RFC: GCP Clawback
Authors: @NathanVDH, @GFXlabs
Abstract
This proposal seeks to claw back all unutilized and uncommitted funds from the Arbitrum GCP. It authorizes the appointed contributors to initiate winding down functions immediately. The goal of this proposal is to preserve governance funds, restore community trust, and ensure that any future disbursements are strictly performance-driven and accountable.
Motivation
The Gaming Catalyst Program (GCP) was approved during a period of exceptionally optimistic projections that, in hindsight, proved unsustainable. One of its primary backers – Treasure DAO – has already exited Arbitrum, and other key contributors have either stepped down or signaled waning commitment. In addition, the GCP has repeatedly shown a reluctance to adequately document its activities and performance. Instead of embracing transparency, the program has recently sought to increase contributor compensation and lower its own reporting requirements. Given these failures, the risks associated with a lump-sum allocation of funds, and the mounting concerns raised by the community, it is time to cut our losses. We must wind down GCP activities and secure all possible funds in order to safeguard the DAO’s funds and restore investor confidence in the ability of this DAO to allocate capital.
Specification
Arbitrum governance hereby formally instructs the GCP—its council and all full-time and part-time contributors—to immediately cease any expenditures not necessary for the orderly winding down of GCP activities. This includes halting any discretionary spending until a full review of the fund’s status and obligations is completed.
The GCP is required to immediately return all funds that become available and are not anticipated or legally required to be retained for settling outstanding obligations. This measure is designed to prevent any further dissipation of resources given the program’s underperformance and operational missteps, as evidenced by the prolonged inactivity. Luckily, the funds are still in possession of the Arbitrum DAO.
For clarity, the GCP Council is authorized to approve up to six months of severance compensation for non-Council contributors to facilitate a smooth transition. In addition, they may issue a positive letter of recommendation for these contributors in the name of Arbitrum governance, provided it is consistent with the overall aim of ensuring continuity and respect for past contributions. The goal of this proposal is not to punish GCP employees.
All unvested compensation packages are hereby revoked. Any such funds, along with all other recoverable assets, must be returned to Arbitrum governance. This ensures that no further rewards are disbursed without demonstrated value and accountability, aligning with the broader need to safeguard the DAO’s assets.
Rationale and Context
The GCP’s initial promise of catalyzing the Web3 gaming ecosystem on Arbitrum has had persistent delays in meeting key milestones. Despite a 225 million ARB allocation, the program has struggled to launch even basic operational processes such as transparent reporting and grant issuance. Requests by the program’s own team to relax reporting standards only exacerbate the community’s concerns regarding accountability and increase their own salary.
The departure of major supporters like Treasure DAO and the resignation of key council members have left the program’s leadership in disarray. This instability raises serious questions about GCP’s ability to manage a large fund responsibly and to execute its mission in a timely manner.
In addition to these strategic concerns, the GCP has substantial funds held in a multisig wallet controlled by a small group increasing the risk of security breaches. Transferring these funds back to a more secure DAO treasury system is a necessary step to protect our collective assets.
Other DAO initiatives have demonstrated that phased funding and rigorous oversight are essential. This proposal reflects best practices by ensuring that funds are only deployed based on measurable progress and verified accountability. It responds directly to the community’s call for greater fiscal discipline and transparency.
Conclusion
In light of the significant mismanagement, opaque reporting practices, and management turnover within the GCP, it is in the best interest of the Arbitrum community to cut our losses now. By clawing back the funds and winding down operations in a controlled, accountable manner, we protect our treasury and uphold the principles of transparent, responsible governance.
We urge all delegates to support this proposal as a necessary measure to restore trust and ensure that governance funds are used effectively in the future. We welcome comments and suggestions.
RFC: GCP Clawback
Authors: @NathanVDH, @GFXlabs
Abstract
This proposal seeks to claw back all unutilized and uncommitted funds from the Arbitrum GCP. It authorizes the appointed contributors to initiate winding down functions immediately. The goal of this proposal is to preserve governance funds, restore community trust, and ensure that any future disbursements are strictly performance-driven and accountable.
Motivation
The Gaming Catalyst Program (GCP) was approved during a period of exceptionally optimistic projections that, in hindsight, proved unsustainable. One of its primary backers – Treasure DAO – has already exited Arbitrum, and other key contributors have either stepped down or signaled waning commitment. In addition, the GCP has repeatedly shown a reluctance to adequately document its activities and performance. Instead of embracing transparency, the program has recently sought to increase contributor compensation and lower its own reporting requirements. Given these failures, the risks associated with a lump-sum allocation of funds, and the mounting concerns raised by the community, it is time to cut our losses. We must wind down GCP activities and secure all possible funds in order to safeguard the DAO’s funds and restore investor confidence in the ability of this DAO to allocate capital.
Specification
Arbitrum governance hereby formally instructs the GCP—its council and all full-time and part-time contributors—to immediately cease any expenditures not necessary for the orderly winding down of GCP activities. This includes halting any discretionary spending until a full review of the fund’s status and obligations is completed.
The GCP is required to immediately return all funds that become available and are not anticipated or legally required to be retained for settling outstanding obligations. This measure is designed to prevent any further dissipation of resources given the program’s underperformance and operational missteps, as evidenced by the prolonged inactivity. Luckily, the funds are still in possession of the Arbitrum DAO.
For clarity, the GCP Council is authorized to approve up to six months of severance compensation for non-Council contributors to facilitate a smooth transition. In addition, they may issue a positive letter of recommendation for these contributors in the name of Arbitrum governance, provided it is consistent with the overall aim of ensuring continuity and respect for past contributions. The goal of this proposal is not to punish GCP employees.
All unvested compensation packages are hereby revoked. Any such funds, along with all other recoverable assets, must be returned to Arbitrum governance. This ensures that no further rewards are disbursed without demonstrated value and accountability, aligning with the broader need to safeguard the DAO’s assets.
Rationale and Context
The GCP’s initial promise of catalyzing the Web3 gaming ecosystem on Arbitrum has had persistent delays in meeting key milestones. Despite a 225 million ARB allocation, the program has struggled to launch even basic operational processes such as transparent reporting and grant issuance. Requests by the program’s own team to relax reporting standards only exacerbate the community’s concerns regarding accountability and increase their own salary.
The departure of major supporters like Treasure DAO and the resignation of key council members have left the program’s leadership in disarray. This instability raises serious questions about GCP’s ability to manage a large fund responsibly and to execute its mission in a timely manner.
In addition to these strategic concerns, the GCP has substantial funds held in a multisig wallet controlled by a small group increasing the risk of security breaches. Transferring these funds back to a more secure DAO treasury system is a necessary step to protect our collective assets.
Other DAO initiatives have demonstrated that phased funding and rigorous oversight are essential. This proposal reflects best practices by ensuring that funds are only deployed based on measurable progress and verified accountability. It responds directly to the community’s call for greater fiscal discipline and transparency.
Conclusion
In light of the significant mismanagement, opaque reporting practices, and management turnover within the GCP, it is in the best interest of the Arbitrum community to cut our losses now. By clawing back the funds and winding down operations in a controlled, accountable manner, we protect our treasury and uphold the principles of transparent, responsible governance.
We urge all delegates to support this proposal as a necessary measure to restore trust and ensure that governance funds are used effectively in the future. We welcome comments and suggestions.
The Game Developers Conference (GDC) 2025 saw a significant presence from Arbitrum, which deserves commendation for its impactful contribution.
We acknowledge that the concerns stem from the lack of measurable results despite the significant ARB funding allocated to this initiative. However, it is important to recognize that venture and early-stage investing are inherently challenging and often require substantial time to yield meaningful outcomes.
The Game Developers Conference (GDC) 2025 saw a significant presence from Arbitrum, which deserves commendation for its impactful contribution.
We acknowledge that the concerns stem from the lack of measurable results despite the significant ARB funding allocated to this initiative. However, it is important to recognize that venture and early-stage investing are inherently challenging and often require substantial time to yield meaningful outcomes.
While Treasure DAO has been a key early supporter of the GCP, it should not define the entire Web3 gaming landscape on Arbitrum.
To ensure accountability while allowing the initiative to succeed, we propose that GCP establish clear milestones and implement a phased clawback mechanism if these milestones are not met. This approach would maintain oversight without prematurely winding down the initiative. Ultimately, we hope to allow GCP the necessary time to deliver results that align with the long-term nature of venture investments.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
The Game Developers Conference (GDC) 2025 saw a significant presence from Arbitrum, which deserves commendation for its impactful contribution.
We acknowledge that the concerns stem from the lack of measurable results despite the significant ARB funding allocated to this initiative. However, it is important to recognize that venture and early-stage investing are inherently challenging and often require substantial time to yield meaningful outcomes.
The Game Developers Conference (GDC) 2025 saw a significant presence from Arbitrum, which deserves commendation for its impactful contribution.
We acknowledge that the concerns stem from the lack of measurable results despite the significant ARB funding allocated to this initiative. However, it is important to recognize that venture and early-stage investing are inherently challenging and often require substantial time to yield meaningful outcomes.
While Treasure DAO has been a key early supporter of the GCP, it should not define the entire Web3 gaming landscape on Arbitrum.
To ensure accountability while allowing the initiative to succeed, we propose that GCP establish clear milestones and implement a phased clawback mechanism if these milestones are not met. This approach would maintain oversight without prematurely winding down the initiative. Ultimately, we hope to allow GCP the necessary time to deliver results that align with the long-term nature of venture investments.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
So, if I understand the latest posts correctly, the plan is to retain the status quo while ensuring transparency and disclosures via more....reports?
As a gamer and game dev, I tend not to lean towards any chain or any game, but instead looking at the long-term overarching picture of gaming as a whole because gamers have always gravitated towards games and communities that hold their interest. Web3 gaming is no different from any other gaming sector, except for the fact that thus far it has failed - miserably - to attract core gamers. Instead we have Web3 gaming dominated by gamblers and speculators who are more focused on making money than they are in engagement. The mistakes there have already been made and there's no going back. But what if we had the chance to change that - for the better?
So, if I understand the latest posts correctly, the plan is to retain the status quo while ensuring transparency and disclosures via more....reports?
As a gamer and game dev, I tend not to lean towards any chain or any game, but instead looking at the long-term overarching picture of gaming as a whole because gamers have always gravitated towards games and communities that hold their interest. Web3 gaming is no different from any other gaming sector, except for the fact that thus far it has failed - miserably - to attract core gamers. Instead we have Web3 gaming dominated by gamblers and speculators who are more focused on making money than they are in engagement. The mistakes there have already been made and there's no going back. But what if we had the chance to change that - for the better?
IMX, AVAX, Treasure, XAI et al - across all chains - are all siting on catalogs of underperforming games. We refer to that as the "Steam Enigma". And collectively, millions have been thrown at breaking the cycle of Web3 transient gaming engagement. That has thus far failed to yield tangible results because Web3 gaming engagement is transient by nature. When you flood an ecosystem with a lot of games, UA aside, the end result is that breaking out presents an insurmountable challenge for teams - regardless of funding, experience or clout.
Anyone paying attention - and who understands the metrics - already realizes that the era of token funded games is at an end. That's just not going to work as it once did - unless of course the teams are more focused on token-funded raises so they can get an early exit while abandoning the games when the music stops and the speculators have all moved on post-TGE.
Djinn, Karel et al came up with the idea for the GCP at a different time in the gaming cycle. A year ago, sentiments were high, the outlook seemed great - and Web3 gaming was supposed to be taking off. Then it didn't. Most of us who actually do this for a living - right here on this forum - said that gaming has its swings and misses and that the risks were high. And so, the GCP needed to ensure that it was positioned to take steps in mitigating those risks and that throwing money at gaming was never - ever - a guarantee of success.
Every single day there are well-funded gaming teams either closing, being sold or downsizing their teams. That's not a fluke, it's a sign of the times ahead.
All that is to say, I still maintain that the GCP has to make the hiring of people with actual gaming and game dev experience a top priority. And they need to be in the intake team so that even before it gets to the council there is a good chance that the team and project have been thoroughly researched, vetted and the due diligence solid. Which is what I had originally assumed was being done. Turning it into a VC model isn't going to yield the expects results because lets face it, how is that different from what came before - and has subsequently failed?
Build a better mouse trap.
Currently, as per the current transparency report, we have this structure. Image courtesy of the GCP - Strategic Update (March 2025)

According to that chart, from what I can tell, the GCP is still missing about 6 positions. And nowhere in there is the mention of any position that is "gaming" related. So, where are the gaming people? The people with actual gaming and game dev experience? The people who, when speaking with a gamedev team, understand precisely what is being conveyed, relayed and planned about a project? Every single successful games publisher, licensing distributor or funding team, either has such a person on staff or bring them in at some point - even if they are external. If such people are defined as being a part of pre-existing roles (e.g. Content Lead) in that chart, then that brings me to this...
Another point to consider. While the Project Review process as outlined in the transparency report is solid enough, Screen One and Two are the ultimate points of failure. And so, that's where the focus needs to be in terms of a proper and all-encompassing due diligence into a project's chances of success. Yes, while 90% of game projects will ultimately fail to yield the expected results, "failure" is relative to the investment made. Meaning, is the GCP looking for a 2x, a 10x or a break-even?

The GCP grant from the Mar 2024 startup was a 200M $ARB ask.
On Mar 15, 2024 $ARB was trading at around $2.00. Today, it is at $0.33. That's an 84% drop. And so, as of this writing, the 200M ARB grant to the GCP fund is $66M.
This means that the value and number of inaugural GCP projects are ultimately affected - especially when you take into account the costs of running the GCP project.
To wit: Off The Grid, a standard-fare AAA game with Web3 elements, raised $82M. It's still in early dev, and the token TGE is today. Before that, we had Shrapnel.
That the GCP says they have already signed 66 projects makes it all the more important for the interested/vested parties to get insight into what those projects are, what they cost, the expectations, the ROI tracking etc. Given the above post by the ARB Foundation, they're obviously aware of these projects, have confidence in them etc. All said and done, I see that as a good sign.
However, I still have concerns about the viability of the GCP actually signing 66 projects within a span of 12 months even though it clearly wasn't staffed to any meaningful degree during that period. That's not normal and is completely outside the norm. Was it rushed? Were corners cut? Were projects signed because of the pedigree of the team sans normal DD etc?
Lastly, it is my understanding that the GCP lacks the infra and team to lead a funding round. So, what is the play here? Do teams have to then first get a funding lead before engaging with the GCP investment team?
In conclusion, I still believe that the GCP should be setup as a third-party game distribution studio structure, staffed with experienced gamers/gamedevs because this Web3 version of a VC inspired fund is the very same playbook that has seen very little success in Web3 gaming.
To be clear, I still support the idea of the GCP because its success means that Web3 gaming will have a chance to prosper in some way. While most of us have since moved on for one reason or another, the fact remains that any Web3 gaming win is a win for all of us who are vested in the sector. And most of us aren't transient in gaming. We've been here since the beginning.
This proposal represents the nuclear option to claw back funds from a DAO-approved program and we are thankful that all community members, contributors and delegates, took the proposal seriously from the onset. It appears there is a resolution in sight that will result in the proposal not going forward for a vote, but there are still a few lessons that we as a community should take from this experience.
Less twitter, more discourse. It is our understanding that the proposal’s origin comes from this twitter post. We should be mindful that most interaction in our DAO occurs on this forum, on telegram and on governance calls. If a delegate, or contributor, is having an issue with a DAO-approved program, then we should keep the discourse amongst ourselves and attempt to find the best possible resolution before publishing nuclear-like proposals.
Constructive feedback. There are many people lurking the forum and telegram chats who will read comments at face value. They do not understand the nuances of comments and will quickly skim the discussion to figure out what is happening. This can result in miscommunication if comments are distracting in any way. We should hold everyone to exceptionally high standards to ensure communication is constructive, maximally polite, and focused on the matter at hand. This will help us to continue attracting the best contributors to our DAO.
Unnecessary media attention. All eyes are on the ArbitrumDAO. This thread has had >1k views over the past 4 days. When a proposal is published to the forum, it can, and will, be picked up by the media. Within a few hours, several outlets including TheBlock, Leviathan News and Cointelegraph published a story. The problem is that outlets often have misleading titles which are misinterpreted by readers. As a result, in this case, many external people were under the impression that the GCP funds were guaranteed to be clawed back and the program would end, which is not true.
Harming GCP’s efforts. Unfortunately, the media attention has led to practical operational issues for the GCP. It has interfered with ongoing and potentially future investments as projects (and co-investors) are now unsure whether the GCP is at risk. It has also harmed on-going recruitment efforts as quality candidates are now more reluctant to leave their current jobs for the GCP as headlines indicate that the DAO will dissolve it. It will take time for the team and program to recover which is unfortunate given the positive outcome from GDC last week.
Faith in GCP Council. The ArbitrumDAO elected 5 members to serve on the oversight committee of the GCP. They are tasked with approving budgets, hiring plans, treasury management, evaluating deals, providing strategic direction to the GCP program, and overseeing performance reviews. This is all accounted for in the GCP’s bylaws. Everyone should allow the GCP council to perform their job and use them to get your questions answered.
Transparency. All DAO-approved programs should seek to be transparent, whenever possible, with the community. If there is a delay for an anticipated disclosure, then the team should clearly communicate it with an updated timeline. We recommend all programs to appoint a dedicated individual (or team) focused on DAO relations that can support disclosures alongside help manage relationships with the DAO. In this case, there was already an on-going negotiation with CastleCap to support the GCP program prior to this proposal becoming public, but unfortunately it was not completed on time.
This proposal represents the nuclear option to claw back funds from a DAO-approved program and we are thankful that all community members, contributors and delegates, took the proposal seriously from the onset. It appears there is a resolution in sight that will result in the proposal not going forward for a vote, but there are still a few lessons that we as a community should take from this experience.
Less twitter, more discourse. It is our understanding that the proposal’s origin comes from this twitter post. We should be mindful that most interaction in our DAO occurs on this forum, on telegram and on governance calls. If a delegate, or contributor, is having an issue with a DAO-approved program, then we should keep the discourse amongst ourselves and attempt to find the best possible resolution before publishing nuclear-like proposals.
Constructive feedback. There are many people lurking the forum and telegram chats who will read comments at face value. They do not understand the nuances of comments and will quickly skim the discussion to figure out what is happening. This can result in miscommunication if comments are distracting in any way. We should hold everyone to exceptionally high standards to ensure communication is constructive, maximally polite, and focused on the matter at hand. This will help us to continue attracting the best contributors to our DAO.
Unnecessary media attention. All eyes are on the ArbitrumDAO. This thread has had >1k views over the past 4 days. When a proposal is published to the forum, it can, and will, be picked up by the media. Within a few hours, several outlets including TheBlock, Leviathan News and Cointelegraph published a story. The problem is that outlets often have misleading titles which are misinterpreted by readers. As a result, in this case, many external people were under the impression that the GCP funds were guaranteed to be clawed back and the program would end, which is not true.
Harming GCP’s efforts. Unfortunately, the media attention has led to practical operational issues for the GCP. It has interfered with ongoing and potentially future investments as projects (and co-investors) are now unsure whether the GCP is at risk. It has also harmed on-going recruitment efforts as quality candidates are now more reluctant to leave their current jobs for the GCP as headlines indicate that the DAO will dissolve it. It will take time for the team and program to recover which is unfortunate given the positive outcome from GDC last week.
Faith in GCP Council. The ArbitrumDAO elected 5 members to serve on the oversight committee of the GCP. They are tasked with approving budgets, hiring plans, treasury management, evaluating deals, providing strategic direction to the GCP program, and overseeing performance reviews. This is all accounted for in the GCP’s bylaws. Everyone should allow the GCP council to perform their job and use them to get your questions answered.
Transparency. All DAO-approved programs should seek to be transparent, whenever possible, with the community. If there is a delay for an anticipated disclosure, then the team should clearly communicate it with an updated timeline. We recommend all programs to appoint a dedicated individual (or team) focused on DAO relations that can support disclosures alongside help manage relationships with the DAO. In this case, there was already an on-going negotiation with CastleCap to support the GCP program prior to this proposal becoming public, but unfortunately it was not completed on time.
We (the Arbitrum Foundation) have been heavily involved with the GCP Council and the GCP Team to help it become operational. It is now in a good position to start carrying out their mandate as an essential function of the wider Arbitrum Gaming front and we believe they should be allowed to do so. Let’s support the team alongside all other DAO-approved programs to ensure that Arbitrum continues to win.
Honestly, reading through this, it feels like we're all looking at a project that just... didn't take off like we hoped. You know, those big, ambitious plans that sounded amazing at the time? Yeah, that. And now, we're left with this situation where we're basically saying, "Okay, let's cut our losses and move on."
And honestly? I get it. We've all been there. You put your faith in something, maybe throw some resources at it, and then it just fizzles. And what I appreciate about this proposal is it's not about pointing fingers. It's about being responsible.
Honestly, reading through this, it feels like we're all looking at a project that just... didn't take off like we hoped. You know, those big, ambitious plans that sounded amazing at the time? Yeah, that. And now, we're left with this situation where we're basically saying, "Okay, let's cut our losses and move on."
And honestly? I get it. We've all been there. You put your faith in something, maybe throw some resources at it, and then it just fizzles. And what I appreciate about this proposal is it's not about pointing fingers. It's about being responsible.
We're talking about our DAO's money here, right? Money that's supposed to build something awesome for all of us. And when things aren't working out, we gotta be grown-ups and say, "Alright, let's reel it in."
I mean, the whole "transparency" thing? That's huge. We're a community, not some shadowy backroom deal. We need to know what's going on, where the money's going, and what we're getting for it. And when a project isn't giving us that, yeah, we gotta step in.
And I like that they're not just saying "screw everyone." They're talking about severance for the regular folks who were working on the GCP. That's decent. We're not trying to ruin anyone's lives, just get our funds back where they belong.
So, yeah, I'm voting for this. It's not fun, but it's the right thing to do. We need to show everyone that we're serious about being responsible with our DAO's money, and that we're gonna keep things open and honest. Let's learn from this, and make sure we do better next time.
Hi @GFXlabs - to clarify, the GCP Foundation initially adopted plain vanilla bylaws upon its incorporation on July 5, 2024. As you know, before the GCP Council was elected, the Initial Transparency Committee was appointed, with one of its main objectives being to define DAO oversight in greater detail, working alongside the GCP Team and the Arbitrum Foundation.
Once the ITC’s term ended, the team focused on: a. Onboarding the GCP Council members (August - September 2024) b. Onboarding the initial employees (October 2024) c. Drafting the investment thesis for the GCP Foundation (November-December 2024) all while setting up the operational foundation of the entire company i.e. obtaining insurance, onboarding with different custodians, service providers, setting up bank accounts etc.
So, if I understand the latest posts correctly, the plan is to retain the status quo while ensuring transparency and disclosures via more....reports?
As a gamer and game dev, I tend not to lean towards any chain or any game, but instead looking at the long-term overarching picture of gaming as a whole because gamers have always gravitated towards games and communities that hold their interest. Web3 gaming is no different from any other gaming sector, except for the fact that thus far it has failed - miserably - to attract core gamers. Instead we have Web3 gaming dominated by gamblers and speculators who are more focused on making money than they are in engagement. The mistakes there have already been made and there's no going back. But what if we had the chance to change that - for the better?
So, if I understand the latest posts correctly, the plan is to retain the status quo while ensuring transparency and disclosures via more....reports?
As a gamer and game dev, I tend not to lean towards any chain or any game, but instead looking at the long-term overarching picture of gaming as a whole because gamers have always gravitated towards games and communities that hold their interest. Web3 gaming is no different from any other gaming sector, except for the fact that thus far it has failed - miserably - to attract core gamers. Instead we have Web3 gaming dominated by gamblers and speculators who are more focused on making money than they are in engagement. The mistakes there have already been made and there's no going back. But what if we had the chance to change that - for the better?
