Danke für die strukturierte Einordnung.

Den Ansatz, BLAZE primär als unternehmerische Kapitalallokation zu betrachten, halte ich für richtig- insbesondere im Vergleich zu risikoarmen Alternativen wie AAVE oder Staatsanleihen.

Entscheidend wird aus meiner Sicht weniger die Zielrendite sein als die konkrete Ausgestaltung der Risikomanagments ( Sicherheiten, Laufzeiten, Umgang mit uneinbringlichen Forderungen).

Positiv sehe ich, dass BLAZE alseigenständiges, experimentelles Programm aufgesetzt ist und damit gezielt reale Cashflow-Anwendungen testen kann ohen bestehende Strukturen zu verwässern.

We would like to provide additional context on the feedback that was initially shared with @maxlomu when he was drafting this proposal, and which reflects the views of all AAEs, as coordinated by the OpCo.

Overall, we believe the initiative could be valuable and appreciate the effort that has gone into it. As outlined in the proposal, the Arbitrum Foundation would be happy to serve as a technical service provider, helping to assess the quality and robustness of the underlying technology of projects applying to the program, and the OpCo would be keen to support on the operations side.

That said, from a broader ecosystem perspective, we do not believe that such an initiative being undertaken from an individual or team that’s external to the existing AAEs that focus on ecosystem support is sensible.

There is a lot of context to consider when thinking about a program like this, from the teams' needs to the process to be followed, so this effort is fruitful. For the DAO to undertake such an initiative without the accompanying context would be a waste of effort and resources.

At the same time, we believe that the Arbitrum Foundation’s ecosystem team, alongside Offchain Labs’ business development team, can likely address any high-impact opportunities without requiring a separate program with additional funding from the DAO.

cc @Arbitrum @Entropy @offchainlabs

Danke für die strukturierte Einordnung.

Den Ansatz, BLAZE primär als unternehmerische Kapitalallokation zu betrachten, halte ich für richtig- insbesondere im Vergleich zu risikoarmen Alternativen wie AAVE oder Staatsanleihen.

Entscheidend wird aus meiner Sicht weniger die Zielrendite sein als die konkrete Ausgestaltung der Risikomanagments ( Sicherheiten, Laufzeiten, Umgang mit uneinbringlichen Forderungen).

Positiv sehe ich, dass BLAZE alseigenständiges, experimentelles Programm aufgesetzt ist und damit gezielt reale Cashflow-Anwendungen testen kann ohen bestehende Strukturen zu verwässern.

We would like to provide additional context on the feedback that was initially shared with @maxlomu when he was drafting this proposal, and which reflects the views of all AAEs, as coordinated by the OpCo.

Overall, we believe the initiative could be valuable and appreciate the effort that has gone into it. As outlined in the proposal, the Arbitrum Foundation would be happy to serve as a technical service provider, helping to assess the quality and robustness of the underlying technology of projects applying to the program, and the OpCo would be keen to support on the operations side.

That said, from a broader ecosystem perspective, we do not believe that such an initiative being undertaken from an individual or team that’s external to the existing AAEs that focus on ecosystem support is sensible.

There is a lot of context to consider when thinking about a program like this, from the teams' needs to the process to be followed, so this effort is fruitful. For the DAO to undertake such an initiative without the accompanying context would be a waste of effort and resources.

At the same time, we believe that the Arbitrum Foundation’s ecosystem team, alongside Offchain Labs’ business development team, can likely address any high-impact opportunities without requiring a separate program with additional funding from the DAO.

cc @Arbitrum @Entropy @offchainlabs

Speaking as a builder, one under-discussed advantage of BLAZE is how it changes team behavior, not just liquidity numbers.

When liquidity comes from recyclable, time-bounded DAO capital rather than grants or mercenary incentives, teams are implicitly pushed to design markets that can actually stand on their own. It forces earlier thinking around fee generation, secondary market demand, and exit paths for protocol-owned liquidity, all things that tend to get postponed when liquidity is “free.”

