PROPOSAL [PASSED]
ELECTION DETAILS:
23/01/2024 [12:01AM UTC]
3-day buffer period pre-application submission period is initiated.
26/01/2024 [12:01AM UTC] - 05/02/2024 [11:59PM UTC]
7-business day ‘Application Submission’ Period
06/02/2024 [12:01AM UTC] - 14/02/2024 [11:59PM UTC]
7-business day ‘KYC/KYB + Proposal Review Period’
15/02/2024 [12:01AM UTC] - 19/02/2024 [11:59PM UTC]
3-business day ‘Amendment Period’
20/02/2024 - Snapshot Elections [Weighted Voting]
Election Template: ARDC Election Template - Google Docs
Guidance Note: ARDC Guidance Note - Google Docs
APPLICATIONS TO BE POSTED HERE: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-development-collective-elections-applications/20805
Amendments in light of community feedback:
Added detail re. clawback functions on [Multi-Sig] + [Service Provider Streams]
Created the ArbitrumDAO ARDC [Clawback Capability] Governor via the Zodiac Governor Module: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrumdao-ardc-clawback-capability
Abstract - This proposal aims to fund the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective to aid in turning Arbitrum DAO members’ ideas into reality for a term of 6 months.
Motivation - The ARDC's role in reviewing and enhancing governance proposals, conducting code reviews for security, providing quantitative analysis for economic risk, and fostering active delegate engagement will contribute significantly to the growth and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem. It will provide valuable tools and reports for proposal authors, helping them refine their ideas and make better-informed decisions.
Rationale - the ARDC's primary mandate aligns with the strategic priorities of the ArbitrumDAO, particularly in terms of governance optimization, risk management, research, and security. By funding the ARDC, the ArbitrumDAO can enhance its governance framework and future-proof the ecosystem through specialized verticals dedicated to these critical areas.
Steps to Implement - Steps to Implement - The AIP will move to Snapshot on the 11th of December 2023. Following the conclusion of the Snapshot vote, the AIP will then proceed to the on-chain voting stage so as to ratify the funding & process for the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective. Once the forecited steps are concluded, @Immutablelawyer will be announcing the starting date of the election process.
Specifications & Timeline - Specifications & timeline can be found in the following sections.
Overall Cost - Option A: If the ARDC is funded with 880,000 ARB + Multi-Sig Budget.
Option B: If the ARDC is funded with 1.3 Million ARB + Multi-Sig Budget.
Option C: If the ARDC is funded with 1.715 Million ARB + Multi-Sig Budget.
[Excess ARB which will not be utilised as a result of the elected members and their corresponding fees will be returned to the ArbitrumDAO Treasury]
Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [ARDC]
Non-Constitutional
Defining ‘Arbitrum Research & Development Collective’ or ‘ARDC’: An alliance for combined action used to achieve a common goal in the best interests of the ArbitrumDAO
TL;DR
This proposal aims to fund the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective to aid in turning Arbitrum DAO members’ ideas into reality for a term of 6 months.
This proposal intends on forking the Arbitrum Coalition proposal that was submitted & spearheaded by Blockworks Research, Gauntlet & Trail of Bits on the 25th of October 2023 (https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145). The proposal failed the Snapshot temperature check submitted on November 3rd 2023 (https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x42f68a26ff5a5be692a80468a1d1885cf07d590836536f5169cc4b69f64f3f37);
Alignment to the ArbitrumDAO Strategic Priorities:
The ARDC’s mandate will naturally aid in ‘Governance Optimization’ through research & development of tooling related to the ArbitrumDAO’s governance framework.
The ARDC’s mandate will aid in future-proofing the ArbitrumDAO by virtue of its member-specific verticals re. Risk, Research & Security.
This proposal intends on improving on the Arbitrum Coalition proposal by implementing an election mechanism to choose the service providers that may participate in the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective;
This proposal intends on implementing a set of legally enforceable checks & balances to regulate the internal operations of the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective;
The ARDC will be made up of the following members [Subject to change following forum post feedback]: The DAOAdvocate, Risk Management-Oriented Members, Security-Oriented Members, Research-Oriented Members.
Fund the ARDC for a 6-month term.
Background - Perspective
The Arbitrum Coalition was an organization initially made up of Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits. The Coalition aimed to execute turnkey R&D work on behalf of the Arbitrum DAO. The Coalition’s mandate was to help steer the path from ideation in the forum to the optimal, efficient, and safe execution of proposals. In other words, being a steward in making the DAO’s visions a reality. The coalition would have provided the necessary resources so that the ArbitrumDAO can make informed decisions.
The Arbitrum Coalition proposal received a lot of feedback from delegates, community members and contributors alike. In general, the general consensus was that the Arbitrum Coalition was a great theoretical idea & would have provided a great value-add to the Arbitrum Ecosystem. However, it lacked optimal execution in relation to its structural mechanics, especially mechanics re. the appointment & policing of service providers.
This proposal forks the Arbitrum Coalition proposal by iterating & optimizing on such proposal. Hence, certain parts of the proposal will be similar or identical.
The Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [Why?]
The Arbitrum forum is host to numerous commendable proposals, discussions & ideas. These Forum posts frequently lack the pre-requisite research, coordination, design, and risk evaluation mechanisms necessary for them to result in net-positive progress for the Arbitrum Ecosystem.
For instance, the iterative refinement of proposals, the cultivation of delegate awareness & participation at the Forum & voting stage, and the identification of suitable partners to execute an idea often present formidable challenges for proposers themselves (especially when they are newer entrants to the ArbitrumDAO). The primary mandate of the ARDC will be that of providing objective assessment of governance posts by distilling information and expediting governance decision-making; thereby enabling participants in the ArbitrumDAO to make better-informed choices.
The ARDC aims to possess unparalleled expertise by having an established dedicated team capable of executing this initiative. Ideally, all of the ARDC members would have made significant contributions to the ArbitrumDAO. The subject-matter areas that the ARDC Verticals aim to cater for include, but are not limited to:
In our opinion, the forecited subject-matter areas would provide the ArbitrumDAO with the necessary resources so as to ensure that ARDC members provide the ArbitrumDAO with a holistic execution of the ARDC mandate.
Mandate of the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective (ARDC):
Forum Proposal Review & Assistance:
Objective Reporting: The impartial data-driven research conducted by ARDC aids delegates in making well-informed decisions by offering a comprehensive understanding of proposal contexts and competitive landscapes.
Proposal Improvement Tooling: These reports double as valuable tools for proposal authors, helping them enhance their work by incorporating feedback and addressing shortcomings. In this regard, the ARDC will serve as an assistant to proposers on an on-request basis to optimize & structure proposals that could prove to be a value-add to the Arbitrum Ecosystem.
Review on Chain Proposal Code Updates:
Quantitative Assistance:
Quantitative Analysis: The ArbitrumDAO needs an element of quantitative rigor added to proposal evaluations, offering insights into economic risk, design optimization, and overall proposal viability.
Risk Mitigation: This service assists the ArbitrumDAO in identifying and mitigating economic risks associated with proposed initiatives, promoting sound decision-making.
Project Management [On a Request-Basis]:
In addition to the aforementioned services, the ARDC aims to offer the following benefits:
Tooling Creation and Enhancement:
Research New Mechanisms:
Delegate Engagement:
Growth Initiatives:
In summary, the services provided by the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective(ARDC) serve to enhance governance decision-making, security, transparency, and community engagement within the Arbitrum ecosystem, ultimately contributing to its continued growth and success.
Arbitrum Research & Development Collective - Specifications of Verticals [Risk, Research, Security, DAOAdvocate]
The DAOAdvocate
The DAOAdvocate will be a single designated person (Legal/Natural) that will represent the ArbitrumDAO & maintains the ability to direct the ARDC’s efforts; Functions as the bridge between the ArbitrumDAO and the ARDC. The DAOAdvocate will be elected via Snapshot. The advocate will receive a stipend per month as per his ask in the application submitted to the DAO pre-election. The advocate’s main responsibility is ensuring that the Arbitrum DAO’s best interests are met by the ARDC & that the ARDC acts in accordance with its mandate & purposes.
If a member of the ARDC is deemed to have acted negligently, in bad faith, or contrary to the mandate/purposes of the ARDC as ratified by the ArbitrumDAO, the DAOAdvocate will have a legal obligation submit a proposal via Snapshot to terminate such a member of the ARDC together with the necessary details that justify such termination. Following this, the DAOAdvocate will have an ancillary legal obligation to submit a call for applications for the vacant ARDC seat. The decision as to who ought to take up the vacant seat will be determined by the ArbitrumDAO via the election mechanism stipulated in this Forum Post.
The Risk Member
The Risk member should ideally possess a range of skills. This includes a strong quantitative background for conducting thorough reviews, research, and modeling or simulations related to economic risk, design, and optimization. The Risk member is to provide the ArbitrumDAO [through the ARDC] with a comprehensive knowledge-base in relation to digital asset-focused risk identification, risk assessment & risk mitigation. The Risk member should ideally have experience re. risk-focused design, research, and modeling to determine how to incentivize usage, maximize economic efficiency, protect systemic protocol health, and plan for the future with rigorously validated insights.
The Security Member
The Security member should ideally possess skills in specific static analysis bug detection targeting code updates and developing fuzzing capabilities to validate upgrade states. They should be proficient in visualizing the state of governance contracts, ensuring correct encoding of values, and providing educational materials and guidelines for reviewing upgrade procedures. Additionally, they should have expertise in whitebox source code reviews, identifying design flaws, and ensuring security and correctness properties in on-chain upgrade proposals. This role is crucial for preventing governance attacks and may involve building tools and educational materials to support proposal reviews when no code review is required.
The Research Member
The Research member should ideally possess a range of skills, including the ability to conduct objective analysis and contribute to the design of various mechanisms such as sequencers, fraud proofs, and data availability solutions, with a strong emphasis on objective data-driven research. They should also be proficient in creating processes that incentivize active delegate participation, such as developing delegate incentives frameworks and hosting regular collaborative calls. Additionally, they should be skilled in content creation to promote the Arbitrum ecosystem's growth. Moreover, the candidate should have a knack for producing impartial, data-driven research to aid delegates in making informed decisions and improving proposal quality. Excellent communication skills and the ability to manage interactions with DAO stakeholders and service providers are essential, along with the capacity to document ARDC activities and recommend solutions for any issues that arise, maintaining a governance process for continuity.
Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [Elections]
We propose adapting section 4 of the ArbitrumDAO Constitution & optimizing it to apply to the election for ARDC Members [REF: https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/dao-constitution]. Hereunder, we propose an adapted model of Section 4 of the ArbitrumDAO Constitution to implement to the ARDC Elections.
The ARDC election process is scheduled to begin 3 business days from the ratification of the on-chain proposal.
The date chosen for the first election will form the basis for all future elections. Every election should begin 6 months after the previous election has been finalized.
All ARDC members are expected to serve their term unless terminated by the ArbitrumDAO through Snapshot as stipulated in the Agreement regulating the ARDC [Further details below re. the Agreement & Defining provisions].
There will be four separate elections per vertical based on the intellectual need of the ARDC:
The following timeline governs an election process that starts at time T [‘T’ means the date that the on-chain vote passes +3 days]:
Governing Rules
Election Process
1. Application Submission (T+7 business days):
Anyone may submit an application on a dedicated page on the ArbitrumDAO Forums in conformity with the application template;
2. KYB/KYC + Delegate Review Period (7 business day period following end of Application Submission Period):
Applicants who would have validly submitted their applications in conformity with the application template will then be required to undergo KYC/KYB processes. All candidates will cooperate with the Arbitrum Foundation and complete the compliance process. The Arbitrum Foundation is responsible for removing any candidates that fail the compliance process. Only applicants that pass KYB/KYC will be eligible for election.
3. Amendment Period (3 business day period following the end of the KYB/KYC + Delegate Review period whereby applicants may amend their application):
Applicants may amend their applications in light of community feedback during this time period.
4. Member election (7 business day period following end of Amendment Period):
A Snapshot with weighted voting will be put up per vertical including the list of all eligible candidates:
Snapshot for DAOAdvocate election;
Snapshot for Risk Management-Oriented Member election;
Snapshot for Security-Oriented Member election;
Snapshot for Research-Oriented Member election.
The ArbitrumDAO may approve and implement a Non-Constitutional AIP to change the rules governing future ARDC elections, but the AIP process may not be used to intervene in an ongoing election.
Election Application Template
For the fee-cap applicable to the role being applied for, please refer to the Funding section. Applicants requesting asks exceeding the corresponding cap will be contacted to amend accordingly.
Applicant Information
Name of Applicant & Applicant’s Representative [If Applicable]:
Email Address:
Telegram Handle (if applicable):
LinkedIn Profile (if applicable):
Role being applied for [1 Max] [DAOAdvocate, Risk Management-Oriented Member, Security-Oriented Member, Research-Oriented Member]:
Background Information [Applicable to all]
Please provide a brief overview of your experience in the digital asset industry and, more specifically, Ethereum & Arbitrum Ecosystems. Include any relevant projects, contributions, or roles within the ArbitrumDAO, if applicable. (400 words max)
Specify the subject-matter area(s) you are interested in contributing to within ARDC (e.g., Research, Framework Development, Risk Assessment, etc.). Explain why you believe your skills align with the chosen area(s). (500 words max)
Objectives & Motivation [Applicable to all]
What motivates you to join ARDC, and what do you hope to achieve as a member? (300 words max)
Explain how you envision contributing to the primary mandate of ARDC, which is to provide objective assessment of ArbitrumDAO Forum proposals & discussions and expedite governance decision-making within the Arbitrum ecosystem. (300 words max)
Skills and Experience [Applicable to all]
Provide details about your relevant skills and experience, including any previous work or contributions related to the subject-matter area(s) you are interested in within ARDC. (300 words max)
Proposal Review & Assistance [Applicable to all]
Share what approach you would implement to conducting objective research and providing assistance to proposers to enhance their proposals. (300 words max)
Review on Chain Proposal Code Updates [Only applicable to Security]
Describe your experience in conducting code reviews and assessing security risks. How can you contribute to enhancing the security and integrity of the Arbitrum ecosystem? (500 words max)
Quantitative Assistance [Only applicable to Risk]
Explain how you can bring quantitative analysis skills to proposal evaluations and contribute to identifying and mitigating economic risks associated with proposed initiatives. (500 words max)
Research Initiatives [Only applicable to Research]
Describe your experience conducting research-oriented initiatives within the digital asset industry, more specifically, research re. the Arbitrum-specific tech-stack. Explain how your previous experience can translate to an added value contribution to the ARDC & the ArbitrumDAO. (500 words max)
Project Management [Applicable to all]
Describe your project management experience. (250 words max)
Purpose/Mandate of the ARDC [Applicable to all]
How do you intend to objectively contribute to achieving the purposes/mandate of the ARDC? (500 words max)
Additional Contributions [Applicable to all]
How can you contribute to the creation and enhancement of tools for security assessment, the development of educational materials, research into new mechanisms, delegate engagement, and growth initiatives, as outlined in ARDC's objectives? (500 words max)
Scope of Services & Applicable Fees [Detailed breakdown of fees including pricing model for the 6-month term] [Applicable to all except DAOAdvocate] [Must not exceed applicable cap]
Please provide a detailed breakdown of the scope of services through which you will be contributing. Include the pricing model implemented & a description of expected hours + hourly rate (if applicable) & manpower dedicated to the ARDC.
