Co-Authors: @Matt_StableLab and @JoJo
This proposal aims to fund a working group to research incentive structures and design a new incentive framework. This working group aims to deliver a proposal for the DAO for a vote in December after the detox period. The working group will proceed in three phases: discovery, framework design, and Approval. The discovery phase includes delegate/protocol interviews, analyzing past incentive performance and limitations, and researching other ecosystem / traditional government incentive designs. This research will be used to create guidelines for incentives and design a framework for utilization. Finally, the group will take this framework to make a final proposal, including demonstrable KPIs, for a broader DAO vote.
The DAO has consistently expressed interest in using incentives to attract users and protocols to the Arbitrum ecosystem. However, to date, we have not yet taken sufficient time to design from first principles, that is, to first understand the goals and objectives of the program, deploying incentives to achieve particular measures. Arbitrum has also not had a chance to thoroughly analyze past incentives' performance nor design a robust framework that may last more than a few months. We believe funding a small working group would create a better incentive program. Through a focused effort, we will help the DAO produce a sustainable incentives framework to satisfy both delegates and protocols.
Prior Incentive Program Design
STIP. STIP was created quickly using a DAO-wide working group funded by a foundation grant in response to the DAO voting down Camelot’s incentive proposal and requesting a larger framework for granting protocol incentives. It was the first major DAO initiative and achieved the goal of creating a first attempt at incentives. While it was not a perfect program, it got the ball rolling and taught us about incentives.
LTIPP. The creation of the LTIPP proposal was funded retroactively once it was passed. This proposal involved risk on behalf of the composing parties. It took four months of writing, lobbying delegates, and modifying the proposal to ensure ratification. The improvements of LTIPP focused on making operational changes to STIP challenges while providing incentives to protocols not funded in STIP. These changes allowed Arbitrum to broaden its incentive distribution while evaluating a new program structure that included the council and advisors.
STIP.B. The creation of STIP.B was not funded. STIP.B was a grassroots effort by protocols that argued that incentives should continue for protocols that used STIP rewards correctly to keep the largest Arbitrum protocols focused on Arbitrum while other chains offered large grants to migrate.
The previous incentive programs were designed under tight time pressure. With STIP, the DAO was rushing to get something started. With LTIPP, the DAO wanted to ensure we had a program to immediately follow STIP. With STIP.B, the STIP protocols tried to ensure they could follow a similar timeline to stay competitive with LTIPP.
Without sufficient time, the DAO could not decide the concrete objectives of these programs. This has made it extremely hard to evaluate the success of the programs. Additionally, with a near-zero gap between programs, there was insufficient time to examine past performance and improve distribution efficiency. While LTIPP introduced the council and advisors to help protocols create better incentive plans, we need more data-driven guidelines on how protocols should utilize incentives to maximize return on ARB grants. Finally, because these programs were each planned independently, they have all been short 3-5 months as we have not had time to create a robust global framework to last 1+ years. This disconnection between programs has made protocols unsure of when their next chance at funding will be, making it much harder for them to plan their future in Arbitrum.
At present, we have a three-month break from incentives. This window presents an opportunity to research and create a thoughtful Arbitrium Incentives program. To best take advantage of this time, it makes sense to have a group of stakeholders focused on and responsible for completing the necessary research. With the research in hand, this group may then deliver a framework and program design to meet the needs of all DAO stakeholders.
Presently, there is no compensation or incentives for the research, coordination, and planning of Arbitrum incentive programs. This is a nontrivial amount of work and requires both incentive research and operations research, ultimately translating these into effective program design. Without a clear commitment from Arbitrum, counterparties bear significant risks in performing this research. As a result, programs were underdesigned and underresearched.
In the absence of the necessary incentives, past program design opted for an open incentives working group. This format led to a diffusion of responsibility and inefficiency. The proposal creation phase was focused on passing a DAO vote quickly instead of optimizing for the best possible program.
A smaller group of responsible individuals will likely lead to better-focused outcomes. When a group is accountable to the DAO, we can expect better results as incentives are aligned with performance.
While everybody tends to agree, at a high level, that incentive programs should foster “growth” and “adoption,” we fall short of properly specifying the KPIs and the base ground values achieved before and after it. The byproduct is the inability to measure the effective success or failure. The lack of discussion on this topic will make every program meaningless.
