To clarify, Pedro is no longer part of SEEDGov. This situation was communicated in July 2024.

To clarify, Pedro is no longer part of SEEDGov. This situation was communicated in July 2024.

I think a better compromise would be to raise the minimum voting power requirement to 100K ARB, maybe even 250K ARB (appx. $110K at current prices), which would make gaming the system much less feasible. You'd have quite a bit of risk if the price moves downwards, and still can reasonably break-even on your expenses to buy that stake in 1-2 years. That makes it less attractive for pure short-term value extractors.

We can observe how this plays out in the coming months, and then re-adjust if needed.

The idea around endorsements of level 1 delegates complicates it too much, and opens other attack vectors, including paying someone to endorse you.

Generally, I can also live with continuing the 50K voting power requirement, but given the drastic ARB price decrease it is indeed not that large of a cost anymore to acquire that voting power yourself.

Probably, giving a range of options in the Snapshot vote, including 100K ARB, 250K ARB, and 500K ARB would make sense for delegates to choose from.

I think a better compromise would be to raise the minimum voting power requirement to 100K ARB, maybe even 250K ARB (appx. $110K at current prices), which would make gaming the system much less feasible. You'd have quite a bit of risk if the price moves downwards, and still can reasonably break-even on your expenses to buy that stake in 1-2 years. That makes it less attractive for pure short-term value extractors.

We can observe how this plays out in the coming months, and then re-adjust if needed.

The idea around endorsements of level 1 delegates complicates it too much, and opens other attack vectors, including paying someone to endorse you.

Generally, I can also live with continuing the 50K voting power requirement, but given the drastic ARB price decrease it is indeed not that large of a cost anymore to acquire that voting power yourself.

Probably, giving a range of options in the Snapshot vote, including 100K ARB, 250K ARB, and 500K ARB would make sense for delegates to choose from.

Even if it's distributed amongst a set of L1 delegates, it's still viewed as a centralization of sorts. It's a similar power structure in most corporates or even governments.

There is the possibility that what is expected is not what happens in reality and needs to be taken into account. Currently we're more for an approach that considers the value of contributions (not frequency) as a way to filter delegates that should be rewarded.

We believe that we're aligned in the desired end goal but are taking different approaches.

There are so many good comments already that we try to keep it brief. We would be against this proposal, while also agreeing that improving the DIP process is always a good idea.

Echoing the sentiment of others, we think that the current incentive structure leads to a deterioration of comments. We'd be in favour of simplifying the requirements.

What's more useful to the DAO? A delegate that adds to the collective workload by repeating other people's ideas in every thread to be rewarded, or a delegate who only posts following an intrinsic motivation to do so, e.g. to contribute a new perspective or emphasize their conviction?

On a high level, what is the one thing that the DAO wants to achieve? In our opinion: to make (good) decisions.

This means, voting is the single most important action and primary responsibility of a delegate.

A vesting schedule is a proven method of incentive alignment and we'd support this greatly.

Further, our understanding of the DIP is that only the top 50 delegates can participate. While this is not a tangible limit to participation currently, it will inevitably push the minimum delegation amount significantly upwards of 50k ARB as more delegates join over time.

With this perspective in mind, we think that the DIP should not be more complicated than it is now, and in fact should be further simplified by deleting all requirements that create distracting incentives, such as paying for forum activity.

Thank you for the proposal @thedevanshmehta.

After reviewing your proposal and the feedback from other delegates, we’d like to specifically address the two proposed amendments:

1. Level 1 delegates ◦ Increase the minimum entry threshold for DIP participation to 500k ARB

2. Level 2 delegates ◦ Delegates with between 50k–499k ARB that wish to participate in DIP must secure the endorsement of a Level 1 delegate

This structure raises several concerns:

1. It centralizes gatekeeping of DIP participation.
2. It adds more complexity to an already multifaceted process.
3. Reputational risk for Level 1 delegates becomes a factor if they endorse a delegate who underperforms.
4. It focuses rewards on securing support rather than on the substance and quality of contributions.

We feel that implementing this structure is not constructive. Rather than centering on threshold metrics, we should focus on improving the DIP’s ability to incentivize valuable contributions and active participation across the DAO.

We agree with @pedrob that the proposed minimum threshold of ARB tokens needed to participate in the DIP seems arbitrary.

We also agree with @0xDonPepe on the points below. We’ve seen a similar effect recently with applications from various groups to run the Domain Allocator Offerings grant program, where some potential applicants were hesitant because they felt they had no real chance. The new structure you propose may have a similar outcome, discouraging additional voices from stepping forward.

