.”
Accordingly, we would like to extend the current trial period until March 31st, 2026, in order to give the now operational OpCo sufficient time to take responsibility for the oversight of these guiding documents. In this period, we also encourage the DAO to review the existing versions of these guiding documents and suggest any changes to be included in the potentially constitutionalised versions.
We will be hosting governance calls on this topic in February. Stay tuned.
Here is the recording of the Trial Period Extension for Code of Conduct & DAO’s Procedures: Open Discussion.
We look forward to hearing more feedback from the DAO on the latest versions of the Code of Conduct and DAO’s Procedures as we work towards a proposal to ratify any potential changes to these guiding documents.
The first governance call on the Trial Period Extension for Code of Conduct & DAO's Procedures will take place on February 6th at 14:00 UTC.
Trial Period Extension for Code of Conduct & DAO's Procedures: Open Discussion Friday, February 6 · 14:00 – 15:00pm Time zone: UTC Video call link: https://meet.google.com/zxp-mvcq-wqg
As outlined in the proposal to update the Code of Conduct and DAO’s procedures, the current versions are set to expire by the end of January 2026.
The proposal mentions that “at the conclusion of this 2nd trial, the DAO can revisit its procedures and discuss if it is time to formalize the Code of Conduct into the Arbitrum Constitution on an annual basis. To ensure that the DAO has ample time to discuss such matters without the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures losing its validity, the Arbitrum Foundation reserves the right to extend their effectiveness by up to two months through March 31st, 2026 as long as a new version has not yet been officially ratified.”
As outlined in the proposal to update the Code of Conduct and DAO’s procedures, the current versions are set to expire by the end of January 2026.
The proposal mentions that “at the conclusion of this 2nd trial, the DAO can revisit its procedures and discuss if it is time to formalize the Code of Conduct into the Arbitrum Constitution on an annual basis. To ensure that the DAO has ample time to discuss such matters without the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures losing its validity, the Arbitrum Foundation reserves the right to extend their effectiveness by up to two months through March 31st, 2026 as long as a new version has not yet been officially ratified.”
It also mentions that “in the future and once OpCo is fully operational, responsibility for the resolution of conflicts can be transferred to the OpCo at the Arbitrum Foundation’s discretion. The Arbitrum Foundation will acknowledge when this transfer can take place and make it public on the governance forum when it goes into effect.”
Accordingly, we would like to extend the current trial period until March 31st, 2026, in order to give the now operational OpCo sufficient time to take responsibility for the oversight of these guiding documents. In this period, we also encourage the DAO to review the existing versions of these guiding documents and suggest any changes to be included in the potentially constitutionalised versions.
We will be hosting governance calls on this topic in February. Stay tuned.
Thank you to Entropy for reigniting this critical conversation and for the thoughtful refinements introduced in this proposal.
The Code of Conduct and procedural updates play a vital role in fostering a professional, transparent, and values-aligned DAO culture. As someone focused on DAO integrity and sustainability, I strongly support the continuation of this trial with the proposed revisions.
Thank you to Entropy for reigniting this critical conversation and for the thoughtful refinements introduced in this proposal.
The Code of Conduct and procedural updates play a vital role in fostering a professional, transparent, and values-aligned DAO culture. As someone focused on DAO integrity and sustainability, I strongly support the continuation of this trial with the proposed revisions.
In particular:
Overall, I view this proposal as a solid step forward in maturing Arbitrum’s governance infrastructure. The updates reflect lessons learned, maintain DAO flexibility, and lay the groundwork for more scalable contributor programs.
Looking forward to seeing how this second trial phase plays out and happy to contribute to ongoing refinements along the way.
Thank you to Entropy for reigniting this critical conversation and for the thoughtful refinements introduced in this proposal.
The Code of Conduct and procedural updates play a vital role in fostering a professional, transparent, and values-aligned DAO culture. As someone focused on DAO integrity and sustainability, I strongly support the continuation of this trial with the proposed revisions.
Thank you to Entropy for reigniting this critical conversation and for the thoughtful refinements introduced in this proposal.
The Code of Conduct and procedural updates play a vital role in fostering a professional, transparent, and values-aligned DAO culture. As someone focused on DAO integrity and sustainability, I strongly support the continuation of this trial with the proposed revisions.
In particular:
Overall, I view this proposal as a solid step forward in maturing Arbitrum’s governance infrastructure. The updates reflect lessons learned, maintain DAO flexibility, and lay the groundwork for more scalable contributor programs.
Looking forward to seeing how this second trial phase plays out and happy to contribute to ongoing refinements along the way.
To be honest, I don't really understand the need for a Code of Conduct to have an expiration date
It's like passing a law for a year. The idea behind laws and regulations is to make them as fair and accurate as possible, so they don't have to be changed too often.
I propose only amending the approved version of the code if the need arises.
voted Against on this offchain vote because I don't agree with removing the Responsible Voting Policy and the inclusion of policing language about how contributors can't publicly talk about conflicts in the DAO.
To be honest, I don't really understand the need for a Code of Conduct to have an expiration date
It's like passing a law for a year. The idea behind laws and regulations is to make them as fair and accurate as possible, so they don't have to be changed too often.
I propose only amending the approved version of the code if the need arises.
voted Against on this offchain vote because I don't agree with removing the Responsible Voting Policy and the inclusion of policing language about how contributors can't publicly talk about conflicts in the DAO.
I have voted in Favour. All highlighted changes look good, and iterations made after delegate comments were also an improvement.
I have voted in Favour. All highlighted changes look good, and iterations made after delegate comments were also an improvement.
I disagree with this sentiment, candidates should not be able to use their voting power to vote for themselves, usually terms or elections come with compensation… but battle is already lost, and I understand the DAO and delegates want another direction. Voted FOR
With the proposal passing and meeting the 3% votable supply quorum on Snapshot, the revised Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures are now in effect. This 2nd trial period will last until January 31st, 2026, with the Arbitrum Foundation reserving the right to extend it by 2 months till March 31st, 2026.
The new versions of the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures have been posted in the Guides and Documentation sub-category. Contributors should refer to these posts as the most up to date and active versions. The previous posts have been moved to the archive and locked.
With the proposal passing and meeting the 3% votable supply quorum on Snapshot, the revised Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures are now in effect. This 2nd trial period will last until January 31st, 2026, with the Arbitrum Foundation reserving the right to extend it by 2 months till March 31st, 2026.
The new versions of the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures have been posted in the Guides and Documentation sub-category. Contributors should refer to these posts as the most up to date and active versions. The previous posts have been moved to the archive and locked.
Thank you again to all the contributors who provided thoughtful feedback and questions.
DAOplomats voted FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
We support strengthening the DAO’s governance framework through this updated Code of Conduct. This proposal improves accountability and clarity, sets expectations for “contributors’” behavior, and gives the community a process to address violations.
These updates are foundational for scaling governance participation responsibly and credibly.
I voted FOR on this proposal, as it is an useful update, helping clarifying several items. I still think it is relevant to enhance the wording to avoid any type of confusion and I'm still available to help on that regard.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
This proposal enhances Arbitrum governance by refining the Code of Conduct to strengthen transparency, accountability, and adaptability. In the first half of the year, we witnessed several members stepping down from their roles, which surfaced key operational challenges. It’s encouraging to see those issues being directly addressed in this proposal. The extended trial period also allows for further testing of shielded voting and member replacement processes, providing valuable flexibility before these rules are codified in the Constitution. We will be voting in favor of this proposal.
At first, the proposal received reasonable objections from various members. I noticed that Entropy responded to these concerns multiple times and even made changes before the proposal reached the Snapshot stage. Their responsiveness and the meaningful adjustments they made, all in the context of a proposal that serves broader DAO utility, lead me to vote FOR.
Voting "For"
Not much to say other than agree on all points. I'm glad these types of clerical things are being addressed - just because it's a DAO doesn't mean it can't have some type of guidelines and structure to run more efficently. I think the changes make sense, and a few gaps were filled. I'm also glad to see not much was removed as I think overall it was an effective idea.
Voting "For"
Not much to say other than agree on all points. I'm glad these types of clerical things are being addressed - just because it's a DAO doesn't mean it can't have some type of guidelines and structure to run more efficently. I think the changes make sense, and a few gaps were filled. I'm also glad to see not much was removed as I think overall it was an effective idea.
As mentioned above, Entropy is not confident that this is solely attributable to shielded voting, and could be partially due to the more predictable voting schedule with elections now being posted only on Thursdays.
FWIW - I agree with this take. My thought would have been non-shielded voting would have had the higher 11th hour voting due to gamification, but with the changes to the Thursday voting schedule I think that makes sense. For example I usually set aside time on Weds/Thurs to vote in a block, as its just easier to manage and lets me make sure all point shave been made. (which might be another explanation, people want to make sure all available info is out there versus voting righ at the start). And if the early voting dropped undre shielded conditions, that may point to the lack of gamification as well. Where in unshielded voting would cause people to try and get early support because then they seem to be a canidate where their vote is less 'wasted' oon.
We support these changes at a high level. In general, we are supportive of this proposal as it finishes Snapshot.
We have but a few suggestions moving forward:
We support these changes at a high level. In general, we are supportive of this proposal as it finishes Snapshot.
We have but a few suggestions moving forward:
For the member replacement process, we think that it's somewhat important to include a timeline in here, as in a new member must be appointed as program manager within X amount of time. We've seen proposals sit by the wayside for months being delayed by payment scheduling and additional planning due to unforeseen circumstances, we should safeguard against accidentally casting proposals and initiatives to the side.
If we are adding language detailing the removal/step down process for a member on a committee, then we should probably include more committee/council skeleton details here. The replacement process serves the DAO by decreasing decision fatigue and making rules less hazy. Following that same rationale, we should have more "preset" rules for committees. For example, during the end of incentives we saw a few stragglers that had last minute extension proposals. It may be in the scope of the Code of Conduct to explicitly provide some policy for initiative extensions and the returning of funds, like an automatic return date, so if funds have not been returned and there was no established return date, then by default the funds are expected to be returned within 90 days or X amount of time, etc.
Additionally, while we support the AF as a mediator, we are uncertain if this is a truly neutral mediator in the long term, especially as we foray further into AAEs. In other words, it's a good start, but maybe we should think further than that (maybe Kleros is a good idea for the future, but this might be pushing it a bit too ideologically far).