These tasks take a lot of time. To achieve the best results, Arbtirum should assign a modest budget to ensure satisfactory delivery. Funding this working group will give the DAO more information in three months to make a smarter decision when voting on the next incentives program.
Considering the scale of the programs, potentially 50,000,000+ ARB, an operational expenditure of approximately 0.4% is acceptable and reasonable examining market comparables. In general, fund operations cost around 2% per annum, exclusive of planning and setup costs. Our hopes are to vastly improve the performance of ARB incentive programs, leading to long term cost savings and efficiency gains.
Only three steps are required to operationalize this proposal.
The project is projected to span from mid-September, targeting an incentives go-live date of February 2025.
225,000 ARB
Five working group members paid $7,500 per month. (Blockworks would forgo payment as their contributions to this working group would be covered by ARDC v2 funding, if approved)
Three months of work (2 months for research and proposal creation + 1 month for feedback, modification, and setup)
5 x 3 x $7,500 = $112,500 (225,000 ARB at current prices)
This proposal would not require any additional funding from the DAO treasury. Over 24,000,000 ARB remain from LTIPP in the LTIPP multisig. Part of these leftover funds can be used to fund this incentive working group.
Co-Authors: @Matt_StableLab and @JoJo
This proposal aims to fund a working group to research incentive structures and design a new incentive framework. This working group aims to deliver a proposal for the DAO for a vote in December after the detox period. The working group will proceed in three phases: discovery, framework design, and Approval. The discovery phase includes delegate/protocol interviews, analyzing past incentive performance and limitations, and researching other ecosystem / traditional government incentive designs. This research will be used to create guidelines for incentives and design a framework for utilization. Finally, the group will take this framework to make a final proposal, including demonstrable KPIs, for a broader DAO vote.
The DAO has consistently expressed interest in using incentives to attract users and protocols to the Arbitrum ecosystem. However, to date, we have not yet taken sufficient time to design from first principles, that is, to first understand the goals and objectives of the program, deploying incentives to achieve particular measures. Arbitrum has also not had a chance to thoroughly analyze past incentives' performance nor design a robust framework that may last more than a few months. We believe funding a small working group would create a better incentive program. Through a focused effort, we will help the DAO produce a sustainable incentives framework to satisfy both delegates and protocols.
Prior Incentive Program Design
STIP. STIP was created quickly using a DAO-wide working group funded by a foundation grant in response to the DAO voting down Camelot’s incentive proposal and requesting a larger framework for granting protocol incentives. It was the first major DAO initiative and achieved the goal of creating a first attempt at incentives. While it was not a perfect program, it got the ball rolling and taught us about incentives.
LTIPP. The creation of the LTIPP proposal was funded retroactively once it was passed. This proposal involved risk on behalf of the composing parties. It took four months of writing, lobbying delegates, and modifying the proposal to ensure ratification. The improvements of LTIPP focused on making operational changes to STIP challenges while providing incentives to protocols not funded in STIP. These changes allowed Arbitrum to broaden its incentive distribution while evaluating a new program structure that included the council and advisors.
STIP.B. The creation of STIP.B was not funded. STIP.B was a grassroots effort by protocols that argued that incentives should continue for protocols that used STIP rewards correctly to keep the largest Arbitrum protocols focused on Arbitrum while other chains offered large grants to migrate.
The previous incentive programs were designed under tight time pressure. With STIP, the DAO was rushing to get something started. With LTIPP, the DAO wanted to ensure we had a program to immediately follow STIP. With STIP.B, the STIP protocols tried to ensure they could follow a similar timeline to stay competitive with LTIPP.
Without sufficient time, the DAO could not decide the concrete objectives of these programs. This has made it extremely hard to evaluate the success of the programs. Additionally, with a near-zero gap between programs, there was insufficient time to examine past performance and improve distribution efficiency. While LTIPP introduced the council and advisors to help protocols create better incentive plans, we need more data-driven guidelines on how protocols should utilize incentives to maximize return on ARB grants. Finally, because these programs were each planned independently, they have all been short 3-5 months as we have not had time to create a robust global framework to last 1+ years. This disconnection between programs has made protocols unsure of when their next chance at funding will be, making it much harder for them to plan their future in Arbitrum.