We’d also highlight what @SEEDGov noted regarding the importance of skill diversity. Because the DAO manages and operates several programs and grants, having a range of delegates with different backgrounds is essential. The varied expertise of each delegate is precisely what the DAO needs to function effectively. For this very reason we need to encourage broader participation from a larger pool of talents.

We do appreciate the initiative to bring this issue forward but we are NOT IN FAVOUR of this proposal. Although we believe the proposed amendments focus on the wrong metric, conversations like this are important. They help refine how the DIP can better drive constructive engagement, reward meaningful contributions, and promote growth within Arbitrum DAO.

But we acknowledge the need to introduce accountability mechanisms to ensure we foster and reward high-quality contributions rather than simply incentivizing quantity.

I did stay out of this discussion so far on purpose in the beginning. We did talk a lot about the DIP in the chat, here, in private, and in public. I have to say comms have being a mess and detrimental for the DAO in my opinion on this topic.

First, a few bullet points on this very proposal.

• in this topic we only focus on the bad of a low entry point, 50k arb. I would have not been personally able to enter without this. My current delegation is half what I racked around (thanks to @dk3 for bootstrapping it) and half what i auto delegated. I think this could be said for a lot of other very good delegates with low VP
• there is a general erratic behaviour of first suggesting an increase delegation up to 500k arb, then move to an endorsement process, then move to different programs based on the amount of VP. All of these are neither good nor bad solutions per se: but they have been clearly thrown around without a proper analysis of the current state of DIP. Saying you need 500k to post on snapshot is not a reason good enough to be clear. So I don't think neither the 100k/500k/1M/whatever is a solution, nor the endorsement from a big delegate
• DIP can be improved for sure. In searching for quality we have created a program in which everybody and their grandma has to write their take on X because this accrues points. Byproduct is that it creates a lot of noise, and it becomes blurry to distinguish between comments sometimes written for the sake of writing, and comments that are just a different opinion.

We should go back to the roots: what was the DIP created for, did it provided a proper solution, did it create further issues. DIP was created to increase participation in the DAO and to also sustain delegates that have to spend a big amount of time in here. But, useless to say, is extremely more likely that a delegate with millions in voting power will have an higher impact (keyword) compared to a lower one. When can a lower VP one create an impact? When is able to steer opinions of the DAO, is able to provide feedback that gets incorporated, and creates secondary effect that are hard to measure. Does it happen often? No. Does it happen? Yes, I see this secondary impact from several delegates, to name a few @jameskbh and @pedrob but they are not the only ones.

The DIP did create a net to sustain high VP delegates, to give them a reason to spend time here and in the calls, and to constantly put their voting power to use. The DIP also gave enough motivation to low VP delegates to put enough energy to create non tangible but important effects. The DIP also attracted a series of delegates that we will see in future if they will provide any meaningful impact, but that in the meantime are also creating detrimental noise.

To me, the high level answer is evolving the DIP toward a program that is more skewed toward impact.

What is impact? Is the ability to have a meaningful effect. Inheretely means that the practical definition of impact will change based on the state of the dao, of our chain and of the crypto industry as a whole, and will be a fluid definition. We are coming for example more and more close to a situation in which impact is being able to address the always rising quorum. Does it mean that for example compensation should partially be tied to the voting power accrued? Maybe. Does it mean that if I am able to come, as a old 50k delegate (or new delegate) with a new delegation of 1-2M arbs that were not previously delegated I should get a bonus? Maybe.

I don't have the precise answer on how to make DIP better right now. There are likely infinite ways, each one more skewed toward one specific outcome that we all want more than others, so all with certain pros and cons. Any change will come with people that will protest around it, and others that will be satisfied.

But if we don't first assess the goals we had, whether they were reached, and what challenges we have ahead as a collective, all that we are discussing will be nothing more than virtue signaling, allowing ourselves to look in the mirror in the morning and tell ourselves how good we are as crypto native people, how we are allegedly changing the reality around us, while, in fact, we are just going in circles in a small world that is becoming more and more detached from the reality of any business.

Even if it's distributed amongst a set of L1 delegates, it's still viewed as a centralization of sorts. It's a similar power structure in most corporates or even governments.

There is the possibility that what is expected is not what happens in reality and needs to be taken into account. Currently we're more for an approach that considers the value of contributions (not frequency) as a way to filter delegates that should be rewarded.

We believe that we're aligned in the desired end goal but are taking different approaches.

There are so many good comments already that we try to keep it brief. We would be against this proposal, while also agreeing that improving the DIP process is always a good idea.

