Approximately three weeks ago, just before the conclusion of the Accelerating Arbitrum proposal, I shared a perspective on these forums about being highly confused about the state of the DAO and the decision-making process for protocols to engage with us. This concern was particularly pronounced as many influential and respected delegates advocated for a clear framework before any further action was taken on liquidity incentives or similar programs.
Since then, we've seen effort through a community call and the diligent efforts of the liquidity incentives working group. I've wholeheartedly participated in these discussions and have even reached out to various delegates open to dialogue. Some significant delegates have refrained from engaging in the framework design process, which means that the drafting and ratification will take much longer than most expect. This isn't a critique of the committee's efforts (please see Disruption Joe’s recent post which includes an update on work done in the last workshop) or the delegates; it's merely an observation that there is a high chance we spend weeks or months discussing and preparing only to discover that the proposed framework doesn’t resonate with their vision. Having already heard various delegates articulate diametrically different views on what a framework should look like confirms this is not a simple process and will take time.
While I hold a strong belief that a formal framework will eventually prove beneficial for the DAO, my apprehension today stems from the practicality of implementing such a framework within a timeline that aligns with the pressing demands dictated by the rapidly evolving landscape. This landscape encompasses the dynamic activities of other Chains and their respective DAOs. These entities are making swift strides—established ones bolstering their native protocols while emerging chains attract projects away from Arbitrum with the lure of incentives, grants, and new users. While it might be tempting to frown upon protocols seeking opportunities elsewhere or to envision a scenario where our exceptional builders can thrive on merit alone without incentives available on other chains, the reality is that we should instead look at how the ambiguity on builder support within the ecosystem might influence their decision-making process.
I propose a pragmatic approach: the DAO is the framework, at least until a formal one is established. The DAO is endowed with the authority to manage its affairs. It acts as the evaluating committee, the approving body, and the custodian of funds to be distributed. Our existing multi-stage process, involving Proposal, Snapshot, and Tally voting, over a recommended 4-week process, inherently supports this notion. It's incumbent upon delegates of all scales to proactively participate in discussions, provide timely feedback on proposals, and drive this process forward. Importantly, those crafting the framework will benefit immensely from the insights garnered through these discussions and votes, meaning we will get to the framework quicker and more reflective of the DAOs intent.
The present course might deviate from what people anticipated when raising their hands to become delegates. Nevertheless, this is the need of the moment. I hope we can rally around our shared responsibilities without a ratifying vote, however, if needed, a proposal could be framed as follows:
Collectively, the DAO expresses its agreement and issues guidelines to delegates, urging them to consider, evaluate, and ultimately ratify or decline individual proposals for liquidity incentives and grants based on their intrinsic merits.
Moreover, the DAO seeks the Arbitrum Foundation’s assistance in providing the community with timely feedback regarding any proposal's adherence to the Arbitrum Constitution, administrative guidelines, and overlaps with the foundation’s activities. In cases where discrepancies arise, the Foundation could propose potential solutions.
These guidelines shall persist until such time that the DAO chooses to revise them—potentially, although not necessarily, in alignment with a formalized Framework.
This approach empowers us to drive the progress we urgently need while laying the groundwork for a more comprehensive Framework that captures the vision and aspirations of all DAO stakeholders.
We are Arbitrum, and we need to act now.
Approximately three weeks ago, just before the conclusion of the Accelerating Arbitrum proposal, I shared a perspective on these forums about being highly confused about the state of the DAO and the decision-making process for protocols to engage with us. This concern was particularly pronounced as many influential and respected delegates advocated for a clear framework before any further action was taken on liquidity incentives or similar programs.
Since then, we've seen effort through a community call and the diligent efforts of the liquidity incentives working group. I've wholeheartedly participated in these discussions and have even reached out to various delegates open to dialogue. Some significant delegates have refrained from engaging in the framework design process, which means that the drafting and ratification will take much longer than most expect. This isn't a critique of the committee's efforts (please see Disruption Joe’s recent post which includes an update on work done in the last workshop) or the delegates; it's merely an observation that there is a high chance we spend weeks or months discussing and preparing only to discover that the proposed framework doesn’t resonate with their vision. Having already heard various delegates articulate diametrically different views on what a framework should look like confirms this is not a simple process and will take time.
While I hold a strong belief that a formal framework will eventually prove beneficial for the DAO, my apprehension today stems from the practicality of implementing such a framework within a timeline that aligns with the pressing demands dictated by the rapidly evolving landscape. This landscape encompasses the dynamic activities of other Chains and their respective DAOs. These entities are making swift strides—established ones bolstering their native protocols while emerging chains attract projects away from Arbitrum with the lure of incentives, grants, and new users. While it might be tempting to frown upon protocols seeking opportunities elsewhere or to envision a scenario where our exceptional builders can thrive on merit alone without incentives available on other chains, the reality is that we should instead look at how the ambiguity on builder support within the ecosystem might influence their decision-making process.
I propose a pragmatic approach: the DAO is the framework, at least until a formal one is established. The DAO is endowed with the authority to manage its affairs. It acts as the evaluating committee, the approving body, and the custodian of funds to be distributed. Our existing multi-stage process, involving Proposal, Snapshot, and Tally voting, over a recommended 4-week process, inherently supports this notion. It's incumbent upon delegates of all scales to proactively participate in discussions, provide timely feedback on proposals, and drive this process forward. Importantly, those crafting the framework will benefit immensely from the insights garnered through these discussions and votes, meaning we will get to the framework quicker and more reflective of the DAOs intent.
The present course might deviate from what people anticipated when raising their hands to become delegates. Nevertheless, this is the need of the moment. I hope we can rally around our shared responsibilities without a ratifying vote, however, if needed, a proposal could be framed as follows:
Collectively, the DAO expresses its agreement and issues guidelines to delegates, urging them to consider, evaluate, and ultimately ratify or decline individual proposals for liquidity incentives and grants based on their intrinsic merits.
Moreover, the DAO seeks the Arbitrum Foundation’s assistance in providing the community with timely feedback regarding any proposal's adherence to the Arbitrum Constitution, administrative guidelines, and overlaps with the foundation’s activities. In cases where discrepancies arise, the Foundation could propose potential solutions.
These guidelines shall persist until such time that the DAO chooses to revise them—potentially, although not necessarily, in alignment with a formalized Framework.
This approach empowers us to drive the progress we urgently need while laying the groundwork for a more comprehensive Framework that captures the vision and aspirations of all DAO stakeholders.
We are Arbitrum, and we need to act now.
I will come back to this post.
Very much reflects some of my own comments expressed in my first post here.
I will come back to this post.
Very much reflects some of my own comments expressed in my first post here.
Love the title "Arbitrum Now" - I am here to focus on /r/ethtrader porting infra, LP (DONUT) and our community reward system to Arbitrum. We want to get this done in months so we can focus on building out Arbitrum quests and educate people. While I have interest in 1-3 years - that is not my focus here today, or my communities focus now.
I think a real look at what needs to be done 'by when' is a real positive PRAGMATIC approach that could lead to some real tangible gains.
I will come back and look at other responses here (I have to pick up kids at school).
Great to see a lot of people working hard. It is my hope people like yourself @coinflip get some traction with more pragmatic ideas. Even if you ran a feedback poll this week asking for input. Next month there may be a completely different feedback poll result. So some real thinking of how to pragmatically guide is really important.
My first post - has similar echos to yours coinflip.
It’s a fair argument that with the speed and scale of this industry you can’t risk losing traction. Technology moves in waves can’t risk being left behind.
This is also true and valid
Governance blackholes that abstain from voting, great project sir
I look forward to the DAO signalling that decisive action is required now, and that it is ready and willing to support and incentivise its native ecosystem.
Influencers with large holdings and followings like @ChainLinkGod should post in this forum more and speak for themselves. Sadly the twitter clout doesnt follow them from here, I hope that's not what is stopping large influencers.
More community input is needed. Proposals as of right now come here to die, just like this one. Improvements in outreach to the community can definitely be made.
I will come back to this post.
Very much reflects some of my own comments expressed in my first post here.
I will come back to this post.
Very much reflects some of my own comments expressed in my first post here.
Love the title "Arbitrum Now" - I am here to focus on /r/ethtrader porting infra, LP (DONUT) and our community reward system to Arbitrum. We want to get this done in months so we can focus on building out Arbitrum quests and educate people. While I have interest in 1-3 years - that is not my focus here today, or my communities focus now.
I think a real look at what needs to be done 'by when' is a real positive PRAGMATIC approach that could lead to some real tangible gains.
I will come back and look at other responses here (I have to pick up kids at school).
Great to see a lot of people working hard. It is my hope people like yourself @coinflip get some traction with more pragmatic ideas. Even if you ran a feedback poll this week asking for input. Next month there may be a completely different feedback poll result. So some real thinking of how to pragmatically guide is really important.
My first post - has similar echos to yours coinflip.
It’s a fair argument that with the speed and scale of this industry you can’t risk losing traction. Technology moves in waves can’t risk being left behind.
This is also true and valid
Governance blackholes that abstain from voting, great project sir
I look forward to the DAO signalling that decisive action is required now, and that it is ready and willing to support and incentivise its native ecosystem.
Influencers with large holdings and followings like @ChainLinkGod should post in this forum more and speak for themselves. Sadly the twitter clout doesnt follow them from here, I hope that's not what is stopping large influencers.
More community input is needed. Proposals as of right now come here to die, just like this one. Improvements in outreach to the community can definitely be made.
Hahaha, I couldn'y help but laugh at your comparison of these guys with Web3 version of bureaucrats. Truth is that there is money to be made in Web3 and these people will always be there to exercise their power.
Generally speaking, every DAO needs a pragmatic yet flexible approach. I agree with Coinflip.
Hahaha, I couldn'y help but laugh at your comparison of these guys with Web3 version of bureaucrats. Truth is that there is money to be made in Web3 and these people will always be there to exercise their power.
Generally speaking, every DAO needs a pragmatic yet flexible approach. I agree with Coinflip.
Let me say this out loud because the main point of this article is keep getting diluted.
I just cannot erase a notion of ARB's dao space is packed with brokers trying to get a cut under the logic of "we will manage your grants"
Let me say this out loud because the main point of this article is keep getting diluted.
I just cannot erase a notion of ARB's dao space is packed with brokers trying to get a cut under the logic of "we will manage your grants"
I can hardly agree on their wordy, abstract objectives and i fear how much more tokens intermediaries will ask for in the future. If there is a conflict of interest between them and delegates, well i wish best of luck in managing the funds.
Above all, ARB needs strong, concentrated, incentives to established builders in the space, not small scale pocket moneys in search of innovative projects visions, goals, etc.
ARB has drawn good enough projects and community has power to define its visions together. Agree?
Excuse my language but no market analysis is needed to see whether users are leaving ARB because if you are a daily user you should have FELT IT by now.
Respectfully Joe, I think your comment isn't fair. It is true that native Arbitrum projects have remained loyal to Arbitrum - so far. But it is also true that there are fewer than 10 native Arbitrum projects that people usually align with Arbitrum One. If either one of these projects decides to move to another chain, that would paint a very ugly picture. I'm not telling you that some projects are looking to move; I don't have any inside knowledge. But I can see that a few of them are struggling. As you know, none of the core team members will publicly talk about the proposals they are getting from other L2s, and I'm sure they are getting them. Some of the competing L2s have fat treasuries, and they are ready to throw some money around. I could also ask the question: what new, innovative project has been launched on Arbitrum lately? But this is not the point I was trying to make. I still stand by my words: money and users are moving around fast, and at the moment the dominant sentiment is that interesting things onchain are happening on other chains (e.g., Base). You can say that you don't care much for degens and apes, but those are crypto users, at least for now. Take a look at GLP LPs. Some funds and whales held LP positions there for more than a year. They burned GLP and moved elsewhere. We need that liquidity; it is the best way to attract users and builders. During the last six months, more than 10 L2s and alt L1s launched. Others are coming before the year's end. Most of them are or will be ghost towns. But they are also attracting builders with grants and users with a possible airdrop. I strongly believe that the DAO should help established teams. They need to fight for existing users and continue to build. I believe we need incentives for native projects with new products and also to attract things that are missing. I'll give a few examples off the top of my head: deeper liquidity for LSDs (especially stETH as a market leader); tokenized RWAs (they are one of the leading narratives now and they could be useful collateral); etc. I probably moved far away from the subject; sorry for that. But I really think some changes are needed, and the current "stale" sentiment has to go away.
A huge part of DAO inefficiencies has been from “building the wrong thing”. This is because there generally isn’t a good discovery phase leading into many projects. This is a problem in web 2 startups as well. How many millions have been wasted building solutions to the wrong problem or ones that people won’t use?
With all due respect Joe, it this logic that is causing the DAO to remain deadlocked - a gaping void between the reality of building and the thoughts of users and delegates that have never had "boots on the ground", so to speak. We can't sit back and go through a feedback session for a framework to shape our every thought. We need action. We need progress.
As in all types of business, deals and agreements are mostly private and certainly aren't going to be shared in a survey on the Arbitrum forum. Unfortunately, it would be naive to think that teams are going to discuss things that are also highly dynamic and in constant flux. Even if a team did move somewhere for incentives, do you think they would tell you that? Of course not.
With all due respect Joe, it this logic that is causing the DAO to remain deadlocked - a gaping void between the reality of building and the thoughts of users and delegates that have never had "boots on the ground", so to speak. We can't sit back and go through a feedback session for a framework to shape our every thought. We need action. We need progress.
As in all types of business, deals and agreements are mostly private and certainly aren't going to be shared in a survey on the Arbitrum forum. Unfortunately, it would be naive to think that teams are going to discuss things that are also highly dynamic and in constant flux. Even if a team did move somewhere for incentives, do you think they would tell you that? Of course not.
Teams go where incentives are. Incentives bring users and TVL. Builders go where the highest upside for growth is. Markets are highly fluid and protocols need to constantly be making new decisions. Signals and sentiment have disproportionate effects on long-term decisions.
Do not be fooled by the current metrics of today - look at the attention that Base currently has, a chain generating more sequencer fees than Arbitrum, despite having a fraction of its TVL... it would take 1-2 real protocols launching on Base to set a narrative that Arbitrum would seriously need to compete with.
Base is just 1 potential competitor out of 10.