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
During the first iteration, we backed the first six-month trial, noting that the document would need real-world feedback and progressive iterations. This new version is exactly that: it removes an unenforceable self-voting cap, broadens the language to cover all paid contributors—not just delegates—and addresses two governance gaps by clarifying how to replace an elected member and how to wind down an underperforming program.
For a clearer understanding, we created a comparison between the initial iteration and the proposed changes.
| Item | What v1 (Oct 2024) Introduced | What v2 (Jul 2025) changes | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audience & vocabulary | Uses “delegate” everywhere; COI & enforcement tied to Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) | Re-labels participants as “contributors”; expands to any DAO-approved program (AAEs, councils, etc.) | Broadens the code so it applies to everyone paid or elected by the DAO, not just voting delegates |
| Trial window | 6½-month pilot Nov 11 2024 → May 30 2025 | Second pilot Jul 24 2025 → Jan 31 2026 (Arbitrum Foundation can auto-extend to Mar 31 2026 if a new version isn’t ready) | Extends the experiment and gives the DAO ~7 additional months of data |
| Responsible Voting Policy | Introduces detailed limits on self-voting weights for multi-seat elections | Completely removed (vote-buying services make it “impossible to enforce”) | Simplifies elections; candidates may now self-vote 100 % (but must still disclose COI) |
| New operational processes | None (other than voting schedule & shielded elections) | • Member replacement procedure when an elected person steps down | |
| • Initiative cancellation process & quorum (Snapshot, 3 % FOR votes) | Fills two governance gaps repeatedly encountered during the last iteration of the CoC. | ||
| Constitutional ambitions | Envisions adding the Code & procedures to the Constitution after the first trial | Calls that premature; keeps procedures as a living social contract; only high-level values likely to become Section 7 someday | Lowers stakes, makes it easier to iterate annually |
| Voting schedule & shielded elections | Weekly cadence (Thursday starts), shielded + weighted voting as default | Kept unchanged, but shielded voting pilot extended | Confirms delegates liked 2024 rhythm; continues to study shielded effects |
| Holiday break | Dec 20 2024 – Jan 6 2025; recommends no new forum posts | Dec 18 2025 – Jan 5 2026; forum posts allowed, but voting strongly discouraged | Slightly longer, more flexibility for non-urgent forum activity |
One thing that we would like to point out is that we believe that this is the type of document that needs to be treated as a living document, one that will be flexible in response to the situations that may arise in the DAO. We see no blocker to another trial run and look forward to this new version.
We are voting in favor of this proposal.
While there are areas that could be further improved, the changes overall represent a solid step forward in updating and clarifying the DAO’s operating norms. In particular, we support efforts to standardize expectations around delegate behavior and responsibilities.
We are voting in favor of this proposal.
While there are areas that could be further improved, the changes overall represent a solid step forward in updating and clarifying the DAO’s operating norms. In particular, we support efforts to standardize expectations around delegate behavior and responsibilities.
We would, however, like to echo @SEEDGov’s concerns regarding the removal of the Responsible Voting Policy:
“We’re not entirely comfortable with the removal of this policy. While it’s true that enforcement is not possible in the case of vote-buying platforms like LobbyFi, we believe that what can be enforced should be enforced... Typically, the response to such loopholes is to amend the policy to address the gap (if possible) — not to remove the rule entirely because one edge case cannot be controlled.”
We think this is an important point. Even if full enforcement isn't possible, having a policy in place provides a clear signal on the DAO’s values and expectations. A weaker stance here risks normalizing behavior that most of the community sees as misaligned.
At the same time, we understand Entropy’s perspective:
“...there seems to be strong consensus that such censoring would be embarking on a losing game of cat and mouse and push what are currently public/semi-transparent vote buying services to transform into being more opaque/private... Entropy is not in favor of creating a system that incentivizes or leaves the door open for participating candidates to discreetly gain an advantage.”
That said, this could be an opportunity for the DAO to engage more proactively with vote-buying platforms. If these platforms are willing, we may be able to co-develop rules or features that disallow buying votes in specific contexts, particularly for elected or incentivized roles without needing to rely solely on enforcement after the fact.
Overall, we support the proposal, but recommend revisiting the Responsible Voting Policy in a future update and not to discard it, but to refine it into something both enforceable and directionally valuable for the DAO.
I have voted FOR this proposal, thanks @Entropy the changes make a lot of sense. On a side note, for disputes with binary outcomes, one option could be to use the Kleros protocol to gather feedback from a neutral third party outside the Arbitrum Ecosystem. This could be a step in the process of solving disputes. I'm happy to help explore this with you guys !
After reviewing @Entropy’s clarification and feedback from other delegates, we’ve decided to vote FOR in the temp check.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/2?u=curia
We have cast our vote in favor of this proposal.
Aside from a few minor points, we find the proposal to be highly rational.
While there may be room for further community discussion on some of the finer details, we believe these should not prevent us from supporting the proposal at this stage.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
As we mentioned in our previous comment, we think the updated Code of Conduct and procedures strike the right balance. The separation between high-level values and the more flexible processes makes a lot of sense to us. We also appreciate how this proposal builds on what worked during the first trial and improves on the parts that needed more clarity.
We support extending this trial period to keep testing these norms in the wild before we lock anything into the Constitution.
gm, all changes sound reasonable to me. Voted FOR.
I support extending this trial period to keep testing these norms in the wild before we lock anything into the Constitution. It is a healthy iterative approach that gives us extra time to keep learning and adjust based on real usage
I support extending this trial period to keep testing these norms in the wild before we lock anything into the Constitution. It is a healthy iterative approach that gives us extra time to keep learning and adjust based on real usage
I love the clear expectations around behavior and direction for managing difficult discussions without turning things into a drama.
The one piece of feedback I would give is to make the clawback to be onchain instead of Snapshot. It is not a blocker but if someone is checking the onchain votes they will assume they were all paid out in full, unless they see an onchain clawback. It’s a little bureaucratic, but I would skip the snapshot and go straight to onchain for clawbacks to keep things clean and easy for people later who might be trying to track spending and such. Prob not a big deal tho.
Despite some disagreement with certain points, I consider most of these changes to be positive Voted FOR https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/cp0x-delegate-communication-thread/22217/202?u=cp0x
Overall I think these are reasonable changes, so for that reason I am inclined to vote "For" the proposal. However..
Overall I think these are reasonable changes, so for that reason I am inclined to vote "For" the proposal. However..
It either becomes practically unenforceable, or risks becoming a cudgel with which anyone who disagrees or has a different interpretation of an issue can be attacked for "just not being knowledgeable", or with which delegates are suddenly at risk for having violated the CoC because "didn't you know about X? We've talked about it a lot..".
Given the reception of the Code of Conduct revisions thus far, we feel comfortable moving this to a Snapshot vote. With the previous iteration requiring a majority approval and quorum set as at least 3% of all votable tokens having cast votes in favor or abstaining, this version will be held to the same requirements. If this proposal passes on Snapshot, the updated versions of the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures will go into effect immediately.
Two changes that have been made to the proposal since Tuesday. The first is based on a suggestion from @krst during the open discussion. The Enforcement & Appeal Process section has been updated with the following language, which requires that the responsible party must at least acknowledge receipt and investigate a Code of Conduct violation raised by a community member:
I have voted in Favour. All highlighted changes look good, and iterations made after delegate comments were also an improvement.
I have voted in Favour. All highlighted changes look good, and iterations made after delegate comments were also an improvement.
I disagree with this sentiment, candidates should not be able to use their voting power to vote for themselves, usually terms or elections come with compensation… but battle is already lost, and I understand the DAO and delegates want another direction. Voted FOR
With the proposal passing and meeting the 3% votable supply quorum on Snapshot, the revised Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures are now in effect. This 2nd trial period will last until January 31st, 2026, with the Arbitrum Foundation reserving the right to extend it by 2 months till March 31st, 2026.
The new versions of the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures have been posted in the Guides and Documentation sub-category. Contributors should refer to these posts as the most up to date and active versions. The previous posts have been moved to the archive and locked.
With the proposal passing and meeting the 3% votable supply quorum on Snapshot, the revised Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures are now in effect. This 2nd trial period will last until January 31st, 2026, with the Arbitrum Foundation reserving the right to extend it by 2 months till March 31st, 2026.
The new versions of the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures have been posted in the Guides and Documentation sub-category. Contributors should refer to these posts as the most up to date and active versions. The previous posts have been moved to the archive and locked.
Thank you again to all the contributors who provided thoughtful feedback and questions.
DAOplomats voted FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
We support strengthening the DAO’s governance framework through this updated Code of Conduct. This proposal improves accountability and clarity, sets expectations for “contributors’” behavior, and gives the community a process to address violations.
These updates are foundational for scaling governance participation responsibly and credibly.
I voted FOR on this proposal, as it is an useful update, helping clarifying several items. I still think it is relevant to enhance the wording to avoid any type of confusion and I'm still available to help on that regard.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
This proposal enhances Arbitrum governance by refining the Code of Conduct to strengthen transparency, accountability, and adaptability. In the first half of the year, we witnessed several members stepping down from their roles, which surfaced key operational challenges. It’s encouraging to see those issues being directly addressed in this proposal. The extended trial period also allows for further testing of shielded voting and member replacement processes, providing valuable flexibility before these rules are codified in the Constitution. We will be voting in favor of this proposal.
At first, the proposal received reasonable objections from various members. I noticed that Entropy responded to these concerns multiple times and even made changes before the proposal reached the Snapshot stage. Their responsiveness and the meaningful adjustments they made, all in the context of a proposal that serves broader DAO utility, lead me to vote FOR.
Voting "For"
Not much to say other than agree on all points. I'm glad these types of clerical things are being addressed - just because it's a DAO doesn't mean it can't have some type of guidelines and structure to run more efficently. I think the changes make sense, and a few gaps were filled. I'm also glad to see not much was removed as I think overall it was an effective idea.
Voting "For"
Not much to say other than agree on all points. I'm glad these types of clerical things are being addressed - just because it's a DAO doesn't mean it can't have some type of guidelines and structure to run more efficently. I think the changes make sense, and a few gaps were filled. I'm also glad to see not much was removed as I think overall it was an effective idea.