At present, we have a three-month break from incentives. This window presents an opportunity to research and create a thoughtful Arbitrium Incentives program. To best take advantage of this time, it makes sense to have a group of stakeholders focused on and responsible for completing the necessary research. With the research in hand, this group may then deliver a framework and program design to meet the needs of all DAO stakeholders.
Presently, there is no compensation or incentives for the research, coordination, and planning of Arbitrum incentive programs. This is a nontrivial amount of work and requires both incentive research and operations research, ultimately translating these into effective program design. Without a clear commitment from Arbitrum, counterparties bear significant risks in performing this research. As a result, programs were underdesigned and underresearched.
In the absence of the necessary incentives, past program design opted for an open incentives working group. This format led to a diffusion of responsibility and inefficiency. The proposal creation phase was focused on passing a DAO vote quickly instead of optimizing for the best possible program.
A smaller group of responsible individuals will likely lead to better-focused outcomes. When a group is accountable to the DAO, we can expect better results as incentives are aligned with performance.
While everybody tends to agree, at a high level, that incentive programs should foster “growth” and “adoption,” we fall short of properly specifying the KPIs and the base ground values achieved before and after it. The byproduct is the inability to measure the effective success or failure. The lack of discussion on this topic will make every program meaningless.
These tasks take a lot of time. To achieve the best results, Arbtirum should assign a modest budget to ensure satisfactory delivery. Funding this working group will give the DAO more information in three months to make a smarter decision when voting on the next incentives program.
Considering the scale of the programs, potentially 50,000,000+ ARB, an operational expenditure of approximately 0.4% is acceptable and reasonable examining market comparables. In general, fund operations cost around 2% per annum, exclusive of planning and setup costs. Our hopes are to vastly improve the performance of ARB incentive programs, leading to long term cost savings and efficiency gains.
Only three steps are required to operationalize this proposal.
The project is projected to span from mid-September, targeting an incentives go-live date of February 2025.
225,000 ARB
Five working group members paid $7,500 per month. (Blockworks would forgo payment as their contributions to this working group would be covered by ARDC v2 funding, if approved)
Three months of work (2 months for research and proposal creation + 1 month for feedback, modification, and setup)
5 x 3 x $7,500 = $112,500 (225,000 ARB at current prices)
This proposal would not require any additional funding from the DAO treasury. Over 24,000,000 ARB remain from LTIPP in the LTIPP multisig. Part of these leftover funds can be used to fund this incentive working group.
werent the recap from ltipp and stip supposed to come up with actionables instead of having to fund another research project?
We are in favor of this RFC. The 225,000 ARB budget seems reasonable given the scope and importance of the work. We've clearly seen the limitations of past incentive programs, a dedicated working group to thoroughly research and design a more effective framework is long overdue.
The proposed timeline and deliverables make sense, and I appreciate the focus on stakeholder interviews and data-driven guidelines. It's about time we take a step back and create a sustainable, long-term approach to incentives rather than continuing with ad-hoc programs.
werent the recap from ltipp and stip supposed to come up with actionables instead of having to fund another research project?
We are in favor of this RFC. The 225,000 ARB budget seems reasonable given the scope and importance of the work. We've clearly seen the limitations of past incentive programs, a dedicated working group to thoroughly research and design a more effective framework is long overdue.
The proposed timeline and deliverables make sense, and I appreciate the focus on stakeholder interviews and data-driven guidelines. It's about time we take a step back and create a sustainable, long-term approach to incentives rather than continuing with ad-hoc programs.
Love this proposal. I have been working on a similar working group proposal for the CEX to DEX initiative. Is the goal of this working group to create a general incentive program or to create incentives programs for different categories of protocols/projects?
Love this proposal. I have been working on a similar working group proposal for the CEX to DEX initiative. Is the goal of this working group to create a general incentive program or to create incentives programs for different categories of protocols/projects?
Happy to support re: @Frisson's comments above.
My only flag's here would be that I do think the research deliverables are likely a bit more vague and ambitious than the program design deliverables. Interviews and feedback are certainly helpful, but we've seen multiple attempts at a robust quantitative analysis fall below delegate's goals. A broken record, but we're never going to get a clean answer to the "did STIP/LTIPP work?" question. The diversity of grants, the lack of goals from STIP/LTIPP, and the asynchronous nature of the incentives over the past ~10 months make it very difficult. This isn’t a critique, just an acknowledgment that meeting the expectations of DAO stakeholders at this point would require a dedicated DS/analyst team and a project manager with deep and tactical incentives expertise.
