We propose a program for rewarding active delegates focused solely on their voting record and making public their voting rationale. This is the first of a series of upcoming proposals under the umbrella of a DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.1).
A delegate is defined as a party with voting power who votes on proposals. It narrowly focuses on voting and aiding sentiment analysis of why a proposal passed (or failed).
With this in mind, there are three overarching goals that this program is trying to achieve:
This program can be considered successful if delegates are incentivized to continue participating and new delegates step up to participate in the DAO’s voting system. As well, if a proposal does fail, then the proposer should have the ability to gauge sentiment of various voters across the DAO based on the public feedback they leave on the forum.
This program is designed to be objective and on a per-proposal basis.
Any delegate who has satisfied the following eligibility criteria can receive a payment provided that:
Actionable requirements:
Prior requirements:
Additionally, delegates must adhere to the program’s terms and conditions in order to remain eligible. Any proposals related to this program will not be eligible for rewards, to avoid any possible conflicts of interest.
*AGAINST does not typically count towards quorum, but for the purpose of this program, it will be included in the count towards quorum for the purpose of issuing rewards. The intention is to enable delegates to vote according to their preference such that ‘quorum’ is always hit even if not officially.
| Proposal type | Incentive Budget | Payout Cap | Minimum voting power |
|---|---|---|---|
| On-chain constitutional quorum | 15,000 USD | 700 USD | 200k ARB |
| On-chain non-constitutional quorum | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional) | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain election | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain temperature check (non-binding) | 5,000 USD | 300 USD | 200k ARB |
Table 1: Incentive Budget from November 1st 2025 to January 31st 2026
Every quarter (3 months), the OpCo will decide an incentive budget that is paid on a per-proposal basis, with the following information:
The budget is expected to be shared at the start of every quarter and to remain in effect for that quarter. This will provide delegates with predictability on the reward structure while allowing the payout strategies to change over time. For clarity, the proposal’s end date for voting (whether on-chain or off-chain) will be the date used to decide which payout strategy is used. All payouts will be issued in ARB tokens with a 7-day TWAP.
Table 1 provides the initial incentive budget that will be adopted if the proposal is passed. An illustration of how the payouts may look for the DIP 1.7 September Cohort and if all voting power was eligible for the program, can be found here.
Rewards are calculated relative to:
This is designed to ensure the entire incentive budget for a proposal is fully allocated and the rewards are distributed fairly among the delegates.
The key finding is that the payout cap in the September Cohort effectively redistributes rewards across the delegate set and prevents concentration among those with the highest voting power. This mechanism ensures all participating delegates receive some reward. However, as the total eligible voting power increases to ~300m, the influence of the payout cap becomes less pronounced.
If we assume, in a given month, there are two temperature check proposals followed by a non-constitutional proposal and constitutional proposal, then the DAO as a collective will spend ~$32k.
Based on the DIP 1.7’s September Cohort data, we estimate the following payments for certain sized delegates:
The estimates are subject to change based on participation by voting power. As more voting power participates, the rewards will be diluted, and it will be up to the OpCo every quarter to evaluate this data to set a new budget.
The following metric will be used to track the cost-effectiveness of the program:
Dollar spent per vote, alongside rewards on a per-proposal basis, enables the DAO to explicitly define a collective cost for the passage of a proposal. The program will need to find a balance that sufficiently rewards delegates to keep them engaged, and onboard newcomers, while keeping a keen eye on the collective cost to the DAO for the passage of a proposal.
The OpCo is responsible for keeping track of all rewards for delegate voting. It should be available on a public spreadsheet. For clarity, all records should be kept on a per calendar month basis, and payouts should be issued shortly after month’s end. If a proposal's voting phase starts in one month and ends in the next, it will count towards the month in which it ends. When payouts are computed, the program manager (who could either be OpCo or another party) should accurately keep track of total accrued rewards and total payouts, to ensure only the difference carries over to the next month.
Delegates must earn at least $100 before a payment is issued. The allocation will carry over to the next calendar month, but it will expire after 3 months if the threshold is not reached. This is simply to avoid sending dust transactions alongside the overhead in doing so.
The OpCo reserves the right to offer bespoke incentive grant budgets for specific proposals. For example, if a proposal requires multiple temperature check proposals at the same time (like in the STIP), then all proposals may fall within a single bespoke incentive budget.
The OpCo may decide not to offer any reward. This should be taken in cases to prevent potential abuse such as an avalanche of unnecessary proposals or proposals that are deemed very minor in nature (including canceled proposals). If so, the rationale should be published prior or during the respective proposal’s voting phase.
The Arbitrum OpCo Foundation (“OpCo”) retains the authority to change any aspect of the program and any major change should be published to the DAO.
Additionally, the OpCo are in charge of hiring (and terminating) a program manager (if they choose to do so) with an appropriate service level agreement. It is expected that the program manager will handle the day-to-day operations, but rely on instructions from the OpCo.
This program will initially be run by the Arbitrum Foundation, but will be handed over with the OpCo as it ramps up its own resources to run DAO-programs. For clarity, anything that states “OpCo” in this proposal will be handled by the Arbitrum Foundation from the onset.
The program’s goal is to activate unique and human delegates who will express their opinion through voting and sharing rationales. The program will exclude platforms that enable non-human activity (i.e., AI agents) or enable token holders who sell their votes for short-term profits. Additionally, no Arbitrum Aligned Entity nor the program manager will be allowed to earn any incentive payouts.
The Delegate Incentive Program multisig is holding approximately 7 million ARB. This program, alongside upcoming proposals under the umbrella of a DAO incentive program, will absorb the entire budget.
The OpCo will use this budget for:
The program manager’s compensation and scope of work will be announced if and when it is negotiated by the OpCo. This will be periodically reviewed by the OpCo and any changes will be published to the DAO.
We do not expect miscellaneous costs to be substantial. An initial budget of $50k per year will be allocated. If the costs exceed this budget, then the OpCo’s OAT must approve and notify the DAO.
Finally, a transparency report will be prepared and published every 6 months, to track total spend of any program that falls under the umbrella of a DAO Incentive Program.
The intention is for the RAD program to run for 1 year. If the OpCo, based on feedback, deems the program is running well, it may authorise the program to continue operating beyond 1 year. If not, any excess funds will be returned to the DAO Treasury.
The off-chain proposal was posted on December 4th, 2025. A non-constitutional quorum is required alongside more FOR than AGAINST votes for the proposal to pass.
If passed, the program will retrospectively take into account any proposals conducted after the 1st November 2025, and issue rewards in a timely manner.
We propose a program for rewarding active delegates focused solely on their voting record and making public their voting rationale. This is the first of a series of upcoming proposals under the umbrella of a DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.1).
A delegate is defined as a party with voting power who votes on proposals. It narrowly focuses on voting and aiding sentiment analysis of why a proposal passed (or failed).
With this in mind, there are three overarching goals that this program is trying to achieve:
This program can be considered successful if delegates are incentivized to continue participating and new delegates step up to participate in the DAO’s voting system. As well, if a proposal does fail, then the proposer should have the ability to gauge sentiment of various voters across the DAO based on the public feedback they leave on the forum.
This program is designed to be objective and on a per-proposal basis.
Any delegate who has satisfied the following eligibility criteria can receive a payment provided that:
Actionable requirements:
Prior requirements:
Additionally, delegates must adhere to the program’s terms and conditions in order to remain eligible. Any proposals related to this program will not be eligible for rewards, to avoid any possible conflicts of interest.
*AGAINST does not typically count towards quorum, but for the purpose of this program, it will be included in the count towards quorum for the purpose of issuing rewards. The intention is to enable delegates to vote according to their preference such that ‘quorum’ is always hit even if not officially.
| Proposal type | Incentive Budget | Payout Cap | Minimum voting power |
|---|---|---|---|
| On-chain constitutional quorum | 15,000 USD | 700 USD | 200k ARB |
| On-chain non-constitutional quorum | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional) | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain election | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain temperature check (non-binding) | 5,000 USD | 300 USD | 200k ARB |
Table 1: Incentive Budget from November 1st 2025 to January 31st 2026
Every quarter (3 months), the OpCo will decide an incentive budget that is paid on a per-proposal basis, with the following information:
The budget is expected to be shared at the start of every quarter and to remain in effect for that quarter. This will provide delegates with predictability on the reward structure while allowing the payout strategies to change over time. For clarity, the proposal’s end date for voting (whether on-chain or off-chain) will be the date used to decide which payout strategy is used. All payouts will be issued in ARB tokens with a 7-day TWAP.
Table 1 provides the initial incentive budget that will be adopted if the proposal is passed. An illustration of how the payouts may look for the DIP 1.7 September Cohort and if all voting power was eligible for the program, can be found here.
Rewards are calculated relative to:
This is designed to ensure the entire incentive budget for a proposal is fully allocated and the rewards are distributed fairly among the delegates.
The key finding is that the payout cap in the September Cohort effectively redistributes rewards across the delegate set and prevents concentration among those with the highest voting power. This mechanism ensures all participating delegates receive some reward. However, as the total eligible voting power increases to ~300m, the influence of the payout cap becomes less pronounced.
If we assume, in a given month, there are two temperature check proposals followed by a non-constitutional proposal and constitutional proposal, then the DAO as a collective will spend ~$32k.
Based on the DIP 1.7’s September Cohort data, we estimate the following payments for certain sized delegates:
The estimates are subject to change based on participation by voting power. As more voting power participates, the rewards will be diluted, and it will be up to the OpCo every quarter to evaluate this data to set a new budget.
The following metric will be used to track the cost-effectiveness of the program:
Dollar spent per vote, alongside rewards on a per-proposal basis, enables the DAO to explicitly define a collective cost for the passage of a proposal. The program will need to find a balance that sufficiently rewards delegates to keep them engaged, and onboard newcomers, while keeping a keen eye on the collective cost to the DAO for the passage of a proposal.
The OpCo is responsible for keeping track of all rewards for delegate voting. It should be available on a public spreadsheet. For clarity, all records should be kept on a per calendar month basis, and payouts should be issued shortly after month’s end. If a proposal's voting phase starts in one month and ends in the next, it will count towards the month in which it ends. When payouts are computed, the program manager (who could either be OpCo or another party) should accurately keep track of total accrued rewards and total payouts, to ensure only the difference carries over to the next month.
Delegates must earn at least $100 before a payment is issued. The allocation will carry over to the next calendar month, but it will expire after 3 months if the threshold is not reached. This is simply to avoid sending dust transactions alongside the overhead in doing so.
The OpCo reserves the right to offer bespoke incentive grant budgets for specific proposals. For example, if a proposal requires multiple temperature check proposals at the same time (like in the STIP), then all proposals may fall within a single bespoke incentive budget.
The OpCo may decide not to offer any reward. This should be taken in cases to prevent potential abuse such as an avalanche of unnecessary proposals or proposals that are deemed very minor in nature (including canceled proposals). If so, the rationale should be published prior or during the respective proposal’s voting phase.
The Arbitrum OpCo Foundation (“OpCo”) retains the authority to change any aspect of the program and any major change should be published to the DAO.
Additionally, the OpCo are in charge of hiring (and terminating) a program manager (if they choose to do so) with an appropriate service level agreement. It is expected that the program manager will handle the day-to-day operations, but rely on instructions from the OpCo.
This program will initially be run by the Arbitrum Foundation, but will be handed over with the OpCo as it ramps up its own resources to run DAO-programs. For clarity, anything that states “OpCo” in this proposal will be handled by the Arbitrum Foundation from the onset.
The program’s goal is to activate unique and human delegates who will express their opinion through voting and sharing rationales. The program will exclude platforms that enable non-human activity (i.e., AI agents) or enable token holders who sell their votes for short-term profits. Additionally, no Arbitrum Aligned Entity nor the program manager will be allowed to earn any incentive payouts.
The Delegate Incentive Program multisig is holding approximately 7 million ARB. This program, alongside upcoming proposals under the umbrella of a DAO incentive program, will absorb the entire budget.
The OpCo will use this budget for:
The program manager’s compensation and scope of work will be announced if and when it is negotiated by the OpCo. This will be periodically reviewed by the OpCo and any changes will be published to the DAO.
We do not expect miscellaneous costs to be substantial. An initial budget of $50k per year will be allocated. If the costs exceed this budget, then the OpCo’s OAT must approve and notify the DAO.
Finally, a transparency report will be prepared and published every 6 months, to track total spend of any program that falls under the umbrella of a DAO Incentive Program.
The intention is for the RAD program to run for 1 year. If the OpCo, based on feedback, deems the program is running well, it may authorise the program to continue operating beyond 1 year. If not, any excess funds will be returned to the DAO Treasury.
The off-chain proposal was posted on December 4th, 2025. A non-constitutional quorum is required alongside more FOR than AGAINST votes for the proposal to pass.
If passed, the program will retrospectively take into account any proposals conducted after the 1st November 2025, and issue rewards in a timely manner.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/37
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-144): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-144
The Event Horizon Community voted AGAINST on this proposal (ehARB-144): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-144
For, this structure guarantees decentralized technology and effective management, enhancing Arbitrum’s governance with transparency. It fosters a positive-sum environment, empowering the DAO strategically.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/35?u=blockful
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/36
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/33?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/34?u=castlecapital
This version meaningfully reduces the complexity and administrative overhead of earlier iterations. As part of the broader DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.1), it’s important to maintain continuity in incentivizing voting participation, communicating rationale, and overall governance engagement. Strong, diverse delegate activity is essential for a healthy governance system.
I will receive rewards from this program if this proposal passes.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/25?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/29?u=maxlomu
Here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/sov-delegate-communication-thread/30257/4?u=sov
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/37
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-144): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-144
The Event Horizon Community voted AGAINST on this proposal (ehARB-144): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-144
For, this structure guarantees decentralized technology and effective management, enhancing Arbitrum’s governance with transparency. It fosters a positive-sum environment, empowering the DAO strategically.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/35?u=blockful
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/36
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/33?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/34?u=castlecapital
This version meaningfully reduces the complexity and administrative overhead of earlier iterations. As part of the broader DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.1), it’s important to maintain continuity in incentivizing voting participation, communicating rationale, and overall governance engagement. Strong, diverse delegate activity is essential for a healthy governance system.