This is especially valuable at the early stage, where the difference between a protocol that survives and one that stalls is often not TVL size, but whether real usage appears quickly enough to replace bootstrap capital.

From a builder’s POV, knowing there is a clear lifecycle, bootstrap → organic adoption → DAO exit is hugely helpful for planning product milestones and liquidity strategy. It also creates healthier alignment with the DAO, since success means returning capital to be reused, not optimizing for perpetual subsidy.

If executed with conservative sizing and strong monitoring, this feels like one of the rare programs that can both:

• lower the barrier for serious builders to launch on Arbitrum, and

• improve the long-term capital efficiency of the DAO itself.

Strongly supportive and excited to see this iterated on with real data.

Speaking as a builder, one under-discussed advantage of BLAZE is how it changes team behavior, not just liquidity numbers.

When liquidity comes from recyclable, time-bounded DAO capital rather than grants or mercenary incentives, teams are implicitly pushed to design markets that can actually stand on their own. It forces earlier thinking around fee generation, secondary market demand, and exit paths for protocol-owned liquidity, all things that tend to get postponed when liquidity is “free.”

This is especially valuable at the early stage, where the difference between a protocol that survives and one that stalls is often not TVL size, but whether real usage appears quickly enough to replace bootstrap capital.

From a builder’s POV, knowing there is a clear lifecycle, bootstrap → organic adoption → DAO exit is hugely helpful for planning product milestones and liquidity strategy. It also creates healthier alignment with the DAO, since success means returning capital to be reused, not optimizing for perpetual subsidy.

If executed with conservative sizing and strong monitoring, this feels like one of the rare programs that can both:

• lower the barrier for serious builders to launch on Arbitrum, and

• improve the long-term capital efficiency of the DAO itself.

Strongly supportive and excited to see this iterated on with real data.

Thanks @maxlomu .

From hearing from various AAE-folk — on today’s governance call and elsewhere — I do feel like I have a better sense of how they’re thinking about proposals like this one, and (just to be sure) it’s clear to me that all parties involved are operating on good faith to support the DAO.

I would encourage said AAE-entities to further explain their rationale publicly here in this thread as I think it would help with some the concerns that have been raised.

Below are some thoughts that our team shared on the open proposals call on Tuesday.

First we’d like to thank Max for the hard work he’s put into exploring this idea by speaking with numerous projects and stakeholders to assess its feasibility. When considering the following question, our primary concern arises from our belief that the risk of capital loss in this situation outweighs the anticipated returns.

Underwriting crypto loans, especially when they are intertwined with offchain assets, is notoriously difficult and evaluating the opportunities is only one aspect. Constant monitoring of positions is required to ensure that the DAO does not become the lender of last resort.

For example, the RealT protocol on Gnosis that was mentioned in a comment above as a comparison, is currently facing a liquidity crisis. The protocol allows investors to collateralize real-estate tokens that represent fractional shares of properties. They recently announced that they are offloading properties based in Detroit (we estimate it's ~10% of the total portfolio based on public information) due to ongoing property management issues and disputes with the city. Leading up to this announcement, holders of the property tokens had been maximizing their leverage (LTV) to extract value in stablecoins, resulting in about ~14.8m USDC & xDAI becoming stuck as available liquidity for withdrawals fell to zero. RealT has paused borrowing on its markets in response to the events, and it's unclear how quickly the properties can be sold so that collateral tokens can be redeemed.

We recognize that this project was just an example provided, so it shouldn’t be assumed that if on Arbitrum RealT would’ve passed the diligence process proposed by BLAZE, nor is it the sole type of activity/protocol being discussed, but we believe it highlights the risk and speed at which these positions can quickly turn into losses. Had the DAO provided a loan/liquidity to the protocol, it is unlikely the proposed structure would’ve been able to react quickly enough. To summarize, this is a complex initiative that would carry high execution risk, and we think it is best that it is closed for the time being.

gm all. Unfortunately, this initiative will be paused for now.

