ATTENTION: AFTER ~1 MONTH OF COMMUNITY FEEDBACK AND COMMITTEE MEMBER VETTING, THIS PROPOSAL HAS BEEN RENAMED FROM V1.1 TO V1.2 AFTER BEING UPDATED. PLEASE REVIEW THOROUGHLY AS OF OCTOBER 30, 2024.
On September 12th, Entropy hosted a preliminary treasury working group call (recordings available here) in an effort to align all of the different parties within the DAO on the optimal path forward when it comes to managing the different sections of the DAO’s balance sheet. I.e., chain profits (ETH) and tokens that have been authorized for spend but have not entered circulation yet (ARB). The primary points of contention were around ARB diversification, the need for a DAO budget before the conversation on treasury management continues forward, whether the DAO needs active treasury managers at all, infrastructure selection, and details around a treasury committee’s implementation, e.g., how many individuals/entities, are they DAO-elected or appointed, when should we target to have this committee stood up, etc. From our perspective, we did gain consensus that the DAO’s profits (ETH) in the treasury should be turned productive and that a treasury management committee of some sort should be established. However, even on these two points that most people seem to be in favor of, specific details need to be ironed out for actionable strategies to be implemented.
We believe that we have come up with a fair compromise between all of the various perspectives on these identified issues, all of which stem from the information gathered during the working group calls and conversations with delegates. The compromise suggested herein will, in our opinion, enable the DAO to move forward and initiate the required operational standards for optimizing the use of idle tokens in the treasury. Based on the feedback received on the call on September 25th (link to recording here) where we presented the overarching ideas herein, we feel confident that this proposal aligns well with the treasury managers, infrastructure providers, and overall DAO sentiment towards treasury management. We are eager to gather more feedback from the community and continue iterating so this initiative can move forward.
Since inception, the DAO has spent 19.3M ARB on core DAO initiatives (long-term committees/groups that get funding directly from the DAO via proposal), grants programs, and direct DAO-to-service provider grants according to the August Token Flow report from @r3gen. So outside of protocol/user incentives and the large GCP initiative, the DAO’s spend has been relatively modest throughout the first 18 months of its life, spending about 1.07M ARB per month. The average price of ARB since the token launched sits at $1.16, which puts the DAO’s rough monthly spend on these types of initiatives at $1.24M USD.
In an ideal world, we would have a budget outlined before setting aside some ARB to be converted to stablecoins or other cash-like assets to cover general operating expenses and make up for any service provider contract shortcomings. However, we need the proper people and procedures in place in order for a budget to be executed to the expected standard. We believe that the OpCo will not only be better equipped to tackle this issue, but will also have better incentive alignment with the DAO than any other entity/individual tasked with creating a DAO budget, and more data surrounding DAO-revenue to analyze.
In many cases it is unprofessional for the DAO to put the burden of ARB volatility on its service providers. If we aren’t careful, we will negatively impact the pool of SPs that desire working with Arbitrum DAO. Given the aforementioned historical spend and the absence of a formal budget, we are suggesting the TM track be given 25M ARB with the intent to swap 15M ARB for stablecoins over the course of 3 months. This stablecoin reserve may be deployed in low-risk, yield-bearing strategies or other cash-like assets and will be used to cover DAO dollar-denominated expenses and service provider contract shortfalls. This cash-like balance should not be used to give out grants, but rather to pay out service providers that demand dollars. The remaining 10M ARB is to be used on ARB-only onchain strategies that are approved by the TM Committee (TMC). The TM track will solve problems 1&2 mentioned above by putting the infrastructure and service providers in place to conduct onchain strategies on both ARB and stablecoins while ensuring service providers enjoy a professional/stress-free experience working with Arbitrum. The TMC’s mandate also indirectly supports ecosystem growth by focusing primarily on ARB-only strategies by leveraging Arbitrum protocols.
The need to reinvest sequencer revenue is best depicted by the following chart, which shows the DAO has foregone ~400 ETH by not staking its idle holdings.
However, given that the primary goal of the Arbitrum DAO is spreading its technology stack and promoting growth across its ecosystem, we believe that we can do better than just staking the ETH or otherwise reinvesting DAO profits into liquid market opportunities. Furthermore, Entropy Advisors has been approached by numerous protocols interested in strengthening their alliance with the Arbitrum DAO. These protocols include market leaders within well-established DeFi and infrastructure sub sectors as well as projects in emerging verticals that have generated significant attention within the industry. Some of these projects are pre-TGE, generate significant revenue, could solve liquidity fragmentation/interoperability across Orbit chains, or strengthen ARB narratives. These types of deals require a counterparty to negotiate with and discretion until a deal is formally reached. This will be one of the primary deliverables of the Growth Management Committee (GMC), but all deals will need to be approved by the DAO via a snapshot vote with a simple majority For/Abstain, and a quorum equal to 3% of the votable token supply prior to any engagement’s execution. Again, only strategies that rely on ETH and ETH-pegged asset strategies will be pursued. It is important to note that some specific details may need to remain confidential even once the DAO begins voting via Snapshot. The GMC will play a similar role as the STEP committee so that this can be achieved. A stark contrast between the TMC and GMC is that the former will make a one-time recommendation to the DAO on how to allocate the full 25M ARB across various RFP applicants, whereas the latter will make one-off recommendations that are ad hoc in nature.
While we could staff these positions via DAO election, we believe that it would be more efficient to appoint these individuals/entities given the specific qualifications required of the members. These council members will serve a term of around 6 months, with payments for both TMC and GMC members tied to specific milestones.
When it comes to the TMC, each member will be eligible to claim 20K USDC for each of the following milestones achieved: 1) RFP process finalized and the TMC’s final recommendation of which managers to move forward with and the respective amounts allocated approved via Snapshot; 2) The first quarterly report posted on the forum and continuous oversight of strategies having been performed 3) The second quarterly report posted on the forum and continuous oversight of strategies having been performed.
In terms of the GMC, the three milestones, each of which will unlock a 20K USDC payment per member (excluding Entropy), are as follows: 1) RFP process finalized and the GMC’s first recommendation to which project(s) to allocate capital to approved through Snapshot; 2) given the DAO approves an allocation to a project, the first quarterly report posted on the forum and continuous risk monitoring having been performed; 3) given the DAO approves an allocation to a project, the second quarterly report posted on the forum and continuous risk monitoring having been performed.
In other words, both councils’ members (excluding Entropy) will be eligible for a total of 60K USDC per member, given they reach all of their respective milestones. As always, the DAO can remove these members from the council, replace committee members with other candidate(s), or disband this program altogether at any point in time through a Snapshot vote with a simple majority For/Abstain, and a quorum equal to 3% of the votable token supply. Entropy Advisors is happy to assist in any type of open election process if that is deemed necessary in the future.
Suggested TMC Members:
Austin will be paid based on 20K USDC per milestone reached.
Three Sigma will be paid based on 20K USDC per milestone reached.
Make Markets will be paid based on 20K USDC per milestone reached.
TMC Deliverables and Expected Timeline:
Suggested GMC Members:
The primary qualifications for GMC members are the ability to negotiate deals and possess large networks within the wider crypto industry. They may also be required to sign and adhere to NDAs. Entropy felt it was important to add a risk-focused member to the GMC so that economic, general smart contract, and other design risks can be better accounted for when evaluating deals. The GMC will receive support from Arbitrum partnership teams (Foundation and OCL), thus ensuring all opportunities are explored and that whatever the GMC is exploring does not conflict with that of Arbitrum partnership teams.
GMC Deliverables and Expected Timeline:
In order to reduce ambiguity around tax, legal, and any other possible liabilities, we suggest that the Arbitrum Foundation serves as the custodian/counterparty of the funds at all times. The TMC and the GMC simply help coordinate the process, the DAO still remains as the ultimate decision maker, and the Foundation serves as the custodian/counterparty of the funds and thus abides by Cayman Islands law. While the MSS is great for serving as the DAO’s solution to multi-sigs, it is clear that the Arbitrum Foundation is the most logical party to custody these funds, until the OpCo’s legal entity is stood up and fully operational, to avoid unforeseen legal liabilities.
If this vote passes onchain via Tally, 7,500 ETH and 26M ARB will be moved to this address, and then transferred to two separate foundation controlled addresses. No funds can be deployed by either the TMC or GMC—they are only tasked with providing options for the DAO to vote on, and the Arbitrum Foundation will be subject to act in accordance with how the DAO votes. The additional 1M ARB being transferred to the Foundation will be liquidated for 300k USDC in the most suitable manner to pay committee members, with the remainder immediately returned to the DAO treasury.
The DAO can claw back funds at any time via a snapshot vote with a simple majority For/Abstain, and a quorum equal to 3% of the votable token supply. It is worth noting that some of the initiatives in the GM track may contain verbiage that prevents the DAO from clawing back a specific allotment of funds. As mentioned, the DAO will ultimately make the decision on these deals, so delegates/voters will need to review and take these factors into account when voting. Again, the GMC members may be under NDA and only be able to disclose what the partner in question is willing to share publicly. As proposed, the GMC will receive assistance from the OCL and the Arbitrum Foundation, and it is equipped with members with strong BD skill sets and risk evaluation experience. Therefore, we feel confident the GMC will only have the DAO’s best interest in mind.
Lastly, we want to emphasize that this is not a proposal to spend these funds, so the funds being moved are not actually a “cost” to the DAO. Rather, these funds will be used for diversifying risks and creating yield, laying the groundwork for prudent financial management for the Arbitrum DAO, setting it up for long-term success, sustainability, and growth. The only costs incurred by the DAO from this proposal are those of specific committee members, which equates to 300k USDC if all milestones are achieved. Entropy received overwhelming feedback from both interested committee members and the broader Arbitrum DAO community that the payment needed to be altered from 30k ARB vested over 2 years to a more attractive payment arrangement in order to attract the right people.
