The ArbitrumDAO approved the OpCo: A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution which allocates 30M ARB towards an operation company whose mandate is to operationalise, assist and oversee proposals approved by the ArbitrumDAO.
The OpCo elections have been completed which appointed Patrick McCorry, A.J. Warner, and Frisson. The three council members have appointed Pedro Breuer as an OAT council member and are in final stage conversations with an identified candidate. All council members, alongside the Arbitrum Foundation, are now working towards operationalizing the OpCo entity and hiring the initial team to lead the organisation.
In the course of our work we reviewed the original OpCo proposal to fully internalize its mandate and operational capability. We discovered a number of restrictions during this process that may hinder the OpCo’s ability to fulfil its mission, attract the best talent who can contribute towards the OpCo’s success, and prevent the OpCo from proactively working on initiatives that can lead to future proposals in the DAO.
We want to take this opportunity to go through each identified restriction, how it may impact the OpCo’s operational capability, and a proposed fix that can resolve the restrictions.
We’ll take this opportunity to go through each restriction alongside the proposed updates for the OpCo. Keep in mind, we will pick the problem statement from the OpCo proposal that most accurately reflects the problem, as sometimes the same restriction is repeated several times in the proposal.
The OpCo is unable to enter service agreements with service providers or individual contributors unless it is related to its own operational needs.
To illustrate the issue, let’s consider an example where a contributor approaches the OpCo with a proposal for the DAO and the OpCo thinks it may be valuable for the ecosystem. Unfortunately, the OpCo cannot engage with a consulting firm to evaluate the idea. The only option available for OpCo is to encourage the contributor to seek permission (and potential funding from exploratory work) from the DAO.
We believe this situation is counter to the OpCo’s core mandate to support preliminary work on potentially promising proposals before it reaches the DAO. It should have the freedom to engage third parties, when necessary, to work on initiatives that it believes will receive a positive response from the DAO.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
This proposed fix will enable the OpCo to enter agreements with service providers or individual contributors alongside allowing the OAT to provide oversight on whether the agreement indeed fulfils the mandate of supporting the ArbitrumDAO.
The OpCo restricts its budget to only be used for operational costs related to employees, running the organisation, and administrative costs.
We can re-use the previous example to highlight the issue. Let’s assume a contributor approaches the OpCo with a proposal for the DAO. The OpCo cannot offer a grant to the contributor to investigate the idea further, in a similar manner to M&A Pilot or the Arbitrum Venture Initiative Pilot. To obtain any exploratory funding, the OpCo will need to work with the contributor on a proposal for the DAO, as opposed to offering its own funds to support preliminary work.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
This proposed fix will enable the OpCo to spend funds on a discretionary basis with oversight of the OAT. We believe this is mandatory to ensure the OpCo can be ‘proactive, meaning if the entity has the bandwidth and recognizes an area within its focus categories where developers could be made, it can propose a strategy’ as written in the original proposal.
In many organisations, it is common for employees to have a base salary, token agreement that vests over time as a structure of the initial compensation package, and a bonus structure for good performance. We believe the bonus pool should be available to support token agreements as well as bonuses.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
This will offer the optionality to offer future employees a token vesting agreement alongside a bonus structure for performance related compensation.
The initial restrictions were crafted to prevent conflicts of interests for OAT council members, but as we have witnessed in the previous election, several promising candidates who generally have the best interests in Arbitrum in mind were unable to apply and join the OAT. For example, tnorm was unable to apply as it would restrict Gauntlet’s ability to enter service level agreements.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
The proposed fix is inspired by the eligibility policy that is applied to Arbitrum’s Security Council as outlined in the ArbitrumDAO’s constitution. It relies on the current OAT to enforce the policy, but if the ArbitrumDAO disagrees with the decision, they can overturn with a vote that achieves a non-constitutional quorum.
OAT members are no longer required to relinquish their role as contributors within the ArbitrumDAO and are allowed to be a member of other DAO-adjacent entity oversight committees. The motivation is to ensure talented individuals can continue to support initiatives in the ArbitrumDAO while offering their expertise to help the OAT navigate its own future. Of course, a contributor may voluntarily decide to relinquish some roles depending on time commitments, to ensure they can dedicate themselves to this role.
Finally, if an OAT member is affiliated with an entity, that entity is no longer prevented from engaging in service provider contracts with the OpCo. Keep in mind, there will be a conflict of interest policy that will require a conflicted OAT member to recuse themselves on all matters related to that entity or any service agreement signed with OpCo.
We believe this requirement is overkill as a requirement for the OAT elections. It is important that direct conflicts of interests are disclosed (e.g., working at a competitor), but potential conflicts of interests can become impractical for certain user profiles (e.g., prolific investors) who have valuable networks and skillsets that can be beneficial to the council. It is easier for potential conflicts to be handled within the council as they must be disclosed when necessary and the conflicted OAT member must exclude themselves from the matter.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
Our proposed fix aims to strike a balance. Candidates for the OAT election are required to publicly disclose direct conflicts, in a similar manner as Arbitrum’s Security Council elections. If the candidate is elected as an OAT member, then they can disclose potential conflicts of interests with the remaining members of the OAT council. If the OAT council believes it is indeed a conflict of interest, then the conflicted OAT member will be forced to recluse themselves from the matter at hand.
The original proposal fixed the mandate of OpCo to only focus on ecosystem support or financial management unless there is an additional proposal that expands its scope. We are weary about pigeon-holing the OpCo’s mandate before it is operational as there are many verticals that can arise that the OpCo is best suited to tackle, but it is unable to do so without an explicit vote by the ArbitrumDAO. For example, taking the reins on governance related matters in the ArbitrumDAO seems like a natural fit for OpCo, but at present it is unable to take up that mantle due to this restriction.
Additionally, since the OpCo will offer oversight capabilities for proposals passed by the ArbitrumDAO and executed by others (like AAEs, contributors, etc), it should have the full freedom to take that on without contention on whether it is focused on ecosystem support, financial management or whether the DAO needs to approve a new domain for OpCo. In fact, as written in the proposal, the OpCo should proactively work on identifying opportunities and we believe restricting the OpCo to specific categories can be problematic in this pursuit.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
The proposed fix will allow the OpCo to proactively work on and experiment with new strategies and verticals that it believes the ArbitrumDAO may positively vote on in the future. For example, it can begin work on a proposal focused on improving governance in the DAO or a future grant program for public goods. This can enable the OpCo to operate in a flexible manner with rough consensus amongst delegates and the OAT on initiatives it believes will ultimately benefit the ArbitrumDAO.
Of course, to carry out any large initiative, the OpCo will still need to request funds from the ArbitrumDAO’s treasury, so this flexibility should be viewed as enabling small-scale experiments by the OpCo and proactive work towards acquiring future funding when it is required on domains that it believes is important for the DAO’s success.
The proposed fixes should enable the OpCo to voluntarily enter service agreements with service providers or individual contributors using discretionary funding available to help access additional resources to fulfil its mandate to the DAO. Additionally, it helps fix the compensation structure for OpCo employees to be in line with industry standards and relaxes restrictions for OAT council elections to enable attract more candidates who have the interests of Arbitrun in mind.
We invite the community to discuss the matters on this thread and we will organise two governance calls to discuss the above proposal across different time zones:
Assuming all goes well, we will aim to put a vote up on Snapshot for 12th June 2025 to enact the above changes with a non-constitutional Quorum.
The ArbitrumDAO approved the OpCo: A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution which allocates 30M ARB towards an operation company whose mandate is to operationalise, assist and oversee proposals approved by the ArbitrumDAO.
The OpCo elections have been completed which appointed Patrick McCorry, A.J. Warner, and Frisson. The three council members have appointed Pedro Breuer as an OAT council member and are in final stage conversations with an identified candidate. All council members, alongside the Arbitrum Foundation, are now working towards operationalizing the OpCo entity and hiring the initial team to lead the organisation.
In the course of our work we reviewed the original OpCo proposal to fully internalize its mandate and operational capability. We discovered a number of restrictions during this process that may hinder the OpCo’s ability to fulfil its mission, attract the best talent who can contribute towards the OpCo’s success, and prevent the OpCo from proactively working on initiatives that can lead to future proposals in the DAO.
We want to take this opportunity to go through each identified restriction, how it may impact the OpCo’s operational capability, and a proposed fix that can resolve the restrictions.
We’ll take this opportunity to go through each restriction alongside the proposed updates for the OpCo. Keep in mind, we will pick the problem statement from the OpCo proposal that most accurately reflects the problem, as sometimes the same restriction is repeated several times in the proposal.
The OpCo is unable to enter service agreements with service providers or individual contributors unless it is related to its own operational needs.
To illustrate the issue, let’s consider an example where a contributor approaches the OpCo with a proposal for the DAO and the OpCo thinks it may be valuable for the ecosystem. Unfortunately, the OpCo cannot engage with a consulting firm to evaluate the idea. The only option available for OpCo is to encourage the contributor to seek permission (and potential funding from exploratory work) from the DAO.
We believe this situation is counter to the OpCo’s core mandate to support preliminary work on potentially promising proposals before it reaches the DAO. It should have the freedom to engage third parties, when necessary, to work on initiatives that it believes will receive a positive response from the DAO.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
This proposed fix will enable the OpCo to enter agreements with service providers or individual contributors alongside allowing the OAT to provide oversight on whether the agreement indeed fulfils the mandate of supporting the ArbitrumDAO.
The OpCo restricts its budget to only be used for operational costs related to employees, running the organisation, and administrative costs.
We can re-use the previous example to highlight the issue. Let’s assume a contributor approaches the OpCo with a proposal for the DAO. The OpCo cannot offer a grant to the contributor to investigate the idea further, in a similar manner to M&A Pilot or the Arbitrum Venture Initiative Pilot. To obtain any exploratory funding, the OpCo will need to work with the contributor on a proposal for the DAO, as opposed to offering its own funds to support preliminary work.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
This proposed fix will enable the OpCo to spend funds on a discretionary basis with oversight of the OAT. We believe this is mandatory to ensure the OpCo can be ‘proactive, meaning if the entity has the bandwidth and recognizes an area within its focus categories where developers could be made, it can propose a strategy’ as written in the original proposal.
In many organisations, it is common for employees to have a base salary, token agreement that vests over time as a structure of the initial compensation package, and a bonus structure for good performance. We believe the bonus pool should be available to support token agreements as well as bonuses.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
This will offer the optionality to offer future employees a token vesting agreement alongside a bonus structure for performance related compensation.
The initial restrictions were crafted to prevent conflicts of interests for OAT council members, but as we have witnessed in the previous election, several promising candidates who generally have the best interests in Arbitrum in mind were unable to apply and join the OAT. For example, tnorm was unable to apply as it would restrict Gauntlet’s ability to enter service level agreements.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
The proposed fix is inspired by the eligibility policy that is applied to Arbitrum’s Security Council as outlined in the ArbitrumDAO’s constitution. It relies on the current OAT to enforce the policy, but if the ArbitrumDAO disagrees with the decision, they can overturn with a vote that achieves a non-constitutional quorum.
OAT members are no longer required to relinquish their role as contributors within the ArbitrumDAO and are allowed to be a member of other DAO-adjacent entity oversight committees. The motivation is to ensure talented individuals can continue to support initiatives in the ArbitrumDAO while offering their expertise to help the OAT navigate its own future. Of course, a contributor may voluntarily decide to relinquish some roles depending on time commitments, to ensure they can dedicate themselves to this role.
Finally, if an OAT member is affiliated with an entity, that entity is no longer prevented from engaging in service provider contracts with the OpCo. Keep in mind, there will be a conflict of interest policy that will require a conflicted OAT member to recuse themselves on all matters related to that entity or any service agreement signed with OpCo.
We believe this requirement is overkill as a requirement for the OAT elections. It is important that direct conflicts of interests are disclosed (e.g., working at a competitor), but potential conflicts of interests can become impractical for certain user profiles (e.g., prolific investors) who have valuable networks and skillsets that can be beneficial to the council. It is easier for potential conflicts to be handled within the council as they must be disclosed when necessary and the conflicted OAT member must exclude themselves from the matter.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
Our proposed fix aims to strike a balance. Candidates for the OAT election are required to publicly disclose direct conflicts, in a similar manner as Arbitrum’s Security Council elections. If the candidate is elected as an OAT member, then they can disclose potential conflicts of interests with the remaining members of the OAT council. If the OAT council believes it is indeed a conflict of interest, then the conflicted OAT member will be forced to recluse themselves from the matter at hand.
The original proposal fixed the mandate of OpCo to only focus on ecosystem support or financial management unless there is an additional proposal that expands its scope. We are weary about pigeon-holing the OpCo’s mandate before it is operational as there are many verticals that can arise that the OpCo is best suited to tackle, but it is unable to do so without an explicit vote by the ArbitrumDAO. For example, taking the reins on governance related matters in the ArbitrumDAO seems like a natural fit for OpCo, but at present it is unable to take up that mantle due to this restriction.
Additionally, since the OpCo will offer oversight capabilities for proposals passed by the ArbitrumDAO and executed by others (like AAEs, contributors, etc), it should have the full freedom to take that on without contention on whether it is focused on ecosystem support, financial management or whether the DAO needs to approve a new domain for OpCo. In fact, as written in the proposal, the OpCo should proactively work on identifying opportunities and we believe restricting the OpCo to specific categories can be problematic in this pursuit.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
The proposed fix will allow the OpCo to proactively work on and experiment with new strategies and verticals that it believes the ArbitrumDAO may positively vote on in the future. For example, it can begin work on a proposal focused on improving governance in the DAO or a future grant program for public goods. This can enable the OpCo to operate in a flexible manner with rough consensus amongst delegates and the OAT on initiatives it believes will ultimately benefit the ArbitrumDAO.
Of course, to carry out any large initiative, the OpCo will still need to request funds from the ArbitrumDAO’s treasury, so this flexibility should be viewed as enabling small-scale experiments by the OpCo and proactive work towards acquiring future funding when it is required on domains that it believes is important for the DAO’s success.
The proposed fixes should enable the OpCo to voluntarily enter service agreements with service providers or individual contributors using discretionary funding available to help access additional resources to fulfil its mandate to the DAO. Additionally, it helps fix the compensation structure for OpCo employees to be in line with industry standards and relaxes restrictions for OAT council elections to enable attract more candidates who have the interests of Arbitrun in mind.
We invite the community to discuss the matters on this thread and we will organise two governance calls to discuss the above proposal across different time zones:
Assuming all goes well, we will aim to put a vote up on Snapshot for 12th June 2025 to enact the above changes with a non-constitutional Quorum.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/46
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/44?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/46
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/44?u=0x_ultra
For. Empowering the OpCo guarantees transparent operations and decentralized technology. Flexible treasury spend, compensation, and broad mandate could benefit ArbitrumDAO.
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/41
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/40?u=maxlomu
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-109): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-109
The Event Horizon Community voted FOR on this proposal (ehARB-109): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-109
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/19?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/35
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/34?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/29?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/33
I agree with proposed fixes but my only concern is if there is any hidden clause in giving free hand to Opco for spending or dealing with third party contractors or service providers which can be misused even if it is under the observation of OAT. Is there a way to address such possible conflicts in the future?
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/30?u=0xalex
this is a clear power overreach that the DAO should not tolerate. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/23?u=paulofonseca
For. Empowering the OpCo guarantees transparent operations and decentralized technology. Flexible treasury spend, compensation, and broad mandate could benefit ArbitrumDAO.
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/41
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/40?u=maxlomu
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-109): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-109
The Event Horizon Community voted FOR on this proposal (ehARB-109): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-109
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/19?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/35
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/34?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/29?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/33
I agree with proposed fixes but my only concern is if there is any hidden clause in giving free hand to Opco for spending or dealing with third party contractors or service providers which can be misused even if it is under the observation of OAT. Is there a way to address such possible conflicts in the future?
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/30?u=0xalex
this is a clear power overreach that the DAO should not tolerate. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/updating-the-opco-foundation-s-operational-capability/29388/23?u=paulofonseca
Before getting started, we appreciate that despite the complex legal and governance nature of this structural update, the proposal has been presented in a clear and systematic manner. We understand the goal of creating a more agile operational structure within the DAO and agree that this process needs to be made more efficient. However, we believe that the increased executive power gained through this transition must be balanced with transparency and community oversight. While operational speed is improved, accountability must not be compromised. At the same time, we have concerns that this update may give rise to conflicts of interest. We are of the opinion that measures should be put in place to prevent any potential abuse.
We support the general direction of the proposal and view the effort to enhance the DAO’s operational capacity positively. However, to ensure this increased capacity does not weaken DAO sovereignty, we recommend that the proposed structure operate within a stronger feedback loop with the community.
Before getting started, we appreciate that despite the complex legal and governance nature of this structural update, the proposal has been presented in a clear and systematic manner. We understand the goal of creating a more agile operational structure within the DAO and agree that this process needs to be made more efficient. However, we believe that the increased executive power gained through this transition must be balanced with transparency and community oversight. While operational speed is improved, accountability must not be compromised. At the same time, we have concerns that this update may give rise to conflicts of interest. We are of the opinion that measures should be put in place to prevent any potential abuse.
We support the general direction of the proposal and view the effort to enhance the DAO’s operational capacity positively. However, to ensure this increased capacity does not weaken DAO sovereignty, we recommend that the proposed structure operate within a stronger feedback loop with the community.
We thank the proposal authors for their constructive contributions and wish to express our continued support for Arbitrum DAO’s development toward a more transparent and inclusive structure.
ITU Governance, @talha
Before getting started, we appreciate that despite the complex legal and governance nature of this structural update, the proposal has been presented in a clear and systematic manner. We understand the goal of creating a more agile operational structure within the DAO and agree that this process needs to be made more efficient. However, we believe that the increased executive power gained through this transition must be balanced with transparency and community oversight. While operational speed is improved, accountability must not be compromised. At the same time, we have concerns that this update may give rise to conflicts of interest. We are of the opinion that measures should be put in place to prevent any potential abuse.