While I wish I had received more actionable feedback, it’s clear there’s a broader misalignment around capital usage and risk appetite between some Arbitrum entities and this initiative.

Given that, I don’t think it would be thoughtful to push this to a vote at this stage.

I want to thank all the delegates who took the time to engage and provide feedback across the different iterations - and who were ready to support it in a voting snapshot.

I still believe this represents a real economic opportunity for both liquidity providers and ecosystem platforms, and I’ll continue engaging with capital allocators and the numerous stakeholders that have reached out, which in itself shows there is genuine appetite in the open market.

After reading through the proposal and speaking directly with @maxlomu I am, broadly speaking, in strong support of this proposal. It seems that Max has identified a valuable, currently unfilled niche that will help keep the Arbitrum ecosystem competitive.

Re Opco:

we believe that the Arbitrum Foundation’s ecosystem team, alongside Offchain Labs’ business development team, can likely address any high-impact opportunities without requiring a separate program with additional funding from the DAO.

I think that to better make the case for the DAO to follow the loose AAE framework, Opco should

1. Propose ways this initiative could be incorporated into pre-existing AAE-related work,

2. Explain why this proposal is duplicative with work already being done by the AAE-entities, or

3. Argue as to why this vertical (loans/liquidity provision) shouldn’t be perused by the DAO in general.

I echo others’ response in that I see the response given as insufficient, and worry that it gives the impression that the AAE framework (at least in this case) is limiting the DAO’s output instead of coordinating it.

gm and thanks for the support GMX

It depends on the project and use case. With the simulations we are running with some protocols, once trading fees start to come in from secondary marketplaces, LPing becomes an attractive activity, which in turn makes it easier for the DAO to gradually exit its position.

Initial expectation is loan durations in the 6 to 12 month range, with the goal of shortening cycles over time as we gather real performance data and refine the model.

Happy to leverage the learnings from DRIP or delegate the incentive design to Entropy, if aligned. The objective would generally be to keep incentives minimal and phased out as organic liquidity replaces DAO capital.

Thanks @maxlomu .

From hearing from various AAE-folk — on today’s governance call and elsewhere — I do feel like I have a better sense of how they’re thinking about proposals like this one, and (just to be sure) it’s clear to me that all parties involved are operating on good faith to support the DAO.

I would encourage said AAE-entities to further explain their rationale publicly here in this thread as I think it would help with some the concerns that have been raised.

Below are some thoughts that our team shared on the open proposals call on Tuesday.

First we’d like to thank Max for the hard work he’s put into exploring this idea by speaking with numerous projects and stakeholders to assess its feasibility. When considering the following question, our primary concern arises from our belief that the risk of capital loss in this situation outweighs the anticipated returns.

Underwriting crypto loans, especially when they are intertwined with offchain assets, is notoriously difficult and evaluating the opportunities is only one aspect. Constant monitoring of positions is required to ensure that the DAO does not become the lender of last resort.

For example, the RealT protocol on Gnosis that was mentioned in a comment above as a comparison, is currently facing a liquidity crisis. The protocol allows investors to collateralize real-estate tokens that represent fractional shares of properties. They recently announced that they are offloading properties based in Detroit (we estimate it's ~10% of the total portfolio based on public information) due to ongoing property management issues and disputes with the city. Leading up to this announcement, holders of the property tokens had been maximizing their leverage (LTV) to extract value in stablecoins, resulting in about ~14.8m USDC & xDAI becoming stuck as available liquidity for withdrawals fell to zero. RealT has paused borrowing on its markets in response to the events, and it's unclear how quickly the properties can be sold so that collateral tokens can be redeemed.