This proposal remedies 3 key problems plaguing the Arbitrum DAO today, and sets the stage for all of the DAO’s identified financial management needs being met in the future:
- Service Provider Shortfalls: DAO-funded programs as well as service providers that have proved valuable to the DAO (the ARDC, Steakhouse’s services as a part of STEP, etc.) have run into the problem of having dollar-denominated contracts and not enough ARB to meet the agreed upon rate for services rendered.
- Flexible & Metrics-Driven Capital Deployment: The DAO is reliant on RWAs/Treasuries for passive yield on dollars, but has no mechanism for reallocating to onchain strategies as we enter a global rate cutting regime that could make onchain yields more attractive. The DAO also currently lacks the ability to frictionlessly assess the returns and underlying risks of comparative liquid market investments, how much of/when ARB in the treasury should be diversified, and how to optimize operating cash-like reserves.
- Reinvesting Sequencer Revenue: The DAO has neglected to do anything productive with its ETH holdings, which could provide the DAO leverage to fuel growth and partnerships alongside yield—consistent with the DAO’s growth-first mindset.
We envision the functions of the TMC and the GMC to roll up into OpCo once established and fully operationalized, and depending upon the OpCo’s structure, e.g., Cayman Islands Foundation entity, the OpCo could become the custodian of these funds in the future. A lot of the ground work around treasury management will be handled by the TMC and GMC in the interim, and will provide the OpCo with a rubric that can be improved upon as it relates to procuring treasury managers, budgeting, transparency/reporting, etc.
This is a good starting point as it ensures service providers do not bear the burden of ARB volatility, puts the infrastructure and SPs in place for the DAO to conduct onchain strategies, and generates revenue while spurring growth across the Arbitrum ecosystem.
ATTENTION: AFTER ~1 MONTH OF COMMUNITY FEEDBACK AND COMMITTEE MEMBER VETTING, THIS PROPOSAL HAS BEEN RENAMED FROM V1.1 TO V1.2 AFTER BEING UPDATED. PLEASE REVIEW THOROUGHLY AS OF OCTOBER 30, 2024.
On September 12th, Entropy hosted a preliminary treasury working group call (recordings available here) in an effort to align all of the different parties within the DAO on the optimal path forward when it comes to managing the different sections of the DAO’s balance sheet. I.e., chain profits (ETH) and tokens that have been authorized for spend but have not entered circulation yet (ARB). The primary points of contention were around ARB diversification, the need for a DAO budget before the conversation on treasury management continues forward, whether the DAO needs active treasury managers at all, infrastructure selection, and details around a treasury committee’s implementation, e.g., how many individuals/entities, are they DAO-elected or appointed, when should we target to have this committee stood up, etc. From our perspective, we did gain consensus that the DAO’s profits (ETH) in the treasury should be turned productive and that a treasury management committee of some sort should be established. However, even on these two points that most people seem to be in favor of, specific details need to be ironed out for actionable strategies to be implemented.
We believe that we have come up with a fair compromise between all of the various perspectives on these identified issues, all of which stem from the information gathered during the working group calls and conversations with delegates. The compromise suggested herein will, in our opinion, enable the DAO to move forward and initiate the required operational standards for optimizing the use of idle tokens in the treasury. Based on the feedback received on the call on September 25th (link to recording here) where we presented the overarching ideas herein, we feel confident that this proposal aligns well with the treasury managers, infrastructure providers, and overall DAO sentiment towards treasury management. We are eager to gather more feedback from the community and continue iterating so this initiative can move forward.
Since inception, the DAO has spent 19.3M ARB on core DAO initiatives (long-term committees/groups that get funding directly from the DAO via proposal), grants programs, and direct DAO-to-service provider grants according to the August Token Flow report from @r3gen. So outside of protocol/user incentives and the large GCP initiative, the DAO’s spend has been relatively modest throughout the first 18 months of its life, spending about 1.07M ARB per month. The average price of ARB since the token launched sits at $1.16, which puts the DAO’s rough monthly spend on these types of initiatives at $1.24M USD.
In an ideal world, we would have a budget outlined before setting aside some ARB to be converted to stablecoins or other cash-like assets to cover general operating expenses and make up for any service provider contract shortcomings. However, we need the proper people and procedures in place in order for a budget to be executed to the expected standard. We believe that the OpCo will not only be better equipped to tackle this issue, but will also have better incentive alignment with the DAO than any other entity/individual tasked with creating a DAO budget, and more data surrounding DAO-revenue to analyze.
In many cases it is unprofessional for the DAO to put the burden of ARB volatility on its service providers. If we aren’t careful, we will negatively impact the pool of SPs that desire working with Arbitrum DAO. Given the aforementioned historical spend and the absence of a formal budget, we are suggesting the TM track be given 25M ARB with the intent to swap 15M ARB for stablecoins over the course of 3 months. This stablecoin reserve may be deployed in low-risk, yield-bearing strategies or other cash-like assets and will be used to cover DAO dollar-denominated expenses and service provider contract shortfalls. This cash-like balance should not be used to give out grants, but rather to pay out service providers that demand dollars. The remaining 10M ARB is to be used on ARB-only onchain strategies that are approved by the TM Committee (TMC). The TM track will solve problems 1&2 mentioned above by putting the infrastructure and service providers in place to conduct onchain strategies on both ARB and stablecoins while ensuring service providers enjoy a professional/stress-free experience working with Arbitrum. The TMC’s mandate also indirectly supports ecosystem growth by focusing primarily on ARB-only strategies by leveraging Arbitrum protocols.
The need to reinvest sequencer revenue is best depicted by the following chart, which shows the DAO has foregone ~400 ETH by not staking its idle holdings.
However, given that the primary goal of the Arbitrum DAO is spreading its technology stack and promoting growth across its ecosystem, we believe that we can do better than just staking the ETH or otherwise reinvesting DAO profits into liquid market opportunities. Furthermore, Entropy Advisors has been approached by numerous protocols interested in strengthening their alliance with the Arbitrum DAO. These protocols include market leaders within well-established DeFi and infrastructure sub sectors as well as projects in emerging verticals that have generated significant attention within the industry. Some of these projects are pre-TGE, generate significant revenue, could solve liquidity fragmentation/interoperability across Orbit chains, or strengthen ARB narratives. These types of deals require a counterparty to negotiate with and discretion until a deal is formally reached. This will be one of the primary deliverables of the Growth Management Committee (GMC), but all deals will need to be approved by the DAO via a snapshot vote with a simple majority For/Abstain, and a quorum equal to 3% of the votable token supply prior to any engagement’s execution. Again, only strategies that rely on ETH and ETH-pegged asset strategies will be pursued. It is important to note that some specific details may need to remain confidential even once the DAO begins voting via Snapshot. The GMC will play a similar role as the STEP committee so that this can be achieved. A stark contrast between the TMC and GMC is that the former will make a one-time recommendation to the DAO on how to allocate the full 25M ARB across various RFP applicants, whereas the latter will make one-off recommendations that are ad hoc in nature.
While we could staff these positions via DAO election, we believe that it would be more efficient to appoint these individuals/entities given the specific qualifications required of the members. These council members will serve a term of around 6 months, with payments for both TMC and GMC members tied to specific milestones.
When it comes to the TMC, each member will be eligible to claim 20K USDC for each of the following milestones achieved: 1) RFP process finalized and the TMC’s final recommendation of which managers to move forward with and the respective amounts allocated approved via Snapshot; 2) The first quarterly report posted on the forum and continuous oversight of strategies having been performed 3) The second quarterly report posted on the forum and continuous oversight of strategies having been performed.
In terms of the GMC, the three milestones, each of which will unlock a 20K USDC payment per member (excluding Entropy), are as follows: 1) RFP process finalized and the GMC’s first recommendation to which project(s) to allocate capital to approved through Snapshot; 2) given the DAO approves an allocation to a project, the first quarterly report posted on the forum and continuous risk monitoring having been performed; 3) given the DAO approves an allocation to a project, the second quarterly report posted on the forum and continuous risk monitoring having been performed.
In other words, both councils’ members (excluding Entropy) will be eligible for a total of 60K USDC per member, given they reach all of their respective milestones. As always, the DAO can remove these members from the council, replace committee members with other candidate(s), or disband this program altogether at any point in time through a Snapshot vote with a simple majority For/Abstain, and a quorum equal to 3% of the votable token supply. Entropy Advisors is happy to assist in any type of open election process if that is deemed necessary in the future.
Suggested TMC Members:
Austin will be paid based on 20K USDC per milestone reached.
Three Sigma will be paid based on 20K USDC per milestone reached.
Make Markets will be paid based on 20K USDC per milestone reached.
TMC Deliverables and Expected Timeline:
Suggested GMC Members:
The primary qualifications for GMC members are the ability to negotiate deals and possess large networks within the wider crypto industry. They may also be required to sign and adhere to NDAs. Entropy felt it was important to add a risk-focused member to the GMC so that economic, general smart contract, and other design risks can be better accounted for when evaluating deals. The GMC will receive support from Arbitrum partnership teams (Foundation and OCL), thus ensuring all opportunities are explored and that whatever the GMC is exploring does not conflict with that of Arbitrum partnership teams.
GMC Deliverables and Expected Timeline:
In order to reduce ambiguity around tax, legal, and any other possible liabilities, we suggest that the Arbitrum Foundation serves as the custodian/counterparty of the funds at all times. The TMC and the GMC simply help coordinate the process, the DAO still remains as the ultimate decision maker, and the Foundation serves as the custodian/counterparty of the funds and thus abides by Cayman Islands law. While the MSS is great for serving as the DAO’s solution to multi-sigs, it is clear that the Arbitrum Foundation is the most logical party to custody these funds, until the OpCo’s legal entity is stood up and fully operational, to avoid unforeseen legal liabilities.