On the topic of conflicts of interest, I have already made my personal view clear on Olimpio's "airdrop hunting" approach.
It is highly toxic to any chain, and the fact that airdrop farmers can also be one of the largest delegates on multiple DAOs is incredibly questionable.
I would also like to raise an article I came across regarding @Griff.
On the topic of conflicts of interest, I have already made my personal view clear on Olimpio's "airdrop hunting" approach.
It is highly toxic to any chain, and the fact that airdrop farmers can also be one of the largest delegates on multiple DAOs is incredibly questionable.
I would also like to raise an article I came across regarding @Griff.
I am requesting full transparency from the largest delegates. The DAO is frozen whilst any proposal can be decided by less than 10 of the top delegates. This needs to change, otherwise nothing else will.
https://www.dlnews.com/articles/defi/green-offers-mea-culpa-to-optimism-dao-over-grants-disclosure/
I would like to also raise the fact that @ChainLinkGod - one of the largest delegates with 10m ARB, hasn't made a single forum post since April, and has not voted on some of the most recent proposals.
What is the reasoning for this? It is unacceptable.
This is highly concerning.
Let me say this out loud because the main point of this article is keep getting diluted.
I just cannot erase a notion of ARB's dao space is packed with brokers trying to get a cut under the logic of "we will manage your grants"
Let me say this out loud because the main point of this article is keep getting diluted.
I just cannot erase a notion of ARB's dao space is packed with brokers trying to get a cut under the logic of "we will manage your grants"
I can hardly agree on their wordy, abstract objectives and i fear how much more tokens intermediaries will ask for in the future. If there is a conflict of interest between them and delegates, well i wish best of luck in managing the funds.
Above all, ARB needs strong, concentrated, incentives to established builders in the space, not small scale pocket moneys in search of innovative projects visions, goals, etc.
ARB has drawn good enough projects and community has power to define its visions together. Agree?
Excuse my language but no market analysis is needed to see whether users are leaving ARB because if you are a daily user you should have FELT IT by now.
Respectfully Joe, I think your comment isn't fair. It is true that native Arbitrum projects have remained loyal to Arbitrum - so far. But it is also true that there are fewer than 10 native Arbitrum projects that people usually align with Arbitrum One. If either one of these projects decides to move to another chain, that would paint a very ugly picture. I'm not telling you that some projects are looking to move; I don't have any inside knowledge. But I can see that a few of them are struggling. As you know, none of the core team members will publicly talk about the proposals they are getting from other L2s, and I'm sure they are getting them. Some of the competing L2s have fat treasuries, and they are ready to throw some money around. I could also ask the question: what new, innovative project has been launched on Arbitrum lately? But this is not the point I was trying to make. I still stand by my words: money and users are moving around fast, and at the moment the dominant sentiment is that interesting things onchain are happening on other chains (e.g., Base). You can say that you don't care much for degens and apes, but those are crypto users, at least for now. Take a look at GLP LPs. Some funds and whales held LP positions there for more than a year. They burned GLP and moved elsewhere. We need that liquidity; it is the best way to attract users and builders. During the last six months, more than 10 L2s and alt L1s launched. Others are coming before the year's end. Most of them are or will be ghost towns. But they are also attracting builders with grants and users with a possible airdrop. I strongly believe that the DAO should help established teams. They need to fight for existing users and continue to build. I believe we need incentives for native projects with new products and also to attract things that are missing. I'll give a few examples off the top of my head: deeper liquidity for LSDs (especially stETH as a market leader); tokenized RWAs (they are one of the leading narratives now and they could be useful collateral); etc. I probably moved far away from the subject; sorry for that. But I really think some changes are needed, and the current "stale" sentiment has to go away.
A huge part of DAO inefficiencies has been from “building the wrong thing”. This is because there generally isn’t a good discovery phase leading into many projects. This is a problem in web 2 startups as well. How many millions have been wasted building solutions to the wrong problem or ones that people won’t use?
With all due respect Joe, it this logic that is causing the DAO to remain deadlocked - a gaping void between the reality of building and the thoughts of users and delegates that have never had "boots on the ground", so to speak. We can't sit back and go through a feedback session for a framework to shape our every thought. We need action. We need progress.
As in all types of business, deals and agreements are mostly private and certainly aren't going to be shared in a survey on the Arbitrum forum. Unfortunately, it would be naive to think that teams are going to discuss things that are also highly dynamic and in constant flux. Even if a team did move somewhere for incentives, do you think they would tell you that? Of course not.
With all due respect Joe, it this logic that is causing the DAO to remain deadlocked - a gaping void between the reality of building and the thoughts of users and delegates that have never had "boots on the ground", so to speak. We can't sit back and go through a feedback session for a framework to shape our every thought. We need action. We need progress.
As in all types of business, deals and agreements are mostly private and certainly aren't going to be shared in a survey on the Arbitrum forum. Unfortunately, it would be naive to think that teams are going to discuss things that are also highly dynamic and in constant flux. Even if a team did move somewhere for incentives, do you think they would tell you that? Of course not.
Teams go where incentives are. Incentives bring users and TVL. Builders go where the highest upside for growth is. Markets are highly fluid and protocols need to constantly be making new decisions. Signals and sentiment have disproportionate effects on long-term decisions.
Do not be fooled by the current metrics of today - look at the attention that Base currently has, a chain generating more sequencer fees than Arbitrum, despite having a fraction of its TVL... it would take 1-2 real protocols launching on Base to set a narrative that Arbitrum would seriously need to compete with.
Base is just 1 potential competitor out of 10.
On the topic of conflicts of interest, I have already made my personal view clear on Olimpio's "airdrop hunting" approach.
It is highly toxic to any chain, and the fact that airdrop farmers can also be one of the largest delegates on multiple DAOs is incredibly questionable.
I would also like to raise an article I came across regarding @Griff.
On the topic of conflicts of interest, I have already made my personal view clear on Olimpio's "airdrop hunting" approach.
It is highly toxic to any chain, and the fact that airdrop farmers can also be one of the largest delegates on multiple DAOs is incredibly questionable.
I would also like to raise an article I came across regarding @Griff.
I am requesting full transparency from the largest delegates. The DAO is frozen whilst any proposal can be decided by less than 10 of the top delegates. This needs to change, otherwise nothing else will.
https://www.dlnews.com/articles/defi/green-offers-mea-culpa-to-optimism-dao-over-grants-disclosure/
I would like to also raise the fact that @ChainLinkGod - one of the largest delegates with 10m ARB, hasn't made a single forum post since April, and has not voted on some of the most recent proposals.
What is the reasoning for this? It is unacceptable.
This is highly concerning.
A huge part of DAO inefficiencies has been from “building the wrong thing”. This is because there generally isn’t a good discovery phase leading into many projects. This is a problem in web 2 startups as well. How many millions have been wasted building solutions to the wrong problem or ones that people won’t use?
This is why I am fundamentally bearish on small-scale grant frameworks. When you distribute tokens through tiny $50k grants, you end up funding part-time devs that have relatively humble ambitions and almost 0 downside. These small types of development grants, as per Questbook's type of framework and others, will produce marginal value in the next 12 months - relative to the impact of incentivising protocol and app use.
People receiving these types of grants have almost no downside, there is no risk or urgency, and they can also go and do the same in any other DAO, with almost 0 commitment to Arbitrum. Anyone building something interesting will not do so through a $50k DAO grant. They will get funding privately and deploy onto the "best" chain. DAO development grants target an entirely different type of builder...
Take a look at these types of small grant programmes on any other chain or large DAO - you end up funding small events, basic tooling apps, analytics, community parties etc. Very rarely do these small grant programmes ever achieve significant growth for an ecosystem. Perhaps you can find a couple anomalies, but the vast majority of things funded through these types of grants will add marginal value - you can see this just through browsing what has been supported in the past.
Ecosystem incentives stimulate growth. Growth encourages development. Development deepens network effects of protocols and incentivises them to stay where liquidity is deepest and users are most active.
Small-scale grant frameworks give the illusion of a fair and transparent and measured approach, at the expense of achieving anything of value on a larger-scale.
I just leave it here
suggests swapping ARB, an unproductive asset, for ETH, a productive one that can be directly used by Synapse to further benefit Arbitrum.
This is why Camelot are such legends. Even though I prefer RAMSES, without Camelot and their dedicated work and discussion, we wouldn't even be having this debate.
All zk , All L2, All L3 , event L1, bridges includes, and so on, even related, , All of them , past & future
roots db(s) networks
it is a full time Job ,
Engagement to the space. in one word.
Commitment.
wonderful take, Karel
Only in crypto will you find a twitter influencer trying to lecture builders on what they should do - remarkable.
Since @olimpio has raised the topic of conflict of interests, I would like to make totally transparent that his own interests are in direct conflict with the DAO, and this may explain his positioning.
olimpio’s main occupation is being an airdrop farmer, as claimed by his own profiles.
Only in crypto will you find a twitter influencer trying to lecture builders on what they should do - remarkable.
Since @olimpio has raised the topic of conflict of interests, I would like to make totally transparent that his own interests are in direct conflict with the DAO, and this may explain his positioning.
olimpio’s main occupation is being an airdrop farmer, as claimed by his own profiles.
olimpio is compensated rather well by ecosystems, apps, and chains to encourage his followers to “make the most of potential airdrop opportunities”. Not only is this a questionable practice in general, it’s a significantly conflict that should be brought to attention for one of the major Arbitrum delegates.
Being incentivised to drive activity towards other chains is a significant point to ponder… this must play role in his voting decisions?
I encourage everyone to read his latest tweets, about how Base is a prime airdrop opportunity and thanks to his strategy users earned up to 10k ARB airdrops.
Interesting.
https://twitter.com/olimpiocrypto/status/1689635973154697216?s=46
This is why I delegated my ARB to @coinflip. Reading this maybe it would be good if even more would do so to advance the cause of Arbitrum. Consider.
Hey everyone,
I hope this message finds you well. I wanted to take a moment to share my thoughts on this post. Reading through the post, I found myself in complete agreement with Coinflip's perspective and the proposed pragmatic approach.
Hey everyone,
I hope this message finds you well. I wanted to take a moment to share my thoughts on this post. Reading through the post, I found myself in complete agreement with Coinflip's perspective and the proposed pragmatic approach.
First and foremost, I want to commend Coinflip for articulating the complex challenges we've been facing and the need for a practical solution. Managing a DAO is an intricate task, and it's becoming increasingly clear that we're navigating uncharted waters.
Coinflip's proposal to let the DAO itself act as the framework, at least until a formal one is established, resonates with me. The notion of utilizing the existing multi-stage process involving Proposal, Snapshot, and Tally voting as the basis for decision-making is not only efficient but aligns with the inherent spirit of decentralization and community-driven governance.
In light of the rapidly evolving landscape, it's essential that we find a balance between thorough decision-making and timely action. Other chains and their respective DAOs are making swift progress, and the risk of being left behind is real.
Furthermore, the proposal's emphasis on cooperation with the Arbitrum Foundation is a crucial step. Their insights and guidance in aligning proposals with the Arbitrum Constitution, administrative guidelines, and the Foundation's activities can help us maintain cohesion and alignment.
I'm genuinely amazed by the overwhelming support and engagement this post has garnered. It's a testament to the fact that many of us share the same sentiments and recognize the need for a solution that enables us to move forward efficiently and effectively. Personally, I find it reassuring to know that I'm not alone in grappling with the time constraints that come with managing a DAO while juggling other responsibilities.
We are indeed Arbitrum, and the time to act is now.
Looking forward to seeing this proposal gain traction and contribute to the continued success of our community.
I think it is really questionable that an airdrop farmer has one of the largest voting powers in the entire DAO, this is a highly concerning conflict of interest. Combined with the fact that Olimpio has and will have governance power in other DAOs through the same airdrop strategy, this becomes even more questionable.
"Base airdrop strategy: using Arbitrum criteria" - I ask all Arbitrum builders, users, and stakeholders to read this wording and let me know how they genuinely feel. As an ecosystem supporter it makes me feel genuinely uncomfortable.
I think it is really questionable that an airdrop farmer has one of the largest voting powers in the entire DAO, this is a highly concerning conflict of interest. Combined with the fact that Olimpio has and will have governance power in other DAOs through the same airdrop strategy, this becomes even more questionable.
"Base airdrop strategy: using Arbitrum criteria" - I ask all Arbitrum builders, users, and stakeholders to read this wording and let me know how they genuinely feel. As an ecosystem supporter it makes me feel genuinely uncomfortable.
For airdrop hunters, Arbitrum is already "old news", and I imagine most of these hunters have dumped and moved on to the next shiny chain that @olimpio is tweeting about.
I have not found any tweets about providing value to the ecosystem or contributing - the focus is entirely on extracting before moving on to the next ecosystem.
What should be hunting for now - Linea, Base, zkSync, Mantle, Starknet, zkEVM?
A very insightful perspective and particularly relevant with the recent successes of BASE and the potential inherent with MANTLE. Without a doubt, plenty of speculators will move over there to chase some potential airdrops and see what they can score with some new protocols.
With that said, ARB has become a powerhouse and is now home to some of the best protocols in all of defi. Sure defi market action sucks at the moment, but anyone who is anyone is coming over to ARB. ARB is home to protocols like GMX, Dopex, Jones, Camelot, Ramses and is drawing in the big players like Pendle, Balancer and others. I think the point is that the DAO does not need to take urgent action to address the latest moves in the crypto space. In other words, we are safe for the moment in that we have many of the best builders in defi and should acknowledge that!
A very insightful perspective and particularly relevant with the recent successes of BASE and the potential inherent with MANTLE. Without a doubt, plenty of speculators will move over there to chase some potential airdrops and see what they can score with some new protocols.
With that said, ARB has become a powerhouse and is now home to some of the best protocols in all of defi. Sure defi market action sucks at the moment, but anyone who is anyone is coming over to ARB. ARB is home to protocols like GMX, Dopex, Jones, Camelot, Ramses and is drawing in the big players like Pendle, Balancer and others. I think the point is that the DAO does not need to take urgent action to address the latest moves in the crypto space. In other words, we are safe for the moment in that we have many of the best builders in defi and should acknowledge that!
BUT, resting on our laurels will also lead to atrophy and a slow death. So what might a balanced approach be? The approach proposed above to use the DAO governance process to approve grants in the interim makes sense, especially if it is in a provisional framework that allows things to get moving without over committing the foundation’s native assets. So maybe a short list of protocols with innovative ideas who receive generous grants and then show their results and how the grants have benefited Arbitrum more broadly would work.