We recognize that this project was just an example provided, so it shouldn’t be assumed that if on Arbitrum RealT would’ve passed the diligence process proposed by BLAZE, nor is it the sole type of activity/protocol being discussed, but we believe it highlights the risk and speed at which these positions can quickly turn into losses. Had the DAO provided a loan/liquidity to the protocol, it is unlikely the proposed structure would’ve been able to react quickly enough. To summarize, this is a complex initiative that would carry high execution risk, and we think it is best that it is closed for the time being.

gm all. Unfortunately, this initiative will be paused for now.

While I wish I had received more actionable feedback, it’s clear there’s a broader misalignment around capital usage and risk appetite between some Arbitrum entities and this initiative.

Given that, I don’t think it would be thoughtful to push this to a vote at this stage.

I want to thank all the delegates who took the time to engage and provide feedback across the different iterations - and who were ready to support it in a voting snapshot.

I still believe this represents a real economic opportunity for both liquidity providers and ecosystem platforms, and I’ll continue engaging with capital allocators and the numerous stakeholders that have reached out, which in itself shows there is genuine appetite in the open market.

After reading through the proposal and speaking directly with @maxlomu I am, broadly speaking, in strong support of this proposal. It seems that Max has identified a valuable, currently unfilled niche that will help keep the Arbitrum ecosystem competitive.

Re Opco:

we believe that the Arbitrum Foundation’s ecosystem team, alongside Offchain Labs’ business development team, can likely address any high-impact opportunities without requiring a separate program with additional funding from the DAO.

I think that to better make the case for the DAO to follow the loose AAE framework, Opco should

1. Propose ways this initiative could be incorporated into pre-existing AAE-related work,

2. Explain why this proposal is duplicative with work already being done by the AAE-entities, or

3. Argue as to why this vertical (loans/liquidity provision) shouldn’t be perused by the DAO in general.

I echo others’ response in that I see the response given as insufficient, and worry that it gives the impression that the AAE framework (at least in this case) is limiting the DAO’s output instead of coordinating it.

gm and thanks for the support GMX

It depends on the project and use case. With the simulations we are running with some protocols, once trading fees start to come in from secondary marketplaces, LPing becomes an attractive activity, which in turn makes it easier for the DAO to gradually exit its position.

Initial expectation is loan durations in the 6 to 12 month range, with the goal of shortening cycles over time as we gather real performance data and refine the model.

Happy to leverage the learnings from DRIP or delegate the incentive design to Entropy, if aligned. The objective would generally be to keep incentives minimal and phased out as organic liquidity replaces DAO capital.

It is refreshing to see a proposal focused on helping builders get the support they need to take the next step. Let’s manifest more of this in 2026.

We believe BLAZE is a good initiative for using treasury funds to generate revenue. This helps put idle funds to work and reduces dependence on native ARB tokens in the treasury, while complementing existing treasury management initiatives.

We also recognise the second-order benefits for the ecosystem and for innovative protocols. Deploying these funds as liquidity can help address the cold-start problem faced by most protocols, while simultaneously generating revenue for the DAO. Beyond previous grant programs, the ecosystem currently lacks initiatives specifically focused on liquidity bootstrapping. In this context, BLAZE appears complementary to DRIP (for more established protocols) and D.A.O. Grants (for earlier-stage ideas), and could further strengthen Arbitrum’s liquidity bootstrapping stack. The potential for future investment in early-stage projects is also notable.

That said, we note the risks associated with this type of mechanism and believe these should be carefully managed as the program moves toward execution.

The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.

Overall, We are very supportive of this initiative. Helping projects bootstrap early liquidity especially with support from the DAO would be extremely valuable. This would drive confidence among users and the wider Arbitrum community to provide liquidity to these projects as well. When speaking with early-stage teams, this is consistently one of their biggest bottlenecks. The proposed budget is also a solid starting point, and as the program proves itself and scales, the initial allocation can be increased.

