This proposal seeks DAO approval for an updated compensation framework for the Arbitrum Gaming Ventures (AGV) Council.
For the current Council (Year One), we recommend a one-time startup-phase bonus of 90,000 ARB tokens per member, fully vested, in recognition of the heavier-than-anticipated contributions required to establish AGV’s structure, processes, and early investment strategy during its startup phase.
This startup phase bonus is a retrospective acknowledgment of extraordinary effort, not an element of the benchmark alignment. Additionally, these changes will be fully funded within AGV’s existing operating budget and require no additional DAO funds
The startup responsibilities required to transform AGV from a concept into a functioning business entity were not envisaged at all in the original Tally proposal. During AGV’s launch, Council members undertook a heavier, more hands-on workload than was scoped or anticipated. This extra work undertaken during AGV’s startup phase was essential to successfully turn the original GCP Proposal into a functioning VC.
These startup-phase efforts, which were essential to successfully turn the original GCP Proposal into a functioning VC, are listed and expanded on in detail below:
Table B: AGV Startup Phase: Scoped vs Actual Council Workload
| Category | Original Scope (4 hrs/week) | Startup Phase Scope (~10 hrs/week) | Notes / Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Risk Mitigation & Investment Thesis | Advise on initial investment thesis and portfolio approach | Contributed to initial portfolio strategy design, including risk policies and compliance checks | Front-loaded work to ensure robust oversight scaffolding and 0-1 strategic direction |
| Team Oversight & Nominations | Provide oversight and input on GCP team members and performance | Direct involvement in early hiring of core partners; provided input on org design | Higher time intensity due to recruitment, headcount planning, and onboarding of initial team members |
| DAO Liaison | Serve as liaison and oversight committee between DAO and GCP initiative | Engaged in foundational DAO communications, collaboration with Arbitrum Foundation, legal, ensuring transparency during setup | Higher oversight/responsibilities, frequency of updates needed at launch |
| Compliance & Governance | Complete NDAs, KYC, disclose conflicts; uphold Arbitrum Constitution | Helped shape governance documents (bylaws, entity setup), ensuring legal/structural alignment with DAO goals | Expanded scope vs. original role |
The AGV team fully supports fair recognition of the Council’s critical role during the program’s inception. The proposed startup-phase bonus specifically acknowledges the extraordinary, front-loaded effort involved in designing AGV’s foundational systems and launching its operations. This one-time award is separate from the forward-looking, market-benchmark adjustment and reflects the Council’s instrumental work in positioning the program for scale.
The AGV team, in carrying out its responsibilities under the Foundation Bylaws to manage general and administrative matters of the GCP Program, including finance and human resources, prepared this proposal using industry and compensation benchmarks, as well as a comparison of the Council’s originally laid out scope, and the additional startup phase scope that was required of them, along with its impact. The proposal was presented to the Council, which provided key input but recused itself from the decision-making process to avoid any conflict of interest. The Foundation Director has reviewed and approved the proposal in its current form.
In order to seek tokenholder approval on financial discrepancies between the original GCP Proposal and this proposal, the AGV team and Council now submit this proposal for a DAO vote.
If the proposal passes:
This proposal will include the following voting options:
Should FOR be the majority preference, and the combined FOR and ABSTAIN votes meet at least 3% of the total votable ARB supply, the proposal will be considered approved and may proceed to implementation.
This proposal seeks DAO approval for an updated compensation framework for the Arbitrum Gaming Ventures (AGV) Council.
For the current Council (Year One), we recommend a one-time startup-phase bonus of 90,000 ARB tokens per member, fully vested, in recognition of the heavier-than-anticipated contributions required to establish AGV’s structure, processes, and early investment strategy during its startup phase.
This startup phase bonus is a retrospective acknowledgment of extraordinary effort, not an element of the benchmark alignment. Additionally, these changes will be fully funded within AGV’s existing operating budget and require no additional DAO funds
The startup responsibilities required to transform AGV from a concept into a functioning business entity were not envisaged at all in the original Tally proposal. During AGV’s launch, Council members undertook a heavier, more hands-on workload than was scoped or anticipated. This extra work undertaken during AGV’s startup phase was essential to successfully turn the original GCP Proposal into a functioning VC.
These startup-phase efforts, which were essential to successfully turn the original GCP Proposal into a functioning VC, are listed and expanded on in detail below:
Table B: AGV Startup Phase: Scoped vs Actual Council Workload
| Category | Original Scope (4 hrs/week) | Startup Phase Scope (~10 hrs/week) | Notes / Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Risk Mitigation & Investment Thesis | Advise on initial investment thesis and portfolio approach | Contributed to initial portfolio strategy design, including risk policies and compliance checks | Front-loaded work to ensure robust oversight scaffolding and 0-1 strategic direction |
| Team Oversight & Nominations | Provide oversight and input on GCP team members and performance | Direct involvement in early hiring of core partners; provided input on org design | Higher time intensity due to recruitment, headcount planning, and onboarding of initial team members |
| DAO Liaison | Serve as liaison and oversight committee between DAO and GCP initiative | Engaged in foundational DAO communications, collaboration with Arbitrum Foundation, legal, ensuring transparency during setup | Higher oversight/responsibilities, frequency of updates needed at launch |
| Compliance & Governance | Complete NDAs, KYC, disclose conflicts; uphold Arbitrum Constitution | Helped shape governance documents (bylaws, entity setup), ensuring legal/structural alignment with DAO goals | Expanded scope vs. original role |
The AGV team fully supports fair recognition of the Council’s critical role during the program’s inception. The proposed startup-phase bonus specifically acknowledges the extraordinary, front-loaded effort involved in designing AGV’s foundational systems and launching its operations. This one-time award is separate from the forward-looking, market-benchmark adjustment and reflects the Council’s instrumental work in positioning the program for scale.
The AGV team, in carrying out its responsibilities under the Foundation Bylaws to manage general and administrative matters of the GCP Program, including finance and human resources, prepared this proposal using industry and compensation benchmarks, as well as a comparison of the Council’s originally laid out scope, and the additional startup phase scope that was required of them, along with its impact. The proposal was presented to the Council, which provided key input but recused itself from the decision-making process to avoid any conflict of interest. The Foundation Director has reviewed and approved the proposal in its current form.
In order to seek tokenholder approval on financial discrepancies between the original GCP Proposal and this proposal, the AGV team and Council now submit this proposal for a DAO vote.
If the proposal passes:
This proposal will include the following voting options:
Should FOR be the majority preference, and the combined FOR and ABSTAIN votes meet at least 3% of the total votable ARB supply, the proposal will be considered approved and may proceed to implementation.
Abstaining. I'm a member of the council that would be receiving this compensation.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/49?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/48
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/47?u=blockful
Abstaining. I'm a member of the council that would be receiving this compensation.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/49?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/48
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/47?u=blockful
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/45
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-138): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-138
The Event Horizon Community voted AGAINST on this proposal (ehARB-138): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-138
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/44?u=seedgov
For. Positive-sum collaboration requires fair compensation for significant contributions, especially during startup phases. Supporting this acknowledges the council's extraordinary effort, ensuring seamless governance and empowering strategic vision within the AGV.
I haven’t seen enough proof of results to justify this bonus
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/43?u=maxlomu
For. Positive-sum collaboration requires fair compensation for significant contributions, especially during startup phases. Supporting this acknowledges the council's extraordinary effort, ensuring seamless governance and empowering strategic vision within the AGV.
For. Positive-sum collaboration requires fair compensation for significant contributions, especially during startup phases. Supporting this acknowledges the council's extraordinary effort, ensuring seamless governance and empowering strategic vision within the AGV.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/24
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/42?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/39?u=euphoria
Bonus is for results exceeding expectations, not for doing the job in the first place.
The games that are coming from it look promising, i would support with longer vesting
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/34
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/30
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-135): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-135
The Event Horizon Community voted FOR on this proposal (ehARB-135): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-135
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/28?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/curia-delegate-communication-thread/23600/41
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/23
There isn't enough evidence that increasing pay will yield better performance outcomes for AGV.
it will allow to attract better candidates in the next elections for this council.
A bonus should generally be tied to better than expected results, not workload. This is not the time to needlessly increase overhead.
the setup of this vote breaks our precendent of requiring 3% quorum to modify an ongoing initiative.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/45
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-138): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-138
The Event Horizon Community voted AGAINST on this proposal (ehARB-138): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-138
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/44?u=seedgov
For. Positive-sum collaboration requires fair compensation for significant contributions, especially during startup phases. Supporting this acknowledges the council's extraordinary effort, ensuring seamless governance and empowering strategic vision within the AGV.
I haven’t seen enough proof of results to justify this bonus
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/43?u=maxlomu
For. Positive-sum collaboration requires fair compensation for significant contributions, especially during startup phases. Supporting this acknowledges the council's extraordinary effort, ensuring seamless governance and empowering strategic vision within the AGV.
For. Positive-sum collaboration requires fair compensation for significant contributions, especially during startup phases. Supporting this acknowledges the council's extraordinary effort, ensuring seamless governance and empowering strategic vision within the AGV.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/24
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/42?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/39?u=euphoria
Bonus is for results exceeding expectations, not for doing the job in the first place.
The games that are coming from it look promising, i would support with longer vesting
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/34
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/30
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-135): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-135
The Event Horizon Community voted FOR on this proposal (ehARB-135): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-135
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-agv-council-compensation-calibration-benchmark-for-next-term-startup-phase-bonus/29424/28?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/curia-delegate-communication-thread/23600/41
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/23
There isn't enough evidence that increasing pay will yield better performance outcomes for AGV.
it will allow to attract better candidates in the next elections for this council.
A bonus should generally be tied to better than expected results, not workload. This is not the time to needlessly increase overhead.
the setup of this vote breaks our precendent of requiring 3% quorum to modify an ongoing initiative.
Good to see you here JoJo, the work you guys have done is remarkable to me and I can compare it to other blockchain gaming grant systems, you are the most professional I have seen.
Good to see you here JoJo, the work you guys have done is remarkable to me and I can compare it to other blockchain gaming grant systems, you are the most professional I have seen.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members. Committee member Atomist was not involved in this discussion, as he is temporarily on leave.
The GMX Governance Committee is voting in favor of the proposal. The council members appear to have put in significant time and effort beyond the job scope initially outlined. Although a retroactive payment increase is not ideal, we believe commensurate compensation is warranted.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members. Committee member Atomist was not involved in this discussion, as he is temporarily on leave.
The GMX Governance Committee is voting in favor of the proposal. The council members appear to have put in significant time and effort beyond the job scope initially outlined. Although a retroactive payment increase is not ideal, we believe commensurate compensation is warranted.
The AGV is one of the most important DAO-funded initiatives, and it feels reasonable to compensate the sitting council members for stepping up to ensure the AGV foundation is solid.
As others have noted, the AGV's results so far fall short of initial expectations, but it is a long-term vision. And crypto gaming in general is currently a struggling sector. There’s a case to be made for the AGV’s mandate to be expanded to investments in domains outside of gaming. This, however, is a separate discussion.