We support the general direction of the proposal and view the effort to enhance the DAO’s operational capacity positively. However, to ensure this increased capacity does not weaken DAO sovereignty, we recommend that the proposed structure operate within a stronger feedback loop with the community.
Before getting started, we appreciate that despite the complex legal and governance nature of this structural update, the proposal has been presented in a clear and systematic manner. We understand the goal of creating a more agile operational structure within the DAO and agree that this process needs to be made more efficient. However, we believe that the increased executive power gained through this transition must be balanced with transparency and community oversight. While operational speed is improved, accountability must not be compromised. At the same time, we have concerns that this update may give rise to conflicts of interest. We are of the opinion that measures should be put in place to prevent any potential abuse.
We support the general direction of the proposal and view the effort to enhance the DAO’s operational capacity positively. However, to ensure this increased capacity does not weaken DAO sovereignty, we recommend that the proposed structure operate within a stronger feedback loop with the community.
We thank the proposal authors for their constructive contributions and wish to express our continued support for Arbitrum DAO’s development toward a more transparent and inclusive structure.
ITU Governance, @talha
This a gross exaggeration of the observations made in that thread lol. OpCo will help ensure that the DAO has a competent counterparty to work with vendors
This a gross exaggeration of the observations made in that thread lol. OpCo will help ensure that the DAO has a competent counterparty to work with vendors
We'll wait to listen to the calls before making a final judgement but while we were generally apprehensive about OpCo being formed at first, and these changes specifically, we've had some private conversations that make us feel we must vote 'for' on this. Only AF and OCL have the context to push the chain forward in an efficient way. However, AF/OCL isn't always going to share this context with the wider DAO like they might with the other few members on the OAT or future hires for OpCo like the Chief Chaos Coordinator or Chief of Coins. Therefore, any decision making that goes through a wider delegate body will be inherently flawed as a result of issues being seen and understood through a lens of partial information. This obviously should be limited as much as possible, leaving the elected, appointed, and hired individuals free to make as many decisions as they can themselves, only bringing in more delegates when absolutely necessary and when they are willing to share all the relevant context so that a fully informed decision can be made.
We know this might be seen with some wariness by other delegates but OpCo already exists and the OAT has been formed with its elected individuals. If those individuals don't feel like they can do their best work with the OpCo as it is in the iteration that was voted through initially, it should be reshaped such that they can. The alternative is having a team that feels like they are being forced to work through constraints that hinder their abilities, which we don't think is a good spot for the DAO to be in.
We'll wait to listen to the calls before making a final judgement but while we were generally apprehensive about OpCo being formed at first, and these changes specifically, we've had some private conversations that make us feel we must vote 'for' on this. Only AF and OCL have the context to push the chain forward in an efficient way. However, AF/OCL isn't always going to share this context with the wider DAO like they might with the other few members on the OAT or future hires for OpCo like the Chief Chaos Coordinator or Chief of Coins. Therefore, any decision making that goes through a wider delegate body will be inherently flawed as a result of issues being seen and understood through a lens of partial information. This obviously should be limited as much as possible, leaving the elected, appointed, and hired individuals free to make as many decisions as they can themselves, only bringing in more delegates when absolutely necessary and when they are willing to share all the relevant context so that a fully informed decision can be made.
We know this might be seen with some wariness by other delegates but OpCo already exists and the OAT has been formed with its elected individuals. If those individuals don't feel like they can do their best work with the OpCo as it is in the iteration that was voted through initially, it should be reshaped such that they can. The alternative is having a team that feels like they are being forced to work through constraints that hinder their abilities, which we don't think is a good spot for the DAO to be in.
Our only suggestion is similar to the one we had with the adjustment of quorum. We don't expect this to be the last time this kind of conversation comes up. It is more than likely that OpCo and OAT will run into more restrictions they will wish to lift in the future. To avoid repeating this kind of discussion, which we believe can become contentious quickly, we would encourage the OAT to make sure that any changes here err on the side of giving OpCo more freedom than they think they might need, even if it means expanding this proposal more.
If I understand correctly, the proposal does not imply that only OpCo can propose service providers to the ArbitrumDAO. The proposed fix for the 'Inability to Interact with Service Providers' restriction grants OpCo the authority to enter contracts with service providers or individual contributors as needed to fulfill its mandate, subject to OAT oversight, seems intuitive.
Since the proposal neither states nor implies that OpCo is the sole entity allowed to propose service providers, other entities, contributors, or the DAO itself can still propose service providers through existing governance processes. Therefore, I don’t believe there’s a significant cause for concern regarding centralization risks.
If I understand correctly, the proposal does not imply that only OpCo can propose service providers to the ArbitrumDAO. The proposed fix for the 'Inability to Interact with Service Providers' restriction grants OpCo the authority to enter contracts with service providers or individual contributors as needed to fulfill its mandate, subject to OAT oversight, seems intuitive.
Since the proposal neither states nor implies that OpCo is the sole entity allowed to propose service providers, other entities, contributors, or the DAO itself can still propose service providers through existing governance processes. Therefore, I don’t believe there’s a significant cause for concern regarding centralization risks.
Also, are AAEs officially a thing now? just want to clarify where things are at
The OpCo elections have been completed which appointed Patrick McCorry, A.J. Warner, and Frisson. The three council members have appointed Pedro Breuer as an OAT council member and are in final stage conversations with an identified candidate. All council members, alongside the Arbitrum Foundation, are now working towards operationalizing the OpCo entity and hiring the initial team to lead the organisation.
We'll wait to listen to the calls before making a final judgement but while we were generally apprehensive about OpCo being formed at first, and these changes specifically, we've had some private conversations that make us feel we must vote 'for' on this. Only AF and OCL have the context to push the chain forward in an efficient way. However, AF/OCL isn't always going to share this context with the wider DAO like they might with the other few members on the OAT or future hires for OpCo like the Chief Chaos Coordinator or Chief of Coins. Therefore, any decision making that goes through a wider delegate body will be inherently flawed as a result of issues being seen and understood through a lens of partial information. This obviously should be limited as much as possible, leaving the elected, appointed, and hired individuals free to make as many decisions as they can themselves, only bringing in more delegates when absolutely necessary and when they are willing to share all the relevant context so that a fully informed decision can be made.
We know this might be seen with some wariness by other delegates but OpCo already exists and the OAT has been formed with its elected individuals. If those individuals don't feel like they can do their best work with the OpCo as it is in the iteration that was voted through initially, it should be reshaped such that they can. The alternative is having a team that feels like they are being forced to work through constraints that hinder their abilities, which we don't think is a good spot for the DAO to be in.
We'll wait to listen to the calls before making a final judgement but while we were generally apprehensive about OpCo being formed at first, and these changes specifically, we've had some private conversations that make us feel we must vote 'for' on this. Only AF and OCL have the context to push the chain forward in an efficient way. However, AF/OCL isn't always going to share this context with the wider DAO like they might with the other few members on the OAT or future hires for OpCo like the Chief Chaos Coordinator or Chief of Coins. Therefore, any decision making that goes through a wider delegate body will be inherently flawed as a result of issues being seen and understood through a lens of partial information. This obviously should be limited as much as possible, leaving the elected, appointed, and hired individuals free to make as many decisions as they can themselves, only bringing in more delegates when absolutely necessary and when they are willing to share all the relevant context so that a fully informed decision can be made.
We know this might be seen with some wariness by other delegates but OpCo already exists and the OAT has been formed with its elected individuals. If those individuals don't feel like they can do their best work with the OpCo as it is in the iteration that was voted through initially, it should be reshaped such that they can. The alternative is having a team that feels like they are being forced to work through constraints that hinder their abilities, which we don't think is a good spot for the DAO to be in.
Our only suggestion is similar to the one we had with the adjustment of quorum. We don't expect this to be the last time this kind of conversation comes up. It is more than likely that OpCo and OAT will run into more restrictions they will wish to lift in the future. To avoid repeating this kind of discussion, which we believe can become contentious quickly, we would encourage the OAT to make sure that any changes here err on the side of giving OpCo more freedom than they think they might need, even if it means expanding this proposal more.
If I understand correctly, the proposal does not imply that only OpCo can propose service providers to the ArbitrumDAO. The proposed fix for the 'Inability to Interact with Service Providers' restriction grants OpCo the authority to enter contracts with service providers or individual contributors as needed to fulfill its mandate, subject to OAT oversight, seems intuitive.
Since the proposal neither states nor implies that OpCo is the sole entity allowed to propose service providers, other entities, contributors, or the DAO itself can still propose service providers through existing governance processes. Therefore, I don’t believe there’s a significant cause for concern regarding centralization risks.
If I understand correctly, the proposal does not imply that only OpCo can propose service providers to the ArbitrumDAO. The proposed fix for the 'Inability to Interact with Service Providers' restriction grants OpCo the authority to enter contracts with service providers or individual contributors as needed to fulfill its mandate, subject to OAT oversight, seems intuitive.
Since the proposal neither states nor implies that OpCo is the sole entity allowed to propose service providers, other entities, contributors, or the DAO itself can still propose service providers through existing governance processes. Therefore, I don’t believe there’s a significant cause for concern regarding centralization risks.
Also, are AAEs officially a thing now? just want to clarify where things are at
The OpCo elections have been completed which appointed Patrick McCorry, A.J. Warner, and Frisson. The three council members have appointed Pedro Breuer as an OAT council member and are in final stage conversations with an identified candidate. All council members, alongside the Arbitrum Foundation, are now working towards operationalizing the OpCo entity and hiring the initial team to lead the organisation.
The OpCo elections have been completed which appointed Patrick McCorry, A.J. Warner, and Frisson. The three council members have appointed Pedro Breuer as an OAT council member and are in final stage conversations with an identified candidate. All council members, alongside the Arbitrum Foundation, are now working towards operationalizing the OpCo entity and hiring the initial team to lead the organisation.
In the course of our work we reviewed the original OpCo proposal to fully internalize its mandate and operational capability. We discovered a number of restrictions during this process that may hinder the OpCo’s ability to fulfil its mission, attract the best talent who can contribute towards the OpCo’s success, and prevent the OpCo from proactively working on initiatives that can lead to future proposals in the DAO.
We want to take this opportunity to go through each identified restriction, how it may impact the OpCo’s operational capability, and a proposed fix that can resolve the restrictions.
We’ll take this opportunity to go through each restriction alongside the proposed updates for the OpCo. Keep in mind, we will pick the problem statement from the OpCo proposal that most accurately reflects the problem, as sometimes the same restriction is repeated several times in the proposal.
The OpCo is unable to enter service agreements with service providers or individual contributors unless it is related to its own operational needs.
To illustrate the issue, let’s consider an example where a contributor approaches the OpCo with a proposal for the DAO and the OpCo thinks it may be valuable for the ecosystem. Unfortunately, the OpCo cannot engage with a consulting firm to evaluate the idea. The only option available for OpCo is to encourage the contributor to seek permission (and potential funding from exploratory work) from the DAO.
We believe this situation is counter to the OpCo’s core mandate to support preliminary work on potentially promising proposals before it reaches the DAO. It should have the freedom to engage third parties, when necessary, to work on initiatives that it believes will receive a positive response from the DAO.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
This proposed fix will enable the OpCo to enter agreements with service providers or individual contributors alongside allowing the OAT to provide oversight on whether the agreement indeed fulfils the mandate of supporting the ArbitrumDAO.
The OpCo restricts its budget to only be used for operational costs related to employees, running the organisation, and administrative costs.
We can re-use the previous example to highlight the issue. Let’s assume a contributor approaches the OpCo with a proposal for the DAO. The OpCo cannot offer a grant to the contributor to investigate the idea further, in a similar manner to M&A Pilot or the Arbitrum Venture Initiative Pilot. To obtain any exploratory funding, the OpCo will need to work with the contributor on a proposal for the DAO, as opposed to offering its own funds to support preliminary work.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
This proposed fix will enable the OpCo to spend funds on a discretionary basis with oversight of the OAT. We believe this is mandatory to ensure the OpCo can be ‘proactive, meaning if the entity has the bandwidth and recognizes an area within its focus categories where developers could be made, it can propose a strategy’ as written in the original proposal.
In many organisations, it is common for employees to have a base salary, token agreement that vests over time as a structure of the initial compensation package, and a bonus structure for good performance. We believe the bonus pool should be available to support token agreements as well as bonuses.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
This will offer the optionality to offer future employees a token vesting agreement alongside a bonus structure for performance related compensation.
The initial restrictions were crafted to prevent conflicts of interests for OAT council members, but as we have witnessed in the previous election, several promising candidates who generally have the best interests in Arbitrum in mind were unable to apply and join the OAT. For example, tnorm was unable to apply as it would restrict Gauntlet’s ability to enter service level agreements.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
The proposed fix is inspired by the eligibility policy that is applied to Arbitrum’s Security Council as outlined in the ArbitrumDAO’s constitution. It relies on the current OAT to enforce the policy, but if the ArbitrumDAO disagrees with the decision, they can overturn with a vote that achieves a non-constitutional quorum.
OAT members are no longer required to relinquish their role as contributors within the ArbitrumDAO and are allowed to be a member of other DAO-adjacent entity oversight committees. The motivation is to ensure talented individuals can continue to support initiatives in the ArbitrumDAO while offering their expertise to help the OAT navigate its own future. Of course, a contributor may voluntarily decide to relinquish some roles depending on time commitments, to ensure they can dedicate themselves to this role.
Finally, if an OAT member is affiliated with an entity, that entity is no longer prevented from engaging in service provider contracts with the OpCo. Keep in mind, there will be a conflict of interest policy that will require a conflicted OAT member to recuse themselves on all matters related to that entity or any service agreement signed with OpCo.
We believe this requirement is overkill as a requirement for the OAT elections. It is important that direct conflicts of interests are disclosed (e.g., working at a competitor), but potential conflicts of interests can become impractical for certain user profiles (e.g., prolific investors) who have valuable networks and skillsets that can be beneficial to the council. It is easier for potential conflicts to be handled within the council as they must be disclosed when necessary and the conflicted OAT member must exclude themselves from the matter.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
Our proposed fix aims to strike a balance. Candidates for the OAT election are required to publicly disclose direct conflicts, in a similar manner as Arbitrum’s Security Council elections. If the candidate is elected as an OAT member, then they can disclose potential conflicts of interests with the remaining members of the OAT council. If the OAT council believes it is indeed a conflict of interest, then the conflicted OAT member will be forced to recluse themselves from the matter at hand.
The original proposal fixed the mandate of OpCo to only focus on ecosystem support or financial management unless there is an additional proposal that expands its scope. We are weary about pigeon-holing the OpCo’s mandate before it is operational as there are many verticals that can arise that the OpCo is best suited to tackle, but it is unable to do so without an explicit vote by the ArbitrumDAO. For example, taking the reins on governance related matters in the ArbitrumDAO seems like a natural fit for OpCo, but at present it is unable to take up that mantle due to this restriction.
Additionally, since the OpCo will offer oversight capabilities for proposals passed by the ArbitrumDAO and executed by others (like AAEs, contributors, etc), it should have the full freedom to take that on without contention on whether it is focused on ecosystem support, financial management or whether the DAO needs to approve a new domain for OpCo. In fact, as written in the proposal, the OpCo should proactively work on identifying opportunities and we believe restricting the OpCo to specific categories can be problematic in this pursuit.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
The proposed fix will allow the OpCo to proactively work on and experiment with new strategies and verticals that it believes the ArbitrumDAO may positively vote on in the future. For example, it can begin work on a proposal focused on improving governance in the DAO or a future grant program for public goods. This can enable the OpCo to operate in a flexible manner with rough consensus amongst delegates and the OAT on initiatives it believes will ultimately benefit the ArbitrumDAO.
Of course, to carry out any large initiative, the OpCo will still need to request funds from the ArbitrumDAO’s treasury, so this flexibility should be viewed as enabling small-scale experiments by the OpCo and proactive work towards acquiring future funding when it is required on domains that it believes is important for the DAO’s success.
The proposed fixes should enable the OpCo to voluntarily enter service agreements with service providers or individual contributors using discretionary funding available to help access additional resources to fulfil its mandate to the DAO. Additionally, it helps fix the compensation structure for OpCo employees to be in line with industry standards and relaxes restrictions for OAT council elections to enable attract more candidates who have the interests of Arbitrun in mind.
We invite the community to discuss the matters on this thread and we will organise two governance calls to discuss the above proposal across different time zones:
Assuming all goes well, we will aim to put a vote up on Snapshot for 12th June 2025 to enact the above changes with a non-constitutional Quorum.
First off, thank you to the OpCo team and the OAT Council for the transparency and foresight in surfacing these early-stage challenges.
Identifying these operational bottlenecks and proactively suggesting amendments is a strong signal of commitment to DAO maturity and efficiency.
That said, several of the proposed changes raise material governance and fiduciary considerations that merit thoughtful safeguards. Below is a breakdown of key themes and recommendations:
Empowering OpCo to independently engage third-party contributors is a logical step toward agile execution. However, unchecked discretion can invite risks.
Suggested Improvements:
Allowing OpCo to deploy surplus funds toward promising initiatives fits its proactive mandate — but discretion must be counterbalanced with transparency.
Suggested Improvements:
Updating compensation to include token vesting and performance-based bonuses aligns with standard Web3 employment practices, but clarity is crucial.
Suggested Improvements:
Relaxing the eligibility criteria is a smart adjustment to avoid losing quality candidates. However, it’s critical that the new policy doesn’t dilute accountability.
Suggested Improvements:
Shifting all potential conflict disclosures to internal-only review may reduce unnecessary noise but also undermines transparency.
Suggested Improvements:
Expanding the OpCo mandate to allow proactive work in new areas (e.g., governance, grants) is sensible but mandate creep must be avoided.