As mentioned above, Entropy is not confident that this is solely attributable to shielded voting, and could be partially due to the more predictable voting schedule with elections now being posted only on Thursdays.
FWIW - I agree with this take. My thought would have been non-shielded voting would have had the higher 11th hour voting due to gamification, but with the changes to the Thursday voting schedule I think that makes sense. For example I usually set aside time on Weds/Thurs to vote in a block, as its just easier to manage and lets me make sure all point shave been made. (which might be another explanation, people want to make sure all available info is out there versus voting righ at the start). And if the early voting dropped undre shielded conditions, that may point to the lack of gamification as well. Where in unshielded voting would cause people to try and get early support because then they seem to be a canidate where their vote is less 'wasted' oon.
We support these changes at a high level. In general, we are supportive of this proposal as it finishes Snapshot.
We have but a few suggestions moving forward:
We support these changes at a high level. In general, we are supportive of this proposal as it finishes Snapshot.
We have but a few suggestions moving forward:
For the member replacement process, we think that it's somewhat important to include a timeline in here, as in a new member must be appointed as program manager within X amount of time. We've seen proposals sit by the wayside for months being delayed by payment scheduling and additional planning due to unforeseen circumstances, we should safeguard against accidentally casting proposals and initiatives to the side.
If we are adding language detailing the removal/step down process for a member on a committee, then we should probably include more committee/council skeleton details here. The replacement process serves the DAO by decreasing decision fatigue and making rules less hazy. Following that same rationale, we should have more "preset" rules for committees. For example, during the end of incentives we saw a few stragglers that had last minute extension proposals. It may be in the scope of the Code of Conduct to explicitly provide some policy for initiative extensions and the returning of funds, like an automatic return date, so if funds have not been returned and there was no established return date, then by default the funds are expected to be returned within 90 days or X amount of time, etc.
Additionally, while we support the AF as a mediator, we are uncertain if this is a truly neutral mediator in the long term, especially as we foray further into AAEs. In other words, it's a good start, but maybe we should think further than that (maybe Kleros is a good idea for the future, but this might be pushing it a bit too ideologically far).
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
During the first iteration, we backed the first six-month trial, noting that the document would need real-world feedback and progressive iterations. This new version is exactly that: it removes an unenforceable self-voting cap, broadens the language to cover all paid contributors—not just delegates—and addresses two governance gaps by clarifying how to replace an elected member and how to wind down an underperforming program.
For a clearer understanding, we created a comparison between the initial iteration and the proposed changes.
| Item | What v1 (Oct 2024) Introduced | What v2 (Jul 2025) changes | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audience & vocabulary | Uses “delegate” everywhere; COI & enforcement tied to Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) | Re-labels participants as “contributors”; expands to any DAO-approved program (AAEs, councils, etc.) | Broadens the code so it applies to everyone paid or elected by the DAO, not just voting delegates |
| Trial window | 6½-month pilot Nov 11 2024 → May 30 2025 | Second pilot Jul 24 2025 → Jan 31 2026 (Arbitrum Foundation can auto-extend to Mar 31 2026 if a new version isn’t ready) | Extends the experiment and gives the DAO ~7 additional months of data |
| Responsible Voting Policy | Introduces detailed limits on self-voting weights for multi-seat elections | Completely removed (vote-buying services make it “impossible to enforce”) | Simplifies elections; candidates may now self-vote 100 % (but must still disclose COI) |
| New operational processes | None (other than voting schedule & shielded elections) | • Member replacement procedure when an elected person steps down | |
| • Initiative cancellation process & quorum (Snapshot, 3 % FOR votes) | Fills two governance gaps repeatedly encountered during the last iteration of the CoC. | ||
| Constitutional ambitions | Envisions adding the Code & procedures to the Constitution after the first trial | Calls that premature; keeps procedures as a living social contract; only high-level values likely to become Section 7 someday | Lowers stakes, makes it easier to iterate annually |
| Voting schedule & shielded elections | Weekly cadence (Thursday starts), shielded + weighted voting as default | Kept unchanged, but shielded voting pilot extended | Confirms delegates liked 2024 rhythm; continues to study shielded effects |
| Holiday break | Dec 20 2024 – Jan 6 2025; recommends no new forum posts | Dec 18 2025 – Jan 5 2026; forum posts allowed, but voting strongly discouraged | Slightly longer, more flexibility for non-urgent forum activity |
One thing that we would like to point out is that we believe that this is the type of document that needs to be treated as a living document, one that will be flexible in response to the situations that may arise in the DAO. We see no blocker to another trial run and look forward to this new version.
We are voting in favor of this proposal.
While there are areas that could be further improved, the changes overall represent a solid step forward in updating and clarifying the DAO’s operating norms. In particular, we support efforts to standardize expectations around delegate behavior and responsibilities.
We are voting in favor of this proposal.
While there are areas that could be further improved, the changes overall represent a solid step forward in updating and clarifying the DAO’s operating norms. In particular, we support efforts to standardize expectations around delegate behavior and responsibilities.
We would, however, like to echo @SEEDGov’s concerns regarding the removal of the Responsible Voting Policy:
“We’re not entirely comfortable with the removal of this policy. While it’s true that enforcement is not possible in the case of vote-buying platforms like LobbyFi, we believe that what can be enforced should be enforced... Typically, the response to such loopholes is to amend the policy to address the gap (if possible) — not to remove the rule entirely because one edge case cannot be controlled.”
We think this is an important point. Even if full enforcement isn't possible, having a policy in place provides a clear signal on the DAO’s values and expectations. A weaker stance here risks normalizing behavior that most of the community sees as misaligned.
At the same time, we understand Entropy’s perspective:
“...there seems to be strong consensus that such censoring would be embarking on a losing game of cat and mouse and push what are currently public/semi-transparent vote buying services to transform into being more opaque/private... Entropy is not in favor of creating a system that incentivizes or leaves the door open for participating candidates to discreetly gain an advantage.”
That said, this could be an opportunity for the DAO to engage more proactively with vote-buying platforms. If these platforms are willing, we may be able to co-develop rules or features that disallow buying votes in specific contexts, particularly for elected or incentivized roles without needing to rely solely on enforcement after the fact.
Overall, we support the proposal, but recommend revisiting the Responsible Voting Policy in a future update and not to discard it, but to refine it into something both enforceable and directionally valuable for the DAO.
I have voted FOR this proposal, thanks @Entropy the changes make a lot of sense. On a side note, for disputes with binary outcomes, one option could be to use the Kleros protocol to gather feedback from a neutral third party outside the Arbitrum Ecosystem. This could be a step in the process of solving disputes. I'm happy to help explore this with you guys !
After reviewing @Entropy’s clarification and feedback from other delegates, we’ve decided to vote FOR in the temp check.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-code-of-conduct-daos-procedures/29594/2?u=curia
We have cast our vote in favor of this proposal.
Aside from a few minor points, we find the proposal to be highly rational.
While there may be room for further community discussion on some of the finer details, we believe these should not prevent us from supporting the proposal at this stage.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
As we mentioned in our previous comment, we think the updated Code of Conduct and procedures strike the right balance. The separation between high-level values and the more flexible processes makes a lot of sense to us. We also appreciate how this proposal builds on what worked during the first trial and improves on the parts that needed more clarity.
We support extending this trial period to keep testing these norms in the wild before we lock anything into the Constitution.
gm, all changes sound reasonable to me. Voted FOR.
I support extending this trial period to keep testing these norms in the wild before we lock anything into the Constitution. It is a healthy iterative approach that gives us extra time to keep learning and adjust based on real usage
I support extending this trial period to keep testing these norms in the wild before we lock anything into the Constitution. It is a healthy iterative approach that gives us extra time to keep learning and adjust based on real usage
I love the clear expectations around behavior and direction for managing difficult discussions without turning things into a drama.
The one piece of feedback I would give is to make the clawback to be onchain instead of Snapshot. It is not a blocker but if someone is checking the onchain votes they will assume they were all paid out in full, unless they see an onchain clawback. It’s a little bureaucratic, but I would skip the snapshot and go straight to onchain for clawbacks to keep things clean and easy for people later who might be trying to track spending and such. Prob not a big deal tho.
Despite some disagreement with certain points, I consider most of these changes to be positive Voted FOR https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/cp0x-delegate-communication-thread/22217/202?u=cp0x
Overall I think these are reasonable changes, so for that reason I am inclined to vote "For" the proposal. However..
Overall I think these are reasonable changes, so for that reason I am inclined to vote "For" the proposal. However..
It either becomes practically unenforceable, or risks becoming a cudgel with which anyone who disagrees or has a different interpretation of an issue can be attacked for "just not being knowledgeable", or with which delegates are suddenly at risk for having violated the CoC because "didn't you know about X? We've talked about it a lot..".
Given the reception of the Code of Conduct revisions thus far, we feel comfortable moving this to a Snapshot vote. With the previous iteration requiring a majority approval and quorum set as at least 3% of all votable tokens having cast votes in favor or abstaining, this version will be held to the same requirements. If this proposal passes on Snapshot, the updated versions of the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures will go into effect immediately.
Two changes that have been made to the proposal since Tuesday. The first is based on a suggestion from @krst during the open discussion. The Enforcement & Appeal Process section has been updated with the following language, which requires that the responsible party must at least acknowledge receipt and investigate a Code of Conduct violation raised by a community member:
Given the reception of the Code of Conduct revisions thus far, we feel comfortable moving this to a Snapshot vote. With the previous iteration requiring a majority approval and quorum set as at least 3% of all votable tokens having cast votes in favor or abstaining, this version will be held to the same requirements. If this proposal passes on Snapshot, the updated versions of the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures will go into effect immediately.
Two changes that have been made to the proposal since Tuesday. The first is based on a suggestion from @krst during the open discussion. The Enforcement & Appeal Process section has been updated with the following language, which requires that the responsible party must at least acknowledge receipt and investigate a Code of Conduct violation raised by a community member:
[quote=”Entropy,post:1, topic:29594”]
Any community member can raise a concern to the party responsible for managing the program with respect to a contributor failing to uphold the Code of Conduct. While the responsible party is required to acknowledge receipt of the concern and investigate the matter, the final determination and resulting course of action, which may include dismissing the concern, will depend on the underlying program’s structure.