I will receive rewards from this program if this proposal passes.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/25?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249/29?u=maxlomu
Here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/sov-delegate-communication-thread/30257/4?u=sov
Appreciate the clarifications shared above. One operational point I’m still unclear on (and which may also help future delegates): for RAD eligibility, is a voting rationale considered valid if it’s posted in any one of the following (forum thread, Snapshot rationale field, or on-chain reason field), or is the intent to standardize this to a single required location?
Appreciate the clarifications shared above. One operational point I’m still unclear on (and which may also help future delegates): for RAD eligibility, is a voting rationale considered valid if it’s posted in any one of the following (forum thread, Snapshot rationale field, or on-chain reason field), or is the intent to standardize this to a single required location?
After discussing with the Arbitrum Foundation, we have decided that it might be more productive if the OpCo takes over the management of the program, including operations, from the very beginning. This way, we’ll avoid having a handover down the line and having delegates go through the process of KYC/KYB twice, while maintaining operational cohesion throughout the entire program.
After discussing with the Arbitrum Foundation, we have decided that it might be more productive if the OpCo takes over the management of the program, including operations, from the very beginning. This way, we’ll avoid having a handover down the line and having delegates go through the process of KYC/KYB twice, while maintaining operational cohesion throughout the entire program.
With that in mind, we wanted to provide a quick update on all the relevant items.
Since OpCo is going to be the counterparty for all legal agreements with delegates that participate in the RAD, delegates will have to go through the KYC/KYB process with the provider we’ll be utilizing, as well as sign new grant agreements with OpCo. Since we do not have in-house legal counsel yet, we’ll be leveraging external counsel to assist us in processing everything. We ask for delegates’ understanding as we move everyone through the process, as it might take a little bit longer than what is typically expected.
OpCo will also be taking over the execution of payments. The remaining balance from the previous DIP will be transferred to a multisig wallet under OpCo’s control, through which we’ll distribute rewards to delegates.
We have decided to hire SEED as a Program Manager for RAD, with a much more limited scope than the DIP, given that the new program is much narrower anyway and that the OpCo team will also be involved in operations. Having a PM work alongside the OpCo to manage the program will enable us to increase our capacity, improve our efficiency, and reduce our turnaround time for program-related tasks.
The reasons we hired SEED instead of having an open call for potential program managers were two: a) they have been managing the previous program, so they’re intimately familiar with the process, and they already have an open line of communications with most delegates who will probably be participating, and b) they will be able to hit the ground running.
For transparency’s sake, here’s some bullet-point information about our engagement of SEED as Program Managers of RAD:
As mentioned in the proposal, proposals conducted after the 1st November 2025 will be retroactively eligible for rewards. Delegates who voted and, at the time, met the requirements of RAD, will receive their rewards in early January.
The proposals eligible for retroactive rewards are the following:
AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Startup-Phase Bonus for Current Council Members
AIP: Raise the gas target, min L2 base fee, & implement improvements to the pricing algorithm
Tim Chang and John Kennedy reconfirmation votes for AGV council
[Constitutional] AIP: Activate ArbOS 51 (Dia) and Gas Pricing Updates
As an exception, we’ll not be requiring that delegates have communicated their rationale to receive the retroactive rewards. If you haven’t published a rationale for one or more of the retroactively eligible votes, you will still receive your rewards, provided that you meet the other requirements.
Delegates who meet the requirements and wish to participate in RAD can do so under this thread we’ve published.
While we do not yet have a concrete timeline for everything, and with the holidays approaching, making this a bit slower all around, the next steps that we’ll be taking in relation to RAD are the following:
Tentatively, we’re looking to get as much as possible done before the holidays, but we’re probably looking at mid-January for the retroactive rewards to be distributed.
For any questions regarding the RAD, please contact Sinkas (@Sinkas5 on Telegram), who is the POC from OpCo.
That has been my experience. Rationales are often generic and not challenged because its so subjective.
If it is required, please don’t have people post them to the forum in their own threads. Then all the top threads are delegate threads.
After discussing with the Arbitrum Foundation, we have decided that it might be more productive if the OpCo takes over the management of the program, including operations, from the very beginning. This way, we’ll avoid having a handover down the line and having delegates go through the process of KYC/KYB twice, while maintaining operational cohesion throughout the entire program.
After discussing with the Arbitrum Foundation, we have decided that it might be more productive if the OpCo takes over the management of the program, including operations, from the very beginning. This way, we’ll avoid having a handover down the line and having delegates go through the process of KYC/KYB twice, while maintaining operational cohesion throughout the entire program.
With that in mind, we wanted to provide a quick update on all the relevant items.
Since OpCo is going to be the counterparty for all legal agreements with delegates that participate in the RAD, delegates will have to go through the KYC/KYB process with the provider we’ll be utilizing, as well as sign new grant agreements with OpCo. Since we do not have in-house legal counsel yet, we’ll be leveraging external counsel to assist us in processing everything. We ask for delegates’ understanding as we move everyone through the process, as it might take a little bit longer than what is typically expected.
OpCo will also be taking over the execution of payments. The remaining balance from the previous DIP will be transferred to a multisig wallet under OpCo’s control, through which we’ll distribute rewards to delegates.
We have decided to hire SEED as a Program Manager for RAD, with a much more limited scope than the DIP, given that the new program is much narrower anyway and that the OpCo team will also be involved in operations. Having a PM work alongside the OpCo to manage the program will enable us to increase our capacity, improve our efficiency, and reduce our turnaround time for program-related tasks.
The reasons we hired SEED instead of having an open call for potential program managers were two: a) they have been managing the previous program, so they’re intimately familiar with the process, and they already have an open line of communications with most delegates who will probably be participating, and b) they will be able to hit the ground running.
For transparency’s sake, here’s some bullet-point information about our engagement of SEED as Program Managers of RAD:
As mentioned in the proposal, proposals conducted after the 1st November 2025 will be retroactively eligible for rewards. Delegates who voted and, at the time, met the requirements of RAD, will receive their rewards in early January.
The proposals eligible for retroactive rewards are the following:
AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Startup-Phase Bonus for Current Council Members
AIP: Raise the gas target, min L2 base fee, & implement improvements to the pricing algorithm
Tim Chang and John Kennedy reconfirmation votes for AGV council
[Constitutional] AIP: Activate ArbOS 51 (Dia) and Gas Pricing Updates
As an exception, we’ll not be requiring that delegates have communicated their rationale to receive the retroactive rewards. If you haven’t published a rationale for one or more of the retroactively eligible votes, you will still receive your rewards, provided that you meet the other requirements.
Delegates who meet the requirements and wish to participate in RAD can do so under this thread we’ve published.
While we do not yet have a concrete timeline for everything, and with the holidays approaching, making this a bit slower all around, the next steps that we’ll be taking in relation to RAD are the following:
Tentatively, we’re looking to get as much as possible done before the holidays, but we’re probably looking at mid-January for the retroactive rewards to be distributed.
For any questions regarding the RAD, please contact Sinkas (@Sinkas5 on Telegram), who is the POC from OpCo.
That has been my experience. Rationales are often generic and not challenged because its so subjective.
If it is required, please don’t have people post them to the forum in their own threads. Then all the top threads are delegate threads.
Thanks for the transparency on the iteration process. I'm supportive of this direction.
As someone who voted consistently and participated in the earlier DIP program, I found DIP 2.0 genuinely confusing and stepped back from active participation because the rules were hard to follow. The previous version also created an unintended problem where it incentivized discussions for the sake of discussion rather than meaningful engagement.
Thanks for the transparency on the iteration process. I'm supportive of this direction.
As someone who voted consistently and participated in the earlier DIP program, I found DIP 2.0 genuinely confusing and stepped back from active participation because the rules were hard to follow. The previous version also created an unintended problem where it incentivized discussions for the sake of discussion rather than meaningful engagement.
This approach, focusing on voting participation with clear barriers to entry, makes it easier to understand what's expected and how to qualify.
On the retrospective question: I could go either way, but given we're only looking at November, I think it's reasonable to move forward with recognition for that period. I wouldn't support going back further than that as it would add complexity.
Hope this helps. Thanks again for surfacing and to all of the people that have worked on putting this new structure together.
Thanks for the transparency on the iteration process. I'm supportive of this direction.
As someone who voted consistently and participated in the earlier DIP program, I found DIP 2.0 genuinely confusing and stepped back from active participation because the rules were hard to follow. The previous version also created an unintended problem where it incentivized discussions for the sake of discussion rather than meaningful engagement.
Thanks for the transparency on the iteration process. I'm supportive of this direction.
As someone who voted consistently and participated in the earlier DIP program, I found DIP 2.0 genuinely confusing and stepped back from active participation because the rules were hard to follow. The previous version also created an unintended problem where it incentivized discussions for the sake of discussion rather than meaningful engagement.
This approach, focusing on voting participation with clear barriers to entry, makes it easier to understand what's expected and how to qualify.
On the retrospective question: I could go either way, but given we're only looking at November, I think it's reasonable to move forward with recognition for that period. I wouldn't support going back further than that as it would add complexity.
Hope this helps. Thanks again for surfacing and to all of the people that have worked on putting this new structure together.
Hi all,
I just wanted to drop a quick comment on the vesting. This is something that can be added after the vote. I think main bottleneck right now is finding a reasonable solution for creating a batch of vesting contracts per month via safe.
Hi all,
I just wanted to drop a quick comment on the vesting. This is something that can be added after the vote. I think main bottleneck right now is finding a reasonable solution for creating a batch of vesting contracts per month via safe.
Thank you for raising this point.
The requirement for delegates to comment their rationales within 5 days will not apply retroactively. Assuming that the RAD proposal goes to Snapshot today, for proposals that took place between Nov 1 and Dec 11, delegates will have until Dec 16 (5 days after the RAD proposal hypothetically passes), to comment their rationales.
I agree with this.
A delegate is not necessarily commenting on the proposal, but posting the rationale behind their own vote, which is a very personal statement. That rationale is very useful, especially if a proposal fails (like DIP 2.0), as it enables sentiment analysis / vibe checking.
I agree with this.
A delegate is not necessarily commenting on the proposal, but posting the rationale behind their own vote, which is a very personal statement. That rationale is very useful, especially if a proposal fails (like DIP 2.0), as it enables sentiment analysis / vibe checking.
Today, rationale posted by delegates, is pretty good and reasonable by them. If people have a change of heart and post AI slop, it will be obvious to everyone including OpCo/program manager. Subjectivity is not “is this the best rationale in the world” but “does it actually represent the delegates view?”.
on the forum? on the snapshot and onchain vote reason fields? on both? on any of the above?
on the forum? on the snapshot and onchain vote reason fields? on both? on any of the above?
Hi @paulofonseca, delegates will need to publicly post their rationales on the forum (either in the proposal’s thread or in their own delegate thread). Because rewards are distributed on a per-proposal basis, delegates should submit their rationales within five days of the end of each voting phase (we have updated the proposal accordingly). For example, if a proposal includes both a temperature check and a subsequent on-chain vote, delegates should provide their rationale for each phase.
As of today, we have in address for incentives around 7M arb equivalent to 1.5M usd, and arb at 0.21$. While we could theorize that this monthly expenditure could be above or beyond, because is based on amount of votes and amount of delegates, we can say that this budget should last based on projection for 3 to 4 years. In the even of ARB below 5 cents, this budget would instead only last for 1 year.
Was any thought put into this piece of feedback?
Thanks for your questions, @JoJo.
As stated, this proposal aims to optimize for the dollar spent per vote cast. Accordingly, the remaining funds from DIP 1.7 have no impact on the budget outlined here. It will be up to the PM and OpCo to adjust the quarterly budget and payout strategies moving forward, taking broader macro conditions into account as well.
We do have around 16200 in rewards distributed this way if we just assume that each delegates in the 18 list has 1M in voting power. Considering the names, that at 4M we have 1.6k in rewards and at 8M we have 1.8K in rewards, we can safely assume an average of 1.2k each delegates to round this at 21800 usd per september.
This is especially true due to this table
| Proposal type | Incentive Budget | Payout Cap | Minimum voting power |
|---|---|---|---|
| On-chain constitutional quorum | 15,000 USD | 700 USD | 200k ARB |
| On-chain non-constitutional quorum | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional) | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain election | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain temperature check (non-binding) | 5,000 USD | 300 USD | 200k ARB |
In here, I do see
But we have ARB token as reserve.There is a mismatch in this accounting and operational system that will lead to the problems we have seen in several programs such as the grant ones based and denominated in ARB.
On the table above I also have another question: what was the rationale to come down to these payouts for each proposal? Was it done through a study of history of previous set of proposals, was it done taking in account other grant programs in other DAOs, was it done taking in account budget and runaway? It would be good to know the rationale behind, knowing that 1) is stated that all budget are studied and changed if any quarterly 2) we are seeing a tendency of having less votes 3) but also historically we have seen voting clusters in certain period.
We also benchmarked against recent DIP 1.7 payout data. As shown in the simulations using September and October’s DIP 1.7 results, median earners from the September cohort would receive a similar amount (less compared to September data but more compared to October data) under the RAD Program.
Looking ahead, the PM and OpCo will review the data from the RAD Program and determine how and whether to adjust the budget on a quarterly basis. This data will also help inform the financial cost of pushing a proposal through the DAO, allowing the program to further optimize the dollar-spent-per-vote-cast metric.
Each of those questions requires a different level of tracking effort, which will affect the amount of work needed to comply with the rule.
Can you clarify this point?