Suggested Improvements:
These amendments reflect a DAO that’s becoming more operational and forward-thinking. That said, flexibility without structure risks backfiring. The OpCo must have room to execute, but its authority must remain transparent, scoped, and ultimately accountable to the DAO.
The OpCo elections have been completed which appointed Patrick McCorry, A.J. Warner, and Frisson. The three council members have appointed Pedro Breuer as an OAT council member and are in final stage conversations with an identified candidate. All council members, alongside the Arbitrum Foundation, are now working towards operationalizing the OpCo entity and hiring the initial team to lead the organisation.
In the course of our work we reviewed the original OpCo proposal to fully internalize its mandate and operational capability. We discovered a number of restrictions during this process that may hinder the OpCo’s ability to fulfil its mission, attract the best talent who can contribute towards the OpCo’s success, and prevent the OpCo from proactively working on initiatives that can lead to future proposals in the DAO.
We want to take this opportunity to go through each identified restriction, how it may impact the OpCo’s operational capability, and a proposed fix that can resolve the restrictions.
We’ll take this opportunity to go through each restriction alongside the proposed updates for the OpCo. Keep in mind, we will pick the problem statement from the OpCo proposal that most accurately reflects the problem, as sometimes the same restriction is repeated several times in the proposal.
The OpCo is unable to enter service agreements with service providers or individual contributors unless it is related to its own operational needs.
To illustrate the issue, let’s consider an example where a contributor approaches the OpCo with a proposal for the DAO and the OpCo thinks it may be valuable for the ecosystem. Unfortunately, the OpCo cannot engage with a consulting firm to evaluate the idea. The only option available for OpCo is to encourage the contributor to seek permission (and potential funding from exploratory work) from the DAO.
We believe this situation is counter to the OpCo’s core mandate to support preliminary work on potentially promising proposals before it reaches the DAO. It should have the freedom to engage third parties, when necessary, to work on initiatives that it believes will receive a positive response from the DAO.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
This proposed fix will enable the OpCo to enter agreements with service providers or individual contributors alongside allowing the OAT to provide oversight on whether the agreement indeed fulfils the mandate of supporting the ArbitrumDAO.
The OpCo restricts its budget to only be used for operational costs related to employees, running the organisation, and administrative costs.
We can re-use the previous example to highlight the issue. Let’s assume a contributor approaches the OpCo with a proposal for the DAO. The OpCo cannot offer a grant to the contributor to investigate the idea further, in a similar manner to M&A Pilot or the Arbitrum Venture Initiative Pilot. To obtain any exploratory funding, the OpCo will need to work with the contributor on a proposal for the DAO, as opposed to offering its own funds to support preliminary work.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
This proposed fix will enable the OpCo to spend funds on a discretionary basis with oversight of the OAT. We believe this is mandatory to ensure the OpCo can be ‘proactive, meaning if the entity has the bandwidth and recognizes an area within its focus categories where developers could be made, it can propose a strategy’ as written in the original proposal.
In many organisations, it is common for employees to have a base salary, token agreement that vests over time as a structure of the initial compensation package, and a bonus structure for good performance. We believe the bonus pool should be available to support token agreements as well as bonuses.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
This will offer the optionality to offer future employees a token vesting agreement alongside a bonus structure for performance related compensation.
The initial restrictions were crafted to prevent conflicts of interests for OAT council members, but as we have witnessed in the previous election, several promising candidates who generally have the best interests in Arbitrum in mind were unable to apply and join the OAT. For example, tnorm was unable to apply as it would restrict Gauntlet’s ability to enter service level agreements.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
The proposed fix is inspired by the eligibility policy that is applied to Arbitrum’s Security Council as outlined in the ArbitrumDAO’s constitution. It relies on the current OAT to enforce the policy, but if the ArbitrumDAO disagrees with the decision, they can overturn with a vote that achieves a non-constitutional quorum.
OAT members are no longer required to relinquish their role as contributors within the ArbitrumDAO and are allowed to be a member of other DAO-adjacent entity oversight committees. The motivation is to ensure talented individuals can continue to support initiatives in the ArbitrumDAO while offering their expertise to help the OAT navigate its own future. Of course, a contributor may voluntarily decide to relinquish some roles depending on time commitments, to ensure they can dedicate themselves to this role.
Finally, if an OAT member is affiliated with an entity, that entity is no longer prevented from engaging in service provider contracts with the OpCo. Keep in mind, there will be a conflict of interest policy that will require a conflicted OAT member to recuse themselves on all matters related to that entity or any service agreement signed with OpCo.
We believe this requirement is overkill as a requirement for the OAT elections. It is important that direct conflicts of interests are disclosed (e.g., working at a competitor), but potential conflicts of interests can become impractical for certain user profiles (e.g., prolific investors) who have valuable networks and skillsets that can be beneficial to the council. It is easier for potential conflicts to be handled within the council as they must be disclosed when necessary and the conflicted OAT member must exclude themselves from the matter.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
Our proposed fix aims to strike a balance. Candidates for the OAT election are required to publicly disclose direct conflicts, in a similar manner as Arbitrum’s Security Council elections. If the candidate is elected as an OAT member, then they can disclose potential conflicts of interests with the remaining members of the OAT council. If the OAT council believes it is indeed a conflict of interest, then the conflicted OAT member will be forced to recluse themselves from the matter at hand.
The original proposal fixed the mandate of OpCo to only focus on ecosystem support or financial management unless there is an additional proposal that expands its scope. We are weary about pigeon-holing the OpCo’s mandate before it is operational as there are many verticals that can arise that the OpCo is best suited to tackle, but it is unable to do so without an explicit vote by the ArbitrumDAO. For example, taking the reins on governance related matters in the ArbitrumDAO seems like a natural fit for OpCo, but at present it is unable to take up that mantle due to this restriction.
Additionally, since the OpCo will offer oversight capabilities for proposals passed by the ArbitrumDAO and executed by others (like AAEs, contributors, etc), it should have the full freedom to take that on without contention on whether it is focused on ecosystem support, financial management or whether the DAO needs to approve a new domain for OpCo. In fact, as written in the proposal, the OpCo should proactively work on identifying opportunities and we believe restricting the OpCo to specific categories can be problematic in this pursuit.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
The proposed fix will allow the OpCo to proactively work on and experiment with new strategies and verticals that it believes the ArbitrumDAO may positively vote on in the future. For example, it can begin work on a proposal focused on improving governance in the DAO or a future grant program for public goods. This can enable the OpCo to operate in a flexible manner with rough consensus amongst delegates and the OAT on initiatives it believes will ultimately benefit the ArbitrumDAO.
Of course, to carry out any large initiative, the OpCo will still need to request funds from the ArbitrumDAO’s treasury, so this flexibility should be viewed as enabling small-scale experiments by the OpCo and proactive work towards acquiring future funding when it is required on domains that it believes is important for the DAO’s success.
The proposed fixes should enable the OpCo to voluntarily enter service agreements with service providers or individual contributors using discretionary funding available to help access additional resources to fulfil its mandate to the DAO. Additionally, it helps fix the compensation structure for OpCo employees to be in line with industry standards and relaxes restrictions for OAT council elections to enable attract more candidates who have the interests of Arbitrun in mind.
We invite the community to discuss the matters on this thread and we will organise two governance calls to discuss the above proposal across different time zones:
Assuming all goes well, we will aim to put a vote up on Snapshot for 12th June 2025 to enact the above changes with a non-constitutional Quorum.
First off, thank you to the OpCo team and the OAT Council for the transparency and foresight in surfacing these early-stage challenges.
Identifying these operational bottlenecks and proactively suggesting amendments is a strong signal of commitment to DAO maturity and efficiency.
That said, several of the proposed changes raise material governance and fiduciary considerations that merit thoughtful safeguards. Below is a breakdown of key themes and recommendations:
Empowering OpCo to independently engage third-party contributors is a logical step toward agile execution. However, unchecked discretion can invite risks.
Suggested Improvements:
Allowing OpCo to deploy surplus funds toward promising initiatives fits its proactive mandate — but discretion must be counterbalanced with transparency.
Suggested Improvements:
Updating compensation to include token vesting and performance-based bonuses aligns with standard Web3 employment practices, but clarity is crucial.
Suggested Improvements:
Relaxing the eligibility criteria is a smart adjustment to avoid losing quality candidates. However, it’s critical that the new policy doesn’t dilute accountability.
Suggested Improvements:
Shifting all potential conflict disclosures to internal-only review may reduce unnecessary noise but also undermines transparency.
Suggested Improvements:
Expanding the OpCo mandate to allow proactive work in new areas (e.g., governance, grants) is sensible but mandate creep must be avoided.
Suggested Improvements:
These amendments reflect a DAO that’s becoming more operational and forward-thinking. That said, flexibility without structure risks backfiring. The OpCo must have room to execute, but its authority must remain transparent, scoped, and ultimately accountable to the DAO.
While caution is needed when expanding mandates, I am supportive in this case. I have voted FOR. Unblocking budget channels without asking for new money is a pragmatic step, but it requires strong transparency. I was supportive of OpCo from the start and think (optimistically) that the involved parties are operating in Arb's best interest. I acknowledge that this proposal is giving even more latitude, but with the level of scrutiny there is on this DAO I am comfortable signaling approval in this case.
While caution is needed when expanding mandates, I am supportive in this case. I have voted FOR. Unblocking budget channels without asking for new money is a pragmatic step, but it requires strong transparency. I was supportive of OpCo from the start and think (optimistically) that the involved parties are operating in Arb's best interest. I acknowledge that this proposal is giving even more latitude, but with the level of scrutiny there is on this DAO I am comfortable signaling approval in this case.
We believe this requirement is overkill as a requirement for the OAT elections. It is important that direct conflicts of interests are disclosed (e.g., working at a competitor), but potential conflicts of interests can become impractical for certain user profiles (e.g., prolific investors) who have valuable networks and skillsets that can be beneficial to the council. It is easier for potential conflicts to be handled within the council as they must be disclosed when necessary and the conflicted OAT member must exclude themselves from the matter.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
Our proposed fix aims to strike a balance. Candidates for the OAT election are required to publicly disclose direct conflicts, in a similar manner as Arbitrum’s Security Council elections. If the candidate is elected as an OAT member, then they can disclose potential conflicts of interests with the remaining members of the OAT council. If the OAT council believes it is indeed a conflict of interest, then the conflicted OAT member will be forced to recluse themselves from the matter at hand.
I don't support this, and I disagree. I have voted in favour anyway, but wanted to express here.
Decision Summary
After a close read of the forum thread and the linked docs, I’m casting a FOR vote. These amendments give OpCo just enough freedom to move at the speed our ecosystem now demands, while still anchoring key guardrails the DAO painstakingly put in place last year.
Decision Summary
After a close read of the forum thread and the linked docs, I’m casting a FOR vote. These amendments give OpCo just enough freedom to move at the speed our ecosystem now demands, while still anchoring key guardrails the DAO painstakingly put in place last year.
Faster, Smarter Execution
By clarifying that the existing monthly spend caps also cover exploratory pilots, OpCo can commission research or run small-scale tests before a full DAO vote is warranted. This closes the “analysis-paralysis” gap we’ve seen on several promising ideas.
Competitive Talent Packages
Re-labeling the 4 M ARB comp pool into a unified base + vesting + performance bonus structure lets OpCo craft offers that top operators in web3 actually say “yes” to—without asking the DAO for piecemeal approvals.
Oversight Intact, Transparency Enhanced
The OAT veto and DAO claw-back remain untouched. I do, however, echo calls from other delegates for a public quarterly contract registry (counterparty, deliverable, spend band) so everyone can track where funds flow.
Twelve-Month Review Clause
Please add a formal 12-month review in the Snapshot description: after a year of data, delegates can renew, revise, or sunset these flexibilities.
Confirm Review Mechanics
Clarify now how that review will be triggered (automatic Snapshot? OAT proposal?) so we’re not scrambling later.
With these two final tweaks, I’m confident the proposal balances agility with accountability—and positions OpCo to deliver outsized value for ArbitrumDAO.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR (Update the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
In this case, we want to give comments on the changes:
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We would be voting in favour of the proposal as it provides the necessary flexibility and clarity to ensure the OpCo can fulfil its mandate effectively. By allowing the OpCo to engage with service providers, allocate discretionary funds for proactive initiatives, and offer flexible compensation structures, these changes will empower the entity to attract top talent. After discussion with Pedro it’s clear this model is similar to a fire-starter grant by Plurality; if the OpCo believes an initiative adds value to the DAO, it can fund the contributor or service provider for their time and effort.
The DAO will benefit from the capacity of OpCo to move quickly and execute.
As a DAO, we already voted for the OpCo budget, and those limitations are absurd. I'm in favor of letting OpCo do their thing and what comes from it, we will be watching, and holding the people running it accountable. Often every micro-decision becomes a governance theater performance. We're burning contributor energy on process instead of progress.
The DAO will benefit from the capacity of OpCo to move quickly and execute.
As a DAO, we already voted for the OpCo budget, and those limitations are absurd. I'm in favor of letting OpCo do their thing and what comes from it, we will be watching, and holding the people running it accountable. Often every micro-decision becomes a governance theater performance. We're burning contributor energy on process instead of progress.
The DAO needs an execution arm that can actually execute, without the need of asking permission. These changes create the operational flexibility OpCo was supposed to have from the start.
If anything, I'd like to see this evolve into a more general pattern: DAO sets strategy, execution entities carry it out.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
While we understand the concerns raised by other delegates regarding the change to the OpCo’s original mandate, we do not share them. We’ve seen several initiatives in the past fall short and require additional clarification (e.g., the role of the DAO Advocate in the original ARDC, or the responsibilities of chairs in the MSS); therefore, we shouldn’t let the original proposal restrict us from proposing changes.
Furthermore, we believe that, at this stage, the OAT should have the flexibility to maximize the chances of OpCo's success. However, we ask that the OAT and OpCo personnel ensure frequent and proper reporting back to the DAO so that we can keep track of what’s happening, raise concerns or issues in a timely manner, and correct course if needed.
While caution is needed when expanding mandates, I am supportive in this case. I have voted FOR. Unblocking budget channels without asking for new money is a pragmatic step, but it requires strong transparency. I was supportive of OpCo from the start and think (optimistically) that the involved parties are operating in Arb's best interest. I acknowledge that this proposal is giving even more latitude, but with the level of scrutiny there is on this DAO I am comfortable signaling approval in this case.
While caution is needed when expanding mandates, I am supportive in this case. I have voted FOR. Unblocking budget channels without asking for new money is a pragmatic step, but it requires strong transparency. I was supportive of OpCo from the start and think (optimistically) that the involved parties are operating in Arb's best interest. I acknowledge that this proposal is giving even more latitude, but with the level of scrutiny there is on this DAO I am comfortable signaling approval in this case.
We believe this requirement is overkill as a requirement for the OAT elections. It is important that direct conflicts of interests are disclosed (e.g., working at a competitor), but potential conflicts of interests can become impractical for certain user profiles (e.g., prolific investors) who have valuable networks and skillsets that can be beneficial to the council. It is easier for potential conflicts to be handled within the council as they must be disclosed when necessary and the conflicted OAT member must exclude themselves from the matter.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
Our proposed fix aims to strike a balance. Candidates for the OAT election are required to publicly disclose direct conflicts, in a similar manner as Arbitrum’s Security Council elections. If the candidate is elected as an OAT member, then they can disclose potential conflicts of interests with the remaining members of the OAT council. If the OAT council believes it is indeed a conflict of interest, then the conflicted OAT member will be forced to recluse themselves from the matter at hand.
I don't support this, and I disagree. I have voted in favour anyway, but wanted to express here.
Decision Summary
After a close read of the forum thread and the linked docs, I’m casting a FOR vote. These amendments give OpCo just enough freedom to move at the speed our ecosystem now demands, while still anchoring key guardrails the DAO painstakingly put in place last year.
Decision Summary
After a close read of the forum thread and the linked docs, I’m casting a FOR vote. These amendments give OpCo just enough freedom to move at the speed our ecosystem now demands, while still anchoring key guardrails the DAO painstakingly put in place last year.
Faster, Smarter Execution
By clarifying that the existing monthly spend caps also cover exploratory pilots, OpCo can commission research or run small-scale tests before a full DAO vote is warranted. This closes the “analysis-paralysis” gap we’ve seen on several promising ideas.
Competitive Talent Packages
Re-labeling the 4 M ARB comp pool into a unified base + vesting + performance bonus structure lets OpCo craft offers that top operators in web3 actually say “yes” to—without asking the DAO for piecemeal approvals.
Oversight Intact, Transparency Enhanced
The OAT veto and DAO claw-back remain untouched. I do, however, echo calls from other delegates for a public quarterly contract registry (counterparty, deliverable, spend band) so everyone can track where funds flow.
Twelve-Month Review Clause
Please add a formal 12-month review in the Snapshot description: after a year of data, delegates can renew, revise, or sunset these flexibilities.
Confirm Review Mechanics
Clarify now how that review will be triggered (automatic Snapshot? OAT proposal?) so we’re not scrambling later.
With these two final tweaks, I’m confident the proposal balances agility with accountability—and positions OpCo to deliver outsized value for ArbitrumDAO.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR (Update the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
In this case, we want to give comments on the changes:
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We would be voting in favour of the proposal as it provides the necessary flexibility and clarity to ensure the OpCo can fulfil its mandate effectively. By allowing the OpCo to engage with service providers, allocate discretionary funds for proactive initiatives, and offer flexible compensation structures, these changes will empower the entity to attract top talent. After discussion with Pedro it’s clear this model is similar to a fire-starter grant by Plurality; if the OpCo believes an initiative adds value to the DAO, it can fund the contributor or service provider for their time and effort.
The DAO will benefit from the capacity of OpCo to move quickly and execute.