[/quote]
The second change is the addition of a clarifying sentence to the Voting Requirement for the Cancellation of Ongoing Initiatives section for when there are multiple voting options beyond the basic FOR/AGAINST/ABSTAIN. The intention of the original language is to address instances where both modification & cancellation are proposed as options for voters, which is something the DAO has seen before. However, it is intended to only be applicable when cancellation or a clawback is being considered.
A Snapshot vote where the number of FOR votes to wind down the initiative meets 3% of the votable supply. If there are more voting options than the basic FOR/AGAINST/ABSTAIN, the option with the largest number of votes will be applied, given that the options to modify/cancel an initiative together exceed the 3% of votable supply level. For the purpose of clarity, if a proposal only seeks to modify an existing initiative, this voting requirement will not apply.
Lastly, we’d like to thank @jameskbh for the thoughtful suggestions; however, after considering the proposed revisions we have decided not to make any changes. This is primarily due to our preference to keep the sub-sections of the Code of Conduct that could be added to the Arbitrum Constitution at a sufficiently high-level. Additionally, we are hesitant to add an explicit suggestion to refrain from voting with current participation rates as well as adding overly descriptive rules regarding timing due to the difficulty of enforcing consistently. Finally, regarding the clause highlighted from the the cancellation requirements, we believe it already accounts for the scenario you are concerned about. If there are multiple options and AGAINST (which in this case means continuing the initiative) has the largest number of votes, then it will be the option applied.
Extending the Code of Conduct and procedure test to 31 January 2026 gives the DAO time to see what works before writing anything into the Constitution, which is a positive in our eyes. Removing the Responsible Voting rule makes sense because vote‑buying tools now make limits impossible to police. The new replacement steps are positive because they ensure programs keep moving if an elected member leaves, by naming who should pick a successor and requiring a short public note. A Snapshot vote with a 3 % quorum and the usual 500 k ARB posting rule makes any shutdown both simple and fair. We also support keeping shielded elections in place so the DAO can gather more data about turnout and late voting before deciding whether to keep them. Taken together, these changes are overall positive, so AranaDigital supports the proposal.
The recording from yesterday's open discussion can be found here. Thank you to all the contributors who joined and asked questions.
Thanks for pushing this forward!
I have a few comments regarding a few specific points:
Contributors are advised to vote abstain when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand the proposals.
Thanks for pushing this forward!
I have a few comments regarding a few specific points:
Contributors are advised to vote abstain when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand the proposals.
While I understand the intention behind this guidance, I’d like to highlight that an ABSTAIN vote is not entirely neutral in our context, as it still counts towards quorum. This means that if a contributor with significant VP—or a group of contributors—votes ABSTAIN, it could inadvertently result in a suboptimal proposal being approved.
My suggestion would be to recommend that contributors simply refrain from voting on proposals they have not properly reviewed.
Contributors should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels
In this case, I believe it would be helpful to explicitly name the recommended feedback channels (even if the text is high-level). Clear guidance on where contributors should provide input (my initial suggestion is the governance forum, but we could add TG channels, or other relevant spaces) would enhance clarity and eliminate room for misunderstandings.
Staying consistent with the Disclosure and Transparency Policy, candidates who plan to self-vote should still disclose the action to the DAO.
I believe we should clarify when this disclosure should happen. My suggestion is to incorporate this information into all candidacy templates, ensuring that candidates declare their self-voting intentions upfront. This way, contributors have full transparency from the start of the election process. Additionally, if the entity the candidate is associated with plans to allocate its VP in support of the candidacy, this should also be disclosed from the outset.
Remaining unchanged from the previous trial, contributors not participating in the election are free to vote however they wish, but if a conflict of interest exists, it should be disclosed on the forums before voting.
Here, I recommend being more explicit about the timing of the disclosure. As currently phrased, one could interpret “before voting” as just before casting a vote, potentially at the last moment. To avoid this ambiguity, I suggest we require COI disclosures to be made before the voting period starts, ensuring all contributors have adequate context throughout the full voting process.
A Snapshot vote where the number of FOR votes to wind down the initiative meets 3% of the votable supply. If there are more voting options than the basic FOR/AGAINST/ABSTAIN, the option with the largest number of votes will be applied, given that the options to modify/cancel an initiative together exceed the 3% of votable supply level.
I suggest we take a more cautious approach here. Since the vote is to reverse a previous DAO-approved initiative, I believe a simple plurality should not be sufficient when multiple voting options are presented. Instead, we could also require that the most popular option must have more votes than the “AGAINST” (or equivalent) option.
My reasoning is:
I hope those comments/suggestions make sense!
Our team appreciates the thoughtful suggestions raised by contributors. First, the following changes have been incorporated into the Code of Conduct. Sub-section 7.4 has been updated to match SeedGov’s suggested wording for unsubstantiated accusations:
Our team appreciates the thoughtful suggestions raised by contributors. First, the following changes have been incorporated into the Code of Conduct. Sub-section 7.4 has been updated to match SeedGov’s suggested wording for unsubstantiated accusations:
In our view, this clause could benefit from being expanded. We suggest the following wording:
Contributors should avoid making unsubstantiated accusations that imply malice without proper evidence. They should conduct proper due diligence before making any public accusations via social media, public forums, or any other recognized communication channels. This includes exhausting all available avenues — for example, seeking clarification privately — before issuing any public statement that contains an unsubstantiated accusation about another DAO contributor.
Clarifying language has been added to the member replacement process that the party responsible for selecting the individual/entity to fill the role, should also make a post on the forum updating the DAO of the change along with some basic information and rationale. Similar language has been added for the winding down of an initiative along with clarifying that anyone with adequate voting power (500k ARB) can post the cancellation vote to Snapshot.
Here we suggest including a clause that allows a relevant stakeholder (e.g. the Arbitrum Foundation, Entropy, OpCo/OAT) to trigger an extension of the Code’s validity by one or two additional months, if necessary, without the necessity of going through a vote.
Lastly, we have also added language based on SeedGov’s suggestion that grants the Arbitrum Foundation the power to extend the trial period by up to two months through March 31st, 2026 in the event a new version has not yet been ratified.
Moving on to open topics & questions raised, we will first address the comments regarding the Responsible Voting Policy:
However, we believe that the policy still holds cultural and ethical value even if it cannot be enforced strictly. Rather than removing it entirely, we suggest keeping it as a best-practice standard for election participants, especially those in compensated or elected roles. Maintaining the expectation of fair and transparent voting behavior, even informally, helps reinforce the integrity of elections.
Typically, the response to such loopholes is to amend the policy to address the gap (if possible) — not to remove the rule entirely because one edge case cannot be controlled.
We fear including the Responsible Voting policy in the Code of Conduct as a guiding principle, creates blurred expectations for participating candidates. It is entirely possible to encounter a scenario where an election is decided by a participating candidate fully self-voting and the runner up splitting their votes equally. In this event, we envision there being a great deal of confusion and controversy on if the policy should be applied. So while some participating candidates may choose to still follow the standard, such a decision should be free from informal expectations.
Our team is open to other suggestions, but closing this loop hole would likely require retroactively removing votes from LobbyFi or other vote buying platforms in shielded elections. From the discussion the DAO had in April on the topic, there seems to be strong consensus that such censoring would be embarking on a losing game of cat and mouse and push what are currently public/semi-transparent vote buying services to transform into being more opaque/private. Considering the original intentions of the policy, Entropy is not in favor of creating a system that incentivizes or leaves the door open for participating candidates to discreetly gain an advantage.
In terms of the replacement itself, we suggest that the DAO consider adopting a runner-up mechanism as the first fallback. If the runner-up from the original election meets a reasonable minimum threshold of vote share, such as a percentage of the winning candidate’s total, they could automatically be offered the role.
In the current proposed system, the program manager, proposal author, or Arbitrum Foundation (if the responsibility falls to them) can choose the runner-up as the replacement. However, as we experienced with the ARDC v2, a replacement is not always necessary, and constraining the DAO into a runner-up mechanism could be less than ideal in certain circumstances. We prefer to entrust the responsible and generally highest-context party with the flexibility to make the right decision in any scenario.
However, we note that many delegates continue to post their votes and reasoning in delegate threads during the voting period, which partially undermines the privacy benefits. To fully realize the intent of shielded voting, we recommend encouraging delegates to wait until the voting period has concluded before publishing their vote rationale.
If a contributor wishes to make their vote public, there is no means by which Entropy, the Arbitrum Foundation, or any other party can keep them from posting either on social media or the forum. Additionally, with shielded elections being limited to those only on Snapshot, all votes are editable, so if a delegate wishes to change their vote based on new public information that is disclosed during the election, they can do so. Taking both of these factors into account, it is our opinion that attempting to enforce such a policy will lead to more controversy than benefits.
Again, Entropy appreciates the thoughtful feedback and commentary from contributors. We look forward to discussing these topics further on the open community call.
Thank you to the contributors who have provided thoughtful feedback on the Code of Conduct thus far. Our team will post a response to the questions shortly. Entropy will also be hosting a community call tomorrow, July 15th, at 2 pm UTC to walk through the proposed changes and allow for more contributor input.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Thank you @Entropy for refining the Code of Conduct and procedural updates.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Thank you @Entropy for refining the Code of Conduct and procedural updates.
We appreciate the effort to keep procedural elements outside the Constitution while aiming to elevate enduring principles like civility, due diligence, and responsibility.
Looks like we'll all be using 'contributors' instead of 'delegates' going forward. It feels like the right shift, given how participation in governance has evolved. We'll just have to get used to it, apologies in advance if we slip and say 'delegates' out of habit!
As contributors who’ve actively participated across different DAO programs, we’ve seen how even well-intentioned norms can lose traction without consistent framing and reminders. The proposed structure, splitting high-level principles into Section 7 while keeping enforcement and appeals adaptable, feels like the right middle ground.
Building on points raised by other delegates:
We recognize that enforcing the Responsible Voting Policy is no longer practical due to vote-buying platforms and circumvention tactics. However, we echo concerns raised by @Curia and @Tane that removing the policy entirely could weaken important cultural norms around self-voting and ethics.