IMX, AVAX, Treasure, XAI et al - across all chains - are all siting on catalogs of underperforming games. We refer to that as the "Steam Enigma". And collectively, millions have been thrown at breaking the cycle of Web3 transient gaming engagement. That has thus far failed to yield tangible results because Web3 gaming engagement is transient by nature. When you flood an ecosystem with a lot of games, UA aside, the end result is that breaking out presents an insurmountable challenge for teams - regardless of funding, experience or clout.
Anyone paying attention - and who understands the metrics - already realizes that the era of token funded games is at an end. That's just not going to work as it once did - unless of course the teams are more focused on token-funded raises so they can get an early exit while abandoning the games when the music stops and the speculators have all moved on post-TGE.
Djinn, Karel et al came up with the idea for the GCP at a different time in the gaming cycle. A year ago, sentiments were high, the outlook seemed great - and Web3 gaming was supposed to be taking off. Then it didn't. Most of us who actually do this for a living - right here on this forum - said that gaming has its swings and misses and that the risks were high. And so, the GCP needed to ensure that it was positioned to take steps in mitigating those risks and that throwing money at gaming was never - ever - a guarantee of success.
Every single day there are well-funded gaming teams either closing, being sold or downsizing their teams. That's not a fluke, it's a sign of the times ahead.
All that is to say, I still maintain that the GCP has to make the hiring of people with actual gaming and game dev experience a top priority. And they need to be in the intake team so that even before it gets to the council there is a good chance that the team and project have been thoroughly researched, vetted and the due diligence solid. Which is what I had originally assumed was being done. Turning it into a VC model isn't going to yield the expects results because lets face it, how is that different from what came before - and has subsequently failed?
Build a better mouse trap.
Currently, as per the current transparency report, we have this structure. Image courtesy of the GCP - Strategic Update (March 2025)

According to that chart, from what I can tell, the GCP is still missing about 6 positions. And nowhere in there is the mention of any position that is "gaming" related. So, where are the gaming people? The people with actual gaming and game dev experience? The people who, when speaking with a gamedev team, understand precisely what is being conveyed, relayed and planned about a project? Every single successful games publisher, licensing distributor or funding team, either has such a person on staff or bring them in at some point - even if they are external. If such people are defined as being a part of pre-existing roles (e.g. Content Lead) in that chart, then that brings me to this...
Another point to consider. While the Project Review process as outlined in the transparency report is solid enough, Screen One and Two are the ultimate points of failure. And so, that's where the focus needs to be in terms of a proper and all-encompassing due diligence into a project's chances of success. Yes, while 90% of game projects will ultimately fail to yield the expected results, "failure" is relative to the investment made. Meaning, is the GCP looking for a 2x, a 10x or a break-even?

The GCP grant from the Mar 2024 startup was a 200M $ARB ask.
On Mar 15, 2024 $ARB was trading at around $2.00. Today, it is at $0.33. That's an 84% drop. And so, as of this writing, the 200M ARB grant to the GCP fund is $66M.
This means that the value and number of inaugural GCP projects are ultimately affected - especially when you take into account the costs of running the GCP project.
To wit: Off The Grid, a standard-fare AAA game with Web3 elements, raised $82M. It's still in early dev, and the token TGE is today. Before that, we had Shrapnel.
That the GCP says they have already signed 66 projects makes it all the more important for the interested/vested parties to get insight into what those projects are, what they cost, the expectations, the ROI tracking etc. Given the above post by the ARB Foundation, they're obviously aware of these projects, have confidence in them etc. All said and done, I see that as a good sign.
However, I still have concerns about the viability of the GCP actually signing 66 projects within a span of 12 months even though it clearly wasn't staffed to any meaningful degree during that period. That's not normal and is completely outside the norm. Was it rushed? Were corners cut? Were projects signed because of the pedigree of the team sans normal DD etc?
Lastly, it is my understanding that the GCP lacks the infra and team to lead a funding round. So, what is the play here? Do teams have to then first get a funding lead before engaging with the GCP investment team?
In conclusion, I still believe that the GCP should be setup as a third-party game distribution studio structure, staffed with experienced gamers/gamedevs because this Web3 version of a VC inspired fund is the very same playbook that has seen very little success in Web3 gaming.
To be clear, I still support the idea of the GCP because its success means that Web3 gaming will have a chance to prosper in some way. While most of us have since moved on for one reason or another, the fact remains that any Web3 gaming win is a win for all of us who are vested in the sector. And most of us aren't transient in gaming. We've been here since the beginning.
This proposal represents the nuclear option to claw back funds from a DAO-approved program and we are thankful that all community members, contributors and delegates, took the proposal seriously from the onset. It appears there is a resolution in sight that will result in the proposal not going forward for a vote, but there are still a few lessons that we as a community should take from this experience.
Less twitter, more discourse. It is our understanding that the proposal’s origin comes from this twitter post. We should be mindful that most interaction in our DAO occurs on this forum, on telegram and on governance calls. If a delegate, or contributor, is having an issue with a DAO-approved program, then we should keep the discourse amongst ourselves and attempt to find the best possible resolution before publishing nuclear-like proposals.
Constructive feedback. There are many people lurking the forum and telegram chats who will read comments at face value. They do not understand the nuances of comments and will quickly skim the discussion to figure out what is happening. This can result in miscommunication if comments are distracting in any way. We should hold everyone to exceptionally high standards to ensure communication is constructive, maximally polite, and focused on the matter at hand. This will help us to continue attracting the best contributors to our DAO.
Unnecessary media attention. All eyes are on the ArbitrumDAO. This thread has had >1k views over the past 4 days. When a proposal is published to the forum, it can, and will, be picked up by the media. Within a few hours, several outlets including TheBlock, Leviathan News and Cointelegraph published a story. The problem is that outlets often have misleading titles which are misinterpreted by readers. As a result, in this case, many external people were under the impression that the GCP funds were guaranteed to be clawed back and the program would end, which is not true.
Harming GCP’s efforts. Unfortunately, the media attention has led to practical operational issues for the GCP. It has interfered with ongoing and potentially future investments as projects (and co-investors) are now unsure whether the GCP is at risk. It has also harmed on-going recruitment efforts as quality candidates are now more reluctant to leave their current jobs for the GCP as headlines indicate that the DAO will dissolve it. It will take time for the team and program to recover which is unfortunate given the positive outcome from GDC last week.
Faith in GCP Council. The ArbitrumDAO elected 5 members to serve on the oversight committee of the GCP. They are tasked with approving budgets, hiring plans, treasury management, evaluating deals, providing strategic direction to the GCP program, and overseeing performance reviews. This is all accounted for in the GCP’s bylaws. Everyone should allow the GCP council to perform their job and use them to get your questions answered.
Transparency. All DAO-approved programs should seek to be transparent, whenever possible, with the community. If there is a delay for an anticipated disclosure, then the team should clearly communicate it with an updated timeline. We recommend all programs to appoint a dedicated individual (or team) focused on DAO relations that can support disclosures alongside help manage relationships with the DAO. In this case, there was already an on-going negotiation with CastleCap to support the GCP program prior to this proposal becoming public, but unfortunately it was not completed on time.
This proposal represents the nuclear option to claw back funds from a DAO-approved program and we are thankful that all community members, contributors and delegates, took the proposal seriously from the onset. It appears there is a resolution in sight that will result in the proposal not going forward for a vote, but there are still a few lessons that we as a community should take from this experience.
Less twitter, more discourse. It is our understanding that the proposal’s origin comes from this twitter post. We should be mindful that most interaction in our DAO occurs on this forum, on telegram and on governance calls. If a delegate, or contributor, is having an issue with a DAO-approved program, then we should keep the discourse amongst ourselves and attempt to find the best possible resolution before publishing nuclear-like proposals.
Constructive feedback. There are many people lurking the forum and telegram chats who will read comments at face value. They do not understand the nuances of comments and will quickly skim the discussion to figure out what is happening. This can result in miscommunication if comments are distracting in any way. We should hold everyone to exceptionally high standards to ensure communication is constructive, maximally polite, and focused on the matter at hand. This will help us to continue attracting the best contributors to our DAO.
Unnecessary media attention. All eyes are on the ArbitrumDAO. This thread has had >1k views over the past 4 days. When a proposal is published to the forum, it can, and will, be picked up by the media. Within a few hours, several outlets including TheBlock, Leviathan News and Cointelegraph published a story. The problem is that outlets often have misleading titles which are misinterpreted by readers. As a result, in this case, many external people were under the impression that the GCP funds were guaranteed to be clawed back and the program would end, which is not true.
Harming GCP’s efforts. Unfortunately, the media attention has led to practical operational issues for the GCP. It has interfered with ongoing and potentially future investments as projects (and co-investors) are now unsure whether the GCP is at risk. It has also harmed on-going recruitment efforts as quality candidates are now more reluctant to leave their current jobs for the GCP as headlines indicate that the DAO will dissolve it. It will take time for the team and program to recover which is unfortunate given the positive outcome from GDC last week.
Faith in GCP Council. The ArbitrumDAO elected 5 members to serve on the oversight committee of the GCP. They are tasked with approving budgets, hiring plans, treasury management, evaluating deals, providing strategic direction to the GCP program, and overseeing performance reviews. This is all accounted for in the GCP’s bylaws. Everyone should allow the GCP council to perform their job and use them to get your questions answered.
Transparency. All DAO-approved programs should seek to be transparent, whenever possible, with the community. If there is a delay for an anticipated disclosure, then the team should clearly communicate it with an updated timeline. We recommend all programs to appoint a dedicated individual (or team) focused on DAO relations that can support disclosures alongside help manage relationships with the DAO. In this case, there was already an on-going negotiation with CastleCap to support the GCP program prior to this proposal becoming public, but unfortunately it was not completed on time.
We (the Arbitrum Foundation) have been heavily involved with the GCP Council and the GCP Team to help it become operational. It is now in a good position to start carrying out their mandate as an essential function of the wider Arbitrum Gaming front and we believe they should be allowed to do so. Let’s support the team alongside all other DAO-approved programs to ensure that Arbitrum continues to win.
Honestly, reading through this, it feels like we're all looking at a project that just... didn't take off like we hoped. You know, those big, ambitious plans that sounded amazing at the time? Yeah, that. And now, we're left with this situation where we're basically saying, "Okay, let's cut our losses and move on."
And honestly? I get it. We've all been there. You put your faith in something, maybe throw some resources at it, and then it just fizzles. And what I appreciate about this proposal is it's not about pointing fingers. It's about being responsible.
Honestly, reading through this, it feels like we're all looking at a project that just... didn't take off like we hoped. You know, those big, ambitious plans that sounded amazing at the time? Yeah, that. And now, we're left with this situation where we're basically saying, "Okay, let's cut our losses and move on."
And honestly? I get it. We've all been there. You put your faith in something, maybe throw some resources at it, and then it just fizzles. And what I appreciate about this proposal is it's not about pointing fingers. It's about being responsible.
We're talking about our DAO's money here, right? Money that's supposed to build something awesome for all of us. And when things aren't working out, we gotta be grown-ups and say, "Alright, let's reel it in."
I mean, the whole "transparency" thing? That's huge. We're a community, not some shadowy backroom deal. We need to know what's going on, where the money's going, and what we're getting for it. And when a project isn't giving us that, yeah, we gotta step in.
And I like that they're not just saying "screw everyone." They're talking about severance for the regular folks who were working on the GCP. That's decent. We're not trying to ruin anyone's lives, just get our funds back where they belong.
So, yeah, I'm voting for this. It's not fun, but it's the right thing to do. We need to show everyone that we're serious about being responsible with our DAO's money, and that we're gonna keep things open and honest. Let's learn from this, and make sure we do better next time.
Hi @GFXlabs - to clarify, the GCP Foundation initially adopted plain vanilla bylaws upon its incorporation on July 5, 2024. As you know, before the GCP Council was elected, the Initial Transparency Committee was appointed, with one of its main objectives being to define DAO oversight in greater detail, working alongside the GCP Team and the Arbitrum Foundation.
Once the ITC’s term ended, the team focused on: a. Onboarding the GCP Council members (August - September 2024) b. Onboarding the initial employees (October 2024) c. Drafting the investment thesis for the GCP Foundation (November-December 2024) all while setting up the operational foundation of the entire company i.e. obtaining insurance, onboarding with different custodians, service providers, setting up bank accounts etc.
Hi @GFXlabs - to clarify, the GCP Foundation initially adopted plain vanilla bylaws upon its incorporation on July 5, 2024. As you know, before the GCP Council was elected, the Initial Transparency Committee was appointed, with one of its main objectives being to define DAO oversight in greater detail, working alongside the GCP Team and the Arbitrum Foundation.
Once the ITC’s term ended, the team focused on: a. Onboarding the GCP Council members (August - September 2024) b. Onboarding the initial employees (October 2024) c. Drafting the investment thesis for the GCP Foundation (November-December 2024) all while setting up the operational foundation of the entire company i.e. obtaining insurance, onboarding with different custodians, service providers, setting up bank accounts etc.
Please note that all this time GCP Foundation operated with minimum operational funding and NO investment/grant funds.
The bylaws were officially finalized in February 2025 since the main objectives of GCP were to first operationalize the company and set out a clear vision for it. Once the bylaws were fully fledged and the DAO oversight was baked in that's also when GCP Foundation started to receive grant/investment funds.
Additionally, please see the latest update which outlines our approach to GCP's DAO communications strategy. Looking forward to building stronger relationships across the delegate base and ecosystem in the future. We'll share our monthly update at the end of this week which we believe will set us on a new path as well.
Thanks,
GCP Team
Where can we see how many funds have already been spent and what results they've achieved?
@usamaro Can we get any metric that supports both these claims (Arbitrum is a key hub for gaming projects + network effects benefiting DeFi/RWAs)? Based on awareness alone, it seems Avalanche is the key crypto gaming hub (i.e., Off the Grid, Shrapnel, Maplestory, Nexus, etc.).
The 2024 State of web3 gaming report by Game7 is one reference in regards to Arbitrum being a key hub for gaming. This tweet summarizes the report. Some quotes from the report: "Immutable and Arbitrum ecosystems grew the most over the past 12 months. Arbitrum achieved a 68% YoY growth to 119 titles" and "Immutable, Arbitrum and Avalanche Welcomed Most Migrating Games".
@usamaro Can we get any metric that supports both these claims (Arbitrum is a key hub for gaming projects + network effects benefiting DeFi/RWAs)? Based on awareness alone, it seems Avalanche is the key crypto gaming hub (i.e., Off the Grid, Shrapnel, Maplestory, Nexus, etc.).
The 2024 State of web3 gaming report by Game7 is one reference in regards to Arbitrum being a key hub for gaming. This tweet summarizes the report. Some quotes from the report: "Immutable and Arbitrum ecosystems grew the most over the past 12 months. Arbitrum achieved a 68% YoY growth to 119 titles" and "Immutable, Arbitrum and Avalanche Welcomed Most Migrating Games".
In terms of the comparison to avalanche, there are 2 key differences in my opinion.
Regarding the 25 gaming chains, this ecosystem has been building up since the first Orbit chain launch in January 2024. For reference, the GCP received it's first funding this month after completion of entity and bylaw setup. Two of the GCP's deals in final stages have chains in their plans so I expect this to accelerate and i'm excited about the potential.
Arbitrum has become a key hub for gaming projects, with significant network effects benefiting the broader ecosystem, including DeFi, RWA, and consumer applications. Maintaining a dedicated investment strategy for this sector is essential to sustaining and expanding Arbitrum’s position in the market.
Hey Argonaut,
In our opinion, just because others are doing it doesn’t mean we should follow without evaluating the downsides
Hey Argonaut,
In our opinion, just because others are doing it doesn’t mean we should follow without evaluating the downsides
I'm fully aligned here regarding not just following suit. There are many examples of Arbitrum going against the grain in a positive manner. I think a token holder owned entity of the DAO with the vision to grow the ecosystem through investments rather than relying 100% on grants (or not and falling behind the competition) is a great example of DAO innovation.
Regarding the GameFi stats that you mentioned, i suspect that the failure rate is partly due to too many teams receiving funding in an overly loose macro period. Taking equity (in addition to tokens) in the studios plus going exceptionally deep on DD is a mitigation of this, and i see the GCP (with input from the GCP council, Offchain Labs and Arbitrum Foundation) having a high bar. If I were to guess, these stats that you shared wouldn't differ too much between verticals like NFTs, DeFi, RWAs etc if we are looking historically. Though i suspect we are on the cusp of real adoption due to friendlier regulations, so i'm cautiously optimistic that the industry has tailwinds.
Do you think the amount invested, and more importantly, the valuation at the time of investment
The current valuation of the fund is around $85m, much smaller than competing ecosystem gaming funds (e.g. Avalanche Blizzard $200m). The valuation at the time of the tally proposal is likely not relevant as the tokens are distributed to GCP through vesting over 3 years.
How long will the DAO keep investing in this? Until the GCP runs out of funds, or will more funding be needed after that?
The DAO has empowered the council with detailed oversight of the individual deals and budget. If the investments don't look likely to be providing a return on capital, then i'd expect this to be raised to the DAO. With that said, equity and token investments in companies take time to mature, often reflecting a prolonged J-curve, so we won't know right away, but i can say for sure now is not the time to make judgement on that given the initial vested funds were only transferred to the GCP. Let's remember that the alternative is a grants program with arguably a 0% direct financial return rate.
But if you were to revise this proposal so the program continues, how would you adjust it to include clear failure metrics that would justify ending the program if they’re met?
Upcoming transparency reports will be detailed in that the investment portfolio projects will be documented. This provides an opportunity for the DAO to assess the strength of the portfolio in real-time. However, similarly to my answer above, investments will require time to mature. Prior to maturity, the council's judgement will provide the best protection here, and we have a strong cohort on the council to make this judgement early.
Hi @GFXlabs - to clarify, the GCP Foundation initially adopted plain vanilla bylaws upon its incorporation on July 5, 2024. As you know, before the GCP Council was elected, the Initial Transparency Committee was appointed, with one of its main objectives being to define DAO oversight in greater detail, working alongside the GCP Team and the Arbitrum Foundation.
Once the ITC’s term ended, the team focused on: a. Onboarding the GCP Council members (August - September 2024) b. Onboarding the initial employees (October 2024) c. Drafting the investment thesis for the GCP Foundation (November-December 2024) all while setting up the operational foundation of the entire company i.e. obtaining insurance, onboarding with different custodians, service providers, setting up bank accounts etc.
Please note that all this time GCP Foundation operated with minimum operational funding and NO investment/grant funds.
The bylaws were officially finalized in February 2025 since the main objectives of GCP were to first operationalize the company and set out a clear vision for it. Once the bylaws were fully fledged and the DAO oversight was baked in that's also when GCP Foundation started to receive grant/investment funds.
Additionally, please see the latest update which outlines our approach to GCP's DAO communications strategy. Looking forward to building stronger relationships across the delegate base and ecosystem in the future. We'll share our monthly update at the end of this week which we believe will set us on a new path as well.
Thanks,
GCP Team
Where can we see how many funds have already been spent and what results they've achieved?
@usamaro Can we get any metric that supports both these claims (Arbitrum is a key hub for gaming projects + network effects benefiting DeFi/RWAs)? Based on awareness alone, it seems Avalanche is the key crypto gaming hub (i.e., Off the Grid, Shrapnel, Maplestory, Nexus, etc.).
The 2024 State of web3 gaming report by Game7 is one reference in regards to Arbitrum being a key hub for gaming. This tweet summarizes the report. Some quotes from the report: "Immutable and Arbitrum ecosystems grew the most over the past 12 months. Arbitrum achieved a 68% YoY growth to 119 titles" and "Immutable, Arbitrum and Avalanche Welcomed Most Migrating Games".
@usamaro Can we get any metric that supports both these claims (Arbitrum is a key hub for gaming projects + network effects benefiting DeFi/RWAs)? Based on awareness alone, it seems Avalanche is the key crypto gaming hub (i.e., Off the Grid, Shrapnel, Maplestory, Nexus, etc.).
The 2024 State of web3 gaming report by Game7 is one reference in regards to Arbitrum being a key hub for gaming. This tweet summarizes the report. Some quotes from the report: "Immutable and Arbitrum ecosystems grew the most over the past 12 months. Arbitrum achieved a 68% YoY growth to 119 titles" and "Immutable, Arbitrum and Avalanche Welcomed Most Migrating Games".
In terms of the comparison to avalanche, there are 2 key differences in my opinion.
Regarding the 25 gaming chains, this ecosystem has been building up since the first Orbit chain launch in January 2024. For reference, the GCP received it's first funding this month after completion of entity and bylaw setup. Two of the GCP's deals in final stages have chains in their plans so I expect this to accelerate and i'm excited about the potential.
Arbitrum has become a key hub for gaming projects, with significant network effects benefiting the broader ecosystem, including DeFi, RWA, and consumer applications. Maintaining a dedicated investment strategy for this sector is essential to sustaining and expanding Arbitrum’s position in the market.
Hey Argonaut,
In our opinion, just because others are doing it doesn’t mean we should follow without evaluating the downsides
Hey Argonaut,
In our opinion, just because others are doing it doesn’t mean we should follow without evaluating the downsides
I'm fully aligned here regarding not just following suit. There are many examples of Arbitrum going against the grain in a positive manner. I think a token holder owned entity of the DAO with the vision to grow the ecosystem through investments rather than relying 100% on grants (or not and falling behind the competition) is a great example of DAO innovation.
Regarding the GameFi stats that you mentioned, i suspect that the failure rate is partly due to too many teams receiving funding in an overly loose macro period. Taking equity (in addition to tokens) in the studios plus going exceptionally deep on DD is a mitigation of this, and i see the GCP (with input from the GCP council, Offchain Labs and Arbitrum Foundation) having a high bar. If I were to guess, these stats that you shared wouldn't differ too much between verticals like NFTs, DeFi, RWAs etc if we are looking historically. Though i suspect we are on the cusp of real adoption due to friendlier regulations, so i'm cautiously optimistic that the industry has tailwinds.
Do you think the amount invested, and more importantly, the valuation at the time of investment
The current valuation of the fund is around $85m, much smaller than competing ecosystem gaming funds (e.g. Avalanche Blizzard $200m). The valuation at the time of the tally proposal is likely not relevant as the tokens are distributed to GCP through vesting over 3 years.
How long will the DAO keep investing in this? Until the GCP runs out of funds, or will more funding be needed after that?
The DAO has empowered the council with detailed oversight of the individual deals and budget. If the investments don't look likely to be providing a return on capital, then i'd expect this to be raised to the DAO. With that said, equity and token investments in companies take time to mature, often reflecting a prolonged J-curve, so we won't know right away, but i can say for sure now is not the time to make judgement on that given the initial vested funds were only transferred to the GCP. Let's remember that the alternative is a grants program with arguably a 0% direct financial return rate.
But if you were to revise this proposal so the program continues, how would you adjust it to include clear failure metrics that would justify ending the program if they’re met?
Upcoming transparency reports will be detailed in that the investment portfolio projects will be documented. This provides an opportunity for the DAO to assess the strength of the portfolio in real-time. However, similarly to my answer above, investments will require time to mature. Prior to maturity, the council's judgement will provide the best protection here, and we have a strong cohort on the council to make this judgement early.
Arbitrum has become a key hub for gaming projects, with significant network effects benefiting the broader ecosystem, including DeFi, RWA, and consumer applications. Maintaining a dedicated investment strategy for this sector is essential to sustaining and expanding Arbitrum’s position in the market.