As a DAO, we already voted for the OpCo budget, and those limitations are absurd. I'm in favor of letting OpCo do their thing and what comes from it, we will be watching, and holding the people running it accountable. Often every micro-decision becomes a governance theater performance. We're burning contributor energy on process instead of progress.
The DAO will benefit from the capacity of OpCo to move quickly and execute.
As a DAO, we already voted for the OpCo budget, and those limitations are absurd. I'm in favor of letting OpCo do their thing and what comes from it, we will be watching, and holding the people running it accountable. Often every micro-decision becomes a governance theater performance. We're burning contributor energy on process instead of progress.
The DAO needs an execution arm that can actually execute, without the need of asking permission. These changes create the operational flexibility OpCo was supposed to have from the start.
If anything, I'd like to see this evolve into a more general pattern: DAO sets strategy, execution entities carry it out.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
While we understand the concerns raised by other delegates regarding the change to the OpCo’s original mandate, we do not share them. We’ve seen several initiatives in the past fall short and require additional clarification (e.g., the role of the DAO Advocate in the original ARDC, or the responsibilities of chairs in the MSS); therefore, we shouldn’t let the original proposal restrict us from proposing changes.
Furthermore, we believe that, at this stage, the OAT should have the flexibility to maximize the chances of OpCo's success. However, we ask that the OAT and OpCo personnel ensure frequent and proper reporting back to the DAO so that we can keep track of what’s happening, raise concerns or issues in a timely manner, and correct course if needed.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR (Update the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
In this case, we want to give comments on the changes:
Ecosystem Support or Financial Management only: makes sense, this clause is hindering the OpCo’s ability to perform on other non-related verticals because it is a formally created entity that must fulfill its foundational purpose. Although Ecosystem Support or Financial Management are broad concepts, if we want to ensure optimal operational capability for the OpCo, this change is a must.
Compensation for OpCo Employees: We support this approach. In traditional finance, salary structures similar to what the OAT has proposed are standard practice.
That said, SEED believes that token vesting schedules may be an even more effective and aligned mechanism than the initially proposed bonuses, especially for an organization of this nature. Vesting helps reinforce long-term commitment and accountability.
Inability to Interact with Service Providers and Restrictive Treasury Spend: This provides the OpCo with the capability to manage budgetary surplus for hiring service providers or providing grants, converting the OpCo into a more proactive organization, and allowing them to make some minor decisions without the need for a governance vote.
For the remaining changes, we think these are no-brainer decisions.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We would be voting in favour of the proposal as it provides the necessary flexibility and clarity to ensure the OpCo can fulfil its mandate effectively. By allowing the OpCo to engage with service providers, allocate discretionary funds for proactive initiatives, and offer flexible compensation structures, these changes will empower the entity to attract top talent. After discussion with Pedro it’s clear this model is similar to a fire-starter grant by Plurality; if the OpCo believes an initiative adds value to the DAO, it can fund the contributor or service provider for their time and effort.
The revisions to governance structures, conflict of interest policies, and the mandate itself reinforce both transparency and accountability, while also enabling broader participation from aligned contributors. This is especially important for hiring high-quality talent for the OpCo. During the OAT elections, many DAO contributors expressed interest in applying but were restricted due to the requirement to relinquish existing roles. With this new framework, OpCo will be better positioned to recruit top talent without unnecessary trade-offs. Combined with the capabilities of the current committee members, these updates will empower the OpCo to become a more effective and proactive partner in advancing the long-term interests of the ArbitrumDAO.
We vote against this proposal.
The proposal pinpoints a real bottleneck. Delegates have watched promising ideas wither while each step—draft, OAT review, Snapshot, on-chain execution—grinds forward, so letting OpCo co-design solutions with service providers before a formal DAO vote could shrink timelines, surface realistic budgets sooner, and keep momentum alive. We share that goal, and we agree that some discretionary spend is essential to avoid bureaucratic gridlock.
As illustrated by the given examples, the intention behind these modifications is to enable agile funding of groundwork needed to prepare proposals that will be submitted to the DAO. This aligns with the overarching goal of reducing friction in order to fulfill the approved mandate.
We vote against this proposal.
The proposal pinpoints a real bottleneck. Delegates have watched promising ideas wither while each step—draft, OAT review, Snapshot, on-chain execution—grinds forward, so letting OpCo co-design solutions with service providers before a formal DAO vote could shrink timelines, surface realistic budgets sooner, and keep momentum alive. We share that goal, and we agree that some discretionary spend is essential to avoid bureaucratic gridlock.
As illustrated by the given examples, the intention behind these modifications is to enable agile funding of groundwork needed to prepare proposals that will be submitted to the DAO. This aligns with the overarching goal of reducing friction in order to fulfill the approved mandate.
Where we part ways is on scope and safeguards. The charter already lets OpCo draw up to $500k a month with no vote, climbing to an OAT or DAO check above that. After covering the exemplary $5.2 M annual budgeting, about $436k per month, roughly $64k in “excess” cash would still be available every month. Under the amendment, that surplus could finance external work without pre-defined limits or public sign-off, effectively repurposing the treasury while the community learns only in hindsight.
Agility does not require a blank cheque. A practical compromise would:
These guardrails keep the spirit of fast, iterative vendor collaboration while ensuring that material sums still pass through the DAO’s accountability mechanisms. Until such parameters are built into the text, we would vote against and invite the authors to return with a tighter, budget-bounded revision.
Voting "For"
I've felt similarly in other situations like this - the DAO has elected a group of individuals who were trusted with the project, so it doesn't make sense to then question their judgement when they implement their plans. If we don't trust the people we elected at their first step, why even have this project.
Voting "For"
I've felt similarly in other situations like this - the DAO has elected a group of individuals who were trusted with the project, so it doesn't make sense to then question their judgement when they implement their plans. If we don't trust the people we elected at their first step, why even have this project.
Yes, obviously with the caveat of reasonableness, but I don't really see much issue with the changes noted. And nothing enough for me to stop it out right.
gm, I agree that giving opCo enough autonomy to execute makes sense. Voting FOR.
That said, with its expanding scope, opCo’s activities seem like they could start overlapping with the Arbitrum Foundation and other AAEs.
It would be helpful to have a finalized map showing what areas each entity is accountable for, to avoid duplication and clarify responsibilities.
It’s possible that if this proposal had come while the OpCo was already fully operational, I might have taken a different stance. However, given the strong majority by which the OpCo passed, and considering its expected usefulness in supporting the DAO going forward, I will vote For.
If I’ve correctly understood the context from all the related proposals I’ve engaged with, and if I’ve correctly interpreted the tone during the most recent calls, then I sense that the overall direction is to support the OpCo. Choosing otherwise here might reflect inconsistency with previous votes.
It’s possible that if this proposal had come while the OpCo was already fully operational, I might have taken a different stance. However, given the strong majority by which the OpCo passed, and considering its expected usefulness in supporting the DAO going forward, I will vote For.
If I’ve correctly understood the context from all the related proposals I’ve engaged with, and if I’ve correctly interpreted the tone during the most recent calls, then I sense that the overall direction is to support the OpCo. Choosing otherwise here might reflect inconsistency with previous votes.
Lastly, I’d like to note that during the corresponding community call, @Frisson gave a very thorough overview of the proposal, and no participant raised any objections.
Voting in Favour
As mentioned above, no point throwing a spanner in the wheel (longer rationale in post above)
I'm supportive of these changes overall. The original OpCo proposal was probably a bit too tight in how it framed things, and this feels like a sensible shift toward giving OpCo the flexibility it needs to actually operate effectively.
I'm supportive of these changes overall. The original OpCo proposal was probably a bit too tight in how it framed things, and this feels like a sensible shift toward giving OpCo the flexibility it needs to actually operate effectively.
Totally agree the current restrictions are too strict. If we want the OAT to attract experienced, high-quality contributors, we can’t have overly rigid rules that shrink the talent pool unnecessarily.
It might also make sense to apply the same logic to OpCo’s internal hiring. Right now, these restrictions are quite strict (i.e., full-time only, no outside roles, no exceptions), excluding a lot of great talent who may prefer part-time setups or simply want more flexibility. Not saying those edge cases shouldn't be evaluated carefully, but giving the OAT discretion to approve them on a case-by-case basis could go a long way in helping attract the right people without compromising alignment.
I voted AGAINST this proposal
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/cp0x-delegate-communication-thread/22217/190?u=cp0x
I voted FOR on this proposal. While not agreeing with some items and the selected voting method, I find more important to move this initiative forward.
We voted in favour of the proposal on Snapshot because we agree OpCo needs room to operate effectively. That said, several details would benefit from tighter definitions to give delegates full confidence in the new scope.
Treasury spending: Outlining clear expenditure thresholds and approval flows for day-to-day operational disbursements, larger strategic bets, and any emergency spend will provide better guiding principles and guardrails that can be referenced.
Ecosystem support & financial management: Having a concise framework with objectives, and information on how KPIs will be defined will help the DAO be more cognizant of expected outcomes.
I'm voting in favor. These seem like pragmatic changes that will improve Opco’s operational capability and help avoid unnecessary slowdowns along the way, so I believe it is better to support this proposal now rather than face delays later. That said, I also think that every time there is a move towards more centralization, community oversight and transparency from the operators should increase. I’ll keep following developments closely and expect Opco to uphold the highest standards of transparency moving forward
We’ll be voting FOR this proposal. While we do have some concerns, particularly around the potential for scope and the need for clear accountability as OpCo gains more flexibility we believe the benefits outweigh the risks. The updates make sense given how the DAO and ecosystem have evolved, and they give OpCo the tools it needs to operate more effectively, engage with the right partners, and attract strong talent. Importantly, there are safeguards in place, like spending caps and transparency requirements, that help mitigate potential downsides. On balance, we see this as a positive step toward a more efficient and responsive operational structure for the DAO.
We support the updates to the OpCo Foundation’s operational framework, which strengthen the original OpCo proposal we backed. The ability for OpCo to independently contract service providers will speed up the evaluation and development of promising ideas, aligning with its mandate to support the ArbitrumDAO. We value the flexibility to use excess funds for exploratory work, allowing OpCo to test strategies before seeking broader DAO approval. The restructured compensation pool, combining salaries and performance-based bonuses, will help attract and retain skilled professionals. Additionally, relaxing oversight council election rules will encourage more qualified candidates to participate while maintaining balanced representation. To ensure transparency, we encourage OpCo to regularly share contract details with the DAO. These changes make OpCo more capable of delivering meaningful results for our community.
I have voted FOR this proposal. For Arbitrum DAO to remain competitive and efficient, it must delegate certain powers to a structure that is both empowered and accountable.
I believe the OpCo can serve as this structure for the DAO. The three gaps identified in the proposal do grant additional authority to the OpCo, but in my view, it is riskier to have an entity with its hands tied, unable to act effectively. Like many delegates, I would have preferred this scoping to be included in the initial proposal.
I have voted FOR this proposal. For Arbitrum DAO to remain competitive and efficient, it must delegate certain powers to a structure that is both empowered and accountable.
I believe the OpCo can serve as this structure for the DAO. The three gaps identified in the proposal do grant additional authority to the OpCo, but in my view, it is riskier to have an entity with its hands tied, unable to act effectively. Like many delegates, I would have preferred this scoping to be included in the initial proposal.
In my view, the DAO should give the strategic vision and remain vigilant while the OpCO focus on operational execution.
Camelot has voted “for” extending the OpCo capabilities. While there are some specific details in the proposal, it is our strong belief that this is a natural path toward supporting the people we collectively decided to vote for in the OAT.
We think Patrick, AJ and Frisson are the best people to take the oversight role of OpCo. Specifically, we think giving a more active role to members of Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs will give them what they might have missed so far, a direct role to steer and direct the operations of the DAO in a successful way. We have also growth to know and appreciate Frisson both for his work at Tally and the roles he has had in our DAO, and we think he has the business posture to cover this important position as well.
Im just referring to the reduction in disclosures for conflict of interest. It’s really hard to see how that's necessary or even how that needs to be a package with the other changes
Looking at DAOs from a service provider POV and getting more insights into the reasoning why to engage with a DAO or not, I fully support the changes.
Especially:
Looking at DAOs from a service provider POV and getting more insights into the reasoning why to engage with a DAO or not, I fully support the changes.
Especially:
1. Inability to Interact with Service Providers To further elaborate on the OAT's point, as DeFi is maturing and service providers become more professional, they can choose their clients. Engaging with DAO's has been historically painful/cumbersome even from a pure "closing the deal" and planning perspective - making it increasingly less interesting to deal with a DAO.
I believe to continue attracting top service providers, enabling OpCO to interact with them is key.
2. Restrictive Treasury Spend I believe this ties closely to 6. Ecosystem Support or Financial Management only as well as to attracting and retaining top talent.
One one side we want the OpCo to be forward and out of the box looking, at the same time this is the only way to attract top talent - I believe to know that few ones want to lead an OpCo with a very narrow scope and no potential to fundamentally change/grow/move things along.
3. Compensation for OpCo Employees Comp is a "hygiene" factor in my opinion - hence full agree with the proposed solution.
Based on the feedback received here and during the calls, we believe the best approach is to keep it simple and continue with this proposal format.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR (Update the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
In this case, we want to give comments on the changes:
Ecosystem Support or Financial Management only: makes sense, this clause is hindering the OpCo’s ability to perform on other non-related verticals because it is a formally created entity that must fulfill its foundational purpose. Although Ecosystem Support or Financial Management are broad concepts, if we want to ensure optimal operational capability for the OpCo, this change is a must.
Compensation for OpCo Employees: We support this approach. In traditional finance, salary structures similar to what the OAT has proposed are standard practice.
That said, SEED believes that token vesting schedules may be an even more effective and aligned mechanism than the initially proposed bonuses, especially for an organization of this nature. Vesting helps reinforce long-term commitment and accountability.
Inability to Interact with Service Providers and Restrictive Treasury Spend: This provides the OpCo with the capability to manage budgetary surplus for hiring service providers or providing grants, converting the OpCo into a more proactive organization, and allowing them to make some minor decisions without the need for a governance vote.
For the remaining changes, we think these are no-brainer decisions.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We would be voting in favour of the proposal as it provides the necessary flexibility and clarity to ensure the OpCo can fulfil its mandate effectively. By allowing the OpCo to engage with service providers, allocate discretionary funds for proactive initiatives, and offer flexible compensation structures, these changes will empower the entity to attract top talent. After discussion with Pedro it’s clear this model is similar to a fire-starter grant by Plurality; if the OpCo believes an initiative adds value to the DAO, it can fund the contributor or service provider for their time and effort.
The revisions to governance structures, conflict of interest policies, and the mandate itself reinforce both transparency and accountability, while also enabling broader participation from aligned contributors. This is especially important for hiring high-quality talent for the OpCo. During the OAT elections, many DAO contributors expressed interest in applying but were restricted due to the requirement to relinquish existing roles. With this new framework, OpCo will be better positioned to recruit top talent without unnecessary trade-offs. Combined with the capabilities of the current committee members, these updates will empower the OpCo to become a more effective and proactive partner in advancing the long-term interests of the ArbitrumDAO.
We vote against this proposal.
The proposal pinpoints a real bottleneck. Delegates have watched promising ideas wither while each step—draft, OAT review, Snapshot, on-chain execution—grinds forward, so letting OpCo co-design solutions with service providers before a formal DAO vote could shrink timelines, surface realistic budgets sooner, and keep momentum alive. We share that goal, and we agree that some discretionary spend is essential to avoid bureaucratic gridlock.
As illustrated by the given examples, the intention behind these modifications is to enable agile funding of groundwork needed to prepare proposals that will be submitted to the DAO. This aligns with the overarching goal of reducing friction in order to fulfill the approved mandate.
We vote against this proposal.
The proposal pinpoints a real bottleneck. Delegates have watched promising ideas wither while each step—draft, OAT review, Snapshot, on-chain execution—grinds forward, so letting OpCo co-design solutions with service providers before a formal DAO vote could shrink timelines, surface realistic budgets sooner, and keep momentum alive. We share that goal, and we agree that some discretionary spend is essential to avoid bureaucratic gridlock.
As illustrated by the given examples, the intention behind these modifications is to enable agile funding of groundwork needed to prepare proposals that will be submitted to the DAO. This aligns with the overarching goal of reducing friction in order to fulfill the approved mandate.
Where we part ways is on scope and safeguards. The charter already lets OpCo draw up to $500k a month with no vote, climbing to an OAT or DAO check above that. After covering the exemplary $5.2 M annual budgeting, about $436k per month, roughly $64k in “excess” cash would still be available every month. Under the amendment, that surplus could finance external work without pre-defined limits or public sign-off, effectively repurposing the treasury while the community learns only in hindsight.
Agility does not require a blank cheque. A practical compromise would:
These guardrails keep the spirit of fast, iterative vendor collaboration while ensuring that material sums still pass through the DAO’s accountability mechanisms. Until such parameters are built into the text, we would vote against and invite the authors to return with a tighter, budget-bounded revision.
Voting "For"
I've felt similarly in other situations like this - the DAO has elected a group of individuals who were trusted with the project, so it doesn't make sense to then question their judgement when they implement their plans. If we don't trust the people we elected at their first step, why even have this project.
Voting "For"
I've felt similarly in other situations like this - the DAO has elected a group of individuals who were trusted with the project, so it doesn't make sense to then question their judgement when they implement their plans. If we don't trust the people we elected at their first step, why even have this project.
Yes, obviously with the caveat of reasonableness, but I don't really see much issue with the changes noted. And nothing enough for me to stop it out right.
gm, I agree that giving opCo enough autonomy to execute makes sense. Voting FOR.
That said, with its expanding scope, opCo’s activities seem like they could start overlapping with the Arbitrum Foundation and other AAEs.
It would be helpful to have a finalized map showing what areas each entity is accountable for, to avoid duplication and clarify responsibilities.