Delegates must meet the minimum voting power threshold at the beginning of each proposal’s voting period and (as you suggested) must also maintain an average voting power at or above this threshold throughout the relevant month. We have modified the proposal accordingly. The PM and OpCo will evaluate data from the RAD Program and may modify this clause in the future if needed.
so this criteria needs to be way more defined, because in one extreme if a delegate can get paid for voting with any vote rationale, without any subjective criteria to evaluate that vote rationale, then way more delegates than today will post way more AI slop comments on the forum, just to check that box.
I recommend that this program should drop this criteria entirely. So delegates would be paid for voting only, and it doesn’t matter if they vote with a rationale of “just because” or a fully fledged articulated rationale essay with over 400 words.
Otherwise, this program will need a team to subjectively assess the quality of the vote rationales and score them with rubrics and… we are back to DIP 1.5 when the results were taking 3 weeks to show up and the DAO was spending way too much money on the admin of this, supposedly simpler, program.
The OpCo has the authority to update the program. If participants begin abusing it with AI-generated content, the OpCo can establish rules to address such behavior.
We understand that OpCo will handle the operational side, but this structure may incentivize a higher number of votes (whether Temperature Checks or on-chain) purely to increase delegate compensation within the DAO — effectively creating a sybil vector for delegate remuneration.
Because the RAD Program’s design is more objective than previous DIP programs, issuing payments on a per-proposal basis ensures that rewards closely reflect the amount of work conducted by delegates.
While this could potentially strengthen the DAO’s economic security — with more people voting and helping to reach quorum — it may also end up consuming the entire budget allocated to the RAD, potentially exceeding the US$32K/month illustrated in the proposal.
As stated in the proposal, the OpCo may choose not to issue rewards in certain cases to prevent potential abuse—such as an influx of unnecessary proposals or proposals considered to be minor in scope.
In addition, clearer rules for compensation should be established, such as requiring a minimum level of participation in votes, as is already the case with DIPs. This would ensure that only delegates who consistently maintain a defined participation threshold remain eligible for compensation.
Has any simulation been conducted to demonstrate that this approach is more efficient than a fixed monthly payment tied to a minimum participation requirement from delegates?
You can review the hypothetical RAD payout figures based on DIP 1.7 data from September and October. Looking ahead, if the RAD Program passes, the PM and OpCo will analyze data from its initial months to determine how and whether to adjust the budget and payout strategies.
The recording of The Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program: Open Discussion #1 can be accessed here:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zF6N3RsL4FTSOHbjsMnfshEq-_x6ZKWh/view
We will be hosting a governance call on this proposal on Friday, November 28.
The Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program: Open Discussion #1 Friday, November 28 · 14:00 – 15:00 Time zone: UTC Video call link: https://meet.google.com/wna-nyco-zxf
Hi all!
I want to provide some context on what happened after the DIP 2.0 proposal failed.
We collected all the feedback from the temperature check vote and used that data to decide next steps. To summarise some of the key points:
Hi all!
I want to provide some context on what happened after the DIP 2.0 proposal failed.
We collected all the feedback from the temperature check vote and used that data to decide next steps. To summarise some of the key points:
Specifically for delegate incentives. The feedback focused on making participation as simple as possible with fewest barriers to entry.
After going through the feedback, we have decided to work on a series of proposals that builds up the incentive program for delegates and contributors. This first proposal, focused only on delegate voting, was put together with the intention of getting it online as soon as reasonably possible to ensure everyone has an opportunity to read it, discuss it, and provide their thoughts.
If it is approved, it is set to currently be retrospective back to the 1st November, although interestingly I’ve had discussions with several delegates now who believe that it might be better to have a detox period before restarting the incentive grant. I’d be interested to hear more thoughts on this on the forum or elsewhere.
Anyway, I hope this provides some transparency on how we approached this proposal, alongside the timeline for getting it online and next steps that we think are reasonable for getting a well-thought out incentive program up and running.
Thank you for raising this point.
The requirement for delegates to comment their rationales within 5 days will not apply retroactively. Assuming that the RAD proposal goes to Snapshot today, for proposals that took place between Nov 1 and Dec 11, delegates will have until Dec 16 (5 days after the RAD proposal hypothetically passes), to comment their rationales.
I agree with this.
A delegate is not necessarily commenting on the proposal, but posting the rationale behind their own vote, which is a very personal statement. That rationale is very useful, especially if a proposal fails (like DIP 2.0), as it enables sentiment analysis / vibe checking.
I agree with this.
A delegate is not necessarily commenting on the proposal, but posting the rationale behind their own vote, which is a very personal statement. That rationale is very useful, especially if a proposal fails (like DIP 2.0), as it enables sentiment analysis / vibe checking.
Today, rationale posted by delegates, is pretty good and reasonable by them. If people have a change of heart and post AI slop, it will be obvious to everyone including OpCo/program manager. Subjectivity is not “is this the best rationale in the world” but “does it actually represent the delegates view?”.
on the forum? on the snapshot and onchain vote reason fields? on both? on any of the above?
on the forum? on the snapshot and onchain vote reason fields? on both? on any of the above?
Hi @paulofonseca, delegates will need to publicly post their rationales on the forum (either in the proposal’s thread or in their own delegate thread). Because rewards are distributed on a per-proposal basis, delegates should submit their rationales within five days of the end of each voting phase (we have updated the proposal accordingly). For example, if a proposal includes both a temperature check and a subsequent on-chain vote, delegates should provide their rationale for each phase.
As of today, we have in address for incentives around 7M arb equivalent to 1.5M usd, and arb at 0.21$. While we could theorize that this monthly expenditure could be above or beyond, because is based on amount of votes and amount of delegates, we can say that this budget should last based on projection for 3 to 4 years. In the even of ARB below 5 cents, this budget would instead only last for 1 year.
Was any thought put into this piece of feedback?
Thanks for your questions, @JoJo.
As stated, this proposal aims to optimize for the dollar spent per vote cast. Accordingly, the remaining funds from DIP 1.7 have no impact on the budget outlined here. It will be up to the PM and OpCo to adjust the quarterly budget and payout strategies moving forward, taking broader macro conditions into account as well.
We do have around 16200 in rewards distributed this way if we just assume that each delegates in the 18 list has 1M in voting power. Considering the names, that at 4M we have 1.6k in rewards and at 8M we have 1.8K in rewards, we can safely assume an average of 1.2k each delegates to round this at 21800 usd per september.
This is especially true due to this table
| Proposal type | Incentive Budget | Payout Cap | Minimum voting power |
|---|---|---|---|
| On-chain constitutional quorum | 15,000 USD | 700 USD | 200k ARB |
| On-chain non-constitutional quorum | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional) | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain election | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain temperature check (non-binding) | 5,000 USD | 300 USD | 200k ARB |
In here, I do see
But we have ARB token as reserve.There is a mismatch in this accounting and operational system that will lead to the problems we have seen in several programs such as the grant ones based and denominated in ARB.
On the table above I also have another question: what was the rationale to come down to these payouts for each proposal? Was it done through a study of history of previous set of proposals, was it done taking in account other grant programs in other DAOs, was it done taking in account budget and runaway? It would be good to know the rationale behind, knowing that 1) is stated that all budget are studied and changed if any quarterly 2) we are seeing a tendency of having less votes 3) but also historically we have seen voting clusters in certain period.
We also benchmarked against recent DIP 1.7 payout data. As shown in the simulations using September and October’s DIP 1.7 results, median earners from the September cohort would receive a similar amount (less compared to September data but more compared to October data) under the RAD Program.
Looking ahead, the PM and OpCo will review the data from the RAD Program and determine how and whether to adjust the budget on a quarterly basis. This data will also help inform the financial cost of pushing a proposal through the DAO, allowing the program to further optimize the dollar-spent-per-vote-cast metric.
Each of those questions requires a different level of tracking effort, which will affect the amount of work needed to comply with the rule.
Can you clarify this point?
Delegates must meet the minimum voting power threshold at the beginning of each proposal’s voting period and (as you suggested) must also maintain an average voting power at or above this threshold throughout the relevant month. We have modified the proposal accordingly. The PM and OpCo will evaluate data from the RAD Program and may modify this clause in the future if needed.
so this criteria needs to be way more defined, because in one extreme if a delegate can get paid for voting with any vote rationale, without any subjective criteria to evaluate that vote rationale, then way more delegates than today will post way more AI slop comments on the forum, just to check that box.
I recommend that this program should drop this criteria entirely. So delegates would be paid for voting only, and it doesn’t matter if they vote with a rationale of “just because” or a fully fledged articulated rationale essay with over 400 words.
Otherwise, this program will need a team to subjectively assess the quality of the vote rationales and score them with rubrics and… we are back to DIP 1.5 when the results were taking 3 weeks to show up and the DAO was spending way too much money on the admin of this, supposedly simpler, program.
The OpCo has the authority to update the program. If participants begin abusing it with AI-generated content, the OpCo can establish rules to address such behavior.
We understand that OpCo will handle the operational side, but this structure may incentivize a higher number of votes (whether Temperature Checks or on-chain) purely to increase delegate compensation within the DAO — effectively creating a sybil vector for delegate remuneration.
Because the RAD Program’s design is more objective than previous DIP programs, issuing payments on a per-proposal basis ensures that rewards closely reflect the amount of work conducted by delegates.
While this could potentially strengthen the DAO’s economic security — with more people voting and helping to reach quorum — it may also end up consuming the entire budget allocated to the RAD, potentially exceeding the US$32K/month illustrated in the proposal.
As stated in the proposal, the OpCo may choose not to issue rewards in certain cases to prevent potential abuse—such as an influx of unnecessary proposals or proposals considered to be minor in scope.
In addition, clearer rules for compensation should be established, such as requiring a minimum level of participation in votes, as is already the case with DIPs. This would ensure that only delegates who consistently maintain a defined participation threshold remain eligible for compensation.
Has any simulation been conducted to demonstrate that this approach is more efficient than a fixed monthly payment tied to a minimum participation requirement from delegates?
You can review the hypothetical RAD payout figures based on DIP 1.7 data from September and October. Looking ahead, if the RAD Program passes, the PM and OpCo will analyze data from its initial months to determine how and whether to adjust the budget and payout strategies.
The recording of The Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program: Open Discussion #1 can be accessed here:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zF6N3RsL4FTSOHbjsMnfshEq-_x6ZKWh/view
We will be hosting a governance call on this proposal on Friday, November 28.
The Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program: Open Discussion #1 Friday, November 28 · 14:00 – 15:00 Time zone: UTC Video call link: https://meet.google.com/wna-nyco-zxf
Hi all!
I want to provide some context on what happened after the DIP 2.0 proposal failed.
We collected all the feedback from the temperature check vote and used that data to decide next steps. To summarise some of the key points:
Hi all!
I want to provide some context on what happened after the DIP 2.0 proposal failed.
We collected all the feedback from the temperature check vote and used that data to decide next steps. To summarise some of the key points:
Specifically for delegate incentives. The feedback focused on making participation as simple as possible with fewest barriers to entry.
After going through the feedback, we have decided to work on a series of proposals that builds up the incentive program for delegates and contributors. This first proposal, focused only on delegate voting, was put together with the intention of getting it online as soon as reasonably possible to ensure everyone has an opportunity to read it, discuss it, and provide their thoughts.
If it is approved, it is set to currently be retrospective back to the 1st November, although interestingly I’ve had discussions with several delegates now who believe that it might be better to have a detox period before restarting the incentive grant. I’d be interested to hear more thoughts on this on the forum or elsewhere.
Anyway, I hope this provides some transparency on how we approached this proposal, alongside the timeline for getting it online and next steps that we think are reasonable for getting a well-thought out incentive program up and running.
Voted FOR on this proposal, as I appreciated the simplicity of the new system and feel it’s an upgrade over previous incentive systems.
The OpCo team is super lean right now, and taking on every administrative task for all the different initiatives we are involved with will quickly lead to us being at capacity and unable to do anything else. Strategically leveraging external help when needed can amplify our capacity.
Even if we hired someone in-house, the scope of work (and likely the cost as well) would still be similar. Might as well contract SEED, who have been doing this for a while and do not need much hand-holding.
Voted FOR on this proposal, as I appreciated the simplicity of the new system and feel it’s an upgrade over previous incentive systems.
The OpCo team is super lean right now, and taking on every administrative task for all the different initiatives we are involved with will quickly lead to us being at capacity and unable to do anything else. Strategically leveraging external help when needed can amplify our capacity.
Even if we hired someone in-house, the scope of work (and likely the cost as well) would still be similar. Might as well contract SEED, who have been doing this for a while and do not need much hand-holding.
Could you clarify? I must have mistakenly thought that OpCo exists so you can handle operational activities yourself and not hire anyone. Is this a common practice for operational activities, or are you doing this temporarily due to the lack of a full-time staff?
I voted abstain, acknowledging the need for a delegate incentive program, but not fully convinced by the current implementation.
voting Abstain on this offchain vote because I will receive rewards from this program if this proposal passes.
you mean all 6,882,488.93526075817 ARB in the multisig, right? not just the 2,000,000 ARB that is in the transaction queue right now, right?
I voted FOR
I consistently vote for programs that are objective, and this one is one of them. Its effectiveness can be debated, but it’s undoubtedly the best decision in the last year regarding delegate incentives.
We voted abstain for this proposal. We appreciate the intention behind this program and the broader effort to encourage more consistent delegate participation. Having delegates actively vote and share their reasoning adds transparency and provides valuable insight for proposers who rely on genuine feedback to improve their work.
But, we share the concern regarding the current minimum voting power requirement. The threshold is quite high and excludes a significant number of delegates who are active, who participate in votes, and who take the time to explain their positions. These contributors strengthen the governance process, yet under the current structure they are unable to benefit from the incentives.
We voted abstain for this proposal. We appreciate the intention behind this program and the broader effort to encourage more consistent delegate participation. Having delegates actively vote and share their reasoning adds transparency and provides valuable insight for proposers who rely on genuine feedback to improve their work.