Can we get any metric that supports both these claims (Arbitrum is a key hub for gaming projects + network effects benefiting DeFi/RWAs)? Based on awareness alone, it seems Avalanche is the key crypto gaming hub (i.e., Off the Grid, Shrapnel, Maplestory, Nexus, etc.).
25 gaming-related chains building with Arbitrum’s tech stack—more than any other blockchain framework. Additionally, traditional gaming industry giants such as Ubisoft, Square Enix, and Tap Nation are developing on Arbitrum.
Are the 25 gaming-related chains building on Arbitrum and the game studios mentioned a result of the GCP's work? If yes, can you expand on what specific actions were taken to onboard them? I may have missed it, but I couldn't find much information in the GCP Update thread, and the studios mentioned seem to have partnered with Offchain Labs according to media (although I read from the updates that OCL x GCP alignment is developing through a series of collaborative efforts [Business Dev Funnel, DD process, etc.]).
Thanks in advance!
Hi @NathanVDH,
I’m David Bolger, a member of the GCP council. I am also Head of Gaming & Consumer Partnerships at Offchain Labs. I am replying here from my POV purely in my capacity as a council member on why I think this proposal is detrimental to the growth of Arbitrum.
I’d like to highlight some key context that I think is not accounted for in this proposal.
Hi @NathanVDH,
I’m David Bolger, a member of the GCP council. I am also Head of Gaming & Consumer Partnerships at Offchain Labs. I am replying here from my POV purely in my capacity as a council member on why I think this proposal is detrimental to the growth of Arbitrum.
I’d like to highlight some key context that I think is not accounted for in this proposal.
The Strategic Importance of Gaming for Arbitrum
The gaming audience is one of the largest consumers of digital assets, with global gaming revenue exceeding $185 billion last year (source). This audience already has a strong appetite for digital ownership, making blockchain technology a natural fit.
Arbitrum has become a key hub for gaming projects, with significant network effects benefiting the broader ecosystem, including DeFi, RWA, and consumer applications. Maintaining a dedicated investment strategy for this sector is essential to sustaining and expanding Arbitrum’s position in the market.
The Reality of Blockchain Partnerships
Having worked in the blockchain partnership space for the past three years, I can confidently say that no chain can remain competitive without allocating financial resources to attract and support builders. The industry is fiercely competitive, with rival chains routinely offering grants ranging from $5M to $100M. In some cases, single deals from competing chains have been rumored to exceed the total GCP allocation (currently valued at $85M).
Arbitrum DAO has consistently taken a more disciplined approach, prioritizing sustainable investment over excessive grant spending. In my view, the GCP is a key pillar of this strategy, and shutting it down would severely limit Arbitrum’s ability to continue to compete for top-tier partnerships.
Balancing Speed and Diligence
While faster execution is always desirable, maintaining oversight is critical to responsible fund allocation. The GCP council, with input from the Arbitrum Foundation as observers, has maintained rigorous oversight over the GCP. This includes direct engagement from at least two council members in candidate evaluations and final interviews.
To date, over 50 deals have been put forward to the GCP, yet fewer than 5% have reached the final stages—demonstrating a clear commitment to due diligence. While this approach has led to some frustration within the ecosystem, it ultimately ensures that treasury funds are allocated effectively, rather than distributed indiscriminately or carelessly.
Treasure Chain
Treasure chain taking a deal with another ecosystem does not define Arbitrum’s gaming strategy. There are currently over 25 gaming-related chains building with Arbitrum’s tech stack—more than any other blockchain framework. Additionally, traditional gaming industry giants such as Ubisoft, Square Enix, and Tap Nation are developing on Arbitrum. I am also extremely excited about the pipeline of projects which the GCP currently has in its final stages. The ecosystem’s growth is robust and diversified and not reliant on any single project.
Final Thoughts
Rather than shutting down a program which has strategic value, we should continue refining and expanding sustainable growth initiatives.
For anyone seeking further insights, I’m happy to discuss this topic in more detail on a call or via text. Please feel free to reach out to me on Telegram (@david_cocora).
It would be nice if there was more transparency in the cohort funding process. Who are the 66 applicants, while no teams have been funded it would be valuable to understand what the due diligence process is? What is the application process like? Where can information related to this be found?
I fully agree with this clawback. I think we can restructure something in the future that doesn't have a significant amount of the $arb supply involved. After Treasure DAO left it hasn't made much since to invest this alarming amount into gaming. For the amount allocated what has it gotten us? Arbitrum gaming will grow but this amount of $arb was always outrageous when DeFi is what has gotten this L2 where it is.
Arbitrum has become a key hub for gaming projects, with significant network effects benefiting the broader ecosystem, including DeFi, RWA, and consumer applications. Maintaining a dedicated investment strategy for this sector is essential to sustaining and expanding Arbitrum’s position in the market.
Can we get any metric that supports both these claims (Arbitrum is a key hub for gaming projects + network effects benefiting DeFi/RWAs)? Based on awareness alone, it seems Avalanche is the key crypto gaming hub (i.e., Off the Grid, Shrapnel, Maplestory, Nexus, etc.).
25 gaming-related chains building with Arbitrum’s tech stack—more than any other blockchain framework. Additionally, traditional gaming industry giants such as Ubisoft, Square Enix, and Tap Nation are developing on Arbitrum.
Are the 25 gaming-related chains building on Arbitrum and the game studios mentioned a result of the GCP's work? If yes, can you expand on what specific actions were taken to onboard them? I may have missed it, but I couldn't find much information in the GCP Update thread, and the studios mentioned seem to have partnered with Offchain Labs according to media (although I read from the updates that OCL x GCP alignment is developing through a series of collaborative efforts [Business Dev Funnel, DD process, etc.]).
Thanks in advance!
Hi @NathanVDH,
I’m David Bolger, a member of the GCP council. I am also Head of Gaming & Consumer Partnerships at Offchain Labs. I am replying here from my POV purely in my capacity as a council member on why I think this proposal is detrimental to the growth of Arbitrum.
I’d like to highlight some key context that I think is not accounted for in this proposal.
Hi @NathanVDH,
I’m David Bolger, a member of the GCP council. I am also Head of Gaming & Consumer Partnerships at Offchain Labs. I am replying here from my POV purely in my capacity as a council member on why I think this proposal is detrimental to the growth of Arbitrum.
I’d like to highlight some key context that I think is not accounted for in this proposal.
The Strategic Importance of Gaming for Arbitrum
The gaming audience is one of the largest consumers of digital assets, with global gaming revenue exceeding $185 billion last year (source). This audience already has a strong appetite for digital ownership, making blockchain technology a natural fit.
Arbitrum has become a key hub for gaming projects, with significant network effects benefiting the broader ecosystem, including DeFi, RWA, and consumer applications. Maintaining a dedicated investment strategy for this sector is essential to sustaining and expanding Arbitrum’s position in the market.
The Reality of Blockchain Partnerships
Having worked in the blockchain partnership space for the past three years, I can confidently say that no chain can remain competitive without allocating financial resources to attract and support builders. The industry is fiercely competitive, with rival chains routinely offering grants ranging from $5M to $100M. In some cases, single deals from competing chains have been rumored to exceed the total GCP allocation (currently valued at $85M).
Arbitrum DAO has consistently taken a more disciplined approach, prioritizing sustainable investment over excessive grant spending. In my view, the GCP is a key pillar of this strategy, and shutting it down would severely limit Arbitrum’s ability to continue to compete for top-tier partnerships.
Balancing Speed and Diligence
While faster execution is always desirable, maintaining oversight is critical to responsible fund allocation. The GCP council, with input from the Arbitrum Foundation as observers, has maintained rigorous oversight over the GCP. This includes direct engagement from at least two council members in candidate evaluations and final interviews.
To date, over 50 deals have been put forward to the GCP, yet fewer than 5% have reached the final stages—demonstrating a clear commitment to due diligence. While this approach has led to some frustration within the ecosystem, it ultimately ensures that treasury funds are allocated effectively, rather than distributed indiscriminately or carelessly.
Treasure Chain
Treasure chain taking a deal with another ecosystem does not define Arbitrum’s gaming strategy. There are currently over 25 gaming-related chains building with Arbitrum’s tech stack—more than any other blockchain framework. Additionally, traditional gaming industry giants such as Ubisoft, Square Enix, and Tap Nation are developing on Arbitrum. I am also extremely excited about the pipeline of projects which the GCP currently has in its final stages. The ecosystem’s growth is robust and diversified and not reliant on any single project.
Final Thoughts
Rather than shutting down a program which has strategic value, we should continue refining and expanding sustainable growth initiatives.
For anyone seeking further insights, I’m happy to discuss this topic in more detail on a call or via text. Please feel free to reach out to me on Telegram (@david_cocora).
It would be nice if there was more transparency in the cohort funding process. Who are the 66 applicants, while no teams have been funded it would be valuable to understand what the due diligence process is? What is the application process like? Where can information related to this be found?
I fully agree with this clawback. I think we can restructure something in the future that doesn't have a significant amount of the $arb supply involved. After Treasure DAO left it hasn't made much since to invest this alarming amount into gaming. For the amount allocated what has it gotten us? Arbitrum gaming will grow but this amount of $arb was always outrageous when DeFi is what has gotten this L2 where it is.
Judging by the responses both private and the views to the now-hidden original post, it appears that some people did find value in the post - despite it's length and copious amounts of snark.
Below is a revised version sans the snark and the tongue-in-cheek humor. I still have the original which I will be converting to a Medium article. So, if anyone is interested in it, do feel free to send me a DM or ping me on Telegram.
Judging by the responses both private and the views to the now-hidden original post, it appears that some people did find value in the post - despite it's length and copious amounts of snark.
Below is a revised version sans the snark and the tongue-in-cheek humor. I still have the original which I will be converting to a Medium article. So, if anyone is interested in it, do feel free to send me a DM or ping me on Telegram.
=======
I don't even know where to begin, but since no-one is likely to say the quiet part out loud because God forbid someone wants something from someone who is in the [Web3] mix, here goes....
First, I have been involved in the gaming industry for over four decades now, made - and survived - many partnerships, trends, downturns etc. All while being an indie who just loves building games and tech. So, needless to say, I know a thing or two about, you know, gaming and game dev.
My foray into Web3 started back in 2021 when I deduced that Web3 represented a blue ocean opportunity for gaming. I have written tomes (1, 2, 3) about what I see - and believe - will be the failure of Web3 gaming - and why. While very few paid attention (Even though I'm a well-known legacy white hat dev, I'm not a AAA game dev - so who cares what I think, right?) to the alarm that myself and other legacy game devs were sounding,
I supported - and still support - the idea of the GCP since day one and continue to follow it's progress mostly because @Djinn is one of the most accessible and forthcoming people in the space. Bar none. I can never imagine a time whereby I would show up in the GCP spaces or pinged him on TG about a material update, without him responding.
When the GCP first appeared - even as my own ApeChain DAO was on the verge of it's own collapse (which it incidentally came to mere months later) - I made my opinions and suggestions known here. And in those I outlined everything that I personally knew and have experienced in my 40 yr track record as a gamer (first) and a game dev (second) - and why I believe that the GCP is doomed to fail if lessons learned as well as tried and proven methods weren't adhered to. Key to those are this missive.
[quote] Getting DAOs to fund gaming isn’t going to work out as planned; and so, will always yield failure and/r malcontent. Even if, as in the case of this proposal idea, it’s to funnel the money to publishers like Treasure who are already sitting on a list of underperforming (note: a fun game doesn’t mean that it’s making money ) games because there no guarantees in an industry that yields a 90% failure rate. [/quote]
Then there was this excerpt from another post.
[quote] How is ARB going to support gaming so that it’s sustainable and with upside for the DAO?
Short of giving money out and wishing on a prayer, none of those things are achievable due to all the aforementioned dependencies and insurmountable challenges that come with gaming. Neither the foundation nor the DAO proper can be expected to reasonably perform any of the functions required of a publishing arm. So, what’s left? Treat it as marketing BD and with incentives. Which is basically a “hands off” grants program with minimal entry requirements front-loaded with the usual checks and balances. In other words, no different from how the pre-existing ARB grants already work. [/quote]
Note that in that post above, I provided an outline of the legacy steps that us devs, publishers, and distributors take in making a determination on how to go from funding a game to GTM to release.
While they didn't have to take this level of advice, from what I can tell this past year - and 9 months into the GCP kick-off - none have been adhered to. Instead we have this:
[quote]
While I realize that's a more high-level list - and btw I have had discussions with Djinn about specifically this - the fact remains that even at a macro level, industry best-practices are to be followed. To the extent that projects still fail, at the very least, adhering to such practices tends to not only de-risk but also allows outside-the-box thinking which then augments such processes in order to find what fits, what works, and what's less risk.
The GCP has thus far failed to yield tangible results in this regard - but not for the reasons pointing to any one person or reason but because, by nature of being related to games and game funding, it was doomed to fail from the start. Why? Because, guess what - who else here thinks that it's a good idea to not make priority hires people who have:
or
Yes - Greg is moonlighting - and he's awesome; but you literally need people with the aforementioned experience and expertise in a full-time role because despite what Web3 will have you believe, the role of a [gaming] BD person means that person has a track record of experience and skills which encompass gaming. That person is able to talk to devs at a peer-to-peer level, understand the project, the process, the tools etc. This issue is precisely how Web3 ended up with so many failed gaming ventures - failures which eclipse even the failures of trad gaming as a whole. And all because most Web3 BD people have zero or near zero actual gaming or game dev experience.
Another peeve. The Gaming Catalyst website isn't reflective of the aspirations - and not even in a funny ha-ha kind of way. Go look at it. An $85M fund with copious amounts of disposable cash, paid for what doesn't appear to look like a game-centric funding initiative.
My cursory observations:
To me, that website doesn't say "We're totally serious about gaming!".
Let me rewind a bit. How did the GCP program lose someone like Andrew Green? NOTE: While I know how/when/why this happened, being old school I have always respected the boundaries of confidentiality. And so, my original comment wasn't designed to point the finger at the GCP as being responsible for his departure nor to delve into anything that would cause me to divulge private & confidential material. All that I can say to this - in the interest of clarity for those inquiring - is that Karel leaving and then Andrew - who he nominated - later following him to that venture, made sense. Especially since the GCP was obviously not up and running, and its scope and premise likely didn't fit with what Karel envisioned for his platform. It happens
Read the entire GCP update thread, then accept this challenge: List the names, bios, and GCP tasking for everyone associated with the program. No cheating.
It's not on the website or in this forum. But it's in the transparency report which, at a glance, still appears to be incomplete.
From what I've observed, most questions asked of the GCP receive a resounding "Yes". Then mostly nothing happens which is what leads to all the calls for transparency and such.
Thus far, the DAO hasn't gained anything by way of funding the GCP. There have been far too many issues - all of which go back to my original points: they're seemingly over their heads because setting up something like this is no small feat.
And when it comes to DAOs, they tend to [consistently] fail because most people would never support the idea that voting on important and financially material things should be down to the size of your bags rather than the merits of the proposal. Even in corporations, the number of shares held tend not to have any material effect on the number of votes which can be used.
The GCP has a rumored "66" deals in the pipeline, yet still there hasn't been a single - not one - announcement about any deal, team, product, project or even the tooth fairy. And no list. I can almost guarantee that if/when that list is ever made public, that there would be even more questions and arguments because all involved would have their own opinions about what is a good or bad deal. That despite the fact that the success and failure of a project - as we all know - has very little to do with the team or the project, but more to do with the PMF. And timing. And luck. That's why even the best and well-funded teams with the best products continue to fail. Especially in gaming. Mostly in Web3.
Not to mention that, despite the intent and best efforts, the first transparency report isn't all that transparent because to me it just reads like pages of words and phrases on a road to: "Thus far we haven't achieved much anything impactful".
I challenge anyone to change my mind. I'm the guy who writes design docs, technical specs, engineering frameworks - and manages teams of engineers who, more than anything else, hate documenting anything and will avoid it like the plague if they could. And so, it is easy for me to decipher what constitutes an informative data-driven report. Yes - of course anyone of us can ping Djinn or Chris about anything, and immediately get a response. But why go through all that trouble when most of the inquiries are better served in either an FAQ (e.g. on the website) or in such a report? Plus, it saves time while reducing drama.
When gaming teams can go deploy on other chains - including ARB - without having to wait around for months on end to get an answer let alone funding for their project, guess what happens when word gets around. Serious teams don't have time to wait around or wade through a convoluted process when they have projects to build and require the funding to do so.
While I still support the idea of the GCP - as I always have - I can no longer support it in it's current form because, on-going [gaming] trends aside, I have come to believe that the odds of success aren't currently in its favor.
Giving money to the deserving few shouldn't be a challenge. But for too long and too often, Web3 has routinely funded the wrong teams. And so, Web3 needs to stop rewarding failure after failure because the end result is that programs like GCP will not only find it challenging to curate worthy projects and teams but will also have an uphill battle in achieving success. Gaming is hard. Very hard. And that's why gaming routinely requires specialist handling and expertise for any team and/or project to break out, let alone be a success.
At this point, my recommendation is for the GCP to wind down and let the ARB Foundation put those funds into gaming via already established processes and procedures which are doing a lot better and have thus far served the ARB [gaming] community (I'm not in it and I don't hold any tokens) in more ways that one. Why mess with what already works? Why take the risk and the additional costs to setup a new fund when - as most of us said from the start - it could have been done within the scope of pre-existing ARB programs? Though the foundation doles out game funding in grants and not investments, I don't think it would have taken a year for them to retro-fit that program with an investment option. To be honest, having followed GCP from the start, never in my wildest dreams did I think that over a year later not only would there not be a single funded project but also not a single word about the curation of said projects. To the extent that most of us just moved on to other chains, similar to what Treasure ended up doing.
Djinn, Karel and co had a dream, and Djinn has done his utmost, put his best foot forward and stuck to what he wanted to build as per his vision. But in a world where even the best laid plans of mice and men tend to fall apart at first contact with reality, the unfortunate result is one of timing and opportunity.
To try and to fail is no disgrace. What matters is whether or not you are brave enough to get up and do it again - differently. I would know. I've been there, done that - got the scars and the derision that comes with the territory.
Since this is really up to the voting whales, if the GCP is to continue - I feel that radical changes need to be made. What those are, I don't know because most of what's done and pending still need clarity in order for outsiders like us to make an informed determination.
With any such radical changes, Djinn, alongside his stellar cohort, Rick, can then build an operating team of full-time people who have GAMING AND GAME DEV EXPERIENCE.
I also feel that there is no need for a council because despite best intentions imo it's really just there to give whale bags some degree of comfort while spending money with currently zero ROI. Too many cooks and all that.
Follow some - if not all - of the guidelines that I outlined before.
Put the whole GCP program on chain alongside a robust project in-take web form - complete with a counter showing the number of intake, the status, a brief description etc. But if that's going to be done, why not just roll it back into the pre-existing ARB grants program?
Anyway, the goal is to build a lean, mean GCP program, with complete transparency - and which operates in an efficient manner.
Seeing as it's gaming related, though it still stands a 90% chance of failure, all it takes is one or two hits to see a meaningful ROI. Then again, due to gaming and current game funding trends, that's just saying when the whales voted for an $85M (originally $200M) fund that's likely to lose 90% of its funding due to how gaming metrics tend to play out, they basically voted to set $76.5M on fire. They could very well have just bought $ARB and burned it. Same end result.
That is all. Please don't hate me.
ps....
In the past three months alone, game studios and projects that raised over $300M in an avg of 14 months, have failed and shutdown. And the recent GDC - regardless of all the nonsense you see online by the usual larping suspects - is a wakeup call that says gaming will continue to decline and that Web3 gaming - for all intent and purposes - is on life support. Anyone who believes - even for a minute - that the general failure of trad gaming means those devs and projects are going to spill over to Web3 - is a fool.
The Konvoy Q4/24 Gaming Report states that "Gaming VC Funding is down -47% QoQ" Their website PDF functionality is broken atm, but Game7 has a great synopsis.
You should probably read InvestGames' Games Investment Review Q4 2024 Executive Summary Report and their 2025 Gaming Industry Report
Treasure DAO was a prominent early backer of the GCP, but it is not synonymous with Web3 gaming on Arbitrum. Its departure reflects a shift in its own roadmap—not the death knell of gaming on the chain.
Treasure DAO leaving is an opportunity to redefine Arbitrum’s gaming strategy—not abandon it. Leadership is about setting direction, not reacting to who stays or goes.
Treasure DAO was a prominent early backer of the GCP, but it is not synonymous with Web3 gaming on Arbitrum. Its departure reflects a shift in its own roadmap—not the death knell of gaming on the chain.
Treasure DAO leaving is an opportunity to redefine Arbitrum’s gaming strategy—not abandon it. Leadership is about setting direction, not reacting to who stays or goes.
A resilient DAO invests in systems that outlast individual contributors. Perhaps an effort to fix what’s broken should be considered—without forfeiting the mission.
If there is good feedback in the post, then we welcome the poster to publish it, but it should remove any aspects that violate our code of conduct.
If there is good feedback in the post, then we welcome the poster to publish it, but it should remove any aspects that violate our code of conduct.
What do you consider to be "good feedback"? Isn't that subjective? So, that means, even if I re-posted it and removed the original joke that had it removed, it will likely suffer the same fate for an unrelated reason.
So, now what?
Well, I pointed out that it was a tongue-in-cheek joke - and explained the context. But that post too was promptly deleted. And so, nobody will actually know the context or what this is even about as all the related posts have now been deleted. Not sure how else to address this.
As I mentioned in my private message to @thedereksmart, it is inappropriate to make accusations that grants are going to non-appropriate parties without any tangible evidence. It harms the reputation of the GCP program. We have a maximum politeness policy that focuses on constructive feedback.
If there is good feedback in the post, then we welcome the poster to publish it, but it should remove any aspects that violate our code of conduct.
Judging by the responses both private and the views to the now-hidden original post, it appears that some people did find value in the post - despite it's length and copious amounts of snark.
Below is a revised version sans the snark and the tongue-in-cheek humor. I still have the original which I will be converting to a Medium article. So, if anyone is interested in it, do feel free to send me a DM or ping me on Telegram.
Judging by the responses both private and the views to the now-hidden original post, it appears that some people did find value in the post - despite it's length and copious amounts of snark.
Below is a revised version sans the snark and the tongue-in-cheek humor. I still have the original which I will be converting to a Medium article. So, if anyone is interested in it, do feel free to send me a DM or ping me on Telegram.
=======
I don't even know where to begin, but since no-one is likely to say the quiet part out loud because God forbid someone wants something from someone who is in the [Web3] mix, here goes....
First, I have been involved in the gaming industry for over four decades now, made - and survived - many partnerships, trends, downturns etc. All while being an indie who just loves building games and tech. So, needless to say, I know a thing or two about, you know, gaming and game dev.
My foray into Web3 started back in 2021 when I deduced that Web3 represented a blue ocean opportunity for gaming. I have written tomes (1, 2, 3) about what I see - and believe - will be the failure of Web3 gaming - and why. While very few paid attention (Even though I'm a well-known legacy white hat dev, I'm not a AAA game dev - so who cares what I think, right?) to the alarm that myself and other legacy game devs were sounding,
I supported - and still support - the idea of the GCP since day one and continue to follow it's progress mostly because @Djinn is one of the most accessible and forthcoming people in the space. Bar none. I can never imagine a time whereby I would show up in the GCP spaces or pinged him on TG about a material update, without him responding.