It’s possible that if this proposal had come while the OpCo was already fully operational, I might have taken a different stance. However, given the strong majority by which the OpCo passed, and considering its expected usefulness in supporting the DAO going forward, I will vote For.
If I’ve correctly understood the context from all the related proposals I’ve engaged with, and if I’ve correctly interpreted the tone during the most recent calls, then I sense that the overall direction is to support the OpCo. Choosing otherwise here might reflect inconsistency with previous votes.
It’s possible that if this proposal had come while the OpCo was already fully operational, I might have taken a different stance. However, given the strong majority by which the OpCo passed, and considering its expected usefulness in supporting the DAO going forward, I will vote For.
If I’ve correctly understood the context from all the related proposals I’ve engaged with, and if I’ve correctly interpreted the tone during the most recent calls, then I sense that the overall direction is to support the OpCo. Choosing otherwise here might reflect inconsistency with previous votes.
Lastly, I’d like to note that during the corresponding community call, @Frisson gave a very thorough overview of the proposal, and no participant raised any objections.
Voting in Favour
As mentioned above, no point throwing a spanner in the wheel (longer rationale in post above)
I'm supportive of these changes overall. The original OpCo proposal was probably a bit too tight in how it framed things, and this feels like a sensible shift toward giving OpCo the flexibility it needs to actually operate effectively.
I'm supportive of these changes overall. The original OpCo proposal was probably a bit too tight in how it framed things, and this feels like a sensible shift toward giving OpCo the flexibility it needs to actually operate effectively.
Totally agree the current restrictions are too strict. If we want the OAT to attract experienced, high-quality contributors, we can’t have overly rigid rules that shrink the talent pool unnecessarily.
It might also make sense to apply the same logic to OpCo’s internal hiring. Right now, these restrictions are quite strict (i.e., full-time only, no outside roles, no exceptions), excluding a lot of great talent who may prefer part-time setups or simply want more flexibility. Not saying those edge cases shouldn't be evaluated carefully, but giving the OAT discretion to approve them on a case-by-case basis could go a long way in helping attract the right people without compromising alignment.
I voted AGAINST this proposal
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/cp0x-delegate-communication-thread/22217/190?u=cp0x
I voted FOR on this proposal. While not agreeing with some items and the selected voting method, I find more important to move this initiative forward.
We voted in favour of the proposal on Snapshot because we agree OpCo needs room to operate effectively. That said, several details would benefit from tighter definitions to give delegates full confidence in the new scope.
Treasury spending: Outlining clear expenditure thresholds and approval flows for day-to-day operational disbursements, larger strategic bets, and any emergency spend will provide better guiding principles and guardrails that can be referenced.
Ecosystem support & financial management: Having a concise framework with objectives, and information on how KPIs will be defined will help the DAO be more cognizant of expected outcomes.
I'm voting in favor. These seem like pragmatic changes that will improve Opco’s operational capability and help avoid unnecessary slowdowns along the way, so I believe it is better to support this proposal now rather than face delays later. That said, I also think that every time there is a move towards more centralization, community oversight and transparency from the operators should increase. I’ll keep following developments closely and expect Opco to uphold the highest standards of transparency moving forward
We’ll be voting FOR this proposal. While we do have some concerns, particularly around the potential for scope and the need for clear accountability as OpCo gains more flexibility we believe the benefits outweigh the risks. The updates make sense given how the DAO and ecosystem have evolved, and they give OpCo the tools it needs to operate more effectively, engage with the right partners, and attract strong talent. Importantly, there are safeguards in place, like spending caps and transparency requirements, that help mitigate potential downsides. On balance, we see this as a positive step toward a more efficient and responsive operational structure for the DAO.
We support the updates to the OpCo Foundation’s operational framework, which strengthen the original OpCo proposal we backed. The ability for OpCo to independently contract service providers will speed up the evaluation and development of promising ideas, aligning with its mandate to support the ArbitrumDAO. We value the flexibility to use excess funds for exploratory work, allowing OpCo to test strategies before seeking broader DAO approval. The restructured compensation pool, combining salaries and performance-based bonuses, will help attract and retain skilled professionals. Additionally, relaxing oversight council election rules will encourage more qualified candidates to participate while maintaining balanced representation. To ensure transparency, we encourage OpCo to regularly share contract details with the DAO. These changes make OpCo more capable of delivering meaningful results for our community.
I have voted FOR this proposal. For Arbitrum DAO to remain competitive and efficient, it must delegate certain powers to a structure that is both empowered and accountable.
I believe the OpCo can serve as this structure for the DAO. The three gaps identified in the proposal do grant additional authority to the OpCo, but in my view, it is riskier to have an entity with its hands tied, unable to act effectively. Like many delegates, I would have preferred this scoping to be included in the initial proposal.
I have voted FOR this proposal. For Arbitrum DAO to remain competitive and efficient, it must delegate certain powers to a structure that is both empowered and accountable.
I believe the OpCo can serve as this structure for the DAO. The three gaps identified in the proposal do grant additional authority to the OpCo, but in my view, it is riskier to have an entity with its hands tied, unable to act effectively. Like many delegates, I would have preferred this scoping to be included in the initial proposal.
In my view, the DAO should give the strategic vision and remain vigilant while the OpCO focus on operational execution.
Camelot has voted “for” extending the OpCo capabilities. While there are some specific details in the proposal, it is our strong belief that this is a natural path toward supporting the people we collectively decided to vote for in the OAT.
We think Patrick, AJ and Frisson are the best people to take the oversight role of OpCo. Specifically, we think giving a more active role to members of Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs will give them what they might have missed so far, a direct role to steer and direct the operations of the DAO in a successful way. We have also growth to know and appreciate Frisson both for his work at Tally and the roles he has had in our DAO, and we think he has the business posture to cover this important position as well.
Im just referring to the reduction in disclosures for conflict of interest. It’s really hard to see how that's necessary or even how that needs to be a package with the other changes
Looking at DAOs from a service provider POV and getting more insights into the reasoning why to engage with a DAO or not, I fully support the changes.
Especially:
Looking at DAOs from a service provider POV and getting more insights into the reasoning why to engage with a DAO or not, I fully support the changes.
Especially:
1. Inability to Interact with Service Providers To further elaborate on the OAT's point, as DeFi is maturing and service providers become more professional, they can choose their clients. Engaging with DAO's has been historically painful/cumbersome even from a pure "closing the deal" and planning perspective - making it increasingly less interesting to deal with a DAO.
I believe to continue attracting top service providers, enabling OpCO to interact with them is key.
2. Restrictive Treasury Spend I believe this ties closely to 6. Ecosystem Support or Financial Management only as well as to attracting and retaining top talent.
One one side we want the OpCo to be forward and out of the box looking, at the same time this is the only way to attract top talent - I believe to know that few ones want to lead an OpCo with a very narrow scope and no potential to fundamentally change/grow/move things along.
3. Compensation for OpCo Employees Comp is a "hygiene" factor in my opinion - hence full agree with the proposed solution.
Based on the feedback received here and during the calls, we believe the best approach is to keep it simple and continue with this proposal format.
We voted in favour of the proposal on Snapshot because we agree OpCo needs room to operate effectively. That said, several details would benefit from tighter definitions to give delegates full confidence in the new scope.
Treasury spending: Outlining clear expenditure thresholds and approval flows for day-to-day operational disbursements, larger strategic bets, and any emergency spend will provide better guiding principles and guardrails that can be referenced.
Ecosystem support & financial management: Having a concise framework with objectives, and information on how KPIs will be defined will help the DAO be more cognizant of expected outcomes.
Addressing these guardrails up front should make the expanded mandate smoother to implement while preserving the DAO’s role as a final back-stop.
Camelot has voted “for” extending the OpCo capabilities. While there are some specific details in the proposal, it is our strong belief that this is a natural path toward supporting the people we collectively decided to vote for in the OAT.
We think Patrick, AJ and Frisson are the best people to take the oversight role of OpCo. Specifically, we think giving a more active role to members of Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs will give them what they might have missed so far, a direct role to steer and direct the operations of the DAO in a successful way. We have also growth to know and appreciate Frisson both for his work at Tally and the roles he has had in our DAO, and we think he has the business posture to cover this important position as well.
We believe, as we did previously, that both the Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs should be put in the best position possible to exercise direct leadership on both the ecosystem and the DAO. For what it’s worth, we did forecast in the last six months how a healthy OpCo should have evolved toward a more enlarged scope, not specifically encapsulated by the rails of the initial proposal. Our goal is to ensure this entity can indeed have a meaningful impact on how the DAO acts toward the chain and in coordinating all other entities; at the same time, it is paramount to reaffirm how the privileged position of OpCo makes both the Foundation and the Labs even more accountable than before for the results of the ecosystem.
Based on the feedback received here and during the calls, we believe the best approach is to keep it simple and continue with this proposal format.
Delegeates have expressed concerns and different opinions with different points. Why not use Approval voting? Not using it comes across the wrong way for me, forcing the bill as a package when it doesn't need to be.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
First, we want to thank the OAT and all contributors for their diligent work in incorporating community feedback and carefully refining the OpCo structure.
We are pleased to see that two of the primary concerns StableLab had when reading the proposal have been constructively addressed in the comments, namely transparency reporting and budget limitations:
We are voting FOR this proposal.
First, we want to thank the OAT and all contributors for their diligent work in incorporating community feedback and carefully refining the OpCo structure.
We are pleased to see that two of the primary concerns StableLab had when reading the proposal have been constructively addressed in the comments, namely transparency reporting and budget limitations:
Regarding caps, the approved proposal already includes them
While we do continue to hold some reservations about the reduced guardrails around conflict of interest management, particularly given the important role OpCo will play, we acknowledge that this tradeoff has been made thoughtfully to enable stronger candidate pools, attract specialized expertise, and accelerate operational ramp-up.
At this stage, with a highly capable OAT cohort now in place, broad alignment among major stakeholders, and a clear pathway toward full operationalization, we prefer to move forward with these changes if that will take us closer to enabling OpCo as a strategic execution arm of the DAO.
Delegeates have expressed concerns and different opinions with different points. Why not use Approval voting? Not using it comes across the wrong way for me, forcing the bill as a package when it doesn’t need to be.
Delegeates have expressed concerns and different opinions with different points. Why not use Approval voting? Not using it comes across the wrong way for me, forcing the bill as a package when it doesn’t need to be.
without having any horse in this race, is pretty clear that is mostly an all of none of the above.
Clearly OAT is proposing to us a different scope and different goals for OpCo, and I don't see how they can move it forward if we approve X, Y and Z and not K, Q and R.
I see the points they did highlight as necessary for what they want to do; at the same time i totally understand the concerns of delegates, especially smaller one that sees (again) opco as a capture all with inability for them to contribute. On the latter, I actually think that without the changes above opco will have less capacity to involve individuals. And obviously service providers since is a specific point. On the former, my personal take is that if the DAO doesn't approve this "package" it means the mission the OAT pitched in the last few weeks was not properly sold to the DAO and they either have to go to the very initial mission, or craft something different that satisfies these concerns.
Due to the above i think approval voting would have been detrimental.
voting Against on the current offchain vote because this is a clear power overreach that the DAO should not tolerate.
AranaDigital supports the changes to OpCo because they will let the team sign service-provider contracts on its own, so good ideas get vetted quickly instead of waiting for a full DAO vote; they free up any extra budget for small pilots, letting us test new plans before asking the DAO for large sums; they turn the 4 M ARB bonus pool into a broader pay-and-bonus pool, making it easier to hire and keep top staff; and they loosen the election rules so more skilled people can serve on the oversight council while still limiting one seat per company. However, to keep OpCo credible, we suggest adding a simple monthly cap on discretionary spending and for OpCo to publish a quarterly report of all contracts, so the DAO can track how funds are used while making OpCo more efficient.
Sorry, whats the exaggeration you're referring to?
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
First, we thank the OAT and the OpCo for identifying these challenges early, and we appreciate the clarity in the problem statements and the proposed solutions.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
First, we thank the OAT and the OpCo for identifying these challenges early, and we appreciate the clarity in the problem statements and the proposed solutions.
We support the overall direction because we believe these updates provide OpCo with the right tools to fulfill its dual mandate more effectively: executing DAO-approved initiatives and proactively preparing work that keeps Arbitrum at the forefront. The added flexibility to engage service providers, deploy discretionary funds for pilot work, adjust compensation to attract top talent, and broaden the scope where needed are all positive steps if implemented with care.
At the same time, we recognize and share some of the wider concerns about accountability, mandate creep, and conflict of interest management. We see these as areas that can be addressed through clearer policies and steady operational discipline. To that end, we would like to share our thoughts alongside our rationale:
OpCo has the authority to enter contracts with service providers or individual contributors for any matter it deems necessary to fulfil its mandate to support the ArbitrumDAO.
We agree with the need for agility here and echo the points raised by @karpatkey and @AranaDigital that publishing a simple registry of active contracts with short deliverable summaries and spend bands, updated monthly or quarterly, would keep this process transparent and maintain trust without adding friction.
any excess capital that is available can be used on a discretionary basis to fulfil its mandate as a proactive entity in the ArbitrumDAO.
We see real value in letting OpCo test ideas quickly. To maintain focus on core operations, we suggest defining a budget split: for example, at least 70% of total funds stay reserved for staffing and recurring costs, with no more than 30% used for discretionary pilots. This keeps spending aligned with OpCo’s primary executor role rather than duplicating other funding programs.
OpCo’s core mandate is to work on, facilitate, and provide operational and oversight support for strategies that have the potential to benefit the ArbitrumDAO.
We support this more flexible scope but encourage a sandbox-style approach: test new verticals through short pilots (three to six months) with capped budgets and clear reporting before proposing full-scale expansions.
We also acknowledge concerns from @paulofonseca and @danielo on bundling multiple structural changes into a single vote. While we understand the rationale for this round, we strongly encourage modular approval voting for future governance adjustments so that delegates can support parts they agree with without blocking others.
We believe these updates give OpCo the operational freedom it needs to deliver on its promise to the DAO, while the checks and balances can continue to be refined as we learn.
Thanks for the responses. What I'm lacking so far is a vision. We're debating the details point by point but said details only make sense as a coherent whole. Now, that's the view of someone not invited to a top delegate's meeting. So obviously I'm lacking context. And I see little value in throwing a spanner in the works for what has taken a lot of work already.
Where I see I can add more value is nudging towards a couple of points on the vision: the value of operating as an open ecosystem and not as a closed traditional corporation.
Thanks for the responses. What I'm lacking so far is a vision. We're debating the details point by point but said details only make sense as a coherent whole. Now, that's the view of someone not invited to a top delegate's meeting. So obviously I'm lacking context. And I see little value in throwing a spanner in the works for what has taken a lot of work already.
Where I see I can add more value is nudging towards a couple of points on the vision: the value of operating as an open ecosystem and not as a closed traditional corporation.
For context, I'm not a decentralisation maxi. I have criticised DAO designs since 2018 as rather impractical. Most DAOs today shoot themselves in the foot over and over. They can't innovate (that is, spot opportunities and execute well towards them). But I also come from 10 years in organisation design and see that traditional corporations are also pretty bad at innovation.
I unpacked the point here https://x.com/_Daniel_Ospina/status/1932303862917955797
For the case of Arbitrum, grounding those ideas means:
There's a material fear that transparency will expose Arbitrum to competitors. And with the current DAO design I agree that's an unviable risk. However, with a platform organisation design there's a lot more to win through transparency than through secrecy, because the capabilities (talent, capital, IP, risk capacity, etc.) of a whole ecosystem can be leveraged. This is at the core how Open Source Software is advancing, the realisation that openness can compound value through the ecosystem. Growign the pie for all as opposed to fighting to keep the bigger slice of a small pie (both in control and upside).
In consequence:
Concrete example of the issues of the current design and increased centralisation is what happed with Areta as @tnorm mentioned here https://x.com/t__norm/status/1932859058270449761?s=46
Thanks everyone for attending the second call last Monday! Here you can find the recording.
The proposal is now live on Snapshot
Thanks everyone for attending the second call last Monday! Here you can find the recording.
The proposal is now live on Snapshot
I believe it’s best, for this offchain vote to be conducted with the approval voting type, where delegates would be able to signal support for each one of the changes individually, with all of their voting power being casted towards each “problem/solution change” they agree with.
All the points addressed by the proposal share a common goal: to enable the OpCo to operate smoothly and fulfill its dual mandate. Based on the feedback received here and during the calls, we believe the best approach is to keep it simple and continue with this proposal format.
Where I see I can add more value is nudging towards a couple of points on the vision: the value of operating as an open ecosystem and not as a closed traditional corporation.
The OAT is aligned with this vision, and the establishment of the OpCo enables a full-time team dedicated to making it possible.
For the case of Arbitrum, grounding those ideas means:
processes to work with ecosystem partners i.e. entities that can be aligned via partial ownership (arbitrum incubates them or invests in them), LPing, in some cases, exclusivity contracts, etc.
enabling potential partners to propose and have high signal conversations (my issues with the AAEs having to approve everything first is that it creates a bottleneck for small experiments, effectively killing most of them unless a mechanism is set to incubate said relationships)
clearer scope for AAEs so ecosystem partners know where to propose and where not. And higher transparency from AAEs for the same reason.
We are also in agreement with these principles. In fact, these changes will allow the OpCo to operate more smoothly alongside contributors in the preparation of proposals. In the current wording, the OpCo cannot leverage the ecosystem for the ideation and preparation of proposals (funding support).
In consequence:
The dilution of conflict of interest declaration policy worries me. We need more transparency and accountability, not less.
Expanding the mandate of the OpCo… to all areas? let’s not reduce clarity, that cripples the ecosystem. The solution here is sharing the vision for the OpCo. And I know a lot depends on the OpCo CEO but there should be a commitment to the OpCo not becoming a closed-off entity that does everything internally without the ecosystem even knowing. With that countelever, then I’m ok with expanding the mandate. Without it, we move closer towards corporate mediocrity.
the OpCo having a budget to collaborate with service providers: great. (Let’s make sure though the OpCo is open minded and not just following directivess top down but also trying new things at a small scale first and snowballing)
Compensation structure with all the tools available: sure. I hope this doesn’t become an excuse for bloated compensation, though.