Happy to support re: @Frisson's comments above.
My only flag's here would be that I do think the research deliverables are likely a bit more vague and ambitious than the program design deliverables. Interviews and feedback are certainly helpful, but we've seen multiple attempts at a robust quantitative analysis fall below delegate's goals. A broken record, but we're never going to get a clean answer to the "did STIP/LTIPP work?" question. The diversity of grants, the lack of goals from STIP/LTIPP, and the asynchronous nature of the incentives over the past ~10 months make it very difficult. This isn’t a critique, just an acknowledgment that meeting the expectations of DAO stakeholders at this point would require a dedicated DS/analyst team and a project manager with deep and tactical incentives expertise.
At this stage, and for the purposes of THIS working group, I'd over-index on finding the right KPIs/objectives for Arbitrum Incentives and designing a program designed to meet them.
Happy to support re: @Frisson's comments above.
My only flag's here would be that I do think the research deliverables are likely a bit more vague and ambitious than the program design deliverables. Interviews and feedback are certainly helpful, but we've seen multiple attempts at a robust quantitative analysis fall below delegate's goals. A broken record, but we're never going to get a clean answer to the "did STIP/LTIPP work?" question. The diversity of grants, the lack of goals from STIP/LTIPP, and the asynchronous nature of the incentives over the past ~10 months make it very difficult. This isn’t a critique, just an acknowledgment that meeting the expectations of DAO stakeholders at this point would require a dedicated DS/analyst team and a project manager with deep and tactical incentives expertise.
Happy to support re: @Frisson's comments above.
My only flag's here would be that I do think the research deliverables are likely a bit more vague and ambitious than the program design deliverables. Interviews and feedback are certainly helpful, but we've seen multiple attempts at a robust quantitative analysis fall below delegate's goals. A broken record, but we're never going to get a clean answer to the "did STIP/LTIPP work?" question. The diversity of grants, the lack of goals from STIP/LTIPP, and the asynchronous nature of the incentives over the past ~10 months make it very difficult. This isn’t a critique, just an acknowledgment that meeting the expectations of DAO stakeholders at this point would require a dedicated DS/analyst team and a project manager with deep and tactical incentives expertise.
At this stage, and for the purposes of THIS working group, I'd over-index on finding the right KPIs/objectives for Arbitrum Incentives and designing a program designed to meet them.
Castle Capital is one of the named members of the proposed Incentives Working Group (WG).
As part of this working group, we will ensure that the program incorporates key learnings from STIP, LTIPP, and STIP.b. We now have access to quantitative data, allowing us to refine our strategy based on past experiences and results.
Castle Capital is one of the named members of the proposed Incentives Working Group (WG).
As part of this working group, we will ensure that the program incorporates key learnings from STIP, LTIPP, and STIP.b. We now have access to quantitative data, allowing us to refine our strategy based on past experiences and results.
The early phase of the WG will be dedicated to gathering feedback from protocols and conducting research on previous programs. This ensures that the final proposal reflects a broad range of perspectives and incorporates best practices. These concerns are already considered in the multifaceted proposal that aims to create a long-term framework to better address the diverse needs of different projects, including timelines, incentive mechanisms, and goals.
Additionally, the WG will engage in discussions about Arbitrum’s overarching vision and objectives, ensuring that each program presents relevant KPIs to measure success. We are fully aligned with L2Beat’s detox proposal, and will use these three months to establish a more sustainable and comprehensive framework, ready for implementation once the detox period ends.
To clarify some details around the proposal arising from some other comments (as we see it):
Liked the idea of the proposal and thought it was headed in the right direction, with a clear motivation for the proposal and the goal of creating a more sustainable and effective incentive framework. Related Suggestions: 1- Reasonable time planning: the previous incentive design was rushed, resulting in low quality. Now that there is a three-month buffer, it is recommended that the time be fully utilized to ensure that the research and framework design is sound. 2- Resource allocation: with a reasonable budget and no need for additional funds, it is a good option to use the remaining funds available to finance the working groups. It is recommended to ensure effective delivery within three months to avoid subsequent delays.
Thank you, @Matt_StableLab, for sharing this proposal.
We are generally supportive of adopting a more structured, long-term approach to incentives.