Summary [Applicable to all]
In summary, please highlight your key qualifications and what you believe you can bring to ARDC. (400 words max)
Feel free to attach any relevant documents, portfolios, or links to previous work or contributions.
Checks & Balances
The ARDC will be regulated via an Agreement entered into by all elected ARDC Members with the Arbitrum Foundation serving as a counterparty to the Agreement.
The Agreement will be made public & include, but will not be limited to the following provisions:
Appointment & Termination: ARDC Members will be appointed via the forecited election process in accordance with ArbitrumDAO Consent by the Arbitrum Community.
“Arbitrum Community” means those persons who have the right to propose and vote on proposals ergo, the token holders of the ARB token with the following contract address [0x912CE59144191C1204E64559FE8253a0e49E6548] from time to time visible at [https://arbiscan.io/token/0x912ce59144191c1204e64559fe8253a0e49e6548#balances].
“"ArbitrumDAO Consent" means a vote of the ArbitrumDAO Community in favour of a proposal satisfying the minimum requirements set forth at https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/dao-constitution (as such minimum requirements set forth therein on the date hereof may be revised from time to time with ArbitrumDAO Consent) taken by any of the following means:
1. https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth (or any successor thereto); or
2. another mechanism, whether on or off a blockchain, that ensures only and all people voting hold or have been delegated blockchain-based tokens known as ARB."
Conflict of Interest Provision: ARDC Members will be bound to act in absolute good faith, utmost honesty, refraining from deriving unauthorized profits from their position & disclose conflicts of interest. ARDC members should always disclose any potential or actual conflicts of interests to the DAOAdvocate who will then proceed to mitigate the respective ARDC Member’s involvement in the task in relation to which such ARDC Member is conflicted.
To sum up, all ARDC Members must declare the nature and extent of any interest, direct or indirect, which the ARDC Member is aware that she, he or it has in a proposed task at hand.
Mandate & Purpose of the ARDC: The ARDC members are pivotal in executing the purposes of the ARDC, ensuring that the activities thereof align with the ARDC’s objectives and the stipulations of ratified proposal. Here, it is also a role of the DAOAdvocate, to see that this is actually being done and that activities within the ARDC will actually further or are in conformity with the purposes outlined in the ratified proposal.
Record-keeping and Reporting: Comprehensive and precise record-keeping is imperative. ARDC Members will be required to maintain detailed accounts and documentation of the ARDC’S internal operational workflow together with meeting minutes taken by the DAOAdvocate. Furthermore, periodic reporting is essential so as to keep the ArbitrumDAO updated re. Task-specific progress & internal ARDC Administration (such as which ARDC Member is working on which task & deadlines for the expected publication of tasks that fall in line with the purposes of the ARDC).
Duty of Impartiality: ARDC Members will have an obligation to act in an impartial manner in relation to their tasks & workflow, ensuring that the ARDC is not compromised by personal interests or external influences.
Obligation of Recusal: ARDC Members with a conflict of interest involving a project being reviewed by the ARDC should recuse themselves from participating in the evaluation and should vote Abstain if a proposal directly related to the ARDC is submitted. Additionally, ARDC members will abstain from commenting or voting on proposals made by any company that can be deemed a direct competitor.
Prohibition of Self-Dealing: Participants should refrain from voting on sending funds to themselves or organizations where any portion of those funds is expected to flow to them, their other projects, or anyone they have a close personal or economic relationship with.
Ethical Trading: Members are required to follow ethical trading standards in regard to ARB and any other relevant digital assets.
Operational parameters to be implemented
We believe this eliminates information asymmetry while allowing ARDC members to conduct their work in the most efficient possible manner. For token holders and the community, they can quickly go to these operational dashboards and see ARDC progress. When research is released, it's clearly defined who worked on it, amount of hours, and total project time.
Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [Multi-Sig]
The ARDC’s 3/5 multisig is being created. The funds in the multisig belong to the ArbitrumDAO and the signers act as Multi-Sig administrators on behalf of the ArbitrumDAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Signers will receive 1,000 ARB per month for their contribution. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in ArbitrumDAO governance including delegation. The multisig includes:
The ARDC multisig includes two features to ensure accountability of signers and members elected:
Streaming of funds to elected members through Hedgey on a monthly basis. The ArbitrumDAO will maintain control over this stream and have the ability to cut it off with an on-chain vote as the ArbitrumDAO will be made the Grant Admin on the Hedgey module.
Clawback capability as explained hereunder.
The Multi-Sig will grant the ArbitrumDAO the function to clawback funds from the ARDC Multi-Sig via the Zodiac Governor Module via the created ArbitrumDAO ARDC [Clawback Capability]: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrumdao-ardc-clawback-capability
In addition, after the ARDC Elections & thus, member appointment, the ARDC Multi-Sig members will utilise Hedgey to stream the respective funds to the elected members with the ArbitrumDAO being the Grant Admin thereof. The ArbitrumDAO's Grant Admin role thus gives the DAO the ability to halt any streaming of funds to any member via governance.
Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [Term]
The duration of the ARDC’s mandate will be of 182 days [6 months] from the moment the on-chain proposal is approved. The ARDC may seek to identify and complete other initiatives for the ArbitrumDAO & the wider Arbitrum Ecosystem, depending on the changing needs of such ecosystem, at the discretion of the DAOAdvocate following consultation with the ArbitrumDAO via the ArbitrumDAO Forums.
Costs
Voting
Overall Cost - Option A: If the ARDC is funded with 880,000 ARB + Multi-Sig Budget.
Option B: If the ARDC is funded with 1.3 Million ARB + Multi-Sig Budget.
Option C: If the ARDC is funded with 1.715 Million ARB + Multi-Sig Budget.
Option D: Abstain
Option E: Do not fund the ARDC
[Excess ARB which will not be utilised as a result of the elected members and their corresponding fees will be returned to the ArbitrumDAO Treasury]
PROPOSAL [PASSED]
ELECTION DETAILS:
23/01/2024 [12:01AM UTC]
3-day buffer period pre-application submission period is initiated.
26/01/2024 [12:01AM UTC] - 05/02/2024 [11:59PM UTC]
7-business day ‘Application Submission’ Period
06/02/2024 [12:01AM UTC] - 14/02/2024 [11:59PM UTC]
7-business day ‘KYC/KYB + Proposal Review Period’
15/02/2024 [12:01AM UTC] - 19/02/2024 [11:59PM UTC]
3-business day ‘Amendment Period’
20/02/2024 - Snapshot Elections [Weighted Voting]
Election Template: ARDC Election Template - Google Docs
Guidance Note: ARDC Guidance Note - Google Docs
APPLICATIONS TO BE POSTED HERE: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-development-collective-elections-applications/20805
Amendments in light of community feedback:
Added detail re. clawback functions on [Multi-Sig] + [Service Provider Streams]
Created the ArbitrumDAO ARDC [Clawback Capability] Governor via the Zodiac Governor Module: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrumdao-ardc-clawback-capability
Abstract - This proposal aims to fund the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective to aid in turning Arbitrum DAO members’ ideas into reality for a term of 6 months.
Motivation - The ARDC's role in reviewing and enhancing governance proposals, conducting code reviews for security, providing quantitative analysis for economic risk, and fostering active delegate engagement will contribute significantly to the growth and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem. It will provide valuable tools and reports for proposal authors, helping them refine their ideas and make better-informed decisions.
Rationale - the ARDC's primary mandate aligns with the strategic priorities of the ArbitrumDAO, particularly in terms of governance optimization, risk management, research, and security. By funding the ARDC, the ArbitrumDAO can enhance its governance framework and future-proof the ecosystem through specialized verticals dedicated to these critical areas.
Steps to Implement - Steps to Implement - The AIP will move to Snapshot on the 11th of December 2023. Following the conclusion of the Snapshot vote, the AIP will then proceed to the on-chain voting stage so as to ratify the funding & process for the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective. Once the forecited steps are concluded, @Immutablelawyer will be announcing the starting date of the election process.
Specifications & Timeline - Specifications & timeline can be found in the following sections.
Overall Cost - Option A: If the ARDC is funded with 880,000 ARB + Multi-Sig Budget.
Option B: If the ARDC is funded with 1.3 Million ARB + Multi-Sig Budget.
Option C: If the ARDC is funded with 1.715 Million ARB + Multi-Sig Budget.
[Excess ARB which will not be utilised as a result of the elected members and their corresponding fees will be returned to the ArbitrumDAO Treasury]
Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [ARDC]
Non-Constitutional
Defining ‘Arbitrum Research & Development Collective’ or ‘ARDC’: An alliance for combined action used to achieve a common goal in the best interests of the ArbitrumDAO
TL;DR
This proposal aims to fund the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective to aid in turning Arbitrum DAO members’ ideas into reality for a term of 6 months.
This proposal intends on forking the Arbitrum Coalition proposal that was submitted & spearheaded by Blockworks Research, Gauntlet & Trail of Bits on the 25th of October 2023 (https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145). The proposal failed the Snapshot temperature check submitted on November 3rd 2023 (https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x42f68a26ff5a5be692a80468a1d1885cf07d590836536f5169cc4b69f64f3f37);
Alignment to the ArbitrumDAO Strategic Priorities:
The ARDC’s mandate will naturally aid in ‘Governance Optimization’ through research & development of tooling related to the ArbitrumDAO’s governance framework.
The ARDC’s mandate will aid in future-proofing the ArbitrumDAO by virtue of its member-specific verticals re. Risk, Research & Security.
This proposal intends on improving on the Arbitrum Coalition proposal by implementing an election mechanism to choose the service providers that may participate in the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective;
This proposal intends on implementing a set of legally enforceable checks & balances to regulate the internal operations of the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective;
The ARDC will be made up of the following members [Subject to change following forum post feedback]: The DAOAdvocate, Risk Management-Oriented Members, Security-Oriented Members, Research-Oriented Members.
Fund the ARDC for a 6-month term.
Background - Perspective
The Arbitrum Coalition was an organization initially made up of Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits. The Coalition aimed to execute turnkey R&D work on behalf of the Arbitrum DAO. The Coalition’s mandate was to help steer the path from ideation in the forum to the optimal, efficient, and safe execution of proposals. In other words, being a steward in making the DAO’s visions a reality. The coalition would have provided the necessary resources so that the ArbitrumDAO can make informed decisions.
The Arbitrum Coalition proposal received a lot of feedback from delegates, community members and contributors alike. In general, the general consensus was that the Arbitrum Coalition was a great theoretical idea & would have provided a great value-add to the Arbitrum Ecosystem. However, it lacked optimal execution in relation to its structural mechanics, especially mechanics re. the appointment & policing of service providers.
This proposal forks the Arbitrum Coalition proposal by iterating & optimizing on such proposal. Hence, certain parts of the proposal will be similar or identical.
The Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [Why?]
The Arbitrum forum is host to numerous commendable proposals, discussions & ideas. These Forum posts frequently lack the pre-requisite research, coordination, design, and risk evaluation mechanisms necessary for them to result in net-positive progress for the Arbitrum Ecosystem.
For instance, the iterative refinement of proposals, the cultivation of delegate awareness & participation at the Forum & voting stage, and the identification of suitable partners to execute an idea often present formidable challenges for proposers themselves (especially when they are newer entrants to the ArbitrumDAO). The primary mandate of the ARDC will be that of providing objective assessment of governance posts by distilling information and expediting governance decision-making; thereby enabling participants in the ArbitrumDAO to make better-informed choices.
The ARDC aims to possess unparalleled expertise by having an established dedicated team capable of executing this initiative. Ideally, all of the ARDC members would have made significant contributions to the ArbitrumDAO. The subject-matter areas that the ARDC Verticals aim to cater for include, but are not limited to:
In our opinion, the forecited subject-matter areas would provide the ArbitrumDAO with the necessary resources so as to ensure that ARDC members provide the ArbitrumDAO with a holistic execution of the ARDC mandate.
Mandate of the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective (ARDC):
Forum Proposal Review & Assistance:
Objective Reporting: The impartial data-driven research conducted by ARDC aids delegates in making well-informed decisions by offering a comprehensive understanding of proposal contexts and competitive landscapes.
Proposal Improvement Tooling: These reports double as valuable tools for proposal authors, helping them enhance their work by incorporating feedback and addressing shortcomings. In this regard, the ARDC will serve as an assistant to proposers on an on-request basis to optimize & structure proposals that could prove to be a value-add to the Arbitrum Ecosystem.
Review on Chain Proposal Code Updates:
Quantitative Assistance:
Quantitative Analysis: The ArbitrumDAO needs an element of quantitative rigor added to proposal evaluations, offering insights into economic risk, design optimization, and overall proposal viability.
Risk Mitigation: This service assists the ArbitrumDAO in identifying and mitigating economic risks associated with proposed initiatives, promoting sound decision-making.
Project Management [On a Request-Basis]:
In addition to the aforementioned services, the ARDC aims to offer the following benefits:
Tooling Creation and Enhancement:
Research New Mechanisms:
Delegate Engagement:
Growth Initiatives:
In summary, the services provided by the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective(ARDC) serve to enhance governance decision-making, security, transparency, and community engagement within the Arbitrum ecosystem, ultimately contributing to its continued growth and success.
Arbitrum Research & Development Collective - Specifications of Verticals [Risk, Research, Security, DAOAdvocate]
The DAOAdvocate
The DAOAdvocate will be a single designated person (Legal/Natural) that will represent the ArbitrumDAO & maintains the ability to direct the ARDC’s efforts; Functions as the bridge between the ArbitrumDAO and the ARDC. The DAOAdvocate will be elected via Snapshot. The advocate will receive a stipend per month as per his ask in the application submitted to the DAO pre-election. The advocate’s main responsibility is ensuring that the Arbitrum DAO’s best interests are met by the ARDC & that the ARDC acts in accordance with its mandate & purposes.
If a member of the ARDC is deemed to have acted negligently, in bad faith, or contrary to the mandate/purposes of the ARDC as ratified by the ArbitrumDAO, the DAOAdvocate will have a legal obligation submit a proposal via Snapshot to terminate such a member of the ARDC together with the necessary details that justify such termination. Following this, the DAOAdvocate will have an ancillary legal obligation to submit a call for applications for the vacant ARDC seat. The decision as to who ought to take up the vacant seat will be determined by the ArbitrumDAO via the election mechanism stipulated in this Forum Post.