Following the successful Snapshot vote for Proposal A: Benchmark Calibration for Future Council Terms, the new compensation framework has been formally approved by the DAO and will take effect with the start of the next AGV Council term.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members. Committee member Atomist was not involved in this discussion, as he is temporarily on leave.
The GMX Governance Committee is voting in favor of the proposal. The council members appear to have put in significant time and effort beyond the job scope initially outlined. Although a retroactive payment increase is not ideal, we believe commensurate compensation is warranted.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members. Committee member Atomist was not involved in this discussion, as he is temporarily on leave.
The GMX Governance Committee is voting in favor of the proposal. The council members appear to have put in significant time and effort beyond the job scope initially outlined. Although a retroactive payment increase is not ideal, we believe commensurate compensation is warranted.
The AGV is one of the most important DAO-funded initiatives, and it feels reasonable to compensate the sitting council members for stepping up to ensure the AGV foundation is solid.
As others have noted, the AGV's results so far fall short of initial expectations, but it is a long-term vision. And crypto gaming in general is currently a struggling sector. There’s a case to be made for the AGV’s mandate to be expanded to investments in domains outside of gaming. This, however, is a separate discussion.
Following the successful Snapshot vote for Proposal A: Benchmark Calibration for Future Council Terms, the new compensation framework has been formally approved by the DAO and will take effect with the start of the next AGV Council term.
Following the successful Snapshot vote for Proposal A: Benchmark Calibration for Future Council Terms, the new compensation framework has been formally approved by the DAO and will take effect with the start of the next AGV Council term.
Proposal B: Startup-Phase Bonus for Current Council Members will be raised as a Snapshot vote on Thursday 6th November. The vote will be conducted in the same fashion as Proposal A.
Each proposal will include the following voting options:
Should FOR be the majority preference, and the combined FOR and ABSTAIN votes meet at least 3% of the total votable ARB supply, the respective proposal will be considered approved and may proceed to implementation.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We will be voting in favor of the proposal, as it represents one of the most important DAO-funded initiatives. Increasing the salary here would be essential for attracting top talent and making the position more competitive in the next elections, which we view as a net positive for the DAO. A strong oversight role for this well-funded initiative is crucial.
The Temperature Check vote for Proposal A is now live on Snapshot for the next 7 days.
Over the past few days, several delegates and community members have raised questions about the current AGV proposal vote, particularly around the bundled voting format and how options were presented.
While the proposal followed all DAO procedures, it has become clear that the structure has caused confusion for some delegates. This includes two confirmed instances of mis-voting, equating to over 9.6M ARB in voting power, under the outlined approval voting format. In these instances, delegates voted in approval of both None and another option, which skews the reliability of results.
Over the past few days, several delegates and community members have raised questions about the current AGV proposal vote, particularly around the bundled voting format and how options were presented.
While the proposal followed all DAO procedures, it has become clear that the structure has caused confusion for some delegates. This includes two confirmed instances of mis-voting, equating to over 9.6M ARB in voting power, under the outlined approval voting format. In these instances, delegates voted in approval of both None and another option, which skews the reliability of results.
Following feedback from DAO stakeholders, AGV has decided to withdraw the current Snapshot vote and repost the proposal in a clearer, separated format later this week.
This change affects presentation only, not the substance or intent of the proposal. By breaking the proposal into individual components, delegates will be able to assess and decide on each part independently, supporting more precise and transparent decision-making. The team will also review and consider the vote’s quorum requirements in line with the magnitude of the change, ensuring that votes reach an appropriate level of participation and consensus.
We appreciate the constructive feedback and engagement from various DAO stakeholders, who supported this reset as the clearest path forward. AGV remains committed to maintaining transparency, alignment with DAO governance standards, and a high level of care in how decisions are presented to the DAO.
A follow-up post will be shared shortly outlining the next steps and updated proposal structure.
Arbitrum Gaming Ventures (AGV) Team
As noted in yesterday’s update, the previous Snapshot vote has been withdrawn following feedback from DAO stakeholders regarding confusion caused by the bundled approval voting structure and the lack of a defined quorum requirement.
As noted in yesterday’s update, the previous Snapshot vote has been withdrawn following feedback from DAO stakeholders regarding confusion caused by the bundled approval voting structure and the lack of a defined quorum requirement.
Delegates raised valid concerns that, while the original proposal technically complied with the DAO’s current procedural definitions for “modifications to existing initiatives,” given the updates to the initiative's oversight, AGV agrees that a 3% quorum threshold should apply.
To ensure full clarity, consistency, and proper deliberation, AGV will now proceed with a revised, sequential voting process that separates the prior bundled proposal into two distinct votes, each with a defined quorum and improved voting mechanics.
The material details of each proposal will remain unchanged.
Proposal B will only be posted after Proposal A concludes, allowing the DAO to first confirm the long-term compensation framework before considering any retrospective recognition.
AGV appreciates the constructive feedback from DAO delegates, particularly around procedural consistency and voting standards. These adjustments are intended to reinforce clarity, legitimacy, and trust in AGV’s governance process, ensuring that all financial or structural decisions meet the high standards expected by the Arbitrum DAO.
Each proposal will include the following voting options:
Should FOR be the majority preference, and the combined FOR and ABSTAIN votes meet at least 3% of the total votable ARB supply, the respective proposal will be considered approved and may proceed to implementation.
The Temperature Check vote is now live on Snapshot for the next 7 days.
As the proposed changes are independent of one another, this temperature check will use ‘approval voting’ to better understand sentiment regarding each individual change.
Hey @tamara , we paused this process for a while, but have taken your feedback in drafting the newly updated proposal. Please take a look at Table B: AGV Startup Phase: Scoped vs Actual Council Workload in the (edited) first post in this thread for the details you requested.
Also tagging @Jonezee for visibility.
This thread has been edited at [date=2025-10-02 time=10:50:00 timezone="US/Central"] to reflect the updated AGV Council Compensation Calibration proposal.
This thread has been edited at [date=2025-10-02 time=10:50:00 timezone="US/Central"] to reflect the updated AGV Council Compensation Calibration proposal.
Please review the update proposal above and feel free to provide feedback/ask questions; as mentioned above, we plan to launch as Snapshot vote on Thursday, October 9.
Concur with Tamara's request here.
Following the successful Snapshot vote for Proposal A: Benchmark Calibration for Future Council Terms, the new compensation framework has been formally approved by the DAO and will take effect with the start of the next AGV Council term.
Proposal B: Startup-Phase Bonus for Current Council Members will be raised as a Snapshot vote on Thursday 6th November. The vote will be conducted in the same fashion as Proposal A.
Each proposal will include the following voting options:
Should FOR be the majority preference, and the combined FOR and ABSTAIN votes meet at least 3% of the total votable ARB supply, the respective proposal will be considered approved and may proceed to implementation.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We will be voting in favor of the proposal, as it represents one of the most important DAO-funded initiatives. Increasing the salary here would be essential for attracting top talent and making the position more competitive in the next elections, which we view as a net positive for the DAO. A strong oversight role for this well-funded initiative is crucial.
The Temperature Check vote for Proposal A is now live on Snapshot for the next 7 days.
Over the past few days, several delegates and community members have raised questions about the current AGV proposal vote, particularly around the bundled voting format and how options were presented.
While the proposal followed all DAO procedures, it has become clear that the structure has caused confusion for some delegates. This includes two confirmed instances of mis-voting, equating to over 9.6M ARB in voting power, under the outlined approval voting format. In these instances, delegates voted in approval of both None and another option, which skews the reliability of results.
Over the past few days, several delegates and community members have raised questions about the current AGV proposal vote, particularly around the bundled voting format and how options were presented.
While the proposal followed all DAO procedures, it has become clear that the structure has caused confusion for some delegates. This includes two confirmed instances of mis-voting, equating to over 9.6M ARB in voting power, under the outlined approval voting format. In these instances, delegates voted in approval of both None and another option, which skews the reliability of results.
Following feedback from DAO stakeholders, AGV has decided to withdraw the current Snapshot vote and repost the proposal in a clearer, separated format later this week.
This change affects presentation only, not the substance or intent of the proposal. By breaking the proposal into individual components, delegates will be able to assess and decide on each part independently, supporting more precise and transparent decision-making. The team will also review and consider the vote’s quorum requirements in line with the magnitude of the change, ensuring that votes reach an appropriate level of participation and consensus.
We appreciate the constructive feedback and engagement from various DAO stakeholders, who supported this reset as the clearest path forward. AGV remains committed to maintaining transparency, alignment with DAO governance standards, and a high level of care in how decisions are presented to the DAO.
A follow-up post will be shared shortly outlining the next steps and updated proposal structure.
Arbitrum Gaming Ventures (AGV) Team
As noted in yesterday’s update, the previous Snapshot vote has been withdrawn following feedback from DAO stakeholders regarding confusion caused by the bundled approval voting structure and the lack of a defined quorum requirement.
As noted in yesterday’s update, the previous Snapshot vote has been withdrawn following feedback from DAO stakeholders regarding confusion caused by the bundled approval voting structure and the lack of a defined quorum requirement.
Delegates raised valid concerns that, while the original proposal technically complied with the DAO’s current procedural definitions for “modifications to existing initiatives,” given the updates to the initiative's oversight, AGV agrees that a 3% quorum threshold should apply.
To ensure full clarity, consistency, and proper deliberation, AGV will now proceed with a revised, sequential voting process that separates the prior bundled proposal into two distinct votes, each with a defined quorum and improved voting mechanics.
The material details of each proposal will remain unchanged.
Proposal B will only be posted after Proposal A concludes, allowing the DAO to first confirm the long-term compensation framework before considering any retrospective recognition.
AGV appreciates the constructive feedback from DAO delegates, particularly around procedural consistency and voting standards. These adjustments are intended to reinforce clarity, legitimacy, and trust in AGV’s governance process, ensuring that all financial or structural decisions meet the high standards expected by the Arbitrum DAO.
Each proposal will include the following voting options:
Should FOR be the majority preference, and the combined FOR and ABSTAIN votes meet at least 3% of the total votable ARB supply, the respective proposal will be considered approved and may proceed to implementation.
The Temperature Check vote is now live on Snapshot for the next 7 days.
As the proposed changes are independent of one another, this temperature check will use ‘approval voting’ to better understand sentiment regarding each individual change.
Hey @tamara , we paused this process for a while, but have taken your feedback in drafting the newly updated proposal. Please take a look at Table B: AGV Startup Phase: Scoped vs Actual Council Workload in the (edited) first post in this thread for the details you requested.
Also tagging @Jonezee for visibility.
This thread has been edited at [date=2025-10-02 time=10:50:00 timezone="US/Central"] to reflect the updated AGV Council Compensation Calibration proposal.
This thread has been edited at [date=2025-10-02 time=10:50:00 timezone="US/Central"] to reflect the updated AGV Council Compensation Calibration proposal.
Please review the update proposal above and feel free to provide feedback/ask questions; as mentioned above, we plan to launch as Snapshot vote on Thursday, October 9.
Concur with Tamara's request here.
The Temperature Check vote is now live on Snapshot for the next 7 days.