When the GCP first appeared - even as my own ApeChain DAO was on the verge of it's own collapse (which it incidentally came to mere months later) - I made my opinions and suggestions known here. And in those I outlined everything that I personally knew and have experienced in my 40 yr track record as a gamer (first) and a game dev (second) - and why I believe that the GCP is doomed to fail if lessons learned as well as tried and proven methods weren't adhered to. Key to those are this missive.
[quote] Getting DAOs to fund gaming isn’t going to work out as planned; and so, will always yield failure and/r malcontent. Even if, as in the case of this proposal idea, it’s to funnel the money to publishers like Treasure who are already sitting on a list of underperforming (note: a fun game doesn’t mean that it’s making money ) games because there no guarantees in an industry that yields a 90% failure rate. [/quote]
Then there was this excerpt from another post.
[quote] How is ARB going to support gaming so that it’s sustainable and with upside for the DAO?
Short of giving money out and wishing on a prayer, none of those things are achievable due to all the aforementioned dependencies and insurmountable challenges that come with gaming. Neither the foundation nor the DAO proper can be expected to reasonably perform any of the functions required of a publishing arm. So, what’s left? Treat it as marketing BD and with incentives. Which is basically a “hands off” grants program with minimal entry requirements front-loaded with the usual checks and balances. In other words, no different from how the pre-existing ARB grants already work. [/quote]
Note that in that post above, I provided an outline of the legacy steps that us devs, publishers, and distributors take in making a determination on how to go from funding a game to GTM to release.
While they didn't have to take this level of advice, from what I can tell this past year - and 9 months into the GCP kick-off - none have been adhered to. Instead we have this:
[quote]
While I realize that's a more high-level list - and btw I have had discussions with Djinn about specifically this - the fact remains that even at a macro level, industry best-practices are to be followed. To the extent that projects still fail, at the very least, adhering to such practices tends to not only de-risk but also allows outside-the-box thinking which then augments such processes in order to find what fits, what works, and what's less risk.
The GCP has thus far failed to yield tangible results in this regard - but not for the reasons pointing to any one person or reason but because, by nature of being related to games and game funding, it was doomed to fail from the start. Why? Because, guess what - who else here thinks that it's a good idea to not make priority hires people who have:
or
Yes - Greg is moonlighting - and he's awesome; but you literally need people with the aforementioned experience and expertise in a full-time role because despite what Web3 will have you believe, the role of a [gaming] BD person means that person has a track record of experience and skills which encompass gaming. That person is able to talk to devs at a peer-to-peer level, understand the project, the process, the tools etc. This issue is precisely how Web3 ended up with so many failed gaming ventures - failures which eclipse even the failures of trad gaming as a whole. And all because most Web3 BD people have zero or near zero actual gaming or game dev experience.
Another peeve. The Gaming Catalyst website isn't reflective of the aspirations - and not even in a funny ha-ha kind of way. Go look at it. An $85M fund with copious amounts of disposable cash, paid for what doesn't appear to look like a game-centric funding initiative.
My cursory observations:
To me, that website doesn't say "We're totally serious about gaming!".
Let me rewind a bit. How did the GCP program lose someone like Andrew Green? NOTE: While I know how/when/why this happened, being old school I have always respected the boundaries of confidentiality. And so, my original comment wasn't designed to point the finger at the GCP as being responsible for his departure nor to delve into anything that would cause me to divulge private & confidential material. All that I can say to this - in the interest of clarity for those inquiring - is that Karel leaving and then Andrew - who he nominated - later following him to that venture, made sense. Especially since the GCP was obviously not up and running, and its scope and premise likely didn't fit with what Karel envisioned for his platform. It happens
Read the entire GCP update thread, then accept this challenge: List the names, bios, and GCP tasking for everyone associated with the program. No cheating.
It's not on the website or in this forum. But it's in the transparency report which, at a glance, still appears to be incomplete.
From what I've observed, most questions asked of the GCP receive a resounding "Yes". Then mostly nothing happens which is what leads to all the calls for transparency and such.
Thus far, the DAO hasn't gained anything by way of funding the GCP. There have been far too many issues - all of which go back to my original points: they're seemingly over their heads because setting up something like this is no small feat.
And when it comes to DAOs, they tend to [consistently] fail because most people would never support the idea that voting on important and financially material things should be down to the size of your bags rather than the merits of the proposal. Even in corporations, the number of shares held tend not to have any material effect on the number of votes which can be used.
The GCP has a rumored "66" deals in the pipeline, yet still there hasn't been a single - not one - announcement about any deal, team, product, project or even the tooth fairy. And no list. I can almost guarantee that if/when that list is ever made public, that there would be even more questions and arguments because all involved would have their own opinions about what is a good or bad deal. That despite the fact that the success and failure of a project - as we all know - has very little to do with the team or the project, but more to do with the PMF. And timing. And luck. That's why even the best and well-funded teams with the best products continue to fail. Especially in gaming. Mostly in Web3.
Not to mention that, despite the intent and best efforts, the first transparency report isn't all that transparent because to me it just reads like pages of words and phrases on a road to: "Thus far we haven't achieved much anything impactful".
I challenge anyone to change my mind. I'm the guy who writes design docs, technical specs, engineering frameworks - and manages teams of engineers who, more than anything else, hate documenting anything and will avoid it like the plague if they could. And so, it is easy for me to decipher what constitutes an informative data-driven report. Yes - of course anyone of us can ping Djinn or Chris about anything, and immediately get a response. But why go through all that trouble when most of the inquiries are better served in either an FAQ (e.g. on the website) or in such a report? Plus, it saves time while reducing drama.
When gaming teams can go deploy on other chains - including ARB - without having to wait around for months on end to get an answer let alone funding for their project, guess what happens when word gets around. Serious teams don't have time to wait around or wade through a convoluted process when they have projects to build and require the funding to do so.
While I still support the idea of the GCP - as I always have - I can no longer support it in it's current form because, on-going [gaming] trends aside, I have come to believe that the odds of success aren't currently in its favor.
Giving money to the deserving few shouldn't be a challenge. But for too long and too often, Web3 has routinely funded the wrong teams. And so, Web3 needs to stop rewarding failure after failure because the end result is that programs like GCP will not only find it challenging to curate worthy projects and teams but will also have an uphill battle in achieving success. Gaming is hard. Very hard. And that's why gaming routinely requires specialist handling and expertise for any team and/or project to break out, let alone be a success.
At this point, my recommendation is for the GCP to wind down and let the ARB Foundation put those funds into gaming via already established processes and procedures which are doing a lot better and have thus far served the ARB [gaming] community (I'm not in it and I don't hold any tokens) in more ways that one. Why mess with what already works? Why take the risk and the additional costs to setup a new fund when - as most of us said from the start - it could have been done within the scope of pre-existing ARB programs? Though the foundation doles out game funding in grants and not investments, I don't think it would have taken a year for them to retro-fit that program with an investment option. To be honest, having followed GCP from the start, never in my wildest dreams did I think that over a year later not only would there not be a single funded project but also not a single word about the curation of said projects. To the extent that most of us just moved on to other chains, similar to what Treasure ended up doing.
Djinn, Karel and co had a dream, and Djinn has done his utmost, put his best foot forward and stuck to what he wanted to build as per his vision. But in a world where even the best laid plans of mice and men tend to fall apart at first contact with reality, the unfortunate result is one of timing and opportunity.
To try and to fail is no disgrace. What matters is whether or not you are brave enough to get up and do it again - differently. I would know. I've been there, done that - got the scars and the derision that comes with the territory.
Since this is really up to the voting whales, if the GCP is to continue - I feel that radical changes need to be made. What those are, I don't know because most of what's done and pending still need clarity in order for outsiders like us to make an informed determination.
With any such radical changes, Djinn, alongside his stellar cohort, Rick, can then build an operating team of full-time people who have GAMING AND GAME DEV EXPERIENCE.
I also feel that there is no need for a council because despite best intentions imo it's really just there to give whale bags some degree of comfort while spending money with currently zero ROI. Too many cooks and all that.
Follow some - if not all - of the guidelines that I outlined before.
Put the whole GCP program on chain alongside a robust project in-take web form - complete with a counter showing the number of intake, the status, a brief description etc. But if that's going to be done, why not just roll it back into the pre-existing ARB grants program?
Anyway, the goal is to build a lean, mean GCP program, with complete transparency - and which operates in an efficient manner.
Seeing as it's gaming related, though it still stands a 90% chance of failure, all it takes is one or two hits to see a meaningful ROI. Then again, due to gaming and current game funding trends, that's just saying when the whales voted for an $85M (originally $200M) fund that's likely to lose 90% of its funding due to how gaming metrics tend to play out, they basically voted to set $76.5M on fire. They could very well have just bought $ARB and burned it. Same end result.
That is all. Please don't hate me.
ps....
In the past three months alone, game studios and projects that raised over $300M in an avg of 14 months, have failed and shutdown. And the recent GDC - regardless of all the nonsense you see online by the usual larping suspects - is a wakeup call that says gaming will continue to decline and that Web3 gaming - for all intent and purposes - is on life support. Anyone who believes - even for a minute - that the general failure of trad gaming means those devs and projects are going to spill over to Web3 - is a fool.
The Konvoy Q4/24 Gaming Report states that "Gaming VC Funding is down -47% QoQ" Their website PDF functionality is broken atm, but Game7 has a great synopsis.
You should probably read InvestGames' Games Investment Review Q4 2024 Executive Summary Report and their 2025 Gaming Industry Report
Treasure DAO was a prominent early backer of the GCP, but it is not synonymous with Web3 gaming on Arbitrum. Its departure reflects a shift in its own roadmap—not the death knell of gaming on the chain.
Treasure DAO leaving is an opportunity to redefine Arbitrum’s gaming strategy—not abandon it. Leadership is about setting direction, not reacting to who stays or goes.
Treasure DAO was a prominent early backer of the GCP, but it is not synonymous with Web3 gaming on Arbitrum. Its departure reflects a shift in its own roadmap—not the death knell of gaming on the chain.
Treasure DAO leaving is an opportunity to redefine Arbitrum’s gaming strategy—not abandon it. Leadership is about setting direction, not reacting to who stays or goes.
A resilient DAO invests in systems that outlast individual contributors. Perhaps an effort to fix what’s broken should be considered—without forfeiting the mission.
If there is good feedback in the post, then we welcome the poster to publish it, but it should remove any aspects that violate our code of conduct.
If there is good feedback in the post, then we welcome the poster to publish it, but it should remove any aspects that violate our code of conduct.
What do you consider to be "good feedback"? Isn't that subjective? So, that means, even if I re-posted it and removed the original joke that had it removed, it will likely suffer the same fate for an unrelated reason.
So, now what?
Well, I pointed out that it was a tongue-in-cheek joke - and explained the context. But that post too was promptly deleted. And so, nobody will actually know the context or what this is even about as all the related posts have now been deleted. Not sure how else to address this.
As I mentioned in my private message to @thedereksmart, it is inappropriate to make accusations that grants are going to non-appropriate parties without any tangible evidence. It harms the reputation of the GCP program. We have a maximum politeness policy that focuses on constructive feedback.
If there is good feedback in the post, then we welcome the poster to publish it, but it should remove any aspects that violate our code of conduct.
Our transparency report is for the year 2024 (i.e., January to December) prior to the GCP being in a position to issue grants or investments. So the grants will be unrelated. GCP will be taking the lead on investments & grants for blockchain gaming. AF will be coordinating with them whenever it is necessary/needed.
I know @raam answered this last night, but it is still worth posting here. Admins and moderators are generally based in Europe and Asia. As such, it was Saturday morning by the time we were back online and saw the proposal pop up. It should be expected that proposals may be delayed for approval over the weekend. In this case, given the magnitude of this proposal's request, it was best to wait until Monday when the community was back online and to allow everyone to have a break over the weekend.
If we had to characterize the overarching theme, it’s that GCP needs to be more professional and present that professional image. This is a lot of money at risk. To someone literate in corporate finance or who invests in private equity ventures, it looks unprofessional and disorganized. GCP is an investment, and an investment is only worth the money you can extract from it over the lifetime of that investment. GCP can restore some measure of credibility if it demonstrates professionalism, competence, and a clear, understandable business plan to make and return money to governance.
If we had to characterize the overarching theme, it’s that GCP needs to be more professional and present that professional image. This is a lot of money at risk. To someone literate in corporate finance or who invests in private equity ventures, it looks unprofessional and disorganized. GCP is an investment, and an investment is only worth the money you can extract from it over the lifetime of that investment. GCP can restore some measure of credibility if it demonstrates professionalism, competence, and a clear, understandable business plan to make and return money to governance.
This rather salient point basically summarizes the overarching angst surrounding the GCP. In fact, it is precisely the impetus for my suggesting that we truly need someone at the top of the GCP who has the requisite experience in running a well-funded corp that's parked atop an $85M fund.
More importantly, while significant, that amount of money wouldn't even fund a AA team, let alone a AAA team. And so, what's the GCP target for these funds? Disclosing the "66" entities currently in the pipeline will - as you have aptly stated by way of your aforementioned request for clarity and transparency - go a long way to us being aware of what the targets are, what they hope to achieve and the targeted ROI for each.
As I said to Djinn yesterday, the GCP has - in my view - been constantly on the defensive simply because of the lack of transparency in some processes. All that does is provide ammo to dissenters and others who were opposed to this fund in the first place. While a GM and/or a CTO would go a long way towards handling the nuances of disclosures, the fact remains that such persons - if from the same pool of "web3 crypto bros and frens" are likely to simply seek to maintain the status quo while achieving nothing worthy of note let alone merit. To me that means the ARB Foundation needs to hire/appoint an external party to fill in this role, thus freeing up Djinn and Chris to manage other more pressing day to day ops, intake etc.
One last thing that seems to be missing (unless I missed) is that, AFAIK, every person in the GCP is moonlighting. That's bad in and of itself, though in the case of the council members, it's acceptable given that they're not involved in the day to day ops of the GCP. That said, there needs to be clarity into which parties are part-time, full-time, contractors, employees etc. Including third-party pass-through (aka "consultants") entities.
While there have been quite a bit of behind-the-scenes shenanigans which have hampered the GCP progress - and which the public isn't privy to - the fact remains that in order for the GCP to succeed, better policies and processes need to be implemented because, guess what? Any level of dysfunction is likely to ultimately spill over into the deal making process and likely lead to deals that may not yield the expected results. This being Web3 and all, this danger and it's prerequisite premise is always clear and present.
While I would like to see the GCP succeed, the end will never justify the means if the end result is a level of failure which could have very well been mitigated, minimized or otherwise prevented.
Our transparency report is for the year 2024 (i.e., January to December) prior to the GCP being in a position to issue grants or investments. So the grants will be unrelated. GCP will be taking the lead on investments & grants for blockchain gaming. AF will be coordinating with them whenever it is necessary/needed.
I know @raam answered this last night, but it is still worth posting here. Admins and moderators are generally based in Europe and Asia. As such, it was Saturday morning by the time we were back online and saw the proposal pop up. It should be expected that proposals may be delayed for approval over the weekend. In this case, given the magnitude of this proposal's request, it was best to wait until Monday when the community was back online and to allow everyone to have a break over the weekend.
If we had to characterize the overarching theme, it’s that GCP needs to be more professional and present that professional image. This is a lot of money at risk. To someone literate in corporate finance or who invests in private equity ventures, it looks unprofessional and disorganized. GCP is an investment, and an investment is only worth the money you can extract from it over the lifetime of that investment. GCP can restore some measure of credibility if it demonstrates professionalism, competence, and a clear, understandable business plan to make and return money to governance.
If we had to characterize the overarching theme, it’s that GCP needs to be more professional and present that professional image. This is a lot of money at risk. To someone literate in corporate finance or who invests in private equity ventures, it looks unprofessional and disorganized. GCP is an investment, and an investment is only worth the money you can extract from it over the lifetime of that investment. GCP can restore some measure of credibility if it demonstrates professionalism, competence, and a clear, understandable business plan to make and return money to governance.
This rather salient point basically summarizes the overarching angst surrounding the GCP. In fact, it is precisely the impetus for my suggesting that we truly need someone at the top of the GCP who has the requisite experience in running a well-funded corp that's parked atop an $85M fund.
More importantly, while significant, that amount of money wouldn't even fund a AA team, let alone a AAA team. And so, what's the GCP target for these funds? Disclosing the "66" entities currently in the pipeline will - as you have aptly stated by way of your aforementioned request for clarity and transparency - go a long way to us being aware of what the targets are, what they hope to achieve and the targeted ROI for each.
As I said to Djinn yesterday, the GCP has - in my view - been constantly on the defensive simply because of the lack of transparency in some processes. All that does is provide ammo to dissenters and others who were opposed to this fund in the first place. While a GM and/or a CTO would go a long way towards handling the nuances of disclosures, the fact remains that such persons - if from the same pool of "web3 crypto bros and frens" are likely to simply seek to maintain the status quo while achieving nothing worthy of note let alone merit. To me that means the ARB Foundation needs to hire/appoint an external party to fill in this role, thus freeing up Djinn and Chris to manage other more pressing day to day ops, intake etc.
One last thing that seems to be missing (unless I missed) is that, AFAIK, every person in the GCP is moonlighting. That's bad in and of itself, though in the case of the council members, it's acceptable given that they're not involved in the day to day ops of the GCP. That said, there needs to be clarity into which parties are part-time, full-time, contractors, employees etc. Including third-party pass-through (aka "consultants") entities.
While there have been quite a bit of behind-the-scenes shenanigans which have hampered the GCP progress - and which the public isn't privy to - the fact remains that in order for the GCP to succeed, better policies and processes need to be implemented because, guess what? Any level of dysfunction is likely to ultimately spill over into the deal making process and likely lead to deals that may not yield the expected results. This being Web3 and all, this danger and it's prerequisite premise is always clear and present.
While I would like to see the GCP succeed, the end will never justify the means if the end result is a level of failure which could have very well been mitigated, minimized or otherwise prevented.
This comment really reflects what is wrong with the GCP in its current state and why changes need to happen and not only transparency reports, which are at least a good thing.
The main problem is, as stated, that the GCP was announced in a time where the whole ecosystem was really growing and a lot was happening, also in terms of gaming.
This comment really reflects what is wrong with the GCP in its current state and why changes need to happen and not only transparency reports, which are at least a good thing.
The main problem is, as stated, that the GCP was announced in a time where the whole ecosystem was really growing and a lot was happening, also in terms of gaming.
But now after more than a year its completely different. Things have changed and we need to reasses this proposal. Need to see if some goals from the original proposal need to be removed, revised or something different added.
And on a personal note, so far I have not seen anything interesting regarding gaming personally. The games at the GDC have been underwhelming from what Ive heard and the DAO needs to think if these funds can be put at use better somehow.
Thank you for bringing this issue up. While the GCP has evidently not yet achieved the desired standards of transparency, it is equally important to recognize that there have been no significant reports of gross mismanagement or misconduct. Thus, we believe that a total winding down of the GCP could be more detrimental to the Arbitrum ecosystem in the long term than beneficial. While recovering funds would allow a better strategic reallocation of the funds, it would also signal a loss of momentum and credibility for the Arbitrum ecosystem, making it more difficult to attracting Llng-term quality contributors as they may be discouraged from participating in Arbitrum’s ecosystem due to concerns over the security of funding.
Still, an initiative of this size should require the highest accountability standards. Those outlined by @NathanVDH and to which the GCP committed are a good start to regain community trust, and we are pleased to see the prompt reaction from the GCP team by appointing Castle DAO as DAO Communications Manager, as this will improve transparency and reporting quality.
It hurts to rip off the bandaid but we have to admit:
Reading through the answers to this clawback proposal, I see different points of view that seem valid enough from both sides, including @thedereksmart expert depiction of the challenges of gaming development and how it is expected in some way for this kind of initiative to fail.
To me, as it stands today, the GCP is already wounded in its current form, and bringing back the support and momentum that it once had would be very difficult given the current level of scrutiny that it currently has on its actions and the departure of some key members that would have contributed to the success of the initiative.
This comment really reflects what is wrong with the GCP in its current state and why changes need to happen and not only transparency reports, which are at least a good thing.
The main problem is, as stated, that the GCP was announced in a time where the whole ecosystem was really growing and a lot was happening, also in terms of gaming.
This comment really reflects what is wrong with the GCP in its current state and why changes need to happen and not only transparency reports, which are at least a good thing.
The main problem is, as stated, that the GCP was announced in a time where the whole ecosystem was really growing and a lot was happening, also in terms of gaming.
But now after more than a year its completely different. Things have changed and we need to reasses this proposal. Need to see if some goals from the original proposal need to be removed, revised or something different added.
And on a personal note, so far I have not seen anything interesting regarding gaming personally. The games at the GDC have been underwhelming from what Ive heard and the DAO needs to think if these funds can be put at use better somehow.
Thank you for bringing this issue up. While the GCP has evidently not yet achieved the desired standards of transparency, it is equally important to recognize that there have been no significant reports of gross mismanagement or misconduct. Thus, we believe that a total winding down of the GCP could be more detrimental to the Arbitrum ecosystem in the long term than beneficial. While recovering funds would allow a better strategic reallocation of the funds, it would also signal a loss of momentum and credibility for the Arbitrum ecosystem, making it more difficult to attracting Llng-term quality contributors as they may be discouraged from participating in Arbitrum’s ecosystem due to concerns over the security of funding.
Still, an initiative of this size should require the highest accountability standards. Those outlined by @NathanVDH and to which the GCP committed are a good start to regain community trust, and we are pleased to see the prompt reaction from the GCP team by appointing Castle DAO as DAO Communications Manager, as this will improve transparency and reporting quality.
It hurts to rip off the bandaid but we have to admit:
Reading through the answers to this clawback proposal, I see different points of view that seem valid enough from both sides, including @thedereksmart expert depiction of the challenges of gaming development and how it is expected in some way for this kind of initiative to fail.
To me, as it stands today, the GCP is already wounded in its current form, and bringing back the support and momentum that it once had would be very difficult given the current level of scrutiny that it currently has on its actions and the departure of some key members that would have contributed to the success of the initiative.
Thank you for bringing this issue up. While the GCP has evidently not yet achieved the desired standards of transparency, it is equally important to recognize that there have been no significant reports of gross mismanagement or misconduct. Thus, we believe that a total winding down of the GCP could be more detrimental to the Arbitrum ecosystem in the long term than beneficial. While recovering funds would allow a better strategic reallocation of the funds, it would also signal a loss of momentum and credibility for the Arbitrum ecosystem, making it more difficult to attracting Llng-term quality contributors as they may be discouraged from participating in Arbitrum’s ecosystem due to concerns over the security of funding.
Still, an initiative of this size should require the highest accountability standards. Those outlined by @NathanVDH and to which the GCP committed are a good start to regain community trust, and we are pleased to see the prompt reaction from the GCP team by appointing Castle DAO as DAO Communications Manager, as this will improve transparency and reporting quality.
In our experience as program and grant managers, a program of this magnitude should follow these accountability measures:
We believe with the correct transparency and accountability standards and under the supervision and guidance of the AF and OCL, the GCP can thrive to become a benchmark for decentralized ventures initiatives and help onboard high quality projects to the Arbitrum ecosystem.
It hurts to rip off the bandaid but we have to admit:
Do not fall into the sunk cost fallacy. its a fallacy. Repeal GCP and claw back the funds.
Reading through the answers to this clawback proposal, I see different points of view that seem valid enough from both sides, including @thedereksmart expert depiction of the challenges of gaming development and how it is expected in some way for this kind of initiative to fail.
To me, as it stands today, the GCP is already wounded in its current form, and bringing back the support and momentum that it once had would be very difficult given the current level of scrutiny that it currently has on its actions and the departure of some key members that would have contributed to the success of the initiative.