Echoing the sentiment of others, we think that the current incentive structure leads to a deterioration of comments. We'd be in favour of simplifying the requirements.

What's more useful to the DAO? A delegate that adds to the collective workload by repeating other people's ideas in every thread to be rewarded, or a delegate who only posts following an intrinsic motivation to do so, e.g. to contribute a new perspective or emphasize their conviction?

On a high level, what is the one thing that the DAO wants to achieve? In our opinion: to make (good) decisions.

This means, voting is the single most important action and primary responsibility of a delegate.

A vesting schedule is a proven method of incentive alignment and we'd support this greatly.

Further, our understanding of the DIP is that only the top 50 delegates can participate. While this is not a tangible limit to participation currently, it will inevitably push the minimum delegation amount significantly upwards of 50k ARB as more delegates join over time.

With this perspective in mind, we think that the DIP should not be more complicated than it is now, and in fact should be further simplified by deleting all requirements that create distracting incentives, such as paying for forum activity.

Thank you for the proposal @thedevanshmehta.

After reviewing your proposal and the feedback from other delegates, we’d like to specifically address the two proposed amendments:

1. Level 1 delegates ◦ Increase the minimum entry threshold for DIP participation to 500k ARB

2. Level 2 delegates ◦ Delegates with between 50k–499k ARB that wish to participate in DIP must secure the endorsement of a Level 1 delegate

This structure raises several concerns:

1. It centralizes gatekeeping of DIP participation.
2. It adds more complexity to an already multifaceted process.
3. Reputational risk for Level 1 delegates becomes a factor if they endorse a delegate who underperforms.
4. It focuses rewards on securing support rather than on the substance and quality of contributions.

We feel that implementing this structure is not constructive. Rather than centering on threshold metrics, we should focus on improving the DIP’s ability to incentivize valuable contributions and active participation across the DAO.

We agree with @pedrob that the proposed minimum threshold of ARB tokens needed to participate in the DIP seems arbitrary.

We also agree with @0xDonPepe on the points below. We’ve seen a similar effect recently with applications from various groups to run the Domain Allocator Offerings grant program, where some potential applicants were hesitant because they felt they had no real chance. The new structure you propose may have a similar outcome, discouraging additional voices from stepping forward.

We’d also highlight what @SEEDGov noted regarding the importance of skill diversity. Because the DAO manages and operates several programs and grants, having a range of delegates with different backgrounds is essential. The varied expertise of each delegate is precisely what the DAO needs to function effectively. For this very reason we need to encourage broader participation from a larger pool of talents.

We do appreciate the initiative to bring this issue forward but we are NOT IN FAVOUR of this proposal. Although we believe the proposed amendments focus on the wrong metric, conversations like this are important. They help refine how the DIP can better drive constructive engagement, reward meaningful contributions, and promote growth within Arbitrum DAO.

But we acknowledge the need to introduce accountability mechanisms to ensure we foster and reward high-quality contributions rather than simply incentivizing quantity.

I did stay out of this discussion so far on purpose in the beginning. We did talk a lot about the DIP in the chat, here, in private, and in public. I have to say comms have being a mess and detrimental for the DAO in my opinion on this topic.

First, a few bullet points on this very proposal.

• in this topic we only focus on the bad of a low entry point, 50k arb. I would have not been personally able to enter without this. My current delegation is half what I racked around (thanks to @dk3 for bootstrapping it) and half what i auto delegated. I think this could be said for a lot of other very good delegates with low VP
• there is a general erratic behaviour of first suggesting an increase delegation up to 500k arb, then move to an endorsement process, then move to different programs based on the amount of VP. All of these are neither good nor bad solutions per se: but they have been clearly thrown around without a proper analysis of the current state of DIP. Saying you need 500k to post on snapshot is not a reason good enough to be clear. So I don't think neither the 100k/500k/1M/whatever is a solution, nor the endorsement from a big delegate
• DIP can be improved for sure. In searching for quality we have created a program in which everybody and their grandma has to write their take on X because this accrues points. Byproduct is that it creates a lot of noise, and it becomes blurry to distinguish between comments sometimes written for the sake of writing, and comments that are just a different opinion.

We should go back to the roots: what was the DIP created for, did it provided a proper solution, did it create further issues. DIP was created to increase participation in the DAO and to also sustain delegates that have to spend a big amount of time in here. But, useless to say, is extremely more likely that a delegate with millions in voting power will have an higher impact (keyword) compared to a lower one. When can a lower VP one create an impact? When is able to steer opinions of the DAO, is able to provide feedback that gets incorporated, and creates secondary effect that are hard to measure. Does it happen often? No. Does it happen? Yes, I see this secondary impact from several delegates, to name a few @jameskbh and @pedrob but they are not the only ones.