If this vote passes onchain via Tally, 7,500 ETH and 26M ARB will be moved to this address, and then transferred to two separate foundation controlled addresses. No funds can be deployed by either the TMC or GMC—they are only tasked with providing options for the DAO to vote on, and the Arbitrum Foundation will be subject to act in accordance with how the DAO votes. The additional 1M ARB being transferred to the Foundation will be liquidated for 300k USDC in the most suitable manner to pay committee members, with the remainder immediately returned to the DAO treasury.
The DAO can claw back funds at any time via a snapshot vote with a simple majority For/Abstain, and a quorum equal to 3% of the votable token supply. It is worth noting that some of the initiatives in the GM track may contain verbiage that prevents the DAO from clawing back a specific allotment of funds. As mentioned, the DAO will ultimately make the decision on these deals, so delegates/voters will need to review and take these factors into account when voting. Again, the GMC members may be under NDA and only be able to disclose what the partner in question is willing to share publicly. As proposed, the GMC will receive assistance from the OCL and the Arbitrum Foundation, and it is equipped with members with strong BD skill sets and risk evaluation experience. Therefore, we feel confident the GMC will only have the DAO’s best interest in mind.
Lastly, we want to emphasize that this is not a proposal to spend these funds, so the funds being moved are not actually a “cost” to the DAO. Rather, these funds will be used for diversifying risks and creating yield, laying the groundwork for prudent financial management for the Arbitrum DAO, setting it up for long-term success, sustainability, and growth. The only costs incurred by the DAO from this proposal are those of specific committee members, which equates to 300k USDC if all milestones are achieved. Entropy received overwhelming feedback from both interested committee members and the broader Arbitrum DAO community that the payment needed to be altered from 30k ARB vested over 2 years to a more attractive payment arrangement in order to attract the right people.
This proposal remedies 3 key problems plaguing the Arbitrum DAO today, and sets the stage for all of the DAO’s identified financial management needs being met in the future:
- Service Provider Shortfalls: DAO-funded programs as well as service providers that have proved valuable to the DAO (the ARDC, Steakhouse’s services as a part of STEP, etc.) have run into the problem of having dollar-denominated contracts and not enough ARB to meet the agreed upon rate for services rendered.
- Flexible & Metrics-Driven Capital Deployment: The DAO is reliant on RWAs/Treasuries for passive yield on dollars, but has no mechanism for reallocating to onchain strategies as we enter a global rate cutting regime that could make onchain yields more attractive. The DAO also currently lacks the ability to frictionlessly assess the returns and underlying risks of comparative liquid market investments, how much of/when ARB in the treasury should be diversified, and how to optimize operating cash-like reserves.
- Reinvesting Sequencer Revenue: The DAO has neglected to do anything productive with its ETH holdings, which could provide the DAO leverage to fuel growth and partnerships alongside yield—consistent with the DAO’s growth-first mindset.
We envision the functions of the TMC and the GMC to roll up into OpCo once established and fully operationalized, and depending upon the OpCo’s structure, e.g., Cayman Islands Foundation entity, the OpCo could become the custodian of these funds in the future. A lot of the ground work around treasury management will be handled by the TMC and GMC in the interim, and will provide the OpCo with a rubric that can be improved upon as it relates to procuring treasury managers, budgeting, transparency/reporting, etc.
This is a good starting point as it ensures service providers do not bear the burden of ARB volatility, puts the infrastructure and SPs in place for the DAO to conduct onchain strategies, and generates revenue while spurring growth across the Arbitrum ecosystem.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/117
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/116?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/117
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/116?u=mcfly
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-60: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-60
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-60: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-60
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/113?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/71
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/112?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/111?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/109?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/27
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/107?u=gabriel
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
We are supportive of the Growth track, so will not comment further except to say it is a great idea, and we are excited to see movement on it. The Treasury track does not, in its current form, have enough of our support to vote in favor. Given the size of the allocation, we will withhold an affirmative vote until we are 100% comfortable with it. Specifically, we desire to see a more defined investment universe for the Treasury track (which the Growth track does have). This would reduce the possible discretion of this 3-person committee, as well as help governance have some idea of risk and return profiles it is likely to get.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/101?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/48?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/53
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/100?u=todayindefi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/99?u=winverse
I do not support this proposal because it introduces unnecessary complexity with two separate committees and overlapping responsibilities, which could lead to inefficiency and confusion.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/98?u=tempetechie
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/97?u=duokongcrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/55?u=ezr3al
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/94?u=0xdonpepe
Support, hope to see some surprises. This expenditure is significant and should be done with great caution. If there is an accountability mechanism and poor returns, it should be terminated immediately. You can try it for now
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/93?u=kuiclub
Same as my Snapshot vote: Treasury and Growth fund will help Arbitrum build a stronger financial system while supporting long term growth and stability of the DAO.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/91?u=bruce
I feel that this is something the DAO can experiment with at this point since the amount is not that high in the grand scheme of things. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/90?u=paulofonseca
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476/101?u=larva
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/89?u=0xtalvo.eth_mty
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/67?u=0xalex
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/76?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/75
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/74?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/73?u=ocandocrypto
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
StableLab supports this proposal as we believe it represents a critical step toward enhancing the financial management of the Arbitrum DAO, which aligns with our focus on promoting sustainable governance practices.
I feel that this is something the DAO can experiment with at this point. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/72?u=paulofonseca
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/71
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/48?u=griff
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-54: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-54
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-54: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-54
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/14
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/68?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/66?u=euphoria
Abstaining due to a clear COI
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/treasury-management-working-group-call/26723/8?u=todayindefi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/59?u=tempetechie
ChamaDao supports a structured approach to treasury management
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/57?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/40?u=juanrah
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/55?u=ezr3al
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/53
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/51?u=jojo
Good proposal, need to monitor how it is spent and how it is allocated. However, your fee should not be given in one lump sum. If efficiency is not improved, please terminate funding. This ideal is very good. Can your purposeful plan guarantee profitability? I support
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476/88?u=larva
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/50?u=gabriel
I am not support because the plan is not clear enough about how it will handle disagreements or failures in treasury management
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/48?u=pedrob
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/47?u=kuiclub
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/46?u=0xtalvo.eth_mty
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/45?u=0xdonpepe
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/42?u=duokongcrypto
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-60: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-60
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-60: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-60
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/113?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/71
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/112?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/111?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/109?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/27
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/107?u=gabriel
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
We are supportive of the Growth track, so will not comment further except to say it is a great idea, and we are excited to see movement on it. The Treasury track does not, in its current form, have enough of our support to vote in favor. Given the size of the allocation, we will withhold an affirmative vote until we are 100% comfortable with it. Specifically, we desire to see a more defined investment universe for the Treasury track (which the Growth track does have). This would reduce the possible discretion of this 3-person committee, as well as help governance have some idea of risk and return profiles it is likely to get.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/101?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/48?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/53
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/100?u=todayindefi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/99?u=winverse
I do not support this proposal because it introduces unnecessary complexity with two separate committees and overlapping responsibilities, which could lead to inefficiency and confusion.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/98?u=tempetechie
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/97?u=duokongcrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/55?u=ezr3al
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/94?u=0xdonpepe
Support, hope to see some surprises. This expenditure is significant and should be done with great caution. If there is an accountability mechanism and poor returns, it should be terminated immediately. You can try it for now
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/93?u=kuiclub
Same as my Snapshot vote: Treasury and Growth fund will help Arbitrum build a stronger financial system while supporting long term growth and stability of the DAO.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/91?u=bruce
I feel that this is something the DAO can experiment with at this point since the amount is not that high in the grand scheme of things. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/90?u=paulofonseca
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476/101?u=larva
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/89?u=0xtalvo.eth_mty
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/67?u=0xalex
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/76?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/75
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/74?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/73?u=ocandocrypto
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
StableLab supports this proposal as we believe it represents a critical step toward enhancing the financial management of the Arbitrum DAO, which aligns with our focus on promoting sustainable governance practices.
I feel that this is something the DAO can experiment with at this point. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/72?u=paulofonseca
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/71
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/48?u=griff
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-54: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-54
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-54: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-54
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/14
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/68?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/66?u=euphoria
Abstaining due to a clear COI
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/treasury-management-working-group-call/26723/8?u=todayindefi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/59?u=tempetechie
ChamaDao supports a structured approach to treasury management
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/57?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/40?u=juanrah
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/55?u=ezr3al
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/53
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/51?u=jojo
Good proposal, need to monitor how it is spent and how it is allocated. However, your fee should not be given in one lump sum. If efficiency is not improved, please terminate funding. This ideal is very good. Can your purposeful plan guarantee profitability? I support
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476/88?u=larva
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/50?u=gabriel
I am not support because the plan is not clear enough about how it will handle disagreements or failures in treasury management
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/48?u=pedrob
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/47?u=kuiclub
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/46?u=0xtalvo.eth_mty
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/45?u=0xdonpepe
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/42?u=duokongcrypto
I did address that, so to be very clear:
"Obviously I cannot say more than that re: specifics" means there are confidential business, regulatory, or legal issues that I'm not allowed to speak about on a public forum under any circumstances that are central to the discussion you keep attempting to have on a public forum.
I did address that, so to be very clear:
"Obviously I cannot say more than that re: specifics" means there are confidential business, regulatory, or legal issues that I'm not allowed to speak about on a public forum under any circumstances that are central to the discussion you keep attempting to have on a public forum.
I genuinely cannot tell if you are not picking up that point or you are specifically fishing for confidential information, but to be clear I take my professional obligations around these things exceptionally seriously so you can vote yes or no based on the current disclosed information and there will not be more forthcoming.