I do not claim to know how best protocols could demonstrate this value to the ecosystem, but a simple proposal to set some limits and a defined grant amount would generate interest, and hopefully align participants to our long term future.
A huge part of DAO inefficiencies has been from “building the wrong thing”. This is because there generally isn’t a good discovery phase leading into many projects. This is a problem in web 2 startups as well. How many millions have been wasted building solutions to the wrong problem or ones that people won’t use?
This is why I am fundamentally bearish on small-scale grant frameworks. When you distribute tokens through tiny $50k grants, you end up funding part-time devs that have relatively humble ambitions and almost 0 downside. These small types of development grants, as per Questbook's type of framework and others, will produce marginal value in the next 12 months - relative to the impact of incentivising protocol and app use.
People receiving these types of grants have almost no downside, there is no risk or urgency, and they can also go and do the same in any other DAO, with almost 0 commitment to Arbitrum. Anyone building something interesting will not do so through a $50k DAO grant. They will get funding privately and deploy onto the "best" chain. DAO development grants target an entirely different type of builder...
Take a look at these types of small grant programmes on any other chain or large DAO - you end up funding small events, basic tooling apps, analytics, community parties etc. Very rarely do these small grant programmes ever achieve significant growth for an ecosystem. Perhaps you can find a couple anomalies, but the vast majority of things funded through these types of grants will add marginal value - you can see this just through browsing what has been supported in the past.
Ecosystem incentives stimulate growth. Growth encourages development. Development deepens network effects of protocols and incentivises them to stay where liquidity is deepest and users are most active.
Small-scale grant frameworks give the illusion of a fair and transparent and measured approach, at the expense of achieving anything of value on a larger-scale.
I just leave it here
suggests swapping ARB, an unproductive asset, for ETH, a productive one that can be directly used by Synapse to further benefit Arbitrum.
This is why Camelot are such legends. Even though I prefer RAMSES, without Camelot and their dedicated work and discussion, we wouldn't even be having this debate.
All zk , All L2, All L3 , event L1, bridges includes, and so on, even related, , All of them , past & future
roots db(s) networks
it is a full time Job ,
Engagement to the space. in one word.
Commitment.
wonderful take, Karel
Only in crypto will you find a twitter influencer trying to lecture builders on what they should do - remarkable.
Since @olimpio has raised the topic of conflict of interests, I would like to make totally transparent that his own interests are in direct conflict with the DAO, and this may explain his positioning.
olimpio’s main occupation is being an airdrop farmer, as claimed by his own profiles.
Only in crypto will you find a twitter influencer trying to lecture builders on what they should do - remarkable.
Since @olimpio has raised the topic of conflict of interests, I would like to make totally transparent that his own interests are in direct conflict with the DAO, and this may explain his positioning.
olimpio’s main occupation is being an airdrop farmer, as claimed by his own profiles.
olimpio is compensated rather well by ecosystems, apps, and chains to encourage his followers to “make the most of potential airdrop opportunities”. Not only is this a questionable practice in general, it’s a significantly conflict that should be brought to attention for one of the major Arbitrum delegates.
Being incentivised to drive activity towards other chains is a significant point to ponder… this must play role in his voting decisions?
I encourage everyone to read his latest tweets, about how Base is a prime airdrop opportunity and thanks to his strategy users earned up to 10k ARB airdrops.
Interesting.
https://twitter.com/olimpiocrypto/status/1689635973154697216?s=46
This is why I delegated my ARB to @coinflip. Reading this maybe it would be good if even more would do so to advance the cause of Arbitrum. Consider.
Hey everyone,
I hope this message finds you well. I wanted to take a moment to share my thoughts on this post. Reading through the post, I found myself in complete agreement with Coinflip's perspective and the proposed pragmatic approach.
Hey everyone,
I hope this message finds you well. I wanted to take a moment to share my thoughts on this post. Reading through the post, I found myself in complete agreement with Coinflip's perspective and the proposed pragmatic approach.
First and foremost, I want to commend Coinflip for articulating the complex challenges we've been facing and the need for a practical solution. Managing a DAO is an intricate task, and it's becoming increasingly clear that we're navigating uncharted waters.
Coinflip's proposal to let the DAO itself act as the framework, at least until a formal one is established, resonates with me. The notion of utilizing the existing multi-stage process involving Proposal, Snapshot, and Tally voting as the basis for decision-making is not only efficient but aligns with the inherent spirit of decentralization and community-driven governance.
In light of the rapidly evolving landscape, it's essential that we find a balance between thorough decision-making and timely action. Other chains and their respective DAOs are making swift progress, and the risk of being left behind is real.
Furthermore, the proposal's emphasis on cooperation with the Arbitrum Foundation is a crucial step. Their insights and guidance in aligning proposals with the Arbitrum Constitution, administrative guidelines, and the Foundation's activities can help us maintain cohesion and alignment.
I'm genuinely amazed by the overwhelming support and engagement this post has garnered. It's a testament to the fact that many of us share the same sentiments and recognize the need for a solution that enables us to move forward efficiently and effectively. Personally, I find it reassuring to know that I'm not alone in grappling with the time constraints that come with managing a DAO while juggling other responsibilities.
We are indeed Arbitrum, and the time to act is now.
Looking forward to seeing this proposal gain traction and contribute to the continued success of our community.
I think it is really questionable that an airdrop farmer has one of the largest voting powers in the entire DAO, this is a highly concerning conflict of interest. Combined with the fact that Olimpio has and will have governance power in other DAOs through the same airdrop strategy, this becomes even more questionable.
"Base airdrop strategy: using Arbitrum criteria" - I ask all Arbitrum builders, users, and stakeholders to read this wording and let me know how they genuinely feel. As an ecosystem supporter it makes me feel genuinely uncomfortable.
I think it is really questionable that an airdrop farmer has one of the largest voting powers in the entire DAO, this is a highly concerning conflict of interest. Combined with the fact that Olimpio has and will have governance power in other DAOs through the same airdrop strategy, this becomes even more questionable.
"Base airdrop strategy: using Arbitrum criteria" - I ask all Arbitrum builders, users, and stakeholders to read this wording and let me know how they genuinely feel. As an ecosystem supporter it makes me feel genuinely uncomfortable.
For airdrop hunters, Arbitrum is already "old news", and I imagine most of these hunters have dumped and moved on to the next shiny chain that @olimpio is tweeting about.
I have not found any tweets about providing value to the ecosystem or contributing - the focus is entirely on extracting before moving on to the next ecosystem.
What should be hunting for now - Linea, Base, zkSync, Mantle, Starknet, zkEVM?
A very insightful perspective and particularly relevant with the recent successes of BASE and the potential inherent with MANTLE. Without a doubt, plenty of speculators will move over there to chase some potential airdrops and see what they can score with some new protocols.
With that said, ARB has become a powerhouse and is now home to some of the best protocols in all of defi. Sure defi market action sucks at the moment, but anyone who is anyone is coming over to ARB. ARB is home to protocols like GMX, Dopex, Jones, Camelot, Ramses and is drawing in the big players like Pendle, Balancer and others. I think the point is that the DAO does not need to take urgent action to address the latest moves in the crypto space. In other words, we are safe for the moment in that we have many of the best builders in defi and should acknowledge that!
A very insightful perspective and particularly relevant with the recent successes of BASE and the potential inherent with MANTLE. Without a doubt, plenty of speculators will move over there to chase some potential airdrops and see what they can score with some new protocols.
With that said, ARB has become a powerhouse and is now home to some of the best protocols in all of defi. Sure defi market action sucks at the moment, but anyone who is anyone is coming over to ARB. ARB is home to protocols like GMX, Dopex, Jones, Camelot, Ramses and is drawing in the big players like Pendle, Balancer and others. I think the point is that the DAO does not need to take urgent action to address the latest moves in the crypto space. In other words, we are safe for the moment in that we have many of the best builders in defi and should acknowledge that!
BUT, resting on our laurels will also lead to atrophy and a slow death. So what might a balanced approach be? The approach proposed above to use the DAO governance process to approve grants in the interim makes sense, especially if it is in a provisional framework that allows things to get moving without over committing the foundation’s native assets. So maybe a short list of protocols with innovative ideas who receive generous grants and then show their results and how the grants have benefited Arbitrum more broadly would work.
I do not claim to know how best protocols could demonstrate this value to the ecosystem, but a simple proposal to set some limits and a defined grant amount would generate interest, and hopefully align participants to our long term future.
I see the refusal of the Camelot proposal as a major governance failure. This should have been an obvious “yes”. If necessary reduce the grant. But a “No” is the absolute worst outcome.
There was a first alert after the airdrop, when the DAO showed defiance against the very team that created Arbitrum : Community wants Arbitrum Foundation to return 700M ARB to DAO Treasury
I see the refusal of the Camelot proposal as a major governance failure. This should have been an obvious “yes”. If necessary reduce the grant. But a “No” is the absolute worst outcome.
There was a first alert after the airdrop, when the DAO showed defiance against the very team that created Arbitrum : Community wants Arbitrum Foundation to return 700M ARB to DAO Treasury
This was a big red flag for me.
As an ardent Arbitrum believer, I now have doubt on the capacity of the DAO to implement agile, bold and flexible policies to grow Abritrum. Seeing protocols like Plutus, that I love so much, oppose the Camelot grant was a major disappointment. I see a deadly danger which is bureaucracy and petty politics. It’s like the governance is frozen by it’s own success and fears mistakes. It’s like Abritrum’s success made us win the lottery, but we are incapable of spending anything for fear of spoiling it all.
And it is a concern for the whole ARB ecosystem : DAO ARB airdrop mostly sitting idle: Report - Blockworks
We need to embrace the risk and understand that action is required, even if it means mistakes.
Arbitrum should be run like a startup, not like a multinational company that waits for “frameworks” before acting.
Arbitrum airdrop was in march, 5 months ago, and nothing is happening. This seems unacceptable to me.
Make no mistake, adoption is lighntning fast in crypto. Just one killer app can drain massive amount of users. Bureaucracy and inner politics is a potentially deadly danger. It killed many companies in the past.
That being said, I understand that I’m not an expert. Just sharing my impressions as a user.
I fully agree with the proposal. We need a framework, but it won't come fast (and we should talk about the reasons for that, but not here and now). Arbitrum Dao can't afford to wait and do nothing while work on a framework drags on for months. We need to act now because our competition is using its firepower (incentives) to capture the market. Developers and users are scarce resources. Capital is mercenary and chain agnostic. ArbitrumDao wasted five months, and as a consequence teams, users, and capital started moving elsewhere. If we want Arbitrum to remain a defi hub we must move more quickly and try to always be in front of others. The best way to do that is to support Arbitrum native projects, innovative builders, and the development of crucial infrastructure. Grants should be a tool for that. Some money will be wasted, deadlines will be broken... But in general, the effects will be better than if we do nothing. We all sometimes joke that Arb is a valueless governance token. With the current state of ArbitrumDao - it really is. It's time to change things here.
In agreement with @coinflip, the ecosystem and the DAO need to start moving fast, fully in support
ARB has no time to waste - it has to act immediately to regain traction and fuel growth of the failing ecosystem. The DAO should not be impacted by haters and people that try to delay the proposal by dragging it into heated discussion.
Delegates need to come together and make "meaningful decisions" instead of having endless conversation with sit back and relax attitude. Votes should go to delegates that are trying to make impact on ARB ecosystem, not big mouth talkers like some of twitter influencers we all know of.
ARB has no time to waste - it has to act immediately to regain traction and fuel growth of the failing ecosystem. The DAO should not be impacted by haters and people that try to delay the proposal by dragging it into heated discussion.
Delegates need to come together and make "meaningful decisions" instead of having endless conversation with sit back and relax attitude. Votes should go to delegates that are trying to make impact on ARB ecosystem, not big mouth talkers like some of twitter influencers we all know of.
ARB has wasted great amount of time, it is time to act NOW.
100% on board with this take! Actions need to be taken now. A dedicated committee to evaluate the proposals is crucial to the proper allocation of the grants etc. Execution is the key. Looking forward to see how this moves.
Agreed. I think @coinflip proposal makes a lot of sense and offers a way forward.
Fully aligned with the proposal.
Time for action is now, nothing good will come from waiting too much, specially when other competitors are actively incentivizing and some others will dangle soon the carrot of "future airdrop".
Arbitrum could not be in a better position to be the "place to be" after ETH Mainnet, let's go for it.
Let's not become the Metamask/Opensea of L2s.
Onwards!
As an Arbitrum native, I wholeheartedly agree with @coinflip, and the need of the DAO to atleast do something, currently way too many voting power delegated to people that abstain from voting which seem very counterproductive imo.
If we really want to make Arbitrum to keep thriving like it's currently doing, we need the DAO to take actions and learn from them.
As an Arbitrum native, I wholeheartedly agree with @coinflip, and the need of the DAO to atleast do something, currently way too many voting power delegated to people that abstain from voting which seem very counterproductive imo.
If we really want to make Arbitrum to keep thriving like it's currently doing, we need the DAO to take actions and learn from them.
If we delay this too much, builders will go to other chains where there is a more mature framework to get grants and accelerate their growth.
Please let's not lose the power Arbitrum together with the builders have.
I resonate with this post, my two cents is that projects should just post clear and concise proposals that bring utility to the arb token and is EV+ for the whole rollup. Not just asking for money for the sake of it.
This will show that arbitrum native projects are serious about growing the ecosystem and not just pumping their bags. Setting realistic kpis within the proposals would allow for the big delegates to vote-in.
I resonate with this post, my two cents is that projects should just post clear and concise proposals that bring utility to the arb token and is EV+ for the whole rollup. Not just asking for money for the sake of it.
This will show that arbitrum native projects are serious about growing the ecosystem and not just pumping their bags. Setting realistic kpis within the proposals would allow for the big delegates to vote-in.
Anyways, best of luck to all projects and looking forward the next steps on how projects keep building great products within the arb ecosystem.
-0xCasio
Completely agreeing with this, it's time for DAOs to step up and take control of their own decisions. The space is changing really quickly, so we can't spend months just talking about what's good for the system. We need to take action now and the points above capture perfectly what needs to happen for Arbitrum to do well among all the other chains. Instead of just talking about things that don't really matter, the Arbitrum DAO should focus on things that will actually help it succeed.