The DIP did create a net to sustain high VP delegates, to give them a reason to spend time here and in the calls, and to constantly put their voting power to use. The DIP also gave enough motivation to low VP delegates to put enough energy to create non tangible but important effects. The DIP also attracted a series of delegates that we will see in future if they will provide any meaningful impact, but that in the meantime are also creating detrimental noise.

To me, the high level answer is evolving the DIP toward a program that is more skewed toward impact.

What is impact? Is the ability to have a meaningful effect. Inheretely means that the practical definition of impact will change based on the state of the dao, of our chain and of the crypto industry as a whole, and will be a fluid definition. We are coming for example more and more close to a situation in which impact is being able to address the always rising quorum. Does it mean that for example compensation should partially be tied to the voting power accrued? Maybe. Does it mean that if I am able to come, as a old 50k delegate (or new delegate) with a new delegation of 1-2M arbs that were not previously delegated I should get a bonus? Maybe.

I don't have the precise answer on how to make DIP better right now. There are likely infinite ways, each one more skewed toward one specific outcome that we all want more than others, so all with certain pros and cons. Any change will come with people that will protest around it, and others that will be satisfied.

But if we don't first assess the goals we had, whether they were reached, and what challenges we have ahead as a collective, all that we are discussing will be nothing more than virtue signaling, allowing ourselves to look in the mirror in the morning and tell ourselves how good we are as crypto native people, how we are allegedly changing the reality around us, while, in fact, we are just going in circles in a small world that is becoming more and more detached from the reality of any business.

I will move from criticism of the proposal to a constructive proposal. You raised the issue that 50,000 should not be the only indicator for participation in the program and this is close to me.

My proposal for improvement: It is necessary to revise the number of points for the program so that only voting and their rationale do not provide the opportunity to receive incentives.

Now you can get 70 points without taking any active part in the discussions, it is enough to vote for 13 proposals (as was the case in December) and once a month write why you voted that way. A delegate who actively participates can receive only 10-20% more, but will spend significantly more of his time.

The second option, without changing the scoring system, is to lower the minimum amount for receiving a reward. Currently, the minimum amount is $3,000. Perhaps if we lower it to $1,000, then delegates will become more involved in the community.

Thanks for sharing your worms eye view of the program as a prospective applicant!

The amendments are expected to be cost neutral if every delegate over 500k ARB exercises their right to endorse a smaller delegate between 50 and 500k ARB.

So this isn't a cost cutting exercise - more an accountability one (as larger delegates will likely endorse someone going above and beyond the call of duty) and an impact one (as smaller delegates get to influence the votes of the larger delegate who endorsed them).

This is a genuine problem to solve, as Goodhearts law means that when we make a measure like comments or votes into a target, it ceases to be a good measure. We are already seeing some negative effects from this,

I completely agree! I do still think we should be more judicious about who gets 'overpayed' rather than making it open to all who fulfil some criteria.

I am sure you also agree that the program is not perfect - would be curious to know if you have any proposed amendments to make it better

This one is the most interesting point. If the amendments were already in effect, I predict that after you got the ops lead role a larger delegate would have decided to endorse you. Which is good! We want there to be some rigour in selection right? And while it would be harder for you to join, once you're in you would likely find it easier to effect change

The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.

As mentioned by others this proposal severely undermines the presence and emergence of new delegates into Arbitrum ecosystem. With a reduced actively engaged delegates, it limits perspective, centralises control amongst few delegates, and creates a larger barrier to entry for the average participant wanting to have their voice heard.

SeedLATAM has performed an exceedingly decisive effort in order to filter upstanding quality reviewers amongst the DAO. The provisional encouragement of incentives is advantageous for attracting a diverse set of opinions.

Giving consideration retrospectively, it's very clear how participants in the DIP, have further enhanced discussions. As mentioned by @SEEDGov, another consideration is if a small delegate doesn't align with Level 1 delegate preference, it may be weaponised and generate a wrong outcome. It can create conversations out of periphery of what is most pragmatic for the DAO and the ecosystem as a whole.