So I will answer this one personally:
There is a lot I cannot say here for confidentiality reasons, but you will note that the DAI support being added to the Paxos platform, as was committed to in 2021, includes several components:
So I will answer this one personally:
There is a lot I cannot say here for confidentiality reasons, but you will note that the DAI support being added to the Paxos platform, as was committed to in 2021, includes several components:
1 - DAI being listed on the platform (which includes going through the listing procedures of Paxos, which are agreed upon by the NYDFS and might require regulatory approval depending on the nature of the asset listed)
2 - After such approval is received, engineering actually doing the work to onboard it (e.g. custody, buy/sell as if it were USD equivalent, and deposit/withdraw) and then having this reviewed (potentially both audited and also approved internally and potentially externally)
3 - Neither of those were completely under the control of the partnerships or DeFi team, and at least one of them was not unilaterally under control of Paxos at all (if not both, depending on exact terms).
Obviously I cannot say more than that re: specifics, but it might be the case that there should have been some questions around promising fixed dates in deals when Paxos was not in unilateral control of those dates as opposed to commitments on a best efforts basis, contingent upon external/regulatory approvals.
On the revenue sharing, one might note that initial discussions for that began in early 2022 with negotiations that had to span product, strategy, and the treasury team, and that Trident was hired by Paxos to manage those things after certain personnel had left the firm in all three of those groups, as there were a number of departures from those teams.
Put differently - if you have serious concerns or think I actually lack risk management or treasury expertise despite having built the modern reserves, disclosure, and risk management framework for the only stablecoin in the entire industry to go from double digit billions to nearly zero without losing anyone's money in the process, I'm more than happy to step aside and let someone else attempt this. Is that your ask?
A
Proposal to Enhance ARB Utility via TheStandard.io, an Arbitrum-Native CDP
Overview: In light of ongoing discussions about ARB liquidity and its standing within DeFi, we propose utilizing some ARB which is a collateral asset within TheStandard.io, an Arbitrum-native collateralized debt protocol (CDP). This would increase the utility and demand for ARB by allowing users to leverage their ARB holdings to mint stablecoins (USDs), earn yield, and access capital efficiently.
Proposal to Enhance ARB Utility via TheStandard.io, an Arbitrum-Native CDP
Overview: In light of ongoing discussions about ARB liquidity and its standing within DeFi, we propose utilizing some ARB which is a collateral asset within TheStandard.io, an Arbitrum-native collateralized debt protocol (CDP). This would increase the utility and demand for ARB by allowing users to leverage their ARB holdings to mint stablecoins (USDs), earn yield, and access capital efficiently.
Proposal Highlights:
I did address that, so to be very clear:
"Obviously I cannot say more than that re: specifics" means there are confidential business, regulatory, or legal issues that I'm not allowed to speak about on a public forum under any circumstances that are central to the discussion you keep attempting to have on a public forum.
I did address that, so to be very clear:
"Obviously I cannot say more than that re: specifics" means there are confidential business, regulatory, or legal issues that I'm not allowed to speak about on a public forum under any circumstances that are central to the discussion you keep attempting to have on a public forum.
I genuinely cannot tell if you are not picking up that point or you are specifically fishing for confidential information, but to be clear I take my professional obligations around these things exceptionally seriously so you can vote yes or no based on the current disclosed information and there will not be more forthcoming.
So I will answer this one personally:
There is a lot I cannot say here for confidentiality reasons, but you will note that the DAI support being added to the Paxos platform, as was committed to in 2021, includes several components:
So I will answer this one personally:
There is a lot I cannot say here for confidentiality reasons, but you will note that the DAI support being added to the Paxos platform, as was committed to in 2021, includes several components:
1 - DAI being listed on the platform (which includes going through the listing procedures of Paxos, which are agreed upon by the NYDFS and might require regulatory approval depending on the nature of the asset listed)
2 - After such approval is received, engineering actually doing the work to onboard it (e.g. custody, buy/sell as if it were USD equivalent, and deposit/withdraw) and then having this reviewed (potentially both audited and also approved internally and potentially externally)
3 - Neither of those were completely under the control of the partnerships or DeFi team, and at least one of them was not unilaterally under control of Paxos at all (if not both, depending on exact terms).
Obviously I cannot say more than that re: specifics, but it might be the case that there should have been some questions around promising fixed dates in deals when Paxos was not in unilateral control of those dates as opposed to commitments on a best efforts basis, contingent upon external/regulatory approvals.
On the revenue sharing, one might note that initial discussions for that began in early 2022 with negotiations that had to span product, strategy, and the treasury team, and that Trident was hired by Paxos to manage those things after certain personnel had left the firm in all three of those groups, as there were a number of departures from those teams.
Put differently - if you have serious concerns or think I actually lack risk management or treasury expertise despite having built the modern reserves, disclosure, and risk management framework for the only stablecoin in the entire industry to go from double digit billions to nearly zero without losing anyone's money in the process, I'm more than happy to step aside and let someone else attempt this. Is that your ask?
A
Proposal to Enhance ARB Utility via TheStandard.io, an Arbitrum-Native CDP
Overview: In light of ongoing discussions about ARB liquidity and its standing within DeFi, we propose utilizing some ARB which is a collateral asset within TheStandard.io, an Arbitrum-native collateralized debt protocol (CDP). This would increase the utility and demand for ARB by allowing users to leverage their ARB holdings to mint stablecoins (USDs), earn yield, and access capital efficiently.
Proposal to Enhance ARB Utility via TheStandard.io, an Arbitrum-Native CDP
Overview: In light of ongoing discussions about ARB liquidity and its standing within DeFi, we propose utilizing some ARB which is a collateral asset within TheStandard.io, an Arbitrum-native collateralized debt protocol (CDP). This would increase the utility and demand for ARB by allowing users to leverage their ARB holdings to mint stablecoins (USDs), earn yield, and access capital efficiently.
Proposal Highlights:
Voting has ended!
===============
[Treasury Management V1.2](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4/proposal/2474535158363981241)
### Final Votes
| **Category** | **Result** | **Details** |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| **Quorum reached** | ✅ | 183.79M of 126.01M |
| **Majority Support** | ✅ | |
| **For** | | 153.25M (81.7%) |
| **Against** | | 3.84M (2.0%) |
| **Abstain** | | 30.54M (16.3%) |
* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]
what happened to dao budgeting? wasn't there a consensus that dao-wide budget needs to be figured out before deploying any capital and treasury-management in general? like this treasury is not gonna go anywhere, why the rush?
Onchain voting for this proposal is ending within 24 hours:
[Vote on Tally: Treasury Management V1.2](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4/proposal/2474535158363981241)
* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]
Voting has ended!
===============
[Treasury Management V1.2](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4/proposal/2474535158363981241)
### Final Votes
| **Category** | **Result** | **Details** |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| **Quorum reached** | ✅ | 183.79M of 126.01M |
| **Majority Support** | ✅ | |
| **For** | | 153.25M (81.7%) |
| **Against** | | 3.84M (2.0%) |
| **Abstain** | | 30.54M (16.3%) |
* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]
what happened to dao budgeting? wasn't there a consensus that dao-wide budget needs to be figured out before deploying any capital and treasury-management in general? like this treasury is not gonna go anywhere, why the rush?
Onchain voting for this proposal is ending within 24 hours:
[Vote on Tally: Treasury Management V1.2](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4/proposal/2474535158363981241)
* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]
As per this proposal, the Arbitrum Foundation has converted 1M ARB to 300K USDC (to pay committee members), and has returned the excess from this 1M ARB to the DAO Treasury.
Update on Treasury Management v1.2 Token Conversions for TMC Strategies
As per this proposal, the Arbitrum Foundation has converted 1M ARB to 300K USDC (to pay committee members), and has returned the excess from this 1M ARB to the DAO Treasury.
Update on Treasury Management v1.2 Token Conversions for TMC Strategies
Voting has started for this proposal! Vote on Tally: Treasury Management V1.2
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]
Voting has started for this proposal! Vote on Tally: Treasury Management V1.2
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]
I can confirm that 0xAc20CD734C65Baf48a1476447af7D3E3165DC739 is a Foundation-controlled safe and that funds will be transferred to separate foundation-controlled addresses if the proposal passes.
Gm, gm :sparkles:
The results are in for the [Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2 off-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1498
I can confirm that 0xAc20CD734C65Baf48a1476447af7D3E3165DC739 is a Foundation-controlled safe and that funds will be transferred to separate foundation-controlled addresses if the proposal passes.
Gm, gm :sparkles:
The results are in for the [Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2 off-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1498
I appreciate the structured approach to treasury management; it's essential for ensuring the DAO's financial health. However, I echo Larva's BlockworksResearch and concerns regarding the proposed 15M ARB swap into stablecoins, which could generate significant market volatility (15M ARB represents a large selling pressure, given the current liquidity available). We should explore both OTC options and engaging with more market makers.
Moreover, there is no need to rush structuring this before the budget is approved, as originally planned. Taking the time to align treasury plans with the approved budget would allow for a more coherent, rational, transparent and effective approach.
I appreciate the structured approach to treasury management; it's essential for ensuring the DAO's financial health. However, I echo Larva's BlockworksResearch and concerns regarding the proposed 15M ARB swap into stablecoins, which could generate significant market volatility (15M ARB represents a large selling pressure, given the current liquidity available). We should explore both OTC options and engaging with more market makers.
Moreover, there is no need to rush structuring this before the budget is approved, as originally planned. Taking the time to align treasury plans with the approved budget would allow for a more coherent, rational, transparent and effective approach.
FOR this, idle funds need to be liquid, strategies to maintain diversification and drive growth. As we move into the global rate cut mechanism, on-chain yields may be more attractive. It is in line with the long-term healthy development of Arbitrum and the interests of all users of Arbitrum. By deploying infrastructure and service providers to implement on-chain strategies for ARB and stablecoins, TMC's mission is to indirectly support the growth of the ecosystem by leveraging the Arbitrum protocol, which is in line with my thinking. In the future, I would like to have better employees, more transparent elections, and less expensive salaries.