The Risk Member
The Risk member should ideally possess a range of skills. This includes a strong quantitative background for conducting thorough reviews, research, and modeling or simulations related to economic risk, design, and optimization. The Risk member is to provide the ArbitrumDAO [through the ARDC] with a comprehensive knowledge-base in relation to digital asset-focused risk identification, risk assessment & risk mitigation. The Risk member should ideally have experience re. risk-focused design, research, and modeling to determine how to incentivize usage, maximize economic efficiency, protect systemic protocol health, and plan for the future with rigorously validated insights.
The Security Member
The Security member should ideally possess skills in specific static analysis bug detection targeting code updates and developing fuzzing capabilities to validate upgrade states. They should be proficient in visualizing the state of governance contracts, ensuring correct encoding of values, and providing educational materials and guidelines for reviewing upgrade procedures. Additionally, they should have expertise in whitebox source code reviews, identifying design flaws, and ensuring security and correctness properties in on-chain upgrade proposals. This role is crucial for preventing governance attacks and may involve building tools and educational materials to support proposal reviews when no code review is required.
The Research Member
The Research member should ideally possess a range of skills, including the ability to conduct objective analysis and contribute to the design of various mechanisms such as sequencers, fraud proofs, and data availability solutions, with a strong emphasis on objective data-driven research. They should also be proficient in creating processes that incentivize active delegate participation, such as developing delegate incentives frameworks and hosting regular collaborative calls. Additionally, they should be skilled in content creation to promote the Arbitrum ecosystem's growth. Moreover, the candidate should have a knack for producing impartial, data-driven research to aid delegates in making informed decisions and improving proposal quality. Excellent communication skills and the ability to manage interactions with DAO stakeholders and service providers are essential, along with the capacity to document ARDC activities and recommend solutions for any issues that arise, maintaining a governance process for continuity.
Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [Elections]
We propose adapting section 4 of the ArbitrumDAO Constitution & optimizing it to apply to the election for ARDC Members [REF: https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/dao-constitution]. Hereunder, we propose an adapted model of Section 4 of the ArbitrumDAO Constitution to implement to the ARDC Elections.
The ARDC election process is scheduled to begin 3 business days from the ratification of the on-chain proposal.
The date chosen for the first election will form the basis for all future elections. Every election should begin 6 months after the previous election has been finalized.
All ARDC members are expected to serve their term unless terminated by the ArbitrumDAO through Snapshot as stipulated in the Agreement regulating the ARDC [Further details below re. the Agreement & Defining provisions].
There will be four separate elections per vertical based on the intellectual need of the ARDC:
The following timeline governs an election process that starts at time T [‘T’ means the date that the on-chain vote passes +3 days]:
Governing Rules
Election Process
1. Application Submission (T+7 business days):
Anyone may submit an application on a dedicated page on the ArbitrumDAO Forums in conformity with the application template;
2. KYB/KYC + Delegate Review Period (7 business day period following end of Application Submission Period):
Applicants who would have validly submitted their applications in conformity with the application template will then be required to undergo KYC/KYB processes. All candidates will cooperate with the Arbitrum Foundation and complete the compliance process. The Arbitrum Foundation is responsible for removing any candidates that fail the compliance process. Only applicants that pass KYB/KYC will be eligible for election.
3. Amendment Period (3 business day period following the end of the KYB/KYC + Delegate Review period whereby applicants may amend their application):
Applicants may amend their applications in light of community feedback during this time period.
4. Member election (7 business day period following end of Amendment Period):
A Snapshot with weighted voting will be put up per vertical including the list of all eligible candidates:
Snapshot for DAOAdvocate election;
Snapshot for Risk Management-Oriented Member election;
Snapshot for Security-Oriented Member election;
Snapshot for Research-Oriented Member election.
The ArbitrumDAO may approve and implement a Non-Constitutional AIP to change the rules governing future ARDC elections, but the AIP process may not be used to intervene in an ongoing election.
Election Application Template
For the fee-cap applicable to the role being applied for, please refer to the Funding section. Applicants requesting asks exceeding the corresponding cap will be contacted to amend accordingly.
Applicant Information
Name of Applicant & Applicant’s Representative [If Applicable]:
Email Address:
Telegram Handle (if applicable):
LinkedIn Profile (if applicable):
Role being applied for [1 Max] [DAOAdvocate, Risk Management-Oriented Member, Security-Oriented Member, Research-Oriented Member]:
Background Information [Applicable to all]
Please provide a brief overview of your experience in the digital asset industry and, more specifically, Ethereum & Arbitrum Ecosystems. Include any relevant projects, contributions, or roles within the ArbitrumDAO, if applicable. (400 words max)
Specify the subject-matter area(s) you are interested in contributing to within ARDC (e.g., Research, Framework Development, Risk Assessment, etc.). Explain why you believe your skills align with the chosen area(s). (500 words max)
Objectives & Motivation [Applicable to all]
What motivates you to join ARDC, and what do you hope to achieve as a member? (300 words max)
Explain how you envision contributing to the primary mandate of ARDC, which is to provide objective assessment of ArbitrumDAO Forum proposals & discussions and expedite governance decision-making within the Arbitrum ecosystem. (300 words max)
Skills and Experience [Applicable to all]
Provide details about your relevant skills and experience, including any previous work or contributions related to the subject-matter area(s) you are interested in within ARDC. (300 words max)
Proposal Review & Assistance [Applicable to all]
Share what approach you would implement to conducting objective research and providing assistance to proposers to enhance their proposals. (300 words max)
Review on Chain Proposal Code Updates [Only applicable to Security]
Describe your experience in conducting code reviews and assessing security risks. How can you contribute to enhancing the security and integrity of the Arbitrum ecosystem? (500 words max)
Quantitative Assistance [Only applicable to Risk]
Explain how you can bring quantitative analysis skills to proposal evaluations and contribute to identifying and mitigating economic risks associated with proposed initiatives. (500 words max)
Research Initiatives [Only applicable to Research]
Describe your experience conducting research-oriented initiatives within the digital asset industry, more specifically, research re. the Arbitrum-specific tech-stack. Explain how your previous experience can translate to an added value contribution to the ARDC & the ArbitrumDAO. (500 words max)
Project Management [Applicable to all]
Describe your project management experience. (250 words max)
Purpose/Mandate of the ARDC [Applicable to all]
How do you intend to objectively contribute to achieving the purposes/mandate of the ARDC? (500 words max)
Additional Contributions [Applicable to all]
How can you contribute to the creation and enhancement of tools for security assessment, the development of educational materials, research into new mechanisms, delegate engagement, and growth initiatives, as outlined in ARDC's objectives? (500 words max)
Scope of Services & Applicable Fees [Detailed breakdown of fees including pricing model for the 6-month term] [Applicable to all except DAOAdvocate] [Must not exceed applicable cap]
Please provide a detailed breakdown of the scope of services through which you will be contributing. Include the pricing model implemented & a description of expected hours + hourly rate (if applicable) & manpower dedicated to the ARDC.
Summary [Applicable to all]
In summary, please highlight your key qualifications and what you believe you can bring to ARDC. (400 words max)
Feel free to attach any relevant documents, portfolios, or links to previous work or contributions.
Checks & Balances
The ARDC will be regulated via an Agreement entered into by all elected ARDC Members with the Arbitrum Foundation serving as a counterparty to the Agreement.
The Agreement will be made public & include, but will not be limited to the following provisions:
Appointment & Termination: ARDC Members will be appointed via the forecited election process in accordance with ArbitrumDAO Consent by the Arbitrum Community.
“Arbitrum Community” means those persons who have the right to propose and vote on proposals ergo, the token holders of the ARB token with the following contract address [0x912CE59144191C1204E64559FE8253a0e49E6548] from time to time visible at [https://arbiscan.io/token/0x912ce59144191c1204e64559fe8253a0e49e6548#balances].
“"ArbitrumDAO Consent" means a vote of the ArbitrumDAO Community in favour of a proposal satisfying the minimum requirements set forth at https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/dao-constitution (as such minimum requirements set forth therein on the date hereof may be revised from time to time with ArbitrumDAO Consent) taken by any of the following means:
1. https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth (or any successor thereto); or
2. another mechanism, whether on or off a blockchain, that ensures only and all people voting hold or have been delegated blockchain-based tokens known as ARB."
Conflict of Interest Provision: ARDC Members will be bound to act in absolute good faith, utmost honesty, refraining from deriving unauthorized profits from their position & disclose conflicts of interest. ARDC members should always disclose any potential or actual conflicts of interests to the DAOAdvocate who will then proceed to mitigate the respective ARDC Member’s involvement in the task in relation to which such ARDC Member is conflicted.
To sum up, all ARDC Members must declare the nature and extent of any interest, direct or indirect, which the ARDC Member is aware that she, he or it has in a proposed task at hand.
Mandate & Purpose of the ARDC: The ARDC members are pivotal in executing the purposes of the ARDC, ensuring that the activities thereof align with the ARDC’s objectives and the stipulations of ratified proposal. Here, it is also a role of the DAOAdvocate, to see that this is actually being done and that activities within the ARDC will actually further or are in conformity with the purposes outlined in the ratified proposal.
Record-keeping and Reporting: Comprehensive and precise record-keeping is imperative. ARDC Members will be required to maintain detailed accounts and documentation of the ARDC’S internal operational workflow together with meeting minutes taken by the DAOAdvocate. Furthermore, periodic reporting is essential so as to keep the ArbitrumDAO updated re. Task-specific progress & internal ARDC Administration (such as which ARDC Member is working on which task & deadlines for the expected publication of tasks that fall in line with the purposes of the ARDC).
Duty of Impartiality: ARDC Members will have an obligation to act in an impartial manner in relation to their tasks & workflow, ensuring that the ARDC is not compromised by personal interests or external influences.
Obligation of Recusal: ARDC Members with a conflict of interest involving a project being reviewed by the ARDC should recuse themselves from participating in the evaluation and should vote Abstain if a proposal directly related to the ARDC is submitted. Additionally, ARDC members will abstain from commenting or voting on proposals made by any company that can be deemed a direct competitor.
Prohibition of Self-Dealing: Participants should refrain from voting on sending funds to themselves or organizations where any portion of those funds is expected to flow to them, their other projects, or anyone they have a close personal or economic relationship with.
Ethical Trading: Members are required to follow ethical trading standards in regard to ARB and any other relevant digital assets.
Operational parameters to be implemented
We believe this eliminates information asymmetry while allowing ARDC members to conduct their work in the most efficient possible manner. For token holders and the community, they can quickly go to these operational dashboards and see ARDC progress. When research is released, it's clearly defined who worked on it, amount of hours, and total project time.
Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [Multi-Sig]
The ARDC’s 3/5 multisig is being created. The funds in the multisig belong to the ArbitrumDAO and the signers act as Multi-Sig administrators on behalf of the ArbitrumDAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Signers will receive 1,000 ARB per month for their contribution. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in ArbitrumDAO governance including delegation. The multisig includes:
The ARDC multisig includes two features to ensure accountability of signers and members elected:
Streaming of funds to elected members through Hedgey on a monthly basis. The ArbitrumDAO will maintain control over this stream and have the ability to cut it off with an on-chain vote as the ArbitrumDAO will be made the Grant Admin on the Hedgey module.
Clawback capability as explained hereunder.
The Multi-Sig will grant the ArbitrumDAO the function to clawback funds from the ARDC Multi-Sig via the Zodiac Governor Module via the created ArbitrumDAO ARDC [Clawback Capability]: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrumdao-ardc-clawback-capability
In addition, after the ARDC Elections & thus, member appointment, the ARDC Multi-Sig members will utilise Hedgey to stream the respective funds to the elected members with the ArbitrumDAO being the Grant Admin thereof. The ArbitrumDAO's Grant Admin role thus gives the DAO the ability to halt any streaming of funds to any member via governance.
Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [Term]
The duration of the ARDC’s mandate will be of 182 days [6 months] from the moment the on-chain proposal is approved. The ARDC may seek to identify and complete other initiatives for the ArbitrumDAO & the wider Arbitrum Ecosystem, depending on the changing needs of such ecosystem, at the discretion of the DAOAdvocate following consultation with the ArbitrumDAO via the ArbitrumDAO Forums.
Costs
Voting
Overall Cost - Option A: If the ARDC is funded with 880,000 ARB + Multi-Sig Budget.
Option B: If the ARDC is funded with 1.3 Million ARB + Multi-Sig Budget.
Option C: If the ARDC is funded with 1.715 Million ARB + Multi-Sig Budget.
Option D: Abstain
Option E: Do not fund the ARDC
[Excess ARB which will not be utilised as a result of the elected members and their corresponding fees will be returned to the ArbitrumDAO Treasury]
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-non-constitutional-establish-the-arbitrum-research-development-collective/19899/36?u=krst
This will add more structure to the community
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-non-constitutional-establish-the-arbitrum-research-development-collective/19899/36?u=krst
This will add more structure to the community
https://twitter.com/CarlZielinski/status/1747223754227458083
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-non-constitutional-establish-the-arbitrum-research-development-collective/19899/31?u=karelvuong
I appreciate the sentiment but feel like the scope of this proposal is too wide and too vague. I am excited to be proven wrong tho, and will support the proposal in it's execution if it passes.
I believe the Arbitrum community needs to formalize relationships with top service providers to ensure efficient development/operations
We think that R&D is important for Arbitrum, but we prefer to vote "FOR" less amount.
https://twitter.com/CarlZielinski/status/1747223754227458083
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-non-constitutional-establish-the-arbitrum-research-development-collective/19899/31?u=karelvuong
I appreciate the sentiment but feel like the scope of this proposal is too wide and too vague. I am excited to be proven wrong tho, and will support the proposal in it's execution if it passes.
I believe the Arbitrum community needs to formalize relationships with top service providers to ensure efficient development/operations
We think that R&D is important for Arbitrum, but we prefer to vote "FOR" less amount.
I think this is a well-designed proposal. The ARDC's formation is a strategic move that meets the needs of the Arbitrum DAO. Comments:
The ARDC's mandate aligns well with the DAOs priorities. It sets out to optimize risk management parameters, and in addition invests in research, risk-management and security verticals that are essential to the continued development of Arbitrum.
The establishment of a clear election process for ARDC members, along with the implementation of checks and balances, ensures transparency and accountability. It will be interesting to see how the DAOAdvocate role materializes, but I can certainly see how the concept of a trust-like "protector" in the context of DAOs adds checks and balances.
The integration of clawback functions on the Multi-Sig and Service Provider Streams adds an additional layer of control for the DAO, ensuring that funds are used responsibly and in alignment with community goals.
The proposed budget options offer flexibility (funds are returned if unused) and despite the cost the scope is large so it represents good value for money in this current market.
This proposal also learns from and improves upon past initiatives like the Arbitrum Coalition proposal, demonstrating an ability to evolve and listen to community experience and feedback.
I'm excited about the potential positive impact this could bring to the Arbitrum ecosystem. The ARDC's mandate, which includes governance proposal reviews, code audits, risk assessments, and quantitative analysis, aligns well with the strategic priorities of the ArbitrumDAO. The proposed election process for key roles, such as the DAOAdvocate, Risk Management, Security, and Research members, seems well-structured and inclusive.