Our overall opinion is against seeking this proposal, we do recommend a revised examples with both qualitative and quantitative metrics to effectively outline if there's a necessity in ammendments to the DIP.

first of all, i dont agree with this solution - we would just end up with small delegates begging every large delegate for an endorsement, and i find it difficult for them to turn them down, plus you don't want to put that responsibility on them.

i do think that arbitrum should have two separate programs, one to compensate delegates and another one to compensate contributors. on the one hand, delegates, especially those with high voting power, are the decision makers - so it makes sense to incentivize them to engage more with the DAO and ensure that they have the financial means to professionalize their delegations. then when it comes to those that are small delegates in the program, they most likely are interested in contributing to the DAO in exchange of a payment - acting more like DAO contributors rather than decision makers (realistically they won't have that much of an impact on gov through their vp, which is fine), and they should be compensated accordingly. not every DAO contributor should be a delegate, i know this is sort of the case already, but i do think it would be better to have two separate programs to compensate each accordingly.

that way small delegates that are simply joining the program because they want to contribute to the DAO in exchange of a payment could get paid proportionally to their contributions to the DAO, without having to be delegates, and at the same time i would increase the min vp for delegates so that we keep incentivizing the DAOs decision makers to actively engage in its governance, if that makes sense.

so what i suggest is one program for delegates with a higher vp threshold (idk the number, i dont think it makes sense to arbitrarily throw a number) and another program exclusively for DAO contributors

another thing to add is that currently the threshold is actually way lower since you could in theory loop your ARB on apps like dolomite with vARB, so you could easily get 50k ARB vp with less than 30k vARB at very low risk - i did mention this to SEEDGov which i believe they are going to address this on further iterations of the program

I agree that there are inefficiencies in the current Delegate Incentives Program, and I appreciate the discussion around improving it. However, the proposed solutions—both in the original post and in the comments—come with critical downsides that could introduce more problems than they solve.

For one, holding ARB does not automatically equate to valuable contributions. This is similar to holding ETH versus being able to run an Ethereum node—owning the asset doesn’t mean you have the knowledge, expertise, or dedication to contribute meaningfully. The same applies to governance: a delegate who was entrusted with votes by the community is not inherently less valuable than someone who simply holds ARB.

Additionally, delegation size is not necessarily a reliable indicator of contribution quality. Some protocols have large delegations due to receiving significant ARB airdrops, but that alone doesn’t make them more valuable participants in governance. Contributions should be assessed on their actual impact, not just the amount of ARB held or delegated.

Another suggestion has been to push for more proactivity in governance. While I understand the intent, this risks generating even more noise. The DAO already struggles with a high volume of comments, and incentivizing activity for its own sake could lead to chaotic, misaligned goal-setting and wasted resources. It took significant effort to align on a mission for the Arbitrum DAO—do we really want to undo that progress by creating a system that rewards volume over value?

We need thoughtful, targeted improvements to the incentives program, but I don’t believe the proposed solutions move us in the right direction.

I cannot support this proposal for the following reasons:

1. If the minimum voting power requirement is 500k ARB, how many people will actually be able to participate?
2. If Delegates between 50k - 500k ARB wishing to become part of the program need an endorsement, won’t decision-making power remain concentrated in the hands of a very few Level 1 delegates? I deem that community-wide delegates, rather than delegates of a specific project, are not suitable for using endorsement methods.
3. If this continues, the power of community voting will ultimately rest in the hands of a very small circle. What, then, is the purpose of having delegates?

Expand the circle of delegates rather than shrink it is necessary, we still have a long way to go.

Would this be the case even if delegates had a limited number of endorsement slots they can give out? So its not unlimited but capped to 1, at the most 2

thanks for this intelligent insight! I definitely hope more of the smaller delegates in DIP become like @danielo , who frequently makes proposals to the DAO instead of just voting on them.

I wonder if in addition to the list of amendments, we add in "Directive Principles" which are not hard coded but suggested guidelines.

Some of the Directive Principles;

1. We should strive to include more delegates that are exclusively focusing on Arbitrum, or at least not involved in competitor chains

2. Delegates in the program should lock up some of the pay they receive and increase their voting power, rather than liquidating the entire portion received

3. We should include & reward delegates who go above and beyond the call of duty, to not just checking the list of requirements in the program but also making proposals to the DAO, bullposting Arbitrum, etc

Thanks for recognizing this as a real issue within the DIP program! I also think paying similar amounts to delegates irrespective of whether they have 50k VP or 5 million is not fair.

The point @cattin raised is in the same ballpark here, about differentiating between contributors and delegates. Open to suggestions on ways we can operationalize it better.

It's not true centralization since you can get the endorsement from any of the level 1 delegates. so its distributed permissions, which we do want when we are giving away money.

My hope with the amended structure is that only by having substance and quality will level 1 delegates will endorse contributors to join the program.