A few questions / clarifications that could help strengthen the proposal further:

1. How quickly do you expect capital to recycle on average (i.e., the rough expected loan duration)?

2. Is there a cap on ARB incentives per project or per pool?

3. Entropy has done a great job with DRIP will the committee or Entropy be responsible for deciding on incentives, and for when to taper incentives and remove DAO liquidity?

As someone supporting projects in Arbitrum, I see the need and value of this proposal. There are very important gaps in the Arbitrum support system for early-stage projects, and this proposal only covers DeFi protocols in need of liquidity, so in that sense, it is both badly needed, and other proposals to cover further gaps are needed too.

For this proposal, particularly comes to mind the example of Bulla.network within the RnD Ventures (previously RnDAO) product ecosystem. Bulla is bringing web3 to SMBs via a payroll and invoicing platform where the invoices are minted onchain. The resulting Invoice NFTs represent the bill to be paid by the client and can be sold at a discount (less than the value the client owes) => service providers receive advanced payments, and liquidity providers (NFT buyers) make a profit (8-15% APY).

This process of selling accounts receivable is called Invoice Factoring, and it’s a $3 trillion market globally. To our knowledge, Bulla is the only player bringing this onchain. The automations they have already created (and audited) enable massive cost savings in processing these invoices and making the process trustless.

However, Bulla needs help to overcome the chicken-and-egg problem by attracting liquidity. They have over $20m in unmet demand, and they could easily scale the demand side further!.

If AF or ArbitrumDAO could soon provide $2m in liquidity for at least 6 months, we calculate this would be enough to break the chicken and egg and attract other liquidity providers. The $2m would receive 8-15% APY so Arbitrum would:

• Attract TVL: $20m+ in TVL over the next few months
• Generate onchain transactions (through the NFTs)
• Make a 8-15% APY profit

Given the smart contracts have already been audited, this is basically a no-brainer in our opinion. All that’s missing is a program that can support.

So my only significant concern with this proposal is the budget being too small.

We will take the other side of this. We are agnostic to whom performs a service, although there may be a higher threshold for new contributors.

The AAE framework has never been voted upon, much less approved of, by governance. We therefore give the title no formal weight and simply treat it as shorthand for OCL + AF + Entropy + OpCo + AGV. We urge all delegates to do the same.

If one of those entities feels they specifically are better able to execute upon an iterated version of this proposal or are opposed to the proposal overall, then that would be helpful for those entities to share.

But whether or not a proposer is an "AAE" is not relevant.

Thank you, Max, for the proposal. It’s great to see proposals focused on builders, and I believe the DAO should explore more initiatives like this. I like the direction BLAZE is taking.

A few questions came to mind:

1. KPIs: How will we measure success after the first year, and what criteria will define success or failure of this experiment? You mentioned few things in the Expected Returns part of the proposal, but for the program of this size I would like to see much more detailed and clear KPIs.

2. Timeline: One year feels short for an experimental phase, especially with RWAs. You mentioned liquidity horizon is averaged 6 months, but in FAQ you mentioned the terms aren’t fixed, and that they swing quite a lot. How will results be measured if a protocol can’t repay on time and requests alternate repayment? This could push the experiment well beyond the planned one-year window.

3. What does the Z in BLAZE stands for? :sweat_smile:

gm, quick updates based on feedback & private questions. Will update the proposal shortly.

1. Clarifying the initial committee composition

• Max Lomu (me) - I am a delegate for the Arbitrum DAO and have been pushing for an initiative connecting real world applications to onchain liquidity through the DAO Grant Program. BLAZE is the natural continuation and a necessary step for builders. Before entering crypto, I spent 5 years at General Motors Financial, where I led a team responsible for modeling wholesale loans for international dealerships and later supported the expansion of the refactoring business. This provided hands-on experience in credit risk, portfolio modeling and operational workflows directly relevant to what BLAZE intends to underwrite.

• Lorenzo Sicilia (and team) - Head of Technology at the Arbitrum Foundation.