So, how do we bring these two visions together, recovering some funds for the DAO while still giving the GCP a vote of trust? I propose reducing the size and scope of the project to half of what was initially approved, allowing the GCP to continue with a limited budget, and allowing the DAO to use part of these funds for other purposes that could also be gaming-related.
In this way, the GCP will be able to complete their task (albeit with reduced scope), and will also allow Arbitrum to save face regarding the winding down of a very relevant fund, that could affect the willingness of other participants to contribute with the DAO in the future.
This, instead of a clawback, has the advantage of meeting in the middle, with the benefits mentioned earlier. Nonetheless, I applaud @NathanVDH for his interest in the health of the Arbitrum ecosystem, and his willingness to put his time and effort into presenting such a controversial suggestion, given that it has brought some really interesting actors to explain their experiences and finally brought the GCP to deliver a status report if the timeline presented by @paulofonseca in his earlier post is correct.
The support and active coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation is essential for the success of the GCP. It's comforting to see the AF is optimistic about the initiative and suggests there was indeed work done behind the scenes. That said, I think the very few updates shared over the almost 1 year of operations is a big red flag, especially when considering the funds allocated and if combined with delays on the original plan. I strongly encourage the relevant entities (GCP, its oversight committee and the AF) to be more proactive in communications going forward.
Cross-posting the GCP Strategic Update (March 2025) here for all those following this thread.
Cross-posting the GCP Strategic Update (March 2025) here for all those following this thread.
This particular monthly update will have higher fidelity than other monthly updates and was planned as a special update specifically post-GDC. With new communication roles joining the team, we wanted to kick off with a comprehensive update that included a few additional items.
Here’s what you can expect from this post:
We encourage everyone to follow the link and digest the full update.
Thank you for bringing this issue up. While the GCP has evidently not yet achieved the desired standards of transparency, it is equally important to recognize that there have been no significant reports of gross mismanagement or misconduct. Thus, we believe that a total winding down of the GCP could be more detrimental to the Arbitrum ecosystem in the long term than beneficial. While recovering funds would allow a better strategic reallocation of the funds, it would also signal a loss of momentum and credibility for the Arbitrum ecosystem, making it more difficult to attracting Llng-term quality contributors as they may be discouraged from participating in Arbitrum’s ecosystem due to concerns over the security of funding.
Still, an initiative of this size should require the highest accountability standards. Those outlined by @NathanVDH and to which the GCP committed are a good start to regain community trust, and we are pleased to see the prompt reaction from the GCP team by appointing Castle DAO as DAO Communications Manager, as this will improve transparency and reporting quality.
In our experience as program and grant managers, a program of this magnitude should follow these accountability measures:
We believe with the correct transparency and accountability standards and under the supervision and guidance of the AF and OCL, the GCP can thrive to become a benchmark for decentralized ventures initiatives and help onboard high quality projects to the Arbitrum ecosystem.
It hurts to rip off the bandaid but we have to admit:
Do not fall into the sunk cost fallacy. its a fallacy. Repeal GCP and claw back the funds.
Reading through the answers to this clawback proposal, I see different points of view that seem valid enough from both sides, including @thedereksmart expert depiction of the challenges of gaming development and how it is expected in some way for this kind of initiative to fail.
To me, as it stands today, the GCP is already wounded in its current form, and bringing back the support and momentum that it once had would be very difficult given the current level of scrutiny that it currently has on its actions and the departure of some key members that would have contributed to the success of the initiative.
So, how do we bring these two visions together, recovering some funds for the DAO while still giving the GCP a vote of trust? I propose reducing the size and scope of the project to half of what was initially approved, allowing the GCP to continue with a limited budget, and allowing the DAO to use part of these funds for other purposes that could also be gaming-related.
In this way, the GCP will be able to complete their task (albeit with reduced scope), and will also allow Arbitrum to save face regarding the winding down of a very relevant fund, that could affect the willingness of other participants to contribute with the DAO in the future.
This, instead of a clawback, has the advantage of meeting in the middle, with the benefits mentioned earlier. Nonetheless, I applaud @NathanVDH for his interest in the health of the Arbitrum ecosystem, and his willingness to put his time and effort into presenting such a controversial suggestion, given that it has brought some really interesting actors to explain their experiences and finally brought the GCP to deliver a status report if the timeline presented by @paulofonseca in his earlier post is correct.
The support and active coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation is essential for the success of the GCP. It's comforting to see the AF is optimistic about the initiative and suggests there was indeed work done behind the scenes. That said, I think the very few updates shared over the almost 1 year of operations is a big red flag, especially when considering the funds allocated and if combined with delays on the original plan. I strongly encourage the relevant entities (GCP, its oversight committee and the AF) to be more proactive in communications going forward.
Cross-posting the GCP Strategic Update (March 2025) here for all those following this thread.
Cross-posting the GCP Strategic Update (March 2025) here for all those following this thread.
This particular monthly update will have higher fidelity than other monthly updates and was planned as a special update specifically post-GDC. With new communication roles joining the team, we wanted to kick off with a comprehensive update that included a few additional items.
Here’s what you can expect from this post:
We encourage everyone to follow the link and digest the full update.
As I mentioned in my private message to @thedereksmart, it is inappropriate to make accusations that grants are going to non-appropriate parties without any tangible evidence. It harms the reputation of the GCP program. We have a maximum politeness policy that focuses on constructive feedback.
As I mentioned in my private message to @thedereksmart, it is inappropriate to make accusations that grants are going to non-appropriate parties without any tangible evidence. It harms the reputation of the GCP program. We have a maximum politeness policy that focuses on constructive feedback.
We don't know the poster and don't know who in the admin suite is replying, but why don't you just redact the specific sentence you took issue with? It was a fairly lengthy post.
Really great to see the GCP members start to directly address many of the concerns being raised, such as transparency, progress, use of funds, etc.
There's signs that the GCP actually has been productive, and the initiative may not be in need of being fully wound down.
Really great to see the GCP members start to directly address many of the concerns being raised, such as transparency, progress, use of funds, etc.
There's signs that the GCP actually has been productive, and the initiative may not be in need of being fully wound down.
The question does remain about ROI though. This amount of money(not just money spent but potential money to allocate), Human Resources and effort spent into any other initiative in the DAO such as DeFi initiatives, or the OpCo, gets significantly more scrutiny and requires much more reporting and transparency showing progress, often has milestones for funding, etc.
So I do think Nathan brings up good points and there are many signs that the GCP could do a way better job in those areas.
Thanks @Djinn for engaging with me on this in good faith. I'm grateful for everyone who contributed to this thread, and all those who have taken the time to engage on this important topic.
Based on the recent announcements from the GCP, conversations with GCP employees and members of the Oversight Council, I think the GCP, while it certainly suffered a slow start, has the makings of a program that will return value to tokenholders - which should be the guiding principle of this DAO. I appreciate that the model of the GCP is unique, but it doesn’t make it immune to tokenholder sentiment. To make sure we can continue forward, I’d like to propose a series of measures that the GCP and other service providers to the DAO should follow:
Thanks @Djinn for engaging with me on this in good faith. I'm grateful for everyone who contributed to this thread, and all those who have taken the time to engage on this important topic.
Based on the recent announcements from the GCP, conversations with GCP employees and members of the Oversight Council, I think the GCP, while it certainly suffered a slow start, has the makings of a program that will return value to tokenholders - which should be the guiding principle of this DAO. I appreciate that the model of the GCP is unique, but it doesn’t make it immune to tokenholder sentiment. To make sure we can continue forward, I’d like to propose a series of measures that the GCP and other service providers to the DAO should follow:
I would add this to the already present system of checks and balances that the GCP has, namely its DAO-approved oversight committee composed of OCL team members, the AF, and key delegates. I would like to also state that I don’t think that the accountability benefits of a transparent deal flow will outweigh its strategical downsides. We want to set up the GCP to succeed by operating within a predictable and investment friendly environment.
I think these measures would go a long way to restore investor confidence fully in this program, and I hope they can be useful for future initiatives. If these measures are agreeable to the GCP, I recommend not moving this proposal forward to a vote to avoid any further reputational damage and make sure that we’re giving the best chance to this program.
Hey Nathan, appreciate the open conversation and opportunity for us to have constructive dialogue.
The above makes sense - and I think they strike a balance between the need for operational efficiency / excellence and also transparency. We will continue working with you and other delegates to make sure we both address the asks above and any other requests that can enhance this program's future success. The onboarding of Castle Capital and growth of our team will only ensure that we will be even more proactive on addressing feedback.
Hey Nathan, appreciate the open conversation and opportunity for us to have constructive dialogue.
The above makes sense - and I think they strike a balance between the need for operational efficiency / excellence and also transparency. We will continue working with you and other delegates to make sure we both address the asks above and any other requests that can enhance this program's future success. The onboarding of Castle Capital and growth of our team will only ensure that we will be even more proactive on addressing feedback.
As a last note, I want to give a quick shoutout to the wider gaming ecosystem including OCL, AF, builders, advisors, delegates, and investors that have been working in the trenches with us over many months to ensure that the program is successful. We know that transparency can be improved, but the Council, AF observer, and other close stakeholders can vouch for the fidelity of work and momentum going into this program behind the scenes. This momentum will only become more clear as the next months/quarters proceed. Thank you to all the contributors (you know who you are!).
We will continue working with you and other delegates to make sure we both address the asks above and any other requests that can enhance this program’s future success. The onboarding of Castle Capital and growth of our team will only ensure that we will be even more proactive on addressing feedback.
We will continue working with you and other delegates to make sure we both address the asks above and any other requests that can enhance this program’s future success. The onboarding of Castle Capital and growth of our team will only ensure that we will be even more proactive on addressing feedback.
Just to dot all the I's and cross all the T's before retiring this proposal, are you confirming that GCP will deliver:
and the main piece not already overlapping with his plan:
If so, then it looks like there's a clear path forward for everyone.
Thank you @NathanVDH for the continued dialogue and collaboration on the GCP program. The GCP stakeholders and Nathan have had an open line of communication to address concerns and improve transparency.
Nathan - looking forward to hearing your thoughts on how we can build better programming together, these type of conversations are immensely useful when it comes to fostering a healthy DAO ecosystem :folded_hands:
Hi GFX, we confirmed above, and will be adding details to our upcoming update post that specify any deliverables that we will be providing.
Hey @stonecoldpat Is there a source where we can track all the recipients of the grants mentioned in the Transparency Report who have received funding?
This proposal is at the very least, important and sets a precedent for discussing future clawbacks.
Given the GCP's challenges in meeting its objectives and providing clear reporting, retrieving these funds could allow for their reallocation to initiatives with a higher potential for impact and we are generally in support.
This proposal is at the very least, important and sets a precedent for discussing future clawbacks.
Given the GCP's challenges in meeting its objectives and providing clear reporting, retrieving these funds could allow for their reallocation to initiatives with a higher potential for impact and we are generally in support.
However, it's important to note and see
If we had to characterize the overarching theme, it’s that GCP needs to be more professional and present that professional image. This is a lot of money at risk. To someone literate in corporate finance or who invests in private equity ventures, it looks unprofessional and disorganized.
If we had to characterize the overarching theme, it’s that GCP needs to be more professional and present that professional image. This is a lot of money at risk. To someone literate in corporate finance or who invests in private equity ventures, it looks unprofessional and disorganized.
I wasn't here when this was initially discussed and approved last year, so I might be missing something, but the main problem I see is exactly this. An initiative of this magnitude should be managed by experienced and qualified people AND with proper infrastructure. The GCP received the amount of funding equating to a very large Series B. It should be treated with the same level of professionalism, scrutiny and output expectations.
Hey there @Djinn and @DavidBolger, reading this:
Establishing an investment focused program with a goal of also generating value for the Arbitrum DAO as opposed to only dispersing grants, was and remains a unique undertaking;
The addition of @CastleCapital to the GCP to serve as a liaison to the DAO is a positive development. In the spirit of providing actionable, constructive criticism, here is a summary of suggestions we sent to @Atomist to tackle:
Provide disclosure of expenses to date. These do not need to be line items, but overall spending categories like legal, personnel, etc underneath an aggregate spend so far. There should also be a schedule for an external audit, preferably annually. The more complex the financial structures needed to invest, the more important it is to have an audit.
Quarterly updates should include both more numbers and more specific comms from those in charge to explain what happened and what guidance they give for the upcoming quarters. Think shareholder letter or letter to LPs. Arbitrum governance is the sole investor in GCP and needs to not only understand what has been spent/invested, but also needs to understand how the business is going -- what are the near-term challenges and opportunities, what specifically is being done about those? There are many investor letters out in the wild you can draw from for inspiration. As complexity grows, so should the depth of the quarterly reports.
Explanation of how the finances will be run. Lay out ahead of time accounting treatment for investments - how will they be carried on the books. There are multiple legitimate methods but which is going to be adopted should be clearly communicated ahead of time to avoid shenanigans. Changing accounting methods in a year or two should come as major "stop, look, listen" point because it indicates something is wrong internally (like having a poor plan for financial management) or external forces have shifted significantly (like tax law) and may require discussion to understand if the change is appropriate.
Address the fact that the fund is worth considerably less than it was. There has been little public acknowledgement of this, or how it affects business plans or projected returns, despite it having a material impact on GCP. Going from a $200m fund to a $90m fund will affect whether this is scaled large enough to find winning investments to offset the expected majority of losing investments. How does this impact GCP's ability to build a portfolio that will result in profits and not losses? If a secure runway for funding longterm commitments is so vital (which is why the entire lump sum was transferred at once) then how does this square with the fund being worth less than half what it was before? What mitigations are being taken against another 50% drop? At what point is scale not viable and need to ask for more or close down? We recommend communicating clearly the number now where GCP must either ask for more funding or wind down.
Provide a model for a successful investment’s lifecycle. It has not been explained precisely how this makes money. Suppose a game is successful. Is GCP Foundation getting a % of sales? Equity in an SPV that owns the game's rights? Is the stake controlling or non-controlling, and can a controlling co-investor block or delay GCP's profits? Does GCP get a lump sum in exiting somehow? Or is it a revenue stream that rises, peaks, and peters out? What is the payback period from investment to expected outcome? What is expected rate of return after the end of that investment lifecycle? What is the benchmark to beat? We are not gaming experts, but we do have significant experience with finance (and external entities presumably controlled by a DAO managing hundreds of millions of dollars), and presumably the 3 year period for GCP is simply the ramp-up period to invest all funds, and actual payback period is considerably longer as those investments mature and hopefully bear fruit. GCP needs to publicly demonstrate that it does have domain knowledge in gaming financing, and that it's not simply people who like playing and making games but without a sound financial plan to accompany it. In short, demonstrate that the plan is not simply "invest money > ??? > profit"
If it has not already, GCP needs to appoint a CFO who is available to answer questions after each quarterly report. This should also include whomever is heading the day-to-day operations. Never again should such simple questions as "What is the name of the GCP's legal entity?" require months of back and forth because the GCP Council didn't know if they were allowed to disclose it.
Establish now some specific triggers to reevaluate GCP's continued existence. The goal here is to make money. If that turns out not to be the case, the incentives for those drawing a salary is to just ride the GCP funds to zero and say they tried their best and are honest people. There should be some "stop, look, listen" triggers that either pause investments or require confirmation from the DAO to continue. These triggers should be for true disaster scenarios (e.g. an investment over n dollars turned out to be in a fraudulent company, 50% of the C-suite leaves within 6 months, GCP goes >18 months without an external audit)
I will say right away that I am for Arbitrum to be one of the leaders in web3 gaming, but
I would support this initiative for the following reasons:
Appreciate the intent behind this, but the current proposal feels hasty—more opinion than evidence.
If we’re going to make such a strong claim that the GCP team has failed, I’d expect a detailed breakdown: • What were the actual KPIs? • How many reports were expected, and how many were missed? • When and how did the team show reluctance to report? • What was communicated privately vs publicly?
Appreciate the intent behind this, but the current proposal feels hasty—more opinion than evidence.
If we’re going to make such a strong claim that the GCP team has failed, I’d expect a detailed breakdown: • What were the actual KPIs? • How many reports were expected, and how many were missed? • When and how did the team show reluctance to report? • What was communicated privately vs publicly?
We should hold teams accountable—but with facts, not assumptions. If transparency and council compensation are the real concerns, let’s fix that directly. Clawing back a major program without a structured analysis risks setting a dangerous precedent.
I can feel the strong energy in this proposal. Many will dislike but this "just f***ing do it" energy is what needed to turn things round.
GCP was launched with big expectations, but like many things in Web3, reality didn’t match the hype. It happens.
Personally, I don't see Arbitrum as the gaming chain but I might be biased towards DeFi. I think most ppl see it as finance layer.
When we are collaborating, we don't expect perfection from others but continuous optimization - that's how I believe relations can flourish. From what I heard on the governance call and in the delegate chat, the GCP has been focusing on work and didnt had the need to spend time on accountability. Do the work - it's actually the most crucial part. Accountability is crucial in our space aswell; sometimes you try your best and things don't work out and accountability is what will make both parties agree on what was the problem and continue to grow. I see this post as a tight leash that gives GCP an opportunity to share clear metrics and improve their transparency moving forward.
We want to start by reiterating our support for the Gaming Catalyst Program, and we remain committed to seeing it succeed. However, communication and financial transparency has been insufficient, which is unacceptable given the scale, visibility, and unprecedented level of DAO investment involved.
The current reports, outside of the most recent update, read more like brief notes rather than the comprehensive updates expected for an initiative of this scale. Standardizing monthly reports and determining what financial and legal information should/can be shared with the DAO would increase trust and transparency for all parties.
As I mentioned in my private message to @thedereksmart, it is inappropriate to make accusations that grants are going to non-appropriate parties without any tangible evidence. It harms the reputation of the GCP program. We have a maximum politeness policy that focuses on constructive feedback.
As I mentioned in my private message to @thedereksmart, it is inappropriate to make accusations that grants are going to non-appropriate parties without any tangible evidence. It harms the reputation of the GCP program. We have a maximum politeness policy that focuses on constructive feedback.
We don't know the poster and don't know who in the admin suite is replying, but why don't you just redact the specific sentence you took issue with? It was a fairly lengthy post.
Really great to see the GCP members start to directly address many of the concerns being raised, such as transparency, progress, use of funds, etc.
There's signs that the GCP actually has been productive, and the initiative may not be in need of being fully wound down.
Really great to see the GCP members start to directly address many of the concerns being raised, such as transparency, progress, use of funds, etc.
There's signs that the GCP actually has been productive, and the initiative may not be in need of being fully wound down.
The question does remain about ROI though. This amount of money(not just money spent but potential money to allocate), Human Resources and effort spent into any other initiative in the DAO such as DeFi initiatives, or the OpCo, gets significantly more scrutiny and requires much more reporting and transparency showing progress, often has milestones for funding, etc.
So I do think Nathan brings up good points and there are many signs that the GCP could do a way better job in those areas.
Thanks @Djinn for engaging with me on this in good faith. I'm grateful for everyone who contributed to this thread, and all those who have taken the time to engage on this important topic.
Based on the recent announcements from the GCP, conversations with GCP employees and members of the Oversight Council, I think the GCP, while it certainly suffered a slow start, has the makings of a program that will return value to tokenholders - which should be the guiding principle of this DAO. I appreciate that the model of the GCP is unique, but it doesn’t make it immune to tokenholder sentiment. To make sure we can continue forward, I’d like to propose a series of measures that the GCP and other service providers to the DAO should follow:
Thanks @Djinn for engaging with me on this in good faith. I'm grateful for everyone who contributed to this thread, and all those who have taken the time to engage on this important topic.
Based on the recent announcements from the GCP, conversations with GCP employees and members of the Oversight Council, I think the GCP, while it certainly suffered a slow start, has the makings of a program that will return value to tokenholders - which should be the guiding principle of this DAO. I appreciate that the model of the GCP is unique, but it doesn’t make it immune to tokenholder sentiment. To make sure we can continue forward, I’d like to propose a series of measures that the GCP and other service providers to the DAO should follow:
I would add this to the already present system of checks and balances that the GCP has, namely its DAO-approved oversight committee composed of OCL team members, the AF, and key delegates. I would like to also state that I don’t think that the accountability benefits of a transparent deal flow will outweigh its strategical downsides. We want to set up the GCP to succeed by operating within a predictable and investment friendly environment.
I think these measures would go a long way to restore investor confidence fully in this program, and I hope they can be useful for future initiatives. If these measures are agreeable to the GCP, I recommend not moving this proposal forward to a vote to avoid any further reputational damage and make sure that we’re giving the best chance to this program.
Hey Nathan, appreciate the open conversation and opportunity for us to have constructive dialogue.
The above makes sense - and I think they strike a balance between the need for operational efficiency / excellence and also transparency. We will continue working with you and other delegates to make sure we both address the asks above and any other requests that can enhance this program's future success. The onboarding of Castle Capital and growth of our team will only ensure that we will be even more proactive on addressing feedback.
Hey Nathan, appreciate the open conversation and opportunity for us to have constructive dialogue.
The above makes sense - and I think they strike a balance between the need for operational efficiency / excellence and also transparency. We will continue working with you and other delegates to make sure we both address the asks above and any other requests that can enhance this program's future success. The onboarding of Castle Capital and growth of our team will only ensure that we will be even more proactive on addressing feedback.
As a last note, I want to give a quick shoutout to the wider gaming ecosystem including OCL, AF, builders, advisors, delegates, and investors that have been working in the trenches with us over many months to ensure that the program is successful. We know that transparency can be improved, but the Council, AF observer, and other close stakeholders can vouch for the fidelity of work and momentum going into this program behind the scenes. This momentum will only become more clear as the next months/quarters proceed. Thank you to all the contributors (you know who you are!).
We will continue working with you and other delegates to make sure we both address the asks above and any other requests that can enhance this program’s future success. The onboarding of Castle Capital and growth of our team will only ensure that we will be even more proactive on addressing feedback.
We will continue working with you and other delegates to make sure we both address the asks above and any other requests that can enhance this program’s future success. The onboarding of Castle Capital and growth of our team will only ensure that we will be even more proactive on addressing feedback.
Just to dot all the I's and cross all the T's before retiring this proposal, are you confirming that GCP will deliver:
and the main piece not already overlapping with his plan:
If so, then it looks like there's a clear path forward for everyone.
Thank you @NathanVDH for the continued dialogue and collaboration on the GCP program. The GCP stakeholders and Nathan have had an open line of communication to address concerns and improve transparency.
Nathan - looking forward to hearing your thoughts on how we can build better programming together, these type of conversations are immensely useful when it comes to fostering a healthy DAO ecosystem :folded_hands:
Hi GFX, we confirmed above, and will be adding details to our upcoming update post that specify any deliverables that we will be providing.
Hey @stonecoldpat Is there a source where we can track all the recipients of the grants mentioned in the Transparency Report who have received funding?
This proposal is at the very least, important and sets a precedent for discussing future clawbacks.
Given the GCP's challenges in meeting its objectives and providing clear reporting, retrieving these funds could allow for their reallocation to initiatives with a higher potential for impact and we are generally in support.
This proposal is at the very least, important and sets a precedent for discussing future clawbacks.
Given the GCP's challenges in meeting its objectives and providing clear reporting, retrieving these funds could allow for their reallocation to initiatives with a higher potential for impact and we are generally in support.
However, it's important to note and see
If we had to characterize the overarching theme, it’s that GCP needs to be more professional and present that professional image. This is a lot of money at risk. To someone literate in corporate finance or who invests in private equity ventures, it looks unprofessional and disorganized.
If we had to characterize the overarching theme, it’s that GCP needs to be more professional and present that professional image. This is a lot of money at risk. To someone literate in corporate finance or who invests in private equity ventures, it looks unprofessional and disorganized.