Fully onboard with the above!
Any comment @olimpio @Griff?
Just as a reference, the two delegates mentioned above have a combined total of 25,000,000 ARB voting power. In my opinion, being active and responding to these types of discussions is a core expectation for all delegates.
Failing to respond to this post would send a clear message about your intentions.
Especially governance blackholes that abstain from voting, you literally have one job.
Absolutely agreed with this take. Through overly bureaucratic processes Arbitrum (at a stage that is far too early to be considering these measures) is at risk of losing existing protocols and protocols yet to be to chains that will encourage them to develop elsewhere.
Completely agree with this take. If not careful, the current inaction of the DAO is creating an environment not conducive to builders, and could ultimately lead to builders leaving Arbitrum which is scenario I hope noone here wants to come to pass.
A framework is important and would be welcome, but there seems to be no movement on the creation of one and furthermore no guarantee that one exists that will please all delegates and smaller holders. This should not be something which forces the DAO into stagnation. It is vital that the DAO continues forward in light of this, so the proposed temporary solution seems perfect while the DAO itself comes up with a framework which the majority can agree with.
Completely agree with this take. If not careful, the current inaction of the DAO is creating an environment not conducive to builders, and could ultimately lead to builders leaving Arbitrum which is scenario I hope noone here wants to come to pass.
A framework is important and would be welcome, but there seems to be no movement on the creation of one and furthermore no guarantee that one exists that will please all delegates and smaller holders. This should not be something which forces the DAO into stagnation. It is vital that the DAO continues forward in light of this, so the proposed temporary solution seems perfect while the DAO itself comes up with a framework which the majority can agree with.
In addition, the incentives of the top delegates does not seem to be aligned at the moment with the continued functioning and pushing of proposals for the DAO, which is something which should be addressed soon.
We are Arbitrum.
$DSQ endorses this proposal. :saluting_face:
100% on board with this take. The industry moves too quickly, and the DAO cannot afford months of inaction. Use the momentum that already exists before it costs more to do what will eventually need to be done.
Fully aligned with this approach.
I look forward to the DAO signalling that decisive action is required now, and that it is ready and willing to support and incentivise its native ecosystem.
Echoing @Soby and @coinflip its worth noting that right now Optimism, Avalanche and a lot of other chains are actively talking to protocols right now encouraging them with incentives to come over.
I have no doubt that we have the right team in the Foundation and members and voters to get this right. I've met some incredible people over the last year and a half here and there is absolutely a path forward.
Echoing @Soby and @coinflip its worth noting that right now Optimism, Avalanche and a lot of other chains are actively talking to protocols right now encouraging them with incentives to come over.
I have no doubt that we have the right team in the Foundation and members and voters to get this right. I've met some incredible people over the last year and a half here and there is absolutely a path forward.
We can all see it, let's walk it starting today.
Completely agree with Coinflip. The fact that a comprehensive Framework is lacking doesn't mean the DAO should stand still. Crypto is an insanely fast moving space and Arbitrum need to react to it.
I see the refusal of the Camelot proposal as a major governance failure. This should have been an obvious “yes”. If necessary reduce the grant. But a “No” is the absolute worst outcome.
There was a first alert after the airdrop, when the DAO showed defiance against the very team that created Arbitrum : Community wants Arbitrum Foundation to return 700M ARB to DAO Treasury
I see the refusal of the Camelot proposal as a major governance failure. This should have been an obvious “yes”. If necessary reduce the grant. But a “No” is the absolute worst outcome.
There was a first alert after the airdrop, when the DAO showed defiance against the very team that created Arbitrum : Community wants Arbitrum Foundation to return 700M ARB to DAO Treasury
This was a big red flag for me.
As an ardent Arbitrum believer, I now have doubt on the capacity of the DAO to implement agile, bold and flexible policies to grow Abritrum. Seeing protocols like Plutus, that I love so much, oppose the Camelot grant was a major disappointment. I see a deadly danger which is bureaucracy and petty politics. It’s like the governance is frozen by it’s own success and fears mistakes. It’s like Abritrum’s success made us win the lottery, but we are incapable of spending anything for fear of spoiling it all.
And it is a concern for the whole ARB ecosystem : DAO ARB airdrop mostly sitting idle: Report - Blockworks
We need to embrace the risk and understand that action is required, even if it means mistakes.
Arbitrum should be run like a startup, not like a multinational company that waits for “frameworks” before acting.
Arbitrum airdrop was in march, 5 months ago, and nothing is happening. This seems unacceptable to me.
Make no mistake, adoption is lighntning fast in crypto. Just one killer app can drain massive amount of users. Bureaucracy and inner politics is a potentially deadly danger. It killed many companies in the past.
That being said, I understand that I’m not an expert. Just sharing my impressions as a user.
I fully agree with the proposal. We need a framework, but it won't come fast (and we should talk about the reasons for that, but not here and now). Arbitrum Dao can't afford to wait and do nothing while work on a framework drags on for months. We need to act now because our competition is using its firepower (incentives) to capture the market. Developers and users are scarce resources. Capital is mercenary and chain agnostic. ArbitrumDao wasted five months, and as a consequence teams, users, and capital started moving elsewhere. If we want Arbitrum to remain a defi hub we must move more quickly and try to always be in front of others. The best way to do that is to support Arbitrum native projects, innovative builders, and the development of crucial infrastructure. Grants should be a tool for that. Some money will be wasted, deadlines will be broken... But in general, the effects will be better than if we do nothing. We all sometimes joke that Arb is a valueless governance token. With the current state of ArbitrumDao - it really is. It's time to change things here.
In agreement with @coinflip, the ecosystem and the DAO need to start moving fast, fully in support
ARB has no time to waste - it has to act immediately to regain traction and fuel growth of the failing ecosystem. The DAO should not be impacted by haters and people that try to delay the proposal by dragging it into heated discussion.
Delegates need to come together and make "meaningful decisions" instead of having endless conversation with sit back and relax attitude. Votes should go to delegates that are trying to make impact on ARB ecosystem, not big mouth talkers like some of twitter influencers we all know of.
ARB has no time to waste - it has to act immediately to regain traction and fuel growth of the failing ecosystem. The DAO should not be impacted by haters and people that try to delay the proposal by dragging it into heated discussion.
Delegates need to come together and make "meaningful decisions" instead of having endless conversation with sit back and relax attitude. Votes should go to delegates that are trying to make impact on ARB ecosystem, not big mouth talkers like some of twitter influencers we all know of.
ARB has wasted great amount of time, it is time to act NOW.
100% on board with this take! Actions need to be taken now. A dedicated committee to evaluate the proposals is crucial to the proper allocation of the grants etc. Execution is the key. Looking forward to see how this moves.
Agreed. I think @coinflip proposal makes a lot of sense and offers a way forward.
Fully aligned with the proposal.
Time for action is now, nothing good will come from waiting too much, specially when other competitors are actively incentivizing and some others will dangle soon the carrot of "future airdrop".
Arbitrum could not be in a better position to be the "place to be" after ETH Mainnet, let's go for it.
Let's not become the Metamask/Opensea of L2s.
Onwards!
As an Arbitrum native, I wholeheartedly agree with @coinflip, and the need of the DAO to atleast do something, currently way too many voting power delegated to people that abstain from voting which seem very counterproductive imo.
If we really want to make Arbitrum to keep thriving like it's currently doing, we need the DAO to take actions and learn from them.
As an Arbitrum native, I wholeheartedly agree with @coinflip, and the need of the DAO to atleast do something, currently way too many voting power delegated to people that abstain from voting which seem very counterproductive imo.
If we really want to make Arbitrum to keep thriving like it's currently doing, we need the DAO to take actions and learn from them.
If we delay this too much, builders will go to other chains where there is a more mature framework to get grants and accelerate their growth.
Please let's not lose the power Arbitrum together with the builders have.
I resonate with this post, my two cents is that projects should just post clear and concise proposals that bring utility to the arb token and is EV+ for the whole rollup. Not just asking for money for the sake of it.
This will show that arbitrum native projects are serious about growing the ecosystem and not just pumping their bags. Setting realistic kpis within the proposals would allow for the big delegates to vote-in.
I resonate with this post, my two cents is that projects should just post clear and concise proposals that bring utility to the arb token and is EV+ for the whole rollup. Not just asking for money for the sake of it.
This will show that arbitrum native projects are serious about growing the ecosystem and not just pumping their bags. Setting realistic kpis within the proposals would allow for the big delegates to vote-in.
Anyways, best of luck to all projects and looking forward the next steps on how projects keep building great products within the arb ecosystem.
-0xCasio
Completely agreeing with this, it's time for DAOs to step up and take control of their own decisions. The space is changing really quickly, so we can't spend months just talking about what's good for the system. We need to take action now and the points above capture perfectly what needs to happen for Arbitrum to do well among all the other chains. Instead of just talking about things that don't really matter, the Arbitrum DAO should focus on things that will actually help it succeed.
Fully onboard with the above!
Any comment @olimpio @Griff?
Just as a reference, the two delegates mentioned above have a combined total of 25,000,000 ARB voting power. In my opinion, being active and responding to these types of discussions is a core expectation for all delegates.
Failing to respond to this post would send a clear message about your intentions.
Especially governance blackholes that abstain from voting, you literally have one job.
Absolutely agreed with this take. Through overly bureaucratic processes Arbitrum (at a stage that is far too early to be considering these measures) is at risk of losing existing protocols and protocols yet to be to chains that will encourage them to develop elsewhere.
Completely agree with this take. If not careful, the current inaction of the DAO is creating an environment not conducive to builders, and could ultimately lead to builders leaving Arbitrum which is scenario I hope noone here wants to come to pass.
A framework is important and would be welcome, but there seems to be no movement on the creation of one and furthermore no guarantee that one exists that will please all delegates and smaller holders. This should not be something which forces the DAO into stagnation. It is vital that the DAO continues forward in light of this, so the proposed temporary solution seems perfect while the DAO itself comes up with a framework which the majority can agree with.
Completely agree with this take. If not careful, the current inaction of the DAO is creating an environment not conducive to builders, and could ultimately lead to builders leaving Arbitrum which is scenario I hope noone here wants to come to pass.
A framework is important and would be welcome, but there seems to be no movement on the creation of one and furthermore no guarantee that one exists that will please all delegates and smaller holders. This should not be something which forces the DAO into stagnation. It is vital that the DAO continues forward in light of this, so the proposed temporary solution seems perfect while the DAO itself comes up with a framework which the majority can agree with.
In addition, the incentives of the top delegates does not seem to be aligned at the moment with the continued functioning and pushing of proposals for the DAO, which is something which should be addressed soon.
We are Arbitrum.
$DSQ endorses this proposal. :saluting_face:
100% on board with this take. The industry moves too quickly, and the DAO cannot afford months of inaction. Use the momentum that already exists before it costs more to do what will eventually need to be done.
Fully aligned with this approach.
I look forward to the DAO signalling that decisive action is required now, and that it is ready and willing to support and incentivise its native ecosystem.
Echoing @Soby and @coinflip its worth noting that right now Optimism, Avalanche and a lot of other chains are actively talking to protocols right now encouraging them with incentives to come over.
I have no doubt that we have the right team in the Foundation and members and voters to get this right. I've met some incredible people over the last year and a half here and there is absolutely a path forward.
Echoing @Soby and @coinflip its worth noting that right now Optimism, Avalanche and a lot of other chains are actively talking to protocols right now encouraging them with incentives to come over.
I have no doubt that we have the right team in the Foundation and members and voters to get this right. I've met some incredible people over the last year and a half here and there is absolutely a path forward.
We can all see it, let's walk it starting today.
Completely agree with Coinflip. The fact that a comprehensive Framework is lacking doesn't mean the DAO should stand still. Crypto is an insanely fast moving space and Arbitrum need to react to it.
I completely agree with your sentiment. The DAO IS THE FRAMEWORK. I posted a similar sentiment yesterday and believe your reminder that the DAO IS THE FRAMEWORK is the call to action the ecosystem needs to overcome this long phase of inertia. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/quit-shooting-the-dao-foundation-in-the-foot/15771?u=soby It was quite frustrating to see many large delegates voting "Against" the Camelot proposal and their reasoning was basically: "I'd like to vote Yes on this, but I will wait for the frameworks that are a few months away to be finished". I can't think of a worse reason to vote against something.
We need a sense of urgency. I also feel like there is a concerning lack of engagement from some of the top delegates. Perhaps incentives to keep delegates more involved will help with the overall pace of the DAO.
This is a very timely, sober, pragmatic call for action with details on how to possibly achieve it. That is what need right now 'Action' and we cannot act like we are in a vacuum of ancient greek style democratic debates where we can take as long as we want to come up with a perfect ideal system of governance.
This is crypto, we have to experiment, learn and iterate and time here is very fast. Months here are like years and could be a matter of success or death to some ideas, protocols and even chains if we take our sweet time to come up with a perfect system. Competition is fierce and they are not waiting around.
This is a very timely, sober, pragmatic call for action with details on how to possibly achieve it. That is what need right now 'Action' and we cannot act like we are in a vacuum of ancient greek style democratic debates where we can take as long as we want to come up with a perfect ideal system of governance.
This is crypto, we have to experiment, learn and iterate and time here is very fast. Months here are like years and could be a matter of success or death to some ideas, protocols and even chains if we take our sweet time to come up with a perfect system. Competition is fierce and they are not waiting around.
With GREAT POWER COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY! Absolutely delegates need to take more formal responsibility and need to have true zeal, motivation and urgency in seeing Arbitrum succeed, they are not here to just exercise power and decide the fate with just voting. If not why did you even ask for and take the delegate power?
I don't want to name names but there are some folks with insane amount of delegate power but not even exclusively active or committed to the ecosystem just got the power because the initial claim and delegate process was not optimal or had enough time for careful deliberation in spreading the governance power. It was a mad rush during airdrop claim. I think this is a separate problem we have delegtate power concentration which needs to be addressed for longer term success of the protocol.
Spot on with this take. Been following the developments on the forums since April and it seems like we're constantly a few weeks away from being a few weeks away. To be blunt, there's a lack of discussion/participation from top delegates, but a lot of pontificating from the same delegates on CT when it comes time to vote.