Voted "For" on Tally too, with the same reason with Snapshot vote :)
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/54?u=ignas
FOR this, idle funds need to be liquid, strategies to maintain diversification and drive growth. As we move into the global rate cut mechanism, on-chain yields may be more attractive. It is in line with the long-term healthy development of Arbitrum and the interests of all users of Arbitrum. By deploying infrastructure and service providers to implement on-chain strategies for ARB and stablecoins, TMC's mission is to indirectly support the growth of the ecosystem by leveraging the Arbitrum protocol, which is in line with my thinking. In the future, I would like to have better employees, more transparent elections, and less expensive salaries.
Voted "For" on Tally too, with the same reason with Snapshot vote :)
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/54?u=ignas
We are voting FOR on Tally. This proposal addresses the issue of underutilised treasury assets and adds an extra layer of security against market volatility by creating a stablecoin reserve and deploying ETH holdings into productive strategies.
However, in future iterations, we believe committee members should be elected with active participation from the DAO. This should allow for more transparency and ensure that the members elected are those that the majority of the DAO truly agrees on. That being said, having compensation being tied to milestones achieved is a step in the right direction, as it promotes accountability and ensures that the appointed members are incentivised to deliver measurable outcomes.
We are voting FOR on Tally. This proposal addresses the issue of underutilised treasury assets and adds an extra layer of security against market volatility by creating a stablecoin reserve and deploying ETH holdings into productive strategies.
However, in future iterations, we believe committee members should be elected with active participation from the DAO. This should allow for more transparency and ensure that the members elected are those that the majority of the DAO truly agrees on. That being said, having compensation being tied to milestones achieved is a step in the right direction, as it promotes accountability and ensures that the appointed members are incentivised to deliver measurable outcomes.
Establishing two management tracks creates a structured approach to optimising resource allocation. The treasury management track should address the immediate need to reduce volatility risks and make sure service providers are paid reliably. The growth track would allow for a forward-looking perspective through building partnerships and investing in ETH-backed strategies.
Ultimately, This is a good first step and a solid foundation for improving the DAO’s financial management and operational efficiency. Improvements should be analysed and addressed in the next iteration.
I've decided to support this proposal on Tally as well. As I previously mentioned, I believe it's crucial to implement professional treasury management, enhancing Arbitrum's long-term sustainability and competitiveness. I think that with this proposal we are laying the groundwork for more strategic investments in the Arbitrum ecosystem, having the potential to provide both stability and growth for the ecosystem. Thanks @Entropy , you have my full support here!
As in @web3citizenxyz representation, voting FOR in this proposal. Below the rationale:
We vote FOR the proposal on Tally.
We maintain the voting and rationale made at the Snapshot stage and also look forward to OpCo being in charge of the initiative going forward. We also echo @pedrob 's points on "being very difficult for THE DAO to reject recommendations from the selected council members" and would still like to see a more automated solution for the treasury management with a clarified and articulated IPS being agreed on by the DAO.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
Following our support for this proposal in the temperature check phase we are voting FOR this proposal in the onchain vote.
Based on the proposal's updates and clarifications, we will vote FOR on Tally.
I will vote FOR onchain (Tally) after the concerns on pre selected council was addressed in the call and a background check was done by entropy.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
Having received confirmation from @Entropy on the possible COIs, we see no reason to change our vote regarding Snapshot. Here our previous rationale.
We would like to confirm that!
This perfectly describes our voting rationale on the proposal for Treasury Management - we make our voting power available to anyone who is interested and hence we voted in favor of the proposal.
Thank you @paulofonseca for your support and we kindly invite anyone to participate in auctions or buy our voting power instantly for the future proposals.
After much consideration, I have decided to change my vote and support this proposal on Tally.
Although I do not fully agree with the approach of the two committees or the short-term perspective of the proposal, it represents a step toward the DAO's long-term sustainability. Additionally, the OpCo proposal is already under vote, and I expect it will eventually take charge of this treasury management initiative.
We're voting FOR this proposal on Tally, recognizing it as a necessary first step toward professional treasury management. The committee structure and milestone-based compensation provide proper oversight, though future iterations should transition to DAO-elected positions to reduce centralization around Entropy. Hoping that converting ARB to USD shifts volatility risk to the OTC market.
Voted in favour on-chain (Tally), same reasons
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/86?u=olimpio
I also bought the 804.770,97 ARB of voting power available in lobbyfi.xyz to vote For in this onchain proposal https://arbiscan.io/tx/0xbf39b6eb5b3c673f238f1d72fea71bf82948f80059a4c4cc0d35b7f38df7a7b5
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO (formerly ‘Lampros Labs DAO’) governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in Tally Voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO (formerly ‘Lampros Labs DAO’) governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in Tally Voting.
Building on our Snapshot rationale, we support this proposal as it addresses critical gaps in treasury management with a structured and thoughtful approach. We particularly like the milestone-based payment model, which ensures accountability and incentivizes results. This approach reflects the kind of transparent and effective management we value and advocate for.
We believe this proposal benefits the DAO by creating a solid framework for managing funds, optimizing ETH and ARB use for immediate needs and long-term growth. The flexibility and foresight demonstrated in this proposal align with the DAO's mission to adapt and thrive in an ever-evolving ecosystem.
Voted FOR this proposal
We are voting FOR on Tally. This proposal addresses the issue of underutilised treasury assets and adds an extra layer of security against market volatility by creating a stablecoin reserve and deploying ETH holdings into productive strategies.
However, in future iterations, we believe committee members should be elected with active participation from the DAO. This should allow for more transparency and ensure that the members elected are those that the majority of the DAO truly agrees on. That being said, having compensation being tied to milestones achieved is a step in the right direction, as it promotes accountability and ensures that the appointed members are incentivised to deliver measurable outcomes.
We are voting FOR on Tally. This proposal addresses the issue of underutilised treasury assets and adds an extra layer of security against market volatility by creating a stablecoin reserve and deploying ETH holdings into productive strategies.
However, in future iterations, we believe committee members should be elected with active participation from the DAO. This should allow for more transparency and ensure that the members elected are those that the majority of the DAO truly agrees on. That being said, having compensation being tied to milestones achieved is a step in the right direction, as it promotes accountability and ensures that the appointed members are incentivised to deliver measurable outcomes.
Establishing two management tracks creates a structured approach to optimising resource allocation. The treasury management track should address the immediate need to reduce volatility risks and make sure service providers are paid reliably. The growth track would allow for a forward-looking perspective through building partnerships and investing in ETH-backed strategies.
Ultimately, This is a good first step and a solid foundation for improving the DAO’s financial management and operational efficiency. Improvements should be analysed and addressed in the next iteration.
I've decided to support this proposal on Tally as well. As I previously mentioned, I believe it's crucial to implement professional treasury management, enhancing Arbitrum's long-term sustainability and competitiveness. I think that with this proposal we are laying the groundwork for more strategic investments in the Arbitrum ecosystem, having the potential to provide both stability and growth for the ecosystem. Thanks @Entropy , you have my full support here!
As in @web3citizenxyz representation, voting FOR in this proposal. Below the rationale:
We vote FOR the proposal on Tally.
We maintain the voting and rationale made at the Snapshot stage and also look forward to OpCo being in charge of the initiative going forward. We also echo @pedrob 's points on "being very difficult for THE DAO to reject recommendations from the selected council members" and would still like to see a more automated solution for the treasury management with a clarified and articulated IPS being agreed on by the DAO.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
Following our support for this proposal in the temperature check phase we are voting FOR this proposal in the onchain vote.
Based on the proposal's updates and clarifications, we will vote FOR on Tally.
I will vote FOR onchain (Tally) after the concerns on pre selected council was addressed in the call and a background check was done by entropy.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
Having received confirmation from @Entropy on the possible COIs, we see no reason to change our vote regarding Snapshot. Here our previous rationale.
We would like to confirm that!
This perfectly describes our voting rationale on the proposal for Treasury Management - we make our voting power available to anyone who is interested and hence we voted in favor of the proposal.
Thank you @paulofonseca for your support and we kindly invite anyone to participate in auctions or buy our voting power instantly for the future proposals.
After much consideration, I have decided to change my vote and support this proposal on Tally.
Although I do not fully agree with the approach of the two committees or the short-term perspective of the proposal, it represents a step toward the DAO's long-term sustainability. Additionally, the OpCo proposal is already under vote, and I expect it will eventually take charge of this treasury management initiative.
We're voting FOR this proposal on Tally, recognizing it as a necessary first step toward professional treasury management. The committee structure and milestone-based compensation provide proper oversight, though future iterations should transition to DAO-elected positions to reduce centralization around Entropy. Hoping that converting ARB to USD shifts volatility risk to the OTC market.
Voted in favour on-chain (Tally), same reasons
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-treasury-management-v1-2/26967/86?u=olimpio
I also bought the 804.770,97 ARB of voting power available in lobbyfi.xyz to vote For in this onchain proposal https://arbiscan.io/tx/0xbf39b6eb5b3c673f238f1d72fea71bf82948f80059a4c4cc0d35b7f38df7a7b5
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO (formerly ‘Lampros Labs DAO’) governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in Tally Voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO (formerly ‘Lampros Labs DAO’) governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in Tally Voting.
Building on our Snapshot rationale, we support this proposal as it addresses critical gaps in treasury management with a structured and thoughtful approach. We particularly like the milestone-based payment model, which ensures accountability and incentivizes results. This approach reflects the kind of transparent and effective management we value and advocate for.