There is no dilution. Current conflicts of interest must be publicly disclosed. As for potential conflicts of interest or those that may arise during the OAT’s term, a policy has been created to manage them. In any case, the DAO retains the power to remove members at any time if it deems their candidacy inappropriate
The purpose of this proposal is to provide the OpCo with the flexibility to fulfill its dual mandate with the DAO and for the benefit of the Arbitrum ecosystem. This requires collaboration with contributors and delegates.
Regarding compensation, the OAT’s vision is to have the tools to negotiate competitive, market-aligned salaries and, in particular with respect to vesting, to align incentives for Arbitrum’s long-term success.
I appreciate the structure of this proposal, where you detail each problem separately.
Where, as per your analysis, there are 6 problems with the approved setup for OpCo:
Thnaks for the proposal/update.
I have a few questions regarding some items.
In the current proposal, the following example is provided.
Thnaks for the proposal/update.
I have a few questions regarding some items.
In the current proposal, the following example is provided.
To illustrate the issue, let’s consider an example where a contributor approaches the OpCo with a proposal for the DAO and the OpCo thinks it may be valuable for the ecosystem. Unfortunately, the OpCo cannot engage with a consulting firm to evaluate the idea. The only option available for OpCo is to encourage the contributor to seek permission (and potential funding from exploratory work) from the DAO.
I view the OpCo as operational infrastructure to address the most common demands within the DAO, and evaluating proposal "worthiness" is a core part of this. Therefore, relying on external SPs to fulfil this should be an exception, rather than the rule, and it would need a DAO approval for the request. I'm saying this because I can see a "department" within the "placeholder budget" for internal employees to do exactly that.
This proposal would earmark 30M ARB to cover OpCo’s initial term, with an exemplary budget breakdown shown below. This is not an official budget, meaning that capital may be budgeted and allocated differently once the entity is stood up. For example, Employee #4 doesn’t have to be hired at a yearly salary of ~$130K. The exemplary budget’s purpose is instead to showcase that the ask isn’t arbitrary, and how the figure has been derived. It’s also important to note that several line items, such as entity setup and legal services are notably larger than what the actual expenses are expected to be. This was done to account for any unforeseen events or worst-case scenarios which could require notable capital commitments.
While it is not mandatory to follow a 10-employee setup, OpCO should be able to handle its expected tasks with its internal employees. For example, equivalent to PMs to follow all initiatives, and researchers to cover the most common/relevant topics/proposals for the DAO.
That has a direct relationship with most of the other points, so my main questions are: What is the structure the OAT is planning/envisioning for the OpCo? What should/could be handled internally?
I mostly agree with those items, as they will provide more flexibility and position OpCo better when trying to find the right person for the roles. I would like to see a revised set of rules (not only the fixes) for the Council Elections so that the delegates can ratify them.
We are bundling several items in this topic. What is the voting strategy you are envisioning for this?
Thank you for the thorough analysis and for suggesting amendments to relevant items before the structure is finalised.
Thanks for big analysis of OpCo's functions
Overall, I support the intention to update the scope and boundaries of the OpCo to better align with the newly proposed Arbitrum Aligned Entities (AAE) structure. As the ecosystem evolves, it makes sense to refine roles and responsibilities to ensure better governance and operational clarity.
However, I’d like to emphasize that the effectiveness of these updates will depend heavily on how well the AAE framework is actually implemented. A clear and enforceable AAE structure is essential not only for shaping a viable execution plan for the SOS objectives but also for defining the operational details of OpCo in a sustainable way. Further thoughts on the AAE framework here.
I am going to go point by point here having followed the proposal closely from the beginning.
First a general introduction: I do understand how a proposal that was ideated in eth denver 2024, started a proper discussion in bruxelles at ethcc in 2024, that was voted on snapshot in december 2024 and in tally in february 2025, with elections coming a few months ago, might need updates.
I am going to go point by point here having followed the proposal closely from the beginning.
First a general introduction: I do understand how a proposal that was ideated in eth denver 2024, started a proper discussion in bruxelles at ethcc in 2024, that was voted on snapshot in december 2024 and in tally in february 2025, with elections coming a few months ago, might need updates.
A lot changed in the last year, including the political panorama, how OCL and AF wants to interact with the DAO and broader ecosystem etc. This whole premise to say: it can make sense to put forward a discussion to change a few points that are now deemed by the OAT as too restrictive.
I'll be honest at the time it didn't make too much sense to me how opco would not be able to interact with service provider. Let's assume the normal path:
I do get that the ability to elect a service provider is something the DAO wants to retain. At the same time, looking at the past, I do find difficult to see how the DAO can do a better choice compared to the OpCo and the OAT, knowing already the OAT composition and knowing that they will (hopefully) find the right people to work in it. At the same time opco managing this choice means we remove a lot of friction from any process.
This could be one of the most controversial point for the DAO: basically using funds allocated initially only for people of OpCo and for the ops strictly for OpCo, to be used to fund also initiatives instead. I am unsure if this is a positive or negative thing right now. It might create a natural tendency to spend maybe a bit less on people because there will always be the back idea of allocating funds to initiatives. I also see this being contested by delegates who are advocating for putting in circle less arb as possible, and so we are potentially saying that all budget could be utilized even if not all on people. I don't necessarily care about this last point knowing that few have hundreds of millions of unlocks and so this is mathematically speaking a small amount; I do care instead about the process behind, from Opco, saying "we spend X on this initiative" vs "dao has to put X for this initiative". And the fact that there might be a disagreement on what X should be, and how OpCo would approach the decision of onboarding the capital cost if below a certain threshold, or outsource to the DAO if above. This is probably a nuance at this point in time; as long as the reasoning of deciding on internalizing vs asking to the DAO is made clear in each situation, I think it could be ok. But I would like to avoid a situation in which, in an entity that should have had almost $8M earmarked to pay people, we end up spending instead $1M and put aside $7M for initiatives. Is not about overspending on people, but having opco being a real force operating on behalf of the DAO.
This is one of the thing that makes the most sense. As of today opco can't offer equity nor anything that is "really" appealing in a world in which you can get stock options, carry etc. We need to make the company attractive.
This was probably a big oversight to begin with, and I wonder how many people have not run in the elections due to this very strong limitation. I am one of the few for example. Another point that I strongly support.
Focusing on the public side of job positions, and disclosing privately to the OAT what could be seen as a potential conflict for other to evaluate, is likely for the best. We live in a tokenized world. Do I have a conflict of interest if I have OP tokens in my portfolio, or if I particpate to the Echo Coinbase group? Unlikely. Does it make sense to disclose this to peers for the sake of transparency and for them to evaluate if there could be any strange situation? Yes.
This is another critical point. I do see how enlarging the scope can make sense. We don't want OpCo to be a black hole of initiatives; it will likely not be looking at the budget that will rather large is not infinite, even through external requests. The main point is for the OpCo to evaluate, in good faith, if they deem themself up to the task of properly ideating, executing and managing certain strategies, without internalizing for the sake of control and for the sake of being capital efficient. It will fall in the same framework posted above: each time there is a meaningful decision, clearly explain to the DAO and other AAEs why it should fall into OpCo, why alternatives are not necessarily advised, and how OpCo should potentially be a better executor.
On one side, I do see OpCo managing intiatives outside the initial "ecosystem growth" and "financial" verticals. Looking at people currently in the OAT, we are indeed on the right path to have a very good team, well interconnected in the ecosystem. At the same time we don't want to
It means that people in the OpCo (OAT, Chief etc) will not have to be complacent about their role, and have a constant critical thinking about why they are indeed managing or not managing certain initiatives.
This is not a virtue signal: I am cautiously optimistic in enlarging the scope of the OpCo. But in this whole transition we are collectively experiencing, from DAO executed operations to AAEs taking the lead, we want to constantly ask ourself if we are not losing the plot.
Personally, I am quite confident we won't.
We appreciate the initiative to update and refine OpCo’s operational framework. While the initial proposal was approved only a few months ago, it’s true that the broader discussions have been ongoing for quite some time. Given how quickly the ecosystem evolves, it’s reasonable to make adjustments to ensure OpCo remains effective and fit-for-purpose.
We’d like to focus our feedback specifically on the financial aspects of the proposal:
We appreciate the initiative to update and refine OpCo’s operational framework. While the initial proposal was approved only a few months ago, it’s true that the broader discussions have been ongoing for quite some time. Given how quickly the ecosystem evolves, it’s reasonable to make adjustments to ensure OpCo remains effective and fit-for-purpose.
We’d like to focus our feedback specifically on the financial aspects of the proposal:
1. Engagement with Service Providers
Understandably, OpCo needs the ability to engage service providers directly to execute its mandate. However, this flexibility must be paired with financial accountability. We believe the following principles should apply:
2. Discretionary Treasury Spend
We support the idea of OpCo having access to a discretionary budget, provided there are clear guardrails:
The Uniswap DAO’s discretionary budget for the UAC could serve as a useful precedent and as a template for implementation.
3. Employee Compensation
We support revisiting OpCo’s compensation structure to ensure it is competitive and aligned with market standards. That said, any changes should be backed by benchmarking data and presented transparently so the community can understand how these decisions are made.
We'll reply in more detail later, but this seems like a total rewrite of the purpose of OpCo. The whole point of OpCo was to be a ministerial, not decision-making, arm of the DAO. It was to take action on behalf of governance.
Many of the restrictions noted above are not very restrictive if OpCo sticks to its mandate of
We'll reply in more detail later, but this seems like a total rewrite of the purpose of OpCo. The whole point of OpCo was to be a ministerial, not decision-making, arm of the DAO. It was to take action on behalf of governance.
Many of the restrictions noted above are not very restrictive if OpCo sticks to its mandate of
More generally, why did the current OAT members choose to stand for election if they did not find the OpCo mandate appropriate? We already have the Foundation for independent action. It's not clear why OpCo needs to have the capacity and freedom to pursue independent action.
What kinds of tasks are the OAT members envisioning OpCo doing that AF cannot do? That would help to understand why such a drastic revision to the core mandate is being made.
This is described as a restriction for which "a fix" is proposed, which seems to imply it is an oversight or an unfortunate consequence of some other requirement. Looking back at the proposal as passed, this seems very intentional and is explicitly stated to be the intent.
It’s important to note that OpCo will not have the authority to enter into contracts with service providers or individual contributors for strategies not approved by the DAO through governance, unless directly related to its operational needs (e.g., hiring an accounting firm). OpCo internal full-time employees cannot be contributors to DAO initiatives as individuals (they need to do so through OpCo) and are strictly prohibited from entering into employment engagements with other DAOs, organizations, entities, or comparable affiliations, whilst contractors that facilitate a specific vertical and are signed to OpCo can have engagements in other DAO initiatives and outside of the ecosystem. Full-time OpCo staff can only be appointed internally. However, as mentioned earlier, the DAO can roll any service provider or individual contributor into OpCo by passing an onchain vote. This vote has to request capital to cover the facilitators’ expenses since when it comes to salaries, OpCo’s budget only covers internal full-time staff. OpCo is expected to work closely with Offchain Labs as well as the Arbitrum Foundation to ensure that scopes of work do not overlap.
I think it's misleading to label this "a fix". This proposal suggest to rewriting, even rendering moot to some extent, very clearly stated parts of the passed OpCo proposal. We ought to apply all scrutiny due to such an endeavor, not just greenlight it as a small adjustment to fix some oversights.
We voted in favour of the proposal on Snapshot because we agree OpCo needs room to operate effectively. That said, several details would benefit from tighter definitions to give delegates full confidence in the new scope.
Treasury spending: Outlining clear expenditure thresholds and approval flows for day-to-day operational disbursements, larger strategic bets, and any emergency spend will provide better guiding principles and guardrails that can be referenced.
Ecosystem support & financial management: Having a concise framework with objectives, and information on how KPIs will be defined will help the DAO be more cognizant of expected outcomes.
Addressing these guardrails up front should make the expanded mandate smoother to implement while preserving the DAO’s role as a final back-stop.
Camelot has voted “for” extending the OpCo capabilities. While there are some specific details in the proposal, it is our strong belief that this is a natural path toward supporting the people we collectively decided to vote for in the OAT.
We think Patrick, AJ and Frisson are the best people to take the oversight role of OpCo. Specifically, we think giving a more active role to members of Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs will give them what they might have missed so far, a direct role to steer and direct the operations of the DAO in a successful way. We have also growth to know and appreciate Frisson both for his work at Tally and the roles he has had in our DAO, and we think he has the business posture to cover this important position as well.
We believe, as we did previously, that both the Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs should be put in the best position possible to exercise direct leadership on both the ecosystem and the DAO. For what it’s worth, we did forecast in the last six months how a healthy OpCo should have evolved toward a more enlarged scope, not specifically encapsulated by the rails of the initial proposal. Our goal is to ensure this entity can indeed have a meaningful impact on how the DAO acts toward the chain and in coordinating all other entities; at the same time, it is paramount to reaffirm how the privileged position of OpCo makes both the Foundation and the Labs even more accountable than before for the results of the ecosystem.
Based on the feedback received here and during the calls, we believe the best approach is to keep it simple and continue with this proposal format.
Delegeates have expressed concerns and different opinions with different points. Why not use Approval voting? Not using it comes across the wrong way for me, forcing the bill as a package when it doesn't need to be.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
First, we want to thank the OAT and all contributors for their diligent work in incorporating community feedback and carefully refining the OpCo structure.
We are pleased to see that two of the primary concerns StableLab had when reading the proposal have been constructively addressed in the comments, namely transparency reporting and budget limitations:
We are voting FOR this proposal.
First, we want to thank the OAT and all contributors for their diligent work in incorporating community feedback and carefully refining the OpCo structure.
We are pleased to see that two of the primary concerns StableLab had when reading the proposal have been constructively addressed in the comments, namely transparency reporting and budget limitations:
Regarding caps, the approved proposal already includes them
While we do continue to hold some reservations about the reduced guardrails around conflict of interest management, particularly given the important role OpCo will play, we acknowledge that this tradeoff has been made thoughtfully to enable stronger candidate pools, attract specialized expertise, and accelerate operational ramp-up.
At this stage, with a highly capable OAT cohort now in place, broad alignment among major stakeholders, and a clear pathway toward full operationalization, we prefer to move forward with these changes if that will take us closer to enabling OpCo as a strategic execution arm of the DAO.
Delegeates have expressed concerns and different opinions with different points. Why not use Approval voting? Not using it comes across the wrong way for me, forcing the bill as a package when it doesn’t need to be.
Delegeates have expressed concerns and different opinions with different points. Why not use Approval voting? Not using it comes across the wrong way for me, forcing the bill as a package when it doesn’t need to be.
without having any horse in this race, is pretty clear that is mostly an all of none of the above.
Clearly OAT is proposing to us a different scope and different goals for OpCo, and I don't see how they can move it forward if we approve X, Y and Z and not K, Q and R.
I see the points they did highlight as necessary for what they want to do; at the same time i totally understand the concerns of delegates, especially smaller one that sees (again) opco as a capture all with inability for them to contribute. On the latter, I actually think that without the changes above opco will have less capacity to involve individuals. And obviously service providers since is a specific point. On the former, my personal take is that if the DAO doesn't approve this "package" it means the mission the OAT pitched in the last few weeks was not properly sold to the DAO and they either have to go to the very initial mission, or craft something different that satisfies these concerns.
Due to the above i think approval voting would have been detrimental.
voting Against on the current offchain vote because this is a clear power overreach that the DAO should not tolerate.
AranaDigital supports the changes to OpCo because they will let the team sign service-provider contracts on its own, so good ideas get vetted quickly instead of waiting for a full DAO vote; they free up any extra budget for small pilots, letting us test new plans before asking the DAO for large sums; they turn the 4 M ARB bonus pool into a broader pay-and-bonus pool, making it easier to hire and keep top staff; and they loosen the election rules so more skilled people can serve on the oversight council while still limiting one seat per company. However, to keep OpCo credible, we suggest adding a simple monthly cap on discretionary spending and for OpCo to publish a quarterly report of all contracts, so the DAO can track how funds are used while making OpCo more efficient.
Sorry, whats the exaggeration you're referring to?
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
First, we thank the OAT and the OpCo for identifying these challenges early, and we appreciate the clarity in the problem statements and the proposed solutions.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
First, we thank the OAT and the OpCo for identifying these challenges early, and we appreciate the clarity in the problem statements and the proposed solutions.
We support the overall direction because we believe these updates provide OpCo with the right tools to fulfill its dual mandate more effectively: executing DAO-approved initiatives and proactively preparing work that keeps Arbitrum at the forefront. The added flexibility to engage service providers, deploy discretionary funds for pilot work, adjust compensation to attract top talent, and broaden the scope where needed are all positive steps if implemented with care.
At the same time, we recognize and share some of the wider concerns about accountability, mandate creep, and conflict of interest management. We see these as areas that can be addressed through clearer policies and steady operational discipline. To that end, we would like to share our thoughts alongside our rationale:
OpCo has the authority to enter contracts with service providers or individual contributors for any matter it deems necessary to fulfil its mandate to support the ArbitrumDAO.
We agree with the need for agility here and echo the points raised by @karpatkey and @AranaDigital that publishing a simple registry of active contracts with short deliverable summaries and spend bands, updated monthly or quarterly, would keep this process transparent and maintain trust without adding friction.
any excess capital that is available can be used on a discretionary basis to fulfil its mandate as a proactive entity in the ArbitrumDAO.
We see real value in letting OpCo test ideas quickly. To maintain focus on core operations, we suggest defining a budget split: for example, at least 70% of total funds stay reserved for staffing and recurring costs, with no more than 30% used for discretionary pilots. This keeps spending aligned with OpCo’s primary executor role rather than duplicating other funding programs.