We're in an environment where liquidity is chain agnostic. Like others have said, a lot of L2 competitors are incentivizing migration. From my perspective, (as someone who's not a builder, not a delegate, just a regular defi user) I'm ready to move my funds to where the incentives are.
Hi all,
Just adding a note here. There are several comments in this thread that I've had to delete. We are enforcing a maximum politeness policy alongside our community guidelines.
All feedback should be polite, kept constructive, and add to the discussion. Thanks!
Fully agree with coinflips sentiment. Don’t think “we must wait for an incentive framework” is a valid reason to vote no for proposals.
I completely agree with your sentiment. The DAO IS THE FRAMEWORK. I posted a similar sentiment yesterday and believe your reminder that the DAO IS THE FRAMEWORK is the call to action the ecosystem needs to overcome this long phase of inertia. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/quit-shooting-the-dao-foundation-in-the-foot/15771?u=soby It was quite frustrating to see many large delegates voting "Against" the Camelot proposal and their reasoning was basically: "I'd like to vote Yes on this, but I will wait for the frameworks that are a few months away to be finished". I can't think of a worse reason to vote against something.
We need a sense of urgency. I also feel like there is a concerning lack of engagement from some of the top delegates. Perhaps incentives to keep delegates more involved will help with the overall pace of the DAO.
This is a very timely, sober, pragmatic call for action with details on how to possibly achieve it. That is what need right now 'Action' and we cannot act like we are in a vacuum of ancient greek style democratic debates where we can take as long as we want to come up with a perfect ideal system of governance.
This is crypto, we have to experiment, learn and iterate and time here is very fast. Months here are like years and could be a matter of success or death to some ideas, protocols and even chains if we take our sweet time to come up with a perfect system. Competition is fierce and they are not waiting around.
This is a very timely, sober, pragmatic call for action with details on how to possibly achieve it. That is what need right now 'Action' and we cannot act like we are in a vacuum of ancient greek style democratic debates where we can take as long as we want to come up with a perfect ideal system of governance.
This is crypto, we have to experiment, learn and iterate and time here is very fast. Months here are like years and could be a matter of success or death to some ideas, protocols and even chains if we take our sweet time to come up with a perfect system. Competition is fierce and they are not waiting around.
With GREAT POWER COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY! Absolutely delegates need to take more formal responsibility and need to have true zeal, motivation and urgency in seeing Arbitrum succeed, they are not here to just exercise power and decide the fate with just voting. If not why did you even ask for and take the delegate power?
I don't want to name names but there are some folks with insane amount of delegate power but not even exclusively active or committed to the ecosystem just got the power because the initial claim and delegate process was not optimal or had enough time for careful deliberation in spreading the governance power. It was a mad rush during airdrop claim. I think this is a separate problem we have delegtate power concentration which needs to be addressed for longer term success of the protocol.
Spot on with this take. Been following the developments on the forums since April and it seems like we're constantly a few weeks away from being a few weeks away. To be blunt, there's a lack of discussion/participation from top delegates, but a lot of pontificating from the same delegates on CT when it comes time to vote.
We're in an environment where liquidity is chain agnostic. Like others have said, a lot of L2 competitors are incentivizing migration. From my perspective, (as someone who's not a builder, not a delegate, just a regular defi user) I'm ready to move my funds to where the incentives are.
Hi all,
Just adding a note here. There are several comments in this thread that I've had to delete. We are enforcing a maximum politeness policy alongside our community guidelines.
All feedback should be polite, kept constructive, and add to the discussion. Thanks!
Fully agree with coinflips sentiment. Don’t think “we must wait for an incentive framework” is a valid reason to vote no for proposals.
100% in agreement. We tend to ignore the "decentralized" in DAO :slight_smile:
Proposals should be put forth on forums and approved/rejected. That's the framework. There's decentralized decision making. That's all we need. For now!
Speed is really of the essence. This is an amazing community. Arb is home. I know I'm not the only one who feels that way and wants to make it a huge success!
🚀
Could we see this as a yes/and instead of either/or?
Arbitrum has a big enough treasury to fund both:
And both are needed for Arbitrum to succeed in its mission.
Could we see this as a yes/and instead of either/or?
Arbitrum has a big enough treasury to fund both:
And both are needed for Arbitrum to succeed in its mission.
Our research (RnDAO has been focused on this area for 2 years) into entrepreneurship programs leads us to conclude that, indeed small grants are often ineffective in funding scalable and impactful ventures.
That being said, small grants do support community building if well designed by providing a fast mechanism for talented individuals and groups to get more engaged. We've experienced this ourselves as RnDAO, where a "pilot" grant by Plurality Labs has motivated us to build more relationships here and contribute instead of only continuing the work we were already doing with Optimsim, Near, Celo, etc. Small grants are not about protocol/venture growth but about growing the community and also experiments and small but useful initiatives (e.g. like the equivalent to having an initiative to improve one's neighborhood that's small but well-tailored. Many of these can aggregate to large impact and be antifragile).
Now, we already learned from Web2 that
So, an ideal fund deployment mix could include:
There's a further recommendation I'd add, and that's the idea of business clusters, as they've been shown to create competitive advantages and network effects for cities and nation-states (valuable comparison as businesses can also move from one city to another).
We have a pilot of how this can work through the Co.lab programme (executed by us RnDAO, thanks to funding from Plurality Labs). We start with low-cost, high-mentorship fellowships to deeply understand a problem (fellows are carefully selected for commitment and ambition for scalable innovation). Followed by a venture building programme that has cross-ownership between the ventures to incentivise collaboration (multiple mechanisms complete the ownership layer too) and generate network effects (and also anchoring in the sponsoring ecosystem as it's way harder for many ventures to coordinate a migration than for a single one to make the decision thanks to some grants somewhere else). All the fellows and ventures are selected within a clear domain (collaboration tech) to ensure collaboration, network effects (compounding insights, access to customers, aligned talent, etc), and also to strategically develop a capability in ArbitrumDAO and Arbitrum based projects for operational excellence (which can help attract project from other verticals too thanks to ease to operate).
Programmes such as the Co.Lab by RnDAO would then be paired with the other types of incentives/funding mechanisms mentioned, so there's both short term and long term gains. Then also ensuring this works as a matrix (aligned with strategic objectives) across key needs:
more context on these on the post I made on KPIs proposal by Serious People.
Based on the above, the question then becomes about the mix (i.e. what % for each type? and what's the total amount/% of the treasury that should be disbursed per cycle).
Hope these ideas makes sense and help the discussion. I'm curious to hear your thoughts :slight_smile:
(For clarity, I believe what I'm suggesting here is entirely compatible with what @coinflip are putting forward at the start of this thread and Plurality Labs are working on defining. I meant the above as a mental model that is useful to think with nouance around this difficult and high stakes topic. And the matrix I suggest could be operationalised at some point in the future, but should not hold the DAO back today).
Totally supporting coinflip here. We need to keep the momentum going for arbitrum otherwise the chain will fall behind despite having a big advantage (especially in tech) compared to other l2 so far. This hedge has been depleted over time and one of the reason here is how paralysed the whole eco seems to be cause of "framework", "right size", "right idea" and so on.
This is paralysis by analysis basically. We can't let this happen.
Totally supporting coinflip here. We need to keep the momentum going for arbitrum otherwise the chain will fall behind despite having a big advantage (especially in tech) compared to other l2 so far. This hedge has been depleted over time and one of the reason here is how paralysed the whole eco seems to be cause of "framework", "right size", "right idea" and so on.
This is paralysis by analysis basically. We can't let this happen.
I am seeing too many on arbi, here, whom their profession is to "do governance stuff" in every bug protocol and chain. I see these users as the web3 versions of bureocrats. We don't need this.
100% in agreement. We tend to ignore the "decentralized" in DAO :slight_smile:
Proposals should be put forth on forums and approved/rejected. That's the framework. There's decentralized decision making. That's all we need. For now!
Speed is really of the essence. This is an amazing community. Arb is home. I know I'm not the only one who feels that way and wants to make it a huge success!
🚀
Could we see this as a yes/and instead of either/or?
Arbitrum has a big enough treasury to fund both:
And both are needed for Arbitrum to succeed in its mission.
Could we see this as a yes/and instead of either/or?
Arbitrum has a big enough treasury to fund both:
And both are needed for Arbitrum to succeed in its mission.
Our research (RnDAO has been focused on this area for 2 years) into entrepreneurship programs leads us to conclude that, indeed small grants are often ineffective in funding scalable and impactful ventures.
That being said, small grants do support community building if well designed by providing a fast mechanism for talented individuals and groups to get more engaged. We've experienced this ourselves as RnDAO, where a "pilot" grant by Plurality Labs has motivated us to build more relationships here and contribute instead of only continuing the work we were already doing with Optimsim, Near, Celo, etc. Small grants are not about protocol/venture growth but about growing the community and also experiments and small but useful initiatives (e.g. like the equivalent to having an initiative to improve one's neighborhood that's small but well-tailored. Many of these can aggregate to large impact and be antifragile).
Now, we already learned from Web2 that
So, an ideal fund deployment mix could include:
There's a further recommendation I'd add, and that's the idea of business clusters, as they've been shown to create competitive advantages and network effects for cities and nation-states (valuable comparison as businesses can also move from one city to another).
We have a pilot of how this can work through the Co.lab programme (executed by us RnDAO, thanks to funding from Plurality Labs). We start with low-cost, high-mentorship fellowships to deeply understand a problem (fellows are carefully selected for commitment and ambition for scalable innovation). Followed by a venture building programme that has cross-ownership between the ventures to incentivise collaboration (multiple mechanisms complete the ownership layer too) and generate network effects (and also anchoring in the sponsoring ecosystem as it's way harder for many ventures to coordinate a migration than for a single one to make the decision thanks to some grants somewhere else). All the fellows and ventures are selected within a clear domain (collaboration tech) to ensure collaboration, network effects (compounding insights, access to customers, aligned talent, etc), and also to strategically develop a capability in ArbitrumDAO and Arbitrum based projects for operational excellence (which can help attract project from other verticals too thanks to ease to operate).
Programmes such as the Co.Lab by RnDAO would then be paired with the other types of incentives/funding mechanisms mentioned, so there's both short term and long term gains. Then also ensuring this works as a matrix (aligned with strategic objectives) across key needs:
more context on these on the post I made on KPIs proposal by Serious People.
Based on the above, the question then becomes about the mix (i.e. what % for each type? and what's the total amount/% of the treasury that should be disbursed per cycle).
Hope these ideas makes sense and help the discussion. I'm curious to hear your thoughts :slight_smile:
(For clarity, I believe what I'm suggesting here is entirely compatible with what @coinflip are putting forward at the start of this thread and Plurality Labs are working on defining. I meant the above as a mental model that is useful to think with nouance around this difficult and high stakes topic. And the matrix I suggest could be operationalised at some point in the future, but should not hold the DAO back today).
Totally supporting coinflip here. We need to keep the momentum going for arbitrum otherwise the chain will fall behind despite having a big advantage (especially in tech) compared to other l2 so far. This hedge has been depleted over time and one of the reason here is how paralysed the whole eco seems to be cause of "framework", "right size", "right idea" and so on.
This is paralysis by analysis basically. We can't let this happen.
Totally supporting coinflip here. We need to keep the momentum going for arbitrum otherwise the chain will fall behind despite having a big advantage (especially in tech) compared to other l2 so far. This hedge has been depleted over time and one of the reason here is how paralysed the whole eco seems to be cause of "framework", "right size", "right idea" and so on.
This is paralysis by analysis basically. We can't let this happen.
I am seeing too many on arbi, here, whom their profession is to "do governance stuff" in every bug protocol and chain. I see these users as the web3 versions of bureocrats. We don't need this.
With all due respect Joe, it this logic that is causing the DAO to remain deadlocked - a gaping void between the reality of building and the thoughts of users and delegates that have never had “boots on the ground”, so to speak.
With all due respect Joe, it this logic that is causing the DAO to remain deadlocked - a gaping void between the reality of building and the thoughts of users and delegates that have never had “boots on the ground”, so to speak.
I've been boots on the ground for years. Your assumption here is not accurate.
We can’t sit back and go through a feedback session for a framework to shape our every thought. We need action. We need progress.
I am not asking for us to wait for the feedback. I'm saying we can do things in parallel. We can both work on the short-term "triage" solution and create a higher quality understanding of the problem.
A huge part of DAO inefficiencies has been from "building the wrong thing". This is because there generally isn't a good discovery phase leading into many projects. This is a problem in web 2 startups as well. How many millions have been wasted building solutions to the wrong problem or ones that people won't use?
As in all types of business, deals and agreements are mostly private and certainly aren’t going to be shared in a survey on the Arbitrum forum.
As with all business, relationships matter. Many of us have spent time building relationships in the space. I'm sure between 660,000 token holders we can find one or two projects who would be willing to open up. Not necessarily on a forum.
Even if a team did move somewhere for incentives, do you think they would tell you that? Of course not.
They have before.
Markets are highly fluid and protocols need to constantly be making new decisions. Signals and sentiment have disproportionate effects on long-term decisions.
Exactly this. I agree completely. This is a complex, not a complicated problem. Therefore, we should minimize long-term decisions and maximize our ability to quickly sense and respond to a changing environment. A framework isn't a long-term decision. It is a set of guidlines, roles, and responsibilities that allow the DAO to quickly respond in effective ways.
Base is just 1 potential competitor out of 10.
Hard agree here.
:bulb: Taking action in the short-term & building frameworks that allow for quick and effective decision making in the future are not waterfall processes. These can happen at the same time! Parallel Processing ftw!
Example 1 - Liquidity Incentive Working Group
Respectfully Joe, I think your comment isn’t fair.
I think there is a misunderstanding because I am saying we should do all the things you are asking to do. We are on the same side.
I think there is a misunderstanding because I am saying we should do all the things you are asking to do. We are on the same side.
I ALSO would like to start the process of getting qualitive data to understand if users are leaving and for what reasons. I am not saying we need to wait to get the responses to do something.
I've advocated that the DAO does take risks, shouldn't wait for the framework, and should worry about momentum in multiple threads. This stance has been consistent from the beginning.
Perhaps when someone sees that I am leading a team which is designing a grants framework, they mistakenly think I am the one advocating to wait for the framework. This is more a decision by large delegates who don't want to yield their outsized voting weight without knowing how the DAO feels... which would be provided in our framework discovery. I think is is safe to fund some things quickly that might not be the best outcomes.