I wasn't here when this was initially discussed and approved last year, so I might be missing something, but the main problem I see is exactly this. An initiative of this magnitude should be managed by experienced and qualified people AND with proper infrastructure. The GCP received the amount of funding equating to a very large Series B. It should be treated with the same level of professionalism, scrutiny and output expectations.
Hey there @Djinn and @DavidBolger, reading this:
Establishing an investment focused program with a goal of also generating value for the Arbitrum DAO as opposed to only dispersing grants, was and remains a unique undertaking;
The addition of @CastleCapital to the GCP to serve as a liaison to the DAO is a positive development. In the spirit of providing actionable, constructive criticism, here is a summary of suggestions we sent to @Atomist to tackle:
Provide disclosure of expenses to date. These do not need to be line items, but overall spending categories like legal, personnel, etc underneath an aggregate spend so far. There should also be a schedule for an external audit, preferably annually. The more complex the financial structures needed to invest, the more important it is to have an audit.
Quarterly updates should include both more numbers and more specific comms from those in charge to explain what happened and what guidance they give for the upcoming quarters. Think shareholder letter or letter to LPs. Arbitrum governance is the sole investor in GCP and needs to not only understand what has been spent/invested, but also needs to understand how the business is going -- what are the near-term challenges and opportunities, what specifically is being done about those? There are many investor letters out in the wild you can draw from for inspiration. As complexity grows, so should the depth of the quarterly reports.
Explanation of how the finances will be run. Lay out ahead of time accounting treatment for investments - how will they be carried on the books. There are multiple legitimate methods but which is going to be adopted should be clearly communicated ahead of time to avoid shenanigans. Changing accounting methods in a year or two should come as major "stop, look, listen" point because it indicates something is wrong internally (like having a poor plan for financial management) or external forces have shifted significantly (like tax law) and may require discussion to understand if the change is appropriate.
Address the fact that the fund is worth considerably less than it was. There has been little public acknowledgement of this, or how it affects business plans or projected returns, despite it having a material impact on GCP. Going from a $200m fund to a $90m fund will affect whether this is scaled large enough to find winning investments to offset the expected majority of losing investments. How does this impact GCP's ability to build a portfolio that will result in profits and not losses? If a secure runway for funding longterm commitments is so vital (which is why the entire lump sum was transferred at once) then how does this square with the fund being worth less than half what it was before? What mitigations are being taken against another 50% drop? At what point is scale not viable and need to ask for more or close down? We recommend communicating clearly the number now where GCP must either ask for more funding or wind down.
Provide a model for a successful investment’s lifecycle. It has not been explained precisely how this makes money. Suppose a game is successful. Is GCP Foundation getting a % of sales? Equity in an SPV that owns the game's rights? Is the stake controlling or non-controlling, and can a controlling co-investor block or delay GCP's profits? Does GCP get a lump sum in exiting somehow? Or is it a revenue stream that rises, peaks, and peters out? What is the payback period from investment to expected outcome? What is expected rate of return after the end of that investment lifecycle? What is the benchmark to beat? We are not gaming experts, but we do have significant experience with finance (and external entities presumably controlled by a DAO managing hundreds of millions of dollars), and presumably the 3 year period for GCP is simply the ramp-up period to invest all funds, and actual payback period is considerably longer as those investments mature and hopefully bear fruit. GCP needs to publicly demonstrate that it does have domain knowledge in gaming financing, and that it's not simply people who like playing and making games but without a sound financial plan to accompany it. In short, demonstrate that the plan is not simply "invest money > ??? > profit"
If it has not already, GCP needs to appoint a CFO who is available to answer questions after each quarterly report. This should also include whomever is heading the day-to-day operations. Never again should such simple questions as "What is the name of the GCP's legal entity?" require months of back and forth because the GCP Council didn't know if they were allowed to disclose it.
Establish now some specific triggers to reevaluate GCP's continued existence. The goal here is to make money. If that turns out not to be the case, the incentives for those drawing a salary is to just ride the GCP funds to zero and say they tried their best and are honest people. There should be some "stop, look, listen" triggers that either pause investments or require confirmation from the DAO to continue. These triggers should be for true disaster scenarios (e.g. an investment over n dollars turned out to be in a fraudulent company, 50% of the C-suite leaves within 6 months, GCP goes >18 months without an external audit)
I will say right away that I am for Arbitrum to be one of the leaders in web3 gaming, but
I would support this initiative for the following reasons:
Appreciate the intent behind this, but the current proposal feels hasty—more opinion than evidence.
If we’re going to make such a strong claim that the GCP team has failed, I’d expect a detailed breakdown: • What were the actual KPIs? • How many reports were expected, and how many were missed? • When and how did the team show reluctance to report? • What was communicated privately vs publicly?
Appreciate the intent behind this, but the current proposal feels hasty—more opinion than evidence.
If we’re going to make such a strong claim that the GCP team has failed, I’d expect a detailed breakdown: • What were the actual KPIs? • How many reports were expected, and how many were missed? • When and how did the team show reluctance to report? • What was communicated privately vs publicly?
We should hold teams accountable—but with facts, not assumptions. If transparency and council compensation are the real concerns, let’s fix that directly. Clawing back a major program without a structured analysis risks setting a dangerous precedent.
I can feel the strong energy in this proposal. Many will dislike but this "just f***ing do it" energy is what needed to turn things round.
GCP was launched with big expectations, but like many things in Web3, reality didn’t match the hype. It happens.
Personally, I don't see Arbitrum as the gaming chain but I might be biased towards DeFi. I think most ppl see it as finance layer.
When we are collaborating, we don't expect perfection from others but continuous optimization - that's how I believe relations can flourish. From what I heard on the governance call and in the delegate chat, the GCP has been focusing on work and didnt had the need to spend time on accountability. Do the work - it's actually the most crucial part. Accountability is crucial in our space aswell; sometimes you try your best and things don't work out and accountability is what will make both parties agree on what was the problem and continue to grow. I see this post as a tight leash that gives GCP an opportunity to share clear metrics and improve their transparency moving forward.
We want to start by reiterating our support for the Gaming Catalyst Program, and we remain committed to seeing it succeed. However, communication and financial transparency has been insufficient, which is unacceptable given the scale, visibility, and unprecedented level of DAO investment involved.
The current reports, outside of the most recent update, read more like brief notes rather than the comprehensive updates expected for an initiative of this scale. Standardizing monthly reports and determining what financial and legal information should/can be shared with the DAO would increase trust and transparency for all parties.
Hey there @Djinn and @DavidBolger, reading this:
Establishing an investment focused program with a goal of also generating value for the Arbitrum DAO as opposed to only dispersing grants, was and remains a unique undertaking;
I think a token holder owned entity of the DAO with the vision to grow the ecosystem through investments rather than relying 100% on grants (or not and falling behind the competition) is a great example of DAO innovation.
The first cohort of grants is being processed, with a top native builder, innovative loyalty platform, entertainment focused chain, and esports / ecommerce platform being among the first cohort
...I have a question, is GCP currently also giving grants to gaming projects? If so, how much was spent on grants already? and are these gaming grants different from the ones the @Arbitrum Foundation reported in their recent transparency report, or are these the same gaming grants the AF has given out? If they are the same, who is giving out the gaming grants after all? if they are not the same, how do you coordinate this gaming grant giving activity?

The addition of @CastleCapital to the GCP to serve as a liaison to the DAO is a positive development. In the spirit of providing actionable, constructive criticism, here is a summary of suggestions we sent to @Atomist to tackle:
Provide disclosure of expenses to date. These do not need to be line items, but overall spending categories like legal, personnel, etc underneath an aggregate spend so far. There should also be a schedule for an external audit, preferably annually. The more complex the financial structures needed to invest, the more important it is to have an audit.
Quarterly updates should include both more numbers and more specific comms from those in charge to explain what happened and what guidance they give for the upcoming quarters. Think shareholder letter or letter to LPs. Arbitrum governance is the sole investor in GCP and needs to not only understand what has been spent/invested, but also needs to understand how the business is going -- what are the near-term challenges and opportunities, what specifically is being done about those? There are many investor letters out in the wild you can draw from for inspiration. As complexity grows, so should the depth of the quarterly reports.
Explanation of how the finances will be run. Lay out ahead of time accounting treatment for investments - how will they be carried on the books. There are multiple legitimate methods but which is going to be adopted should be clearly communicated ahead of time to avoid shenanigans. Changing accounting methods in a year or two should come as major "stop, look, listen" point because it indicates something is wrong internally (like having a poor plan for financial management) or external forces have shifted significantly (like tax law) and may require discussion to understand if the change is appropriate.
Address the fact that the fund is worth considerably less than it was. There has been little public acknowledgement of this, or how it affects business plans or projected returns, despite it having a material impact on GCP. Going from a $200m fund to a $90m fund will affect whether this is scaled large enough to find winning investments to offset the expected majority of losing investments. How does this impact GCP's ability to build a portfolio that will result in profits and not losses? If a secure runway for funding longterm commitments is so vital (which is why the entire lump sum was transferred at once) then how does this square with the fund being worth less than half what it was before? What mitigations are being taken against another 50% drop? At what point is scale not viable and need to ask for more or close down? We recommend communicating clearly the number now where GCP must either ask for more funding or wind down.
Provide a model for a successful investment’s lifecycle. It has not been explained precisely how this makes money. Suppose a game is successful. Is GCP Foundation getting a % of sales? Equity in an SPV that owns the game's rights? Is the stake controlling or non-controlling, and can a controlling co-investor block or delay GCP's profits? Does GCP get a lump sum in exiting somehow? Or is it a revenue stream that rises, peaks, and peters out? What is the payback period from investment to expected outcome? What is expected rate of return after the end of that investment lifecycle? What is the benchmark to beat? We are not gaming experts, but we do have significant experience with finance (and external entities presumably controlled by a DAO managing hundreds of millions of dollars), and presumably the 3 year period for GCP is simply the ramp-up period to invest all funds, and actual payback period is considerably longer as those investments mature and hopefully bear fruit. GCP needs to publicly demonstrate that it does have domain knowledge in gaming financing, and that it's not simply people who like playing and making games but without a sound financial plan to accompany it. In short, demonstrate that the plan is not simply "invest money > ??? > profit"
If it has not already, GCP needs to appoint a CFO who is available to answer questions after each quarterly report. This should also include whomever is heading the day-to-day operations. Never again should such simple questions as "What is the name of the GCP's legal entity?" require months of back and forth because the GCP Council didn't know if they were allowed to disclose it.
Establish now some specific triggers to reevaluate GCP's continued existence. The goal here is to make money. If that turns out not to be the case, the incentives for those drawing a salary is to just ride the GCP funds to zero and say they tried their best and are honest people. There should be some "stop, look, listen" triggers that either pause investments or require confirmation from the DAO to continue. These triggers should be for true disaster scenarios (e.g. an investment over n dollars turned out to be in a fraudulent company, 50% of the C-suite leaves within 6 months, GCP goes >18 months without an external audit)
If we had to characterize the overarching theme, it's that GCP needs to be more professional and present that professional image. This is a lot of money at risk. To someone literate in corporate finance or who invests in private equity ventures, it looks unprofessional and disorganized. GCP is an investment, and an investment is only worth the money you can extract from it over the lifetime of that investment. GCP can restore some measure of credibility if it demonstrates professionalism, competence, and a clear, understandable business plan to make and return money to governance.
I will say right away that I am for Arbitrum to be one of the leaders in web3 gaming, but
I would support this initiative for the following reasons:
Of course, there are positive aspects, but all the above factors have a very negative impact on my personal opinion of GCP
I can feel the strong energy in this proposal. Many will dislike but this "just f***ing do it" energy is what needed to turn things round.
GCP was launched with big expectations, but like many things in Web3, reality didn’t match the hype. It happens.
Personally, I don't see Arbitrum as the gaming chain but I might be biased towards DeFi. I think most ppl see it as finance layer.
Gaming isn't picking up at all and if they do, gaming are launching on specialized chains.
The DAO stepping in now to cut losses and reclaim funds is the right move to prevent further waste.
I’m not sure how bad the transparency and execution issues were, but if there was ever a time for a hard reset, this is it.
This is also a lesson for the DAO, when too many things get approved without solid tracking, things slip.
We didn’t do a great job overseeing this from the start, but now, at least, we need to make sure the fund return process is clean, with no legal mess. Hopefully, this sets a better standard for situation like this.
We want to start by reiterating our support for the Gaming Catalyst Program, and we remain committed to seeing it succeed. However, communication and financial transparency has been insufficient, which is unacceptable given the scale, visibility, and unprecedented level of DAO investment involved.
The current reports, outside of the most recent update, read more like brief notes rather than the comprehensive updates expected for an initiative of this scale. Standardizing monthly reports and determining what financial and legal information should/can be shared with the DAO would increase trust and transparency for all parties.
Additionally, there is a notable discrepancy regarding the GCP bylaws being dated February 19th 2025, despite the entity being stated as established in July 2024. While this was recently addressed, more proactive and clear communication is necessary to prevent speculation.
Delays and setbacks are inevitable, but failing to communicate them transparently erodes credibility and leads to negative assumptions. Proactive communication is essential, even when the updates are not all positive.
It is worth highlighting that delegates have consistently voiced the need for more comprehensive updates rather than fewer. Suggestions to improve communication have included newsletters and monthly forum updates.
L2Beat made this clear in May 2024, during the GCP Tally vote, stating:
“However, we know that with this amount of funding, the program is taking on an enormous responsibility for the entire ecosystem, as it will set the standards for proper investment decision-making and future accountability and oversight. We already declare that we will pay close attention to its execution and reporting, ensuring that the DAO remains informed and in control of the overall direction of the program.”
Furthermore, in the December 2024 update, Djinn wrote:
“As per feedback from delegates, we are reviewing supplemental communication methods to keep the community informed, including: monthly newsletters, monthly forum updates, quarterly ‘State of Gaming’ or community-oriented gaming events with GCP updates included, live GCP presentations at major conferences (EthCC, Devcon, etc).”
Lastly, we are pleased to see in the latest update that a DAO liaison has been appointed to address communication issues and that a content strategist will be hired.
Is this arrangement within the scope of Castle's existing ARDC work or will this be a line item on the GCP budget?
We recommend also bringing on a corporate financial expert, preferably with experience in the gaming or venture industry, to provide the detailed financial reporting the DAO, as an investor, would expect from an initiative of this scale. R3gen Finance could be a possible candidate for this role.
To recap, the DAO needs a more robust, consistent, and transparent reporting cadence moving forward. This includes detailed and professional financial reporting, clear communication about typical delays and setbacks, and tighter feedback loops between the GCP Council and the DAO. This is essential for maintaining trust and ensuring alignment with the broader community.
Hello @Djinn, thanks for the detailed and civil response. I appreciate the direction you're taking there. I wouldn't be as adamant in asking for accountability if the DAO was already seeing positive outcomes from the GCP. I understand that things take time, and you're trying to do them the right way - thank you for acknowledging the weakness so far on the communication side. I'll be waiting to see the promised updates, and the list of rituals described above would fit what I would expect to see from the DAO's largest expenditure yet. Based on that, I think the DAO will have a much better picture of whether the GCP is on the right track.
Just to comment on time to set up a legal entity, the GCP Foundation was formed in early July 2024. The articles of organization you link to are dated Feb 19, 2025. That's a substantial period of time for what is supposed to be one of the formation tasks, and not typical.
Just to comment on time to set up a legal entity, the GCP Foundation was formed in early July 2024. The articles of organization you link to are dated Feb 19, 2025. That's a substantial period of time for what is supposed to be one of the formation tasks, and not typical.

We fully support this proposal. This is exactly the kind of accountability mechanism we need to protect the DAO's resources.
The GCP situation highlights precisely why we need better controls on proposals and why we have been actively voting against high spending proposals without clear deliverables. GCP received a massive 225 million ARB allocation, and what do we have to show for it? Almost nothing tangible, key members abandoning ship (including Treasure DAO completely exiting Arbitrum), attempts to reduce their own reporting requirements while increasing their compensation, and a general lack of transparency about how funds are being used. This seems to be normal for many in the DAO, and isn't unique to GCP, but this is a terrible situation to be in and we don't understand why delegates continue to defend this kind of thing.
We fully support this proposal. This is exactly the kind of accountability mechanism we need to protect the DAO's resources.
The GCP situation highlights precisely why we need better controls on proposals and why we have been actively voting against high spending proposals without clear deliverables. GCP received a massive 225 million ARB allocation, and what do we have to show for it? Almost nothing tangible, key members abandoning ship (including Treasure DAO completely exiting Arbitrum), attempts to reduce their own reporting requirements while increasing their compensation, and a general lack of transparency about how funds are being used. This seems to be normal for many in the DAO, and isn't unique to GCP, but this is a terrible situation to be in and we don't understand why delegates continue to defend this kind of thing.
The clawback sets a crucial precedent that the DAO won't tolerate ineffective use of its treasury. The proposal isn't punitive toward regular contributors (allowing for severance packages), but is firm on stopping the bleeding and recovering uncommitted funds.
Looking at both this GCP situation and many other proposals that come to the DAO, it's clear we need a consistent approach to accountability across all DAO spending. We've said many times that DAO spends obscene amounts of money for seemingly no positive outcomes and it is a sad state of affairs to continue.
The recovered funds could be redirected toward initiatives with clearer metrics and accountability, like the proposed airdrop or other programs that demonstrate measurable impact for the ecosystem. Or simply returning to the treasury until we have high-confidence opportunities.
Bottom line: supporting this clawback sends the right message about responsible treasury management. We can't approve large lump sums without ongoing performance requirements, and when programs fail to deliver, we need to act decisively rather than throwing good money after bad.
Thank you for putting this up, @NathanVDH.
We stated our disagreement with funding this initiative a couple of times in the past [1] [2]. However, this does not naturally translate to us supporting a proposal to claw back GCP funds.
This RFC proposes a promising approach to GCP, but it lacks clarity on whether other alternatives have been considered and a proper assessment of the program’s current state.
The GCP’s initial promise of catalyzing the Web3 gaming ecosystem on Arbitrum has had persistent delays in meeting key milestones
This needs more thought around it. Let's take setting up the legal entity as an instance. Have you considered the fact that setting up an entity for GCP of this kind requires as much time as it took? The legal structure outlined in the GCP’s M&A document involves multiple layers of compliance, detailed due diligence, and iterative legal reviews that span across various jurisdictions and regulatory bodies. If other specific key milestones were persistently delayed, it would be great if you could mention/list them.
We believe that each of these delegates will serve as a critical feedback loop for us and offer a wealth of diverse perspectives:
@krst (representing himself, not L2Beat)
@JoJo the famous cow
@Bob-Rossi
@limes
@coinflip
Did you also consider meeting with the interim transparency committee on this subject? Yes, the council is already set up, but we believe meeting them would have painted a clearer picture, as they have a good understanding of things.
This proposal reflects best practices by ensuring that funds are only deployed based on measurable progress and verified accountability
The suggestion to claw back funds negates this comment here. You are not suggesting that funds should be deployed based only on measurable progress but all remaining unallocated funds should be returned and the program wound down.
@Jojo also asked a question along the lines of impact assessment. What are the potential consequences of terminating the GCP on Arbitrum's ecosystem, particularly in the gaming sector? Understanding these impacts can help in evaluating whether the benefits of clawing back funds outweigh the possible setbacks.
While the proposal raises valid concerns about the GCP's performance and accountability, a more comprehensive assessment of the program's current state and potential alternatives could provide a balanced approach that safeguards the DAO's interests while considering the broader implications for the Arbitrum ecosystem and delegates.
As much as I understand the motivation behind this clawback proposal, I believe we might have jumped the gun here. The desire to protect DAO funds and ensure transparency is valid, but immediately resorting to a complete clawback seems overly harsh and potentially counterproductive. Instead, let's take a moment to reconsider the issue more constructively, with empathy for the challenges the GCP has been facing.
I suggest the following:
As much as I understand the motivation behind this clawback proposal, I believe we might have jumped the gun here. The desire to protect DAO funds and ensure transparency is valid, but immediately resorting to a complete clawback seems overly harsh and potentially counterproductive. Instead, let's take a moment to reconsider the issue more constructively, with empathy for the challenges the GCP has been facing.
I suggest the following:
Implement Phased Clawbacks Instead of Immediate Full Clawback: Rather than reclaiming all the unallocated funds at once, a phased approach would offer GCP a realistic opportunity to adjust. For example, we could establish clear milestones with incremental clawbacks only if those milestones aren't met. This provides both accountability and motivation without completely halting their efforts.
Flexible and Realistic Reporting Standards: It's clear that the reporting requirements have become somewhat burdensome. Let’s simplify and streamline reporting:
Clear, Supportive, and Collaborative Oversight: Instead of stringent oversight, we should consider assigning a dedicated governance liaison who works collaboratively with the GCP. Their role would not be punitive but supportive, helping the GCP troubleshoot challenges, clarify goals, and adapt their strategy proactively.
Gradual Adjustment of Compensation Packages: Instead of immediately revoking all unvested compensation, introduce performance-based vesting schedules that clearly reward demonstrable progress. This adjustment provides both motivation for contributors and reassurance to governance that funds are used responsibly.
Finally, our goal should be to empower GCP to succeed, not penalize prematurely. A careful revision of this proposal, incorporating phased funding adjustments, streamlined reporting, supportive oversight, and flexible compensation structures, could strike the right balance between accountability and reorganization.
I will be 100% honest although I may not be the best person/delegate to comment on this, because I didn't follow up with all the details around the GCP:
The complexity of the GCP proposal is unknown atm, which lead to uncertainty and to contributors questioning it. It also appears to be pretty slow, which may not be bad, being slower may better than spending funds fast. We always have this problem in web3, people that allocate capital rush to allocate to justify more capital to be spent.
For a proposal of it's size, reporting is either not done professionally or is too unfrequent, as an example when the Thankarb started and I ran a couple of programs, we had more thorough and frequent reporting than the GCP has at the moment, but most delegates didn't care to verify and the DAO didn't have any mechanism to audit/track progress.
The fact that this proposal being posted has led to more updates in the GPC chat than in the previous 3 months may look a little peculiar to those that do not join the Arbitrum update calls.
Even if the proposal doesn't pass, it has already helped the DAO :blue_heart:
I will be 100% honest although I may not be the best person/delegate to comment on this, because I didn't follow up with all the details around the GCP:
The complexity of the GCP proposal is unknown atm, which lead to uncertainty and to contributors questioning it. It also appears to be pretty slow, which may not be bad, being slower may better than spending funds fast. We always have this problem in web3, people that allocate capital rush to allocate to justify more capital to be spent.
For a proposal of it's size, reporting is either not done professionally or is too unfrequent, as an example when the Thankarb started and I ran a couple of programs, we had more thorough and frequent reporting than the GCP has at the moment, but most delegates didn't care to verify and the DAO didn't have any mechanism to audit/track progress.
The fact that this proposal being posted has led to more updates in the GPC chat than in the previous 3 months may look a little peculiar to those that do not join the Arbitrum update calls.
Even if the proposal doesn't pass, it has already helped the DAO :blue_heart:
Appreciate @NathanVDH and @GFXlabs for the boldness.
The Gaming Catalyst Program (GCP) was approved during a period of exceptionally optimistic projections that, in hindsight, proved unsustainable. One of its primary backers – Treasure DAO – has already exited Arbitrum, and other key contributors have either stepped down or signaled waning commitment. In addition, the GCP has repeatedly shown a reluctance to adequately document its activities and performance. Instead of embracing transparency, the program has recently sought to increase contributor compensation and lower its own reporting requirements. Given these failures, the risks associated with a lump-sum allocation of funds, and the mounting concerns raised by the community, it is time to cut our losses. We must wind down GCP activities and secure all possible funds in order to safeguard the DAO’s funds and restore investor confidence in the ability of this DAO to allocate capital.