Instead of removal, what if we preserve this as non-binding best practice language, perhaps in Code of Conduct Section 7.2? This keeps the DAO’s expectations visible while acknowledging enforcement challenges.
We also echo @cp0x’s concern around replacement processes. While we support flexibility in replacements to avoid operational bottlenecks, a simple requirement to post the reasoning for any replacement decision (whether it comes from a council, proposal author, or the Foundation) would help preserve trust. It doesn’t need to be a vote, just a public note outlining why a change was made and how the new member was selected.
Lastly, on cancellation procedures, we’d recommend that any Snapshot to claw back or sunset a program be accompanied by a brief status update, progress so far, remaining budget, and any pending deliverables. Without this context, contributors are left to guess at performance, which can lead to misinformed outcomes.
On shielded voting, we support @Curia’s suggestion of encouraging post-vote rationale sharing after the Snapshot closes. We has always advocated for transparent vote reasoning, but we agree that timing it post-vote respects the intent behind shielded voting while still allowing delegates to remain accountable.
In the past, we’ve seen (unfortunately more than one) instances of contributors making public accusations or insinuations without having performed adequate due diligence.
We strongly support @SEEDGov’s suggestion to expand the language in Section 7.4 regarding unsubstantiated accusations. We know how quick public assumptions can damage working relationships and erode trust. If this clause is meant to improve community culture, it should not just discourage malicious behavior but also guide contributors toward responsible escalation paths. We’d also recommend mentioning the Watchdog Program explicitly in this clause, so contributors know where to report concerns if they believe norms are being broken.
Overall, we’re in support of the proposal’s direction and the intent behind each change. The proposed second trial period gives the DAO time to test these refinements further before making any constitutional commitments, and we believe that’s the right approach.
First of all, thank you once again to the @Entropy team for facilitating this discussion and for proposing this updated (and much-needed) version of the Code of Conduct.
We would like to offer a few suggestions:
First of all, thank you once again to the @Entropy team for facilitating this discussion and for proposing this updated (and much-needed) version of the Code of Conduct.
We would like to offer a few suggestions:
Contributors should avoid making unsubstantiated accusations that imply malice without proper evidence.
In our view, this clause could benefit from being expanded. We suggest the following wording:
Contributors should avoid making unsubstantiated accusations that imply malice without proper evidence. They should conduct proper due diligence before making any public accusations via social media, public forums, or any other recognized communication channels. This includes exhausting all available avenues — for example, seeking clarification privately — before issuing any public statement that contains an unsubstantiated accusation about another DAO contributor.
In the past, we’ve seen (unfortunately more than one) instances of contributors making public accusations or insinuations without having performed adequate due diligence. We believe the Code of Conduct should be clear in encouraging contributors to exhaust all possible channels before going public with an issue — particularly given that the conflict resolution process itself recommends resolving issues privately and in good faith:
Resolution of conflicts between contributors (and between contributors and programs) will be entrusted to the Arbitrum Foundation, which will act as a neutral mediator. It is recommended that contributors first seek to resolve conflict issues in good faith and privately. If the matter is unable to be resolved for any reason, or if the behavior is threatening or harassing, the matter can be raised to the Arbitrum Foundation using this form. The Arbitrum Foundation will have the final say on the issue and reserves the right to determine if the issue should be brought to the attention of the community as a whole.
It’s also worth noting that the DAO has a Watchdog Program in place (even if it’s not yet operational). If there is a suspicion that a contributor is misusing funds, such concerns should be raised through that channel, with appropriate due diligence.
Entropy recognizes that the complexity of the original policy created confusion for some participating candidates, especially in situations where there was only a single seat being filled through the election. Additionally, since the introduction of the policy, vote-buying services have become more common, and notably, LobbyFi has received substantial delegation. After observing the impact on the OAT election in particular, Entropy has concluded that enforcing the Responsible Voting Policy is no longer feasible. Participating candidates can effectively bypass the policy by sending funds to a fresh address to purchase or bid for additional votes, thus circumventing the original policy’s intentions and putting other candidates strictly following the policy at a disadvantage.
Therefore, Entropy is proposing to sunset the Responsible Voting Policy and return to the DAO’s original standards of allowing participating candidates to self-vote with their full voting power. Staying consistent with the Disclosure and Transparency Policy, candidates who plan to self-vote should still disclose the action to the DAO. Remaining unchanged from the previous trial, contributors not participating in the election are free to vote however they wish, but if a conflict of interest exists, it should be disclosed on the forums before voting.
We’re not entirely comfortable with the removal of this policy. While it's true that enforcement is not possible in the case of vote-buying platforms like LobbyFi, we believe that what can be enforced should be enforced. Whether it involves a DIP participant or an elected member of the DAO, voting activity is public — and thus auditable.
Removing the Responsible Voting Policy due to a loophole is, in our view, the opposite approach of what’s generally practiced in traditional governance. Typically, the response to such loopholes is to amend the policy to address the gap (if possible) — not to remove the rule entirely because one edge case cannot be controlled.
Here we suggest including a clause that allows a relevant stakeholder (e.g. the Arbitrum Foundation, Entropy, OpCo/OAT) to trigger an extension of the Code’s validity by one or two additional months, if necessary, without the necessity of going through a vote. This would apply in cases of force majeure that prevent a timely review and renewal. It’s worth noting that the next step involves a vote to amend the Constitution and include Section 7 of this Code — a process that may require additional time, especially with the holiday season falling just a few weeks before the new Code’s current expiration date.
Aside from the above, we’re happy with the proposal and have no additional comments.
Thanks again!
We would like to thank the @Entropy team for the detailed and well-reasoned proposal following the initial trial of the Code of Conduct and DAO procedures. It is clear that the revisions are grounded in both practical experience and a strong desire to adapt governance processes to the evolving needs of the DAO. We support the general direction of this proposal and appreciate the transparency behind the reasoning for each change. At the same time, we would like to share several suggestions that we believe can strengthen the proposal and better preserve key community standards.
1. Removal of the Responsible Voting Policy We understand the reasoning behind removing the Responsible Voting Policy, particularly due to the increasing difficulty of enforcement and the impact of vote-buying services. However, we believe that the policy still holds cultural and ethical value even if it cannot be enforced strictly. Rather than removing it entirely, we suggest keeping it as a best-practice standard for election participants, especially those in compensated or elected roles. Maintaining the expectation of fair and transparent voting behavior, even informally, helps reinforce the integrity of elections. This guidance could be incorporated into delegate onboarding materials or contributor conduct documentation and tied to conflict of interest disclosure expectations. Preserving this standard in a non-binding form allows the DAO to promote responsible behavior while acknowledging the current limitations.
We would like to thank the @Entropy team for the detailed and well-reasoned proposal following the initial trial of the Code of Conduct and DAO procedures. It is clear that the revisions are grounded in both practical experience and a strong desire to adapt governance processes to the evolving needs of the DAO. We support the general direction of this proposal and appreciate the transparency behind the reasoning for each change. At the same time, we would like to share several suggestions that we believe can strengthen the proposal and better preserve key community standards.
1. Removal of the Responsible Voting Policy We understand the reasoning behind removing the Responsible Voting Policy, particularly due to the increasing difficulty of enforcement and the impact of vote-buying services. However, we believe that the policy still holds cultural and ethical value even if it cannot be enforced strictly. Rather than removing it entirely, we suggest keeping it as a best-practice standard for election participants, especially those in compensated or elected roles. Maintaining the expectation of fair and transparent voting behavior, even informally, helps reinforce the integrity of elections. This guidance could be incorporated into delegate onboarding materials or contributor conduct documentation and tied to conflict of interest disclosure expectations. Preserving this standard in a non-binding form allows the DAO to promote responsible behavior while acknowledging the current limitations.
2. DAO-Elected Member Replacement Process We support the addition of a clear fallback process for replacing elected members when no replacement mechanism is specified in the original proposal. This added clarity will help prevent unnecessary delays or disputes. Additionally, we believe it would be beneficial to define a clear resignation process. If a member wishes to step down, they should be required to notify the appropriate party, such as the program manager, the proposal author, or the Arbitrum Foundation, to ensure formal acknowledgment. The responsible party should then update the quorum on Snapshot if needed, coordinate the member’s removal from any relevant multisig, and communicate the resignation to the DAO through the governance Communication Thread. In terms of the replacement itself, we suggest that the DAO consider adopting a runner-up mechanism as the first fallback. If the runner-up from the original election meets a reasonable minimum threshold of vote share, such as a percentage of the winning candidate’s total, they could automatically be offered the role. This would uphold the original election’s legitimacy and avoid unnecessary delays. If no runner-up meets the threshold, or if the runner-up declines, the fallback process outlined by Entropy would apply. We also recommend looking to frameworks in other ecosystems, such as We also suggest reviewing the approach used by other ecosystems, such as Optimism, which could provide helpful guidance for establishing a consistent and transparent offboarding process.
3. Cancellation of Ongoing Initiatives We agree that a default mechanism is necessary when proposals do not specify how an initiative may be modified or canceled. The use of a Snapshot vote with a 3 percent quorum is a reasonable baseline, and tying the outcome to the most-supported option where multiple choices exist adds flexibility. To strengthen this further, we suggest clarifying who has the authority to initiate such a cancellation vote. In addition, requiring a short update on the initiative’s status and budget before the vote would give voters better context to make informed decisions. It may also be helpful to include non-binary options such as temporarily pausing the initiative or conducting an audit, as sometimes reform or review is more appropriate than full cancellation.
4. Extension of Shielded Elections We support the continued experimentation with shielded voting and appreciate the inclusion of data from previous elections. Shielded voting plays an important role in reducing voter pressure and minimizing coordinated influence. However, we note that many delegates continue to post their votes and reasoning in delegate threads during the voting period, which partially undermines the privacy benefits. To fully realize the intent of shielded voting, we recommend encouraging delegates to wait until the voting period has concluded before publishing their vote rationale. Alternatively, a formal post-vote feedback window could be introduced. This approach maintains transparency and accountability while protecting the independence of voting behavior during the election itself.
5. DAO Holiday Break (December 18th, 2025 to January 5th, 2026) We support the continuation of a holiday break to give contributors a clear pause period and prevent governance fatigue during the year-end. The added flexibility in allowing forum discussions to continue and only limiting voting to emergencies is a reasonable adjustment. To improve planning, we suggest issuing a formal reminder in advance of the break so that contributors can finalize their proposals and votes on time. While the proposed dates are appropriate, we also recommend clarifying that some spillover may be acceptable when justified by timing constraints. This helps balance structure with flexibility.