I've even spearheaded getting the liquidity incentives working group going even if it is out of the Plurality Labs scope. i volunteered to organize and facilitate the first workshop, found a leader in the group who could push it forward, and offered retro comp through a future retrofunding program to get the conversation moving.
This Liquidity incentive working group has met twice to figure out how to pass something before the framework is ready. You can read about it here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-incentives-program-working-group/15843/9?u=disruptionjoe
I don’t want to name names but there are some folks with insane amount of delegate power but not even exclusively active or committed to the ecosystem just got the power because the initial claim and delegate process was not optimal or had enough time for careful deliberation in spreading the governance power.
I don’t want to name names but there are some folks with insane amount of delegate power but not even exclusively active or committed to the ecosystem just got the power because the initial claim and delegate process was not optimal or had enough time for careful deliberation in spreading the governance power.
I am not a fan of delegation as a governance method given all the weak points this thread illustrates. But, that said, it is about the best solution we have at the moment and we do need to continue to refine the selection of delegates, highlighting their activity, and the holding accountable to standards of conduct (perceived conflicts of interest).
While I was working governance at Gitcoin I found that one of the best tools to quantifiably illustrate delegate performance was Karma. What I like about the tool is the creation of a delegate "score" which is transparent calculation of voting and forum activity as well as a ranking where you can see those scores across whale delegates. We used this tool to celebrate dedicated delegates (who thus got greater delegation) and to nudge inactive whale delegates to some success.
Linking to the @coinflip suggestion -
Collectively, the DAO expresses its agreement and issues guidelines to delegates, urging them to consider, evaluate, and ultimately ratify or decline individual proposals for liquidity incentives and grants based on their intrinsic merits.
I am not suggesting adding quantifiable performance metrics to delegates, but a regular appraisal or reporting of performance standings might be helpful. Yes, I know metrics can all be gamed and if you track behavior you can drive unintended behaviors - but until we find the ideal replacement for delegation, this is a mechanism we can consider.
In order to keep a relatively fluid exchange I'll try to be as concise as possible and to focus on the aspects on which I have divergent views.
Your conclusion seems to resonate with coinflip's take (?) but tbh I'm a bit confused since most of the points you raised actually seem to indicate your opposition to it.
In order to keep a relatively fluid exchange I'll try to be as concise as possible and to focus on the aspects on which I have divergent views.
Your conclusion seems to resonate with coinflip's take (?) but tbh I'm a bit confused since most of the points you raised actually seem to indicate your opposition to it.
Don't have much to disagree with from a high level and theoretical perspective. In practice, it's a bit odd to highlight decentralization when the DAO is currently controlled by <10 people concentrating 135M of ARB voting power. For reference, proposals put on Tally gathered ~170M votes on average. Focusing on a long-term vision and refining DAO decision processes and frameworks is key, I'll just temper it by saying decentralization should be here to serve the chain, not the opposite.
Almost all of the messages that preceded your answer in this thread (op included) are from members of major protocols of the ecosystem: GMX, Radiant, Dopex, Umami, Jones, Camelot etc... They are the ones currently holding the majority of this TVL, and also in the best position to be aware of what's happening behind the scenes/under the tip of the iceberg. I can admit a difference in opinion, but it's hard to not take all of those aligned voices in consideration.
Globally echoing your questions. Could also extend them to delegates involved with competing chains through their holdings (or for protocols deployed on multiple other chains). I think transparency is a more judicious approach than exclusion so we can avoid turning proposals into an extended purity test for each participant. If you forbid concerned parties when incentives (through/to protocols) are at stake, ie if they are recipients, competitors, partners etc... then you're basically excluding builders from every decision process of this type.
Personally echoing that a certain degree of centralization makes sense, especially in the beginning, in order to get the DAO on the right track. But I think the Foundation made it quite clear multiple times that their approach was to be "Switzerland". I would definitely support it if they were open to soften their stance though.
Like it was mentioned multiple times, none of these frameworks can be used for liquidity incentives programs, or even large-scale grants. You said it for PL and QB, and the Foundation also confirmed it for its own. Not sure about 4. as there hasn't been any post for nearly 1 month.
Already answered in my previous message, putting it here for simplicity:
This airdrop has been distributed to all Arbitrum protocols proportionally to their contribution and their role in the ecosystem since its inception, and is their only guaranteed voting power to make sure their voice is properly heard as an important part of the DAO.
There wasn’t any requirement or condition from the Foundation when this airdrop was made back in March, and some protocols decided to directly make use of it through incentives, extend their runway etc… But many of the protocols you mentioned (Camelot included), decided to keep this $ARB - or most of it - as a unique opportunity to actively take part to Arbitrum governance. I don’t really understand the idea of suggesting to those protocols to give up on those voting rights before asking for a grant.
--
I think I'll echo the general feeling of many protocols by saying the current DAO situation has been a serious concern. This concern doesn’t stem specifically from Camelot’s proposal not passing the temp check, but rather for the reasons why it didn't pass. It has left most builders hanging in a situation where they genuinely don't know how to proceed / what to expect next. The fact that our proposal was the only one submitted by a protocol in almost 6 months should also be an equally strong alert signal.
This was a nice try @Youyou761.
Although I encourage and applaud discussion, your comment seems a rather personal attack dismissing every point I've tried to bring up for discussion.
This was a nice try @Youyou761.
Although I encourage and applaud discussion, your comment seems a rather personal attack dismissing every point I've tried to bring up for discussion.
olimpio is compensated rather well by ecosystems, apps, and chains to encourage his followers to “make the most of potential airdrop opportunities”.
Completely false, I've never been compensated.
I invite you to go to my public Twitter profile and have a look at the content I produce.
There is no financial motivation here, quite the contrary, as delegates are not being compensated for their work.
Really appreciate the detailed view and will answer to some other sections of your post later as well, but wanted to react to this part as Camelot's representative, since it was mentioned multiple times in our proposal as well:
Overall, there is more than 70% ARB from the initial DAO airdrop still held in protocol multi signatures.
The Arbitrum DAO and token were launched and created 5 months ago. So were these airdrops to the Arbitrum DAOs. So far, there has been little utilization of these funds.
Really appreciate the detailed view and will answer to some other sections of your post later as well, but wanted to react to this part as Camelot's representative, since it was mentioned multiple times in our proposal as well:
Overall, there is more than 70% ARB from the initial DAO airdrop still held in protocol multi signatures.
The Arbitrum DAO and token were launched and created 5 months ago. So were these airdrops to the Arbitrum DAOs. So far, there has been little utilization of these funds.
This airdrop has been distributed to all Arbitrum protocols proportionally to their contribution and their role in the ecosystem since its inception, and is their only guaranteed voting power to make sure their voice is properly heard as an important part of the DAO.
There wasn't any requirement or condition from the Foundation when this airdrop was made back in March, and some protocols decided to directly make use of it through incentives, extend their runway etc... But many of the protocols you mentioned (Camelot included), decided to keep this $ARB - or most of it - as a unique opportunity to actively take part to Arbitrum governance. I don't really understand the idea of suggesting to those protocols to give up on those voting rights before asking for a grant.
There's a very important balance between remaining stagnant and rubber-stamping any disbursement of funds that comes the DAO's way. As delegates, we have to remain critic, fair, and work towards a clear and well-communicated vision. I advocate for the decentralization of finance, and to express to the best of my abilities what my community and the people who entrusted me with voting power communicate they align with.
What's happening here is truly a reflection of the potential decentralized future we all envision. If proposals were to pass without question, if all power was concentrated in a single entity, if a collection of organizations or protocols were to determine the turnout and future of the chain... then it truly would be a valueless governance token, which is not the case here.
There's a very important balance between remaining stagnant and rubber-stamping any disbursement of funds that comes the DAO's way. As delegates, we have to remain critic, fair, and work towards a clear and well-communicated vision. I advocate for the decentralization of finance, and to express to the best of my abilities what my community and the people who entrusted me with voting power communicate they align with.
What's happening here is truly a reflection of the potential decentralized future we all envision. If proposals were to pass without question, if all power was concentrated in a single entity, if a collection of organizations or protocols were to determine the turnout and future of the chain... then it truly would be a valueless governance token, which is not the case here.
Pragmatically speaking, bets will need to be made to allow the ecosystem to seize the advantage sitting in our collective laps and continue moving forward, even if mistakes may be made along the way. Marks will be missed and resources will probably be misallocated from time to time but making fast moves while quickly validating / course correcting will be better than opting and waiting for perfection.
This view from @karelvuong is precise. Every delegate has a different risk tolerance on the size and context of "bets" and "mistakes" that would like to see the DAO make or not make. Personally, I tend to align with a more conservative approach when reviewing ideas and proposals. This does not have to be something negative for the DAO, since it's healthy to have multiple opinions, points of view, -and importantly- risk tolerances between delegates participating in a DAO. Moreover, the approaches can, and will, change. As will the context, proposals, and different other factors that impact a specific decision from a specific delegate for a specific proposal on a specific point of the DAO lifetime.
There's also the fact of actually measuring impact and analyzing what it means to have an impact. Arbitrum is the leading chain by TVL, it has 56% of the Market Share, while Optimism has 27%, according to L2 Beat. Here's DefiLlama's graph of its evolution:
In terms of transactions, you can see there's clearly an uptick in Optimism's transactions in the last few weeks in relation to Arbitrum, as well as other L2s that have been appearing (and will probably continue to do so, even more with chains like Fantom and Celo touting to transition from L1 to L2).
There is a sense of ultimate urgency that's being communicated by some entities and that I disagree with. Other L2s are aggressively operating to obtain market share, this can clearly be seen, however, it should not be the reason why we lose criticality. It's also not a reason to remain halted, this is why I welcome this discussion.
Enabling each delegate to contribute in the way they see fit is core to a DAO. If delegates want to abstain, if delegates want to vote against, if delegates want to vote for, if delegates want not to vote - that's their decision. Each and every one of us can choose to delegate and re-delegate based on the impact we believe that delegate choice is able to create.
Unfortunately, this topic has not yet gathered much discussion, and it would be really positive to see some more Foundation involvement for better accountability. Some unanswered questions:
In Camelot's proposal, JonesDAO utilized their 2.3M ARB (which they received on their ARB airdrop) to vote "For". Were Camelot's proposal to pass, JonesDAO was going to have a pool with their own token be incentivized with ARB. Was it okay that they were able to vote with ARB that was airdropped to them by the initial DAO to ultimately be the beneficiaries of token incentives?
To give more context, the Synthetix Council was involved in a similar situation in the early stages of Optimism, and ultimately the Foundation created the Code of Conduct and the Collective Grant Policies. That explicitly addressed ambiguous situations like this one. It would really be impactful to see better delegate and protocol engagement on topics like this one.
Abitrum has been the leader in many L2 metrics for quite the amount of time, but other L2s are aggressively competing with it.
When thinking of a "Framework", what first comes to mind is a Delegate Code of Conduct, stipulated Voting Times and structure, The Constitution per se, Conflicts of Interests, Grants Policies. It's a broader structure for the DAO to operate within. The Arbitrum Foundation set the initial Community Guidelines, How to submit a DAO Proposal, and Constitution. These, however, fall short in some specific areas that have undoubtedly come up in the past few weeks.
The approach of the Arbitrum Foundation so far has been to have limited involvement and let the DAO sort things out. This is what the DAO sorting things out looks like, for better and for worse, and it is though indeed making progress. However, and this is a personal opinion, it is undeniable that a degree of centralization (I know, explicitly against some of the views expressed above) could be helpful to enable and better allow the DAO to be self-governing in the long run.
With no accountability there is potential funds misusage. Here we find, again, the balance between the risk of not using funds so efficiently, and effectively delaying progress by not incentivizing builders. It's healthy that there are diverse risk tolerance factors amongst delegates to propel discussions like this very same one, escaping a situation where everything and everyone thinks the same and operates under the same views.
There are four Grants structures in the works:
Voting has passed in Tally. They will distribute 1M.
Voting has passed in Tally. They will distribute 2.8M ARB tokens. Initially voted against in Temperature Check, and, after discussions, feedback and amendments from the team, voted For in the final on-chain vote.
This comment is good feedback on the state and progress, reported by @DisruptionJoe.
New, ongoing Program. There's not much information yet on dates and deadlines, but they will be impacting protocols, projects, and individuals in areas like Gaming, DeFi, NFT, and Social.
In forum discussion.
Regardless of the amount of ongoing initiatives, the potential impact they might have (excluding Arbitrum's official one) is not at an immense scale, given the amount of funds put at the disposal of PL and QB. For context, Camelot was asking for 11M, and this greatly surpass what PL and QB is managing.
There were 125M of ARB tokens airdropped.
Source: Dune Analytics from Shogun and Castle Capital.
Overall, there is more than 70% ARB from the initial DAO airdrop still held in protocol multi signatures.
The Arbitrum DAO and token were launched and created 5 months ago. So were these airdrops to the Arbitrum DAOs. So far, there has been little utilization of these funds.
I respect and read all feedback, and I share thoughts whenever possible.
I relate this discussion to something @krst has said on Camelot's discussion:
I also don’t think that approving this request sets a precedent for future requests from other parties. Arbitrum DAO does not have to be a fair judge, treating all existing and future parties fairly, it should always act in the subjective interest of the ecosystem at the given time. If a similar proposal from another DEX appears in the future, we should judge it in the context given at that time and through the lens of the ecosystem benefits provided in the proposal at that time.
My initial reflex reaction to a proposal similar to another one from the past would have been to act inversely to the idea transmitted here on this comment. However, indeed circumstances and context do change, and if a grant is approved, it does not mean another one, similar, cannot be rejected. Consequently, if a proposal is voted against, it does not mean another one, similar, cannot be voted for. The idea of setting a precedent is a powerful idea, and it can have effects in both ways. After reading and after the interexchange of these different ideas, my opinion is that precedents are important, but they don't have to be forever binding.
Moving forward, I personally like the spirit and central idea of this thread (to take a pragmatic approach at the present time and with current given DAO conditions) and asses individual proposals under this optic, maintaining core values and a critical way of thinking.
(Taking my TreasureDAO hat off to chime in on my own accord (insert "all comments/thoughts are my own and not of TreasureDAO's"). Will also address the 'elephant in the room' at the end.)