• opCo - representatives from AAE and the legal team when operative.

2. Coordination with opCo and Foundation legal

The Arbitrum Foundation legal team kindly confirmed they can act as a backup both as legal counterparty and for drafting documents if opCo has no legal personnel available at the time of proposal approval. This reduces operational risks.

3. Source of Funds

I was informed the Treasury Committee is not allowed to use Aave deposits as collateral. Ideally we revisit this rule and position the DAO as a true DeFi power user. We currently hold around 12m of stETH on Aave (enough margin to be used as collateral) and hundreds of millions of ARB that could be collateralised on platforms like Nerite. The alternatives remain as previously presented.

4. Liquidity paths and distribution

I spoke with a couple of wallets that are now evaluating how to present these city yield vaults. This will be key for allowing the DAO to gradually exit bootstrapped positions once retail liquidity arrives.

The Tooling domain has coincidentally received a grant application to build mini apps showcasing Arbitrum Stylus technology. We are requesting as deliverable a crypto city vault app for Farcaster and Lemon to expand distribution channels.

Thanks for the feedback, and excellent questions.

Good point. 2 years is probably more realistic given the types of deals involved, with a half way program review and quarterly public check ins. The aim is still to stay highly liquid, with the majority of capital deployed in short term deals. Longer positions could be taken only when participating in secondary markets and with clear exit visibility.

Proposed KPIs:

1. Capital preservation: 100% of capital (excluding ARB used as incentives) is returned or withdrawable. Locked positions do not exceed 20% of the total and must have full, verified backing.
2. Yield benchmark: Performance exceeds T-Bills (4.5%) or the USDC Aave borrowing rate, depending on the funding source.
3. Ecosystem impact: 10+ projects supported across RWA and crypto city integrations.
4. Operational maturity: Full end to end processes established (compliance, legal, approval flow, credit line management).
5. Time to decision: maintain < 7 day for early responses and <31 days committee response time

The original full name suggested by chatGPT of the program was Bootrasrapping Loans for Arbitrum and Zero to One Ecosystems. Decided to simplify it but keep the name because it sounds cool and on brand :grinning_face: ArbitrumZ Everywhere

It is refreshing to see a proposal focused on helping builders get the support they need to take the next step. Let’s manifest more of this in 2026.

We believe BLAZE is a good initiative for using treasury funds to generate revenue. This helps put idle funds to work and reduces dependence on native ARB tokens in the treasury, while complementing existing treasury management initiatives.

We also recognise the second-order benefits for the ecosystem and for innovative protocols. Deploying these funds as liquidity can help address the cold-start problem faced by most protocols, while simultaneously generating revenue for the DAO. Beyond previous grant programs, the ecosystem currently lacks initiatives specifically focused on liquidity bootstrapping. In this context, BLAZE appears complementary to DRIP (for more established protocols) and D.A.O. Grants (for earlier-stage ideas), and could further strengthen Arbitrum’s liquidity bootstrapping stack. The potential for future investment in early-stage projects is also notable.

That said, we note the risks associated with this type of mechanism and believe these should be carefully managed as the program moves toward execution.

The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.

Overall, We are very supportive of this initiative. Helping projects bootstrap early liquidity especially with support from the DAO would be extremely valuable. This would drive confidence among users and the wider Arbitrum community to provide liquidity to these projects as well. When speaking with early-stage teams, this is consistently one of their biggest bottlenecks. The proposed budget is also a solid starting point, and as the program proves itself and scales, the initial allocation can be increased.

A few questions / clarifications that could help strengthen the proposal further:

1. How quickly do you expect capital to recycle on average (i.e., the rough expected loan duration)?

2. Is there a cap on ARB incentives per project or per pool?

3. Entropy has done a great job with DRIP will the committee or Entropy be responsible for deciding on incentives, and for when to taper incentives and remove DAO liquidity?