I believe that the ARDC proposal, with its well-defined structure, focus on community engagement, and commitment to transparency, has the potential to significantly contribute to the growth and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
I think this is a well-designed proposal. The ARDC's formation is a strategic move that meets the needs of the Arbitrum DAO. Comments:
The ARDC's mandate aligns well with the DAOs priorities. It sets out to optimize risk management parameters, and in addition invests in research, risk-management and security verticals that are essential to the continued development of Arbitrum.
The establishment of a clear election process for ARDC members, along with the implementation of checks and balances, ensures transparency and accountability. It will be interesting to see how the DAOAdvocate role materializes, but I can certainly see how the concept of a trust-like "protector" in the context of DAOs adds checks and balances.
The integration of clawback functions on the Multi-Sig and Service Provider Streams adds an additional layer of control for the DAO, ensuring that funds are used responsibly and in alignment with community goals.
The proposed budget options offer flexibility (funds are returned if unused) and despite the cost the scope is large so it represents good value for money in this current market.
This proposal also learns from and improves upon past initiatives like the Arbitrum Coalition proposal, demonstrating an ability to evolve and listen to community experience and feedback.
I'm excited about the potential positive impact this could bring to the Arbitrum ecosystem. The ARDC's mandate, which includes governance proposal reviews, code audits, risk assessments, and quantitative analysis, aligns well with the strategic priorities of the ArbitrumDAO. The proposed election process for key roles, such as the DAOAdvocate, Risk Management, Security, and Research members, seems well-structured and inclusive.
I believe that the ARDC proposal, with its well-defined structure, focus on community engagement, and commitment to transparency, has the potential to significantly contribute to the growth and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
@devansh This is a significant pitfall to highlight with ranked-choice voting. In any governance decision that includes an Abstain option, I caution against using ranked choice as it may have the unintended consequence of undermining it. To ensure a voter is truly abstaining without applying their voting power, they should not cast at all.
@devansh This is a significant pitfall to highlight with ranked-choice voting. In any governance decision that includes an Abstain option, I caution against using ranked choice as it may have the unintended consequence of undermining it. To ensure a voter is truly abstaining without applying their voting power, they should not cast at all.
This topic was discussed at length in the Ethereum Name Service (ENS) community, culminating in a response from Nick Johnson and Alex Van de Sande. See: A primer on ranked-choice voting.
The conclusion internally in the ENS community seemed to be that:
There does not seem to be any change in the outcome here because this forked coalition proposal intends to remove the direct conflict of interest from voters who previously abstained. Still, considering the similarities in outcome to the coalition proposal, it's worth highlighting.
When voting on the four verticals (security, risk, research, DAOadvocate), avoiding creating a similar situation will be necessary. A possible solution is to use Weighted Voting as this allows voters to spread voting power among different candidates of preference and, for those who wish to entirely abstain, the option to allocate 100% of voting power with that selection.
Compound voting decisions ask the voter to make multiple decisions in one action. Although this can be efficient for governance and is not inherently wrong, it carries a higher risk of unintended outcomes.
This proposal falls into this category. It asks voters to decide two things:
I'm unsure if two separate proposals would be culturally accepted here, and if it's worth the governance burden when spending ~3.5M p.a., but wanted to bring this up.
However, it lacked optimal execution in relation to its structural mechanics, especially mechanics re. the appointment & policing of service providers.
I don't believe that the reason for its rejection was as stated.
@devansh This is a significant pitfall to highlight with ranked-choice voting. In any governance decision that includes an Abstain option, I caution against using ranked choice as it may have the unintended consequence of undermining it. To ensure a voter is truly abstaining without applying their voting power, they should not cast at all.
@devansh This is a significant pitfall to highlight with ranked-choice voting. In any governance decision that includes an Abstain option, I caution against using ranked choice as it may have the unintended consequence of undermining it. To ensure a voter is truly abstaining without applying their voting power, they should not cast at all.
This topic was discussed at length in the Ethereum Name Service (ENS) community, culminating in a response from Nick Johnson and Alex Van de Sande. See: A primer on ranked-choice voting.
The conclusion internally in the ENS community seemed to be that:
There does not seem to be any change in the outcome here because this forked coalition proposal intends to remove the direct conflict of interest from voters who previously abstained. Still, considering the similarities in outcome to the coalition proposal, it's worth highlighting.
When voting on the four verticals (security, risk, research, DAOadvocate), avoiding creating a similar situation will be necessary. A possible solution is to use Weighted Voting as this allows voters to spread voting power among different candidates of preference and, for those who wish to entirely abstain, the option to allocate 100% of voting power with that selection.
Compound voting decisions ask the voter to make multiple decisions in one action. Although this can be efficient for governance and is not inherently wrong, it carries a higher risk of unintended outcomes.
This proposal falls into this category. It asks voters to decide two things:
I'm unsure if two separate proposals would be culturally accepted here, and if it's worth the governance burden when spending ~3.5M p.a., but wanted to bring this up.
However, it lacked optimal execution in relation to its structural mechanics, especially mechanics re. the appointment & policing of service providers.
I don't believe that the reason for its rejection was as stated.
However, it lacked optimal execution in relation to its structural mechanics, especially mechanics re. the appointment & policing of service providers.
I don't believe that the reason for its rejection was as stated.
I think this proposal, overall, suffers from the same issue as the one previously mentioned. It grants excessive power to a single individual for making decisions about resource allocation, which leads to numerous problems. The role of DAOAdvocate, as currently proposed, should not exist.
16,000 ARB to @Immutablelawyer as retroactive payment for Research, draft and reviews of of the ARDC Proposal + Coordinating individually across stakeholders, community members & delegates.
It seems a bit pricey, doesn't it? Could you justify this, especially considering that it is recognized as a fork from another proposal?
R&D is important for Arbitrum DAO and will have many benefits in the long term, but it is important to look at the ROI on the investment made and priority. The ARB proposed are at a relatively higher side and also it may bring lot of negative energy and power in the hands of few. I would love to see the clear framework with accountabilities to decide on.
I think ArbitrumDAO definitely needs RnD arm but there are a few things I would change in the proposal
I think AD should first onboard a DAO advocate who will represent the DAO in the relations between DAO and all other Service Providers
Costs should not be predetermined in this proposal but each role should be selected through a tender where the applicants will clearly specify the costs of their work and what is included in there. So you won't have a Research member with a $1m/y salary who does little to nothing.
Thank you for the reply.
The proposal text (as posted onchain) says it will use Hedgey as a streaming platform for funds.
Thank you for the reply.
The proposal text (as posted onchain) says it will use Hedgey as a streaming platform for funds.
For that to be the case you would need to create a Hedgey stream following the instructions in https://hedgey.gitbook.io/hedgey-community-docs/hedgey/token-grants/for-grant-issuers During this configuration it will allow you to setup the streaming, making it revokable by the DAO (with the grants admin address being the DAO).
If the funds get directly transferred to the Safe multisig (as it is in the current onchain proposal up for a vote), the streaming/vesting will not be respected regardless of Zodiac modules or not.
However, it lacked optimal execution in relation to its structural mechanics, especially mechanics re. the appointment & policing of service providers.
I don't believe that the reason for its rejection was as stated.
I think this proposal, overall, suffers from the same issue as the one previously mentioned. It grants excessive power to a single individual for making decisions about resource allocation, which leads to numerous problems. The role of DAOAdvocate, as currently proposed, should not exist.
16,000 ARB to @Immutablelawyer as retroactive payment for Research, draft and reviews of of the ARDC Proposal + Coordinating individually across stakeholders, community members & delegates.
It seems a bit pricey, doesn't it? Could you justify this, especially considering that it is recognized as a fork from another proposal?
R&D is important for Arbitrum DAO and will have many benefits in the long term, but it is important to look at the ROI on the investment made and priority. The ARB proposed are at a relatively higher side and also it may bring lot of negative energy and power in the hands of few. I would love to see the clear framework with accountabilities to decide on.
I think ArbitrumDAO definitely needs RnD arm but there are a few things I would change in the proposal
I think AD should first onboard a DAO advocate who will represent the DAO in the relations between DAO and all other Service Providers
Costs should not be predetermined in this proposal but each role should be selected through a tender where the applicants will clearly specify the costs of their work and what is included in there. So you won't have a Research member with a $1m/y salary who does little to nothing.
Thank you for the reply.
The proposal text (as posted onchain) says it will use Hedgey as a streaming platform for funds.
Thank you for the reply.
The proposal text (as posted onchain) says it will use Hedgey as a streaming platform for funds.
For that to be the case you would need to create a Hedgey stream following the instructions in https://hedgey.gitbook.io/hedgey-community-docs/hedgey/token-grants/for-grant-issuers During this configuration it will allow you to setup the streaming, making it revokable by the DAO (with the grants admin address being the DAO).
If the funds get directly transferred to the Safe multisig (as it is in the current onchain proposal up for a vote), the streaming/vesting will not be respected regardless of Zodiac modules or not.
A proposal to fund the ARDC initiative was posted in https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/35525013043870715946223420504118237039230172376655957921569389087285511330636
Is there any documentation on how the streaming and clawback mechanisms work? How are they implemented in the multisig linked in the above proposal?
A proposal to fund the ARDC initiative was posted in https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/35525013043870715946223420504118237039230172376655957921569389087285511330636
Is there any documentation on how the streaming and clawback mechanisms work? How are they implemented in the multisig linked in the above proposal?
ARDC Elections, Election Template & Guidance can be found hereunder:
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
We expressed our support for the proposal during temp-check and we’ll also be voting in its favour during the on-chain vote. We believe the establishment of the collective proposed will be beneficial to the DAO.
The Savvy DeFi DAO's Arbitrum Council has voted decisively FOR the ARDC proposal, and we'd like to share our collective perspective on this strategic move.
The Savvy DeFi DAO's Arbitrum Council has voted decisively FOR the ARDC proposal, and we'd like to share our collective perspective on this strategic move.
Special thanks to Immutable Lawyer for his outstanding work.
Savvy DeFi DAO's Arbitrum Council
Hello everyone,
Firstly, I'd like to take this opportunity for everyone's collective participation, feedback & support in the process of getting this initiative up & running for the ArbitrumDAO - Whatever the result of the vote, I am very pleased to have conversed & spoken to a lot of delegates & contributors on the structuring of the proposal, the value proposition of the ARDC together with addressing & incorporating feedback & queries posed.
Hello everyone,
Firstly, I'd like to take this opportunity for everyone's collective participation, feedback & support in the process of getting this initiative up & running for the ArbitrumDAO - Whatever the result of the vote, I am very pleased to have conversed & spoken to a lot of delegates & contributors on the structuring of the proposal, the value proposition of the ARDC together with addressing & incorporating feedback & queries posed.
As an announcement, unfortunately BP from Gamma had to drop from the Multi-sig due to unforeseen circumstance. I'd like to thank BP for his prompt assistance with the Multi-Sig setup and wish him and his team all the best :handshake:
In BP's stead, @JoJo will be added to the Multi-Sig as the fifth signer.
Thank you all!
Kind regards, Joseph [Immutablelawyer] Axis Advisory
Hello sir!
We will be using the Zodiac Governance Module to cater for the forecited mechanisms [ref: https://docs.tally.xyz/user-guides/using-governor-with-gnosis-safe/zodiac-governor-module-for-subdaos-and-grants-programs]
Will be implementing this to the MS tomorrow!
Shoutout to @Frisson for helping out with this particular facet :handshake:
Here is the reasoning behind why we voted FOR this proposal onchain, despite having hesitations around the Snapshot phase
All opinions come from @juanbug and me, the operators of the Uniswap DAO's ARB delegation
After consideration Treasure DAO’s Arbitrum Council (ARC) would like to vote FOR this proposal.
Our rationale remains consistent with the one we expressed during the Snapshot Vote. This is provided below.
After consideration Treasure DAO’s Arbitrum Council (ARC) would like to vote FOR this proposal.
Our rationale remains consistent with the one we expressed during the Snapshot Vote. This is provided below.
Effective management of risk, security and research are important domains Arbitrum DAO needs to prioritise. We recognize the value proposition of the original Arbitrum Coalition proposal but had concerns on the centralization of power in the DAO, and lack of open, fair and meritocratic service provider tender process. We feel this proposal goes some way towards addressing these concerns and provides a level playing field which will allow the DAO to select those providers most suitable for the role. We recognize this proposal is complex, however we have faith both in the authors rigour and the direction this proposal is taking Arbitrum DAO and will be voting FOR.
We have prioritised the options for the total budget cap, listing our preferences as follows: 1.715, 1.3, 880k. We believe this will ensure we do not deter some high-quality service providers from participating, whilst still allowing the opportunity for service providers to competitively bid against each other. We believe this is the best route to provide impactful, fair and merit based outcomes for the DAO.
I support the need for a collective like ARDC for the DAO and acknowledge its necessity in areas like risk management, security, and research.
Managing risks and doing research well is super important for Arbitrum DAO. I liked the original idea of the Arbitrum Coalition, but was a bit worried about too much power being in one place and not enough openness in choosing service providers. This new plan seems to fix some of those worries and makes things more fair for choosing the right people for the job, so I voted YES to support it.
Thanks for this @fred !
We are planning on reposting the on-chain proposal with the forecited implementations + amendments to the text as there were some errors made even in the text.
So the tl;dr is:
The new on-chain proposal will have the clawback mechanism of the DAO re. the Multi-Sig funds embedded;
Thanks for this @fred !
We are planning on reposting the on-chain proposal with the forecited implementations + amendments to the text as there were some errors made even in the text.
So the tl;dr is:
The new on-chain proposal will have the clawback mechanism of the DAO re. the Multi-Sig funds embedded;
Post-SP Election, we will then use Hedgeye to pay elected service providers and put the DAO as the Grant Administrator (thus the DAO will be able to halt payments to SPs as well, aside from also having the ability to clawback MS funds)
Excuse the multiple edits, wanted to provide a quick reply but am currently in a meeting :sweat_smile:
After consideration Treasure DAO’s Arbitrum Representative Council (ARC) would like to share the following feedback on this proposal:
Effective management of risk, security and research are important domains Arbitrum DAO needs to prioritise. We recognize the value proposition of the original Arbitrum Coalition proposal but had concerns on the centralization of power in the DAO, and lack of open, fair and meritocratic service provider tender process. We feel this proposal goes some way towards addressing these concerns and provides a level playing field which will allow the DAO to select those providers most suitable for the role. We recognize this proposal is complex, however we have faith both in the authors rigour and the direction this proposal is taking Arbitrum DAO. As such, we voted FOR.
@coltron.eth @thedevanshmehta
Really sorry I did not address this on yesterday's call @thedevanshmehta as I had to hop off ser (I saw your comment on the google meets).