Personally, I agree wholeheartedly with this call to action by @coinflip and the pragmatic guidelines that have been put forth. I'll also directly admit that others may read this and react in a certain way as it is in some ways at odds with the stance recently put out by Treasure. Will get to that in at the end.
(Taking my TreasureDAO hat off to chime in on my own accord (insert "all comments/thoughts are my own and not of TreasureDAO's"). Will also address the 'elephant in the room' at the end.)
Personally, I agree wholeheartedly with this call to action by @coinflip and the pragmatic guidelines that have been put forth. I'll also directly admit that others may read this and react in a certain way as it is in some ways at odds with the stance recently put out by Treasure. Will get to that in at the end.
RE: Coinflip's original post There's a real fear of inertia setting in that I know to be shared by many delegates, stakeholders, and community members of Arbitrum DAO. Waiting for the formalization of a framework (or several) and not acting will make it impossible for Arbitrum to meaningfully compete with other ecosystems who are able to move much more swiftly (whether by more centralized design, stage/maturity, culture, etc.). The establishment of any framework also shouldn't be seen as a silver bullet as everything will be based on its execution at the end of the day — this in itself will take even more time (design, funding, diligence, negotiation, etc.). Despite the significant resources that Arbitrum DAO has access to, the massive advantage that the ecosystem isn't being tapped into. Pragmatically speaking, bets will need to be made to allow the ecosystem to seize the advantage sitting in our collective laps and continue moving forward, even if mistakes may be made along the way. Marks will be missed and resources will probably be misallocated from time to time but making fast moves while quickly validating / course correcting will be better than opting and waiting for perfection.
RE: Treasure's position With Treasure being a DAO with its own lofty mission/goals and a small core contributor team striving to coordinate what is arguably one of the largest communities on Arbitrum with a complex set of stakeholders (game studios, players, other builders and contributors)... all of this is already a difficult, Herculean task. Adding in a significant responsibility and expectation after somehow — and I say this with endless appreciation :pray: — emerging as Arbitrum's largest delegate has led to this result of a DAO working to figure out how to govern another DAO (DAO2). It's not easy. In a lot of ways, I'm deeply envious of the individual delegates who are able to voice their opinion and vote on matters without outside input. Reaching what we believe to be consensus within a small team is already difficult, let alone a DAO with hundreds of thousands of members.
With all of this said, it is immensely clear that there's an incredible responsibility that is rightfully expected of us and we (as the core TreasureDAO council) have been working towards mechanisms that will allow for greater participation, engagement, and leadership from TreasureDAO as one of the leading delegates of Arbitrum DAO. More details to come at Treasure's next Community Call on this coming Monday (August 14).
Fully supporting this. Frameworks are a crucial part of a chain DAO and should be established asap, but we're almost starting from scratch here and the process is guaranteed to be long and complex - I think people that participated to the initial discussions/workshops can testify to this. I don't think any native Arbitrum builder would be satisfied with a situation where ecosystem incentives are frozen for months (I'll also remind that $ARB has already been live for 5 months), especially with so many L2 competitors adopting aggressive grants strategies.
Developers and users are scarce resources. Capital is mercenary and chain agnostic. ArbitrumDao wasted five months, and as a consequence teams, users, and capital started moving elsewhere.
Developers and users are scarce resources. Capital is mercenary and chain agnostic. ArbitrumDao wasted five months, and as a consequence teams, users, and capital started moving elsewhere.
Can you share a list of the teams, users, and capital agreements you have seen move elsewhere? Perhaps we can talk to them and receive accurate qualitive feedback to understand what their reasoning for switching chains.
If you forbid concerned parties when incentives (through/to protocols) are at stake, ie if they are recipients, competitors, partners etc… then you’re basically excluding builders from every decision process of this type.
With all due respect Joe, it this logic that is causing the DAO to remain deadlocked - a gaping void between the reality of building and the thoughts of users and delegates that have never had “boots on the ground”, so to speak.
With all due respect Joe, it this logic that is causing the DAO to remain deadlocked - a gaping void between the reality of building and the thoughts of users and delegates that have never had “boots on the ground”, so to speak.
I've been boots on the ground for years. Your assumption here is not accurate.
We can’t sit back and go through a feedback session for a framework to shape our every thought. We need action. We need progress.
I am not asking for us to wait for the feedback. I'm saying we can do things in parallel. We can both work on the short-term "triage" solution and create a higher quality understanding of the problem.
A huge part of DAO inefficiencies has been from "building the wrong thing". This is because there generally isn't a good discovery phase leading into many projects. This is a problem in web 2 startups as well. How many millions have been wasted building solutions to the wrong problem or ones that people won't use?
As in all types of business, deals and agreements are mostly private and certainly aren’t going to be shared in a survey on the Arbitrum forum.
As with all business, relationships matter. Many of us have spent time building relationships in the space. I'm sure between 660,000 token holders we can find one or two projects who would be willing to open up. Not necessarily on a forum.
Even if a team did move somewhere for incentives, do you think they would tell you that? Of course not.
They have before.
Markets are highly fluid and protocols need to constantly be making new decisions. Signals and sentiment have disproportionate effects on long-term decisions.
Exactly this. I agree completely. This is a complex, not a complicated problem. Therefore, we should minimize long-term decisions and maximize our ability to quickly sense and respond to a changing environment. A framework isn't a long-term decision. It is a set of guidlines, roles, and responsibilities that allow the DAO to quickly respond in effective ways.
Base is just 1 potential competitor out of 10.
Hard agree here.
:bulb: Taking action in the short-term & building frameworks that allow for quick and effective decision making in the future are not waterfall processes. These can happen at the same time! Parallel Processing ftw!
Example 1 - Liquidity Incentive Working Group
Respectfully Joe, I think your comment isn’t fair.
I think there is a misunderstanding because I am saying we should do all the things you are asking to do. We are on the same side.
I think there is a misunderstanding because I am saying we should do all the things you are asking to do. We are on the same side.
I ALSO would like to start the process of getting qualitive data to understand if users are leaving and for what reasons. I am not saying we need to wait to get the responses to do something.
I've advocated that the DAO does take risks, shouldn't wait for the framework, and should worry about momentum in multiple threads. This stance has been consistent from the beginning.
Perhaps when someone sees that I am leading a team which is designing a grants framework, they mistakenly think I am the one advocating to wait for the framework. This is more a decision by large delegates who don't want to yield their outsized voting weight without knowing how the DAO feels... which would be provided in our framework discovery. I think is is safe to fund some things quickly that might not be the best outcomes.
I've even spearheaded getting the liquidity incentives working group going even if it is out of the Plurality Labs scope. i volunteered to organize and facilitate the first workshop, found a leader in the group who could push it forward, and offered retro comp through a future retrofunding program to get the conversation moving.
This Liquidity incentive working group has met twice to figure out how to pass something before the framework is ready. You can read about it here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-incentives-program-working-group/15843/9?u=disruptionjoe
I don’t want to name names but there are some folks with insane amount of delegate power but not even exclusively active or committed to the ecosystem just got the power because the initial claim and delegate process was not optimal or had enough time for careful deliberation in spreading the governance power.
I don’t want to name names but there are some folks with insane amount of delegate power but not even exclusively active or committed to the ecosystem just got the power because the initial claim and delegate process was not optimal or had enough time for careful deliberation in spreading the governance power.
I am not a fan of delegation as a governance method given all the weak points this thread illustrates. But, that said, it is about the best solution we have at the moment and we do need to continue to refine the selection of delegates, highlighting their activity, and the holding accountable to standards of conduct (perceived conflicts of interest).
While I was working governance at Gitcoin I found that one of the best tools to quantifiably illustrate delegate performance was Karma. What I like about the tool is the creation of a delegate "score" which is transparent calculation of voting and forum activity as well as a ranking where you can see those scores across whale delegates. We used this tool to celebrate dedicated delegates (who thus got greater delegation) and to nudge inactive whale delegates to some success.
Linking to the @coinflip suggestion -
Collectively, the DAO expresses its agreement and issues guidelines to delegates, urging them to consider, evaluate, and ultimately ratify or decline individual proposals for liquidity incentives and grants based on their intrinsic merits.
I am not suggesting adding quantifiable performance metrics to delegates, but a regular appraisal or reporting of performance standings might be helpful. Yes, I know metrics can all be gamed and if you track behavior you can drive unintended behaviors - but until we find the ideal replacement for delegation, this is a mechanism we can consider.
In order to keep a relatively fluid exchange I'll try to be as concise as possible and to focus on the aspects on which I have divergent views.
Your conclusion seems to resonate with coinflip's take (?) but tbh I'm a bit confused since most of the points you raised actually seem to indicate your opposition to it.
In order to keep a relatively fluid exchange I'll try to be as concise as possible and to focus on the aspects on which I have divergent views.
Your conclusion seems to resonate with coinflip's take (?) but tbh I'm a bit confused since most of the points you raised actually seem to indicate your opposition to it.
Don't have much to disagree with from a high level and theoretical perspective. In practice, it's a bit odd to highlight decentralization when the DAO is currently controlled by <10 people concentrating 135M of ARB voting power. For reference, proposals put on Tally gathered ~170M votes on average. Focusing on a long-term vision and refining DAO decision processes and frameworks is key, I'll just temper it by saying decentralization should be here to serve the chain, not the opposite.
Almost all of the messages that preceded your answer in this thread (op included) are from members of major protocols of the ecosystem: GMX, Radiant, Dopex, Umami, Jones, Camelot etc... They are the ones currently holding the majority of this TVL, and also in the best position to be aware of what's happening behind the scenes/under the tip of the iceberg. I can admit a difference in opinion, but it's hard to not take all of those aligned voices in consideration.
Globally echoing your questions. Could also extend them to delegates involved with competing chains through their holdings (or for protocols deployed on multiple other chains). I think transparency is a more judicious approach than exclusion so we can avoid turning proposals into an extended purity test for each participant. If you forbid concerned parties when incentives (through/to protocols) are at stake, ie if they are recipients, competitors, partners etc... then you're basically excluding builders from every decision process of this type.
Personally echoing that a certain degree of centralization makes sense, especially in the beginning, in order to get the DAO on the right track. But I think the Foundation made it quite clear multiple times that their approach was to be "Switzerland". I would definitely support it if they were open to soften their stance though.
Like it was mentioned multiple times, none of these frameworks can be used for liquidity incentives programs, or even large-scale grants. You said it for PL and QB, and the Foundation also confirmed it for its own. Not sure about 4. as there hasn't been any post for nearly 1 month.
Already answered in my previous message, putting it here for simplicity:
This airdrop has been distributed to all Arbitrum protocols proportionally to their contribution and their role in the ecosystem since its inception, and is their only guaranteed voting power to make sure their voice is properly heard as an important part of the DAO.
There wasn’t any requirement or condition from the Foundation when this airdrop was made back in March, and some protocols decided to directly make use of it through incentives, extend their runway etc… But many of the protocols you mentioned (Camelot included), decided to keep this $ARB - or most of it - as a unique opportunity to actively take part to Arbitrum governance. I don’t really understand the idea of suggesting to those protocols to give up on those voting rights before asking for a grant.
--
I think I'll echo the general feeling of many protocols by saying the current DAO situation has been a serious concern. This concern doesn’t stem specifically from Camelot’s proposal not passing the temp check, but rather for the reasons why it didn't pass. It has left most builders hanging in a situation where they genuinely don't know how to proceed / what to expect next. The fact that our proposal was the only one submitted by a protocol in almost 6 months should also be an equally strong alert signal.
This was a nice try @Youyou761.
Although I encourage and applaud discussion, your comment seems a rather personal attack dismissing every point I've tried to bring up for discussion.
This was a nice try @Youyou761.
Although I encourage and applaud discussion, your comment seems a rather personal attack dismissing every point I've tried to bring up for discussion.
olimpio is compensated rather well by ecosystems, apps, and chains to encourage his followers to “make the most of potential airdrop opportunities”.
Completely false, I've never been compensated.
I invite you to go to my public Twitter profile and have a look at the content I produce.
There is no financial motivation here, quite the contrary, as delegates are not being compensated for their work.
Really appreciate the detailed view and will answer to some other sections of your post later as well, but wanted to react to this part as Camelot's representative, since it was mentioned multiple times in our proposal as well:
Overall, there is more than 70% ARB from the initial DAO airdrop still held in protocol multi signatures.
The Arbitrum DAO and token were launched and created 5 months ago. So were these airdrops to the Arbitrum DAOs. So far, there has been little utilization of these funds.
Really appreciate the detailed view and will answer to some other sections of your post later as well, but wanted to react to this part as Camelot's representative, since it was mentioned multiple times in our proposal as well:
Overall, there is more than 70% ARB from the initial DAO airdrop still held in protocol multi signatures.
The Arbitrum DAO and token were launched and created 5 months ago. So were these airdrops to the Arbitrum DAOs. So far, there has been little utilization of these funds.
This airdrop has been distributed to all Arbitrum protocols proportionally to their contribution and their role in the ecosystem since its inception, and is their only guaranteed voting power to make sure their voice is properly heard as an important part of the DAO.
There wasn't any requirement or condition from the Foundation when this airdrop was made back in March, and some protocols decided to directly make use of it through incentives, extend their runway etc... But many of the protocols you mentioned (Camelot included), decided to keep this $ARB - or most of it - as a unique opportunity to actively take part to Arbitrum governance. I don't really understand the idea of suggesting to those protocols to give up on those voting rights before asking for a grant.
There's a very important balance between remaining stagnant and rubber-stamping any disbursement of funds that comes the DAO's way. As delegates, we have to remain critic, fair, and work towards a clear and well-communicated vision. I advocate for the decentralization of finance, and to express to the best of my abilities what my community and the people who entrusted me with voting power communicate they align with.
What's happening here is truly a reflection of the potential decentralized future we all envision. If proposals were to pass without question, if all power was concentrated in a single entity, if a collection of organizations or protocols were to determine the turnout and future of the chain... then it truly would be a valueless governance token, which is not the case here.
There's a very important balance between remaining stagnant and rubber-stamping any disbursement of funds that comes the DAO's way. As delegates, we have to remain critic, fair, and work towards a clear and well-communicated vision. I advocate for the decentralization of finance, and to express to the best of my abilities what my community and the people who entrusted me with voting power communicate they align with.