I think most of the people discussing here are delegates and have a conflict of interest, like me. But I will try to be objective (Sorry in advance for the verbosity)

1. After the pilot incentive for delegates, the author had 2 months to rework the proposal. We considered various options for improvement as a community, and no decision was made to increase the threshold. Why was this not done? It seems to me because the number of delegates never reached 50, although the community had a goal to increase the number of delegates and attract more votes. It was logical not to increase the threshold, which would lead to a decrease in delegates and a decrease in decentralization, as the basis of DAO.
2. The ability to allow a second-category delegate to participate in the program is a corruption-prone proposal. I am sure that most delegates are honest people, but why initially create a system that can lead to a situation where small delegates will start offering bribes to larger ones. I think this should be avoided.
3. The second problem with appointing second-category delegates is that first-category delegates will approve of those who approve of their opinion and can exclude them at any time for an opinion different from the "correct" one.
4. Too sharp an increase in the threshold during the project (changing the rules during the game) will have a negative impact on the reputation of the Arbitrum. It's like promising a grant and then taking it away from some people by changing the rules. In addition, I think most people know that gathering delegations is not an easy task. Due to the decrease in the cost of ARB, many people have started selling their delegations, and their numbers are decreasing.
5. You didn't suggest this, but you were going to think about how to evaluate the number of delegated votes for ownership. Again, you need to understand the goal of this task - to increase delegations. And I don't understand how buying a certain amount of ARB can help with this. Any user will be able to pledge USDC and take ARB for themselves: they will seem to own them, but in fact they have borrowed them. In general, I don't think this will help matters.
6. Regarding industry standards. Lido should base its program on Arbitrum, not vice versa. And at the moment there are only 7 delegates who can receive a reward. I am sure that Lido will lower this threshold (in particular, one of the 7 delegates did not have the corresponding threshold, but was admitted to the program due to his active participation).
7. You write that it is easy to make a profit in the program by investing only $30,000 (and what if people bought them when ARB cost $2?). Thus, I understand that you are saying that rewarding delegates should not bring them profit. But this is the goal of the program - to encourage more delegates to come. If you give only to those who have a lot of money, then they will not be motivated by money in this way.

In the end, I want to say that it may be worth increasing the threshold, but it should be done carefully, gradually and not so significantly.

Hi @thedevanshmehta

First of all, thank you for bringing this discussion to the forum. We believe that these types of debates are valuable not only for the incentive program but also for the DAO members. Additionally, this is the first time a DAO member has proposed modifications to the program, which we find truly valuable.

Before addressing specific points in your proposal, we would like to briefly review how we got here:

In the first draft of the program, we proposed the following:

After a period of feedback and meetings, the DAO members at that time expressed their disagreement with the existence of tiers, the lock mechanism, and the 100k minimum requirement for participation. The reasoning behind this was that, at that stage of the DAO, the priority was to attract more contributors and make it easier for new delegates to participate.

As a result, we introduced changes in a new proposal:

There was also debate regarding the 50k ARB minimum, as some delegates felt it was still too high. However, our reasoning for keeping it at that level was that, at the time, there were at least 194 delegates within that range, making it a reasonable number for us.

Ultimately, this was the proposal that was approved for the first version of the incentive program.

Over the six-month duration of the program, only 50% of the allocated budget was spent:

This allowed us to extend the program for an additional two months without requesting extra funds from the DAO treasury. It also gave us more time to work on version 1.5 of the program, ensuring a broader feedback window.

The proposal included the current requirements:

Once again, discussions arose regarding lowering the 50k ARB entry barrier and increasing the number of delegates eligible for rewards. However, we opposed these changes for the following reasons, which were outlined in our final report on the v1.0 program:

The number of inactive delegates within the 50k ARB range was twice that of active delegates. On average, there were 132 inactive delegates, as shown in this table:

Active delegates within this range represent approximately 98% of the VP in each proposal approved by the DAO:

These metrics reinforced our position to maintain the 50k ARB minimum, increase participation requirements, and keep the number of incentivized delegates at 50, as we did not see a need to expand this number. However, it also made us realize that a large number of inactive delegates within this range could potentially reactivate and participate in the DAO. This insight led us to increase the incentive amounts, setting them above those of other DAOs.

As seen, the 50k threshold is not arbitrary, and while it can certainly be improved, our goal is to strike a balance between keeping the entry barrier accessible, attracting new delegates, reactivating inactive ones, and professionalizing active participants.

Now let's get into the details of this proposal.