But, we share the concern regarding the current minimum voting power requirement. The threshold is quite high and excludes a significant number of delegates who are active, who participate in votes, and who take the time to explain their positions. These contributors strengthen the governance process, yet under the current structure they are unable to benefit from the incentives.
Because of this, we are not in favor at this stage
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
For the sake of maintaining quorum and ensuring that important proposals do not get stuck in gridlock, we see this program as a necessary step. Incentivizing active participation will help keep the DAO functioning smoothly and reduce voter apathy over time.
On the aspect of posting rationales, we are definitely in favour. It is a basic principle every delegate should follow. Sharing rationales not only adds transparency but also helps delegators clearly see how and why their delegate voted. Many delegates, including several with less than 200k voting power, already follow this practice, and formalizing it through a structured program will only strengthen governance standards.
We hope that future iterations will review the 200k ARB minimum threshold so more active mid-size delegates can take part, and that clear reporting standards are maintained to track cost-effectiveness and participation impact.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and is based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
From our perspective, RAD is a simple and direct program. While it does not address all the issues we had with previous programs, it is at least narrowly scoped and has a clear goal.
We voted FOR the proposal.
There are some changes that should be made to make the RAD more open to smaller delegates, and we do not fully agree with the per-proposal payment logic.
However, with the OpCo and the PM in place, we believe that adjustments can be made throughout the program to make RAD more efficient and inclusive.
We’re voting FOR. After months of back-and-forth, RAD feels like a practical baseline: clear mechanics, simple ops, and rationales back in the mix to get large delegates voting and explaining their points of view.
Separately (outside RAD), we’d like to see a stakeholder/participant incentive track that rewards impact and is anchored to explicit DAO goals. This would be unrelated to VP and the piece that will align day-to-day contributions with where the DAO is trying to go.
Thank you for the proposal.
Since this “war” continues, and I’m using the same word I use in my delegate thread, I will express myself very openly.
I believe that this entire issue is a clash of conflicting individuals or entities within the DAO. The only thing we have achieved so far is division. The numbers in this proposal show it clearly: Polarization!
I voted YES, but I want to mention that I agree with a lot of what @Entropy is saying, a voting reward detox could be healthy. But also the work has been done and this is a great foundation to build off... so why wait. I like that this vote is close and I think we win whether it succeeds or fails. :popcorn:
I also agree that we've spent way too much time talking about delegate incentives and I don't want us getting stuck but I believe passing this through with clear rules and expectations should allow the DAO to focus. If this proposal fails, I hope we can shelf it for at least 2 months.
Voted in favor, although I couldn’t be part of the program due to having less than the required 200K $ARB VP.
After reading the discussions, what really surprised me is that some of the DAO’s service providers—who charge millions of dollars a year and generate controversy every year around their budget—are complaining that spending time and resources on this initiative isn’t worth it. Why? Maybe because they are already safe and the rest doesn’t matter as much.
Can you explain the logic behind your vote?
You voted for the highly controversial adoption of DIP version 1.7, which contained many subjective points. And in this version, after the Foundation has truly considered all the comments and removed all subjective parameters, you're voting against it?
Can you explain the logic behind your vote?
You voted for the highly controversial adoption of DIP version 1.7, which contained many subjective points. And in this version, after the Foundation has truly considered all the comments and removed all subjective parameters, you're voting against it?
This is doubly strange, since you're essentially a superdelegate with a huge budget. That said, I think you should have participated in the discussion of this proposal, rather than just writing about the vote itself.
Could you clarify? I must have mistakenly thought that OpCo exists so you can handle operational activities yourself and not hire anyone. Is this a common practice for operational activities, or are you doing this temporarily due to the lack of a full-time staff?
I voted abstain, acknowledging the need for a delegate incentive program, but not fully convinced by the current implementation.
voting Abstain on this offchain vote because I will receive rewards from this program if this proposal passes.
you mean all 6,882,488.93526075817 ARB in the multisig, right? not just the 2,000,000 ARB that is in the transaction queue right now, right?
I voted FOR
I consistently vote for programs that are objective, and this one is one of them. Its effectiveness can be debated, but it’s undoubtedly the best decision in the last year regarding delegate incentives.
We voted abstain for this proposal. We appreciate the intention behind this program and the broader effort to encourage more consistent delegate participation. Having delegates actively vote and share their reasoning adds transparency and provides valuable insight for proposers who rely on genuine feedback to improve their work.
But, we share the concern regarding the current minimum voting power requirement. The threshold is quite high and excludes a significant number of delegates who are active, who participate in votes, and who take the time to explain their positions. These contributors strengthen the governance process, yet under the current structure they are unable to benefit from the incentives.
We voted abstain for this proposal. We appreciate the intention behind this program and the broader effort to encourage more consistent delegate participation. Having delegates actively vote and share their reasoning adds transparency and provides valuable insight for proposers who rely on genuine feedback to improve their work.
But, we share the concern regarding the current minimum voting power requirement. The threshold is quite high and excludes a significant number of delegates who are active, who participate in votes, and who take the time to explain their positions. These contributors strengthen the governance process, yet under the current structure they are unable to benefit from the incentives.
Because of this, we are not in favor at this stage
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
For the sake of maintaining quorum and ensuring that important proposals do not get stuck in gridlock, we see this program as a necessary step. Incentivizing active participation will help keep the DAO functioning smoothly and reduce voter apathy over time.
On the aspect of posting rationales, we are definitely in favour. It is a basic principle every delegate should follow. Sharing rationales not only adds transparency but also helps delegators clearly see how and why their delegate voted. Many delegates, including several with less than 200k voting power, already follow this practice, and formalizing it through a structured program will only strengthen governance standards.
We hope that future iterations will review the 200k ARB minimum threshold so more active mid-size delegates can take part, and that clear reporting standards are maintained to track cost-effectiveness and participation impact.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and is based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
From our perspective, RAD is a simple and direct program. While it does not address all the issues we had with previous programs, it is at least narrowly scoped and has a clear goal.
We voted FOR the proposal.
There are some changes that should be made to make the RAD more open to smaller delegates, and we do not fully agree with the per-proposal payment logic.
However, with the OpCo and the PM in place, we believe that adjustments can be made throughout the program to make RAD more efficient and inclusive.
We’re voting FOR. After months of back-and-forth, RAD feels like a practical baseline: clear mechanics, simple ops, and rationales back in the mix to get large delegates voting and explaining their points of view.
Separately (outside RAD), we’d like to see a stakeholder/participant incentive track that rewards impact and is anchored to explicit DAO goals. This would be unrelated to VP and the piece that will align day-to-day contributions with where the DAO is trying to go.
Thank you for the proposal.
Since this “war” continues, and I’m using the same word I use in my delegate thread, I will express myself very openly.
I believe that this entire issue is a clash of conflicting individuals or entities within the DAO. The only thing we have achieved so far is division. The numbers in this proposal show it clearly: Polarization!
I voted YES, but I want to mention that I agree with a lot of what @Entropy is saying, a voting reward detox could be healthy. But also the work has been done and this is a great foundation to build off... so why wait. I like that this vote is close and I think we win whether it succeeds or fails. :popcorn:
I also agree that we've spent way too much time talking about delegate incentives and I don't want us getting stuck but I believe passing this through with clear rules and expectations should allow the DAO to focus. If this proposal fails, I hope we can shelf it for at least 2 months.
Voted in favor, although I couldn’t be part of the program due to having less than the required 200K $ARB VP.
After reading the discussions, what really surprised me is that some of the DAO’s service providers—who charge millions of dollars a year and generate controversy every year around their budget—are complaining that spending time and resources on this initiative isn’t worth it. Why? Maybe because they are already safe and the rest doesn’t matter as much.
Can you explain the logic behind your vote?
You voted for the highly controversial adoption of DIP version 1.7, which contained many subjective points. And in this version, after the Foundation has truly considered all the comments and removed all subjective parameters, you're voting against it?
Can you explain the logic behind your vote?
You voted for the highly controversial adoption of DIP version 1.7, which contained many subjective points. And in this version, after the Foundation has truly considered all the comments and removed all subjective parameters, you're voting against it?
This is doubly strange, since you're essentially a superdelegate with a huge budget. That said, I think you should have participated in the discussion of this proposal, rather than just writing about the vote itself.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and is based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
From our perspective, RAD is a simple and direct program. While it does not address all the issues we had with previous programs, it is at least narrowly scoped and has a clear goal.
However, we share some of the reservations mentioned in this thread. It is important to keep in mind that this program incentivizes (and therefore expects) only voting with rationale, nothing more. A “vote + rationale” rule naturally invites template-style posts, and in our opinion, it is perfectly acceptable to have them. If someone doesn’t have many thoughts on a given proposal, we would prefer them to publish a short, template-based rationale rather than try to produce a multi-page explanation of what ChatGPT thinks about the matter. We trust that delegates who want to express their voice on decisions made in the DAO and present extensively their point of view will continue doing so, with or without incentives. After all, we believe that the impact that a thoughtful, reasonable, and mindfully presented voice in the DAO has on the future of the Arbitrum ecosystem is itself a reward and an incentive.
That said, we are not sure if the budgets are set correctly for the given scope. In our opinion, for this scope, they could have been set lower, especially since they put a certain pricetag for each vote - setting that expectation now can lead to voting apathy in the future if we lower the rewards or cancel them altogether.
Furthermore, OpCo’s discretion to adjust or pause rewards is useful, but it should be exercised transparently to avoid unpredictability and any potential abuse of power.
Finally, we understand that OpCo is still deciding whether to appoint a Program Manager. Whatever the decision, we would welcome a short public note explaining the choice, who will be accountable (OpCo itself, the Arbitrum Foundation, or a PM), and the scope, KPIs, reporting cadence, and expected cost. If a PM is appointed, please clarify the selection criteria and SLAs; if not, outline how operations will run without one and who the main point of contact will be.
Thank you for the proposal.
Since this “war” continues, and I’m using the same word I use in my delegate thread, I will express myself very openly.
I believe that this entire issue is a clash of conflicting individuals or entities within the DAO. The only thing we have achieved so far is division. The numbers in this proposal show it clearly: Polarization!
I see the repeated argument that we are trying to reduce costs. However, the DAO gives (or gave) far larger amounts of money to teams or programs that in no way justify receiving such levels of funding. Either because they produce no revenue, or because they fail to produce the expected revenue. So why such hostility toward the delegates, who are supposed to be the foundation of the DAO?
The chart below was created using data I pulled today, December 10th, from Karmaq.
Below 500,000 total voting power sits 40% of the top 20 delegates, with only one delegate (5%) in the 200,000–500,000 range.
Therefore, this proposal at the moment is, in my opinion, punitive toward smaller delegates (<200000 tokens).
It would be perfectly reasonable to include a clause that delegates with less than 200,000 voting power count as (for example) two delegates collectively, even if more individuals qualify (as is the case now), and the amount that would normally correspond to two delegates could be distributed among them proportionally to their Karmaq score. Such an approach would increase the sense of equality within the ecosystem and make people feel that the time they invest actually matters.
Personally, although I am among those who will feel the consequences, I am not concerned. I will continue to be part of the community as much as I can.
But why do I disagree with what is happening?
If we add up all the tokens held by delegates with less than 200,000, it amounts to more than 3 million tokens and over 70 delegates. Yesterday, December 9th, I once again saw one of our most highly funded organizations, OpCo, request brainstorming ideas for increasing revenue, either from existing programs or new ones. Yet by cutting the incentive for so many people to participate actively, you reduce the chances that someone will bring you such an idea. Yes…in the name of cost reduction…reduce the amount they receive, but don’t push them away by offering zero.
I say all of this with full respect. Of course, my vote will be AGAINST, based on everything stated above.
I voted YES, but I want to mention that I agree with a lot of what @Entropy is saying, a voting reward detox could be healthy. But also the work has been done and this is a great foundation to build off... so why wait. I like that this vote is close and I think we win whether it succeeds or fails. :popcorn:
I also agree that we've spent way too much time talking about delegate incentives and I don't want us getting stuck but I believe passing this through with clear rules and expectations should allow the DAO to focus. If this proposal fails, I hope we can shelf it for at least 2 months.
ALSO I want to reiterate that I would have loved to see a design that creates long term incentive alignment. Things like rewarding with locked tokens or even increased delegation. That's the biggest thing missing in the current proposal.. but i think it could be added in later.
I think the DAO needs closure on this topic so we can focus on more meaningful work. RAD sets a baseline and lets us move on. The way I look at it is Arbitrum got this massive advisory board (delegates) to receive advice from.
Side note: It's very interesting to know how much every vote will cost and how this will affect our proposal backlog and how the DAO will use delegates' time. This system shows clearly how expensive it is to make a vote in the DAO and I think that is pretty cool.
Voted in favor, although I couldn’t be part of the program due to having less than the required 200K $ARB VP.
After reading the discussions, what really surprised me is that some of the DAO’s service providers—who charge millions of dollars a year and generate controversy every year around their budget—are complaining that spending time and resources on this initiative isn’t worth it. Why? Maybe because they are already safe and the rest doesn’t matter as much.
When the DAO’s own research shows that there are pure voters who consistently participate without any incentives, a proposal like this makes a lot of sense. These voters have already proven their commitment, and this program encourages them to participate even more and formalizes them within the DAO.
Especially for Arbitrum DAO—one of the leaders in DAO experimentation and new initiatives—we’ve had several failed experiments that cost a lot. So calling this program, which helps formalize potential governance voters into active governance participants and future experts, a “waste of resources” feels completely backwards.
I’ve personally been one of these “potential voters” who eventually became a delegate. Even though I haven’t been very active on the forum lately—mainly because of the new threshold criteria and relatively low incentives compared to the time and effort required—I still maintain a relatively high voting participation rate.