As the proposed changes are independent of one another, this temperature check will use ‘approval voting’ to better understand sentiment regarding each individual change.
With approval voting, each delegate may select any number of choices, and each selected choice will receive the delegate’s full voting power. As a reminder, if a delegate does not support any of the proposed changes, they should only select ‘None’ to ensure reliability of results.
Any option that receives more than 50% of the total voting power cast in this Temperature Check will be considered approved and may proceed to implementation.
As this is a modification to an existing initiative, there are no set voting or quorum requirements.
Any option that receives more than 50% of the total voting power cast in this Temperature Check will be considered approved and may proceed to implementation:
There will be no onchain vote on Tally following this temperature check.
In order to seek tokenholder approval on financial discrepancies between the original GCP Proposal and this proposal, the AGV team and Council now submit this proposal for a DAO vote.
Hi @cp0x, thanks for the thoughtful suggestions. We really appreciate you taking the time to engage so deeply with the proposal.
AGV, like much of what the DAO is building, is still early and evolving. We’re approaching this with a startup mindset: moving quickly, learning from what works and what doesn’t, and adjusting along the way. One of our key learnings early on was that in order to deliver real oversight and operational momentum, the Council had to be far more hands-on than originally envisioned, not just reviewers, but active participants in the build.
Hi @cp0x, thanks for the thoughtful suggestions. We really appreciate you taking the time to engage so deeply with the proposal.
AGV, like much of what the DAO is building, is still early and evolving. We’re approaching this with a startup mindset: moving quickly, learning from what works and what doesn’t, and adjusting along the way. One of our key learnings early on was that in order to deliver real oversight and operational momentum, the Council had to be far more hands-on than originally envisioned, not just reviewers, but active participants in the build.
Introduce performance-based bonuses... retroactive bonus if a deal or project they worked on becomes successful...
We’ve explored this idea, but there are several challenges that make performance-based bonuses difficult to implement at this stage:
Attribution is a moving target. Success in venture-style investing is the result of many interlocking factors, including timing, team execution, and market shifts. It’s difficult to draw a clear line from outcome to individual contribution, especially when Council composition may change years down the line.
Timing is misaligned. AGV investments are long-term. It can take years before meaningful results materialize. Structuring retroactive bonuses would require a complex tracking and claims system, which doesn’t fit our current operating model and introduces friction for a lean, fast-moving operation.
Misaligned incentives. We’re wary of introducing task-based KPIs or bonus systems that push quantity over quality. Counting projects reviewed or deals closed risks shifting focus away from thoughtful diligence toward hitting a quota, which goes against AGV’s mission to fund only the most compelling opportunities.
Number of projects reviewed... passed to due diligence... investments approved...
We’ve intentionally avoided tying compensation or evaluation to volume-based metrics. The quality of AGV’s investments, not how many are processed, is the north star. Forcing numerical targets might generate activity, but not necessarily outcomes. Given how early we are, staying flexible and allowing the Council to apply judgment is more valuable than rigid KPI targets.
We agree visibility is important, and this is already built into our process. AGV produces a biannual transparency report that’s reviewed and approved by the Council before publishing. While the core AGV team drafts the report, the Council is responsible for ensuring it reflects an accurate and complete view of operations and decision-making.
We’ll continue evolving AGV’s structure and accountability mechanisms as the program matures, including revisiting compensation models if/when a longer-term fund structure supports it. In the meantime, we’re committed to being transparent, responsive to feedback, and iterative in approach. Thanks again for helping us improve.
This update brings Council compensation in line with benchmarks from both DAO and venture ecosystems and is fully covered by AGV’s existing budget. No additional DAO funds are requested.
This update brings Council compensation in line with benchmarks from both DAO and venture ecosystems and is fully covered by AGV’s existing budget. No additional DAO funds are requested.
Motivation The AGV Council was originally scoped as a high-caliber advisory body with a limited time commitment. In practice, the Council has become a deeply engaged governance partner whose collective expertise in gaming, venture, and decentralized systems has materially strengthened AGV’s operations, strategy, and alignment with DAO values.
As AGV transitions from setup to sustained execution, it’s clear that the initiative is best served by keeping Council members meaningfully involved—not just in oversight, but in shaping capital strategy, navigating ecosystem complexity, and upholding transparent, high-trust processes. This proposal recognizes that the role requires ongoing time, judgment, and context and that attracting and retaining talent at this level requires compensation aligned with the responsibility and value delivered.
Rationale Since onboarding, Council members have played a core role in AGV’s evolution and operation, including capital approvals, governance and incentive design, strategic alignment, and venture structuring. These are not passive advisory roles; they require sustained judgment and context over months and quarters.
Today, AGV Council members contribute an average of 30 hours/month, participating in investment reviews, organizational and budget planning, DAO engagement, and other governance activities that reinforce long-term program integrity.
In many ways, these contributions resemble advisory board members or investment committee participants in traditional venture contexts, yet unlike in VC or startup roles, AGV Council members receive no equity or carry upside. Compensation must therefore reflect a fair-market equivalent for high-responsibility roles with public accountability and long-term context.
Based on comparable industry benchmarks, we propose a fair annual compensation of $50K/year for Council members, based on:
For more detail, see Appendix A : Industry & VC Compensation Benchmarks.
Specifications
Overall Cost
| Role Type | # of Members | Current Annual Comp | Current Total Annual Cost | Proposed Annual Comp | Proposed Total Annual Cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Council Member | 4 | $30,000 | $120,000 | $50,000 | $200,000 |
| Council Member (IC) | 1 | $80,000 | $80,000 | $120,000 | $120,000 |
| Total | 5 | -– | $200,000 | -– | $320,000 |
Appendix A : Industry & VC Compensation Benchmarks
Benchmark Category Comp Range AGV Council Jus
Strong yes from me on this.
It’s time we stop treating governance like a side hustle when the work clearly isn’t. The AGV Council has gone waybeyond “advisory”, they’ve been doing the heavy lifting: managing oversight on $100M+ in assets, leading investment diligence, shaping strategy, and keeping the program aligned with DAO values.
Compensating them fairly isn't a bonus, it's a necessity.
This proposal simply acknowledges reality: high-responsibility, high-context roles deserve market-aligned compensation, especially when there's no equity or upside involved. The $50K/year adjustment (and $120K for the dual-role member) is not only reasonable, it's overdue.
No new DAO funds are being requested, and we retain top-tier contributors without compromising integrity or budget. That’s a win-win for everyone.
Let’s keep raising the bar for what accountable, long-term governance looks like.
Thanks @JoJo, we appreciate you raising this. We’ll continue to work on making the responsibilities of the Council more visible going forward. It’s possible that terms familiar to AGV might carry different connotations to the broader DAO and we recognize the importance of continuously surfacing those differences more clearly so expectations are aligned.
But can likely pass unnoticed to most since is just a single sentence in a proposal, and would urge AGV on working on better surfacing the amount of work all people in there do because to most of Arbitrum is a black box, and is just fair, for the people that carry the torch on a daily basis, to have their work highlighted.
Thanks @JoJo, we appreciate you raising this. We’ll continue to work on making the responsibilities of the Council more visible going forward. It’s possible that terms familiar to AGV might carry different connotations to the broader DAO and we recognize the importance of continuously surfacing those differences more clearly so expectations are aligned.
But can likely pass unnoticed to most since is just a single sentence in a proposal, and would urge AGV on working on better surfacing the amount of work all people in there do because to most of Arbitrum is a black box, and is just fair, for the people that carry the torch on a daily basis, to have their work highlighted.
Thanks as well @cp0x for the thoughtful feedback. We’ll respond to each point in turn:
This is a valid observation. In traditional venture setups, carry or profit-share is common. However, AGV’s structure and governance model, where Council members are reelected annually, make this difficult to implement. There is no guarantee that the same individuals who approve deals today will still be serving when returns materialize years later. This disconnect creates challenges in aligning performance incentives across election cycles.
So while the lack of long-term upside is a known gap, it’s more of a structural limitation rather than an oversight. It also reinforces the case for fair fixed compensation, particularly when Council members take on operational roles typically compensated with both salary and carry in private funds.
Raising compensation by 66% without a new vote or mandate revision seems questionable…
We understand the concern. To clarify, this proposal is being posted precisely so the DAO can weigh in before any changes are made, including voting to approve or reject the adjustment.
While the original compensation mirrored other DAO council structures (like STIP or LTIPP), the role of the AGV Council is fundamentally different. AGV’s Council is not just about oversight; it is operational. Council members lead due diligence, evaluate all proposals, conduct interviews with founders, and approve every investment or grant made. They are also involved in hiring, including our current GM search, and are embedded in every major operational decision.
After benchmarking compensation across similar roles in the ecosystem and factoring in the lack of profit participation, it became clear that AGV’s Council was significantly under-compensated for the scope of work required. The proposed adjustment brings compensation closer to an upper bound aligned with industry standards and reflects the level of responsibility Council members carry.
Where are the performance metrics for such a significant salary increase?
This is a fair question, and one we’ve considered closely.
The challenge is that most meaningful KPIs for a fund like AGV (e.g., realized returns, portfolio company success) are multi-year outcomes, well beyond the tenure of any single Council. Short-term KPIs, such as “number of deals approved” or “grants disbursed,” risk incentivizing quantity over quality, which is counterproductive to AGV’s investment mandate.
In a traditional fund structure, performance metrics would apply more naturally to a stable, long-term team with carry. In our case, with rotating Council membership, no carry, and DAO-driven oversight, we’ve focused on ensuring transparency and accountability through public reporting, forum updates, and community engagement, rather than artificial quantitative KPIs.
That said, we’re open to suggestions on how we might improve performance transparency without misaligning incentives, and appreciate the push for clearer and more transparent accountability.
We’ll continue iterating based on all the feedback received and welcome any additional thoughts as we move toward a vote. Thanks again to all who’ve taken the time to engage here.
Good points, which echo much of what came to mind for me while reading this proposal.
The Temperature Check vote is now live on Snapshot for the next 7 days.
As the proposed changes are independent of one another, this temperature check will use ‘approval voting’ to better understand sentiment regarding each individual change.
With approval voting, each delegate may select any number of choices, and each selected choice will receive the delegate’s full voting power. As a reminder, if a delegate does not support any of the proposed changes, they should only select ‘None’ to ensure reliability of results.
Any option that receives more than 50% of the total voting power cast in this Temperature Check will be considered approved and may proceed to implementation.
As this is a modification to an existing initiative, there are no set voting or quorum requirements.
Any option that receives more than 50% of the total voting power cast in this Temperature Check will be considered approved and may proceed to implementation:
There will be no onchain vote on Tally following this temperature check.
In order to seek tokenholder approval on financial discrepancies between the original GCP Proposal and this proposal, the AGV team and Council now submit this proposal for a DAO vote.
Hi @cp0x, thanks for the thoughtful suggestions. We really appreciate you taking the time to engage so deeply with the proposal.
AGV, like much of what the DAO is building, is still early and evolving. We’re approaching this with a startup mindset: moving quickly, learning from what works and what doesn’t, and adjusting along the way. One of our key learnings early on was that in order to deliver real oversight and operational momentum, the Council had to be far more hands-on than originally envisioned, not just reviewers, but active participants in the build.