One suggestion for the working group would be to begin with a retrospective analysis of previous programs and the detox period to identify successes and areas for improvement.
Thank you, @Matt_StableLab, for sharing this proposal.
We are generally supportive of adopting a more structured, long-term approach to incentives.
One suggestion for the working group would be to begin with a retrospective analysis of previous programs and the detox period to identify successes and areas for improvement.
Additionally, since the Arbitrum Foundation has received funding to expand its strategic partnerships, it would be beneficial to align the new incentives program with the Foundation’s broader efforts for greater synergy and impact.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team.
We commend the working group’s thorough approach to analyzing past incentive programs and designing a long-term framework. This strategic planning will likely result in more efficient use of ARB tokens and improve protocol alignment within the Arbitrum ecosystem.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team.
We commend the working group’s thorough approach to analyzing past incentive programs and designing a long-term framework. This strategic planning will likely result in more efficient use of ARB tokens and improve protocol alignment within the Arbitrum ecosystem.
We share @CastleCapital's perspective that this working group is a preliminary step toward creating a robust system, and we look forward to the establishment of an Incentives Council in the future.
I believe this work is very meaningful, and the required budget is quite modest—only $7,500 per month for 5 people, which comes to $1,500 per person. However, there’s a key issue: how can we ensure the effectiveness of the research? I understand you mentioned KPIs, but that’s not what I’m asking. I want to know how we can guarantee the validity of the research findings? Can we really rely on this report to improve our work? Thanks!
i think i can take this one since i am specifically called out on this.
I was an advisor in both ltipp and stip.b, and we already addressed the COI with both public disclosures of affiliations and also internal management of situations in which, even if no COI was there, the safe approach was still taken (ie: i advised protocols, that i didn't know before hand, for which after reading the application I understood could be seen, partially, as direct competitors of Jones. In that case, i went to the protocols directly to ask if they would be ok in me being their advisor, or if they wanted to be rotated to someone else. Interestingly enough very few protocols decided to rotate me out).
This is a great approach to ensure that incentives make sense. Some have complained about the Delegate Incentive Program methodology, and I think this would help alleviate any future concerns about fairness.
Adjusts the proposal to delegate feedback and lobby delegates to move the proposal to a vote.
Hey Matt, I really think this is the best way to move forward, as creating a good framework, design, follow-up, and incentive analysis can help make the most out of the funds provided. Also, I believe a well-thought-out design can help create a common north star for next incentives rounds.
I like the targeted approach to solving this problem. I always pay close attention to salary expenses and your wishes are quite adequate.
However, I have a couple of wishes for this program:
I like the targeted approach to solving this problem. I always pay close attention to salary expenses and your wishes are quite adequate.
However, I have a couple of wishes for this program:
For my part, I will be an active participant in the discussions on the calls, since this area is important for the development of Arbitrum and the increase of its user base.
Some early thoughts I'm generally supportive of this proposal. It's clear we need a long-term framework for incentives. The working group members seem like a solid balance of contributors from different types of organizations, although it might be nice to have some involvement from @Camelot and @tnorm if possible. I'd recommending pricing the proposal in USD (in ARB).
Thanks for the thoughtful answer and for working to make this happen. It's always good to see you and other members acknowledge the existence of possible conflicts, as this will make them easier to manage.
Overall, the proposal is reasonable and could help the DAO develop a more sustainable incentive framework, but I would like to make 2 points
Thanks for putting together this initiative. We need more of it.
The proposal raises interesting points, but we'd like to explore a few areas further.
Thanks for putting together this initiative. We need more of it.
The proposal raises interesting points, but we'd like to explore a few areas further.
The timing feels a bit early, given we're still awaiting LTIPP research results and detox period insights. Might it be beneficial to revisit this closer to the detox period's end?
On team composition, we're curious about exploring a more inclusive selection process. What if we considered an incentives council with elected members, similar to the security council? This could help address potential 'hairdresser dilemma' concerns - asking a barber if you need a haircut.
Castle Capital is one of the named members of the proposed Incentives Working Group (WG).
As part of this working group, we will ensure that the program incorporates key learnings from STIP, LTIPP, and STIP.b. We now have access to quantitative data, allowing us to refine our strategy based on past experiences and results.
Castle Capital is one of the named members of the proposed Incentives Working Group (WG).