So I appreciate @Arbitrum for proposing this program. I’m sure that, in the future, the market will reward us with a significant premium for having such diverse voters and delegates.
I’ve signaled my vote in favor or this proposal. I’m of the opinion that delegate incentives in some form are necessary for the long term viability of the DAO, for the simple reason that we should not reasonably expect long term active and thoughtful participation from unpaid labor. I think that regarding the growth in delegated votes / continued participation during periods without incentives, “past performance is not indicative of future results”; in fact, given the ongoing proposals of incentive programs — including occasional suggestions of retroactive rewards — it seems plausible that a not-insignificant amount of voting / forum activity has been motivated by the hope/expectation of some such program being put in place eventually.
While I think much of the feedback and criticism has been valuable, I don’t see any of it as decisive and believe that blocking the proposal would be a case of letting perfect be the enemy of the good (presuming one believes having an some form of incentive program is worthwhile to begin with). E.g.,
I’ve signaled my vote in favor or this proposal. I’m of the opinion that delegate incentives in some form are necessary for the long term viability of the DAO, for the simple reason that we should not reasonably expect long term active and thoughtful participation from unpaid labor. I think that regarding the growth in delegated votes / continued participation during periods without incentives, “past performance is not indicative of future results”; in fact, given the ongoing proposals of incentive programs — including occasional suggestions of retroactive rewards — it seems plausible that a not-insignificant amount of voting / forum activity has been motivated by the hope/expectation of some such program being put in place eventually.
While I think much of the feedback and criticism has been valuable, I don’t see any of it as decisive and believe that blocking the proposal would be a case of letting perfect be the enemy of the good (presuming one believes having an some form of incentive program is worthwhile to begin with). E.g.,
- Concerns about spam / AI-slop forum posts are valid, but this is ultimately unpreventable. Given that this requirement likely won’t make a major difference in either direction (as discussed, we’d expect to see active forum participation regardless), I believe that all things equal this requirement is a positive one to nudge things in the direction of transparency. I would trust OpCo with the authority to judge cases of obvious, egregious abuse and withhold rewards accordingly.
- Questions around the cadences of snapshots can be fairly easily clarified, and AFAICT, no option should impose any significant administrative overhead.
Etc.
Some suggested modifications that were brought up (namely by @blockful / @Zeptimus / @cp0x ) that I would support:
Overall, I believe that this proposal is a good starting point and improvement over prior incentive programs with its emphasis on simplicity and objective criteria. Affirming my support.
gm, voted FOR.
This feels like a reasonable starting point for delegates. I’d still like to see more value brought by delegates beyond just voting, but I see RAD as the first step toward that, with room for contributors to add value in new ways in the future.
gm, voted FOR.
This feels like a reasonable starting point for delegates. I’d still like to see more value brought by delegates beyond just voting, but I see RAD as the first step toward that, with room for contributors to add value in new ways in the future.
I think in general delegate incentives make sense: yes, most of us would probably do this for free, but RAD recognizes the actual time spent and pushes for better quality work. Clear rules also help large holders and structured groups model potential earnings and decide how they want to engage in governance.
That said, as Entropy pointed out, this topic has dominated the DAO’s attention. Hopefully passing it lets us move on and focus on what actually matters for the DAO’s future (strategy? revenue? attracting builders?). We can always iterate once we have more data.
There is certainly a risk of AI slop in any voting rationale. It’s fair to allow for some subjectivity in determining whether a particular rationale is AI-generated. If it’s egregious, delegate rewards should not be given.
The reality is we all have access to GenAI, and use it in our workflows in different ways. To the extent that you cannot tell the difference between a human or AI, we have to accept the fact that the two inform each other.
There is certainly a risk of AI slop in any voting rationale. It’s fair to allow for some subjectivity in determining whether a particular rationale is AI-generated. If it’s egregious, delegate rewards should not be given.
The reality is we all have access to GenAI, and use it in our workflows in different ways. To the extent that you cannot tell the difference between a human or AI, we have to accept the fact that the two inform each other.
I believe we should execute on this proposal, and if AI slop drastically increases, then new mechanisms could be put in place to adress the issue. I’m not entirely confident that legitimate delegates will suddenly resort to AI the second this proposal is passed.
Entropy has voted against the RAD program.
Since the passing of DIP v1.5 a little over a year ago, the conversation surrounding delegate incentives has continuously been a polarizing topic and consumed a large amount of delegate bandwidth. To be clear, this is not to discredit SeedGov as they took on a very challenging task with DIP v1.5-1.7, but with the RAD program requiring rationales we fear that we’re heading back down the same path.
Entropy has voted against the RAD program.
Since the passing of DIP v1.5 a little over a year ago, the conversation surrounding delegate incentives has continuously been a polarizing topic and consumed a large amount of delegate bandwidth. To be clear, this is not to discredit SeedGov as they took on a very challenging task with DIP v1.5-1.7, but with the RAD program requiring rationales we fear that we’re heading back down the same path.
At this point, Entropy views the discussion as having largely devolved into something non-productive, similar to incentives pre-detox period. Additionally, our team is not convinced that incentives for voting are a worthwhile expense, especially with the recent influx of new delegations that has raised the amount of active voting power and the upcoming DVP-Quorum proposal. When considering that the Arbitrum Foundation is continuing to engage in re-delegation efforts with large tokenholders and with this program the DAO would be paying ~$30k a month for voting incentives (based on September and October data), Entropy believes it is more prudent to go without any delegate rewards for several months to observe the impacts and reset the conversation.
I will be voting FOR this proposal. While I believe there are still areas that can be improved, the alternatives on the table make the direction clear. When choosing between extending DIP 1.7 or adopting this RAD framework, this proposal is the better option and moves in the right direction.
I agree with blockful on the 200k VP threshold. Given the simplified requirements and the removal of subjective assessments, I believe participation could be open to anyone, with rewards calculated in proportion to each ARB of voting power. One could even argue that two delegates with 100k each provide more value than one delegate with 200k. Two rationales, two perspectives, as long as compensation is proportional to VP.
I will be voting FOR this proposal. While I believe there are still areas that can be improved, the alternatives on the table make the direction clear. When choosing between extending DIP 1.7 or adopting this RAD framework, this proposal is the better option and moves in the right direction.
I agree with blockful on the 200k VP threshold. Given the simplified requirements and the removal of subjective assessments, I believe participation could be open to anyone, with rewards calculated in proportion to each ARB of voting power. One could even argue that two delegates with 100k each provide more value than one delegate with 200k. Two rationales, two perspectives, as long as compensation is proportional to VP.
I also agree with paulofonseca on removing the payout caps. Getting rid of caps would avoid unnecessary speculation or conspiracy theories while costing the DAO the same amount overall. If the incentive budget is fixed for each proposal, redistribution through caps does not change the total cost. It simply distorts how the rewards are distributed.
Something I have been vocal about before is vesting. Delegate incentives paid in ARB should promote alignment over the long term and a healthier governance culture. Vesting payouts would encourage delegates to think in terms of multiple years, and one could even justify a higher reward rate for vested payments. This is especially true considering that ARB appreciation over the long term could naturally compensate participants.
but “does it actually represent the delegates view?”.
how would you be able to tell that a rationale that is AI generated doesn't represent a delegates view?
how would you be able to tell that a rationale that is AI generated doesn't represent a delegates view?
This criteria will lead to some legit delegate being excluded from getting rewards because their rationale is deemed not "good" enough by the PM.
So either there are very clear guidelines as to when to exclude delegates from getting rewards, like a binary check of "the delegate has posted any kind of rationale within the specified timeframe" or not, otherwise, we will get again into a subjective assessment of contributions.
I should also add that there have been many cases, in the past, of delegates posting comments on the forum at the time of voting saying "voted For and the vote rationale will be published later" and then editing that comment several weeks later to actually explain why they voted in that way. And since this proposal establishes a maximum period with which the delegate needs to post a rationale on the forum, the OpCo/PM should make sure to take into account this kind of behavior as well.
I hope that will be the case. And that nobody will be punished by writing certain types of rationales.
I vote in favor of this proposal.
The design introduces a clear and concrete incentive to vote and to share the rationale behind that vote, so that there is public signaling of the stakeholders vision and alignment with the different proposed paths.
I vote in favor of this proposal.
The design introduces a clear and concrete incentive to vote and to share the rationale behind that vote, so that there is public signaling of the stakeholders vision and alignment with the different proposed paths.
The reduction in amounts aligns with the lower workload required under this system. With the OpCo in place, there is now a full-time team whose responsibilities include facilitating the stakeholders engagement with the DAO, digesting information, and enabling a strong feedback loop to support decision-making, while preventing an excessive burden on those who must dedicate their time to building their products.
Lastly, I consider this proposal to be one of several ongoing initiatives aimed at strengthening Arbitrum’s governance. It should not be treated or evaluated as the sole solution, but rather as part of a broader, comprehensive effort to reinforce our governance processes and stakeholders engagement.
*This vote and opinion are my own and do not represent the OAT nor the views of any of its members
:green_circle: Overall, this program is one of the most well-thought-out and objective:
:red_circle: However, there are also some cons:
:green_circle: Overall, this program is one of the most well-thought-out and objective:
:red_circle: However, there are also some cons:
The payment calculations are based on the worst program in my opinion, DIP 1.7, which has been constantly criticized for its unfairness. It would have been more appropriate to use at least version 1.5. Also, consider that the PM's costs will be lower, and these funds can be allocated to delegates as well.
Naturally, I calculated that at the moment, with 205,000 delegations, I will receive an average of $100 per month for voting. Therefore, perhaps now or in the future, we could distribute payments on a quadratic basis – at least present calculations based on these calculations to everyone so that everyone can compare and decide which option is better.
I agree with Paulo regarding the new conditions. In general, any initiative that imposes conditions retroactively is a bad decision. Anything that deviates from the standard conditions and requirements previously applied should be adopted only after the voting on those conditions has concluded. for voting—this program is clearly designed only for large delegates. Therefore, perhaps now or in the future, we could distribute payments on a quadratic basis—at least present calculations based on these calculations to everyone so that everyone can compare and decide which option is better. We must either begin payments from the moment the proposal is accepted, or take into account the results of previous votes without additional conditions.
I believe/hope that most people use AI before voting to sort through large texts, rather than afterward to simply justify their vote. It's difficult to verify, but it's logical to do so. Therefore, explanations may use AI data, but it's not just junk.
I still believe this is a necessary measure to always understand why someone voted the way they did. Personally, I need this information; it's how I assess the validity of delegates' votes and draw my own conclusions.
I believe/hope that most people use AI before voting to sort through large texts, rather than afterward to simply justify their vote. It's difficult to verify, but it's logical to do so. Therefore, explanations may use AI data, but it's not just junk.
I still believe this is a necessary measure to always understand why someone voted the way they did. Personally, I need this information; it's how I assess the validity of delegates' votes and draw my own conclusions.
Also, it's not subjective: you're free to write whatever you want there.
We are voting in favor of this proposal.
The program sets up a straightforward incentive for delegates to vote and share their rationales publicly. That alone helps improve transparency and gives the community a clearer picture of how different stakeholders view each proposal. It also makes it easier for proposers to understand feedback and refine future work.
We are voting in favor of this proposal.
The program sets up a straightforward incentive for delegates to vote and share their rationales publicly. That alone helps improve transparency and gives the community a clearer picture of how different stakeholders view each proposal. It also makes it easier for proposers to understand feedback and refine future work.
We do have one concern around the current minimum voting power requirement. It feels a bit high for where the DAO is right now, and it leaves out many active delegates. That said, this is something that can be revisited as the program runs and as more data comes in. We do not see it as a blocker to getting started.
Since Curia previously received an Arbitrum grant to build governance analytics (Arbitrum Dashboard), we are also happy to support the @OpCo by providing data on voting activity, rationale participation, and other governance signals. If our work can help the OpCo review proposals or monitor the health of the system more easily, we are glad to contribute.
Overall, this proposal moves governance in a constructive direction, and we support giving it a chance to run while continuing to refine the details as the DAO learns more.
Your suggestion (removing rationales from DIP eligibility) means that a lot of delegates would not reveal their reasons why they voted this or the other way. That is a far worse outcome than having a few slop posts here and there.
so this criteria needs to be way more defined, because in one extreme if a delegate can get paid for voting with any vote rationale, without any subjective criteria to evaluate that vote rationale, then way more delegates than today will post way more AI slop comments on the forum, just to check that box.
Echoing @JoJo's comment, if this proposal is mature enough to go to a vote soon and, as mentioned in the proposal text, is meant to secure continuity regarding rewarding voting activities, there is no need to have a vote on the other proposal.
Regarding the RAD proposal itself, it is missing a bit of granularity to prevent issues while the program is running, for example.
Echoing @JoJo's comment, if this proposal is mature enough to go to a vote soon and, as mentioned in the proposal text, is meant to secure continuity regarding rewarding voting activities, there is no need to have a vote on the other proposal.
Regarding the RAD proposal itself, it is missing a bit of granularity to prevent issues while the program is running, for example.
When mentioning the minimum voting power for eligibility (table below):
Each of those questions requires a different level of tracking effort, which will affect the amount of work needed to comply with the rule.
Can you clarify this point?
Because rewards are distributed on a per-proposal basis, delegates should submit their rationales within five days of the end of each voting phase (we have updated the proposal accordingly). For example, if a proposal includes both a temperature check and a subsequent on-chain vote, delegates should provide their rationale for each phase.
The proposal appears to have incorporated the delegates’ feedback after DIP 2.0 failed to pass governance. However, there are still some open questions regarding the decisions made within the RAD.
What is the rationale for making payments on a per-vote basis in governance?
The proposal appears to have incorporated the delegates’ feedback after DIP 2.0 failed to pass governance. However, there are still some open questions regarding the decisions made within the RAD.
What is the rationale for making payments on a per-vote basis in governance?