@coltron.eth @thedevanshmehta
Really sorry I did not address this on yesterday's call @thedevanshmehta as I had to hop off ser (I saw your comment on the google meets).
In all honesty this was a factor (or rather, an in-built flaw) of ranked-choice voting I was not aware of. In fact, I think that for the Procurement Committee proposal I will opt for the Weighted Voting method as suggested by Coltron. I thought that Ranked-Choice would be good as it would give me insight on what would voters prefer from a priority pov re. funding.
Can you guys reach out to me on Telegram @immutablelawyer? I want to discuss what voting options you think would be best for different scenarios and potentially create a post on this!
Congrats on this proposal passing the snapshot vote! Glad to see the strong consensus emerge on the need for service providers helping to get things moving in the DAO.
While going through the votes, I did want to bring up an issue with ranked choice voting as it currently exists: there is no way to abstain!!!
Congrats on this proposal passing the snapshot vote! Glad to see the strong consensus emerge on the need for service providers helping to get things moving in the DAO.
While going through the votes, I did want to bring up an issue with ranked choice voting as it currently exists: there is no way to abstain!!!
In the ARDC vote, a large delegate with 8 million ARB abstained, presumably for conflict of interest reasons
But as very few others abstained, the option was eliminated and his vote went towards funding the collective at the highest amount!
The final result now shows 0 abstain votes
This isn't a comment on this proposal; I just so happened to notice it for this vote and thought it worth mentioning.
Appreciate your guys' support!
Thanks for the valuable feedback @Pepperoni_Jo3 !
ARDC Elections, Election Template & Guidance can be found hereunder:
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
We expressed our support for the proposal during temp-check and we’ll also be voting in its favour during the on-chain vote. We believe the establishment of the collective proposed will be beneficial to the DAO.
The Savvy DeFi DAO's Arbitrum Council has voted decisively FOR the ARDC proposal, and we'd like to share our collective perspective on this strategic move.
The Savvy DeFi DAO's Arbitrum Council has voted decisively FOR the ARDC proposal, and we'd like to share our collective perspective on this strategic move.
Special thanks to Immutable Lawyer for his outstanding work.
Savvy DeFi DAO's Arbitrum Council
Hello everyone,
Firstly, I'd like to take this opportunity for everyone's collective participation, feedback & support in the process of getting this initiative up & running for the ArbitrumDAO - Whatever the result of the vote, I am very pleased to have conversed & spoken to a lot of delegates & contributors on the structuring of the proposal, the value proposition of the ARDC together with addressing & incorporating feedback & queries posed.
Hello everyone,
Firstly, I'd like to take this opportunity for everyone's collective participation, feedback & support in the process of getting this initiative up & running for the ArbitrumDAO - Whatever the result of the vote, I am very pleased to have conversed & spoken to a lot of delegates & contributors on the structuring of the proposal, the value proposition of the ARDC together with addressing & incorporating feedback & queries posed.
As an announcement, unfortunately BP from Gamma had to drop from the Multi-sig due to unforeseen circumstance. I'd like to thank BP for his prompt assistance with the Multi-Sig setup and wish him and his team all the best :handshake:
In BP's stead, @JoJo will be added to the Multi-Sig as the fifth signer.
Thank you all!
Kind regards, Joseph [Immutablelawyer] Axis Advisory
Hello sir!
We will be using the Zodiac Governance Module to cater for the forecited mechanisms [ref: https://docs.tally.xyz/user-guides/using-governor-with-gnosis-safe/zodiac-governor-module-for-subdaos-and-grants-programs]
Will be implementing this to the MS tomorrow!
Shoutout to @Frisson for helping out with this particular facet :handshake:
Here is the reasoning behind why we voted FOR this proposal onchain, despite having hesitations around the Snapshot phase
All opinions come from @juanbug and me, the operators of the Uniswap DAO's ARB delegation
After consideration Treasure DAO’s Arbitrum Council (ARC) would like to vote FOR this proposal.
Our rationale remains consistent with the one we expressed during the Snapshot Vote. This is provided below.
After consideration Treasure DAO’s Arbitrum Council (ARC) would like to vote FOR this proposal.
Our rationale remains consistent with the one we expressed during the Snapshot Vote. This is provided below.
Effective management of risk, security and research are important domains Arbitrum DAO needs to prioritise. We recognize the value proposition of the original Arbitrum Coalition proposal but had concerns on the centralization of power in the DAO, and lack of open, fair and meritocratic service provider tender process. We feel this proposal goes some way towards addressing these concerns and provides a level playing field which will allow the DAO to select those providers most suitable for the role. We recognize this proposal is complex, however we have faith both in the authors rigour and the direction this proposal is taking Arbitrum DAO and will be voting FOR.
We have prioritised the options for the total budget cap, listing our preferences as follows: 1.715, 1.3, 880k. We believe this will ensure we do not deter some high-quality service providers from participating, whilst still allowing the opportunity for service providers to competitively bid against each other. We believe this is the best route to provide impactful, fair and merit based outcomes for the DAO.
I support the need for a collective like ARDC for the DAO and acknowledge its necessity in areas like risk management, security, and research.
Managing risks and doing research well is super important for Arbitrum DAO. I liked the original idea of the Arbitrum Coalition, but was a bit worried about too much power being in one place and not enough openness in choosing service providers. This new plan seems to fix some of those worries and makes things more fair for choosing the right people for the job, so I voted YES to support it.
Thanks for this @fred !
We are planning on reposting the on-chain proposal with the forecited implementations + amendments to the text as there were some errors made even in the text.
So the tl;dr is:
The new on-chain proposal will have the clawback mechanism of the DAO re. the Multi-Sig funds embedded;
Thanks for this @fred !
We are planning on reposting the on-chain proposal with the forecited implementations + amendments to the text as there were some errors made even in the text.
So the tl;dr is:
The new on-chain proposal will have the clawback mechanism of the DAO re. the Multi-Sig funds embedded;
Post-SP Election, we will then use Hedgeye to pay elected service providers and put the DAO as the Grant Administrator (thus the DAO will be able to halt payments to SPs as well, aside from also having the ability to clawback MS funds)
Excuse the multiple edits, wanted to provide a quick reply but am currently in a meeting :sweat_smile:
After consideration Treasure DAO’s Arbitrum Representative Council (ARC) would like to share the following feedback on this proposal:
Effective management of risk, security and research are important domains Arbitrum DAO needs to prioritise. We recognize the value proposition of the original Arbitrum Coalition proposal but had concerns on the centralization of power in the DAO, and lack of open, fair and meritocratic service provider tender process. We feel this proposal goes some way towards addressing these concerns and provides a level playing field which will allow the DAO to select those providers most suitable for the role. We recognize this proposal is complex, however we have faith both in the authors rigour and the direction this proposal is taking Arbitrum DAO. As such, we voted FOR.
@coltron.eth @thedevanshmehta
Really sorry I did not address this on yesterday's call @thedevanshmehta as I had to hop off ser (I saw your comment on the google meets).
@coltron.eth @thedevanshmehta
Really sorry I did not address this on yesterday's call @thedevanshmehta as I had to hop off ser (I saw your comment on the google meets).
In all honesty this was a factor (or rather, an in-built flaw) of ranked-choice voting I was not aware of. In fact, I think that for the Procurement Committee proposal I will opt for the Weighted Voting method as suggested by Coltron. I thought that Ranked-Choice would be good as it would give me insight on what would voters prefer from a priority pov re. funding.
Can you guys reach out to me on Telegram @immutablelawyer? I want to discuss what voting options you think would be best for different scenarios and potentially create a post on this!
Congrats on this proposal passing the snapshot vote! Glad to see the strong consensus emerge on the need for service providers helping to get things moving in the DAO.
While going through the votes, I did want to bring up an issue with ranked choice voting as it currently exists: there is no way to abstain!!!
Congrats on this proposal passing the snapshot vote! Glad to see the strong consensus emerge on the need for service providers helping to get things moving in the DAO.
While going through the votes, I did want to bring up an issue with ranked choice voting as it currently exists: there is no way to abstain!!!
In the ARDC vote, a large delegate with 8 million ARB abstained, presumably for conflict of interest reasons
But as very few others abstained, the option was eliminated and his vote went towards funding the collective at the highest amount!
The final result now shows 0 abstain votes
This isn't a comment on this proposal; I just so happened to notice it for this vote and thought it worth mentioning.
Appreciate your guys' support!
Thanks for the valuable feedback @Pepperoni_Jo3 !
Here is the reasoning behind why we voted FOR this proposal onchain, despite having hesitations around the Snapshot phase
All opinions come from @juanbug and me, the operators of the Uniswap DAO's ARB delegation
Vote: For
Type: Onchain
We voted FOR the initial coalition proposal but voted against this proposal during the Snapshot. However, our position has since changed, so we voted FOR this proposal onchain. Our general stance is that the DAO should have committees for facilitating various critical DAO functions. The initial release of this proposal was met with a lack of engagement, so we wanted more conversation to transpire before being in favor. Although the feedback for this initiative still hasn’t met the same level of engagement as the coalition proposal in the forums, when observing conversations in private channels, it became clear that there is appetite from most delegates to see this through.
We also suggested previously that this proposal can be divided up into multiple proposals to prevent bundling too many decisions into one vote. The broad nature of the proposal may still make this the better approach, however, we do realize that unbundling this proposal may be operationally difficult, requiring multiple snapshots /onchain votes.
After consideration Treasure DAO’s Arbitrum Representative Council (ARC) would like to share the following feedback on this proposal:
Effective management of risk, security and research are important domains Arbitrum DAO needs to prioritise. We recognize the value proposition of the original Arbitrum Coalition proposal but had concerns on the centralization of power in the DAO, and lack of open, fair and meritocratic service provider tender process. We feel this proposal goes some way towards addressing these concerns and provides a level playing field which will allow the DAO to select those providers most suitable for the role. We recognize this proposal is complex, however we have faith both in the authors rigour and the direction this proposal is taking Arbitrum DAO. As such, we voted FOR.
We have prioritised the options for the total budget cap, listing our preferences as follows: 1.715, 1.3, 880k. We believe this will ensure we do not deter some high-quality service providers from participating, whilst still allowing the service provider selection process to be price-competitive. We believe this is the best route to provide impactful, fair and merit based outcomes for the DAO.
aaah ok, I see what you mean.
To clarify, all RnDAO does (via the Co.lab) is attract and support builders to build applications. We do that based on
aaah ok, I see what you mean.
To clarify, all RnDAO does (via the Co.lab) is attract and support builders to build applications. We do that based on
The focus is on collab tech as that has a double benefit:
What we're trying to do is a narrow activity that's cost-efficient and has big leverage.
But talking about collaboration, I'm trying to understand what scope that could take. I understand that the ARDC is essentially electing a 4-person team (and where some members are paid between 660k to 1,320k equivalent per year)? Seems like a really big budget for that so maybe I'm misunderstanding and it's more than a 4 people team? If it's more people or initiatives, then maybe there are ways to coordinate some activities, as 4 people covering that scope will likely have limited bandwidth (irrespective of how well-paid they are)
Is the budget meant to cover funding other things, like e.g. could the fellows we're mentoring apply for funding to advance their ideas further?
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
First off, we want to commend @ImmutableLawyer for putting together the proposal. We appreciate the effort put into communicating with delegates, receiving and considering feedback, and crafting a very well thought out proposal.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
First off, we want to commend @ImmutableLawyer for putting together the proposal. We appreciate the effort put into communicating with delegates, receiving and considering feedback, and crafting a very well thought out proposal.
We believe a collective similar to the one described is definitely needed for the DAO to turn to when in need of services. We’re supportive of the ARDC just like we were supportive of the Arbitrum Coalition proposal, despite it not passing.
And even though we agree that the proposal could be improved to address some of the concerns being raised by other delegates, we also believe it’s a good first step and are willing to help the ARDC move forward and hopefully go to on-chain vote with an improved iteration.
Thanks for your comment @Curia !
Will address your concerns hereunder:
"This decision is grounded in concerns about the potential for influence from the ARDC structure and the extensive scope of services it proposes to offer"
Thanks for your comment @Curia !
Will address your concerns hereunder:
"This decision is grounded in concerns about the potential for influence from the ARDC structure and the extensive scope of services it proposes to offer"
The scope of the ARDC is actually not that wide as it is strictly tied to sub-steps of the ArbitrumDAO proposal process (refer to the Mandate section for further clarity in this regard). In addition, it will also serve as a liaison for proposers to solicit help in structuring their proposal where they hit a stumbling block which, as a fellow proposer myself, happens often.
Keep in mind that we already have a case-by-case basis approach to SPs (various actually) - these are the Arbitrum Grants Programs. However, how efficient is it to have to wait for RFPs to be answered to actually get some work done? Is it sustainable in the longer term given the consistently ever-chainging needs of the Ecosystem? IMO This needs to be coupled with initiatives such as this & more so that the ArbitrumDAO gets stuff done in a more optimal manner.
"methods and criteria used to ensure the accountability and effectiveness of the collective within the report"
To answer this question, the proposal has to be assessed in a holistic manner. There are various operational parameters, checks & balances (legally enforceable) & obligations on the part of the DAOAdvocate that will ensure accountability & operational transperancy. The DAO Advocate will play a pivotal role in this as can be seen from the seat description.
The report should naturally contain the tasks being worked on, progress etc. (keep in mind that all this will be already publicly available through the public operational dashboard [ref. operational parameters], however, we think it's a good idea to have a consolidated version of this on a regular basis).
"Multi-Sig Composition"
The main criteria that were prioritised are the following:
Naturally, above all else, these persons showed interest in contributing to this endeavour.
"Hedgey"
Agreed re. there being a lot of available options for Multi-Sig operations. If I were to summarise my preference for using Hedgey, it would be the optimal UX+UI that makes it easy to use Multi-Sigs, the composability of the Platform & the reputable nature of the product due to its use by various prominent players within the industry.
I hope the above clarifies some points! Please feel free to ping me on Telegram @immutablelawyer should there be additional concerns!
Thanks for the reply @danielo !
Keep in mind that 4 out of the 8 points you cited are actually benefits that are offered as an indirect consequence of the work done in the carrying out of the mandate. In fact, these are under the sub-section of "In addition to the aforementioned services, the ARDC aims to offer the following benefits". Hence, these are ancillary to the mandate as opposed to the mandate itself (see them as indirect results that would come about naturally by virtue of members being a part of the ARDC & executing the mandate).
Thanks for the reply @danielo !
Keep in mind that 4 out of the 8 points you cited are actually benefits that are offered as an indirect consequence of the work done in the carrying out of the mandate. In fact, these are under the sub-section of "In addition to the aforementioned services, the ARDC aims to offer the following benefits". Hence, these are ancillary to the mandate as opposed to the mandate itself (see them as indirect results that would come about naturally by virtue of members being a part of the ARDC & executing the mandate).