Hi @cp0x, thanks for the thoughtful suggestions. We really appreciate you taking the time to engage so deeply with the proposal.
AGV, like much of what the DAO is building, is still early and evolving. We’re approaching this with a startup mindset: moving quickly, learning from what works and what doesn’t, and adjusting along the way. One of our key learnings early on was that in order to deliver real oversight and operational momentum, the Council had to be far more hands-on than originally envisioned, not just reviewers, but active participants in the build.
Introduce performance-based bonuses... retroactive bonus if a deal or project they worked on becomes successful...
We’ve explored this idea, but there are several challenges that make performance-based bonuses difficult to implement at this stage:
Attribution is a moving target. Success in venture-style investing is the result of many interlocking factors, including timing, team execution, and market shifts. It’s difficult to draw a clear line from outcome to individual contribution, especially when Council composition may change years down the line.
Timing is misaligned. AGV investments are long-term. It can take years before meaningful results materialize. Structuring retroactive bonuses would require a complex tracking and claims system, which doesn’t fit our current operating model and introduces friction for a lean, fast-moving operation.
Misaligned incentives. We’re wary of introducing task-based KPIs or bonus systems that push quantity over quality. Counting projects reviewed or deals closed risks shifting focus away from thoughtful diligence toward hitting a quota, which goes against AGV’s mission to fund only the most compelling opportunities.
Number of projects reviewed... passed to due diligence... investments approved...
We’ve intentionally avoided tying compensation or evaluation to volume-based metrics. The quality of AGV’s investments, not how many are processed, is the north star. Forcing numerical targets might generate activity, but not necessarily outcomes. Given how early we are, staying flexible and allowing the Council to apply judgment is more valuable than rigid KPI targets.
We agree visibility is important, and this is already built into our process. AGV produces a biannual transparency report that’s reviewed and approved by the Council before publishing. While the core AGV team drafts the report, the Council is responsible for ensuring it reflects an accurate and complete view of operations and decision-making.
We’ll continue evolving AGV’s structure and accountability mechanisms as the program matures, including revisiting compensation models if/when a longer-term fund structure supports it. In the meantime, we’re committed to being transparent, responsive to feedback, and iterative in approach. Thanks again for helping us improve.
This update brings Council compensation in line with benchmarks from both DAO and venture ecosystems and is fully covered by AGV’s existing budget. No additional DAO funds are requested.
This update brings Council compensation in line with benchmarks from both DAO and venture ecosystems and is fully covered by AGV’s existing budget. No additional DAO funds are requested.
Motivation The AGV Council was originally scoped as a high-caliber advisory body with a limited time commitment. In practice, the Council has become a deeply engaged governance partner whose collective expertise in gaming, venture, and decentralized systems has materially strengthened AGV’s operations, strategy, and alignment with DAO values.
As AGV transitions from setup to sustained execution, it’s clear that the initiative is best served by keeping Council members meaningfully involved—not just in oversight, but in shaping capital strategy, navigating ecosystem complexity, and upholding transparent, high-trust processes. This proposal recognizes that the role requires ongoing time, judgment, and context and that attracting and retaining talent at this level requires compensation aligned with the responsibility and value delivered.
Rationale Since onboarding, Council members have played a core role in AGV’s evolution and operation, including capital approvals, governance and incentive design, strategic alignment, and venture structuring. These are not passive advisory roles; they require sustained judgment and context over months and quarters.
Today, AGV Council members contribute an average of 30 hours/month, participating in investment reviews, organizational and budget planning, DAO engagement, and other governance activities that reinforce long-term program integrity.
In many ways, these contributions resemble advisory board members or investment committee participants in traditional venture contexts, yet unlike in VC or startup roles, AGV Council members receive no equity or carry upside. Compensation must therefore reflect a fair-market equivalent for high-responsibility roles with public accountability and long-term context.
Based on comparable industry benchmarks, we propose a fair annual compensation of $50K/year for Council members, based on:
For more detail, see Appendix A : Industry & VC Compensation Benchmarks.
Specifications
Overall Cost
| Role Type | # of Members | Current Annual Comp | Current Total Annual Cost | Proposed Annual Comp | Proposed Total Annual Cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Council Member | 4 | $30,000 | $120,000 | $50,000 | $200,000 |
| Council Member (IC) | 1 | $80,000 | $80,000 | $120,000 | $120,000 |
| Total | 5 | -– | $200,000 | -– | $320,000 |
Appendix A : Industry & VC Compensation Benchmarks
Benchmark Category Comp Range AGV Council Jus
Strong yes from me on this.
It’s time we stop treating governance like a side hustle when the work clearly isn’t. The AGV Council has gone waybeyond “advisory”, they’ve been doing the heavy lifting: managing oversight on $100M+ in assets, leading investment diligence, shaping strategy, and keeping the program aligned with DAO values.
Compensating them fairly isn't a bonus, it's a necessity.
This proposal simply acknowledges reality: high-responsibility, high-context roles deserve market-aligned compensation, especially when there's no equity or upside involved. The $50K/year adjustment (and $120K for the dual-role member) is not only reasonable, it's overdue.
No new DAO funds are being requested, and we retain top-tier contributors without compromising integrity or budget. That’s a win-win for everyone.
Let’s keep raising the bar for what accountable, long-term governance looks like.
Thanks @JoJo, we appreciate you raising this. We’ll continue to work on making the responsibilities of the Council more visible going forward. It’s possible that terms familiar to AGV might carry different connotations to the broader DAO and we recognize the importance of continuously surfacing those differences more clearly so expectations are aligned.
But can likely pass unnoticed to most since is just a single sentence in a proposal, and would urge AGV on working on better surfacing the amount of work all people in there do because to most of Arbitrum is a black box, and is just fair, for the people that carry the torch on a daily basis, to have their work highlighted.
Thanks @JoJo, we appreciate you raising this. We’ll continue to work on making the responsibilities of the Council more visible going forward. It’s possible that terms familiar to AGV might carry different connotations to the broader DAO and we recognize the importance of continuously surfacing those differences more clearly so expectations are aligned.
But can likely pass unnoticed to most since is just a single sentence in a proposal, and would urge AGV on working on better surfacing the amount of work all people in there do because to most of Arbitrum is a black box, and is just fair, for the people that carry the torch on a daily basis, to have their work highlighted.
Thanks as well @cp0x for the thoughtful feedback. We’ll respond to each point in turn:
This is a valid observation. In traditional venture setups, carry or profit-share is common. However, AGV’s structure and governance model, where Council members are reelected annually, make this difficult to implement. There is no guarantee that the same individuals who approve deals today will still be serving when returns materialize years later. This disconnect creates challenges in aligning performance incentives across election cycles.
So while the lack of long-term upside is a known gap, it’s more of a structural limitation rather than an oversight. It also reinforces the case for fair fixed compensation, particularly when Council members take on operational roles typically compensated with both salary and carry in private funds.
Raising compensation by 66% without a new vote or mandate revision seems questionable…
We understand the concern. To clarify, this proposal is being posted precisely so the DAO can weigh in before any changes are made, including voting to approve or reject the adjustment.
While the original compensation mirrored other DAO council structures (like STIP or LTIPP), the role of the AGV Council is fundamentally different. AGV’s Council is not just about oversight; it is operational. Council members lead due diligence, evaluate all proposals, conduct interviews with founders, and approve every investment or grant made. They are also involved in hiring, including our current GM search, and are embedded in every major operational decision.
After benchmarking compensation across similar roles in the ecosystem and factoring in the lack of profit participation, it became clear that AGV’s Council was significantly under-compensated for the scope of work required. The proposed adjustment brings compensation closer to an upper bound aligned with industry standards and reflects the level of responsibility Council members carry.
Where are the performance metrics for such a significant salary increase?
This is a fair question, and one we’ve considered closely.
The challenge is that most meaningful KPIs for a fund like AGV (e.g., realized returns, portfolio company success) are multi-year outcomes, well beyond the tenure of any single Council. Short-term KPIs, such as “number of deals approved” or “grants disbursed,” risk incentivizing quantity over quality, which is counterproductive to AGV’s investment mandate.
In a traditional fund structure, performance metrics would apply more naturally to a stable, long-term team with carry. In our case, with rotating Council membership, no carry, and DAO-driven oversight, we’ve focused on ensuring transparency and accountability through public reporting, forum updates, and community engagement, rather than artificial quantitative KPIs.
That said, we’re open to suggestions on how we might improve performance transparency without misaligning incentives, and appreciate the push for clearer and more transparent accountability.
We’ll continue iterating based on all the feedback received and welcome any additional thoughts as we move toward a vote. Thanks again to all who’ve taken the time to engage here.
Good points, which echo much of what came to mind for me while reading this proposal.
Voting “For” as I know that the workload was far greater then initially anticipated and believe it is fair to provide this benefit
this is not true.
this is not true.
this proposal mentions specifically, on the Snapshot proposal body text, that:
For this proposal, the 3% quorum at the 23739805 Ethereum block is ~143.58M ARB. This vote achieved the 3% quorum since it got 152.5M ARB casted on the For + Abstain vote choices
I voted for in the part B of this proposal. As several commented, the workload was way bigger than anticipated. I thank them for their effort and wish that, from now on, we have a more structured program running as it matures.
We’ll be ABSTAINING from this vote.
Our concern is not with the proposed compensation increase or performance bonus for Council members, but with the procedure that allows modifying or canceling proposals with a simple majority approval (>50%) rather than a 3% quorum threshold, as mentioned here.
We’ll be ABSTAINING from this vote.
Our concern is not with the proposed compensation increase or performance bonus for Council members, but with the procedure that allows modifying or canceling proposals with a simple majority approval (>50%) rather than a 3% quorum threshold, as mentioned here.
While we recognize the operational convenience this framework brings, it introduces a governance security vulnerability, allowing substantial modifications after initial approval.
We are therefore abstaining, in disagreement with the process, but not with the AGV team’s intent or the substance of their proposal.
Thanks again for this one!
Having seen this discussion running for a long period and having read carefully every comment I do agree with @tamara that
Thanks again for this one!
Having seen this discussion running for a long period and having read carefully every comment I do agree with @tamara that
I listened carefully to what was said in Tuesday’s meeting to gain a deeper understanding of this proposal, as I do every time, but even if I understand more, this is a field in which I am not primarily focused.
Also, I will say again that
especially considering that AGV is part of the DAO that not only consumes capital but also contributes back to it.
Also, I saw that @paulofonseca’s concern was taken under consideration. I do realize that there are still concerns like those @cp0x mentioned, but up to this moment and according to my understing I see no reason for opposing this proposal.
That’s why I am going to vote FOR.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We would like to begin by noting that the DAO recently supported increasing the future compensation for the upcoming AGV Council to $50,000 per year for Council Members and $100,000 for the Investment Committee seat. Based on the 40 hours per month budgeted in the table for the start-up phase, this translates to slightly over $100/hour in the first case and around $200/hour in the second. If we add the 60,000 ARB bonus vested over 6 months, at current prices, that represents an additional $70/hour.