We understand that OpCo will handle the operational side, but this structure may incentivize a higher number of votes (whether Temperature Checks or on-chain) purely to increase delegate compensation within the DAO — effectively creating a sybil vector for delegate remuneration.
While this could potentially strengthen the DAO’s economic security — with more people voting and helping to reach quorum — it may also end up consuming the entire budget allocated to the RAD, potentially exceeding the US$32K/month illustrated in the proposal.
In addition, clearer rules for compensation should be established, such as requiring a minimum level of participation in votes, as is already the case with DIPs. This would ensure that only delegates who consistently maintain a defined participation threshold remain eligible for compensation.
Has any simulation been conducted to demonstrate that this approach is more efficient than a fixed monthly payment tied to a minimum participation requirement from delegates?
The minimum Voting Power (VP) required to be eligible for rewards is set at 200K $ARB. As discussed during the Arbitrum event at Devconnect, the goal was to strike a balance between the 500K $ARB threshold of the previous proposal and the previous 50K $ARB threshold.
However, this is still a high threshold for most delegates. When DIP 2.0 was proposed, there were already criticisms regarding the exclusion of many delegates from the incentive program.
We understand the logic of incentivizing wallets with higher VP to participate in governance, helping to reach quorum and keep the DAO operational. Nevertheless, this decision reduces incentives for broader participation in Arbitrum governance, effectively preserving the same 8 to 10 delegates who are paid to vote and engage in forum discussions.
As suggested by cp0x, a smaller incentive program for delegates with VP below 200K could be designed by OpCo or by the broader community. This way, the programs would be separated, but incentives for both large and small VP holders would remain aligned.
Another suggestion is to hold another "redelegation week", as already done on Arbitrum. This would allow smaller delegates interested in participating to obtain more VP, receive incentives, and participate in governance.
publicly post rationale
on the forum? on the snapshot and onchain vote reason fields? on both? on any of the above?
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and is based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
From our perspective, RAD is a simple and direct program. While it does not address all the issues we had with previous programs, it is at least narrowly scoped and has a clear goal.
However, we share some of the reservations mentioned in this thread. It is important to keep in mind that this program incentivizes (and therefore expects) only voting with rationale, nothing more. A “vote + rationale” rule naturally invites template-style posts, and in our opinion, it is perfectly acceptable to have them. If someone doesn’t have many thoughts on a given proposal, we would prefer them to publish a short, template-based rationale rather than try to produce a multi-page explanation of what ChatGPT thinks about the matter. We trust that delegates who want to express their voice on decisions made in the DAO and present extensively their point of view will continue doing so, with or without incentives. After all, we believe that the impact that a thoughtful, reasonable, and mindfully presented voice in the DAO has on the future of the Arbitrum ecosystem is itself a reward and an incentive.
That said, we are not sure if the budgets are set correctly for the given scope. In our opinion, for this scope, they could have been set lower, especially since they put a certain pricetag for each vote - setting that expectation now can lead to voting apathy in the future if we lower the rewards or cancel them altogether.
Furthermore, OpCo’s discretion to adjust or pause rewards is useful, but it should be exercised transparently to avoid unpredictability and any potential abuse of power.
Finally, we understand that OpCo is still deciding whether to appoint a Program Manager. Whatever the decision, we would welcome a short public note explaining the choice, who will be accountable (OpCo itself, the Arbitrum Foundation, or a PM), and the scope, KPIs, reporting cadence, and expected cost. If a PM is appointed, please clarify the selection criteria and SLAs; if not, outline how operations will run without one and who the main point of contact will be.
Thank you for the proposal.
Since this “war” continues, and I’m using the same word I use in my delegate thread, I will express myself very openly.
I believe that this entire issue is a clash of conflicting individuals or entities within the DAO. The only thing we have achieved so far is division. The numbers in this proposal show it clearly: Polarization!
I see the repeated argument that we are trying to reduce costs. However, the DAO gives (or gave) far larger amounts of money to teams or programs that in no way justify receiving such levels of funding. Either because they produce no revenue, or because they fail to produce the expected revenue. So why such hostility toward the delegates, who are supposed to be the foundation of the DAO?
The chart below was created using data I pulled today, December 10th, from Karmaq.
Below 500,000 total voting power sits 40% of the top 20 delegates, with only one delegate (5%) in the 200,000–500,000 range.
Therefore, this proposal at the moment is, in my opinion, punitive toward smaller delegates (<200000 tokens).
It would be perfectly reasonable to include a clause that delegates with less than 200,000 voting power count as (for example) two delegates collectively, even if more individuals qualify (as is the case now), and the amount that would normally correspond to two delegates could be distributed among them proportionally to their Karmaq score. Such an approach would increase the sense of equality within the ecosystem and make people feel that the time they invest actually matters.
Personally, although I am among those who will feel the consequences, I am not concerned. I will continue to be part of the community as much as I can.
But why do I disagree with what is happening?
If we add up all the tokens held by delegates with less than 200,000, it amounts to more than 3 million tokens and over 70 delegates. Yesterday, December 9th, I once again saw one of our most highly funded organizations, OpCo, request brainstorming ideas for increasing revenue, either from existing programs or new ones. Yet by cutting the incentive for so many people to participate actively, you reduce the chances that someone will bring you such an idea. Yes…in the name of cost reduction…reduce the amount they receive, but don’t push them away by offering zero.
I say all of this with full respect. Of course, my vote will be AGAINST, based on everything stated above.
I voted YES, but I want to mention that I agree with a lot of what @Entropy is saying, a voting reward detox could be healthy. But also the work has been done and this is a great foundation to build off... so why wait. I like that this vote is close and I think we win whether it succeeds or fails. :popcorn:
I also agree that we've spent way too much time talking about delegate incentives and I don't want us getting stuck but I believe passing this through with clear rules and expectations should allow the DAO to focus. If this proposal fails, I hope we can shelf it for at least 2 months.
ALSO I want to reiterate that I would have loved to see a design that creates long term incentive alignment. Things like rewarding with locked tokens or even increased delegation. That's the biggest thing missing in the current proposal.. but i think it could be added in later.
I think the DAO needs closure on this topic so we can focus on more meaningful work. RAD sets a baseline and lets us move on. The way I look at it is Arbitrum got this massive advisory board (delegates) to receive advice from.
Side note: It's very interesting to know how much every vote will cost and how this will affect our proposal backlog and how the DAO will use delegates' time. This system shows clearly how expensive it is to make a vote in the DAO and I think that is pretty cool.
Voted in favor, although I couldn’t be part of the program due to having less than the required 200K $ARB VP.
After reading the discussions, what really surprised me is that some of the DAO’s service providers—who charge millions of dollars a year and generate controversy every year around their budget—are complaining that spending time and resources on this initiative isn’t worth it. Why? Maybe because they are already safe and the rest doesn’t matter as much.
When the DAO’s own research shows that there are pure voters who consistently participate without any incentives, a proposal like this makes a lot of sense. These voters have already proven their commitment, and this program encourages them to participate even more and formalizes them within the DAO.
Especially for Arbitrum DAO—one of the leaders in DAO experimentation and new initiatives—we’ve had several failed experiments that cost a lot. So calling this program, which helps formalize potential governance voters into active governance participants and future experts, a “waste of resources” feels completely backwards.
I’ve personally been one of these “potential voters” who eventually became a delegate. Even though I haven’t been very active on the forum lately—mainly because of the new threshold criteria and relatively low incentives compared to the time and effort required—I still maintain a relatively high voting participation rate.
So I appreciate @Arbitrum for proposing this program. I’m sure that, in the future, the market will reward us with a significant premium for having such diverse voters and delegates.
I’ve signaled my vote in favor or this proposal. I’m of the opinion that delegate incentives in some form are necessary for the long term viability of the DAO, for the simple reason that we should not reasonably expect long term active and thoughtful participation from unpaid labor. I think that regarding the growth in delegated votes / continued participation during periods without incentives, “past performance is not indicative of future results”; in fact, given the ongoing proposals of incentive programs — including occasional suggestions of retroactive rewards — it seems plausible that a not-insignificant amount of voting / forum activity has been motivated by the hope/expectation of some such program being put in place eventually.
While I think much of the feedback and criticism has been valuable, I don’t see any of it as decisive and believe that blocking the proposal would be a case of letting perfect be the enemy of the good (presuming one believes having an some form of incentive program is worthwhile to begin with). E.g.,
I’ve signaled my vote in favor or this proposal. I’m of the opinion that delegate incentives in some form are necessary for the long term viability of the DAO, for the simple reason that we should not reasonably expect long term active and thoughtful participation from unpaid labor. I think that regarding the growth in delegated votes / continued participation during periods without incentives, “past performance is not indicative of future results”; in fact, given the ongoing proposals of incentive programs — including occasional suggestions of retroactive rewards — it seems plausible that a not-insignificant amount of voting / forum activity has been motivated by the hope/expectation of some such program being put in place eventually.
While I think much of the feedback and criticism has been valuable, I don’t see any of it as decisive and believe that blocking the proposal would be a case of letting perfect be the enemy of the good (presuming one believes having an some form of incentive program is worthwhile to begin with). E.g.,
- Concerns about spam / AI-slop forum posts are valid, but this is ultimately unpreventable. Given that this requirement likely won’t make a major difference in either direction (as discussed, we’d expect to see active forum participation regardless), I believe that all things equal this requirement is a positive one to nudge things in the direction of transparency. I would trust OpCo with the authority to judge cases of obvious, egregious abuse and withhold rewards accordingly.
- Questions around the cadences of snapshots can be fairly easily clarified, and AFAICT, no option should impose any significant administrative overhead.
Etc.
Some suggested modifications that were brought up (namely by @blockful / @Zeptimus / @cp0x ) that I would support:
Overall, I believe that this proposal is a good starting point and improvement over prior incentive programs with its emphasis on simplicity and objective criteria. Affirming my support.
gm, voted FOR.
This feels like a reasonable starting point for delegates. I’d still like to see more value brought by delegates beyond just voting, but I see RAD as the first step toward that, with room for contributors to add value in new ways in the future.
gm, voted FOR.
This feels like a reasonable starting point for delegates. I’d still like to see more value brought by delegates beyond just voting, but I see RAD as the first step toward that, with room for contributors to add value in new ways in the future.
I think in general delegate incentives make sense: yes, most of us would probably do this for free, but RAD recognizes the actual time spent and pushes for better quality work. Clear rules also help large holders and structured groups model potential earnings and decide how they want to engage in governance.
That said, as Entropy pointed out, this topic has dominated the DAO’s attention. Hopefully passing it lets us move on and focus on what actually matters for the DAO’s future (strategy? revenue? attracting builders?). We can always iterate once we have more data.
There is certainly a risk of AI slop in any voting rationale. It’s fair to allow for some subjectivity in determining whether a particular rationale is AI-generated. If it’s egregious, delegate rewards should not be given.
The reality is we all have access to GenAI, and use it in our workflows in different ways. To the extent that you cannot tell the difference between a human or AI, we have to accept the fact that the two inform each other.
There is certainly a risk of AI slop in any voting rationale. It’s fair to allow for some subjectivity in determining whether a particular rationale is AI-generated. If it’s egregious, delegate rewards should not be given.
The reality is we all have access to GenAI, and use it in our workflows in different ways. To the extent that you cannot tell the difference between a human or AI, we have to accept the fact that the two inform each other.
I believe we should execute on this proposal, and if AI slop drastically increases, then new mechanisms could be put in place to adress the issue. I’m not entirely confident that legitimate delegates will suddenly resort to AI the second this proposal is passed.
Entropy has voted against the RAD program.
Since the passing of DIP v1.5 a little over a year ago, the conversation surrounding delegate incentives has continuously been a polarizing topic and consumed a large amount of delegate bandwidth. To be clear, this is not to discredit SeedGov as they took on a very challenging task with DIP v1.5-1.7, but with the RAD program requiring rationales we fear that we’re heading back down the same path.
Entropy has voted against the RAD program.
Since the passing of DIP v1.5 a little over a year ago, the conversation surrounding delegate incentives has continuously been a polarizing topic and consumed a large amount of delegate bandwidth. To be clear, this is not to discredit SeedGov as they took on a very challenging task with DIP v1.5-1.7, but with the RAD program requiring rationales we fear that we’re heading back down the same path.
At this point, Entropy views the discussion as having largely devolved into something non-productive, similar to incentives pre-detox period. Additionally, our team is not convinced that incentives for voting are a worthwhile expense, especially with the recent influx of new delegations that has raised the amount of active voting power and the upcoming DVP-Quorum proposal. When considering that the Arbitrum Foundation is continuing to engage in re-delegation efforts with large tokenholders and with this program the DAO would be paying ~$30k a month for voting incentives (based on September and October data), Entropy believes it is more prudent to go without any delegate rewards for several months to observe the impacts and reset the conversation.
I will be voting FOR this proposal. While I believe there are still areas that can be improved, the alternatives on the table make the direction clear. When choosing between extending DIP 1.7 or adopting this RAD framework, this proposal is the better option and moves in the right direction.
I agree with blockful on the 200k VP threshold. Given the simplified requirements and the removal of subjective assessments, I believe participation could be open to anyone, with rewards calculated in proportion to each ARB of voting power. One could even argue that two delegates with 100k each provide more value than one delegate with 200k. Two rationales, two perspectives, as long as compensation is proportional to VP.
I will be voting FOR this proposal. While I believe there are still areas that can be improved, the alternatives on the table make the direction clear. When choosing between extending DIP 1.7 or adopting this RAD framework, this proposal is the better option and moves in the right direction.
I agree with blockful on the 200k VP threshold. Given the simplified requirements and the removal of subjective assessments, I believe participation could be open to anyone, with rewards calculated in proportion to each ARB of voting power. One could even argue that two delegates with 100k each provide more value than one delegate with 200k. Two rationales, two perspectives, as long as compensation is proportional to VP.