In summary, we are supportive of the proposal’s direction and the intent behind each change. Our suggestions focus on preserving important cultural norms, improving transparency, and creating safeguards that support a more consistent and inclusive governance process. We appreciate the Entropy team’s ongoing commitment to thoughtful experimentation and look forward to seeing how these refinements continue to shape the future of Arbitrum DAO governance.
We sincerely appreciate the thorough and insightful work Entropy has dedicated to preparing this comprehensive proposal. It is clear that considerable time, careful consideration, and extensive engagement with the community went into crafting these recommendations. We believe most of the updates provided reasonable, and below is our additional perspective on several key points of this proposal that we wanted to share:
We sincerely appreciate the thorough and insightful work Entropy has dedicated to preparing this comprehensive proposal. It is clear that considerable time, careful consideration, and extensive engagement with the community went into crafting these recommendations. We believe most of the updates provided reasonable, and below is our additional perspective on several key points of this proposal that we wanted to share:
We strongly align with Curia's stance regarding the removal of the Responsible Voting Policy. Although it's clear that enforcing this policy universally poses significant challenges, given exceptions like vote-buying services, maintaining it as a normative standard remains essential. The openness inherent to DAO governance naturally precludes universal enforcement, yet this policy continues to hold cultural and ethical value, particularly for roles such as delegates and AAEs who respect it in practice. Thus, we echo Curia’s viewpoint:
However, we believe that the policy still holds cultural and ethical value even if it cannot be enforced strictly. Rather than removing it entirely, we suggest keeping it as a best-practice standard for election participants, especially those in compensated or elected roles.
Regarding the cancellation of ongoing initiatives, it should be explicitly stated that anyone meeting the existing standard threshold of 500k ARB voting power can submit a cancellation proposal, consistent with regular proposals (referencing current guidelines). Moreover, even if an original initiative includes provisions that limit cancellation proposals to specific parties, such restrictions should be explicitly disallowed. It is essential to maintain openness and transparency by ensuring that cancellation proposals remain accessible to all eligible DAO participants.
We believe creating simplified operational guidelines for program managers, councils, or other responsible facilitators could streamline enforcement. Although setting rigid definitions of behaviors warranting warnings, suspensions, or removals might be overly restrictive, establishing a guideline where suspensions typically follow prior warnings, particularly when behavior fails to improve, seems feasible. Such guidelines would likely have mitigated friction in past DIP evaluation cases, such as this one.
Contributors who disclose a conflict of interest are not expected to alter their voting in any way. Self-voting is not currently banned outright for the reasons stated in previous DAO-wide discussions and based on sentiment gathered from a subsequent temperature check. However, a contributor who repeatedly fails to disclose a conflict of interest before voting risks being removed from their compensated governance role.
We urge deeper reconsideration and discussion on self-voting policies, given that Arbitrum's unique governance structure where delegates and AAEs can overlap, and that the previous discussion took place a long ago. This structure inherently allows scenarios where the same entity could serve as both the requester and the approver, creating potential conflicts of interest or self-serving decisions. Although we acknowledge that completely preventing such conflicts may not be possible, introducing defined restrictions against self-voting specifically by entities that stand to directly execute or benefit financially from a proposal is a necessary step. It is generally acceptable for proposal authors themselves to participate in voting, provided they are not also the entity responsible for executing or benefiting directly from the initiative. This measure introduces meaningful friction and social accountability, altering the incentives and costs associated with potential self-serving behaviors.
We believe addressing these points will reinforce the robustness, fairness, and effectiveness of Arbitrum’s governance.
To strengthen this further, we suggest clarifying who has the authority to initiate such a cancellation vote
To strengthen this further, we suggest clarifying who has the authority to initiate such a cancellation vote
Am I understanding correctly that not just anyone can initiate a cancellation proposal? I'm not sure I see the reasoning behind such a restriction. If a DAO participant believes that a certain committee is no longer needed, and they follow all the standard procedures, how can we prevent them from submitting such a proposal?
Given the reception of the Code of Conduct revisions thus far, we feel comfortable moving this to a Snapshot vote. With the previous iteration requiring a majority approval and quorum set as at least 3% of all votable tokens having cast votes in favor or abstaining, this version will be held to the same requirements. If this proposal passes on Snapshot, the updated versions of the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures will go into effect immediately.
Two changes that have been made to the proposal since Tuesday. The first is based on a suggestion from @krst during the open discussion. The Enforcement & Appeal Process section has been updated with the following language, which requires that the responsible party must at least acknowledge receipt and investigate a Code of Conduct violation raised by a community member:
[quote=”Entropy,post:1, topic:29594”]
Any community member can raise a concern to the party responsible for managing the program with respect to a contributor failing to uphold the Code of Conduct. While the responsible party is required to acknowledge receipt of the concern and investigate the matter, the final determination and resulting course of action, which may include dismissing the concern, will depend on the underlying program’s structure.
[/quote]
The second change is the addition of a clarifying sentence to the Voting Requirement for the Cancellation of Ongoing Initiatives section for when there are multiple voting options beyond the basic FOR/AGAINST/ABSTAIN. The intention of the original language is to address instances where both modification & cancellation are proposed as options for voters, which is something the DAO has seen before. However, it is intended to only be applicable when cancellation or a clawback is being considered.
A Snapshot vote where the number of FOR votes to wind down the initiative meets 3% of the votable supply. If there are more voting options than the basic FOR/AGAINST/ABSTAIN, the option with the largest number of votes will be applied, given that the options to modify/cancel an initiative together exceed the 3% of votable supply level. For the purpose of clarity, if a proposal only seeks to modify an existing initiative, this voting requirement will not apply.
Lastly, we’d like to thank @jameskbh for the thoughtful suggestions; however, after considering the proposed revisions we have decided not to make any changes. This is primarily due to our preference to keep the sub-sections of the Code of Conduct that could be added to the Arbitrum Constitution at a sufficiently high-level. Additionally, we are hesitant to add an explicit suggestion to refrain from voting with current participation rates as well as adding overly descriptive rules regarding timing due to the difficulty of enforcing consistently. Finally, regarding the clause highlighted from the the cancellation requirements, we believe it already accounts for the scenario you are concerned about. If there are multiple options and AGAINST (which in this case means continuing the initiative) has the largest number of votes, then it will be the option applied.
Extending the Code of Conduct and procedure test to 31 January 2026 gives the DAO time to see what works before writing anything into the Constitution, which is a positive in our eyes. Removing the Responsible Voting rule makes sense because vote‑buying tools now make limits impossible to police. The new replacement steps are positive because they ensure programs keep moving if an elected member leaves, by naming who should pick a successor and requiring a short public note. A Snapshot vote with a 3 % quorum and the usual 500 k ARB posting rule makes any shutdown both simple and fair. We also support keeping shielded elections in place so the DAO can gather more data about turnout and late voting before deciding whether to keep them. Taken together, these changes are overall positive, so AranaDigital supports the proposal.
The recording from yesterday's open discussion can be found here. Thank you to all the contributors who joined and asked questions.
Thanks for pushing this forward!
I have a few comments regarding a few specific points:
Contributors are advised to vote abstain when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand the proposals.
Thanks for pushing this forward!
I have a few comments regarding a few specific points:
Contributors are advised to vote abstain when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand the proposals.
While I understand the intention behind this guidance, I’d like to highlight that an ABSTAIN vote is not entirely neutral in our context, as it still counts towards quorum. This means that if a contributor with significant VP—or a group of contributors—votes ABSTAIN, it could inadvertently result in a suboptimal proposal being approved.
My suggestion would be to recommend that contributors simply refrain from voting on proposals they have not properly reviewed.
Contributors should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels
In this case, I believe it would be helpful to explicitly name the recommended feedback channels (even if the text is high-level). Clear guidance on where contributors should provide input (my initial suggestion is the governance forum, but we could add TG channels, or other relevant spaces) would enhance clarity and eliminate room for misunderstandings.
Staying consistent with the Disclosure and Transparency Policy, candidates who plan to self-vote should still disclose the action to the DAO.
I believe we should clarify when this disclosure should happen. My suggestion is to incorporate this information into all candidacy templates, ensuring that candidates declare their self-voting intentions upfront. This way, contributors have full transparency from the start of the election process. Additionally, if the entity the candidate is associated with plans to allocate its VP in support of the candidacy, this should also be disclosed from the outset.
Remaining unchanged from the previous trial, contributors not participating in the election are free to vote however they wish, but if a conflict of interest exists, it should be disclosed on the forums before voting.
Here, I recommend being more explicit about the timing of the disclosure. As currently phrased, one could interpret “before voting” as just before casting a vote, potentially at the last moment. To avoid this ambiguity, I suggest we require COI disclosures to be made before the voting period starts, ensuring all contributors have adequate context throughout the full voting process.
A Snapshot vote where the number of FOR votes to wind down the initiative meets 3% of the votable supply. If there are more voting options than the basic FOR/AGAINST/ABSTAIN, the option with the largest number of votes will be applied, given that the options to modify/cancel an initiative together exceed the 3% of votable supply level.
I suggest we take a more cautious approach here. Since the vote is to reverse a previous DAO-approved initiative, I believe a simple plurality should not be sufficient when multiple voting options are presented. Instead, we could also require that the most popular option must have more votes than the “AGAINST” (or equivalent) option.
My reasoning is:
I hope those comments/suggestions make sense!
Our team appreciates the thoughtful suggestions raised by contributors. First, the following changes have been incorporated into the Code of Conduct. Sub-section 7.4 has been updated to match SeedGov’s suggested wording for unsubstantiated accusations:
Our team appreciates the thoughtful suggestions raised by contributors. First, the following changes have been incorporated into the Code of Conduct. Sub-section 7.4 has been updated to match SeedGov’s suggested wording for unsubstantiated accusations:
In our view, this clause could benefit from being expanded. We suggest the following wording:
Contributors should avoid making unsubstantiated accusations that imply malice without proper evidence. They should conduct proper due diligence before making any public accusations via social media, public forums, or any other recognized communication channels. This includes exhausting all available avenues — for example, seeking clarification privately — before issuing any public statement that contains an unsubstantiated accusation about another DAO contributor.