OpCo’s core mandate is to work on, facilitate, and provide operational and oversight support for strategies that have the potential to benefit the ArbitrumDAO.
We support this more flexible scope but encourage a sandbox-style approach: test new verticals through short pilots (three to six months) with capped budgets and clear reporting before proposing full-scale expansions.
We also acknowledge concerns from @paulofonseca and @danielo on bundling multiple structural changes into a single vote. While we understand the rationale for this round, we strongly encourage modular approval voting for future governance adjustments so that delegates can support parts they agree with without blocking others.
We believe these updates give OpCo the operational freedom it needs to deliver on its promise to the DAO, while the checks and balances can continue to be refined as we learn.
Thanks for the responses. What I'm lacking so far is a vision. We're debating the details point by point but said details only make sense as a coherent whole. Now, that's the view of someone not invited to a top delegate's meeting. So obviously I'm lacking context. And I see little value in throwing a spanner in the works for what has taken a lot of work already.
Where I see I can add more value is nudging towards a couple of points on the vision: the value of operating as an open ecosystem and not as a closed traditional corporation.
Thanks for the responses. What I'm lacking so far is a vision. We're debating the details point by point but said details only make sense as a coherent whole. Now, that's the view of someone not invited to a top delegate's meeting. So obviously I'm lacking context. And I see little value in throwing a spanner in the works for what has taken a lot of work already.
Where I see I can add more value is nudging towards a couple of points on the vision: the value of operating as an open ecosystem and not as a closed traditional corporation.
For context, I'm not a decentralisation maxi. I have criticised DAO designs since 2018 as rather impractical. Most DAOs today shoot themselves in the foot over and over. They can't innovate (that is, spot opportunities and execute well towards them). But I also come from 10 years in organisation design and see that traditional corporations are also pretty bad at innovation.
I unpacked the point here https://x.com/_Daniel_Ospina/status/1932303862917955797
For the case of Arbitrum, grounding those ideas means:
There's a material fear that transparency will expose Arbitrum to competitors. And with the current DAO design I agree that's an unviable risk. However, with a platform organisation design there's a lot more to win through transparency than through secrecy, because the capabilities (talent, capital, IP, risk capacity, etc.) of a whole ecosystem can be leveraged. This is at the core how Open Source Software is advancing, the realisation that openness can compound value through the ecosystem. Growign the pie for all as opposed to fighting to keep the bigger slice of a small pie (both in control and upside).
In consequence:
Concrete example of the issues of the current design and increased centralisation is what happed with Areta as @tnorm mentioned here https://x.com/t__norm/status/1932859058270449761?s=46
Thanks everyone for attending the second call last Monday! Here you can find the recording.
The proposal is now live on Snapshot
Thanks everyone for attending the second call last Monday! Here you can find the recording.
The proposal is now live on Snapshot
I believe it’s best, for this offchain vote to be conducted with the approval voting type, where delegates would be able to signal support for each one of the changes individually, with all of their voting power being casted towards each “problem/solution change” they agree with.
All the points addressed by the proposal share a common goal: to enable the OpCo to operate smoothly and fulfill its dual mandate. Based on the feedback received here and during the calls, we believe the best approach is to keep it simple and continue with this proposal format.
Where I see I can add more value is nudging towards a couple of points on the vision: the value of operating as an open ecosystem and not as a closed traditional corporation.
The OAT is aligned with this vision, and the establishment of the OpCo enables a full-time team dedicated to making it possible.
For the case of Arbitrum, grounding those ideas means:
processes to work with ecosystem partners i.e. entities that can be aligned via partial ownership (arbitrum incubates them or invests in them), LPing, in some cases, exclusivity contracts, etc.
enabling potential partners to propose and have high signal conversations (my issues with the AAEs having to approve everything first is that it creates a bottleneck for small experiments, effectively killing most of them unless a mechanism is set to incubate said relationships)
clearer scope for AAEs so ecosystem partners know where to propose and where not. And higher transparency from AAEs for the same reason.
We are also in agreement with these principles. In fact, these changes will allow the OpCo to operate more smoothly alongside contributors in the preparation of proposals. In the current wording, the OpCo cannot leverage the ecosystem for the ideation and preparation of proposals (funding support).
In consequence:
The dilution of conflict of interest declaration policy worries me. We need more transparency and accountability, not less.
Expanding the mandate of the OpCo… to all areas? let’s not reduce clarity, that cripples the ecosystem. The solution here is sharing the vision for the OpCo. And I know a lot depends on the OpCo CEO but there should be a commitment to the OpCo not becoming a closed-off entity that does everything internally without the ecosystem even knowing. With that countelever, then I’m ok with expanding the mandate. Without it, we move closer towards corporate mediocrity.
the OpCo having a budget to collaborate with service providers: great. (Let’s make sure though the OpCo is open minded and not just following directivess top down but also trying new things at a small scale first and snowballing)
Compensation structure with all the tools available: sure. I hope this doesn’t become an excuse for bloated compensation, though.
There is no dilution. Current conflicts of interest must be publicly disclosed. As for potential conflicts of interest or those that may arise during the OAT’s term, a policy has been created to manage them. In any case, the DAO retains the power to remove members at any time if it deems their candidacy inappropriate
The purpose of this proposal is to provide the OpCo with the flexibility to fulfill its dual mandate with the DAO and for the benefit of the Arbitrum ecosystem. This requires collaboration with contributors and delegates.
Regarding compensation, the OAT’s vision is to have the tools to negotiate competitive, market-aligned salaries and, in particular with respect to vesting, to align incentives for Arbitrum’s long-term success.
I appreciate the structure of this proposal, where you detail each problem separately.
Where, as per your analysis, there are 6 problems with the approved setup for OpCo:
Thnaks for the proposal/update.
I have a few questions regarding some items.
In the current proposal, the following example is provided.
Thnaks for the proposal/update.
I have a few questions regarding some items.
In the current proposal, the following example is provided.
To illustrate the issue, let’s consider an example where a contributor approaches the OpCo with a proposal for the DAO and the OpCo thinks it may be valuable for the ecosystem. Unfortunately, the OpCo cannot engage with a consulting firm to evaluate the idea. The only option available for OpCo is to encourage the contributor to seek permission (and potential funding from exploratory work) from the DAO.
I view the OpCo as operational infrastructure to address the most common demands within the DAO, and evaluating proposal "worthiness" is a core part of this. Therefore, relying on external SPs to fulfil this should be an exception, rather than the rule, and it would need a DAO approval for the request. I'm saying this because I can see a "department" within the "placeholder budget" for internal employees to do exactly that.
This proposal would earmark 30M ARB to cover OpCo’s initial term, with an exemplary budget breakdown shown below. This is not an official budget, meaning that capital may be budgeted and allocated differently once the entity is stood up. For example, Employee #4 doesn’t have to be hired at a yearly salary of ~$130K. The exemplary budget’s purpose is instead to showcase that the ask isn’t arbitrary, and how the figure has been derived. It’s also important to note that several line items, such as entity setup and legal services are notably larger than what the actual expenses are expected to be. This was done to account for any unforeseen events or worst-case scenarios which could require notable capital commitments.
While it is not mandatory to follow a 10-employee setup, OpCO should be able to handle its expected tasks with its internal employees. For example, equivalent to PMs to follow all initiatives, and researchers to cover the most common/relevant topics/proposals for the DAO.
That has a direct relationship with most of the other points, so my main questions are: What is the structure the OAT is planning/envisioning for the OpCo? What should/could be handled internally?
I mostly agree with those items, as they will provide more flexibility and position OpCo better when trying to find the right person for the roles. I would like to see a revised set of rules (not only the fixes) for the Council Elections so that the delegates can ratify them.
We are bundling several items in this topic. What is the voting strategy you are envisioning for this?
Thank you for the thorough analysis and for suggesting amendments to relevant items before the structure is finalised.
Thanks for big analysis of OpCo's functions
Overall, I support the intention to update the scope and boundaries of the OpCo to better align with the newly proposed Arbitrum Aligned Entities (AAE) structure. As the ecosystem evolves, it makes sense to refine roles and responsibilities to ensure better governance and operational clarity.
However, I’d like to emphasize that the effectiveness of these updates will depend heavily on how well the AAE framework is actually implemented. A clear and enforceable AAE structure is essential not only for shaping a viable execution plan for the SOS objectives but also for defining the operational details of OpCo in a sustainable way. Further thoughts on the AAE framework here.
I am going to go point by point here having followed the proposal closely from the beginning.
First a general introduction: I do understand how a proposal that was ideated in eth denver 2024, started a proper discussion in bruxelles at ethcc in 2024, that was voted on snapshot in december 2024 and in tally in february 2025, with elections coming a few months ago, might need updates.
I am going to go point by point here having followed the proposal closely from the beginning.
First a general introduction: I do understand how a proposal that was ideated in eth denver 2024, started a proper discussion in bruxelles at ethcc in 2024, that was voted on snapshot in december 2024 and in tally in february 2025, with elections coming a few months ago, might need updates.
A lot changed in the last year, including the political panorama, how OCL and AF wants to interact with the DAO and broader ecosystem etc. This whole premise to say: it can make sense to put forward a discussion to change a few points that are now deemed by the OAT as too restrictive.
I'll be honest at the time it didn't make too much sense to me how opco would not be able to interact with service provider. Let's assume the normal path:
I do get that the ability to elect a service provider is something the DAO wants to retain. At the same time, looking at the past, I do find difficult to see how the DAO can do a better choice compared to the OpCo and the OAT, knowing already the OAT composition and knowing that they will (hopefully) find the right people to work in it. At the same time opco managing this choice means we remove a lot of friction from any process.
This could be one of the most controversial point for the DAO: basically using funds allocated initially only for people of OpCo and for the ops strictly for OpCo, to be used to fund also initiatives instead. I am unsure if this is a positive or negative thing right now. It might create a natural tendency to spend maybe a bit less on people because there will always be the back idea of allocating funds to initiatives. I also see this being contested by delegates who are advocating for putting in circle less arb as possible, and so we are potentially saying that all budget could be utilized even if not all on people. I don't necessarily care about this last point knowing that few have hundreds of millions of unlocks and so this is mathematically speaking a small amount; I do care instead about the process behind, from Opco, saying "we spend X on this initiative" vs "dao has to put X for this initiative". And the fact that there might be a disagreement on what X should be, and how OpCo would approach the decision of onboarding the capital cost if below a certain threshold, or outsource to the DAO if above. This is probably a nuance at this point in time; as long as the reasoning of deciding on internalizing vs asking to the DAO is made clear in each situation, I think it could be ok. But I would like to avoid a situation in which, in an entity that should have had almost $8M earmarked to pay people, we end up spending instead $1M and put aside $7M for initiatives. Is not about overspending on people, but having opco being a real force operating on behalf of the DAO.
This is one of the thing that makes the most sense. As of today opco can't offer equity nor anything that is "really" appealing in a world in which you can get stock options, carry etc. We need to make the company attractive.
This was probably a big oversight to begin with, and I wonder how many people have not run in the elections due to this very strong limitation. I am one of the few for example. Another point that I strongly support.
Focusing on the public side of job positions, and disclosing privately to the OAT what could be seen as a potential conflict for other to evaluate, is likely for the best. We live in a tokenized world. Do I have a conflict of interest if I have OP tokens in my portfolio, or if I particpate to the Echo Coinbase group? Unlikely. Does it make sense to disclose this to peers for the sake of transparency and for them to evaluate if there could be any strange situation? Yes.
This is another critical point. I do see how enlarging the scope can make sense. We don't want OpCo to be a black hole of initiatives; it will likely not be looking at the budget that will rather large is not infinite, even through external requests. The main point is for the OpCo to evaluate, in good faith, if they deem themself up to the task of properly ideating, executing and managing certain strategies, without internalizing for the sake of control and for the sake of being capital efficient. It will fall in the same framework posted above: each time there is a meaningful decision, clearly explain to the DAO and other AAEs why it should fall into OpCo, why alternatives are not necessarily advised, and how OpCo should potentially be a better executor.
On one side, I do see OpCo managing intiatives outside the initial "ecosystem growth" and "financial" verticals. Looking at people currently in the OAT, we are indeed on the right path to have a very good team, well interconnected in the ecosystem. At the same time we don't want to
It means that people in the OpCo (OAT, Chief etc) will not have to be complacent about their role, and have a constant critical thinking about why they are indeed managing or not managing certain initiatives.
This is not a virtue signal: I am cautiously optimistic in enlarging the scope of the OpCo. But in this whole transition we are collectively experiencing, from DAO executed operations to AAEs taking the lead, we want to constantly ask ourself if we are not losing the plot.
Personally, I am quite confident we won't.
We appreciate the initiative to update and refine OpCo’s operational framework. While the initial proposal was approved only a few months ago, it’s true that the broader discussions have been ongoing for quite some time. Given how quickly the ecosystem evolves, it’s reasonable to make adjustments to ensure OpCo remains effective and fit-for-purpose.
We’d like to focus our feedback specifically on the financial aspects of the proposal:
We appreciate the initiative to update and refine OpCo’s operational framework. While the initial proposal was approved only a few months ago, it’s true that the broader discussions have been ongoing for quite some time. Given how quickly the ecosystem evolves, it’s reasonable to make adjustments to ensure OpCo remains effective and fit-for-purpose.
We’d like to focus our feedback specifically on the financial aspects of the proposal:
1. Engagement with Service Providers
Understandably, OpCo needs the ability to engage service providers directly to execute its mandate. However, this flexibility must be paired with financial accountability. We believe the following principles should apply:
2. Discretionary Treasury Spend
We support the idea of OpCo having access to a discretionary budget, provided there are clear guardrails:
The Uniswap DAO’s discretionary budget for the UAC could serve as a useful precedent and as a template for implementation.
3. Employee Compensation
We support revisiting OpCo’s compensation structure to ensure it is competitive and aligned with market standards. That said, any changes should be backed by benchmarking data and presented transparently so the community can understand how these decisions are made.
We'll reply in more detail later, but this seems like a total rewrite of the purpose of OpCo. The whole point of OpCo was to be a ministerial, not decision-making, arm of the DAO. It was to take action on behalf of governance.
Many of the restrictions noted above are not very restrictive if OpCo sticks to its mandate of
We'll reply in more detail later, but this seems like a total rewrite of the purpose of OpCo. The whole point of OpCo was to be a ministerial, not decision-making, arm of the DAO. It was to take action on behalf of governance.
Many of the restrictions noted above are not very restrictive if OpCo sticks to its mandate of
More generally, why did the current OAT members choose to stand for election if they did not find the OpCo mandate appropriate? We already have the Foundation for independent action. It's not clear why OpCo needs to have the capacity and freedom to pursue independent action.
What kinds of tasks are the OAT members envisioning OpCo doing that AF cannot do? That would help to understand why such a drastic revision to the core mandate is being made.
This is described as a restriction for which "a fix" is proposed, which seems to imply it is an oversight or an unfortunate consequence of some other requirement. Looking back at the proposal as passed, this seems very intentional and is explicitly stated to be the intent.
It’s important to note that OpCo will not have the authority to enter into contracts with service providers or individual contributors for strategies not approved by the DAO through governance, unless directly related to its operational needs (e.g., hiring an accounting firm). OpCo internal full-time employees cannot be contributors to DAO initiatives as individuals (they need to do so through OpCo) and are strictly prohibited from entering into employment engagements with other DAOs, organizations, entities, or comparable affiliations, whilst contractors that facilitate a specific vertical and are signed to OpCo can have engagements in other DAO initiatives and outside of the ecosystem. Full-time OpCo staff can only be appointed internally. However, as mentioned earlier, the DAO can roll any service provider or individual contributor into OpCo by passing an onchain vote. This vote has to request capital to cover the facilitators’ expenses since when it comes to salaries, OpCo’s budget only covers internal full-time staff. OpCo is expected to work closely with Offchain Labs as well as the Arbitrum Foundation to ensure that scopes of work do not overlap.
I think it's misleading to label this "a fix". This proposal suggest to rewriting, even rendering moot to some extent, very clearly stated parts of the passed OpCo proposal. We ought to apply all scrutiny due to such an endeavor, not just greenlight it as a small adjustment to fix some oversights.
I appreciate the structure of this proposal, where you detail each problem separately.
Where, as per your analysis, there are 6 problems with the approved setup for OpCo:
And for each one of those problems, you've suggested a solution.
I believe it's best, for this offchain vote to be conducted with the approval voting type, where delegates would be able to signal support for each one of the changes individually, with all of their voting power being casted towards each "problem/solution change" they agree with.
In this way, we could agree to consider valid, each voting option, aka., each "problem/solution change", that the delegates vote in support of, for the options that will gather more than the non-constitutional 3% quorum threshold in voting power support.
I really don't think we should bundle all of these changes together, in a single For/Abstain/Against vote, since some of these changes are way more impactful than others, and it would force delegates to vote against the whole proposal, if they disagree with just one of the proposed "problem/solution changes".
Thank you all for your comments, feedback, and for joining the call.
Here you can find the recording and the notes.
I'll address each of the concerns raised one by one.
We’ll reply in more detail later, but this seems like a total rewrite of the purpose of OpCo. The whole point of OpCo was to be a ministerial, not decision-making, arm of the DAO. It was to take action on behalf of governance.
This proposal suggest to rewriting, even rendering moot to some extent, very clearly stated parts of the passed OpCo proposal.
According to the approved proposal, the OpCo has a dual mandate: to support the operations of DAO-approved proposals, and to proactively identify opportunities that could benefit the DAO:
OpCo is also required to be proactive, meaning that if the entity has the bandwidth and recognizes a potential advancement that could be made within its mandated focus areas, it can work on and propose a strategy through which the entity would address the identified frictions.