I hope this clarifies the first point. In addition, it's not a question of number (5v3, 4v3 etc.), but rather, what those actionable items actually entail. To my knowledge, and based on this forum post (https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/plurality-labs-arbitrum-dao-x-rndao-co-lab/20138), the Co.Lab is wider in scope in that "We’re helping to develop the Arbitrum ecosystem (and advance the governance and operational capabilities of the Arbitrum DAO and all Arbitrum projects) through incubating ventures that build Apps on Arbitrum.".
As a sidenote, I think you misinterpreted my point re. the collaborative aspect :sweat_smile: I never said that the ARDC cannot collaborate with RnDAO, in fact I actually stated the following: "think the ARDC could actually have a lot of room for collaboration with RnDAO as they can work optimally in a symbiotic manner"
We need to focus more on interoperability between different groups within the DAO, and less on each ring-fencing our knowledge-base (on this, I completely agree)! However, we should also endeavour to not centralise efforts with one provider, and diversify as much as possible in an attempt to attract high quality contributors, service providers, advisory firms so on and so forth. The ARDC is merely the first step in garnering this interest (which it has, as interested applicants are also discussing joint applications with contributors thereby even having contributor + Service Provider applications - this is naturally a great thing to see!).
To sum up, at the end of the day, it's not my decision whether the ARDC would collaborate the RnDAO Co.Lab, but rather it would be the decision of the DAOAdvocate following conversations with the ArbitrumDAO + ARDC Members. In drafting the proposal, I had personal preferences of my own on what to implement, however, I had to keep in mind that this is not a personal endeavour, but one that has to be executed in light of community feedback as opposed to personal preference. To channel my philosophical side, I am merely the vessel to get this much-needed collective up and running hopefully :sweat_smile:
I hope the above clarifies your queries sir! Feel free to reach out to me on TG @immutablelawyer if you want to discuss further!
Hey, I'm not sure I understand. How is RnDAO scope wider?
Hey, I'm not sure I understand. How is RnDAO scope wider?
Tally: RnDAO covers 3 areas ARDC covers 8
I see a lot of the negative feedback for ARDC comes from too broad a scope. Why don't you collaborate with RnDAO to devise tools and mechanisms so you can focus on the other areas? That way, we're each specialized in fewer areas, and we can optimize (note that RnDAO is also just a platform and each tool is built by a dedicated team, we're supporting them to succeed not aiming to own their domains).
Let me know if I'm not understanding something or maybe I can better explain something about what we're doing as I don't understand how you reached the opposite conclusion (RnDAO scope being even wider) and my intention here is very much finding ways to collaborate (we need more people championing R&D not fewer!).
Appreciate your support @krst !
As a sidenote, we have taken note of key-considerations provided by the community as feedback that could be implemented (without taking away from the substance of the proposal) and will be implementing such mechanisms so as to make sure that key concerns are addressed.
Thanks again for the support & also the feedback !
Thankyou for your comment @elbuddy !
As also communicated with other members who have voiced similar concerns, the ARDC will have no power to 'allocate resources' and no decision-making authority within the Arbitrum Ecosystem. In addition, we deem the role of the DAOAdvocate as pivotal. The DAOAdvocate role is emulative of the role of a protector or enforcer in traditional trust structures where an impartial third-party is needed to make sure that the mandate/purposes of an endeavour are being executed in a proper manner and in the best interests of the benefitting party (in this case, the ArbitrumDAO).
Thankyou for your comment @elbuddy !
As also communicated with other members who have voiced similar concerns, the ARDC will have no power to 'allocate resources' and no decision-making authority within the Arbitrum Ecosystem. In addition, we deem the role of the DAOAdvocate as pivotal. The DAOAdvocate role is emulative of the role of a protector or enforcer in traditional trust structures where an impartial third-party is needed to make sure that the mandate/purposes of an endeavour are being executed in a proper manner and in the best interests of the benefitting party (in this case, the ArbitrumDAO).
Re. the fee proposed; firstly, albeit the proposal being a 'fork' of the Coalition proposal, our team only forked the idea of having this collective. If you were to conduct a comparative assessment of the two, you'll find that they are nothing alike except for the member-seats. Our team put in extensive work to research proper structure, introduce legally enforceable checks and balances, preemptively structure the agreement, optimise key facets & much more. In addition, our team will also be administering the elections should the proposal pass. The fee is also reflective of the fee that was established by T-Norm re. the STIP Proposal & other similarly funded proposals. However, should our fee be a pain point for the Arbitrum Community, I will the first one to say that we will waive the fee and do the work nonetheless. We're here to contribute and provide a value-add to the Ecosystem & we think this will provide just that - so much so that as stated, I am ready to waive the fee if this is a major pain point.
Thanks for your comment @elbuddy - hoping the above addresses your concerns!
Hey @bubli.eth ,
The proposal contains several legally enforceable checks & balances together with several powers attributed to the DAOAdvocate (the only member seat that has legally enforceable powers), re. the regulation of the ARDC (Refer to sections on checks and balances, provisions, operational parameters etc.)
Thanks for your comment @danielo !
In my opinion, the RnDAO engagement's scope is actually much wider than the ARDC scope. Albeit it being a much wider scope, I do not personally think that it tackles the subject-matter specific details that are requested in the ARDC Proposal.
Thanks for your comment @danielo !
In my opinion, the RnDAO engagement's scope is actually much wider than the ARDC scope. Albeit it being a much wider scope, I do not personally think that it tackles the subject-matter specific details that are requested in the ARDC Proposal.
In addition, I also think it's a good idea to get more contributors and service providers in the ecosystem to provide services to the DAO so that we do not centralise engagements to one particular person/entity or in this case, RnDAO. Don't get me wrong, I am a fan of the RnDAO collaboration & think the ARDC could actually have a lot of room for collaboration with RnDAO as they can work optimally in a symbiotic manner.
R&D is extremely important, although we (Research and Development DAO aka RnDAO) have a program, already funded by ArbitrumDAO, that focuses on incubating ideas and building upon 2 years of R&D and methodology development doing exactly this. Maybe there's a way we can collaborate or somehow avoid unnecessary redundancy while not concentrating too big a mandate on a single supplier?
I'm very happy to explore how we can work to build on top of what we've already done and that way leapfrog the development of R&D in Arbitrum :)
Hey @thedevanshmehta !
I will have to respectfully disagree for reasons I shall cite below - naturally I'd nonetheless like to thank you for contributing in relation to this proposal sir - it's been good to clarify a lot of points through these comments that could be shared by others :handshake:
Re. "the creation of an executive body"
Hey @thedevanshmehta !
I will have to respectfully disagree for reasons I shall cite below - naturally I'd nonetheless like to thank you for contributing in relation to this proposal sir - it's been good to clarify a lot of points through these comments that could be shared by others :handshake:
Re. "the creation of an executive body"
Firstly, an executive branch of government is a body that carries out pivotal functions in relation to the actual application of laws and regulation within a particular jurisdiction. This is not what the ARDC's mandate reflects re. proposals. If anything, the ARDC is structured as being the executive's (ASrbitrumDAO), secretary, that assists the DAO in optimising proposal where there is the need for optimisation, creates objective reports to lessen the workload on the delegate side, and conducts preemeptive risk assessment re. code updates. Again, if anything, the ARDC is the executive's personal assistant, as opposed to being the executive itself (which it is not, and cannot be, due to the mandate - this is a substantial misconception that even Griff had).
Re. "the flywheel concern"
This isn't at all applicable & is quite a farreaching hypothesis. The same can be said to service providers applying for grants no? [revenue - hire staff - delegate duties etc.). If anything, service providers being part of the ARDC will hinder their prospects of being delegates, as they would not be able to influence proposals whatsoever given their seat within the ARDC & have to omit from voicing concerns on proposals, and stick to reporting objectively on them. Hence, this as well, cannot materialise.
Re. "explicitly encourage something as divisional as a coalition"
I unfortunately fail to see how a research & development collective aimed at helping out proposers optimise & refine proposals so as to provide a better result to the ArbitrumDAO is divisional in any way shape or form. Unfortunately, I think a lot have a prejudiced view of seeing a group of persons that are being paid (below industry-rate mind you, as all the caps are all below industry rate), for providing substantial value to an Ecosystem that needs it. Emphasis on needs it.
A comment from my end:
I keep seeing the term service provider being thrown around; nowhere in the proposal is it stated that this is gated to service providers in the industry - in fact, certain prominent delegates themselves have reached out to express interest in participating albeit not being service providers, but having expertise in certain areas. Keep in mind, you will be voting on who gets elected - if you do not want a prominent SP to take a seat but want a core contributor that is as proficient in an area, you have all the liberty to express interest for that contributor. This isn't gated and there is an open-door policy for participation.
All in all, thanks a lot for the feedback, albeit not agreeing with your concerns I do appreciate you taking the time to voice these concerns especially since, potentially, they could be shared by other members.
Thanks !
Thank you, @Immutablelawyer, and others involved for their efforts in developing this proposal. While appreciating the initiative, we are leaning toward voting against it due to concerns about the broad scope of the collective’s services. This decision is grounded in concerns about the potential for influence from the ARDC structure and the extensive scope of services it proposes to offer. While recognizing the need for specialized service providers in the ecosystem, we believe that a more focused and narrower operational, perhaps addressing issues on a case-by-case project, would be more beneficial. Such an approach is likely to foster a more open ecosystem, encouraging diverse contributions and perspectives.
In addition, we have several inquiries regarding the proposal that we would appreciate further clarification on:
Thanks for the hard work put into this framework! I am voting against this proposal as i believe it will increase factionalism in the DAO and create camps between delegates, but i am open to changing my mind.
If i had to draw an analogy to the real world, it feels like ArbitrumDAO currently has only a legislative body (delegates and token holders) and this proposal seeks to setup an executive branch in ArbitrumDAO (the ARDC) elected by tokenholders , similar to parliamentary democracy in some respect. I like that there is the equivalent of an ombudsman / inspector general (DAO advocate) within the proposed structure.
I don't think this proposal is formatted in a way that makes sense for us. I cannot support this proposal.
As I said in the Arbitrum Coalition thread:
I don't think this proposal is formatted in a way that makes sense for us. I cannot support this proposal.
As I said in the Arbitrum Coalition thread:
Service providers should have a much more narrow scope IMO. For instance, if you said you wanted to take on a budget of 100 M and build a STIP follow-up or something similar, with a very clear budget, and timeline for execution, I’m sure it would pass. Narrow scope, clear limits, GREAT. Large scope, vague limits, BAD.
I would love to see this crew tell the DAO that they will partner with teams to make their proposals more robust, and get payment on a project by project basis, or just take on complex proposals - like making the gas paid in ARB instead of ETH - and propose to be funded to do that!
But if you really want to be the default gate keeper of the DAO, the only way i could get behind it is if all the payments had a 5 year vesting requirement (or longer) and very minimal upfront payments. Then the incentive alignment makes sense. The broad powers you are asking are usually held by a foundation of sorts that has that type of incentive alignment, and there is a reason for that.
Thanks for your input @Griff !
You do raise good points & our team did actually look at the model of Service Providers being paid on a project-by-project basis (this is why our team has & is also working on the Procurement Framework approach to services - however this is more applicable to projects building on Arbitrum rather than the ArbitrumDAO itself i.e. a method of preemptive quality assurance that creates a marketplace of reputable service providers for projects on Arbitrum to solicit services from).
Appreciate the reply @DMH !
Will reply to your feedback below:
Appreciate the reply @DMH !
Will reply to your feedback below:
Personally, I am not in favour of having a DAOAdvocate (or equivalent terminology with similar rights/obligations) deal with service providers across the board. I think this would be a substantial single point of failure + risk that should be avoided. This is why it’s more optimal to have a DAOAdvocate being a subject-matter expert re. A particular endeavour (in this case the ARDC mandate), that would handle that particular mandate as opposed to one DAOAdvocate for every mandate that could arise from time to time (huge point of centralisation here imo).
We opted to cap compensation amounts in light of industry standard pricing (and varied it in a same ratio dependant on different funding amounts voted in favour of) due to several concerns raised by delegates in the initial Coalition proposal re. Pricing. This safeguards against prospective applicants inflating their prices ‘just because the ArbitrumDAO has a large Treasury’. In addition, the caps also serve to incentivise competition and ensure that the ArbitrumDAO gets the best bang for its buck from elected applicants 🤝
Really appreciate your feedback - thanks for contributing🙏
Here is the reasoning behind why we voted FOR this proposal onchain, despite having hesitations around the Snapshot phase
All opinions come from @juanbug and me, the operators of the Uniswap DAO's ARB delegation
Vote: For
Type: Onchain
We voted FOR the initial coalition proposal but voted against this proposal during the Snapshot. However, our position has since changed, so we voted FOR this proposal onchain. Our general stance is that the DAO should have committees for facilitating various critical DAO functions. The initial release of this proposal was met with a lack of engagement, so we wanted more conversation to transpire before being in favor. Although the feedback for this initiative still hasn’t met the same level of engagement as the coalition proposal in the forums, when observing conversations in private channels, it became clear that there is appetite from most delegates to see this through.
We also suggested previously that this proposal can be divided up into multiple proposals to prevent bundling too many decisions into one vote. The broad nature of the proposal may still make this the better approach, however, we do realize that unbundling this proposal may be operationally difficult, requiring multiple snapshots /onchain votes.
After consideration Treasure DAO’s Arbitrum Representative Council (ARC) would like to share the following feedback on this proposal:
Effective management of risk, security and research are important domains Arbitrum DAO needs to prioritise. We recognize the value proposition of the original Arbitrum Coalition proposal but had concerns on the centralization of power in the DAO, and lack of open, fair and meritocratic service provider tender process. We feel this proposal goes some way towards addressing these concerns and provides a level playing field which will allow the DAO to select those providers most suitable for the role. We recognize this proposal is complex, however we have faith both in the authors rigour and the direction this proposal is taking Arbitrum DAO. As such, we voted FOR.
We have prioritised the options for the total budget cap, listing our preferences as follows: 1.715, 1.3, 880k. We believe this will ensure we do not deter some high-quality service providers from participating, whilst still allowing the service provider selection process to be price-competitive. We believe this is the best route to provide impactful, fair and merit based outcomes for the DAO.
aaah ok, I see what you mean.
To clarify, all RnDAO does (via the Co.lab) is attract and support builders to build applications. We do that based on
aaah ok, I see what you mean.
To clarify, all RnDAO does (via the Co.lab) is attract and support builders to build applications. We do that based on
The focus is on collab tech as that has a double benefit:
What we're trying to do is a narrow activity that's cost-efficient and has big leverage.
But talking about collaboration, I'm trying to understand what scope that could take. I understand that the ARDC is essentially electing a 4-person team (and where some members are paid between 660k to 1,320k equivalent per year)? Seems like a really big budget for that so maybe I'm misunderstanding and it's more than a 4 people team? If it's more people or initiatives, then maybe there are ways to coordinate some activities, as 4 people covering that scope will likely have limited bandwidth (irrespective of how well-paid they are)
Is the budget meant to cover funding other things, like e.g. could the fellows we're mentoring apply for funding to advance their ideas further?