What's happening here is truly a reflection of the potential decentralized future we all envision. If proposals were to pass without question, if all power was concentrated in a single entity, if a collection of organizations or protocols were to determine the turnout and future of the chain... then it truly would be a valueless governance token, which is not the case here.
Pragmatically speaking, bets will need to be made to allow the ecosystem to seize the advantage sitting in our collective laps and continue moving forward, even if mistakes may be made along the way. Marks will be missed and resources will probably be misallocated from time to time but making fast moves while quickly validating / course correcting will be better than opting and waiting for perfection.
This view from @karelvuong is precise. Every delegate has a different risk tolerance on the size and context of "bets" and "mistakes" that would like to see the DAO make or not make. Personally, I tend to align with a more conservative approach when reviewing ideas and proposals. This does not have to be something negative for the DAO, since it's healthy to have multiple opinions, points of view, -and importantly- risk tolerances between delegates participating in a DAO. Moreover, the approaches can, and will, change. As will the context, proposals, and different other factors that impact a specific decision from a specific delegate for a specific proposal on a specific point of the DAO lifetime.
There's also the fact of actually measuring impact and analyzing what it means to have an impact. Arbitrum is the leading chain by TVL, it has 56% of the Market Share, while Optimism has 27%, according to L2 Beat. Here's DefiLlama's graph of its evolution:
In terms of transactions, you can see there's clearly an uptick in Optimism's transactions in the last few weeks in relation to Arbitrum, as well as other L2s that have been appearing (and will probably continue to do so, even more with chains like Fantom and Celo touting to transition from L1 to L2).
There is a sense of ultimate urgency that's being communicated by some entities and that I disagree with. Other L2s are aggressively operating to obtain market share, this can clearly be seen, however, it should not be the reason why we lose criticality. It's also not a reason to remain halted, this is why I welcome this discussion.
Enabling each delegate to contribute in the way they see fit is core to a DAO. If delegates want to abstain, if delegates want to vote against, if delegates want to vote for, if delegates want not to vote - that's their decision. Each and every one of us can choose to delegate and re-delegate based on the impact we believe that delegate choice is able to create.
Unfortunately, this topic has not yet gathered much discussion, and it would be really positive to see some more Foundation involvement for better accountability. Some unanswered questions:
In Camelot's proposal, JonesDAO utilized their 2.3M ARB (which they received on their ARB airdrop) to vote "For". Were Camelot's proposal to pass, JonesDAO was going to have a pool with their own token be incentivized with ARB. Was it okay that they were able to vote with ARB that was airdropped to them by the initial DAO to ultimately be the beneficiaries of token incentives?
To give more context, the Synthetix Council was involved in a similar situation in the early stages of Optimism, and ultimately the Foundation created the Code of Conduct and the Collective Grant Policies. That explicitly addressed ambiguous situations like this one. It would really be impactful to see better delegate and protocol engagement on topics like this one.
Abitrum has been the leader in many L2 metrics for quite the amount of time, but other L2s are aggressively competing with it.
When thinking of a "Framework", what first comes to mind is a Delegate Code of Conduct, stipulated Voting Times and structure, The Constitution per se, Conflicts of Interests, Grants Policies. It's a broader structure for the DAO to operate within. The Arbitrum Foundation set the initial Community Guidelines, How to submit a DAO Proposal, and Constitution. These, however, fall short in some specific areas that have undoubtedly come up in the past few weeks.
The approach of the Arbitrum Foundation so far has been to have limited involvement and let the DAO sort things out. This is what the DAO sorting things out looks like, for better and for worse, and it is though indeed making progress. However, and this is a personal opinion, it is undeniable that a degree of centralization (I know, explicitly against some of the views expressed above) could be helpful to enable and better allow the DAO to be self-governing in the long run.
With no accountability there is potential funds misusage. Here we find, again, the balance between the risk of not using funds so efficiently, and effectively delaying progress by not incentivizing builders. It's healthy that there are diverse risk tolerance factors amongst delegates to propel discussions like this very same one, escaping a situation where everything and everyone thinks the same and operates under the same views.
There are four Grants structures in the works:
Voting has passed in Tally. They will distribute 1M.
Voting has passed in Tally. They will distribute 2.8M ARB tokens. Initially voted against in Temperature Check, and, after discussions, feedback and amendments from the team, voted For in the final on-chain vote.
This comment is good feedback on the state and progress, reported by @DisruptionJoe.
New, ongoing Program. There's not much information yet on dates and deadlines, but they will be impacting protocols, projects, and individuals in areas like Gaming, DeFi, NFT, and Social.
In forum discussion.
Regardless of the amount of ongoing initiatives, the potential impact they might have (excluding Arbitrum's official one) is not at an immense scale, given the amount of funds put at the disposal of PL and QB. For context, Camelot was asking for 11M, and this greatly surpass what PL and QB is managing.
There were 125M of ARB tokens airdropped.
Source: Dune Analytics from Shogun and Castle Capital.
Overall, there is more than 70% ARB from the initial DAO airdrop still held in protocol multi signatures.
The Arbitrum DAO and token were launched and created 5 months ago. So were these airdrops to the Arbitrum DAOs. So far, there has been little utilization of these funds.
I respect and read all feedback, and I share thoughts whenever possible.
I relate this discussion to something @krst has said on Camelot's discussion:
I also don’t think that approving this request sets a precedent for future requests from other parties. Arbitrum DAO does not have to be a fair judge, treating all existing and future parties fairly, it should always act in the subjective interest of the ecosystem at the given time. If a similar proposal from another DEX appears in the future, we should judge it in the context given at that time and through the lens of the ecosystem benefits provided in the proposal at that time.
My initial reflex reaction to a proposal similar to another one from the past would have been to act inversely to the idea transmitted here on this comment. However, indeed circumstances and context do change, and if a grant is approved, it does not mean another one, similar, cannot be rejected. Consequently, if a proposal is voted against, it does not mean another one, similar, cannot be voted for. The idea of setting a precedent is a powerful idea, and it can have effects in both ways. After reading and after the interexchange of these different ideas, my opinion is that precedents are important, but they don't have to be forever binding.
Moving forward, I personally like the spirit and central idea of this thread (to take a pragmatic approach at the present time and with current given DAO conditions) and asses individual proposals under this optic, maintaining core values and a critical way of thinking.
(Taking my TreasureDAO hat off to chime in on my own accord (insert "all comments/thoughts are my own and not of TreasureDAO's"). Will also address the 'elephant in the room' at the end.)
Personally, I agree wholeheartedly with this call to action by @coinflip and the pragmatic guidelines that have been put forth. I'll also directly admit that others may read this and react in a certain way as it is in some ways at odds with the stance recently put out by Treasure. Will get to that in at the end.
(Taking my TreasureDAO hat off to chime in on my own accord (insert "all comments/thoughts are my own and not of TreasureDAO's"). Will also address the 'elephant in the room' at the end.)
Personally, I agree wholeheartedly with this call to action by @coinflip and the pragmatic guidelines that have been put forth. I'll also directly admit that others may read this and react in a certain way as it is in some ways at odds with the stance recently put out by Treasure. Will get to that in at the end.
RE: Coinflip's original post There's a real fear of inertia setting in that I know to be shared by many delegates, stakeholders, and community members of Arbitrum DAO. Waiting for the formalization of a framework (or several) and not acting will make it impossible for Arbitrum to meaningfully compete with other ecosystems who are able to move much more swiftly (whether by more centralized design, stage/maturity, culture, etc.). The establishment of any framework also shouldn't be seen as a silver bullet as everything will be based on its execution at the end of the day — this in itself will take even more time (design, funding, diligence, negotiation, etc.). Despite the significant resources that Arbitrum DAO has access to, the massive advantage that the ecosystem isn't being tapped into. Pragmatically speaking, bets will need to be made to allow the ecosystem to seize the advantage sitting in our collective laps and continue moving forward, even if mistakes may be made along the way. Marks will be missed and resources will probably be misallocated from time to time but making fast moves while quickly validating / course correcting will be better than opting and waiting for perfection.
RE: Treasure's position With Treasure being a DAO with its own lofty mission/goals and a small core contributor team striving to coordinate what is arguably one of the largest communities on Arbitrum with a complex set of stakeholders (game studios, players, other builders and contributors)... all of this is already a difficult, Herculean task. Adding in a significant responsibility and expectation after somehow — and I say this with endless appreciation :pray: — emerging as Arbitrum's largest delegate has led to this result of a DAO working to figure out how to govern another DAO (DAO2). It's not easy. In a lot of ways, I'm deeply envious of the individual delegates who are able to voice their opinion and vote on matters without outside input. Reaching what we believe to be consensus within a small team is already difficult, let alone a DAO with hundreds of thousands of members.
With all of this said, it is immensely clear that there's an incredible responsibility that is rightfully expected of us and we (as the core TreasureDAO council) have been working towards mechanisms that will allow for greater participation, engagement, and leadership from TreasureDAO as one of the leading delegates of Arbitrum DAO. More details to come at Treasure's next Community Call on this coming Monday (August 14).
Fully supporting this. Frameworks are a crucial part of a chain DAO and should be established asap, but we're almost starting from scratch here and the process is guaranteed to be long and complex - I think people that participated to the initial discussions/workshops can testify to this. I don't think any native Arbitrum builder would be satisfied with a situation where ecosystem incentives are frozen for months (I'll also remind that $ARB has already been live for 5 months), especially with so many L2 competitors adopting aggressive grants strategies.
Developers and users are scarce resources. Capital is mercenary and chain agnostic. ArbitrumDao wasted five months, and as a consequence teams, users, and capital started moving elsewhere.
Developers and users are scarce resources. Capital is mercenary and chain agnostic. ArbitrumDao wasted five months, and as a consequence teams, users, and capital started moving elsewhere.
Can you share a list of the teams, users, and capital agreements you have seen move elsewhere? Perhaps we can talk to them and receive accurate qualitive feedback to understand what their reasoning for switching chains.
If you forbid concerned parties when incentives (through/to protocols) are at stake, ie if they are recipients, competitors, partners etc… then you’re basically excluding builders from every decision process of this type.
If you forbid concerned parties when incentives (through/to protocols) are at stake, ie if they are recipients, competitors, partners etc… then you’re basically excluding builders from every decision process of this type.
I've been getting a lot of DMs and it is true that many of the builders in the Arbitrum ecosystem have conflicts of interest due to the fact that their $ARB was rewarded for building in the ecosystem. At the same time many $ARB were dropped to many non-builders including promoters, marketers, and being a DAO deployed on Arbitrum. All gave value to the ecosystem. Why would one class of recipient, especially one so valuable, be stripped of their governance rights?
💡 We need to think deeply about the consequences of removing voting rights from both builders AND those who chose to delegate to builders.
It would be great if the delegation contract allowed a person to remove their self-delegation from counting in a vote and keep the rest of what the community delegated active.
Honestly, I was initially thinking more aligned with those saying that we need better conflict of interest rules. I still am, though I don't think I agree with the simple solution some are asking for. I think that they may not be either after considering these points.
The foundation is here to support us. They provide services for us and the Arbitrum community. They should not have dictatorial power or be the parent when the DAO has disagreements. They also provide leadership - servant leadership. The kind where they ask what we need.
Anyone with enough $ARB can post a temp check tomorrow to see if the DAO wants to give them the authority to do some arbitrary action. The foundation already has the authority to present a liquidity incentive program tomorrow. Like some of the large delegates who use their power to abstain or vote against, my intuition says they haven't done this because they don't want to go against the will of the DAO.
❔ Perhaps we simply ask the DAO, "Would you be ok with trusting the foundation (and the terms they set) to do a 1 time liquidity incentive program to advance the ecosystem before the DAO comes to consensus on terms?"
Not everything in Governance is about coming to a final decision. The majority of it is showing the other side how important something is AND putting the issue forward in a way that gets the DAO to reveal itself.
We can use Snapshot more to see which way the wind is blowing.
Anything that we do which isn't enforced onchain creates a gap between what is enforced by math/cryptography vs what is enforced by authority. We should aim to keep these as close as possible. It is more difficult to make a system that aligns the optimal strategy of the participants.
Please watch this: Andreas Antonopolous - Rules Without Rulers
If you forbid concerned parties when incentives (through/to protocols) are at stake, ie if they are recipients, competitors, partners etc… then you’re basically excluding builders from every decision process of this type.
I've been getting a lot of DMs and it is true that many of the builders in the Arbitrum ecosystem have conflicts of interest due to the fact that their $ARB was rewarded for building in the ecosystem. At the same time many $ARB were dropped to many non-builders including promoters, marketers, and being a DAO deployed on Arbitrum. All gave value to the ecosystem. Why would one class of recipient, especially one so valuable, be stripped of their governance rights?
💡 We need to think deeply about the consequences of removing voting rights from both builders AND those who chose to delegate to builders.
It would be great if the delegation contract allowed a person to remove their self-delegation from counting in a vote and keep the rest of what the community delegated active.
Honestly, I was initially thinking more aligned with those saying that we need better conflict of interest rules. I still am, though I don't think I agree with the simple solution some are asking for. I think that they may not be either after considering these points.
The foundation is here to support us. They provide services for us and the Arbitrum community. They should not have dictatorial power or be the parent when the DAO has disagreements. They also provide leadership - servant leadership. The kind where they ask what we need.
Anyone with enough $ARB can post a temp check tomorrow to see if the DAO wants to give them the authority to do some arbitrary action. The foundation already has the authority to present a liquidity incentive program tomorrow. Like some of the large delegates who use their power to abstain or vote against, my intuition says they haven't done this because they don't want to go against the will of the DAO.
❔ Perhaps we simply ask the DAO, "Would you be ok with trusting the foundation (and the terms they set) to do a 1 time liquidity incentive program to advance the ecosystem before the DAO comes to consensus on terms?"
Not everything in Governance is about coming to a final decision. The majority of it is showing the other side how important something is AND putting the issue forward in a way that gets the DAO to reveal itself.
We can use Snapshot more to see which way the wind is blowing.
Anything that we do which isn't enforced onchain creates a gap between what is enforced by math/cryptography vs what is enforced by authority. We should aim to keep these as close as possible. It is more difficult to make a system that aligns the optimal strategy of the participants.
Please watch this: Andreas Antonopolous - Rules Without Rulers