I also agree with paulofonseca on removing the payout caps. Getting rid of caps would avoid unnecessary speculation or conspiracy theories while costing the DAO the same amount overall. If the incentive budget is fixed for each proposal, redistribution through caps does not change the total cost. It simply distorts how the rewards are distributed.
Something I have been vocal about before is vesting. Delegate incentives paid in ARB should promote alignment over the long term and a healthier governance culture. Vesting payouts would encourage delegates to think in terms of multiple years, and one could even justify a higher reward rate for vested payments. This is especially true considering that ARB appreciation over the long term could naturally compensate participants.
but “does it actually represent the delegates view?”.
how would you be able to tell that a rationale that is AI generated doesn't represent a delegates view?
how would you be able to tell that a rationale that is AI generated doesn't represent a delegates view?
This criteria will lead to some legit delegate being excluded from getting rewards because their rationale is deemed not "good" enough by the PM.
So either there are very clear guidelines as to when to exclude delegates from getting rewards, like a binary check of "the delegate has posted any kind of rationale within the specified timeframe" or not, otherwise, we will get again into a subjective assessment of contributions.
I should also add that there have been many cases, in the past, of delegates posting comments on the forum at the time of voting saying "voted For and the vote rationale will be published later" and then editing that comment several weeks later to actually explain why they voted in that way. And since this proposal establishes a maximum period with which the delegate needs to post a rationale on the forum, the OpCo/PM should make sure to take into account this kind of behavior as well.
I hope that will be the case. And that nobody will be punished by writing certain types of rationales.
I vote in favor of this proposal.
The design introduces a clear and concrete incentive to vote and to share the rationale behind that vote, so that there is public signaling of the stakeholders vision and alignment with the different proposed paths.
I vote in favor of this proposal.
The design introduces a clear and concrete incentive to vote and to share the rationale behind that vote, so that there is public signaling of the stakeholders vision and alignment with the different proposed paths.
The reduction in amounts aligns with the lower workload required under this system. With the OpCo in place, there is now a full-time team whose responsibilities include facilitating the stakeholders engagement with the DAO, digesting information, and enabling a strong feedback loop to support decision-making, while preventing an excessive burden on those who must dedicate their time to building their products.
Lastly, I consider this proposal to be one of several ongoing initiatives aimed at strengthening Arbitrum’s governance. It should not be treated or evaluated as the sole solution, but rather as part of a broader, comprehensive effort to reinforce our governance processes and stakeholders engagement.
*This vote and opinion are my own and do not represent the OAT nor the views of any of its members
:green_circle: Overall, this program is one of the most well-thought-out and objective:
:red_circle: However, there are also some cons:
:green_circle: Overall, this program is one of the most well-thought-out and objective:
:red_circle: However, there are also some cons:
The payment calculations are based on the worst program in my opinion, DIP 1.7, which has been constantly criticized for its unfairness. It would have been more appropriate to use at least version 1.5. Also, consider that the PM's costs will be lower, and these funds can be allocated to delegates as well.
Naturally, I calculated that at the moment, with 205,000 delegations, I will receive an average of $100 per month for voting. Therefore, perhaps now or in the future, we could distribute payments on a quadratic basis – at least present calculations based on these calculations to everyone so that everyone can compare and decide which option is better.
I agree with Paulo regarding the new conditions. In general, any initiative that imposes conditions retroactively is a bad decision. Anything that deviates from the standard conditions and requirements previously applied should be adopted only after the voting on those conditions has concluded. for voting—this program is clearly designed only for large delegates. Therefore, perhaps now or in the future, we could distribute payments on a quadratic basis—at least present calculations based on these calculations to everyone so that everyone can compare and decide which option is better. We must either begin payments from the moment the proposal is accepted, or take into account the results of previous votes without additional conditions.
I believe/hope that most people use AI before voting to sort through large texts, rather than afterward to simply justify their vote. It's difficult to verify, but it's logical to do so. Therefore, explanations may use AI data, but it's not just junk.
I still believe this is a necessary measure to always understand why someone voted the way they did. Personally, I need this information; it's how I assess the validity of delegates' votes and draw my own conclusions.
I believe/hope that most people use AI before voting to sort through large texts, rather than afterward to simply justify their vote. It's difficult to verify, but it's logical to do so. Therefore, explanations may use AI data, but it's not just junk.
I still believe this is a necessary measure to always understand why someone voted the way they did. Personally, I need this information; it's how I assess the validity of delegates' votes and draw my own conclusions.
Also, it's not subjective: you're free to write whatever you want there.
We are voting in favor of this proposal.
The program sets up a straightforward incentive for delegates to vote and share their rationales publicly. That alone helps improve transparency and gives the community a clearer picture of how different stakeholders view each proposal. It also makes it easier for proposers to understand feedback and refine future work.
We are voting in favor of this proposal.
The program sets up a straightforward incentive for delegates to vote and share their rationales publicly. That alone helps improve transparency and gives the community a clearer picture of how different stakeholders view each proposal. It also makes it easier for proposers to understand feedback and refine future work.
We do have one concern around the current minimum voting power requirement. It feels a bit high for where the DAO is right now, and it leaves out many active delegates. That said, this is something that can be revisited as the program runs and as more data comes in. We do not see it as a blocker to getting started.
Since Curia previously received an Arbitrum grant to build governance analytics (Arbitrum Dashboard), we are also happy to support the @OpCo by providing data on voting activity, rationale participation, and other governance signals. If our work can help the OpCo review proposals or monitor the health of the system more easily, we are glad to contribute.
Overall, this proposal moves governance in a constructive direction, and we support giving it a chance to run while continuing to refine the details as the DAO learns more.
Your suggestion (removing rationales from DIP eligibility) means that a lot of delegates would not reveal their reasons why they voted this or the other way. That is a far worse outcome than having a few slop posts here and there.
so this criteria needs to be way more defined, because in one extreme if a delegate can get paid for voting with any vote rationale, without any subjective criteria to evaluate that vote rationale, then way more delegates than today will post way more AI slop comments on the forum, just to check that box.
Echoing @JoJo's comment, if this proposal is mature enough to go to a vote soon and, as mentioned in the proposal text, is meant to secure continuity regarding rewarding voting activities, there is no need to have a vote on the other proposal.
Regarding the RAD proposal itself, it is missing a bit of granularity to prevent issues while the program is running, for example.
Echoing @JoJo's comment, if this proposal is mature enough to go to a vote soon and, as mentioned in the proposal text, is meant to secure continuity regarding rewarding voting activities, there is no need to have a vote on the other proposal.
Regarding the RAD proposal itself, it is missing a bit of granularity to prevent issues while the program is running, for example.
When mentioning the minimum voting power for eligibility (table below):
Each of those questions requires a different level of tracking effort, which will affect the amount of work needed to comply with the rule.
Can you clarify this point?
Because rewards are distributed on a per-proposal basis, delegates should submit their rationales within five days of the end of each voting phase (we have updated the proposal accordingly). For example, if a proposal includes both a temperature check and a subsequent on-chain vote, delegates should provide their rationale for each phase.
The proposal appears to have incorporated the delegates’ feedback after DIP 2.0 failed to pass governance. However, there are still some open questions regarding the decisions made within the RAD.
What is the rationale for making payments on a per-vote basis in governance?
The proposal appears to have incorporated the delegates’ feedback after DIP 2.0 failed to pass governance. However, there are still some open questions regarding the decisions made within the RAD.
What is the rationale for making payments on a per-vote basis in governance?
We understand that OpCo will handle the operational side, but this structure may incentivize a higher number of votes (whether Temperature Checks or on-chain) purely to increase delegate compensation within the DAO — effectively creating a sybil vector for delegate remuneration.
While this could potentially strengthen the DAO’s economic security — with more people voting and helping to reach quorum — it may also end up consuming the entire budget allocated to the RAD, potentially exceeding the US$32K/month illustrated in the proposal.
In addition, clearer rules for compensation should be established, such as requiring a minimum level of participation in votes, as is already the case with DIPs. This would ensure that only delegates who consistently maintain a defined participation threshold remain eligible for compensation.
Has any simulation been conducted to demonstrate that this approach is more efficient than a fixed monthly payment tied to a minimum participation requirement from delegates?
The minimum Voting Power (VP) required to be eligible for rewards is set at 200K $ARB. As discussed during the Arbitrum event at Devconnect, the goal was to strike a balance between the 500K $ARB threshold of the previous proposal and the previous 50K $ARB threshold.
However, this is still a high threshold for most delegates. When DIP 2.0 was proposed, there were already criticisms regarding the exclusion of many delegates from the incentive program.
We understand the logic of incentivizing wallets with higher VP to participate in governance, helping to reach quorum and keep the DAO operational. Nevertheless, this decision reduces incentives for broader participation in Arbitrum governance, effectively preserving the same 8 to 10 delegates who are paid to vote and engage in forum discussions.
As suggested by cp0x, a smaller incentive program for delegates with VP below 200K could be designed by OpCo or by the broader community. This way, the programs would be separated, but incentives for both large and small VP holders would remain aligned.
Another suggestion is to hold another "redelegation week", as already done on Arbitrum. This would allow smaller delegates interested in participating to obtain more VP, receive incentives, and participate in governance.
publicly post rationale
on the forum? on the snapshot and onchain vote reason fields? on both? on any of the above?
Your suggestion (removing rationales from DIP eligibility) means that a lot of delegates would not reveal their reasons why they voted this or the other way. That is a far worse outcome than having a few slop posts here and there.
Meaning, exactly the situation we have today. Delegates have not been incentivized to post their rationales since February when the DIP 1.5 became DIP 1.6, but still, most respected delegates continued to do so without any incentive.
Delegates that post their vote reasons, do it because they want to have a public track record of their votes and rationale, in order to attract more delegation for themselves. That's sufficient motivation to post a vote rationale, after voting.
What we need to incentivize, which has never been properly incentivized in any version of the DIP, is BIG delegates giving feedback on proposals before they go up for a vote. This is so that proposal authors can include their feedback on the proposal and have a better chance of getting a proposal passed.
The only thing that incentivized this behavior was the timing criteria on the subjective assessment of forum comments on DIP 1.5/6/7. But first, this was a very small lever, and second, this incentive has never taken into account the size of the delegate providing feedback.
What we need is for BIG delegates to provide feedback on proposals as early as possible, and for them to be rewarded for that proportionally to their voting power. That's the right incentive design that would fix that problem, but that's obviously out of scope for a Delegate Incentive Program like this RAD one, that is supposed to only reward delegates objectively.
That's why I'm saying that including the posting of a vote reason as a requirement for delegates to be rewarded for voting will lead to either: a) Delegates posting AI slop just to collect the rewards. b) Or the program becoming subjective again, where the OpCo or future PM will need to review all vote reasons from all delegates, and exclude from rewards the ones they find not worthy. Making this RAD program a subjective program like the previous DIP, which is against the self-defined goals for this program.
so this criteria needs to be way more defined, because in one extreme if a delegate can get paid for voting with any vote rationale, without any subjective criteria to evaluate that vote rationale, then way more delegates than today will post way more AI slop comments on the forum, just to check that box.
I recommend that this program should drop this criteria entirely. So delegates would be paid for voting only, and it doesn’t matter if they vote with a rationale of “just because” or a fully fledged articulated rationale essay with over 400 words.
I disagree Paulo. While some delegates may post AI slop, I'm sure most will not do that, because it would damage their reputation (everyone will notice the slop).
Your suggestion (removing rationales from DIP eligibility) means that a lot of delegates would not reveal their reasons why they voted this or the other way. That is a far worse outcome than having a few slop posts here and there.
No solution is perfect, but it's much better to require delegates to post rationales than not.
Since the payment is per vote, and not for a specific voting participation % threshold like before, it only makes sense for it to be 200k ARB at the snapshot of each proposal voting period start time. Which yeah, that opens the door to a bunch of possible shenanigans.
Also, in the same line of questioning, my question above and in the last call, still doesn't have a definite answer.
on the forum? on the snapshot and onchain vote reason fields? on both? on any of the above?
the requirement for there to be a vote rationale posted for each vote, so delegates get paid, will incentivize delegates to post slop AI vote rationales and polluting the forum, just to get the reward.
so this criteria needs to be way more defined, because in one extreme if a delegate can get paid for voting with any vote rationale, without any subjective criteria to evaluate that vote rationale, then way more delegates than today will post way more AI slop comments on the forum, just to check that box.
I recommend that this program should drop this criteria entirely. So delegates would be paid for voting only, and it doesn't matter if they vote with a rationale of "just because" or a fully fledged articulated rationale essay with over 400 words.
Otherwise, this program will need a team to subjectively assess the quality of the vote rationales and score them with rubrics and... we are back to DIP 1.5 when the results were taking 3 weeks to show up and the DAO was spending way too much money on the admin of this, supposedly simpler, program.
Because rewards are distributed on a per-proposal basis, delegates should submit their rationales within five days of the end of each voting phase (we have updated the proposal accordingly). For example, if a proposal includes both a temperature check and a subsequent on-chain vote, delegates should provide their rationale for each phase.
there are a lot of delegates that already failed this requirement for the November proposals then, because they haven't post the rationales within the 5 days after the voting period ending. This is too tight of a deadline and is not fair to apply it retroactively. Most delegates only post the rationales at the end of the month, or several days after the end of the month.
this is not entirely correct. this proposal still assigns subjective value to the vote rationale that delegates would have to post, in order to be eligible. and as long as that's a criterion to get rewards for voting, this program is still not using "only objective data".
Like I said previously here:
so this criteria needs to be way more defined, because in one extreme if a delegate can get paid for voting with any vote rationale, without any subjective criteria to evaluate that vote rationale, then way more delegates than today will post way more AI slop comments on the forum, just to check that box.
I recommend that this program should drop this criteria entirely. So delegates would be paid for voting only, and it doesn’t matter if they vote with a rationale of “just because” or a fully fledged articulated rationale essay with over 400 words.