In this proposal, with a 90,000 ARB bonus vested over 12 months, the hourly rate would increase by $52.50, considering that the previous rate was $62.50/hour ($30,000 per year ÷ 12 months ÷ 40 hours per month), resulting in $115/hour in total. From our perspective, the hourly rate paid so far does not reflect the level of seniority and background required for these roles, nor is it consistent with what the DAO has previously approved.
From this standpoint, the requested bonus seems reasonable. While we understand some delegates’ concerns regarding the expected impact of the AGV, in this particular case we are discussing a retroactive payment for the initial phase of an entity whose core purpose is to operate as a VC, meaning that tying this payment to measurable impact would be an overreach, as the true outcomes of such initiatives can only be observed after the initial phase.
With all due respect, we disagree with this idea in this particular case. We are discussing a retroactive payment for a Council whose composition in January 2026 (less than two months from now) remains uncertain — some of the members who are supposed to receive this bonus might not continue in their roles and would therefore have no control over what happens with the AGV afterward. For this reason, the 12-month vesting period already appears more than generous under the current agreement.
That said, we would support this type of approach for future payments, provided that Council members receive a degree of stability or tenure guarantee that ensures a fair alignment of incentives
In summary, the committee has had to perform more tasks than initially expected during the bootstrapping phase. The proposed hourly value is consistent with what was approved for the future in Proposal A, and still remains below the rate outlined in the original scope (approximately $150/hour, based on $2,500 for 16 hours per month).
Regarding vesting, we again find the proposed structure reasonable, since this is compensation for work already completed. If the DAO wishes to ensure greater accountability and long-term alignment through longer or KPI-based vesting schemes, we should also consider extending the Council members’ terms to at least two years. It would be inconsistent to demand long-term alignment in payments without providing a degree of stability, especially when dealing with a VC-style initiative that inherently operates with a long-term vision.
Finally, we want to emphasize again the importance of stability in these structures. Gaming, in particular, is an industry that requires time, and we believe that the best results are yet to come. We value that the team is now complete and have high expectations for Michael Chang as General Manager.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
We understand that the inaugural AGV Council took on a far greater workload than initially anticipated, building the program’s operational, legal, and investment foundations from the ground up. Until some time ago, @krst had been closely following some of these developments. Sometimes, simply discussing progress and potential ways forward took more than the assumed 10 hours per month for Council members. We can only imagine how much more work this required in practice.
Therefore, we see this one-time bonus not as an actual bonus but rather as a retroactive compensation for the extra work that has been delivered.
However, we agree with some delegate comments that the communication on the Council side was far from ideal. While we had a view on the additional work needed during the startup phase, we understand that many delegates lacked this insight. Our support assumes that AGV will continue to improve transparency and reporting. Going forward, we expect regular updates on program performance and Council operations so the DAO can better evaluate their impact.
voting Against in this offchain vote because I haven’t seen enough proof of results to justify this bonus.
I voted AGAINST
I still believe that bonuses should be earned, not granted.
If the authors had included even a hint of a KPI, I would have been in favor of allocating a bonus, but that didn't happen.
The definition of a BONUS is an additional reward above and beyond the base salary (wage), paid for achieving certain results or indicators.
I voted FOR on the Part A of this proposal. Most of the planning exercises fail short of the actual demands of puting a project in place. This adjustment (after running the actual program for a while) is reasonable and has my support.
gm, voting ABSTAIN on the retroactive rewards.
The current council has earned $30k per year for working ~10 hours per week (per the presented table), equivalent to $120k annually for a full time role.
While that seems more than reasonable to me, I trust the other AAEs and delegates who have had the opportunity to monitor the work more closely.
I share the concerns raised above:
I'm voting Abstain on the retroactive rewards
I value what the AGV is doing in finding strong potential candidates to lead the gaming efforts on Arbitrum. The thing is we are not there yet… competing for the gaming ecosystem is a huge opportunity, but not an easy task. I see the great work being done and want to acknowledge those efforts. Which is why I’m on the fence here, and won't vote against.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the increase in compensation.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the increase in compensation.
We have been closely following the developments of the AGV and understand the level of responsibility placed in the council’s hands. We fully support fair compensation for key roles within the DAO and hope this helps attract the best candidates to these positions.
However, we would like to reiterate our request for improved communication with the DAO and greater transparency. The AGV is now fully operational, and this is the time for us to be diligent in ensuring that the ongoing investments deliver measurable returns in the future.
Seems clear the community supports the Council’s workload and impact. The proposed pay adjustment seems fair, especially since it’s benchmarked against comparable DAO and venture roles. Therefore, I’ll be voting for this proposal.
Voting “For” as I know that the workload was far greater then initially anticipated and believe it is fair to provide this benefit
this is not true.
this is not true.
this proposal mentions specifically, on the Snapshot proposal body text, that:
For this proposal, the 3% quorum at the 23739805 Ethereum block is ~143.58M ARB. This vote achieved the 3% quorum since it got 152.5M ARB casted on the For + Abstain vote choices
I voted for in the part B of this proposal. As several commented, the workload was way bigger than anticipated. I thank them for their effort and wish that, from now on, we have a more structured program running as it matures.
We’ll be ABSTAINING from this vote.
Our concern is not with the proposed compensation increase or performance bonus for Council members, but with the procedure that allows modifying or canceling proposals with a simple majority approval (>50%) rather than a 3% quorum threshold, as mentioned here.
We’ll be ABSTAINING from this vote.
Our concern is not with the proposed compensation increase or performance bonus for Council members, but with the procedure that allows modifying or canceling proposals with a simple majority approval (>50%) rather than a 3% quorum threshold, as mentioned here.
While we recognize the operational convenience this framework brings, it introduces a governance security vulnerability, allowing substantial modifications after initial approval.
We are therefore abstaining, in disagreement with the process, but not with the AGV team’s intent or the substance of their proposal.
Thanks again for this one!
Having seen this discussion running for a long period and having read carefully every comment I do agree with @tamara that
Thanks again for this one!
Having seen this discussion running for a long period and having read carefully every comment I do agree with @tamara that
I listened carefully to what was said in Tuesday’s meeting to gain a deeper understanding of this proposal, as I do every time, but even if I understand more, this is a field in which I am not primarily focused.
Also, I will say again that
especially considering that AGV is part of the DAO that not only consumes capital but also contributes back to it.
Also, I saw that @paulofonseca’s concern was taken under consideration. I do realize that there are still concerns like those @cp0x mentioned, but up to this moment and according to my understing I see no reason for opposing this proposal.
That’s why I am going to vote FOR.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We would like to begin by noting that the DAO recently supported increasing the future compensation for the upcoming AGV Council to $50,000 per year for Council Members and $100,000 for the Investment Committee seat. Based on the 40 hours per month budgeted in the table for the start-up phase, this translates to slightly over $100/hour in the first case and around $200/hour in the second. If we add the 60,000 ARB bonus vested over 6 months, at current prices, that represents an additional $70/hour.
In this proposal, with a 90,000 ARB bonus vested over 12 months, the hourly rate would increase by $52.50, considering that the previous rate was $62.50/hour ($30,000 per year ÷ 12 months ÷ 40 hours per month), resulting in $115/hour in total. From our perspective, the hourly rate paid so far does not reflect the level of seniority and background required for these roles, nor is it consistent with what the DAO has previously approved.
From this standpoint, the requested bonus seems reasonable. While we understand some delegates’ concerns regarding the expected impact of the AGV, in this particular case we are discussing a retroactive payment for the initial phase of an entity whose core purpose is to operate as a VC, meaning that tying this payment to measurable impact would be an overreach, as the true outcomes of such initiatives can only be observed after the initial phase.
With all due respect, we disagree with this idea in this particular case. We are discussing a retroactive payment for a Council whose composition in January 2026 (less than two months from now) remains uncertain — some of the members who are supposed to receive this bonus might not continue in their roles and would therefore have no control over what happens with the AGV afterward. For this reason, the 12-month vesting period already appears more than generous under the current agreement.
That said, we would support this type of approach for future payments, provided that Council members receive a degree of stability or tenure guarantee that ensures a fair alignment of incentives
In summary, the committee has had to perform more tasks than initially expected during the bootstrapping phase. The proposed hourly value is consistent with what was approved for the future in Proposal A, and still remains below the rate outlined in the original scope (approximately $150/hour, based on $2,500 for 16 hours per month).
Regarding vesting, we again find the proposed structure reasonable, since this is compensation for work already completed. If the DAO wishes to ensure greater accountability and long-term alignment through longer or KPI-based vesting schemes, we should also consider extending the Council members’ terms to at least two years. It would be inconsistent to demand long-term alignment in payments without providing a degree of stability, especially when dealing with a VC-style initiative that inherently operates with a long-term vision.
Finally, we want to emphasize again the importance of stability in these structures. Gaming, in particular, is an industry that requires time, and we believe that the best results are yet to come. We value that the team is now complete and have high expectations for Michael Chang as General Manager.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
We understand that the inaugural AGV Council took on a far greater workload than initially anticipated, building the program’s operational, legal, and investment foundations from the ground up. Until some time ago, @krst had been closely following some of these developments. Sometimes, simply discussing progress and potential ways forward took more than the assumed 10 hours per month for Council members. We can only imagine how much more work this required in practice.
Therefore, we see this one-time bonus not as an actual bonus but rather as a retroactive compensation for the extra work that has been delivered.
However, we agree with some delegate comments that the communication on the Council side was far from ideal. While we had a view on the additional work needed during the startup phase, we understand that many delegates lacked this insight. Our support assumes that AGV will continue to improve transparency and reporting. Going forward, we expect regular updates on program performance and Council operations so the DAO can better evaluate their impact.
voting Against in this offchain vote because I haven’t seen enough proof of results to justify this bonus.
I voted AGAINST
I still believe that bonuses should be earned, not granted.
If the authors had included even a hint of a KPI, I would have been in favor of allocating a bonus, but that didn't happen.
The definition of a BONUS is an additional reward above and beyond the base salary (wage), paid for achieving certain results or indicators.
I voted FOR on the Part A of this proposal. Most of the planning exercises fail short of the actual demands of puting a project in place. This adjustment (after running the actual program for a while) is reasonable and has my support.
gm, voting ABSTAIN on the retroactive rewards.
The current council has earned $30k per year for working ~10 hours per week (per the presented table), equivalent to $120k annually for a full time role.
While that seems more than reasonable to me, I trust the other AAEs and delegates who have had the opportunity to monitor the work more closely.
I share the concerns raised above:
I'm voting Abstain on the retroactive rewards
I value what the AGV is doing in finding strong potential candidates to lead the gaming efforts on Arbitrum. The thing is we are not there yet… competing for the gaming ecosystem is a huge opportunity, but not an easy task. I see the great work being done and want to acknowledge those efforts. Which is why I’m on the fence here, and won't vote against.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the increase in compensation.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the increase in compensation.
We have been closely following the developments of the AGV and understand the level of responsibility placed in the council’s hands. We fully support fair compensation for key roles within the DAO and hope this helps attract the best candidates to these positions.