The Gaming Catalyst Program (GCP) was approved during a period of exceptionally optimistic projections that, in hindsight, proved unsustainable. One of its primary backers – Treasure DAO – has already exited Arbitrum, and other key contributors have either stepped down or signaled waning commitment. In addition, the GCP has repeatedly shown a reluctance to adequately document its activities and performance. Instead of embracing transparency, the program has recently sought to increase contributor compensation and lower its own reporting requirements. Given these failures, the risks associated with a lump-sum allocation of funds, and the mounting concerns raised by the community, it is time to cut our losses. We must wind down GCP activities and secure all possible funds in order to safeguard the DAO’s funds and restore investor confidence in the ability of this DAO to allocate capital.
This seems like a very strong action/reaction, but I'm unsure there is a strong basis. If possible it would be nice to see links or other sources backing up each part of this statement, to make it easier to follow.
By my understanding the enumerated failures are just 4:
Treasure DAO – has already exited Arbitrum I am not entirely sure it is fair to lay this at the feet of GCP, but perhaps there is context that would make it so.
other key contributors have either stepped down or signaled waning commitment Who were the key contributors? Did they state a reason?
the GCP has repeatedly shown a reluctance to adequately document its activities and performance Sourcing would be helpful to judge the merits of this failing.
the program has recently sought to increase contributor compensation and lower its own reporting requirements Supported by the link OP provided, but this in itself does not seem a strong reason to close up shop.
I'm sure the proposing parties have good reasons for making this proposal, but in reading it I feel like the case is not sufficiently made. Perhaps there are further unstated failures, and/or with context the stated failures become more severe, but if that's the case I think we need that additional context.
We were referring to the documentation in its entirety (from drafting to receiving delegates' feedback) and not necessarily just the GCP Foundation setup.
Thanks for sharing your concerns about the Gaming Catalyst Program. Some of the rationale for this proposal is a bit confusing, but we hear you on the request for additional transparency.
The GCP has been working intensely with our stakeholders to create a robust program that fits within a unified Arbitrum Gaming organization and narrative. Establishing an investment focused program with a goal of also generating value for the Arbitrum DAO as opposed to only dispersing grants, was and remains a unique undertaking; establishing both foundation and operational level policies, procedures including oversight of the diligence and decision making process, takes time.
The update came two days after I posted this proposal, on Friday. The proposal was accepted by moderators on Monday.
humm... @moderators why was this proposal only accepted today, instead of last Friday? is this normal?
I'm echoing @GFXlabs 's response, I'd only add that it is the GCP's job to properly report to the DAO. That's supposed to be the direction of that particular relationship. And yes I've certainly considered the damage that a proposal like this can make, but I think its advantages for $ARB tokenholders are worth having this conversation. It is not normal for a program funded by the DAO to have such sparse reporting to the DAO. The current setup is not sustainable, and I'd like to see clear efforts from the GCP to fix it.
A resilient DAO invests in systems that outlast individual contributors. Perhaps an effort to fix what’s broken should be considered—without forfeiting the mission.
Hello!
Thanks for the proposal. I have a few comments/questions:
I would like to see evidence of the following claims, as it is part of the motivation for the proposal.
and other key contributors have either stepped down or signaled waning commitment.
We are strongly in favor of this proposal. As many delegates predicted, the GCP was a failure. What truly matters for any organization, including DAOs, is the ability to learn from mistakes and pivot. Acknowledging the error and deciding to stop the initiative is probably the hardest part, as it's easy to fall into the sunk-cost fallacy—the tendency to continue a strategy or course of action simply because significant resources have already been invested, even when it's clear that moving on would be the better choice.

The industry is fiercely competitive, with rival chains routinely offering grants ranging from $5M to $100M. In some cases, single deals from competing chains have been rumored to exceed the total GCP allocation (currently valued at $85M).
Hey there @Djinn and @DavidBolger, reading this:
Establishing an investment focused program with a goal of also generating value for the Arbitrum DAO as opposed to only dispersing grants, was and remains a unique undertaking;
I think a token holder owned entity of the DAO with the vision to grow the ecosystem through investments rather than relying 100% on grants (or not and falling behind the competition) is a great example of DAO innovation.
The first cohort of grants is being processed, with a top native builder, innovative loyalty platform, entertainment focused chain, and esports / ecommerce platform being among the first cohort
...I have a question, is GCP currently also giving grants to gaming projects? If so, how much was spent on grants already? and are these gaming grants different from the ones the @Arbitrum Foundation reported in their recent transparency report, or are these the same gaming grants the AF has given out? If they are the same, who is giving out the gaming grants after all? if they are not the same, how do you coordinate this gaming grant giving activity?

The addition of @CastleCapital to the GCP to serve as a liaison to the DAO is a positive development. In the spirit of providing actionable, constructive criticism, here is a summary of suggestions we sent to @Atomist to tackle:
Provide disclosure of expenses to date. These do not need to be line items, but overall spending categories like legal, personnel, etc underneath an aggregate spend so far. There should also be a schedule for an external audit, preferably annually. The more complex the financial structures needed to invest, the more important it is to have an audit.
Quarterly updates should include both more numbers and more specific comms from those in charge to explain what happened and what guidance they give for the upcoming quarters. Think shareholder letter or letter to LPs. Arbitrum governance is the sole investor in GCP and needs to not only understand what has been spent/invested, but also needs to understand how the business is going -- what are the near-term challenges and opportunities, what specifically is being done about those? There are many investor letters out in the wild you can draw from for inspiration. As complexity grows, so should the depth of the quarterly reports.
Explanation of how the finances will be run. Lay out ahead of time accounting treatment for investments - how will they be carried on the books. There are multiple legitimate methods but which is going to be adopted should be clearly communicated ahead of time to avoid shenanigans. Changing accounting methods in a year or two should come as major "stop, look, listen" point because it indicates something is wrong internally (like having a poor plan for financial management) or external forces have shifted significantly (like tax law) and may require discussion to understand if the change is appropriate.
Address the fact that the fund is worth considerably less than it was. There has been little public acknowledgement of this, or how it affects business plans or projected returns, despite it having a material impact on GCP. Going from a $200m fund to a $90m fund will affect whether this is scaled large enough to find winning investments to offset the expected majority of losing investments. How does this impact GCP's ability to build a portfolio that will result in profits and not losses? If a secure runway for funding longterm commitments is so vital (which is why the entire lump sum was transferred at once) then how does this square with the fund being worth less than half what it was before? What mitigations are being taken against another 50% drop? At what point is scale not viable and need to ask for more or close down? We recommend communicating clearly the number now where GCP must either ask for more funding or wind down.
Provide a model for a successful investment’s lifecycle. It has not been explained precisely how this makes money. Suppose a game is successful. Is GCP Foundation getting a % of sales? Equity in an SPV that owns the game's rights? Is the stake controlling or non-controlling, and can a controlling co-investor block or delay GCP's profits? Does GCP get a lump sum in exiting somehow? Or is it a revenue stream that rises, peaks, and peters out? What is the payback period from investment to expected outcome? What is expected rate of return after the end of that investment lifecycle? What is the benchmark to beat? We are not gaming experts, but we do have significant experience with finance (and external entities presumably controlled by a DAO managing hundreds of millions of dollars), and presumably the 3 year period for GCP is simply the ramp-up period to invest all funds, and actual payback period is considerably longer as those investments mature and hopefully bear fruit. GCP needs to publicly demonstrate that it does have domain knowledge in gaming financing, and that it's not simply people who like playing and making games but without a sound financial plan to accompany it. In short, demonstrate that the plan is not simply "invest money > ??? > profit"
If it has not already, GCP needs to appoint a CFO who is available to answer questions after each quarterly report. This should also include whomever is heading the day-to-day operations. Never again should such simple questions as "What is the name of the GCP's legal entity?" require months of back and forth because the GCP Council didn't know if they were allowed to disclose it.
Establish now some specific triggers to reevaluate GCP's continued existence. The goal here is to make money. If that turns out not to be the case, the incentives for those drawing a salary is to just ride the GCP funds to zero and say they tried their best and are honest people. There should be some "stop, look, listen" triggers that either pause investments or require confirmation from the DAO to continue. These triggers should be for true disaster scenarios (e.g. an investment over n dollars turned out to be in a fraudulent company, 50% of the C-suite leaves within 6 months, GCP goes >18 months without an external audit)
If we had to characterize the overarching theme, it's that GCP needs to be more professional and present that professional image. This is a lot of money at risk. To someone literate in corporate finance or who invests in private equity ventures, it looks unprofessional and disorganized. GCP is an investment, and an investment is only worth the money you can extract from it over the lifetime of that investment. GCP can restore some measure of credibility if it demonstrates professionalism, competence, and a clear, understandable business plan to make and return money to governance.
I will say right away that I am for Arbitrum to be one of the leaders in web3 gaming, but
I would support this initiative for the following reasons:
Of course, there are positive aspects, but all the above factors have a very negative impact on my personal opinion of GCP
I can feel the strong energy in this proposal. Many will dislike but this "just f***ing do it" energy is what needed to turn things round.
GCP was launched with big expectations, but like many things in Web3, reality didn’t match the hype. It happens.
Personally, I don't see Arbitrum as the gaming chain but I might be biased towards DeFi. I think most ppl see it as finance layer.
Gaming isn't picking up at all and if they do, gaming are launching on specialized chains.
The DAO stepping in now to cut losses and reclaim funds is the right move to prevent further waste.
I’m not sure how bad the transparency and execution issues were, but if there was ever a time for a hard reset, this is it.
This is also a lesson for the DAO, when too many things get approved without solid tracking, things slip.
We didn’t do a great job overseeing this from the start, but now, at least, we need to make sure the fund return process is clean, with no legal mess. Hopefully, this sets a better standard for situation like this.
We want to start by reiterating our support for the Gaming Catalyst Program, and we remain committed to seeing it succeed. However, communication and financial transparency has been insufficient, which is unacceptable given the scale, visibility, and unprecedented level of DAO investment involved.
The current reports, outside of the most recent update, read more like brief notes rather than the comprehensive updates expected for an initiative of this scale. Standardizing monthly reports and determining what financial and legal information should/can be shared with the DAO would increase trust and transparency for all parties.
Additionally, there is a notable discrepancy regarding the GCP bylaws being dated February 19th 2025, despite the entity being stated as established in July 2024. While this was recently addressed, more proactive and clear communication is necessary to prevent speculation.
Delays and setbacks are inevitable, but failing to communicate them transparently erodes credibility and leads to negative assumptions. Proactive communication is essential, even when the updates are not all positive.
It is worth highlighting that delegates have consistently voiced the need for more comprehensive updates rather than fewer. Suggestions to improve communication have included newsletters and monthly forum updates.
L2Beat made this clear in May 2024, during the GCP Tally vote, stating:
“However, we know that with this amount of funding, the program is taking on an enormous responsibility for the entire ecosystem, as it will set the standards for proper investment decision-making and future accountability and oversight. We already declare that we will pay close attention to its execution and reporting, ensuring that the DAO remains informed and in control of the overall direction of the program.”
Furthermore, in the December 2024 update, Djinn wrote:
“As per feedback from delegates, we are reviewing supplemental communication methods to keep the community informed, including: monthly newsletters, monthly forum updates, quarterly ‘State of Gaming’ or community-oriented gaming events with GCP updates included, live GCP presentations at major conferences (EthCC, Devcon, etc).”
Lastly, we are pleased to see in the latest update that a DAO liaison has been appointed to address communication issues and that a content strategist will be hired.
Is this arrangement within the scope of Castle's existing ARDC work or will this be a line item on the GCP budget?
We recommend also bringing on a corporate financial expert, preferably with experience in the gaming or venture industry, to provide the detailed financial reporting the DAO, as an investor, would expect from an initiative of this scale. R3gen Finance could be a possible candidate for this role.
To recap, the DAO needs a more robust, consistent, and transparent reporting cadence moving forward. This includes detailed and professional financial reporting, clear communication about typical delays and setbacks, and tighter feedback loops between the GCP Council and the DAO. This is essential for maintaining trust and ensuring alignment with the broader community.
Hello @Djinn, thanks for the detailed and civil response. I appreciate the direction you're taking there. I wouldn't be as adamant in asking for accountability if the DAO was already seeing positive outcomes from the GCP. I understand that things take time, and you're trying to do them the right way - thank you for acknowledging the weakness so far on the communication side. I'll be waiting to see the promised updates, and the list of rituals described above would fit what I would expect to see from the DAO's largest expenditure yet. Based on that, I think the DAO will have a much better picture of whether the GCP is on the right track.
Just to comment on time to set up a legal entity, the GCP Foundation was formed in early July 2024. The articles of organization you link to are dated Feb 19, 2025. That's a substantial period of time for what is supposed to be one of the formation tasks, and not typical.
Just to comment on time to set up a legal entity, the GCP Foundation was formed in early July 2024. The articles of organization you link to are dated Feb 19, 2025. That's a substantial period of time for what is supposed to be one of the formation tasks, and not typical.

We fully support this proposal. This is exactly the kind of accountability mechanism we need to protect the DAO's resources.
The GCP situation highlights precisely why we need better controls on proposals and why we have been actively voting against high spending proposals without clear deliverables. GCP received a massive 225 million ARB allocation, and what do we have to show for it? Almost nothing tangible, key members abandoning ship (including Treasure DAO completely exiting Arbitrum), attempts to reduce their own reporting requirements while increasing their compensation, and a general lack of transparency about how funds are being used. This seems to be normal for many in the DAO, and isn't unique to GCP, but this is a terrible situation to be in and we don't understand why delegates continue to defend this kind of thing.
We fully support this proposal. This is exactly the kind of accountability mechanism we need to protect the DAO's resources.
The GCP situation highlights precisely why we need better controls on proposals and why we have been actively voting against high spending proposals without clear deliverables. GCP received a massive 225 million ARB allocation, and what do we have to show for it? Almost nothing tangible, key members abandoning ship (including Treasure DAO completely exiting Arbitrum), attempts to reduce their own reporting requirements while increasing their compensation, and a general lack of transparency about how funds are being used. This seems to be normal for many in the DAO, and isn't unique to GCP, but this is a terrible situation to be in and we don't understand why delegates continue to defend this kind of thing.
The clawback sets a crucial precedent that the DAO won't tolerate ineffective use of its treasury. The proposal isn't punitive toward regular contributors (allowing for severance packages), but is firm on stopping the bleeding and recovering uncommitted funds.
Looking at both this GCP situation and many other proposals that come to the DAO, it's clear we need a consistent approach to accountability across all DAO spending. We've said many times that DAO spends obscene amounts of money for seemingly no positive outcomes and it is a sad state of affairs to continue.
The recovered funds could be redirected toward initiatives with clearer metrics and accountability, like the proposed airdrop or other programs that demonstrate measurable impact for the ecosystem. Or simply returning to the treasury until we have high-confidence opportunities.
Bottom line: supporting this clawback sends the right message about responsible treasury management. We can't approve large lump sums without ongoing performance requirements, and when programs fail to deliver, we need to act decisively rather than throwing good money after bad.
Thank you for putting this up, @NathanVDH.
We stated our disagreement with funding this initiative a couple of times in the past [1] [2]. However, this does not naturally translate to us supporting a proposal to claw back GCP funds.
This RFC proposes a promising approach to GCP, but it lacks clarity on whether other alternatives have been considered and a proper assessment of the program’s current state.
The GCP’s initial promise of catalyzing the Web3 gaming ecosystem on Arbitrum has had persistent delays in meeting key milestones
This needs more thought around it. Let's take setting up the legal entity as an instance. Have you considered the fact that setting up an entity for GCP of this kind requires as much time as it took? The legal structure outlined in the GCP’s M&A document involves multiple layers of compliance, detailed due diligence, and iterative legal reviews that span across various jurisdictions and regulatory bodies. If other specific key milestones were persistently delayed, it would be great if you could mention/list them.
We believe that each of these delegates will serve as a critical feedback loop for us and offer a wealth of diverse perspectives:
@krst (representing himself, not L2Beat)
@JoJo the famous cow
@Bob-Rossi
@limes
@coinflip
Did you also consider meeting with the interim transparency committee on this subject? Yes, the council is already set up, but we believe meeting them would have painted a clearer picture, as they have a good understanding of things.
This proposal reflects best practices by ensuring that funds are only deployed based on measurable progress and verified accountability
The suggestion to claw back funds negates this comment here. You are not suggesting that funds should be deployed based only on measurable progress but all remaining unallocated funds should be returned and the program wound down.
@Jojo also asked a question along the lines of impact assessment. What are the potential consequences of terminating the GCP on Arbitrum's ecosystem, particularly in the gaming sector? Understanding these impacts can help in evaluating whether the benefits of clawing back funds outweigh the possible setbacks.
While the proposal raises valid concerns about the GCP's performance and accountability, a more comprehensive assessment of the program's current state and potential alternatives could provide a balanced approach that safeguards the DAO's interests while considering the broader implications for the Arbitrum ecosystem and delegates.
As much as I understand the motivation behind this clawback proposal, I believe we might have jumped the gun here. The desire to protect DAO funds and ensure transparency is valid, but immediately resorting to a complete clawback seems overly harsh and potentially counterproductive. Instead, let's take a moment to reconsider the issue more constructively, with empathy for the challenges the GCP has been facing.
I suggest the following:
As much as I understand the motivation behind this clawback proposal, I believe we might have jumped the gun here. The desire to protect DAO funds and ensure transparency is valid, but immediately resorting to a complete clawback seems overly harsh and potentially counterproductive. Instead, let's take a moment to reconsider the issue more constructively, with empathy for the challenges the GCP has been facing.
I suggest the following:
Implement Phased Clawbacks Instead of Immediate Full Clawback: Rather than reclaiming all the unallocated funds at once, a phased approach would offer GCP a realistic opportunity to adjust. For example, we could establish clear milestones with incremental clawbacks only if those milestones aren't met. This provides both accountability and motivation without completely halting their efforts.
Flexible and Realistic Reporting Standards: It's clear that the reporting requirements have become somewhat burdensome. Let’s simplify and streamline reporting:
Clear, Supportive, and Collaborative Oversight: Instead of stringent oversight, we should consider assigning a dedicated governance liaison who works collaboratively with the GCP. Their role would not be punitive but supportive, helping the GCP troubleshoot challenges, clarify goals, and adapt their strategy proactively.
Gradual Adjustment of Compensation Packages: Instead of immediately revoking all unvested compensation, introduce performance-based vesting schedules that clearly reward demonstrable progress. This adjustment provides both motivation for contributors and reassurance to governance that funds are used responsibly.
Finally, our goal should be to empower GCP to succeed, not penalize prematurely. A careful revision of this proposal, incorporating phased funding adjustments, streamlined reporting, supportive oversight, and flexible compensation structures, could strike the right balance between accountability and reorganization.
I will be 100% honest although I may not be the best person/delegate to comment on this, because I didn't follow up with all the details around the GCP:
The complexity of the GCP proposal is unknown atm, which lead to uncertainty and to contributors questioning it. It also appears to be pretty slow, which may not be bad, being slower may better than spending funds fast. We always have this problem in web3, people that allocate capital rush to allocate to justify more capital to be spent.
For a proposal of it's size, reporting is either not done professionally or is too unfrequent, as an example when the Thankarb started and I ran a couple of programs, we had more thorough and frequent reporting than the GCP has at the moment, but most delegates didn't care to verify and the DAO didn't have any mechanism to audit/track progress.
The fact that this proposal being posted has led to more updates in the GPC chat than in the previous 3 months may look a little peculiar to those that do not join the Arbitrum update calls.
Even if the proposal doesn't pass, it has already helped the DAO :blue_heart:
I will be 100% honest although I may not be the best person/delegate to comment on this, because I didn't follow up with all the details around the GCP:
The complexity of the GCP proposal is unknown atm, which lead to uncertainty and to contributors questioning it. It also appears to be pretty slow, which may not be bad, being slower may better than spending funds fast. We always have this problem in web3, people that allocate capital rush to allocate to justify more capital to be spent.
For a proposal of it's size, reporting is either not done professionally or is too unfrequent, as an example when the Thankarb started and I ran a couple of programs, we had more thorough and frequent reporting than the GCP has at the moment, but most delegates didn't care to verify and the DAO didn't have any mechanism to audit/track progress.
The fact that this proposal being posted has led to more updates in the GPC chat than in the previous 3 months may look a little peculiar to those that do not join the Arbitrum update calls.
Even if the proposal doesn't pass, it has already helped the DAO :blue_heart:
Appreciate @NathanVDH and @GFXlabs for the boldness.
The Gaming Catalyst Program (GCP) was approved during a period of exceptionally optimistic projections that, in hindsight, proved unsustainable. One of its primary backers – Treasure DAO – has already exited Arbitrum, and other key contributors have either stepped down or signaled waning commitment. In addition, the GCP has repeatedly shown a reluctance to adequately document its activities and performance. Instead of embracing transparency, the program has recently sought to increase contributor compensation and lower its own reporting requirements. Given these failures, the risks associated with a lump-sum allocation of funds, and the mounting concerns raised by the community, it is time to cut our losses. We must wind down GCP activities and secure all possible funds in order to safeguard the DAO’s funds and restore investor confidence in the ability of this DAO to allocate capital.
The Gaming Catalyst Program (GCP) was approved during a period of exceptionally optimistic projections that, in hindsight, proved unsustainable. One of its primary backers – Treasure DAO – has already exited Arbitrum, and other key contributors have either stepped down or signaled waning commitment. In addition, the GCP has repeatedly shown a reluctance to adequately document its activities and performance. Instead of embracing transparency, the program has recently sought to increase contributor compensation and lower its own reporting requirements. Given these failures, the risks associated with a lump-sum allocation of funds, and the mounting concerns raised by the community, it is time to cut our losses. We must wind down GCP activities and secure all possible funds in order to safeguard the DAO’s funds and restore investor confidence in the ability of this DAO to allocate capital.
This seems like a very strong action/reaction, but I'm unsure there is a strong basis. If possible it would be nice to see links or other sources backing up each part of this statement, to make it easier to follow.
By my understanding the enumerated failures are just 4:
Treasure DAO – has already exited Arbitrum I am not entirely sure it is fair to lay this at the feet of GCP, but perhaps there is context that would make it so.
other key contributors have either stepped down or signaled waning commitment Who were the key contributors? Did they state a reason?
the GCP has repeatedly shown a reluctance to adequately document its activities and performance Sourcing would be helpful to judge the merits of this failing.
the program has recently sought to increase contributor compensation and lower its own reporting requirements Supported by the link OP provided, but this in itself does not seem a strong reason to close up shop.
I'm sure the proposing parties have good reasons for making this proposal, but in reading it I feel like the case is not sufficiently made. Perhaps there are further unstated failures, and/or with context the stated failures become more severe, but if that's the case I think we need that additional context.
We were referring to the documentation in its entirety (from drafting to receiving delegates' feedback) and not necessarily just the GCP Foundation setup.
Thanks for sharing your concerns about the Gaming Catalyst Program. Some of the rationale for this proposal is a bit confusing, but we hear you on the request for additional transparency.
The GCP has been working intensely with our stakeholders to create a robust program that fits within a unified Arbitrum Gaming organization and narrative. Establishing an investment focused program with a goal of also generating value for the Arbitrum DAO as opposed to only dispersing grants, was and remains a unique undertaking; establishing both foundation and operational level policies, procedures including oversight of the diligence and decision making process, takes time.
The update came two days after I posted this proposal, on Friday. The proposal was accepted by moderators on Monday.
humm... @moderators why was this proposal only accepted today, instead of last Friday? is this normal?