We believe this proposal benefits the DAO by creating a solid framework for managing funds, optimizing ETH and ARB use for immediate needs and long-term growth. The flexibility and foresight demonstrated in this proposal align with the DAO's mission to adapt and thrive in an ever-evolving ecosystem.
Voted FOR this proposal
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
Having received confirmation from @Entropy on the possible COIs, we see no reason to change our vote regarding Snapshot. Here our previous rationale.
We hope that this is the first of many steps by the DAO towards a comprehensive plan, bringing together all Treasury related initiatives and that through OpCo the DAO will finally have its Annual Budget.
After much consideration, I have decided to change my vote and support this proposal on Tally.
Although I do not fully agree with the approach of the two committees or the short-term perspective of the proposal, it represents a step toward the DAO's long-term sustainability. Additionally, the OpCo proposal is already under vote, and I expect it will eventually take charge of this treasury management initiative.
I would like to reiterate a recommendation I shared in my feedback:
After the TMC delivers the two reports (the second at the six-month mark), I would like to propose including a third report. Considering that by that time the OpCo is expected to begin its operations, this report should cover the state of the treasury, the DAO, expenses, and recommendations for long-term sustainability.
This additional report would serve as a handover document for the OpCo, allowing it to focus on treasury management with a clear vision for long-term success.
Finally,
As a reminder, the DAO is required to approve the TMC and GMC’s recommendation and no funds can be moved without meeting this prerequisite. The DAO will maintain full control over what is allocated (or if any funds are allocated at all)
I understand this, but once the structure and its members are defined, it will be very difficult for the DAO to reject their recommendations. In practice, the management of programs is entirely delegated to those appointed, both in execution and decision-making (as we have seen on several occasions during the LTIPP, the B.STIP, and the STEP). For instance, during the LTIPP, the DAO chose not to vote on bounties due to a lack of context and a preference to leave that decision to the council, even though the proposal explicitly stated that it was a DAO prerogative.
I would have preferred the approval of guidelines that align not only with the interests of the DAO but also with the broader Ethereum ecosystem. I am skeptical that the details of the fund distribution will be thoroughly discussed. Btw, I agree that this should be the case—that’s precisely why the members of the working groups are assigned. However, it would have been better if it were done with clear guidelines.
Voted FOR this proposal
DAOplomats is voting in favor of this prop on Tally.
We are maintaining our support from the temp check.
gm, voted FOR.
I believe the proposal effectively addresses key treasury challenges through a structured and phased approach, and clear goals.
Splitting growth and treasury management into tracks makes sense, and tying compensation to milestones ensures accountability.
gm, voted FOR.
I believe the proposal effectively addresses key treasury challenges through a structured and phased approach, and clear goals.
Splitting growth and treasury management into tracks makes sense, and tying compensation to milestones ensures accountability.
While pre-selected members aren’t ideal, I trust the selected team members for the first phase. Future elections would improve transparency, but this is a solid plan to move forward.
I am voting in favor of the proposal on Tally. I’m pleased to see it reach this stage, and I appreciate its responsiveness to feedback: compensation for the TMC and GMC members is no longer paid monthly, but instead tied to deliverables, with a clear timeline added to ensure efficient and orderly progress. This design better aligns interests with the DAO’s long-term goals and steadily reinforces its financial stability.
The proposal addresses current treasury management challenges—such as insufficient funding for service providers and idle assets—by offering practical solutions. Through flexible allocation of ARB, stablecoins, and ETH, it adapts to global rate changes and market conditions, reducing long-term risk. Additionally, it can leverage decentralized infrastructure to enhance yield and asset utilization, creating a more efficient, transparent, and sustainable treasury management framework for the Arbitrum DAO.
I am voting in favor of the proposal on Tally. I’m pleased to see it reach this stage, and I appreciate its responsiveness to feedback: compensation for the TMC and GMC members is no longer paid monthly, but instead tied to deliverables, with a clear timeline added to ensure efficient and orderly progress. This design better aligns interests with the DAO’s long-term goals and steadily reinforces its financial stability.
The proposal addresses current treasury management challenges—such as insufficient funding for service providers and idle assets—by offering practical solutions. Through flexible allocation of ARB, stablecoins, and ETH, it adapts to global rate changes and market conditions, reducing long-term risk. Additionally, it can leverage decentralized infrastructure to enhance yield and asset utilization, creating a more efficient, transparent, and sustainable treasury management framework for the Arbitrum DAO.
In short, I support this proposal because it effectively addresses the problems at hand and fosters the long-term prosperity of the ecosystem.
I voted FOR on Tally. I believe this proposal is a move in the right direction for the DAO to think about its treasury sustainably.
voting For on the current onchain proposal because I feel that this is something the DAO can experiment with at this point since the amount is not that high in the grand scheme of things.
Voted YES on Tally. Its important to keep track of the treasury because I think currently we are burning too much and need better strategies and execution on how to handle those assets without too much spending.
I'm voting FOR this proposal on Tally. It's a solid step forward in order to make Arbitrum more sustainable by leveraging our reserves in low-risk strategies. Concerns about a member's background were addressed during a governance call, so I'm comfortable with the final proposal. That said, I still believe future members should be selected through an election process by the DAO.
I will vote FOR on Tally.
I acknowledge the proposal’s goals and appreciate its focus on transparency, governance mechanisms, and risk management. The proposal addresses existing issues by providing specific solutions, such as establishing the TMC and GMC, which clearly delineate the management pathways for different types of assets, bringing more professionalism and targeted strategies to DAO treasury management.
I will vote FOR on Tally.
I acknowledge the proposal’s goals and appreciate its focus on transparency, governance mechanisms, and risk management. The proposal addresses existing issues by providing specific solutions, such as establishing the TMC and GMC, which clearly delineate the management pathways for different types of assets, bringing more professionalism and targeted strategies to DAO treasury management.
Furthermore, I personally support the separation of fund management and growth strategies into different tracks, combined with a phased implementation approach to reduce the risks associated with centralized fund management. Particularly, the reinvestment strategies for ARB and ETH, with clear directions on on-chain yields and low-risk asset allocation, align with the DAO’s long-term objectives of preserving and increasing value.
I voted FOR the proposal. This proposal goes a long way towards securing our future as a DAO irrespective of market conditions. Honestly, my take is that we can't rest on treasury diversification until we have a 250 million endowment earning yield that can fund our activities at 12 or 13 million a year.
We are currently at $30 million with STEP. We would have reached around $90 million with this proposal.
I voted FOR the proposal. This proposal goes a long way towards securing our future as a DAO irrespective of market conditions. Honestly, my take is that we can't rest on treasury diversification until we have a 250 million endowment earning yield that can fund our activities at 12 or 13 million a year.
We are currently at $30 million with STEP. We would have reached around $90 million with this proposal.
I am curious to know how they arrive at an optimum liquidation strategy but however it is done, its better than not doing it.
Entropy went and checked references so personally my concerns on this front is assuaged.
Voted For: For the Snapshot, I voted Against due to a lack of clear metrics, a preselected committee, and an impact on ARB price due to converting to stables. After attending a call with the team and feedback on the forum, I decided to vote For on the Tally vote. The biggest change of mind was that after reviewing the committee candidates and general trust in Entropy to execute. Having a clear strategy for our Treasury is the essence here and a step in the right direction. Happy to see we have a strong team to execute on it.
it would be better to keep all this accounting a little bit... cleaner than this. this multisig already had funds from the events budget proposal as well. We should use one multisig per proposal, as per the MSS best practices, even if those multisigs are still controlled by the Arbitrum Foundation members.
Voted in favour. I like the proposal as a whole, and even though the members of the GMC and TMC were "pre-selected", the teams look interdisciplinary and I didn't think that enticed a block.
I do think however that in the future (and even if they perform well) members should be elected via election vote. As for the Treasury Diversification itself, selling ARB for USD to be used and attempt mitigating volatility for Service Providers payments is basically transferring the "disadvantage" to the open market (LPs if this is sold via DEX), but I agree it's also important to stay competitive to attract blockchain talent.
Treasury Management V1.2 is now pending for a vote on Tally. The veribiage of this proposal has been altered to reflect this:
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We would like to thank @Entropy for facilitating this proposal. We genuinely believe it is a step in the right direction concerning Treasury Management. The issues of Service Provider Shortfalls and the treasury’s inactive assets are matters that need to be addressed promptly:
Given the uncertainty surrounding a member's involvement, as discussed in the forum, I have chosen to abstain from voting on Tally. I believe that managing funds requires individuals of the highest integrity. While the proposal itself is promising, I am concerned about the potential risks. If approved..., I expect complete transparency and accountability throughout the project.
Please find the recording of this call here, and feel free to ask any other questions to specific members in the replies.
The proposal raises several concerns that make me hard to support in its current status. First, it lacks a clear risk management framework to mitigate potential losses from market volatility or counterparty risks, leaving the treasury exposed to unnecessary dangers. Additionally,, the proposal appears misaligned with the DAO's decentralized principles by consolidating too much power into a single entity without sufficient safeguards. Sorry, Until these issues are addressed, I cannot support this proposal.
DAOplomats voted in favor of this proposal during the temp check.
The creation of the two management tracks, TM and GM, addresses concerns about service provider shortfalls due to dollar-denominated contracts and insufficient ARB holdings to cover agreed-upon rates, and shortfalls in capital deployment respectively.
DAOplomats voted in favor of this proposal during the temp check.
The creation of the two management tracks, TM and GM, addresses concerns about service provider shortfalls due to dollar-denominated contracts and insufficient ARB holdings to cover agreed-upon rates, and shortfalls in capital deployment respectively.
These two tracks have a lot on their plates, and we would love to see how they handle their respective responsibilities.