As part of this working group, we will ensure that the program incorporates key learnings from STIP, LTIPP, and STIP.b. We now have access to quantitative data, allowing us to refine our strategy based on past experiences and results.
The early phase of the WG will be dedicated to gathering feedback from protocols and conducting research on previous programs. This ensures that the final proposal reflects a broad range of perspectives and incorporates best practices. These concerns are already considered in the multifaceted proposal that aims to create a long-term framework to better address the diverse needs of different projects, including timelines, incentive mechanisms, and goals.
Additionally, the WG will engage in discussions about Arbitrum’s overarching vision and objectives, ensuring that each program presents relevant KPIs to measure success. We are fully aligned with L2Beat’s detox proposal, and will use these three months to establish a more sustainable and comprehensive framework, ready for implementation once the detox period ends.
To clarify some details around the proposal arising from some other comments (as we see it):
Liked the idea of the proposal and thought it was headed in the right direction, with a clear motivation for the proposal and the goal of creating a more sustainable and effective incentive framework. Related Suggestions: 1- Reasonable time planning: the previous incentive design was rushed, resulting in low quality. Now that there is a three-month buffer, it is recommended that the time be fully utilized to ensure that the research and framework design is sound. 2- Resource allocation: with a reasonable budget and no need for additional funds, it is a good option to use the remaining funds available to finance the working groups. It is recommended to ensure effective delivery within three months to avoid subsequent delays.
Thank you, @Matt_StableLab, for sharing this proposal.
We are generally supportive of adopting a more structured, long-term approach to incentives.
One suggestion for the working group would be to begin with a retrospective analysis of previous programs and the detox period to identify successes and areas for improvement.
Thank you, @Matt_StableLab, for sharing this proposal.
We are generally supportive of adopting a more structured, long-term approach to incentives.
One suggestion for the working group would be to begin with a retrospective analysis of previous programs and the detox period to identify successes and areas for improvement.
Additionally, since the Arbitrum Foundation has received funding to expand its strategic partnerships, it would be beneficial to align the new incentives program with the Foundation’s broader efforts for greater synergy and impact.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team.
We commend the working group’s thorough approach to analyzing past incentive programs and designing a long-term framework. This strategic planning will likely result in more efficient use of ARB tokens and improve protocol alignment within the Arbitrum ecosystem.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team.
We commend the working group’s thorough approach to analyzing past incentive programs and designing a long-term framework. This strategic planning will likely result in more efficient use of ARB tokens and improve protocol alignment within the Arbitrum ecosystem.
We share @CastleCapital's perspective that this working group is a preliminary step toward creating a robust system, and we look forward to the establishment of an Incentives Council in the future.
I believe this work is very meaningful, and the required budget is quite modest—only $7,500 per month for 5 people, which comes to $1,500 per person. However, there’s a key issue: how can we ensure the effectiveness of the research? I understand you mentioned KPIs, but that’s not what I’m asking. I want to know how we can guarantee the validity of the research findings? Can we really rely on this report to improve our work? Thanks!
i think i can take this one since i am specifically called out on this.
I was an advisor in both ltipp and stip.b, and we already addressed the COI with both public disclosures of affiliations and also internal management of situations in which, even if no COI was there, the safe approach was still taken (ie: i advised protocols, that i didn't know before hand, for which after reading the application I understood could be seen, partially, as direct competitors of Jones. In that case, i went to the protocols directly to ask if they would be ok in me being their advisor, or if they wanted to be rotated to someone else. Interestingly enough very few protocols decided to rotate me out).
This is a great approach to ensure that incentives make sense. Some have complained about the Delegate Incentive Program methodology, and I think this would help alleviate any future concerns about fairness.
Adjusts the proposal to delegate feedback and lobby delegates to move the proposal to a vote.
Hey Matt, I really think this is the best way to move forward, as creating a good framework, design, follow-up, and incentive analysis can help make the most out of the funds provided. Also, I believe a well-thought-out design can help create a common north star for next incentives rounds.
I like the targeted approach to solving this problem. I always pay close attention to salary expenses and your wishes are quite adequate.
However, I have a couple of wishes for this program:
I like the targeted approach to solving this problem. I always pay close attention to salary expenses and your wishes are quite adequate.
However, I have a couple of wishes for this program:
For my part, I will be an active participant in the discussions on the calls, since this area is important for the development of Arbitrum and the increase of its user base.