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
First off, we want to commend @ImmutableLawyer for putting together the proposal. We appreciate the effort put into communicating with delegates, receiving and considering feedback, and crafting a very well thought out proposal.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
First off, we want to commend @ImmutableLawyer for putting together the proposal. We appreciate the effort put into communicating with delegates, receiving and considering feedback, and crafting a very well thought out proposal.
We believe a collective similar to the one described is definitely needed for the DAO to turn to when in need of services. We’re supportive of the ARDC just like we were supportive of the Arbitrum Coalition proposal, despite it not passing.
And even though we agree that the proposal could be improved to address some of the concerns being raised by other delegates, we also believe it’s a good first step and are willing to help the ARDC move forward and hopefully go to on-chain vote with an improved iteration.
Thanks for your comment @Curia !
Will address your concerns hereunder:
"This decision is grounded in concerns about the potential for influence from the ARDC structure and the extensive scope of services it proposes to offer"
Thanks for your comment @Curia !
Will address your concerns hereunder:
"This decision is grounded in concerns about the potential for influence from the ARDC structure and the extensive scope of services it proposes to offer"
The scope of the ARDC is actually not that wide as it is strictly tied to sub-steps of the ArbitrumDAO proposal process (refer to the Mandate section for further clarity in this regard). In addition, it will also serve as a liaison for proposers to solicit help in structuring their proposal where they hit a stumbling block which, as a fellow proposer myself, happens often.
Keep in mind that we already have a case-by-case basis approach to SPs (various actually) - these are the Arbitrum Grants Programs. However, how efficient is it to have to wait for RFPs to be answered to actually get some work done? Is it sustainable in the longer term given the consistently ever-chainging needs of the Ecosystem? IMO This needs to be coupled with initiatives such as this & more so that the ArbitrumDAO gets stuff done in a more optimal manner.
"methods and criteria used to ensure the accountability and effectiveness of the collective within the report"
To answer this question, the proposal has to be assessed in a holistic manner. There are various operational parameters, checks & balances (legally enforceable) & obligations on the part of the DAOAdvocate that will ensure accountability & operational transperancy. The DAO Advocate will play a pivotal role in this as can be seen from the seat description.
The report should naturally contain the tasks being worked on, progress etc. (keep in mind that all this will be already publicly available through the public operational dashboard [ref. operational parameters], however, we think it's a good idea to have a consolidated version of this on a regular basis).
"Multi-Sig Composition"
The main criteria that were prioritised are the following:
Naturally, above all else, these persons showed interest in contributing to this endeavour.
"Hedgey"
Agreed re. there being a lot of available options for Multi-Sig operations. If I were to summarise my preference for using Hedgey, it would be the optimal UX+UI that makes it easy to use Multi-Sigs, the composability of the Platform & the reputable nature of the product due to its use by various prominent players within the industry.
I hope the above clarifies some points! Please feel free to ping me on Telegram @immutablelawyer should there be additional concerns!
Thanks for the reply @danielo !
Keep in mind that 4 out of the 8 points you cited are actually benefits that are offered as an indirect consequence of the work done in the carrying out of the mandate. In fact, these are under the sub-section of "In addition to the aforementioned services, the ARDC aims to offer the following benefits". Hence, these are ancillary to the mandate as opposed to the mandate itself (see them as indirect results that would come about naturally by virtue of members being a part of the ARDC & executing the mandate).
Thanks for the reply @danielo !
Keep in mind that 4 out of the 8 points you cited are actually benefits that are offered as an indirect consequence of the work done in the carrying out of the mandate. In fact, these are under the sub-section of "In addition to the aforementioned services, the ARDC aims to offer the following benefits". Hence, these are ancillary to the mandate as opposed to the mandate itself (see them as indirect results that would come about naturally by virtue of members being a part of the ARDC & executing the mandate).
I hope this clarifies the first point. In addition, it's not a question of number (5v3, 4v3 etc.), but rather, what those actionable items actually entail. To my knowledge, and based on this forum post (https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/plurality-labs-arbitrum-dao-x-rndao-co-lab/20138), the Co.Lab is wider in scope in that "We’re helping to develop the Arbitrum ecosystem (and advance the governance and operational capabilities of the Arbitrum DAO and all Arbitrum projects) through incubating ventures that build Apps on Arbitrum.".
As a sidenote, I think you misinterpreted my point re. the collaborative aspect :sweat_smile: I never said that the ARDC cannot collaborate with RnDAO, in fact I actually stated the following: "think the ARDC could actually have a lot of room for collaboration with RnDAO as they can work optimally in a symbiotic manner"
We need to focus more on interoperability between different groups within the DAO, and less on each ring-fencing our knowledge-base (on this, I completely agree)! However, we should also endeavour to not centralise efforts with one provider, and diversify as much as possible in an attempt to attract high quality contributors, service providers, advisory firms so on and so forth. The ARDC is merely the first step in garnering this interest (which it has, as interested applicants are also discussing joint applications with contributors thereby even having contributor + Service Provider applications - this is naturally a great thing to see!).
To sum up, at the end of the day, it's not my decision whether the ARDC would collaborate the RnDAO Co.Lab, but rather it would be the decision of the DAOAdvocate following conversations with the ArbitrumDAO + ARDC Members. In drafting the proposal, I had personal preferences of my own on what to implement, however, I had to keep in mind that this is not a personal endeavour, but one that has to be executed in light of community feedback as opposed to personal preference. To channel my philosophical side, I am merely the vessel to get this much-needed collective up and running hopefully :sweat_smile:
I hope the above clarifies your queries sir! Feel free to reach out to me on TG @immutablelawyer if you want to discuss further!
Hey, I'm not sure I understand. How is RnDAO scope wider?
Hey, I'm not sure I understand. How is RnDAO scope wider?
Tally: RnDAO covers 3 areas ARDC covers 8
I see a lot of the negative feedback for ARDC comes from too broad a scope. Why don't you collaborate with RnDAO to devise tools and mechanisms so you can focus on the other areas? That way, we're each specialized in fewer areas, and we can optimize (note that RnDAO is also just a platform and each tool is built by a dedicated team, we're supporting them to succeed not aiming to own their domains).
Let me know if I'm not understanding something or maybe I can better explain something about what we're doing as I don't understand how you reached the opposite conclusion (RnDAO scope being even wider) and my intention here is very much finding ways to collaborate (we need more people championing R&D not fewer!).
Appreciate your support @krst !
As a sidenote, we have taken note of key-considerations provided by the community as feedback that could be implemented (without taking away from the substance of the proposal) and will be implementing such mechanisms so as to make sure that key concerns are addressed.
Thanks again for the support & also the feedback !
Thankyou for your comment @elbuddy !
As also communicated with other members who have voiced similar concerns, the ARDC will have no power to 'allocate resources' and no decision-making authority within the Arbitrum Ecosystem. In addition, we deem the role of the DAOAdvocate as pivotal. The DAOAdvocate role is emulative of the role of a protector or enforcer in traditional trust structures where an impartial third-party is needed to make sure that the mandate/purposes of an endeavour are being executed in a proper manner and in the best interests of the benefitting party (in this case, the ArbitrumDAO).
Thankyou for your comment @elbuddy !
As also communicated with other members who have voiced similar concerns, the ARDC will have no power to 'allocate resources' and no decision-making authority within the Arbitrum Ecosystem. In addition, we deem the role of the DAOAdvocate as pivotal. The DAOAdvocate role is emulative of the role of a protector or enforcer in traditional trust structures where an impartial third-party is needed to make sure that the mandate/purposes of an endeavour are being executed in a proper manner and in the best interests of the benefitting party (in this case, the ArbitrumDAO).
Re. the fee proposed; firstly, albeit the proposal being a 'fork' of the Coalition proposal, our team only forked the idea of having this collective. If you were to conduct a comparative assessment of the two, you'll find that they are nothing alike except for the member-seats. Our team put in extensive work to research proper structure, introduce legally enforceable checks and balances, preemptively structure the agreement, optimise key facets & much more. In addition, our team will also be administering the elections should the proposal pass. The fee is also reflective of the fee that was established by T-Norm re. the STIP Proposal & other similarly funded proposals. However, should our fee be a pain point for the Arbitrum Community, I will the first one to say that we will waive the fee and do the work nonetheless. We're here to contribute and provide a value-add to the Ecosystem & we think this will provide just that - so much so that as stated, I am ready to waive the fee if this is a major pain point.
Thanks for your comment @elbuddy - hoping the above addresses your concerns!
Hey @bubli.eth ,
The proposal contains several legally enforceable checks & balances together with several powers attributed to the DAOAdvocate (the only member seat that has legally enforceable powers), re. the regulation of the ARDC (Refer to sections on checks and balances, provisions, operational parameters etc.)
Thanks for your comment @danielo !
In my opinion, the RnDAO engagement's scope is actually much wider than the ARDC scope. Albeit it being a much wider scope, I do not personally think that it tackles the subject-matter specific details that are requested in the ARDC Proposal.
Thanks for your comment @danielo !
In my opinion, the RnDAO engagement's scope is actually much wider than the ARDC scope. Albeit it being a much wider scope, I do not personally think that it tackles the subject-matter specific details that are requested in the ARDC Proposal.
In addition, I also think it's a good idea to get more contributors and service providers in the ecosystem to provide services to the DAO so that we do not centralise engagements to one particular person/entity or in this case, RnDAO. Don't get me wrong, I am a fan of the RnDAO collaboration & think the ARDC could actually have a lot of room for collaboration with RnDAO as they can work optimally in a symbiotic manner.
R&D is extremely important, although we (Research and Development DAO aka RnDAO) have a program, already funded by ArbitrumDAO, that focuses on incubating ideas and building upon 2 years of R&D and methodology development doing exactly this. Maybe there's a way we can collaborate or somehow avoid unnecessary redundancy while not concentrating too big a mandate on a single supplier?
I'm very happy to explore how we can work to build on top of what we've already done and that way leapfrog the development of R&D in Arbitrum :)
Hey @thedevanshmehta !
I will have to respectfully disagree for reasons I shall cite below - naturally I'd nonetheless like to thank you for contributing in relation to this proposal sir - it's been good to clarify a lot of points through these comments that could be shared by others :handshake:
Re. "the creation of an executive body"
Hey @thedevanshmehta !
I will have to respectfully disagree for reasons I shall cite below - naturally I'd nonetheless like to thank you for contributing in relation to this proposal sir - it's been good to clarify a lot of points through these comments that could be shared by others :handshake:
Re. "the creation of an executive body"
Firstly, an executive branch of government is a body that carries out pivotal functions in relation to the actual application of laws and regulation within a particular jurisdiction. This is not what the ARDC's mandate reflects re. proposals. If anything, the ARDC is structured as being the executive's (ASrbitrumDAO), secretary, that assists the DAO in optimising proposal where there is the need for optimisation, creates objective reports to lessen the workload on the delegate side, and conducts preemeptive risk assessment re. code updates. Again, if anything, the ARDC is the executive's personal assistant, as opposed to being the executive itself (which it is not, and cannot be, due to the mandate - this is a substantial misconception that even Griff had).
Re. "the flywheel concern"
This isn't at all applicable & is quite a farreaching hypothesis. The same can be said to service providers applying for grants no? [revenue - hire staff - delegate duties etc.). If anything, service providers being part of the ARDC will hinder their prospects of being delegates, as they would not be able to influence proposals whatsoever given their seat within the ARDC & have to omit from voicing concerns on proposals, and stick to reporting objectively on them. Hence, this as well, cannot materialise.
Re. "explicitly encourage something as divisional as a coalition"
I unfortunately fail to see how a research & development collective aimed at helping out proposers optimise & refine proposals so as to provide a better result to the ArbitrumDAO is divisional in any way shape or form. Unfortunately, I think a lot have a prejudiced view of seeing a group of persons that are being paid (below industry-rate mind you, as all the caps are all below industry rate), for providing substantial value to an Ecosystem that needs it. Emphasis on needs it.
A comment from my end:
I keep seeing the term service provider being thrown around; nowhere in the proposal is it stated that this is gated to service providers in the industry - in fact, certain prominent delegates themselves have reached out to express interest in participating albeit not being service providers, but having expertise in certain areas. Keep in mind, you will be voting on who gets elected - if you do not want a prominent SP to take a seat but want a core contributor that is as proficient in an area, you have all the liberty to express interest for that contributor. This isn't gated and there is an open-door policy for participation.
All in all, thanks a lot for the feedback, albeit not agreeing with your concerns I do appreciate you taking the time to voice these concerns especially since, potentially, they could be shared by other members.
Thanks !
Thank you, @Immutablelawyer, and others involved for their efforts in developing this proposal. While appreciating the initiative, we are leaning toward voting against it due to concerns about the broad scope of the collective’s services. This decision is grounded in concerns about the potential for influence from the ARDC structure and the extensive scope of services it proposes to offer. While recognizing the need for specialized service providers in the ecosystem, we believe that a more focused and narrower operational, perhaps addressing issues on a case-by-case project, would be more beneficial. Such an approach is likely to foster a more open ecosystem, encouraging diverse contributions and perspectives.
In addition, we have several inquiries regarding the proposal that we would appreciate further clarification on:
Thanks for the hard work put into this framework! I am voting against this proposal as i believe it will increase factionalism in the DAO and create camps between delegates, but i am open to changing my mind.
If i had to draw an analogy to the real world, it feels like ArbitrumDAO currently has only a legislative body (delegates and token holders) and this proposal seeks to setup an executive branch in ArbitrumDAO (the ARDC) elected by tokenholders , similar to parliamentary democracy in some respect. I like that there is the equivalent of an ombudsman / inspector general (DAO advocate) within the proposed structure.
I don't think this proposal is formatted in a way that makes sense for us. I cannot support this proposal.
As I said in the Arbitrum Coalition thread:
I don't think this proposal is formatted in a way that makes sense for us. I cannot support this proposal.
As I said in the Arbitrum Coalition thread:
Service providers should have a much more narrow scope IMO. For instance, if you said you wanted to take on a budget of 100 M and build a STIP follow-up or something similar, with a very clear budget, and timeline for execution, I’m sure it would pass. Narrow scope, clear limits, GREAT. Large scope, vague limits, BAD.
I would love to see this crew tell the DAO that they will partner with teams to make their proposals more robust, and get payment on a project by project basis, or just take on complex proposals - like making the gas paid in ARB instead of ETH - and propose to be funded to do that!
But if you really want to be the default gate keeper of the DAO, the only way i could get behind it is if all the payments had a 5 year vesting requirement (or longer) and very minimal upfront payments. Then the incentive alignment makes sense. The broad powers you are asking are usually held by a foundation of sorts that has that type of incentive alignment, and there is a reason for that.
Thanks for your input @Griff !