However, we would like to reiterate our request for improved communication with the DAO and greater transparency. The AGV is now fully operational, and this is the time for us to be diligent in ensuring that the ongoing investments deliver measurable returns in the future.
Seems clear the community supports the Council’s workload and impact. The proposed pay adjustment seems fair, especially since it’s benchmarked against comparable DAO and venture roles. Therefore, I’ll be voting for this proposal.
gm, voting ABSTAIN on the retroactive rewards.
The current council has earned $30k per year for working ~10 hours per week (per the presented table), equivalent to $120k annually for a full time role.
While that seems more than reasonable to me, I trust the other AAEs and delegates who have had the opportunity to monitor the work more closely.
I share the concerns raised above:
so far the perceived results presented by the AGV are short of the initial expectations. Generally speaking, we would like to see the AGV’s mandate be expanded to invest in teams building outside of the gaming realm, but this is obviously a much larger topic and outside the scope of this proposal.
I would support this for sure if the council showed a stronger long term commitment with longer vesting periods
I'm voting Abstain on the retroactive rewards
I value what the AGV is doing in finding strong potential candidates to lead the gaming efforts on Arbitrum. The thing is we are not there yet… competing for the gaming ecosystem is a huge opportunity, but not an easy task. I see the great work being done and want to acknowledge those efforts. Which is why I’m on the fence here, and won't vote against.
I would support this for sure if the council showed a stronger long term commitment with longer vesting periods as @zeptimus mentioned in his comment on snapshot. Maybe 5 years with a 2 year cliff? 1 year seems like it will go by too fast.
OR, even better, would be KPI based vesting ... like when one of the games you supported hits x revenue in on-chain fees... or something, then the ARB is released to you... That would be an easy one to support.
gm, voted FOR - hope the extra compensation helps to attract talent for the upcoming elections
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
We view this proposal as more than a compensation update. It sets a clear direction for how the DAO values strategic oversight roles tied to large capital programs. AGV Council manages a 200M ARB program, which requires serious time, responsibility, and accountability. Aligning compensation with market benchmarks is a rational step if we want experienced contributors to commit meaningfully. Undercompensating governance roles of this scale would create long-term operational and accountability risks for the DAO.
We also agree with the one-time startup-phase bonus for the inaugural Council. The scope of work during AGV’s setup went far beyond the original plan. Acknowledging that extra effort is fair and also sets a useful precedent for other verticals that may go through similar early-stage build-out phases. This is not about rewarding past work casually, but about recognizing the foundational role these early contributions play in getting such programs operational.
At the same time, this proposal highlights the need for a more structured approach to compensation in the DAO. Instead of treating each vertical’s compensation individually, the DAO should work toward a standardized framework for council and oversight roles. Startup-phase responsibilities should ideally be scoped and approved upfront, and compensation calibration should be reviewed periodically based on both benchmarks and actual responsibilities.
Supporting this proposal reflects our belief that strong governance requires fair and transparent incentive structures. It sets a practical baseline for how we can structure future councils and verticals more predictably.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR Proposal B in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR Proposal B in the Snapshot voting.
Building a venture vehicle like AGV within a DAO structure is demanding work. The inaugural Council went beyond advisory duties; it shaped AGV’s governance, compliance, and operational systems from the ground up. That level of commitment and ownership deserves fair recognition, especially given how much of AGV’s foundation now relies on those early efforts.
We believe the proposed startup-phase bonus is a fair and measured way to acknowledge that work. It reflects the time, responsibility, and strategic input required to bring AGV from idea to execution. Since it’s funded fully within AGV’s existing budget, it also demonstrates a disciplined approach to compensation and resource management.
Supporting this proposal aligns with our broader view that meaningful DAO programs demand real commitment, and recognizing those who deliver helps strengthen accountability and trust across the ecosystem.
Entropy voted FOR Proposal A to adjust council compensation and bring it in line with the expected workload. Despite being in favor, our team does have some reservations about the current design of the AGV council and the existence of significant fixed pay that creates the incentive to keep the AGV going no matter the performance. Back in June, @ArbitrumGaming outlined why factors such as timing and attribution make it difficult to implement performance-based compensation, but now with the creation of the OAT, we think there is an opportunity to revisit the AGV council. Rather than paying for multiple oversight boards, it could for example make more sense to have 1 gaming expert on the OAT with the AGV subservient to that group.
On a separate note, the AGV was sold to the DAO as a necessary, game changing program for bringing developers and users into Arbitrum. Our team is quite familiar with the difficulties that can arise when standing up a DAO initiative and recognize that there are deals in process that can’t be shared publicly, but so far the perceived results presented by the AGV are short of the initial expectations. Generally speaking, we would like to see the AGV’s mandate be expanded to invest in teams building outside of the gaming realm, but this is obviously a much larger topic and outside the scope of this proposal. To close, we are excited by the completion of the team expansion and are eager to see improved results with Michael Chang leading as General Manager.
Voted in favor. This proposal is fair both in absolute and relative terms. In absolute terms, the increase makes the council position more competitive and will help attract top candidates to the role. Relatively, it is essential to align compensation with market rates and other ventures. Failing to do so, could lead to reduced effort and diminished alignment with the ecosystem’s goals. Fully supporting this proposal
AGV is managing a lot of investment capital and it is a lot of work, I would love to see this become attractive for the upcoming elections. AGV made significant progress in the last year. They clearly did way more work than expected during launch. That extra work was needed and delivered, and I hope the next batch can do the same or better!
AGV is managing a lot of investment capital and it is a lot of work, I would love to see this become attractive for the upcoming elections. AGV made significant progress in the last year. They clearly did way more work than expected during launch. That extra work was needed and delivered, and I hope the next batch can do the same or better!
We have zero data on actual returns… The games are still being built. No revenue, no users, no token launches, nothing to show how this is actually working. Which scares me… I would love to see a small win somewhere. Maybe i need to dive deeper… but all that said, we are pot committed, we made this bet, let’s set it up to succeed.
voting For on this offchain vote because it will allow to attract better candidates in the next elections for this council.
Since this snapshot vote was deleted, and we lost public access to the voting data, here is the latest data we indexed at proposals.app for this offchain vote, at the time it was deleted from snapshot.
And here is the full dataset we indexed for this proposal: Offchain Vote Text, Options and Metadata Offchain Vote Casted Votes
We will be voting for the “None” option among those proposed by the AGV team.
What concerns us about the proposal is not (1) the increase in compensation for Council members or (2) the performance bonus intended for them.
We will be voting for the “None” option among those proposed by the AGV team.
What concerns us about the proposal is not (1) the increase in compensation for Council members or (2) the performance bonus intended for them.
The problem with the proposal is the ability to make this change without the need for a vote requiring a 3% quorum for non-constitutional proposals. This is not a problem with the AGV, but with the Arbitrum DAO procedure for modifying and canceling proposals, designed by Entropy.
With the ability to change the form of the proposal with only a >50% approval, without the need for a 3% quorum, it becomes easy to approve a change after the initial proposal has been approved in governance. This is a weakness in the security of DAO governance.
We reiterate: this opposition is more against the procedure for voting/change than the AGV requests themselves.
We understand that this makes it easier operationally for Arbitrum initiatives, but it opens up an opportunity to attack the DAO.
Thank you for the (re-)proposal.
One of my core values in my life is that I won’t take a stance that would oppose improving someone’s compensation. This is the reason why I am voting FOR this proposal.
We’re for this forward-looking calibration. Aligning AGV Council pay with market and DAO benchmarks, funded entirely within AGV’s existing budget, sets a sustainable baseline for overseeing a 200M+ ARB program and better aligns incentives via the ARB bonus. Clearer structure now should help retention, accountability, and long-term execution.
Hi Paulo,
Thank you for your comment and concern.
As discussed in the Delegates Telegram chat, this proposal and vote are following the guidelines laid out in https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-arbitrum-daos-procedures/29712#p-72881-voting-requirement-for-the-cancellation-of-ongoing-initiatives-9 .
this is not the precedent we’ve been following until now
Having had no direct exposure to the AGV I (and most likely a range of other delegates) find it hard to understand the role that was previously envisioned vs what it actually turned out to be.
I had asked about a simple detailed breakdown in a previous comment https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gcp-council-salary-updates-ops-improvements-and-transparency-cadence/28362/23?u=tamara without getting a clear answer, hence here it is again:
Disclaimer: I received a two-month ban from Arbitrum for this very proposal, and I was hoping they'd at least improve it a little
But I see changes that have only gotten worse:
Disclaimer: I received a two-month ban from Arbitrum for this very proposal, and I was hoping they'd at least improve it a little
But I see changes that have only gotten worse:
Hey Paulo,
Whilst your example poses an interesting scenario for discussion around The Arbitrum DAO’s Procedures and their potential revision, I do not believe they are extremely relevant in this specific situation.
A few clarifications around this proposal:
I voted in favour of both options.
First, why both: it doesn't make sense to push for the change in comp in just one of the cohort.
I voted in favour of both options.
First, why both: it doesn't make sense to push for the change in comp in just one of the cohort.
I do understand that there might be general concerns about what is a de facto retro on current council; matter of the fact, the biggest lift of council is usually exactly when a DAO program needs to stand up, because there is so much more things to do. For this reason, if the new cohort will deserve the raise, the same applies to the current one.
On the next cohort and general idea: the data proposed show how the council might just be underpaid for the responsability and workload they have. There are a few emphirical things I guess we can put on table: a somehow similar job compared to the OAT, a strong presence of council members in the operations of AGV etc. On the last point, as a couple of example that I experienced first hand: David was one of the member with whom I made a job interview a few weeks ago with AGV, and Coinflip has been reporting the progress of AGV live at several events such as EthCC in Cannes to the rest of delegates at the delegates' day.
At the same time, while I think the raise is fair, there is something to improve. Some members of the council should be more present in the DAO life since we barely know them. I am not specifically advocating in this case for the IC member, it makes sense that have the work of this person a bit more segmented from here since is not only vital but also closer to more traditional rails; but for the others, we do need a stronger presence. I won't specifically refer to any in particular here, but this to me is where effectively there is the biggest different between the current OAT of OpCo and the council of AGV. Hopefully this is something that will be naturally fixed during next election.
so... do you think it's a binding vote if someone else puts up a forum proposal and an offchain vote to change the AGV council salaries to $0 USD and the result of that offchain vote is 1ARB voting FOR it, and 0 ARB voting on abstain/against it?
would the AGV change the salaries to $0 USD if that would happen? do you think this is a legitimate decision-making procedure to conduct binding votes that impact DAO spending with?
Cross posting from the other thread.
Having had direct experience of the operations from AGV, I do see how council is, today, more aking to a set of employee than a simple oversight body. They do provide expertise each one in their field, and also in specific tasks like job interviews and others. They have also been the closest to the the operations of the fund so far.
gm, voting ABSTAIN on the retroactive rewards.
The current council has earned $30k per year for working ~10 hours per week (per the presented table), equivalent to $120k annually for a full time role.
While that seems more than reasonable to me, I trust the other AAEs and delegates who have had the opportunity to monitor the work more closely.