Clarifying language has been added to the member replacement process that the party responsible for selecting the individual/entity to fill the role, should also make a post on the forum updating the DAO of the change along with some basic information and rationale. Similar language has been added for the winding down of an initiative along with clarifying that anyone with adequate voting power (500k ARB) can post the cancellation vote to Snapshot.
Here we suggest including a clause that allows a relevant stakeholder (e.g. the Arbitrum Foundation, Entropy, OpCo/OAT) to trigger an extension of the Code’s validity by one or two additional months, if necessary, without the necessity of going through a vote.
Lastly, we have also added language based on SeedGov’s suggestion that grants the Arbitrum Foundation the power to extend the trial period by up to two months through March 31st, 2026 in the event a new version has not yet been ratified.
Moving on to open topics & questions raised, we will first address the comments regarding the Responsible Voting Policy:
However, we believe that the policy still holds cultural and ethical value even if it cannot be enforced strictly. Rather than removing it entirely, we suggest keeping it as a best-practice standard for election participants, especially those in compensated or elected roles. Maintaining the expectation of fair and transparent voting behavior, even informally, helps reinforce the integrity of elections.
Typically, the response to such loopholes is to amend the policy to address the gap (if possible) — not to remove the rule entirely because one edge case cannot be controlled.
We fear including the Responsible Voting policy in the Code of Conduct as a guiding principle, creates blurred expectations for participating candidates. It is entirely possible to encounter a scenario where an election is decided by a participating candidate fully self-voting and the runner up splitting their votes equally. In this event, we envision there being a great deal of confusion and controversy on if the policy should be applied. So while some participating candidates may choose to still follow the standard, such a decision should be free from informal expectations.
Our team is open to other suggestions, but closing this loop hole would likely require retroactively removing votes from LobbyFi or other vote buying platforms in shielded elections. From the discussion the DAO had in April on the topic, there seems to be strong consensus that such censoring would be embarking on a losing game of cat and mouse and push what are currently public/semi-transparent vote buying services to transform into being more opaque/private. Considering the original intentions of the policy, Entropy is not in favor of creating a system that incentivizes or leaves the door open for participating candidates to discreetly gain an advantage.
In terms of the replacement itself, we suggest that the DAO consider adopting a runner-up mechanism as the first fallback. If the runner-up from the original election meets a reasonable minimum threshold of vote share, such as a percentage of the winning candidate’s total, they could automatically be offered the role.
In the current proposed system, the program manager, proposal author, or Arbitrum Foundation (if the responsibility falls to them) can choose the runner-up as the replacement. However, as we experienced with the ARDC v2, a replacement is not always necessary, and constraining the DAO into a runner-up mechanism could be less than ideal in certain circumstances. We prefer to entrust the responsible and generally highest-context party with the flexibility to make the right decision in any scenario.
However, we note that many delegates continue to post their votes and reasoning in delegate threads during the voting period, which partially undermines the privacy benefits. To fully realize the intent of shielded voting, we recommend encouraging delegates to wait until the voting period has concluded before publishing their vote rationale.
If a contributor wishes to make their vote public, there is no means by which Entropy, the Arbitrum Foundation, or any other party can keep them from posting either on social media or the forum. Additionally, with shielded elections being limited to those only on Snapshot, all votes are editable, so if a delegate wishes to change their vote based on new public information that is disclosed during the election, they can do so. Taking both of these factors into account, it is our opinion that attempting to enforce such a policy will lead to more controversy than benefits.
Again, Entropy appreciates the thoughtful feedback and commentary from contributors. We look forward to discussing these topics further on the open community call.
Thank you to the contributors who have provided thoughtful feedback on the Code of Conduct thus far. Our team will post a response to the questions shortly. Entropy will also be hosting a community call tomorrow, July 15th, at 2 pm UTC to walk through the proposed changes and allow for more contributor input.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Thank you @Entropy for refining the Code of Conduct and procedural updates.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Thank you @Entropy for refining the Code of Conduct and procedural updates.
We appreciate the effort to keep procedural elements outside the Constitution while aiming to elevate enduring principles like civility, due diligence, and responsibility.
Looks like we'll all be using 'contributors' instead of 'delegates' going forward. It feels like the right shift, given how participation in governance has evolved. We'll just have to get used to it, apologies in advance if we slip and say 'delegates' out of habit!
As contributors who’ve actively participated across different DAO programs, we’ve seen how even well-intentioned norms can lose traction without consistent framing and reminders. The proposed structure, splitting high-level principles into Section 7 while keeping enforcement and appeals adaptable, feels like the right middle ground.
Building on points raised by other delegates:
We recognize that enforcing the Responsible Voting Policy is no longer practical due to vote-buying platforms and circumvention tactics. However, we echo concerns raised by @Curia and @Tane that removing the policy entirely could weaken important cultural norms around self-voting and ethics.
Instead of removal, what if we preserve this as non-binding best practice language, perhaps in Code of Conduct Section 7.2? This keeps the DAO’s expectations visible while acknowledging enforcement challenges.
We also echo @cp0x’s concern around replacement processes. While we support flexibility in replacements to avoid operational bottlenecks, a simple requirement to post the reasoning for any replacement decision (whether it comes from a council, proposal author, or the Foundation) would help preserve trust. It doesn’t need to be a vote, just a public note outlining why a change was made and how the new member was selected.
Lastly, on cancellation procedures, we’d recommend that any Snapshot to claw back or sunset a program be accompanied by a brief status update, progress so far, remaining budget, and any pending deliverables. Without this context, contributors are left to guess at performance, which can lead to misinformed outcomes.
On shielded voting, we support @Curia’s suggestion of encouraging post-vote rationale sharing after the Snapshot closes. We has always advocated for transparent vote reasoning, but we agree that timing it post-vote respects the intent behind shielded voting while still allowing delegates to remain accountable.
In the past, we’ve seen (unfortunately more than one) instances of contributors making public accusations or insinuations without having performed adequate due diligence.
We strongly support @SEEDGov’s suggestion to expand the language in Section 7.4 regarding unsubstantiated accusations. We know how quick public assumptions can damage working relationships and erode trust. If this clause is meant to improve community culture, it should not just discourage malicious behavior but also guide contributors toward responsible escalation paths. We’d also recommend mentioning the Watchdog Program explicitly in this clause, so contributors know where to report concerns if they believe norms are being broken.
Overall, we’re in support of the proposal’s direction and the intent behind each change. The proposed second trial period gives the DAO time to test these refinements further before making any constitutional commitments, and we believe that’s the right approach.
First of all, thank you once again to the @Entropy team for facilitating this discussion and for proposing this updated (and much-needed) version of the Code of Conduct.
We would like to offer a few suggestions:
First of all, thank you once again to the @Entropy team for facilitating this discussion and for proposing this updated (and much-needed) version of the Code of Conduct.
We would like to offer a few suggestions:
Contributors should avoid making unsubstantiated accusations that imply malice without proper evidence.
In our view, this clause could benefit from being expanded. We suggest the following wording:
Contributors should avoid making unsubstantiated accusations that imply malice without proper evidence. They should conduct proper due diligence before making any public accusations via social media, public forums, or any other recognized communication channels. This includes exhausting all available avenues — for example, seeking clarification privately — before issuing any public statement that contains an unsubstantiated accusation about another DAO contributor.
In the past, we’ve seen (unfortunately more than one) instances of contributors making public accusations or insinuations without having performed adequate due diligence. We believe the Code of Conduct should be clear in encouraging contributors to exhaust all possible channels before going public with an issue — particularly given that the conflict resolution process itself recommends resolving issues privately and in good faith:
Resolution of conflicts between contributors (and between contributors and programs) will be entrusted to the Arbitrum Foundation, which will act as a neutral mediator. It is recommended that contributors first seek to resolve conflict issues in good faith and privately. If the matter is unable to be resolved for any reason, or if the behavior is threatening or harassing, the matter can be raised to the Arbitrum Foundation using this form. The Arbitrum Foundation will have the final say on the issue and reserves the right to determine if the issue should be brought to the attention of the community as a whole.
It’s also worth noting that the DAO has a Watchdog Program in place (even if it’s not yet operational). If there is a suspicion that a contributor is misusing funds, such concerns should be raised through that channel, with appropriate due diligence.
Entropy recognizes that the complexity of the original policy created confusion for some participating candidates, especially in situations where there was only a single seat being filled through the election. Additionally, since the introduction of the policy, vote-buying services have become more common, and notably, LobbyFi has received substantial delegation. After observing the impact on the OAT election in particular, Entropy has concluded that enforcing the Responsible Voting Policy is no longer feasible. Participating candidates can effectively bypass the policy by sending funds to a fresh address to purchase or bid for additional votes, thus circumventing the original policy’s intentions and putting other candidates strictly following the policy at a disadvantage.
Therefore, Entropy is proposing to sunset the Responsible Voting Policy and return to the DAO’s original standards of allowing participating candidates to self-vote with their full voting power. Staying consistent with the Disclosure and Transparency Policy, candidates who plan to self-vote should still disclose the action to the DAO. Remaining unchanged from the previous trial, contributors not participating in the election are free to vote however they wish, but if a conflict of interest exists, it should be disclosed on the forums before voting.
We’re not entirely comfortable with the removal of this policy. While it's true that enforcement is not possible in the case of vote-buying platforms like LobbyFi, we believe that what can be enforced should be enforced. Whether it involves a DIP participant or an elected member of the DAO, voting activity is public — and thus auditable.
Removing the Responsible Voting Policy due to a loophole is, in our view, the opposite approach of what’s generally practiced in traditional governance. Typically, the response to such loopholes is to amend the policy to address the gap (if possible) — not to remove the rule entirely because one edge case cannot be controlled.
Here we suggest including a clause that allows a relevant stakeholder (e.g. the Arbitrum Foundation, Entropy, OpCo/OAT) to trigger an extension of the Code’s validity by one or two additional months, if necessary, without the necessity of going through a vote. This would apply in cases of force majeure that prevent a timely review and renewal. It’s worth noting that the next step involves a vote to amend the Constitution and include Section 7 of this Code — a process that may require additional time, especially with the holiday season falling just a few weeks before the new Code’s current expiration date.