I'm echoing @GFXlabs 's response, I'd only add that it is the GCP's job to properly report to the DAO. That's supposed to be the direction of that particular relationship. And yes I've certainly considered the damage that a proposal like this can make, but I think its advantages for $ARB tokenholders are worth having this conversation. It is not normal for a program funded by the DAO to have such sparse reporting to the DAO. The current setup is not sustainable, and I'd like to see clear efforts from the GCP to fix it.
A resilient DAO invests in systems that outlast individual contributors. Perhaps an effort to fix what’s broken should be considered—without forfeiting the mission.
Hello!
Thanks for the proposal. I have a few comments/questions:
I would like to see evidence of the following claims, as it is part of the motivation for the proposal.
and other key contributors have either stepped down or signaled waning commitment.
We are strongly in favor of this proposal. As many delegates predicted, the GCP was a failure. What truly matters for any organization, including DAOs, is the ability to learn from mistakes and pivot. Acknowledging the error and deciding to stop the initiative is probably the hardest part, as it's easy to fall into the sunk-cost fallacy—the tendency to continue a strategy or course of action simply because significant resources have already been invested, even when it's clear that moving on would be the better choice.

The industry is fiercely competitive, with rival chains routinely offering grants ranging from $5M to $100M. In some cases, single deals from competing chains have been rumored to exceed the total GCP allocation (currently valued at $85M).
Asking for more time/we have to ask the lawyers.
You are answering a different question. I didn’t ask if delegates support it. I asked what is your thoughts about the proposal being heavily supported by Offchain Labs and Arbitrum Foundation personnel and marketing/strategic plans.
We work for ARB holders. It's ok to disagree with Offchain Labs and Arbitrum Foundation.
I asked how you think a proposal like yours, if passing, how would impact the business relationships with existing or future partners, that will now know that despite efforts and despite being voted in favor, they could see the DAO clawing back funds despite having them work, setup the foundations of a new initiative, and even get the support from other entities such as our lab.
It's a DAO. DAOs can always reverse a previous decision.
Thanks for sharing your concerns about the Gaming Catalyst Program. Some of the rationale for this proposal is a bit confusing, but we hear you on the request for additional transparency.
The GCP has been working intensely with our stakeholders to create a robust program that fits within a unified Arbitrum Gaming organization and narrative. Establishing an investment focused program with a goal of also generating value for the Arbitrum DAO as opposed to only dispersing grants, was and remains a unique undertaking; establishing both foundation and operational level policies, procedures including oversight of the diligence and decision making process, takes time.
Much of this work so far has been accomplished with GCP Council members and the Arbitrum Foundation observer empowered by the DAO to hold trusted information not shareable publicly.
In addition, there has been heavy involvement from other GCP stakeholders, including Offchain Labs and the Arbitrum Foundation to establish a unified Arbitrum Gaming presence. If the GCP was not holding to its responsibilities and progressing, our stakeholders would have taken action to ensure accountability and proper adjustment.
Governance/entity documentation has already been made publicly available, encompassing Bylaws and M&A:
Our corporate entity docs were updated on our site here as of 3/23/25 (scroll to the bottom): https://thegamingcatalyst.com/
Here’s what has been communicated to follow this week:
Over the next week, we will be sharing quite a few updates that have been planned in coordination with the GCP Council and key delegates. Those of you that were at the Arbitrum Delegate day at Eth Denver may have seen some of this already!
Upcoming updates include:
Onboarding our official DAO Relations partner
Team expansion/new hires
A comprehensive Q1 2025 review on progress
Governance / entity docs (we have communicated that this is coming soon, and this will be updated live in the next 1-2 days on the website!)
Updates on GCP Council pay and next steps
Updates on ARB management practices (ARB to USDC conversion handled by GCP Foundation and vesting), 6 month transparency reports
Although our pending quarterly update is coming this week, but we wanted to drop this here as a preview:
More will be coming the next week in higher fidelity, but we thought it was prudent to share the above in response to questions about progress.
As Arbitrum Gaming, we will continue to host conversations to connect game builders with the broader DAO and help educate folks on the immense opportunity gaming brings to Arbitrum. We can also promise to continue moving in a direction that helps frame both gaming and the Gaming Catalyst Program as an opportunity everyone should be optimistic about.
This will be a continuing conversation, but we also want to hear from delegates and contributors about what type of content, cadence, and transparency you would like to see. We are already committing to the following rituals:
Suggestions for additional transparency we have heard:
We are open to all suggestions, as long as we can support them with our limited resources.
While we have always been available to delegates including GFX Labs, we still acknowledge we could have done better to prioritize sharing of governance documents and other asks, hopefully the actions taken over the last few weeks and months show the commitment to better address this. We have presented an in-depth progress report to key delegates at Arbitrum Delegate day during Eth Denver for example, and have committed to deeper updates at monthly GRC calls.
Thank you for all the patience and collaboration. Excited to continue serving as a part of why Arbitrum Gaming, and Arbitrum more broadly will win.
The update came two days after I posted this proposal, on Friday. The proposal was accepted by moderators on Monday.
humm... @moderators why was this proposal only accepted today, instead of last Friday? is this normal?
because if this is true, then the real timeline of events was:
A resilient DAO invests in systems that outlast individual contributors. Perhaps an effort to fix what’s broken should be considered—without forfeiting the mission.
Certainly agreed, if there is a clear effort from the GCP to more clearly communicate the value that they're creating and bringing to the Arbitrum DAO and the DAO considers that value to be worth the price, I'm not against the continuation of the GCP.
Hello!
Thanks for the proposal. I have a few comments/questions:
I would like to see evidence of the following claims, as it is part of the motivation for the proposal.
and other key contributors have either stepped down or signaled waning commitment.
Regarding updates/reports:
In addition, the GCP has repeatedly shown a reluctance to adequately document its activities and performance.
While I do agree that the reporting/communication front is lacking A LOT, there was an update literally yesterday: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gcp-update-thread/24982/15?u=jameskbh
I'm not against having best security practices regarding reporting/funds distribution, but I want to add extra information here and also invite the author(s) to provide evidence backing their claims, so the delegates/interested parties can find everything in one place.
Despite a 225 million ARB allocation, the program has struggled to launch even basic operational processes such as transparent reporting and grant issuance.
Can you clarify/add which KPIs were not met? This is their last report.
Transferring these funds back to a more secure DAO treasury system is a necessary step to protect our collective assets.
Can you clarify what does this mean?
Thanks in advance!
We are strongly in favor of this proposal. As many delegates predicted, the GCP was a failure. What truly matters for any organization, including DAOs, is the ability to learn from mistakes and pivot. Acknowledging the error and deciding to stop the initiative is probably the hardest part, as it's easy to fall into the sunk-cost fallacy—the tendency to continue a strategy or course of action simply because significant resources have already been invested, even when it's clear that moving on would be the better choice.

As a DAO, learning how to pivot from failed initiatives gives us a competitive edge, which will ultimately benefit ARB holders in the long run through stronger price action.
Regarding the winding down of GCP activities, we believe the proposal has been well detailed, but we’d like to offer the following suggestions:
We want to thank @GFXlabs and @NathanVDH for raising concerns early on and continuing to monitor the project throughout its development.
The industry is fiercely competitive, with rival chains routinely offering grants ranging from $5M to $100M. In some cases, single deals from competing chains have been rumored to exceed the total GCP allocation (currently valued at $85M).
Thanks for sharing this message. In our opinion, just because others are doing it doesn’t mean we should follow without evaluating the downsides. The gaming sector has struggled on nearly every front when it comes to integrating blockchain. Of course, that doesn’t mean Arbitrum can’t get lucky with a breakout success. But looking at the data:
Do you think the amount invested, and more importantly, the valuation at the time of investment, was appropriate for an industry with such a high failure rate and no clear product-market fit yet?
How long will the DAO keep investing in this? Until the GCP runs out of funds, or will more funding be needed after that?
We understand you don’t want to stop the program and Arbitrum miss out on the opportunity to get some market share in the Gaming Industry. But if you were to revise this proposal so the program continues, how would you adjust it to include clear failure metrics that would justify ending the program if they’re met?
Thank you.
and what was the answer?
Waiting a few further days was what had been going on for a long time. At some point you no longer want to wait a few further days.
We do not believe the DAO and delegates support continuing GCP in its existing form. Our focus is on future opportunity cost, and we do not think a sunk cost fallacy is a defense of continuing GCP.
We repeatedly suggested it was bad governance to transfer the lump sum upfront. There would be no clawback if the GCP was reliant upon quarterly or annual transfers from governance. It would lower the stakes and also enforce transparency and reporting requirements.
Again, you are answering a different question. I didn't ask your thoughts about moving the whole lump sum and if it's good practice or not.
I asked how you think a proposal like yours, if passing, how would impact the business relationships with existing or future partners, that will now know that despite efforts and despite being voted in favor, they could see the DAO clawing back funds despite having them work, setup the foundations of a new initiative, and even get the support from other entities such as our lab.
Thanks
Answering only for GFX:
have you contacted, privately, the council members regarding the info you requested prior to post this proposal?
Yes.
Waiting a few further days was what had been going on for a long time. At some point you no longer want to wait a few further days.
We do not believe the DAO and delegates support continuing GCP in its existing form. Our focus is on future opportunity cost, and we do not think a sunk cost fallacy is a defense of continuing GCP.
have you thought about the impact on the reputation of Arbitrum DAO, in term of attracting people and service providers, when whoever wants to do business with us will see how we claimed back hundred of millions from an initiative that was voted, supported by lab and foundation, and didn’t even have a chance to put up the results in a time that is compatible with the nature of a fund?
We repeatedly suggested it was bad governance to transfer the lump sum upfront. There would be no clawback if the GCP was reliant upon quarterly or annual transfers from governance. It would lower the stakes and also enforce transparency and reporting requirements.
Overall, it's worth understanding that 9 months after ratification, GCP's visible record is:
If GCP has something in its invisible record that acts as a counterweight to the visible record then we encourage them to educate everyone.
My questions for @NathanVDH and @GFXlabs are:
My questions for @NathanVDH and @GFXlabs are:
Hope to see an answer on each of these points.
Hi @NathanVDH, thanks for opening this conversation. Many of us have had these thoughts in mind.
From my perspective, GCP has been a slow, unprofessional, and costly effort to increase gaming activity on Arbitrum. However, I currently do not have hard data to support this view, so additional data should be provided to clarify whether this perception is factual or simply subjective. That being said, I believe we should preserve the original motivation behind GCP but restructure it into a leaner initiative that can scale progressively. I'm inclined to vote in favor of discontinuing GCP, provided we, as delegates, collectively find an alternative approach to achieve our goals.
Hi @NathanVDH, thanks for opening this conversation. Many of us have had these thoughts in mind.
From my perspective, GCP has been a slow, unprofessional, and costly effort to increase gaming activity on Arbitrum. However, I currently do not have hard data to support this view, so additional data should be provided to clarify whether this perception is factual or simply subjective. That being said, I believe we should preserve the original motivation behind GCP but restructure it into a leaner initiative that can scale progressively. I'm inclined to vote in favor of discontinuing GCP, provided we, as delegates, collectively find an alternative approach to achieve our goals.
My suggestion would be to bring in a new, more professional team to manage this initiative with a leaner structure, allowing for larger capital calls only when truly necessary.
On a final note, venture or early investing is tricky and typically takes a long time to deliver measurable results. This is because venture investments rely on only a small number of successes to provide returns for the entire fund. Additionally, this asset class has faced significant challenges over the past few years.
I don't think its about leaving an opportunity its more like restructuring things. The GCP has several times failed to deliver simple reports, be transparent about transactions and more. The DAO should step in now and secure what is there and then think about a good and meaningful way of going forward. But for this to happen there has to be a status quo first.
TreasureDAO leaving Arbitrum was a huge loss, anyone saying different is wrong. They were probably the biggest supporter and catalyst but left the DAO pretty quick.
I don't think its about leaving an opportunity its more like restructuring things. The GCP has several times failed to deliver simple reports, be transparent about transactions and more. The DAO should step in now and secure what is there and then think about a good and meaningful way of going forward. But for this to happen there has to be a status quo first.
TreasureDAO leaving Arbitrum was a huge loss, anyone saying different is wrong. They were probably the biggest supporter and catalyst but left the DAO pretty quick.
So yes I am supportive of getting back all the funds and then find a good and sustainable way with way less funding to start with. Especially with the OpCo proposal and the OAT there can be a way to keep things transparent and DAO aligned. Because right now its a total blackbox for everyone expect the GCP member (at least I hope they know more than we do).
Asking for more time/we have to ask the lawyers.
You are answering a different question. I didn’t ask if delegates support it. I asked what is your thoughts about the proposal being heavily supported by Offchain Labs and Arbitrum Foundation personnel and marketing/strategic plans.
We work for ARB holders. It's ok to disagree with Offchain Labs and Arbitrum Foundation.
I asked how you think a proposal like yours, if passing, how would impact the business relationships with existing or future partners, that will now know that despite efforts and despite being voted in favor, they could see the DAO clawing back funds despite having them work, setup the foundations of a new initiative, and even get the support from other entities such as our lab.
It's a DAO. DAOs can always reverse a previous decision.
Thanks for sharing your concerns about the Gaming Catalyst Program. Some of the rationale for this proposal is a bit confusing, but we hear you on the request for additional transparency.
The GCP has been working intensely with our stakeholders to create a robust program that fits within a unified Arbitrum Gaming organization and narrative. Establishing an investment focused program with a goal of also generating value for the Arbitrum DAO as opposed to only dispersing grants, was and remains a unique undertaking; establishing both foundation and operational level policies, procedures including oversight of the diligence and decision making process, takes time.
Much of this work so far has been accomplished with GCP Council members and the Arbitrum Foundation observer empowered by the DAO to hold trusted information not shareable publicly.
In addition, there has been heavy involvement from other GCP stakeholders, including Offchain Labs and the Arbitrum Foundation to establish a unified Arbitrum Gaming presence. If the GCP was not holding to its responsibilities and progressing, our stakeholders would have taken action to ensure accountability and proper adjustment.
Governance/entity documentation has already been made publicly available, encompassing Bylaws and M&A:
Our corporate entity docs were updated on our site here as of 3/23/25 (scroll to the bottom): https://thegamingcatalyst.com/
Here’s what has been communicated to follow this week:
Over the next week, we will be sharing quite a few updates that have been planned in coordination with the GCP Council and key delegates. Those of you that were at the Arbitrum Delegate day at Eth Denver may have seen some of this already!
Upcoming updates include:
Onboarding our official DAO Relations partner
Team expansion/new hires
A comprehensive Q1 2025 review on progress
Governance / entity docs (we have communicated that this is coming soon, and this will be updated live in the next 1-2 days on the website!)
Updates on GCP Council pay and next steps
Updates on ARB management practices (ARB to USDC conversion handled by GCP Foundation and vesting), 6 month transparency reports
Although our pending quarterly update is coming this week, but we wanted to drop this here as a preview:
More will be coming the next week in higher fidelity, but we thought it was prudent to share the above in response to questions about progress.
As Arbitrum Gaming, we will continue to host conversations to connect game builders with the broader DAO and help educate folks on the immense opportunity gaming brings to Arbitrum. We can also promise to continue moving in a direction that helps frame both gaming and the Gaming Catalyst Program as an opportunity everyone should be optimistic about.
This will be a continuing conversation, but we also want to hear from delegates and contributors about what type of content, cadence, and transparency you would like to see. We are already committing to the following rituals:
Suggestions for additional transparency we have heard:
We are open to all suggestions, as long as we can support them with our limited resources.
While we have always been available to delegates including GFX Labs, we still acknowledge we could have done better to prioritize sharing of governance documents and other asks, hopefully the actions taken over the last few weeks and months show the commitment to better address this. We have presented an in-depth progress report to key delegates at Arbitrum Delegate day during Eth Denver for example, and have committed to deeper updates at monthly GRC calls.
Thank you for all the patience and collaboration. Excited to continue serving as a part of why Arbitrum Gaming, and Arbitrum more broadly will win.
The update came two days after I posted this proposal, on Friday. The proposal was accepted by moderators on Monday.
humm... @moderators why was this proposal only accepted today, instead of last Friday? is this normal?
because if this is true, then the real timeline of events was:
A resilient DAO invests in systems that outlast individual contributors. Perhaps an effort to fix what’s broken should be considered—without forfeiting the mission.
Certainly agreed, if there is a clear effort from the GCP to more clearly communicate the value that they're creating and bringing to the Arbitrum DAO and the DAO considers that value to be worth the price, I'm not against the continuation of the GCP.
Hello!
Thanks for the proposal. I have a few comments/questions:
I would like to see evidence of the following claims, as it is part of the motivation for the proposal.
and other key contributors have either stepped down or signaled waning commitment.
Regarding updates/reports:
In addition, the GCP has repeatedly shown a reluctance to adequately document its activities and performance.
While I do agree that the reporting/communication front is lacking A LOT, there was an update literally yesterday: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gcp-update-thread/24982/15?u=jameskbh
I'm not against having best security practices regarding reporting/funds distribution, but I want to add extra information here and also invite the author(s) to provide evidence backing their claims, so the delegates/interested parties can find everything in one place.
Despite a 225 million ARB allocation, the program has struggled to launch even basic operational processes such as transparent reporting and grant issuance.
Can you clarify/add which KPIs were not met? This is their last report.
Transferring these funds back to a more secure DAO treasury system is a necessary step to protect our collective assets.
Can you clarify what does this mean?
Thanks in advance!
We are strongly in favor of this proposal. As many delegates predicted, the GCP was a failure. What truly matters for any organization, including DAOs, is the ability to learn from mistakes and pivot. Acknowledging the error and deciding to stop the initiative is probably the hardest part, as it's easy to fall into the sunk-cost fallacy—the tendency to continue a strategy or course of action simply because significant resources have already been invested, even when it's clear that moving on would be the better choice.

As a DAO, learning how to pivot from failed initiatives gives us a competitive edge, which will ultimately benefit ARB holders in the long run through stronger price action.
Regarding the winding down of GCP activities, we believe the proposal has been well detailed, but we’d like to offer the following suggestions:
We want to thank @GFXlabs and @NathanVDH for raising concerns early on and continuing to monitor the project throughout its development.
The industry is fiercely competitive, with rival chains routinely offering grants ranging from $5M to $100M. In some cases, single deals from competing chains have been rumored to exceed the total GCP allocation (currently valued at $85M).
Thanks for sharing this message. In our opinion, just because others are doing it doesn’t mean we should follow without evaluating the downsides. The gaming sector has struggled on nearly every front when it comes to integrating blockchain. Of course, that doesn’t mean Arbitrum can’t get lucky with a breakout success. But looking at the data:
Do you think the amount invested, and more importantly, the valuation at the time of investment, was appropriate for an industry with such a high failure rate and no clear product-market fit yet?
How long will the DAO keep investing in this? Until the GCP runs out of funds, or will more funding be needed after that?
We understand you don’t want to stop the program and Arbitrum miss out on the opportunity to get some market share in the Gaming Industry. But if you were to revise this proposal so the program continues, how would you adjust it to include clear failure metrics that would justify ending the program if they’re met?
Thank you.
and what was the answer?
Waiting a few further days was what had been going on for a long time. At some point you no longer want to wait a few further days.
We do not believe the DAO and delegates support continuing GCP in its existing form. Our focus is on future opportunity cost, and we do not think a sunk cost fallacy is a defense of continuing GCP.
We repeatedly suggested it was bad governance to transfer the lump sum upfront. There would be no clawback if the GCP was reliant upon quarterly or annual transfers from governance. It would lower the stakes and also enforce transparency and reporting requirements.
Again, you are answering a different question. I didn't ask your thoughts about moving the whole lump sum and if it's good practice or not.
I asked how you think a proposal like yours, if passing, how would impact the business relationships with existing or future partners, that will now know that despite efforts and despite being voted in favor, they could see the DAO clawing back funds despite having them work, setup the foundations of a new initiative, and even get the support from other entities such as our lab.
Thanks
Answering only for GFX:
have you contacted, privately, the council members regarding the info you requested prior to post this proposal?
Yes.
Waiting a few further days was what had been going on for a long time. At some point you no longer want to wait a few further days.
We do not believe the DAO and delegates support continuing GCP in its existing form. Our focus is on future opportunity cost, and we do not think a sunk cost fallacy is a defense of continuing GCP.
have you thought about the impact on the reputation of Arbitrum DAO, in term of attracting people and service providers, when whoever wants to do business with us will see how we claimed back hundred of millions from an initiative that was voted, supported by lab and foundation, and didn’t even have a chance to put up the results in a time that is compatible with the nature of a fund?
We repeatedly suggested it was bad governance to transfer the lump sum upfront. There would be no clawback if the GCP was reliant upon quarterly or annual transfers from governance. It would lower the stakes and also enforce transparency and reporting requirements.
Overall, it's worth understanding that 9 months after ratification, GCP's visible record is:
If GCP has something in its invisible record that acts as a counterweight to the visible record then we encourage them to educate everyone.
My questions for @NathanVDH and @GFXlabs are:
My questions for @NathanVDH and @GFXlabs are:
Hope to see an answer on each of these points.
Hi @NathanVDH, thanks for opening this conversation. Many of us have had these thoughts in mind.
From my perspective, GCP has been a slow, unprofessional, and costly effort to increase gaming activity on Arbitrum. However, I currently do not have hard data to support this view, so additional data should be provided to clarify whether this perception is factual or simply subjective. That being said, I believe we should preserve the original motivation behind GCP but restructure it into a leaner initiative that can scale progressively. I'm inclined to vote in favor of discontinuing GCP, provided we, as delegates, collectively find an alternative approach to achieve our goals.
Hi @NathanVDH, thanks for opening this conversation. Many of us have had these thoughts in mind.
From my perspective, GCP has been a slow, unprofessional, and costly effort to increase gaming activity on Arbitrum. However, I currently do not have hard data to support this view, so additional data should be provided to clarify whether this perception is factual or simply subjective. That being said, I believe we should preserve the original motivation behind GCP but restructure it into a leaner initiative that can scale progressively. I'm inclined to vote in favor of discontinuing GCP, provided we, as delegates, collectively find an alternative approach to achieve our goals.
My suggestion would be to bring in a new, more professional team to manage this initiative with a leaner structure, allowing for larger capital calls only when truly necessary.
On a final note, venture or early investing is tricky and typically takes a long time to deliver measurable results. This is because venture investments rely on only a small number of successes to provide returns for the entire fund. Additionally, this asset class has faced significant challenges over the past few years.
I don't think its about leaving an opportunity its more like restructuring things. The GCP has several times failed to deliver simple reports, be transparent about transactions and more. The DAO should step in now and secure what is there and then think about a good and meaningful way of going forward. But for this to happen there has to be a status quo first.
TreasureDAO leaving Arbitrum was a huge loss, anyone saying different is wrong. They were probably the biggest supporter and catalyst but left the DAO pretty quick.
I don't think its about leaving an opportunity its more like restructuring things. The GCP has several times failed to deliver simple reports, be transparent about transactions and more. The DAO should step in now and secure what is there and then think about a good and meaningful way of going forward. But for this to happen there has to be a status quo first.
TreasureDAO leaving Arbitrum was a huge loss, anyone saying different is wrong. They were probably the biggest supporter and catalyst but left the DAO pretty quick.
So yes I am supportive of getting back all the funds and then find a good and sustainable way with way less funding to start with. Especially with the OpCo proposal and the OAT there can be a way to keep things transparent and DAO aligned. Because right now its a total blackbox for everyone expect the GCP member (at least I hope they know more than we do).