You do raise good points & our team did actually look at the model of Service Providers being paid on a project-by-project basis (this is why our team has & is also working on the Procurement Framework approach to services - however this is more applicable to projects building on Arbitrum rather than the ArbitrumDAO itself i.e. a method of preemptive quality assurance that creates a marketplace of reputable service providers for projects on Arbitrum to solicit services from).
Appreciate the reply @DMH !
Will reply to your feedback below:
Appreciate the reply @DMH !
Will reply to your feedback below:
Personally, I am not in favour of having a DAOAdvocate (or equivalent terminology with similar rights/obligations) deal with service providers across the board. I think this would be a substantial single point of failure + risk that should be avoided. This is why it’s more optimal to have a DAOAdvocate being a subject-matter expert re. A particular endeavour (in this case the ARDC mandate), that would handle that particular mandate as opposed to one DAOAdvocate for every mandate that could arise from time to time (huge point of centralisation here imo).
We opted to cap compensation amounts in light of industry standard pricing (and varied it in a same ratio dependant on different funding amounts voted in favour of) due to several concerns raised by delegates in the initial Coalition proposal re. Pricing. This safeguards against prospective applicants inflating their prices ‘just because the ArbitrumDAO has a large Treasury’. In addition, the caps also serve to incentivise competition and ensure that the ArbitrumDAO gets the best bang for its buck from elected applicants 🤝
Really appreciate your feedback - thanks for contributing🙏
R&D is extremely important, although we (Research and Development DAO aka RnDAO) have a program, already funded by ArbitrumDAO, that focuses on incubating ideas and building upon 2 years of R&D and methodology development doing exactly this. Maybe there's a way we can collaborate or somehow avoid unnecessary redundancy while not concentrating too big a mandate on a single supplier?
I'm very happy to explore how we can work to build on top of what we've already done and that way leapfrog the development of R&D in Arbitrum :)
We have created this dec that explains the ArbitrumDAO Co.Lab
Thank you, @Immutablelawyer, and others involved for their efforts in developing this proposal. While appreciating the initiative, we are leaning toward voting against it due to concerns about the broad scope of the collective’s services. This decision is grounded in concerns about the potential for influence from the ARDC structure and the extensive scope of services it proposes to offer. While recognizing the need for specialized service providers in the ecosystem, we believe that a more focused and narrower operational, perhaps addressing issues on a case-by-case project, would be more beneficial. Such an approach is likely to foster a more open ecosystem, encouraging diverse contributions and perspectives.
In addition, we have several inquiries regarding the proposal that we would appreciate further clarification on:
Accountability and Reporting:
The proposal mentioned the monthly report on collective performance; we are keen to understand the methods and criteria used to ensure the accountability and effectiveness of the collective within the report. How will the performance be evaluated, and what metrics will be used to assess the success of the ARDC's initiatives?
Multi-Sig Composition:
The ARDC’s 3/5 multisig is being created. The funds in the multisig belong to the ArbitrumDAO, and the signers act as Multi-Sig administrators on behalf of the ArbitrumDAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Signers will receive 1,000 ARB per month for their contribution. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in ArbitrumDAO governance, including delegation. The multisig includes:
We’re curious about the criteria and process used for selecting these particular individuals for the multisig. What qualities or qualifications guided these choices, and how do they align with the broader goals of the ARDC and the ArbitrumDAO?
Given the various platforms available for such purposes, I'm interested in understanding the rationale behind choosing Hedgey. What advantages or specific features does Hedgey offer that align with the needs and objectives of the ARDC?
////////////////////////////
After reviewing amendment based on the community feedbacks where it regarding concerns on centralized power and a lack of a transparent, merit-based process for choosing service providers. This new amendment addresses these issues, promoting fairness and enabling the selection of suitable providers. Despite its complexity, we support the proposal for its thoroughness and positive direction for Arbitrum DAO and vote FOR.
Thanks for the hard work put into this framework! I am voting against this proposal as i believe it will increase factionalism in the DAO and create camps between delegates, but i am open to changing my mind.
If i had to draw an analogy to the real world, it feels like ArbitrumDAO currently has only a legislative body (delegates and token holders) and this proposal seeks to setup an executive branch in ArbitrumDAO (the ARDC) elected by tokenholders , similar to parliamentary democracy in some respect. I like that there is the equivalent of an ombudsman / inspector general (DAO advocate) within the proposed structure.
The mandate is restricted to the following; Proposal Review & Assistance (where proposers would request assistance), Review on Chain Proposal Code Updates (this helps ensure that code updates are not malicious+are accurate), Quantitative Analysis & identifying and mitigating economic risks associated with proposed initiatives.
This executive body has a far reaching mandate like assisting with drafting & passing laws and also seeing through the implementation of these laws (code review and economic analysis)
I'm not per se opposed to the creation of an executive body at Arbitrum that Gets Shit Done :tm: - in fact it might well be what we need right now. However, I don't see how the flywheel objection I raised in the Arbitrum coalition proposal is addressed here;
Revenue earned as service provider → Hiring Staff → Greater capacity to undertake delegate duties → More ARB delegated
Almost like how the ruling party in parliamentary democracies use their government power to get re-elected and go after opponents in the legislature
I am curious to know why you explicitly encourage something as divisional as a coalition to form, rather than getting a separate RFP for each role approved by the DAO and then having service providers apply under it. How could I express my preference if i feel we need code review but not proposal drafting?
It would be a more cumbersome process for sure, but also maybe less political?
Thanks again for your work, these are all offered in the spirit of constructive feedback that I hope results in a better end outcome!
Thanks for your input @Griff !
You do raise good points & our team did actually look at the model of Service Providers being paid on a project-by-project basis (this is why our team has & is also working on the Procurement Framework approach to services - however this is more applicable to projects building on Arbitrum rather than the ArbitrumDAO itself i.e. a method of preemptive quality assurance that creates a marketplace of reputable service providers for projects on Arbitrum to solicit services from).
Preemptively & in practice, unfortunately the model you cited would not work as optimally, efficiently & effectively as the ARDC would. The model you're describing above is basically the Grants Program model i.e. Service Providers apply to work on a project on a project-by-project basis.
Unfortunately, this is not as efficient or as optimal as having a retainer-style approach that the ARDC is implementing as per the proposal above. In addition, I personally (emphasis on personally as these are just my thoughts), would not agree that the mandate is too wide or that this would cause a systematic risk for the reasons enlisted hereunder:
The mandate is restricted to the following; Proposal Review & Assistance (where proposers would request assistance), Review on Chain Proposal Code Updates (this helps ensure that code updates are not malicious+are accurate), Quantitative Analysis & identifying and mitigating economic risks associated with proposed initiatives.
In addition, there is no systematic risk present (happy to hear your thoughts re. where a systematic risk may arise though). The ARDC is not a decision-making body & cannot influence decisions (if anything, it can aid delegates in effecting better decisions due to its mandate; specifically, the objective reporting re. proposed initiatives + proposal optimisations where the proposer requests assistance). A systematic risk would have been present if the ARDC would have been given decision-making authority re. what proposals get to be posted/what proposals go to the voting phase (however, this is not the case).
Also, this proposal does not make the ARDC a 'default gatekeeper of the DAO'. The ARDC cannot gatekeep proposals, cannot decide on which proposals go to the voting stage, is bound by legally enforceable checks & balances, gives legally enforceable rights to the DAOAdvocate (refer to the DAOAdvocate section) & much more. The ARDC is positioned as a collective aimed at aiding the ArbitrumDAO where needed, and cannot (it literally cannot), gatekeep in any way, shape or form as it does not have the rights (legal or otherwise) to do so given that it does not have decision-making powers over ANY facets of the ArbitrumDAO.
The ARDC cannot preclude any community member such as myself for ex. from submitting a proposal, going to Snapshot etc. If anything, I can get funded for working on a particular endeavour, and also request the ARDC's help in the structuring of that endeavour should I encounter any obstacles that would need their subject-matter expertise.
In conclusion, I respectfully disagree with your concerns regarding the proposal's potential systemic risk or 'gatekeeper' role. Furthermore, I wish to clarify that the broad powers mentioned in your final sentence are, in fact, non-existent. The ARDC's scope is limited to providing services related to proposal review, assistance, research, and optimization, in accordance with its Mandate.
Thank you for your input & I look forward to your participation at the voting stage whatever the vote may be!
R&D is extremely important, although we (Research and Development DAO aka RnDAO) have a program, already funded by ArbitrumDAO, that focuses on incubating ideas and building upon 2 years of R&D and methodology development doing exactly this. Maybe there's a way we can collaborate or somehow avoid unnecessary redundancy while not concentrating too big a mandate on a single supplier?
I'm very happy to explore how we can work to build on top of what we've already done and that way leapfrog the development of R&D in Arbitrum :)
We have created this dec that explains the ArbitrumDAO Co.Lab
Thank you, @Immutablelawyer, and others involved for their efforts in developing this proposal. While appreciating the initiative, we are leaning toward voting against it due to concerns about the broad scope of the collective’s services. This decision is grounded in concerns about the potential for influence from the ARDC structure and the extensive scope of services it proposes to offer. While recognizing the need for specialized service providers in the ecosystem, we believe that a more focused and narrower operational, perhaps addressing issues on a case-by-case project, would be more beneficial. Such an approach is likely to foster a more open ecosystem, encouraging diverse contributions and perspectives.
In addition, we have several inquiries regarding the proposal that we would appreciate further clarification on:
Accountability and Reporting:
The proposal mentioned the monthly report on collective performance; we are keen to understand the methods and criteria used to ensure the accountability and effectiveness of the collective within the report. How will the performance be evaluated, and what metrics will be used to assess the success of the ARDC's initiatives?
Multi-Sig Composition:
The ARDC’s 3/5 multisig is being created. The funds in the multisig belong to the ArbitrumDAO, and the signers act as Multi-Sig administrators on behalf of the ArbitrumDAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Signers will receive 1,000 ARB per month for their contribution. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in ArbitrumDAO governance, including delegation. The multisig includes:
We’re curious about the criteria and process used for selecting these particular individuals for the multisig. What qualities or qualifications guided these choices, and how do they align with the broader goals of the ARDC and the ArbitrumDAO?
Given the various platforms available for such purposes, I'm interested in understanding the rationale behind choosing Hedgey. What advantages or specific features does Hedgey offer that align with the needs and objectives of the ARDC?
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After reviewing amendment based on the community feedbacks where it regarding concerns on centralized power and a lack of a transparent, merit-based process for choosing service providers. This new amendment addresses these issues, promoting fairness and enabling the selection of suitable providers. Despite its complexity, we support the proposal for its thoroughness and positive direction for Arbitrum DAO and vote FOR.
Thanks for the hard work put into this framework! I am voting against this proposal as i believe it will increase factionalism in the DAO and create camps between delegates, but i am open to changing my mind.
If i had to draw an analogy to the real world, it feels like ArbitrumDAO currently has only a legislative body (delegates and token holders) and this proposal seeks to setup an executive branch in ArbitrumDAO (the ARDC) elected by tokenholders , similar to parliamentary democracy in some respect. I like that there is the equivalent of an ombudsman / inspector general (DAO advocate) within the proposed structure.
The mandate is restricted to the following; Proposal Review & Assistance (where proposers would request assistance), Review on Chain Proposal Code Updates (this helps ensure that code updates are not malicious+are accurate), Quantitative Analysis & identifying and mitigating economic risks associated with proposed initiatives.
This executive body has a far reaching mandate like assisting with drafting & passing laws and also seeing through the implementation of these laws (code review and economic analysis)
I'm not per se opposed to the creation of an executive body at Arbitrum that Gets Shit Done :tm: - in fact it might well be what we need right now. However, I don't see how the flywheel objection I raised in the Arbitrum coalition proposal is addressed here;
Revenue earned as service provider → Hiring Staff → Greater capacity to undertake delegate duties → More ARB delegated
Almost like how the ruling party in parliamentary democracies use their government power to get re-elected and go after opponents in the legislature
I am curious to know why you explicitly encourage something as divisional as a coalition to form, rather than getting a separate RFP for each role approved by the DAO and then having service providers apply under it. How could I express my preference if i feel we need code review but not proposal drafting?
It would be a more cumbersome process for sure, but also maybe less political?
Thanks again for your work, these are all offered in the spirit of constructive feedback that I hope results in a better end outcome!
Thanks for your input @Griff !
You do raise good points & our team did actually look at the model of Service Providers being paid on a project-by-project basis (this is why our team has & is also working on the Procurement Framework approach to services - however this is more applicable to projects building on Arbitrum rather than the ArbitrumDAO itself i.e. a method of preemptive quality assurance that creates a marketplace of reputable service providers for projects on Arbitrum to solicit services from).
Preemptively & in practice, unfortunately the model you cited would not work as optimally, efficiently & effectively as the ARDC would. The model you're describing above is basically the Grants Program model i.e. Service Providers apply to work on a project on a project-by-project basis.
Unfortunately, this is not as efficient or as optimal as having a retainer-style approach that the ARDC is implementing as per the proposal above. In addition, I personally (emphasis on personally as these are just my thoughts), would not agree that the mandate is too wide or that this would cause a systematic risk for the reasons enlisted hereunder:
The mandate is restricted to the following; Proposal Review & Assistance (where proposers would request assistance), Review on Chain Proposal Code Updates (this helps ensure that code updates are not malicious+are accurate), Quantitative Analysis & identifying and mitigating economic risks associated with proposed initiatives.
In addition, there is no systematic risk present (happy to hear your thoughts re. where a systematic risk may arise though). The ARDC is not a decision-making body & cannot influence decisions (if anything, it can aid delegates in effecting better decisions due to its mandate; specifically, the objective reporting re. proposed initiatives + proposal optimisations where the proposer requests assistance). A systematic risk would have been present if the ARDC would have been given decision-making authority re. what proposals get to be posted/what proposals go to the voting phase (however, this is not the case).
Also, this proposal does not make the ARDC a 'default gatekeeper of the DAO'. The ARDC cannot gatekeep proposals, cannot decide on which proposals go to the voting stage, is bound by legally enforceable checks & balances, gives legally enforceable rights to the DAOAdvocate (refer to the DAOAdvocate section) & much more. The ARDC is positioned as a collective aimed at aiding the ArbitrumDAO where needed, and cannot (it literally cannot), gatekeep in any way, shape or form as it does not have the rights (legal or otherwise) to do so given that it does not have decision-making powers over ANY facets of the ArbitrumDAO.
The ARDC cannot preclude any community member such as myself for ex. from submitting a proposal, going to Snapshot etc. If anything, I can get funded for working on a particular endeavour, and also request the ARDC's help in the structuring of that endeavour should I encounter any obstacles that would need their subject-matter expertise.
In conclusion, I respectfully disagree with your concerns regarding the proposal's potential systemic risk or 'gatekeeper' role. Furthermore, I wish to clarify that the broad powers mentioned in your final sentence are, in fact, non-existent. The ARDC's scope is limited to providing services related to proposal review, assistance, research, and optimization, in accordance with its Mandate.
Thank you for your input & I look forward to your participation at the voting stage whatever the vote may be!