Aside from the above, we’re happy with the proposal and have no additional comments.
Thanks again!
We would like to thank the @Entropy team for the detailed and well-reasoned proposal following the initial trial of the Code of Conduct and DAO procedures. It is clear that the revisions are grounded in both practical experience and a strong desire to adapt governance processes to the evolving needs of the DAO. We support the general direction of this proposal and appreciate the transparency behind the reasoning for each change. At the same time, we would like to share several suggestions that we believe can strengthen the proposal and better preserve key community standards.
1. Removal of the Responsible Voting Policy We understand the reasoning behind removing the Responsible Voting Policy, particularly due to the increasing difficulty of enforcement and the impact of vote-buying services. However, we believe that the policy still holds cultural and ethical value even if it cannot be enforced strictly. Rather than removing it entirely, we suggest keeping it as a best-practice standard for election participants, especially those in compensated or elected roles. Maintaining the expectation of fair and transparent voting behavior, even informally, helps reinforce the integrity of elections. This guidance could be incorporated into delegate onboarding materials or contributor conduct documentation and tied to conflict of interest disclosure expectations. Preserving this standard in a non-binding form allows the DAO to promote responsible behavior while acknowledging the current limitations.
We would like to thank the @Entropy team for the detailed and well-reasoned proposal following the initial trial of the Code of Conduct and DAO procedures. It is clear that the revisions are grounded in both practical experience and a strong desire to adapt governance processes to the evolving needs of the DAO. We support the general direction of this proposal and appreciate the transparency behind the reasoning for each change. At the same time, we would like to share several suggestions that we believe can strengthen the proposal and better preserve key community standards.
1. Removal of the Responsible Voting Policy We understand the reasoning behind removing the Responsible Voting Policy, particularly due to the increasing difficulty of enforcement and the impact of vote-buying services. However, we believe that the policy still holds cultural and ethical value even if it cannot be enforced strictly. Rather than removing it entirely, we suggest keeping it as a best-practice standard for election participants, especially those in compensated or elected roles. Maintaining the expectation of fair and transparent voting behavior, even informally, helps reinforce the integrity of elections. This guidance could be incorporated into delegate onboarding materials or contributor conduct documentation and tied to conflict of interest disclosure expectations. Preserving this standard in a non-binding form allows the DAO to promote responsible behavior while acknowledging the current limitations.
2. DAO-Elected Member Replacement Process We support the addition of a clear fallback process for replacing elected members when no replacement mechanism is specified in the original proposal. This added clarity will help prevent unnecessary delays or disputes. Additionally, we believe it would be beneficial to define a clear resignation process. If a member wishes to step down, they should be required to notify the appropriate party, such as the program manager, the proposal author, or the Arbitrum Foundation, to ensure formal acknowledgment. The responsible party should then update the quorum on Snapshot if needed, coordinate the member’s removal from any relevant multisig, and communicate the resignation to the DAO through the governance Communication Thread. In terms of the replacement itself, we suggest that the DAO consider adopting a runner-up mechanism as the first fallback. If the runner-up from the original election meets a reasonable minimum threshold of vote share, such as a percentage of the winning candidate’s total, they could automatically be offered the role. This would uphold the original election’s legitimacy and avoid unnecessary delays. If no runner-up meets the threshold, or if the runner-up declines, the fallback process outlined by Entropy would apply. We also recommend looking to frameworks in other ecosystems, such as We also suggest reviewing the approach used by other ecosystems, such as Optimism, which could provide helpful guidance for establishing a consistent and transparent offboarding process.
3. Cancellation of Ongoing Initiatives We agree that a default mechanism is necessary when proposals do not specify how an initiative may be modified or canceled. The use of a Snapshot vote with a 3 percent quorum is a reasonable baseline, and tying the outcome to the most-supported option where multiple choices exist adds flexibility. To strengthen this further, we suggest clarifying who has the authority to initiate such a cancellation vote. In addition, requiring a short update on the initiative’s status and budget before the vote would give voters better context to make informed decisions. It may also be helpful to include non-binary options such as temporarily pausing the initiative or conducting an audit, as sometimes reform or review is more appropriate than full cancellation.
4. Extension of Shielded Elections We support the continued experimentation with shielded voting and appreciate the inclusion of data from previous elections. Shielded voting plays an important role in reducing voter pressure and minimizing coordinated influence. However, we note that many delegates continue to post their votes and reasoning in delegate threads during the voting period, which partially undermines the privacy benefits. To fully realize the intent of shielded voting, we recommend encouraging delegates to wait until the voting period has concluded before publishing their vote rationale. Alternatively, a formal post-vote feedback window could be introduced. This approach maintains transparency and accountability while protecting the independence of voting behavior during the election itself.
5. DAO Holiday Break (December 18th, 2025 to January 5th, 2026) We support the continuation of a holiday break to give contributors a clear pause period and prevent governance fatigue during the year-end. The added flexibility in allowing forum discussions to continue and only limiting voting to emergencies is a reasonable adjustment. To improve planning, we suggest issuing a formal reminder in advance of the break so that contributors can finalize their proposals and votes on time. While the proposed dates are appropriate, we also recommend clarifying that some spillover may be acceptable when justified by timing constraints. This helps balance structure with flexibility.
In summary, we are supportive of the proposal’s direction and the intent behind each change. Our suggestions focus on preserving important cultural norms, improving transparency, and creating safeguards that support a more consistent and inclusive governance process. We appreciate the Entropy team’s ongoing commitment to thoughtful experimentation and look forward to seeing how these refinements continue to shape the future of Arbitrum DAO governance.
We sincerely appreciate the thorough and insightful work Entropy has dedicated to preparing this comprehensive proposal. It is clear that considerable time, careful consideration, and extensive engagement with the community went into crafting these recommendations. We believe most of the updates provided reasonable, and below is our additional perspective on several key points of this proposal that we wanted to share:
We sincerely appreciate the thorough and insightful work Entropy has dedicated to preparing this comprehensive proposal. It is clear that considerable time, careful consideration, and extensive engagement with the community went into crafting these recommendations. We believe most of the updates provided reasonable, and below is our additional perspective on several key points of this proposal that we wanted to share:
We strongly align with Curia's stance regarding the removal of the Responsible Voting Policy. Although it's clear that enforcing this policy universally poses significant challenges, given exceptions like vote-buying services, maintaining it as a normative standard remains essential. The openness inherent to DAO governance naturally precludes universal enforcement, yet this policy continues to hold cultural and ethical value, particularly for roles such as delegates and AAEs who respect it in practice. Thus, we echo Curia’s viewpoint:
However, we believe that the policy still holds cultural and ethical value even if it cannot be enforced strictly. Rather than removing it entirely, we suggest keeping it as a best-practice standard for election participants, especially those in compensated or elected roles.
Regarding the cancellation of ongoing initiatives, it should be explicitly stated that anyone meeting the existing standard threshold of 500k ARB voting power can submit a cancellation proposal, consistent with regular proposals (referencing current guidelines). Moreover, even if an original initiative includes provisions that limit cancellation proposals to specific parties, such restrictions should be explicitly disallowed. It is essential to maintain openness and transparency by ensuring that cancellation proposals remain accessible to all eligible DAO participants.
We believe creating simplified operational guidelines for program managers, councils, or other responsible facilitators could streamline enforcement. Although setting rigid definitions of behaviors warranting warnings, suspensions, or removals might be overly restrictive, establishing a guideline where suspensions typically follow prior warnings, particularly when behavior fails to improve, seems feasible. Such guidelines would likely have mitigated friction in past DIP evaluation cases, such as this one.
Contributors who disclose a conflict of interest are not expected to alter their voting in any way. Self-voting is not currently banned outright for the reasons stated in previous DAO-wide discussions and based on sentiment gathered from a subsequent temperature check. However, a contributor who repeatedly fails to disclose a conflict of interest before voting risks being removed from their compensated governance role.
We urge deeper reconsideration and discussion on self-voting policies, given that Arbitrum's unique governance structure where delegates and AAEs can overlap, and that the previous discussion took place a long ago. This structure inherently allows scenarios where the same entity could serve as both the requester and the approver, creating potential conflicts of interest or self-serving decisions. Although we acknowledge that completely preventing such conflicts may not be possible, introducing defined restrictions against self-voting specifically by entities that stand to directly execute or benefit financially from a proposal is a necessary step. It is generally acceptable for proposal authors themselves to participate in voting, provided they are not also the entity responsible for executing or benefiting directly from the initiative. This measure introduces meaningful friction and social accountability, altering the incentives and costs associated with potential self-serving behaviors.
We believe addressing these points will reinforce the robustness, fairness, and effectiveness of Arbitrum’s governance.
To strengthen this further, we suggest clarifying who has the authority to initiate such a cancellation vote
To strengthen this further, we suggest clarifying who has the authority to initiate such a cancellation vote
Am I understanding correctly that not just anyone can initiate a cancellation proposal? I'm not sure I see the reasoning behind such a restriction. If a DAO participant believes that a certain committee is no longer needed, and they follow all the standard procedures, how can we prevent them from submitting such a proposal?
I have several questions and proposals:
Should some replacements require a DAO vote regardless? In cases where a committee plays a major governance role or manages a large budget, appointing a replacement without DAO input might not be appropriate. → Could we establish criteria beyond which replacements must go through a DAO vote?
How will transparency be ensured in the replacement process? The current proposal allows committees or proposal authors (or AF) to appoint replacements without any DAO-wide input. → Should there be a minimum transparency requirement, such as a public justification?
Should rules for replacement be included directly in the original election proposals? → For example, by naming the runner-up as an automatic replacement or outlining a predefined procedure?
I have several questions and proposals:
Should some replacements require a DAO vote regardless? In cases where a committee plays a major governance role or manages a large budget, appointing a replacement without DAO input might not be appropriate. → Could we establish criteria beyond which replacements must go through a DAO vote?
How will transparency be ensured in the replacement process? The current proposal allows committees or proposal authors (or AF) to appoint replacements without any DAO-wide input. → Should there be a minimum transparency requirement, such as a public justification?
Should rules for replacement be included directly in the original election proposals? → For example, by naming the runner-up as an automatic replacement or outlining a predefined procedure?