Blockworks Advisory is voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
We've seen the discussion and pitfalls of treasury management in the DAO thus far, and are overall happy to see a proposiiton come forward. We also are confident in Entropy's ability to properly vet and filter for the right candidates. However, we would like to echo the concerns brought by Tane and Gauntlet, in the future it may be a good idea to have some bucket of the treasury minimally managed.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
Having received confirmation from @Entropy on the possible COIs, we see no reason to change our vote regarding Snapshot. Here our previous rationale.
We hope that this is the first of many steps by the DAO towards a comprehensive plan, bringing together all Treasury related initiatives and that through OpCo the DAO will finally have its Annual Budget.
After much consideration, I have decided to change my vote and support this proposal on Tally.
Although I do not fully agree with the approach of the two committees or the short-term perspective of the proposal, it represents a step toward the DAO's long-term sustainability. Additionally, the OpCo proposal is already under vote, and I expect it will eventually take charge of this treasury management initiative.
I would like to reiterate a recommendation I shared in my feedback:
After the TMC delivers the two reports (the second at the six-month mark), I would like to propose including a third report. Considering that by that time the OpCo is expected to begin its operations, this report should cover the state of the treasury, the DAO, expenses, and recommendations for long-term sustainability.
This additional report would serve as a handover document for the OpCo, allowing it to focus on treasury management with a clear vision for long-term success.
Finally,
As a reminder, the DAO is required to approve the TMC and GMC’s recommendation and no funds can be moved without meeting this prerequisite. The DAO will maintain full control over what is allocated (or if any funds are allocated at all)
I understand this, but once the structure and its members are defined, it will be very difficult for the DAO to reject their recommendations. In practice, the management of programs is entirely delegated to those appointed, both in execution and decision-making (as we have seen on several occasions during the LTIPP, the B.STIP, and the STEP). For instance, during the LTIPP, the DAO chose not to vote on bounties due to a lack of context and a preference to leave that decision to the council, even though the proposal explicitly stated that it was a DAO prerogative.
I would have preferred the approval of guidelines that align not only with the interests of the DAO but also with the broader Ethereum ecosystem. I am skeptical that the details of the fund distribution will be thoroughly discussed. Btw, I agree that this should be the case—that’s precisely why the members of the working groups are assigned. However, it would have been better if it were done with clear guidelines.
Voted FOR this proposal
DAOplomats is voting in favor of this prop on Tally.
We are maintaining our support from the temp check.
gm, voted FOR.
I believe the proposal effectively addresses key treasury challenges through a structured and phased approach, and clear goals.
Splitting growth and treasury management into tracks makes sense, and tying compensation to milestones ensures accountability.
gm, voted FOR.
I believe the proposal effectively addresses key treasury challenges through a structured and phased approach, and clear goals.
Splitting growth and treasury management into tracks makes sense, and tying compensation to milestones ensures accountability.
While pre-selected members aren’t ideal, I trust the selected team members for the first phase. Future elections would improve transparency, but this is a solid plan to move forward.
I am voting in favor of the proposal on Tally. I’m pleased to see it reach this stage, and I appreciate its responsiveness to feedback: compensation for the TMC and GMC members is no longer paid monthly, but instead tied to deliverables, with a clear timeline added to ensure efficient and orderly progress. This design better aligns interests with the DAO’s long-term goals and steadily reinforces its financial stability.
The proposal addresses current treasury management challenges—such as insufficient funding for service providers and idle assets—by offering practical solutions. Through flexible allocation of ARB, stablecoins, and ETH, it adapts to global rate changes and market conditions, reducing long-term risk. Additionally, it can leverage decentralized infrastructure to enhance yield and asset utilization, creating a more efficient, transparent, and sustainable treasury management framework for the Arbitrum DAO.
I am voting in favor of the proposal on Tally. I’m pleased to see it reach this stage, and I appreciate its responsiveness to feedback: compensation for the TMC and GMC members is no longer paid monthly, but instead tied to deliverables, with a clear timeline added to ensure efficient and orderly progress. This design better aligns interests with the DAO’s long-term goals and steadily reinforces its financial stability.
The proposal addresses current treasury management challenges—such as insufficient funding for service providers and idle assets—by offering practical solutions. Through flexible allocation of ARB, stablecoins, and ETH, it adapts to global rate changes and market conditions, reducing long-term risk. Additionally, it can leverage decentralized infrastructure to enhance yield and asset utilization, creating a more efficient, transparent, and sustainable treasury management framework for the Arbitrum DAO.
In short, I support this proposal because it effectively addresses the problems at hand and fosters the long-term prosperity of the ecosystem.
I voted FOR on Tally. I believe this proposal is a move in the right direction for the DAO to think about its treasury sustainably.
voting For on the current onchain proposal because I feel that this is something the DAO can experiment with at this point since the amount is not that high in the grand scheme of things.
Voted YES on Tally. Its important to keep track of the treasury because I think currently we are burning too much and need better strategies and execution on how to handle those assets without too much spending.
I'm voting FOR this proposal on Tally. It's a solid step forward in order to make Arbitrum more sustainable by leveraging our reserves in low-risk strategies. Concerns about a member's background were addressed during a governance call, so I'm comfortable with the final proposal. That said, I still believe future members should be selected through an election process by the DAO.
I will vote FOR on Tally.
I acknowledge the proposal’s goals and appreciate its focus on transparency, governance mechanisms, and risk management. The proposal addresses existing issues by providing specific solutions, such as establishing the TMC and GMC, which clearly delineate the management pathways for different types of assets, bringing more professionalism and targeted strategies to DAO treasury management.
I will vote FOR on Tally.
I acknowledge the proposal’s goals and appreciate its focus on transparency, governance mechanisms, and risk management. The proposal addresses existing issues by providing specific solutions, such as establishing the TMC and GMC, which clearly delineate the management pathways for different types of assets, bringing more professionalism and targeted strategies to DAO treasury management.
Furthermore, I personally support the separation of fund management and growth strategies into different tracks, combined with a phased implementation approach to reduce the risks associated with centralized fund management. Particularly, the reinvestment strategies for ARB and ETH, with clear directions on on-chain yields and low-risk asset allocation, align with the DAO’s long-term objectives of preserving and increasing value.
I voted FOR the proposal. This proposal goes a long way towards securing our future as a DAO irrespective of market conditions. Honestly, my take is that we can't rest on treasury diversification until we have a 250 million endowment earning yield that can fund our activities at 12 or 13 million a year.
We are currently at $30 million with STEP. We would have reached around $90 million with this proposal.
I voted FOR the proposal. This proposal goes a long way towards securing our future as a DAO irrespective of market conditions. Honestly, my take is that we can't rest on treasury diversification until we have a 250 million endowment earning yield that can fund our activities at 12 or 13 million a year.
We are currently at $30 million with STEP. We would have reached around $90 million with this proposal.
I am curious to know how they arrive at an optimum liquidation strategy but however it is done, its better than not doing it.
Entropy went and checked references so personally my concerns on this front is assuaged.
Voted For: For the Snapshot, I voted Against due to a lack of clear metrics, a preselected committee, and an impact on ARB price due to converting to stables. After attending a call with the team and feedback on the forum, I decided to vote For on the Tally vote. The biggest change of mind was that after reviewing the committee candidates and general trust in Entropy to execute. Having a clear strategy for our Treasury is the essence here and a step in the right direction. Happy to see we have a strong team to execute on it.
it would be better to keep all this accounting a little bit... cleaner than this. this multisig already had funds from the events budget proposal as well. We should use one multisig per proposal, as per the MSS best practices, even if those multisigs are still controlled by the Arbitrum Foundation members.
Voted in favour. I like the proposal as a whole, and even though the members of the GMC and TMC were "pre-selected", the teams look interdisciplinary and I didn't think that enticed a block.
I do think however that in the future (and even if they perform well) members should be elected via election vote. As for the Treasury Diversification itself, selling ARB for USD to be used and attempt mitigating volatility for Service Providers payments is basically transferring the "disadvantage" to the open market (LPs if this is sold via DEX), but I agree it's also important to stay competitive to attract blockchain talent.
Treasury Management V1.2 is now pending for a vote on Tally. The veribiage of this proposal has been altered to reflect this:
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We would like to thank @Entropy for facilitating this proposal. We genuinely believe it is a step in the right direction concerning Treasury Management. The issues of Service Provider Shortfalls and the treasury’s inactive assets are matters that need to be addressed promptly:
Given the uncertainty surrounding a member's involvement, as discussed in the forum, I have chosen to abstain from voting on Tally. I believe that managing funds requires individuals of the highest integrity. While the proposal itself is promising, I am concerned about the potential risks. If approved..., I expect complete transparency and accountability throughout the project.
Please find the recording of this call here, and feel free to ask any other questions to specific members in the replies.
The proposal raises several concerns that make me hard to support in its current status. First, it lacks a clear risk management framework to mitigate potential losses from market volatility or counterparty risks, leaving the treasury exposed to unnecessary dangers. Additionally,, the proposal appears misaligned with the DAO's decentralized principles by consolidating too much power into a single entity without sufficient safeguards. Sorry, Until these issues are addressed, I cannot support this proposal.
DAOplomats voted in favor of this proposal during the temp check.
The creation of the two management tracks, TM and GM, addresses concerns about service provider shortfalls due to dollar-denominated contracts and insufficient ARB holdings to cover agreed-upon rates, and shortfalls in capital deployment respectively.
DAOplomats voted in favor of this proposal during the temp check.
The creation of the two management tracks, TM and GM, addresses concerns about service provider shortfalls due to dollar-denominated contracts and insufficient ARB holdings to cover agreed-upon rates, and shortfalls in capital deployment respectively.
These two tracks have a lot on their plates, and we would love to see how they handle their respective responsibilities.