Otherwise, this program will need a team to subjectively assess the quality of the vote rationales and score them with rubrics and… we are back to DIP 1.5 when the results were taking 3 weeks to show up and the DAO was spending way too much money on the admin of this, supposedly simpler, program.
on the forum? on the snapshot and onchain vote reason fields? on both? on any of the above?
errr… the money in the DIP multisig needs to be returned to the DAO treasury ASAP, ideally in the next couple of weeks or so (after the October DIP1.7 results come out, which @SEEDGov is late on delivering as usual, and those rewards are paid to delegates), which means that the suggested governance process of this proposal is not correct. this proposal needs to go to an onchain vote to transfer the money from the DAO treasury to a multisig, ideally under the control of the OpCo only.
Hello! I have a few questions. Sorry for posting them this late into the open call for governance.
Hello! I have a few questions. Sorry for posting them this late into the open call for governance.
Based on the DIP 1.7’s September Cohort data, we estimate the following payments for certain sized delegates:
The estimates are subject to change based on participation by voting power. As more voting power participates, the rewards will be diluted, and it will be up to the OpCo every quarter to evaluate this data to set a new budget.
Have a first question related to the amount posted here, 32K each month. This would put the annualized expenditure at $384k/year
As of today, we have in address for incentives around 7M arb equivalent to 1.5M usd, and arb at 0.21$. While we could theorize that this monthly expenditure could be above or beyond, because is based on amount of votes and amount of delegates, we can say that this budget should last based on projection for 3 to 4 years. In the even of ARB below 5 cents, this budget would instead only last for 1 year.
Was any thought put into this piece of feedback?
Budget composition: have the budget in stables, or at least a 50/50 stables-ARB mix. PM/OpCo could decide month by month which portion to use. If sell pressure is a concern, stable-sourced payouts could be converted to ARB via buybacks just before distribution. A bit clunky and complex operationally, but doable.
In my opinion, not only for this, but for any DAO program that requires to pay out in ARB, we should keep the reserve in stablecoin and buy back the ARB in the open market when is time to redistribute. It will introduce predictability in budgeting for long term program, and effectively negate any sell pressure for financing programs. The main issue is operational; but with a more centralized approach like the one we are seeing is likely doable, if we do use twap prices for conversion at time of buyback that are "good enough" even in time of volatility.
We do have around 16200 in rewards distributed this way if we just assume that each delegates in the 18 list has 1M in voting power. Considering the names, that at 4M we have 1.6k in rewards and at 8M we have 1.8K in rewards, we can safely assume an average of 1.2k each delegates to round this at 21800 usd per september.
This is especially true due to this table
| Proposal type | Incentive Budget | Payout Cap | Minimum voting power |
|---|---|---|---|
| On-chain constitutional quorum | 15,000 USD | 700 USD | 200k ARB |
| On-chain non-constitutional quorum | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional) | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain election | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain temperature check (non-binding) | 5,000 USD | 300 USD | 200k ARB |
| In here, I do see |
But we have ARB token as reserve.There is a mismatch in this accounting and operational system that will lead to the problems we have seen in several programs such as the grant ones based and denominated in ARB.
On the table above I also have another question: what was the rationale to come down to these payouts for each proposal? Was it done through a study of history of previous set of proposals, was it done taking in account other grant programs in other DAOs, was it done taking in account budget and runaway? It would be good to know the rationale behind, knowing that 1) is stated that all budget are studied and changed if any quarterly 2) we are seeing a tendency of having less votes 3) but also historically we have seen voting clusters in certain period.
Finally, want to cross post in relation to the proposal that me and @jameskbh posted in the forum related to the extention of previous DIP. While I want to be clear that the proposal was crafted in a weekend, after asking if this or any other DIP proposal would have been voted before the Christmas pause and without knowing it would have been put up for public discussion, I don't personally feel like is necessary to go for a contemporary vote of both. The goal of the extention was, as mentioned in the original post, to give time to AF and other to craft this very proposal. It seems like it has internalized most of the feedbacks of delegates; would also add how it lacks a bit some details, like rationality for certain decision, simulation based on the past year of activity, and projection on the future in different scenarios, but this part is also partially compensated by the flexibility of having OpCo ability to change parameters on a per quarter basis and eventually hire a service provider for management.
My invite, for the foundation, is to put out any other detail regarding simulations, history, decisions that were changed, or any other piece of info related to this final version that can put all the delegates on the same page for a favourable vote if they deem the program good enough.
As I see it now, extention would go on vote in the following scenarios:
That said, there is no interest in having concurrent proposals here. Goal is not for advocating for different frameworks and scenario, but to have something good enough in place, where good enough means
Your suggestion (removing rationales from DIP eligibility) means that a lot of delegates would not reveal their reasons why they voted this or the other way. That is a far worse outcome than having a few slop posts here and there.
Meaning, exactly the situation we have today. Delegates have not been incentivized to post their rationales since February when the DIP 1.5 became DIP 1.6, but still, most respected delegates continued to do so without any incentive.
Delegates that post their vote reasons, do it because they want to have a public track record of their votes and rationale, in order to attract more delegation for themselves. That's sufficient motivation to post a vote rationale, after voting.
What we need to incentivize, which has never been properly incentivized in any version of the DIP, is BIG delegates giving feedback on proposals before they go up for a vote. This is so that proposal authors can include their feedback on the proposal and have a better chance of getting a proposal passed.
The only thing that incentivized this behavior was the timing criteria on the subjective assessment of forum comments on DIP 1.5/6/7. But first, this was a very small lever, and second, this incentive has never taken into account the size of the delegate providing feedback.
What we need is for BIG delegates to provide feedback on proposals as early as possible, and for them to be rewarded for that proportionally to their voting power. That's the right incentive design that would fix that problem, but that's obviously out of scope for a Delegate Incentive Program like this RAD one, that is supposed to only reward delegates objectively.
That's why I'm saying that including the posting of a vote reason as a requirement for delegates to be rewarded for voting will lead to either: a) Delegates posting AI slop just to collect the rewards. b) Or the program becoming subjective again, where the OpCo or future PM will need to review all vote reasons from all delegates, and exclude from rewards the ones they find not worthy. Making this RAD program a subjective program like the previous DIP, which is against the self-defined goals for this program.
so this criteria needs to be way more defined, because in one extreme if a delegate can get paid for voting with any vote rationale, without any subjective criteria to evaluate that vote rationale, then way more delegates than today will post way more AI slop comments on the forum, just to check that box.
I recommend that this program should drop this criteria entirely. So delegates would be paid for voting only, and it doesn’t matter if they vote with a rationale of “just because” or a fully fledged articulated rationale essay with over 400 words.
I disagree Paulo. While some delegates may post AI slop, I'm sure most will not do that, because it would damage their reputation (everyone will notice the slop).
Your suggestion (removing rationales from DIP eligibility) means that a lot of delegates would not reveal their reasons why they voted this or the other way. That is a far worse outcome than having a few slop posts here and there.
No solution is perfect, but it's much better to require delegates to post rationales than not.
Since the payment is per vote, and not for a specific voting participation % threshold like before, it only makes sense for it to be 200k ARB at the snapshot of each proposal voting period start time. Which yeah, that opens the door to a bunch of possible shenanigans.
Also, in the same line of questioning, my question above and in the last call, still doesn't have a definite answer.
on the forum? on the snapshot and onchain vote reason fields? on both? on any of the above?
the requirement for there to be a vote rationale posted for each vote, so delegates get paid, will incentivize delegates to post slop AI vote rationales and polluting the forum, just to get the reward.
so this criteria needs to be way more defined, because in one extreme if a delegate can get paid for voting with any vote rationale, without any subjective criteria to evaluate that vote rationale, then way more delegates than today will post way more AI slop comments on the forum, just to check that box.
I recommend that this program should drop this criteria entirely. So delegates would be paid for voting only, and it doesn't matter if they vote with a rationale of "just because" or a fully fledged articulated rationale essay with over 400 words.
Otherwise, this program will need a team to subjectively assess the quality of the vote rationales and score them with rubrics and... we are back to DIP 1.5 when the results were taking 3 weeks to show up and the DAO was spending way too much money on the admin of this, supposedly simpler, program.
Because rewards are distributed on a per-proposal basis, delegates should submit their rationales within five days of the end of each voting phase (we have updated the proposal accordingly). For example, if a proposal includes both a temperature check and a subsequent on-chain vote, delegates should provide their rationale for each phase.
there are a lot of delegates that already failed this requirement for the November proposals then, because they haven't post the rationales within the 5 days after the voting period ending. This is too tight of a deadline and is not fair to apply it retroactively. Most delegates only post the rationales at the end of the month, or several days after the end of the month.
this is not entirely correct. this proposal still assigns subjective value to the vote rationale that delegates would have to post, in order to be eligible. and as long as that's a criterion to get rewards for voting, this program is still not using "only objective data".
Like I said previously here:
so this criteria needs to be way more defined, because in one extreme if a delegate can get paid for voting with any vote rationale, without any subjective criteria to evaluate that vote rationale, then way more delegates than today will post way more AI slop comments on the forum, just to check that box.
I recommend that this program should drop this criteria entirely. So delegates would be paid for voting only, and it doesn’t matter if they vote with a rationale of “just because” or a fully fledged articulated rationale essay with over 400 words.
Otherwise, this program will need a team to subjectively assess the quality of the vote rationales and score them with rubrics and… we are back to DIP 1.5 when the results were taking 3 weeks to show up and the DAO was spending way too much money on the admin of this, supposedly simpler, program.
on the forum? on the snapshot and onchain vote reason fields? on both? on any of the above?
errr… the money in the DIP multisig needs to be returned to the DAO treasury ASAP, ideally in the next couple of weeks or so (after the October DIP1.7 results come out, which @SEEDGov is late on delivering as usual, and those rewards are paid to delegates), which means that the suggested governance process of this proposal is not correct. this proposal needs to go to an onchain vote to transfer the money from the DAO treasury to a multisig, ideally under the control of the OpCo only.
Hello! I have a few questions. Sorry for posting them this late into the open call for governance.
Hello! I have a few questions. Sorry for posting them this late into the open call for governance.
Based on the DIP 1.7’s September Cohort data, we estimate the following payments for certain sized delegates:
The estimates are subject to change based on participation by voting power. As more voting power participates, the rewards will be diluted, and it will be up to the OpCo every quarter to evaluate this data to set a new budget.
Have a first question related to the amount posted here, 32K each month. This would put the annualized expenditure at $384k/year
As of today, we have in address for incentives around 7M arb equivalent to 1.5M usd, and arb at 0.21$. While we could theorize that this monthly expenditure could be above or beyond, because is based on amount of votes and amount of delegates, we can say that this budget should last based on projection for 3 to 4 years. In the even of ARB below 5 cents, this budget would instead only last for 1 year.
Was any thought put into this piece of feedback?
Budget composition: have the budget in stables, or at least a 50/50 stables-ARB mix. PM/OpCo could decide month by month which portion to use. If sell pressure is a concern, stable-sourced payouts could be converted to ARB via buybacks just before distribution. A bit clunky and complex operationally, but doable.
In my opinion, not only for this, but for any DAO program that requires to pay out in ARB, we should keep the reserve in stablecoin and buy back the ARB in the open market when is time to redistribute. It will introduce predictability in budgeting for long term program, and effectively negate any sell pressure for financing programs. The main issue is operational; but with a more centralized approach like the one we are seeing is likely doable, if we do use twap prices for conversion at time of buyback that are "good enough" even in time of volatility.
We do have around 16200 in rewards distributed this way if we just assume that each delegates in the 18 list has 1M in voting power. Considering the names, that at 4M we have 1.6k in rewards and at 8M we have 1.8K in rewards, we can safely assume an average of 1.2k each delegates to round this at 21800 usd per september.
This is especially true due to this table
| Proposal type | Incentive Budget | Payout Cap | Minimum voting power |
|---|---|---|---|
| On-chain constitutional quorum | 15,000 USD | 700 USD | 200k ARB |
| On-chain non-constitutional quorum | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain decision making (non-constitutional) | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain election | 7,000 USD | 500 USD | 200k ARB |
| Off-chain temperature check (non-binding) | 5,000 USD | 300 USD | 200k ARB |
| In here, I do see |
But we have ARB token as reserve.There is a mismatch in this accounting and operational system that will lead to the problems we have seen in several programs such as the grant ones based and denominated in ARB.
On the table above I also have another question: what was the rationale to come down to these payouts for each proposal? Was it done through a study of history of previous set of proposals, was it done taking in account other grant programs in other DAOs, was it done taking in account budget and runaway? It would be good to know the rationale behind, knowing that 1) is stated that all budget are studied and changed if any quarterly 2) we are seeing a tendency of having less votes 3) but also historically we have seen voting clusters in certain period.
Finally, want to cross post in relation to the proposal that me and @jameskbh posted in the forum related to the extention of previous DIP. While I want to be clear that the proposal was crafted in a weekend, after asking if this or any other DIP proposal would have been voted before the Christmas pause and without knowing it would have been put up for public discussion, I don't personally feel like is necessary to go for a contemporary vote of both. The goal of the extention was, as mentioned in the original post, to give time to AF and other to craft this very proposal. It seems like it has internalized most of the feedbacks of delegates; would also add how it lacks a bit some details, like rationality for certain decision, simulation based on the past year of activity, and projection on the future in different scenarios, but this part is also partially compensated by the flexibility of having OpCo ability to change parameters on a per quarter basis and eventually hire a service provider for management.
My invite, for the foundation, is to put out any other detail regarding simulations, history, decisions that were changed, or any other piece of info related to this final version that can put all the delegates on the same page for a favourable vote if they deem the program good enough.
As I see it now, extention would go on vote in the following scenarios:
That said, there is no interest in having concurrent proposals here. Goal is not for advocating for different frameworks and scenario, but to have something good enough in place, where good enough means