Some early thoughts I'm generally supportive of this proposal. It's clear we need a long-term framework for incentives. The working group members seem like a solid balance of contributors from different types of organizations, although it might be nice to have some involvement from @Camelot and @tnorm if possible. I'd recommending pricing the proposal in USD (in ARB).
Thanks for the thoughtful answer and for working to make this happen. It's always good to see you and other members acknowledge the existence of possible conflicts, as this will make them easier to manage.
Overall, the proposal is reasonable and could help the DAO develop a more sustainable incentive framework, but I would like to make 2 points
Thanks for putting together this initiative. We need more of it.
The proposal raises interesting points, but we'd like to explore a few areas further.
Thanks for putting together this initiative. We need more of it.
The proposal raises interesting points, but we'd like to explore a few areas further.
The timing feels a bit early, given we're still awaiting LTIPP research results and detox period insights. Might it be beneficial to revisit this closer to the detox period's end?
On team composition, we're curious about exploring a more inclusive selection process. What if we considered an incentives council with elected members, similar to the security council? This could help address potential 'hairdresser dilemma' concerns - asking a barber if you need a haircut.
i think i can take this one since i am specifically called out on this.
I was an advisor in both ltipp and stip.b, and we already addressed the COI with both public disclosures of affiliations and also internal management of situations in which, even if no COI was there, the safe approach was still taken (ie: i advised protocols, that i didn't know before hand, for which after reading the application I understood could be seen, partially, as direct competitors of Jones. In that case, i went to the protocols directly to ask if they would be ok in me being their advisor, or if they wanted to be rotated to someone else. Interestingly enough very few protocols decided to rotate me out).
All in all, and is up to the DAO to evaluate, but so far all the programs being run have run through public infrastructure for communication, such as the LTIPP discord, in which everything was openly and publicly available for everyone to read. The best way to address COI has been so far to be extremely transparent in both communication and evaluation, which is what we did.
In general thanks for raising this point because while I have build a lot of trust in all the contributors we have in our dao, remembering that checks and balances are needed is something +ve in general.
Love this proposal. I have been working on a similar working group proposal for the CEX to DEX initiative. Is the goal of this working group to create a general incentive program or to create incentives programs for different categories of protocols/projects?
Idea is to start specializing the program. But there is no definite answer now, some specialization are likely low hanging fruits (re: specialization for perps, specialization for dexes), but drawing a line just in different categories can be hard. It will be more about interviewing all stakeholder, understanding the optimal outcome related what the DAO wants as a whole, and start with something that is more specific to what we have now.
This is a great approach to ensure that incentives make sense. Some have complained about the Delegate Incentive Program methodology, and I think this would help alleviate any future concerns about fairness.
Adjusts the proposal to delegate feedback and lobby delegates to move the proposal to a vote.
the proposal, at a very high level, was presented as idea in the very first call of the group, and with the deck in the third call. Obviously, not with all these details. Would like to add that we have been working on this for the last 30 days, gathering also inputs from various stakeholders to understand if the proposal was at least viable to present and pursue.
damn! that's cold! aahahah :sweat_smile:
I'm reviewing your presentation from last week's detox call and I at least appreciate your attempt to collaborate.
so... did you at least got input from @Sinkas on this proposal posted today? I would be curious to get his take on this proposal...
Also how will you prevent a conflict of interest in Jones and GMX if they are part of the working group????
Arbitrum has struggled with selecting which proposals to grant ARB tokens to and how much to allocate, which has significantly impacted the token’s price and hurt the Arbitrum brand, especially when some of these proposals went viral.
The budget for this working group is reasonable and could yield a good return for the DAO if their efforts help prevent the DAO from being exploited by proposals asking for millions of ARB tokens, which ultimately weaken the token’s value.
Hey @paulofonseca
We view this proposal as complementary to the Detox proposal. We agree that it is important for the DAO to take a break from incentives to analyze past programs and work on designing an improved framework. However, we believe that without a funded working group, no one will take the time to complete the necessary research to create an improved program. The detox proposal was born to discuss incentives and come to a solution resulting from a consensus of the DAO. We fear that without a funded working group, the DAO will finish the detox period with some potentially good high-level ideas but no proper implementation. This will likely translate into no adequate incentive plan and a rush to create a mediocre proposal. This working group will ensure the DAO uses the three-month detox wisely to gather the necessary analysis to make a full incentives framework that the DAO can vote on after the Detox ends.