I share the concerns raised above:
so far the perceived results presented by the AGV are short of the initial expectations. Generally speaking, we would like to see the AGV’s mandate be expanded to invest in teams building outside of the gaming realm, but this is obviously a much larger topic and outside the scope of this proposal.
I would support this for sure if the council showed a stronger long term commitment with longer vesting periods
I'm voting Abstain on the retroactive rewards
I value what the AGV is doing in finding strong potential candidates to lead the gaming efforts on Arbitrum. The thing is we are not there yet… competing for the gaming ecosystem is a huge opportunity, but not an easy task. I see the great work being done and want to acknowledge those efforts. Which is why I’m on the fence here, and won't vote against.
I would support this for sure if the council showed a stronger long term commitment with longer vesting periods as @zeptimus mentioned in his comment on snapshot. Maybe 5 years with a 2 year cliff? 1 year seems like it will go by too fast.
OR, even better, would be KPI based vesting ... like when one of the games you supported hits x revenue in on-chain fees... or something, then the ARB is released to you... That would be an easy one to support.
gm, voted FOR - hope the extra compensation helps to attract talent for the upcoming elections
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
We view this proposal as more than a compensation update. It sets a clear direction for how the DAO values strategic oversight roles tied to large capital programs. AGV Council manages a 200M ARB program, which requires serious time, responsibility, and accountability. Aligning compensation with market benchmarks is a rational step if we want experienced contributors to commit meaningfully. Undercompensating governance roles of this scale would create long-term operational and accountability risks for the DAO.
We also agree with the one-time startup-phase bonus for the inaugural Council. The scope of work during AGV’s setup went far beyond the original plan. Acknowledging that extra effort is fair and also sets a useful precedent for other verticals that may go through similar early-stage build-out phases. This is not about rewarding past work casually, but about recognizing the foundational role these early contributions play in getting such programs operational.
At the same time, this proposal highlights the need for a more structured approach to compensation in the DAO. Instead of treating each vertical’s compensation individually, the DAO should work toward a standardized framework for council and oversight roles. Startup-phase responsibilities should ideally be scoped and approved upfront, and compensation calibration should be reviewed periodically based on both benchmarks and actual responsibilities.
Supporting this proposal reflects our belief that strong governance requires fair and transparent incentive structures. It sets a practical baseline for how we can structure future councils and verticals more predictably.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR Proposal B in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR Proposal B in the Snapshot voting.
Building a venture vehicle like AGV within a DAO structure is demanding work. The inaugural Council went beyond advisory duties; it shaped AGV’s governance, compliance, and operational systems from the ground up. That level of commitment and ownership deserves fair recognition, especially given how much of AGV’s foundation now relies on those early efforts.
We believe the proposed startup-phase bonus is a fair and measured way to acknowledge that work. It reflects the time, responsibility, and strategic input required to bring AGV from idea to execution. Since it’s funded fully within AGV’s existing budget, it also demonstrates a disciplined approach to compensation and resource management.
Supporting this proposal aligns with our broader view that meaningful DAO programs demand real commitment, and recognizing those who deliver helps strengthen accountability and trust across the ecosystem.
Entropy voted FOR Proposal A to adjust council compensation and bring it in line with the expected workload. Despite being in favor, our team does have some reservations about the current design of the AGV council and the existence of significant fixed pay that creates the incentive to keep the AGV going no matter the performance. Back in June, @ArbitrumGaming outlined why factors such as timing and attribution make it difficult to implement performance-based compensation, but now with the creation of the OAT, we think there is an opportunity to revisit the AGV council. Rather than paying for multiple oversight boards, it could for example make more sense to have 1 gaming expert on the OAT with the AGV subservient to that group.
On a separate note, the AGV was sold to the DAO as a necessary, game changing program for bringing developers and users into Arbitrum. Our team is quite familiar with the difficulties that can arise when standing up a DAO initiative and recognize that there are deals in process that can’t be shared publicly, but so far the perceived results presented by the AGV are short of the initial expectations. Generally speaking, we would like to see the AGV’s mandate be expanded to invest in teams building outside of the gaming realm, but this is obviously a much larger topic and outside the scope of this proposal. To close, we are excited by the completion of the team expansion and are eager to see improved results with Michael Chang leading as General Manager.
Voted in favor. This proposal is fair both in absolute and relative terms. In absolute terms, the increase makes the council position more competitive and will help attract top candidates to the role. Relatively, it is essential to align compensation with market rates and other ventures. Failing to do so, could lead to reduced effort and diminished alignment with the ecosystem’s goals. Fully supporting this proposal
AGV is managing a lot of investment capital and it is a lot of work, I would love to see this become attractive for the upcoming elections. AGV made significant progress in the last year. They clearly did way more work than expected during launch. That extra work was needed and delivered, and I hope the next batch can do the same or better!
AGV is managing a lot of investment capital and it is a lot of work, I would love to see this become attractive for the upcoming elections. AGV made significant progress in the last year. They clearly did way more work than expected during launch. That extra work was needed and delivered, and I hope the next batch can do the same or better!
We have zero data on actual returns… The games are still being built. No revenue, no users, no token launches, nothing to show how this is actually working. Which scares me… I would love to see a small win somewhere. Maybe i need to dive deeper… but all that said, we are pot committed, we made this bet, let’s set it up to succeed.
voting For on this offchain vote because it will allow to attract better candidates in the next elections for this council.
Since this snapshot vote was deleted, and we lost public access to the voting data, here is the latest data we indexed at proposals.app for this offchain vote, at the time it was deleted from snapshot.
And here is the full dataset we indexed for this proposal: Offchain Vote Text, Options and Metadata Offchain Vote Casted Votes
We will be voting for the “None” option among those proposed by the AGV team.
What concerns us about the proposal is not (1) the increase in compensation for Council members or (2) the performance bonus intended for them.
We will be voting for the “None” option among those proposed by the AGV team.
What concerns us about the proposal is not (1) the increase in compensation for Council members or (2) the performance bonus intended for them.
The problem with the proposal is the ability to make this change without the need for a vote requiring a 3% quorum for non-constitutional proposals. This is not a problem with the AGV, but with the Arbitrum DAO procedure for modifying and canceling proposals, designed by Entropy.
With the ability to change the form of the proposal with only a >50% approval, without the need for a 3% quorum, it becomes easy to approve a change after the initial proposal has been approved in governance. This is a weakness in the security of DAO governance.
We reiterate: this opposition is more against the procedure for voting/change than the AGV requests themselves.
We understand that this makes it easier operationally for Arbitrum initiatives, but it opens up an opportunity to attack the DAO.
Thank you for the (re-)proposal.
One of my core values in my life is that I won’t take a stance that would oppose improving someone’s compensation. This is the reason why I am voting FOR this proposal.
We’re for this forward-looking calibration. Aligning AGV Council pay with market and DAO benchmarks, funded entirely within AGV’s existing budget, sets a sustainable baseline for overseeing a 200M+ ARB program and better aligns incentives via the ARB bonus. Clearer structure now should help retention, accountability, and long-term execution.
Hi Paulo,
Thank you for your comment and concern.
As discussed in the Delegates Telegram chat, this proposal and vote are following the guidelines laid out in https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-arbitrum-daos-procedures/29712#p-72881-voting-requirement-for-the-cancellation-of-ongoing-initiatives-9 .
this is not the precedent we’ve been following until now
Having had no direct exposure to the AGV I (and most likely a range of other delegates) find it hard to understand the role that was previously envisioned vs what it actually turned out to be.
I had asked about a simple detailed breakdown in a previous comment https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gcp-council-salary-updates-ops-improvements-and-transparency-cadence/28362/23?u=tamara without getting a clear answer, hence here it is again:
Disclaimer: I received a two-month ban from Arbitrum for this very proposal, and I was hoping they'd at least improve it a little
But I see changes that have only gotten worse:
Disclaimer: I received a two-month ban from Arbitrum for this very proposal, and I was hoping they'd at least improve it a little
But I see changes that have only gotten worse:
Hey Paulo,
Whilst your example poses an interesting scenario for discussion around The Arbitrum DAO’s Procedures and their potential revision, I do not believe they are extremely relevant in this specific situation.
A few clarifications around this proposal:
I voted in favour of both options.
First, why both: it doesn't make sense to push for the change in comp in just one of the cohort.
I voted in favour of both options.
First, why both: it doesn't make sense to push for the change in comp in just one of the cohort.
I do understand that there might be general concerns about what is a de facto retro on current council; matter of the fact, the biggest lift of council is usually exactly when a DAO program needs to stand up, because there is so much more things to do. For this reason, if the new cohort will deserve the raise, the same applies to the current one.
On the next cohort and general idea: the data proposed show how the council might just be underpaid for the responsability and workload they have. There are a few emphirical things I guess we can put on table: a somehow similar job compared to the OAT, a strong presence of council members in the operations of AGV etc. On the last point, as a couple of example that I experienced first hand: David was one of the member with whom I made a job interview a few weeks ago with AGV, and Coinflip has been reporting the progress of AGV live at several events such as EthCC in Cannes to the rest of delegates at the delegates' day.
At the same time, while I think the raise is fair, there is something to improve. Some members of the council should be more present in the DAO life since we barely know them. I am not specifically advocating in this case for the IC member, it makes sense that have the work of this person a bit more segmented from here since is not only vital but also closer to more traditional rails; but for the others, we do need a stronger presence. I won't specifically refer to any in particular here, but this to me is where effectively there is the biggest different between the current OAT of OpCo and the council of AGV. Hopefully this is something that will be naturally fixed during next election.
so... do you think it's a binding vote if someone else puts up a forum proposal and an offchain vote to change the AGV council salaries to $0 USD and the result of that offchain vote is 1ARB voting FOR it, and 0 ARB voting on abstain/against it?
would the AGV change the salaries to $0 USD if that would happen? do you think this is a legitimate decision-making procedure to conduct binding votes that impact DAO spending with?
Cross posting from the other thread.
Having had direct experience of the operations from AGV, I do see how council is, today, more aking to a set of employee than a simple oversight body. They do provide expertise each one in their field, and also in specific tasks like job interviews and others. They have also been the closest to the the operations of the fund so far.
Hi Paulo,
Thank you for your comment and concern.
As discussed in the Delegates Telegram chat, this proposal and vote are following the guidelines laid out in https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-arbitrum-daos-procedures/29712#p-72881-voting-requirement-for-the-cancellation-of-ongoing-initiatives-9 .
This has been confirmed by @Pruitt of @Entropy in the Delegates chat.
In terms of your claim above, it should be noted that https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-arbitrum-daos-procedures/29712#p-72881-voting-requirement-for-the-cancellation-of-ongoing-initiatives-9 define the fallback system. Each initiative (e.g., DIP) can set its own specific voting requirements, as occurred in the referenced proposal for DIP 1.7. This was also confirmed in the Delegates chat by @MinistroDolar of @SEEDGov.
this is not the precedent we’ve been following until now
we’ve always followed the precedent of needing more than the 3% quorum to consider an offchain vote binding when changing an existing proposal. the last one was the DIP 1.7 for example.
this is also unprecedented in how we’ve been operating here at Arbitrum DAO. i think each option should only proceed to implementation if they have a casted voting power higher than the 3% quorum.
that’s the only fair way of doing a binding approval vote, because honestly approval votes should not be used to be binding decisions, but only to gauge community sentiment.
if we want to make binding decisions with approval voting, we could argue that approval voting aggregates several independent votes into one single vote for practicality and that’s why each option would need to get more than 3% of the quorum threshold in voting power to be considered binding, because if they were separate offchain votes, they would definitely need to.