This proposal does not change the scope or purpose of the OpCo. Rather, it aims to offer more flexibility in engaging service providers and utilizing available funds to develop proposals that may benefit the DAO. The key of having an operational entity is to enable frictionless execution
The points identified by the OAT and proposed as modifications refer to restrictions that would prevent this mandate from being carried out smoothly, which is ultimately the very reason the entity was created.
This could be one of the most controversial point for the DAO: basically using funds allocated initially only for people of OpCo and for the ops strictly for OpCo, to be used to fund also initiatives instead.
Third, If OpCo is struggling to fulfill its functions and lacks the necessary expert knowledge or experience, I don’t see any problem with approving the expenses through Snapshot by the DAO — it only takes one week
As illustrated by the given examples, the intention behind these modifications is to enable agile funding of groundwork needed to prepare proposals that will be submitted to the DAO. This aligns with the overarching goal of reducing friction in order to fulfill the approved mandate.
OpCo should only kickstart initiatives and ideas when it recognizes a potential advancement, in line with the initial proposal, while any significant expenses such as carrying out larger initiatives to fully execute a proposal will always need to be approved by the DAO, since the OpCo does not have funding for that.
It will fall in the same framework posted above: each time there is a meaningful decision, clearly explain to the DAO and other AAEs why it should fall into OpCo, why alternatives are not necessarily advised, and how OpCo should potentially be a better executor.
The OpCo will be the entity responsible for executing the operations approved by the DAO. That has not changed, so the final decision will always remain with the DAO.
Understandably, OpCo needs the ability to engage service providers directly to execute its mandate. However, this flexibility must be paired with financial accountability. We believe the following principles should apply:
We support the idea of OpCo having access to a discretionary budget, provided there are clear guardrails:
Spending should be capped at a pre-agreed amount.
OAT members should unanimously approve usage.
All spending should be transparently reported to the DAO.
Thank you for the feedback. At the OAT, accountability is a top priority, so there will definitely be regular transparency reports.
Regarding caps, the approved proposal already includes them:
Once OpCo has officially operationalized, the entity can draw up to $500K of cash equivalents each month.
If a monthly drawdown exceeds $500K but is below $1.5M, the executive-equivalent employees must get approval from the OAT before accessing the funds.
If a monthly drawdown exceeds $1.5M, OpCo must seek approval from the DAO through a Snapshot vote.
I don’t quite understand the essence of this proposal, since there is already a separate pool of funds for salaries. This pool is only for bonuses.
The rationale behind this is to equip the OAT with the tools needed to negotiate compensation with OpCo employees. Our vision is to establish a compensation structure that includes token vesting, ensuring incentive alignment with Arbitrum’s long-term success.
That said, I have some concerns around how the proposal addresses the issue of conflicts of interest—something that is endemic to DAO governance and must be handled with more rigor
The goal of the proposed policy is to ensure that talented individuals, who are capable of adding value and have a genuine interest in Arbitrum's success, are able to apply. In any case, the DAO will always have the final say through the vote.
I view the OpCo as operational infrastructure to address the most common demands within the DAO, and evaluating proposal “worthiness” is a core part of this. Therefore, relying on external SPs to fulfil this should be an exception, rather than the rule, and it would need a DAO approval for the request.
In its dual role as the entity executing operations and proactively identifying new opportunities, or evaluating those that arise, as you mentioned, we envision the OpCo having access to a budget to collaborate with contributors or service providers in preparing robust proposals for the DAO.
The goal is to reduce friction and enable the OpCo to operate smoothly and remain adaptable to emerging needs. In any case, such expenditures would need to be approved by the OAT, the body elected by the DAO to represent it.
We are bundling several items in this topic. What is the voting strategy you are envisioning for this?
We will aim to put a vote up on Snapshot for 12th June 2025 to enact the above changes with a non-constitutional Quorum. The options will be For, Against or Abstain.
Update to the proposal:
Based on the feedback received during today’s call, we’ve added an update to the proposal to clarify that if an individual is elected on behalf of an organisation, then it is tied to them and the position cannot be rotated by the organisation.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
Thank you all for the feedback, and just a reminder that there will be a new call next Monday to discuss the matter further. Feel free to leave any additional questions or feedback on the proposal.
Thanks for big analysis of OpCo's functions
First of all, I do not see such a mandate explicitly stated for OpCo
Second, I consider this formulation to be extremely vague In this case, almost any purchase of equipment, services or goods can be written off as a necessity. Buying an expensive massage chair is a necessity, since reading the initiatives from the DAO takes a lot of time and your back gets numb. There are no restrictions in this formulation, so I am against such a clause. In addition, I would like to have specialists who are able to do at least basic things on their own, given their high salaries
Third, If OpCo is struggling to fulfill its functions and lacks the necessary expert knowledge or experience, I don’t see any problem with approving the expenses through Snapshot by the DAO — it only takes one week
I don’t quite understand the essence of this proposal, since there is already a separate pool of funds for salaries. This pool is only for bonuses.
It’s not entirely clear why there is a need to complicate the system and increase administrative complexity, as well as to separate compensation from bonuses
I don’t like the idea of significantly changing OpCo’s scope of activities after everyone voted specifically for the current version. However, I don’t see any restrictions right now preventing OpCo from developing any initiatives — this doesn’t contradict anything as long as they fulfill their core functions and have the time to do so.
Like any delegate, OpCo can initiate proposals to improve anything within the DAO So, I don't see any need to assign new functions to OpCo
Overall, I support the intention to update the scope and boundaries of the OpCo to better align with the newly proposed Arbitrum Aligned Entities (AAE) structure. As the ecosystem evolves, it makes sense to refine roles and responsibilities to ensure better governance and operational clarity.
However, I’d like to emphasize that the effectiveness of these updates will depend heavily on how well the AAE framework is actually implemented. A clear and enforceable AAE structure is essential not only for shaping a viable execution plan for the SOS objectives but also for defining the operational details of OpCo in a sustainable way. Further thoughts on the AAE framework here.
That said, I have some concerns around how the proposal addresses the issue of conflicts of interest—something that is endemic to DAO governance and must be handled with more rigor. In particular:
The proposed changes seem to reduce safeguards against conflicts of interest rather than strengthen them. The previous criteria around elections and eligibility were more appropriate in preventing problematic overlaps and preserving independence. While I recognise the previously agreed terms limit access to valuable contributors, I think the relevance of OpCo within the DAO calls for clear boundaries.
The proposal underestimates the potential conflict posed by personal or institutional token holdings. A large stake in a competing project—even if there is no formal working relationship—can significantly bias decision-making. These situations should be treated with the same seriousness as direct employment with a competing project. I suggest for holdings to be disclosed and considered in the evaluation when they represent more than 25% of one's portfolio.
These structural changes are creating some accountability gaps while giving OpCo way more authority. I get that operational flexibility is needed, but not by throwing basic governance safeguards out the window.
Letting OAT members keep their service provider relationships while they're approving discretionary spending? That's a direct financial conflict waiting to happen. An OAT member could literally approve contracts that benefit their own company, and we're supposed to trust that "recusal" will handle it. Come on. You don’t have to assume bad faith to see the incentive problems.
These structural changes are creating some accountability gaps while giving OpCo way more authority. I get that operational flexibility is needed, but not by throwing basic governance safeguards out the window.
Letting OAT members keep their service provider relationships while they're approving discretionary spending? That's a direct financial conflict waiting to happen. An OAT member could literally approve contracts that benefit their own company, and we're supposed to trust that "recusal" will handle it. Come on. You don’t have to assume bad faith to see the incentive problems.
"Excess capital that is available can be used on a discretionary basis" - this is exactly the kind of language that lets spending spiral out of control.
And what counts as "benefiting the ArbitrumDAO"? Pretty much anything if you're creative enough with the justification.
Where's the Accountability? That's not how this should work. If you want more authority, you need more accountability, not less.
What Should Actually Happen Start small and earn the bigger authority. Give OpCo like $25K quarterly for discretionary stuff and let them prove they can use it well. If they're crushing it and creating real value, then we can talk about expanding that authority. But earning expanded power through good performance, not getting it by removing oversight.
I want OpCo to succeed and I understand they need some flexibility to operate effectively. But these changes feel like they're optimizing for OpCo's convenience rather than what's actually good for the DAO.
I appreciate the structure of this proposal, where you detail each problem separately.
Where, as per your analysis, there are 6 problems with the approved setup for OpCo:
And for each one of those problems, you've suggested a solution.
I believe it's best, for this offchain vote to be conducted with the approval voting type, where delegates would be able to signal support for each one of the changes individually, with all of their voting power being casted towards each "problem/solution change" they agree with.
In this way, we could agree to consider valid, each voting option, aka., each "problem/solution change", that the delegates vote in support of, for the options that will gather more than the non-constitutional 3% quorum threshold in voting power support.
I really don't think we should bundle all of these changes together, in a single For/Abstain/Against vote, since some of these changes are way more impactful than others, and it would force delegates to vote against the whole proposal, if they disagree with just one of the proposed "problem/solution changes".
Thank you all for your comments, feedback, and for joining the call.
Here you can find the recording and the notes.
I'll address each of the concerns raised one by one.
We’ll reply in more detail later, but this seems like a total rewrite of the purpose of OpCo. The whole point of OpCo was to be a ministerial, not decision-making, arm of the DAO. It was to take action on behalf of governance.
This proposal suggest to rewriting, even rendering moot to some extent, very clearly stated parts of the passed OpCo proposal.
According to the approved proposal, the OpCo has a dual mandate: to support the operations of DAO-approved proposals, and to proactively identify opportunities that could benefit the DAO:
OpCo is also required to be proactive, meaning that if the entity has the bandwidth and recognizes a potential advancement that could be made within its mandated focus areas, it can work on and propose a strategy through which the entity would address the identified frictions.
This proposal does not change the scope or purpose of the OpCo. Rather, it aims to offer more flexibility in engaging service providers and utilizing available funds to develop proposals that may benefit the DAO. The key of having an operational entity is to enable frictionless execution
The points identified by the OAT and proposed as modifications refer to restrictions that would prevent this mandate from being carried out smoothly, which is ultimately the very reason the entity was created.
This could be one of the most controversial point for the DAO: basically using funds allocated initially only for people of OpCo and for the ops strictly for OpCo, to be used to fund also initiatives instead.
Third, If OpCo is struggling to fulfill its functions and lacks the necessary expert knowledge or experience, I don’t see any problem with approving the expenses through Snapshot by the DAO — it only takes one week
As illustrated by the given examples, the intention behind these modifications is to enable agile funding of groundwork needed to prepare proposals that will be submitted to the DAO. This aligns with the overarching goal of reducing friction in order to fulfill the approved mandate.
OpCo should only kickstart initiatives and ideas when it recognizes a potential advancement, in line with the initial proposal, while any significant expenses such as carrying out larger initiatives to fully execute a proposal will always need to be approved by the DAO, since the OpCo does not have funding for that.
It will fall in the same framework posted above: each time there is a meaningful decision, clearly explain to the DAO and other AAEs why it should fall into OpCo, why alternatives are not necessarily advised, and how OpCo should potentially be a better executor.
The OpCo will be the entity responsible for executing the operations approved by the DAO. That has not changed, so the final decision will always remain with the DAO.
Understandably, OpCo needs the ability to engage service providers directly to execute its mandate. However, this flexibility must be paired with financial accountability. We believe the following principles should apply:
We support the idea of OpCo having access to a discretionary budget, provided there are clear guardrails:
Spending should be capped at a pre-agreed amount.
OAT members should unanimously approve usage.
All spending should be transparently reported to the DAO.
Thank you for the feedback. At the OAT, accountability is a top priority, so there will definitely be regular transparency reports.
Regarding caps, the approved proposal already includes them:
Once OpCo has officially operationalized, the entity can draw up to $500K of cash equivalents each month.
If a monthly drawdown exceeds $500K but is below $1.5M, the executive-equivalent employees must get approval from the OAT before accessing the funds.
If a monthly drawdown exceeds $1.5M, OpCo must seek approval from the DAO through a Snapshot vote.
I don’t quite understand the essence of this proposal, since there is already a separate pool of funds for salaries. This pool is only for bonuses.
The rationale behind this is to equip the OAT with the tools needed to negotiate compensation with OpCo employees. Our vision is to establish a compensation structure that includes token vesting, ensuring incentive alignment with Arbitrum’s long-term success.
That said, I have some concerns around how the proposal addresses the issue of conflicts of interest—something that is endemic to DAO governance and must be handled with more rigor
The goal of the proposed policy is to ensure that talented individuals, who are capable of adding value and have a genuine interest in Arbitrum's success, are able to apply. In any case, the DAO will always have the final say through the vote.
I view the OpCo as operational infrastructure to address the most common demands within the DAO, and evaluating proposal “worthiness” is a core part of this. Therefore, relying on external SPs to fulfil this should be an exception, rather than the rule, and it would need a DAO approval for the request.
In its dual role as the entity executing operations and proactively identifying new opportunities, or evaluating those that arise, as you mentioned, we envision the OpCo having access to a budget to collaborate with contributors or service providers in preparing robust proposals for the DAO.
The goal is to reduce friction and enable the OpCo to operate smoothly and remain adaptable to emerging needs. In any case, such expenditures would need to be approved by the OAT, the body elected by the DAO to represent it.
We are bundling several items in this topic. What is the voting strategy you are envisioning for this?
We will aim to put a vote up on Snapshot for 12th June 2025 to enact the above changes with a non-constitutional Quorum. The options will be For, Against or Abstain.
Update to the proposal:
Based on the feedback received during today’s call, we’ve added an update to the proposal to clarify that if an individual is elected on behalf of an organisation, then it is tied to them and the position cannot be rotated by the organisation.
We believe it should be fixed with the following:
Thank you all for the feedback, and just a reminder that there will be a new call next Monday to discuss the matter further. Feel free to leave any additional questions or feedback on the proposal.
Thanks for big analysis of OpCo's functions
First of all, I do not see such a mandate explicitly stated for OpCo
Second, I consider this formulation to be extremely vague In this case, almost any purchase of equipment, services or goods can be written off as a necessity. Buying an expensive massage chair is a necessity, since reading the initiatives from the DAO takes a lot of time and your back gets numb. There are no restrictions in this formulation, so I am against such a clause. In addition, I would like to have specialists who are able to do at least basic things on their own, given their high salaries
Third, If OpCo is struggling to fulfill its functions and lacks the necessary expert knowledge or experience, I don’t see any problem with approving the expenses through Snapshot by the DAO — it only takes one week
I don’t quite understand the essence of this proposal, since there is already a separate pool of funds for salaries. This pool is only for bonuses.
It’s not entirely clear why there is a need to complicate the system and increase administrative complexity, as well as to separate compensation from bonuses
I don’t like the idea of significantly changing OpCo’s scope of activities after everyone voted specifically for the current version. However, I don’t see any restrictions right now preventing OpCo from developing any initiatives — this doesn’t contradict anything as long as they fulfill their core functions and have the time to do so.
Like any delegate, OpCo can initiate proposals to improve anything within the DAO So, I don't see any need to assign new functions to OpCo
Overall, I support the intention to update the scope and boundaries of the OpCo to better align with the newly proposed Arbitrum Aligned Entities (AAE) structure. As the ecosystem evolves, it makes sense to refine roles and responsibilities to ensure better governance and operational clarity.
However, I’d like to emphasize that the effectiveness of these updates will depend heavily on how well the AAE framework is actually implemented. A clear and enforceable AAE structure is essential not only for shaping a viable execution plan for the SOS objectives but also for defining the operational details of OpCo in a sustainable way. Further thoughts on the AAE framework here.
That said, I have some concerns around how the proposal addresses the issue of conflicts of interest—something that is endemic to DAO governance and must be handled with more rigor. In particular:
The proposed changes seem to reduce safeguards against conflicts of interest rather than strengthen them. The previous criteria around elections and eligibility were more appropriate in preventing problematic overlaps and preserving independence. While I recognise the previously agreed terms limit access to valuable contributors, I think the relevance of OpCo within the DAO calls for clear boundaries.
The proposal underestimates the potential conflict posed by personal or institutional token holdings. A large stake in a competing project—even if there is no formal working relationship—can significantly bias decision-making. These situations should be treated with the same seriousness as direct employment with a competing project. I suggest for holdings to be disclosed and considered in the evaluation when they represent more than 25% of one's portfolio.
These structural changes are creating some accountability gaps while giving OpCo way more authority. I get that operational flexibility is needed, but not by throwing basic governance safeguards out the window.
Letting OAT members keep their service provider relationships while they're approving discretionary spending? That's a direct financial conflict waiting to happen. An OAT member could literally approve contracts that benefit their own company, and we're supposed to trust that "recusal" will handle it. Come on. You don’t have to assume bad faith to see the incentive problems.
These structural changes are creating some accountability gaps while giving OpCo way more authority. I get that operational flexibility is needed, but not by throwing basic governance safeguards out the window.
Letting OAT members keep their service provider relationships while they're approving discretionary spending? That's a direct financial conflict waiting to happen. An OAT member could literally approve contracts that benefit their own company, and we're supposed to trust that "recusal" will handle it. Come on. You don’t have to assume bad faith to see the incentive problems.
"Excess capital that is available can be used on a discretionary basis" - this is exactly the kind of language that lets spending spiral out of control.
And what counts as "benefiting the ArbitrumDAO"? Pretty much anything if you're creative enough with the justification.
Where's the Accountability? That's not how this should work. If you want more authority, you need more accountability, not less.
What Should Actually Happen Start small and earn the bigger authority. Give OpCo like $25K quarterly for discretionary stuff and let them prove they can use it well. If they're crushing it and creating real value, then we can talk about expanding that authority. But earning expanded power through good performance, not getting it by removing oversight.
I want OpCo to succeed and I understand they need some flexibility to operate effectively. But these changes feel like they're optimizing for OpCo's convenience rather than what's actually good for the DAO.