We like the idea of this proposal and think it's in the right direction. Our main concern is over the timing of the proposal and we question whether or not something like this should be funded closer to the end of the detox period.
We are still waiting on the LTIPP's research bounties which will provide valuable information alongside months of no incentives due to the detox period. Such information will allow the DAO first to assess whether or not these incentive programs are working, whether or not we want to continue with the vision of a 'long-term incentive program', and more importantly, whether or not we need something completely different.
i think i can take this one since i am specifically called out on this.
I was an advisor in both ltipp and stip.b, and we already addressed the COI with both public disclosures of affiliations and also internal management of situations in which, even if no COI was there, the safe approach was still taken (ie: i advised protocols, that i didn't know before hand, for which after reading the application I understood could be seen, partially, as direct competitors of Jones. In that case, i went to the protocols directly to ask if they would be ok in me being their advisor, or if they wanted to be rotated to someone else. Interestingly enough very few protocols decided to rotate me out).
All in all, and is up to the DAO to evaluate, but so far all the programs being run have run through public infrastructure for communication, such as the LTIPP discord, in which everything was openly and publicly available for everyone to read. The best way to address COI has been so far to be extremely transparent in both communication and evaluation, which is what we did.
In general thanks for raising this point because while I have build a lot of trust in all the contributors we have in our dao, remembering that checks and balances are needed is something +ve in general.
Love this proposal. I have been working on a similar working group proposal for the CEX to DEX initiative. Is the goal of this working group to create a general incentive program or to create incentives programs for different categories of protocols/projects?
Idea is to start specializing the program. But there is no definite answer now, some specialization are likely low hanging fruits (re: specialization for perps, specialization for dexes), but drawing a line just in different categories can be hard. It will be more about interviewing all stakeholder, understanding the optimal outcome related what the DAO wants as a whole, and start with something that is more specific to what we have now.
This is a great approach to ensure that incentives make sense. Some have complained about the Delegate Incentive Program methodology, and I think this would help alleviate any future concerns about fairness.
Adjusts the proposal to delegate feedback and lobby delegates to move the proposal to a vote.
the proposal, at a very high level, was presented as idea in the very first call of the group, and with the deck in the third call. Obviously, not with all these details. Would like to add that we have been working on this for the last 30 days, gathering also inputs from various stakeholders to understand if the proposal was at least viable to present and pursue.
damn! that's cold! aahahah :sweat_smile:
I'm reviewing your presentation from last week's detox call and I at least appreciate your attempt to collaborate.
so... did you at least got input from @Sinkas on this proposal posted today? I would be curious to get his take on this proposal...
Also how will you prevent a conflict of interest in Jones and GMX if they are part of the working group????
Arbitrum has struggled with selecting which proposals to grant ARB tokens to and how much to allocate, which has significantly impacted the token’s price and hurt the Arbitrum brand, especially when some of these proposals went viral.
The budget for this working group is reasonable and could yield a good return for the DAO if their efforts help prevent the DAO from being exploited by proposals asking for millions of ARB tokens, which ultimately weaken the token’s value.
Hey @paulofonseca
We view this proposal as complementary to the Detox proposal. We agree that it is important for the DAO to take a break from incentives to analyze past programs and work on designing an improved framework. However, we believe that without a funded working group, no one will take the time to complete the necessary research to create an improved program. The detox proposal was born to discuss incentives and come to a solution resulting from a consensus of the DAO. We fear that without a funded working group, the DAO will finish the detox period with some potentially good high-level ideas but no proper implementation. This will likely translate into no adequate incentive plan and a rush to create a mediocre proposal. This working group will ensure the DAO uses the three-month detox wisely to gather the necessary analysis to make a full incentives framework that the DAO can vote on after the Detox ends.
We like the idea of this proposal and think it's in the right direction. Our main concern is over the timing of the proposal and we question whether or not something like this should be funded closer to the end of the detox period.
We are still waiting on the LTIPP's research bounties which will provide valuable information alongside months of no incentives due to the detox period. Such information will allow the DAO first to assess whether or not these incentive programs are working, whether or not we want to continue with the vision of a 'long-term incentive program', and more importantly, whether or not we need something completely different.