Having had no direct exposure to the AGV I (and most likely a range of other delegates) find it hard to understand the role that was previously envisioned vs what it actually turned out to be.
I had asked about a simple detailed breakdown in a previous comment https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gcp-council-salary-updates-ops-improvements-and-transparency-cadence/28362/23?u=tamara without getting a clear answer, hence here it is again:
Clear breakdown as follows: - Initial responsibilities (aka what we thought the Council has to work on) - Actual responsibilities (aka what they are actually doing on a monthly basis) - Additional responsibilities (aka what they will be doing on top if this proposal passes)
The above neatly formatted in an Excel (or table as has been done with the comp overview) would be a nice visual
Hey Paulo,
Whilst your example poses an interesting scenario for discussion around The Arbitrum DAO’s Procedures and their potential revision, I do not believe they are extremely relevant in this specific situation.
A few clarifications around this proposal:
No additional DAO funds are being requested for opex
The proposal has originated from the managing AAE after lengthy internal discussions and market research
This process has been observed throughout by the Foundation
Cross posting from the other thread.
Having had direct experience of the operations from AGV, I do see how council is, today, more aking to a set of employee than a simple oversight body. They do provide expertise each one in their field, and also in specific tasks like job interviews and others. They have also been the closest to the the operations of the fund so far.
I personally do agree that their current salary is not matching the level of responsability and value they bring to the fund. I also do understand how most delegates are unaware of this, and I think it would be better to start disclosing, in more details and when possible, how the contribute on the day to day operations.
Today, AGV Council members contribute an average of 30 hours/month, participating in investment reviews, organizational and budget planning, DAO engagement, and other governance activities that reinforce long-term program integrity.
This, for example, is a good start. But can likely pass unnoticed to most since is just a single sentence in a proposal, and would urge AGV on working on better surfacing the amount of work all people in there do because to most of Arbitrum is a black box, and is just fair, for the people that carry the torch on a daily basis, to have their work highlighted.
This also makes a lot of sense.
In support of the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
Having followed the work that the AGV council is doing and the responsibilities they are carrying, we understand where the request for adjustment to their compensation comes from, and we’re supportive of it.
We internally debated whether the retroactive aspect of the adjustment makes sense, and we would have been more comfortable supporting the proposal if it weren’t for that part. However, after deliberation, we concluded that we’re essentially voting to adjust the compensation in recognition of the work that the Council has been doing, not as a path for them to do more in the future. With that line of thinking, the retroactive adjustment makes more sense.
However, we would like to clarify that one thing we expect from the Council going forward, especially with the adjusted compensation, is improved communication with the DAO and increased transparency. Castle Labs is doing good work as the communications party of the AGV, but we also expect the Council itself to be more communicative. Similar to how the OAT from the OpCo attends calls and makes itself available to the DAO, we expect the same of the AGV.
Thanks for your reply, however I'll continue
There is no guarantee that the same individuals who approve deals today will still be serving when returns materialize years later
Thanks for your reply, however I'll continue
There is no guarantee that the same individuals who approve deals today will still be serving when returns materialize years later
I still believe that simply increasing the fixed salary does not address the underlying issue. My suggestion is:
This would align incentives more effectively and ensure compensation reflects real impact
we’re open to suggestions on how we might improve performance transparency without misaligning incentives
I have a few suggestions regarding short-term KPIs:
These KPIs are designed to motivate individual participation, making it clear that bonuses and potential reappointment will directly depend on personal contributions. If someone clearly delivers more than others, their chances of being re-elected for the next term will naturally increase
Thanks for this proposal!
I have several questions and concerns, mainly related to the attempt to extend the term durations:
Thanks for this proposal!
I have several questions and concerns, mainly related to the attempt to extend the term durations:
Why is participation in the upside (profit share) not considered? The motivation emphasizes that Council members do not receive equity or carry, presenting this as a problem. However, the proposal itself does not attempt to address this directly, for example, through a profit-based reward mechanism, KPIs, or performance fees. Why wasn’t an option for upside participation proposed? This could serve as a stronger motivator and be more equitable for the DAO, effectively addressing both compensation and incentive issues.
Violation of the conditions under which the current Council was elected. Raising compensation by 66% without a new vote or mandate revision seems questionable, as voters supported the current Council based on the original $30K per year terms. Don’t you think it would be more appropriate to implement such changes in the next cycle or after a new vote? Alternatively, vote now but apply these new conditions only to the next Council composition.
Where are the performance metrics for such a significant salary increase? Given the substantial compensation increase, it is reasonable to expect clear KPIs or reports on each member’s contributions. Is there a plan to introduce KPI for each of Council members?
Hi Paulo,
Thank you for your comment and concern.
As discussed in the Delegates Telegram chat, this proposal and vote are following the guidelines laid out in https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-arbitrum-daos-procedures/29712#p-72881-voting-requirement-for-the-cancellation-of-ongoing-initiatives-9 .
This has been confirmed by @Pruitt of @Entropy in the Delegates chat.
In terms of your claim above, it should be noted that https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-arbitrum-daos-procedures/29712#p-72881-voting-requirement-for-the-cancellation-of-ongoing-initiatives-9 define the fallback system. Each initiative (e.g., DIP) can set its own specific voting requirements, as occurred in the referenced proposal for DIP 1.7. This was also confirmed in the Delegates chat by @MinistroDolar of @SEEDGov.
this is not the precedent we’ve been following until now
we’ve always followed the precedent of needing more than the 3% quorum to consider an offchain vote binding when changing an existing proposal. the last one was the DIP 1.7 for example.
this is also unprecedented in how we’ve been operating here at Arbitrum DAO. i think each option should only proceed to implementation if they have a casted voting power higher than the 3% quorum.
that’s the only fair way of doing a binding approval vote, because honestly approval votes should not be used to be binding decisions, but only to gauge community sentiment.
if we want to make binding decisions with approval voting, we could argue that approval voting aggregates several independent votes into one single vote for practicality and that’s why each option would need to get more than 3% of the quorum threshold in voting power to be considered binding, because if they were separate offchain votes, they would definitely need to.
Having had no direct exposure to the AGV I (and most likely a range of other delegates) find it hard to understand the role that was previously envisioned vs what it actually turned out to be.
I had asked about a simple detailed breakdown in a previous comment https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gcp-council-salary-updates-ops-improvements-and-transparency-cadence/28362/23?u=tamara without getting a clear answer, hence here it is again:
Clear breakdown as follows: - Initial responsibilities (aka what we thought the Council has to work on) - Actual responsibilities (aka what they are actually doing on a monthly basis) - Additional responsibilities (aka what they will be doing on top if this proposal passes)
The above neatly formatted in an Excel (or table as has been done with the comp overview) would be a nice visual
Hey Paulo,
Whilst your example poses an interesting scenario for discussion around The Arbitrum DAO’s Procedures and their potential revision, I do not believe they are extremely relevant in this specific situation.
A few clarifications around this proposal:
No additional DAO funds are being requested for opex
The proposal has originated from the managing AAE after lengthy internal discussions and market research
This process has been observed throughout by the Foundation
Cross posting from the other thread.
Having had direct experience of the operations from AGV, I do see how council is, today, more aking to a set of employee than a simple oversight body. They do provide expertise each one in their field, and also in specific tasks like job interviews and others. They have also been the closest to the the operations of the fund so far.
I personally do agree that their current salary is not matching the level of responsability and value they bring to the fund. I also do understand how most delegates are unaware of this, and I think it would be better to start disclosing, in more details and when possible, how the contribute on the day to day operations.
Today, AGV Council members contribute an average of 30 hours/month, participating in investment reviews, organizational and budget planning, DAO engagement, and other governance activities that reinforce long-term program integrity.
This, for example, is a good start. But can likely pass unnoticed to most since is just a single sentence in a proposal, and would urge AGV on working on better surfacing the amount of work all people in there do because to most of Arbitrum is a black box, and is just fair, for the people that carry the torch on a daily basis, to have their work highlighted.
This also makes a lot of sense.
In support of the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
Having followed the work that the AGV council is doing and the responsibilities they are carrying, we understand where the request for adjustment to their compensation comes from, and we’re supportive of it.
We internally debated whether the retroactive aspect of the adjustment makes sense, and we would have been more comfortable supporting the proposal if it weren’t for that part. However, after deliberation, we concluded that we’re essentially voting to adjust the compensation in recognition of the work that the Council has been doing, not as a path for them to do more in the future. With that line of thinking, the retroactive adjustment makes more sense.
However, we would like to clarify that one thing we expect from the Council going forward, especially with the adjusted compensation, is improved communication with the DAO and increased transparency. Castle Labs is doing good work as the communications party of the AGV, but we also expect the Council itself to be more communicative. Similar to how the OAT from the OpCo attends calls and makes itself available to the DAO, we expect the same of the AGV.
Thanks for your reply, however I'll continue
There is no guarantee that the same individuals who approve deals today will still be serving when returns materialize years later
Thanks for your reply, however I'll continue
There is no guarantee that the same individuals who approve deals today will still be serving when returns materialize years later
I still believe that simply increasing the fixed salary does not address the underlying issue. My suggestion is:
This would align incentives more effectively and ensure compensation reflects real impact
we’re open to suggestions on how we might improve performance transparency without misaligning incentives
I have a few suggestions regarding short-term KPIs:
These KPIs are designed to motivate individual participation, making it clear that bonuses and potential reappointment will directly depend on personal contributions. If someone clearly delivers more than others, their chances of being re-elected for the next term will naturally increase
Thanks for this proposal!
I have several questions and concerns, mainly related to the attempt to extend the term durations:
Thanks for this proposal!
I have several questions and concerns, mainly related to the attempt to extend the term durations:
Why is participation in the upside (profit share) not considered? The motivation emphasizes that Council members do not receive equity or carry, presenting this as a problem. However, the proposal itself does not attempt to address this directly, for example, through a profit-based reward mechanism, KPIs, or performance fees. Why wasn’t an option for upside participation proposed? This could serve as a stronger motivator and be more equitable for the DAO, effectively addressing both compensation and incentive issues.
Violation of the conditions under which the current Council was elected. Raising compensation by 66% without a new vote or mandate revision seems questionable, as voters supported the current Council based on the original $30K per year terms. Don’t you think it would be more appropriate to implement such changes in the next cycle or after a new vote? Alternatively, vote now but apply these new conditions only to the next Council composition.
Where are the performance metrics for such a significant salary increase? Given the substantial compensation increase, it is reasonable to expect clear KPIs or reports on each member’s contributions. Is there a plan to introduce KPI for each of Council members?