We appreciate the effort to compare Arbitrum’s Delegate Incentives Program with other DAOs. However, the document used as the foundation for this proposal contains several inaccuracies that significantly impacts the validity of the comparison. We brought this up in the Telegram group, and for clarity, we will highlight only those errors relevant to the Arbitrum program:

• "Min 25% participation and 50k ARB delegation": This is incorrect. Currently, a 75% on-chain participation rate over the last 90 days is required just to apply, and even then, this does not guarantee that a delegate will receive any compensation.
• "50 delegates get compensated, 194 eligible": Not necessarily—the program has never reached 50 compensated delegates since not all eligible delegates reach the minimum required score. (Yes, there is a minimum score required, which is missing from the document.)

While we see the rationale behind these comparisons, it is important to point out that none of these DAOs operate a blockchain, making their governance structures and activity levels fundamentally different from Arbitrum DAO. Given these structural differences, a direct comparison may not fully capture the unique challenges of Arbitrum's governance. Additionally, a quick look at the 1inch forum would reveal that the level of discussion and governance activity is nowhere near comparable to what we experience in Arbitrum DAO.

To clarify, the 3-month review period was meant exclusively for the new rubric system, as was explicitly stated in the original proposal.

That being said, as you mentioned, anyone is free to propose modifications via Snapshot, and we encourage open discussions on potential improvements.

As @jameskbh correctly pointed out, the $4.2 million budget is a maximum allocation, assuming every single compensated delegate reaches Tier 1, which is highly unlikely. Note that with the last changes + the Voting Power Multiplier, the spending will be even lower.

Your original (now edited) proposal suggested that the main motivation behind this change was to cut expenses in half.

However, under your revised model, if every small delegate secures an endorsement, there would be no savings at all, nor would there be any difference in treatment between delegates with >500k ARB and those below that threshold.

This contradiction raises an important question: What specific issue is this proposal aiming to solve?

What are your arguments to say that this “didn’t play out” when we are only 3 months into the 1.5? We had several comments from delegates who have hired/are looking to hire assistants. We still don't understand the relationship between Hiring someone for your own delegation vs Giving an endorsement to a third party completely unrelated to your delegation.

On Endorsements

As already pointed out by other delegates, we believe this model introduces several serious challenges that could ultimately work against the DAO's best interests:

• The number of compensated delegates is always limited, so a high-VP delegate would have no incentive to endorse someone who competes for a compensation slot.

• Endorsements could be weaponized as a tool for coercion—if a small delegate does not align with a Level 1 delegate's preferences, they could simply be removed from the program.

• This endorsement requirement effectively shuts the door to new contributors who lack an existing reputation or connections with current DIP-participating delegates. The proposed system creates a highly permissioned program for potential new contributors.

• Operational challenges have not been considered.

• Increased Centralization & Lack of Accountability: There is no accountability for Level 1 delegates regarding how they grant endorsements. The system assumes good faith, but as we have seen in many governance models, unchecked authority can lead to unintended consequences.

We truly value constructive dialogue and would have appreciated being consulted as Program Administrators (by the way, it’s SEEDGov, not SEEDLATAM).

For context, before this discussion was brought to Twitter, we were already working on a Voting Power Score Multiplier, which essentially provides differentiated treatment for high-VP delegates while still requiring lower-VP delegates to demonstrate high-quality contributions in the forum to reach the upper tiers.

This multiplier was developed after multiple meetings with various DAO stakeholders, who provided feedback on the first two months of DIP 1.5, and it represents one of the many changes we have been making every month to improve the existing framework. Note that there is a thread in which we inform in advance about each modification.

Conclusion

SEEDGov DOES NOT SUPPORT the proposed change. We truly appreciate the effort put into this proposal and recognize the intention behind it, but after careful analysis, we have identified several issues that lead us to respectfully disagree based on our experience as Program Administrators of the DIP and thorough research into this matter.

We remain fully open to additional suggestions on how we can further optimize the program. We acknowledge that the system can always be improved, which is precisely why we are continuously refining the framework to ensure that Arbitrum DAO has the most effective Delegate Incentive Program in the crypto space.

I will move from criticism of the proposal to a constructive proposal. You raised the issue that 50,000 should not be the only indicator for participation in the program and this is close to me.

My proposal for improvement: It is necessary to revise the number of points for the program so that only voting and their rationale do not provide the opportunity to receive incentives.

Now you can get 70 points without taking any active part in the discussions, it is enough to vote for 13 proposals (as was the case in December) and once a month write why you voted that way. A delegate who actively participates can receive only 10-20% more, but will spend significantly more of his time.

The second option, without changing the scoring system, is to lower the minimum amount for receiving a reward. Currently, the minimum amount is $3,000. Perhaps if we lower it to $1,000, then delegates will become more involved in the community.

Thanks for sharing your worms eye view of the program as a prospective applicant!

The amendments are expected to be cost neutral if every delegate over 500k ARB exercises their right to endorse a smaller delegate between 50 and 500k ARB.

So this isn't a cost cutting exercise - more an accountability one (as larger delegates will likely endorse someone going above and beyond the call of duty) and an impact one (as smaller delegates get to influence the votes of the larger delegate who endorsed them).

This is a genuine problem to solve, as Goodhearts law means that when we make a measure like comments or votes into a target, it ceases to be a good measure. We are already seeing some negative effects from this,

I completely agree! I do still think we should be more judicious about who gets 'overpayed' rather than making it open to all who fulfil some criteria.

I am sure you also agree that the program is not perfect - would be curious to know if you have any proposed amendments to make it better

This one is the most interesting point. If the amendments were already in effect, I predict that after you got the ops lead role a larger delegate would have decided to endorse you. Which is good! We want there to be some rigour in selection right? And while it would be harder for you to join, once you're in you would likely find it easier to effect change

The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.

As mentioned by others this proposal severely undermines the presence and emergence of new delegates into Arbitrum ecosystem. With a reduced actively engaged delegates, it limits perspective, centralises control amongst few delegates, and creates a larger barrier to entry for the average participant wanting to have their voice heard.

SeedLATAM has performed an exceedingly decisive effort in order to filter upstanding quality reviewers amongst the DAO. The provisional encouragement of incentives is advantageous for attracting a diverse set of opinions.

Giving consideration retrospectively, it's very clear how participants in the DIP, have further enhanced discussions. As mentioned by @SEEDGov, another consideration is if a small delegate doesn't align with Level 1 delegate preference, it may be weaponised and generate a wrong outcome. It can create conversations out of periphery of what is most pragmatic for the DAO and the ecosystem as a whole.

Our overall opinion is against seeking this proposal, we do recommend a revised examples with both qualitative and quantitative metrics to effectively outline if there's a necessity in ammendments to the DIP.

first of all, i dont agree with this solution - we would just end up with small delegates begging every large delegate for an endorsement, and i find it difficult for them to turn them down, plus you don't want to put that responsibility on them.

i do think that arbitrum should have two separate programs, one to compensate delegates and another one to compensate contributors. on the one hand, delegates, especially those with high voting power, are the decision makers - so it makes sense to incentivize them to engage more with the DAO and ensure that they have the financial means to professionalize their delegations. then when it comes to those that are small delegates in the program, they most likely are interested in contributing to the DAO in exchange of a payment - acting more like DAO contributors rather than decision makers (realistically they won't have that much of an impact on gov through their vp, which is fine), and they should be compensated accordingly. not every DAO contributor should be a delegate, i know this is sort of the case already, but i do think it would be better to have two separate programs to compensate each accordingly.

that way small delegates that are simply joining the program because they want to contribute to the DAO in exchange of a payment could get paid proportionally to their contributions to the DAO, without having to be delegates, and at the same time i would increase the min vp for delegates so that we keep incentivizing the DAOs decision makers to actively engage in its governance, if that makes sense.

so what i suggest is one program for delegates with a higher vp threshold (idk the number, i dont think it makes sense to arbitrarily throw a number) and another program exclusively for DAO contributors

another thing to add is that currently the threshold is actually way lower since you could in theory loop your ARB on apps like dolomite with vARB, so you could easily get 50k ARB vp with less than 30k vARB at very low risk - i did mention this to SEEDGov which i believe they are going to address this on further iterations of the program

I agree that there are inefficiencies in the current Delegate Incentives Program, and I appreciate the discussion around improving it. However, the proposed solutions—both in the original post and in the comments—come with critical downsides that could introduce more problems than they solve.

For one, holding ARB does not automatically equate to valuable contributions. This is similar to holding ETH versus being able to run an Ethereum node—owning the asset doesn’t mean you have the knowledge, expertise, or dedication to contribute meaningfully. The same applies to governance: a delegate who was entrusted with votes by the community is not inherently less valuable than someone who simply holds ARB.

Additionally, delegation size is not necessarily a reliable indicator of contribution quality. Some protocols have large delegations due to receiving significant ARB airdrops, but that alone doesn’t make them more valuable participants in governance. Contributions should be assessed on their actual impact, not just the amount of ARB held or delegated.

Another suggestion has been to push for more proactivity in governance. While I understand the intent, this risks generating even more noise. The DAO already struggles with a high volume of comments, and incentivizing activity for its own sake could lead to chaotic, misaligned goal-setting and wasted resources. It took significant effort to align on a mission for the Arbitrum DAO—do we really want to undo that progress by creating a system that rewards volume over value?