Blockworks Advisory is voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
We've seen the discussion and pitfalls of treasury management in the DAO thus far, and are overall happy to see a proposiiton come forward. We also are confident in Entropy's ability to properly vet and filter for the right candidates. However, we would like to echo the concerns brought by Tane and Gauntlet, in the future it may be a good idea to have some bucket of the treasury minimally managed.
Voted in favour. I like the proposal as a whole, and even though the members of the GMC and TMC were "pre-selected", the teams look interdisciplinary and I didn't think that enticed a block.
I do think however that in the future (and even if they perform well) members should be elected via election vote. As for the Treasury Diversification itself, selling ARB for USD to be used and attempt mitigating volatility for Service Providers payments is basically transferring the "disadvantage" to the open market (LPs if this is sold via DEX), but I agree it's also important to stay competitive to attract blockchain talent.
Farming with idle ARB and ETH is a good idea, especially for ETH if it's deployed to lower risk strategies like established LSTs. I'm not sure how feasible "ARB-only" lower risk opportunities are, they are all mostly multichain.
I do agree with some comments/feedback regarding the complexities of having two separate councils, but I also liked that fees are not performance-based, but rather a flat fee based on milestones. Interesting to see how this performs.
Treasury Management V1.2 is now pending for a vote on Tally. The veribiage of this proposal has been altered to reflect this:
Please note that the Foundation has elected to use this address for the 26M ARB and 7500 ETH transfers upon this proposal’s passing, which was previously used to custody the funds from Entropy Advisor’s proposal. @stonecoldpat or another Arbitrum Foundation team member can provide confirmation that this is an AF controlled multi-sig, and that funds will be transfered to 2 seperate Foundation-controlled addresses in the days following this proposal's execution.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We would like to thank @Entropy for facilitating this proposal. We genuinely believe it is a step in the right direction concerning Treasury Management. The issues of Service Provider Shortfalls and the treasury’s inactive assets are matters that need to be addressed promptly:
Despite these two solutions, there is still much to be done in establishing an integral plan that encompasses all implemented proposals in this vertical (STEP, AVI, GCP, etc.). We agree that the OpCo could serve as a structure to align these initiatives, ensuring a unified Treasury Management strategy.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal in the temperature check.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal in the temperature check.
Having discussed this proposal extensively with both Entropy Advisors and other Arbitrum delegates, we believe that this is a meaningful and reasonably contained experiment that will provide us with important lessons on how to approach treasury management in the future.
In this case, we like the fact that the board members are pre-appointed as part of the proposal, as ultimate success depends on the competence and effectiveness of these specific teams working for both pathways. We believe that Entropy's vetting and selection of the right teams increases the chances of success and also ensures clear accountability - as these teams are pre-appointed and have mandate from the DAO, they have been provided with everything we could provide to ensure their success.
We also want to ensure our full support as delegates along the way and hope to have a good, healthy relationship with them during their term. We hope that they will present their progress and be available for questions and feedback from delegates during the monthly GRC calls.
Hello SeedGov team - thank you for the questions.
The only COI's that folks should be aware of are the ones stated within the bio's of the TMC/GMC members. Austin Campbell is the newly announced CEO of an up and coming stablecoin project, and members of Make Markets are contributors to Curve. These are the two most obvious examples that could be seen as COIs - but again, the DAO must apporve any recommendations the TMC/GMC makes. If they are unable to get this passed via Snapshot, they will not recieve payment and funds can be returned to the DAO from the Arbitrum Foundation. The conflicts will be very easy for delegates to notice given how straightforward they are.
Hello SeedGov team - thank you for the questions.
The only COI's that folks should be aware of are the ones stated within the bio's of the TMC/GMC members. Austin Campbell is the newly announced CEO of an up and coming stablecoin project, and members of Make Markets are contributors to Curve. These are the two most obvious examples that could be seen as COIs - but again, the DAO must apporve any recommendations the TMC/GMC makes. If they are unable to get this passed via Snapshot, they will not recieve payment and funds can be returned to the DAO from the Arbitrum Foundation. The conflicts will be very easy for delegates to notice given how straightforward they are.
If you are asking about COI's in relation to various treasury managers that may be applying - we specifically seeked memebrs without relationships in the treasury management landscape to avoid any bias being introduced to the process.
In terms of negotiating with various committee members, we needed to ensure everyone was compensated equally accross the TMC and GMC, and when the payment structure was a lower dollar amount paid out in ARB with a vest, that was the primary critique of the proposal. We changed this based on community feedback. We also spoke with dozens of candidates prior to settling on the individuals/companies herein.
We hope this helps alleviate any concerns you may of had! Also, we recommend listening to the Q&A recording posted above in case you missed that.
We vote FOR the proposal on Snapshot.
We believe establishing a proper treasury management function in the DAO is critical as the presented key issues should be addressed sooner rather than later. We also appreciate the updated proposal that have incorporated various feedback from the other delegates including the milestone-based compensation scheme.
We vote FOR the proposal on Snapshot.
We believe establishing a proper treasury management function in the DAO is critical as the presented key issues should be addressed sooner rather than later. We also appreciate the updated proposal that have incorporated various feedback from the other delegates including the milestone-based compensation scheme.
Ultimately, the program success depends on upcoming suggestions from the TMC and GMC and we believe the selected members are capable of providing them along the way. We will closely review them and make sure they are managed in an appropriate manner via their regular reporting. In the future, as @gauntlet suggested, the DAO should explore a less manual approach to manage the treasury with minimized operations (and operating members to be elected by the DAO if needed) and we would encourage the to-be-established OpCo to propose a revised plan after the 6-months v1.2 initiative.
voting For on the current offchain proposal because I feel that this is something the DAO can experiment with at this point.
Hello Everyone. Thank you again for all of the thoughtful feedback on this proposal, and for casting your votes on Snapshot. This proposal has passed the temperature check, and will move forward to onchain vote next Thursday (12/5).
As promised, there will be a chance for anyone to ask questions to specific GMC/TMC members via an open governance call. This will take place tomorrow (11/27) at 9am ET (2pm GMT). The call is on the DAO's open governance calendar. Alternatively, please find the call link here.
We voted FOR this proposal. The system is well setup to give it a go and the benefits are significant
Entropy has confirmed with 2 separate references that previously worked at Paxos that Austin Campbell’s description provided herein is truthful/accurate.
I appreciate the follow up! Changing to a FOR since the due diligence checks out :saluting_face:
I am voting FOR this proposal as it is crucial for any project to do proper Treasury Management. As I mentioned in my initial comment, I do think having an entity (OpCo or maybe the DAO) that has the macro vision of Stable and ETH investments could be beneficial.
I'm voting in favor on Snapshot. I don’t think that this proposal is perfect, but it represents a good starting point. Having dedicated people overseeing this aspect is crucial, and while the approach can be refined over time, it’s essential to begin now to make us more competitive. Also, I think that a first 6-month term for both councils is a good timeframe for experimentation that allows flexibility. I believe that progress should be closely and frequently monitored, and reports should be reviewed regularly to decide whether to renew the initiative. Regarding the suggestion for two committees, I believe having too many people involved could complicate decision-making—more is not always better. But having clear milestones will surely help maintain focus and accountability. We can still work on it and make it better, but it’s a good start.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO (formerly ‘Lampros Labs DAO’) governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot voting.
Entropy Advisors have delivered another excellent proposal - thank you for your efforts!
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO (formerly ‘Lampros Labs DAO’) governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot voting.
Entropy Advisors have delivered another excellent proposal - thank you for your efforts!
We agree with GFXLabs’ concern about bundling multiple items in one proposal. The due diligence done by GFXLabs is what every organization should do when recruiting someone. As a DAO, this is an area we need to improve, so we appreciate GFXLabs’ diligence.
The last bi-weekly call helped us understand Sam’s explanation of Austin’s approach. The fact that payments will be milestone-based gives us confidence. This structure ensures progress, so we decided to vote FOR the proposal to get things moving in the right direction.
We support the idea of linking payments for TMC and GMC members to task completion rather than monthly payments. This approach improves accountability and sets a clear framework for what is completed and paid for. We believe this structure should apply to most proposals.
Since STEP has a similar goal of generating yield for the DAO through RWAs, how will TMC avoid overlapping with STEP? Can TMC use its allocated funds for RWA investments to generate yield?
Additionally, could you clarify what is meant by “high guarantees” in the context of ETH-backed strategies? We are particularly interested in understanding how the DAO will assess and minimize risks while ensuring the safe return of ETH. What mechanisms or safeguards will be in place to protect the DAO’s funds and ensure these strategies remain low-risk?
As mentioned earlier, clear measures to secure DAO funds are crucial. Will the service provider generating yield have risk coverage through insurance providers with players like Nexus Mutual | The crypto insurance? Alternatively, will the DAO get to review the proposal each time a milestone is completed by TMC and GMC?
Hello all - thank you to everyone who has provided thoughtful feedback on this proposal. We wanted to address some ongoing concerns on the forum with the Snapshot set to conclude on Thursday, November 19th.
With the new version of 1.2 I do feel way more comfortable. I still do think that the open call is a good chance to ask questions and get opinions from others that may have not commented yet. When will the call be scheduled cause you want to move to Snapshot already today?
As in @web3citizen representation, voting FOR in this proposal and below is our rationale.
I will be voting "For" on snapshot as ultimately I think we really need to get some type of treasury management process in place. While I have some operational disagreements, I think at it's core the proposal makes sense.
Before the Tally vote, I would like to see this question addressed however. Maybe I'm on an island with this... but I'm not really sure how the DAO voting on ETH investments is going to work if the Growth group is short-term focused
Entropy has confirmed with 2 separate references that previously worked at Paxos that Austin Campbell's description provided herein is truthful/accurate.
We saw some concerns from the community regarding Austin's credentials that were raised by GFX, and although Austin responded himself, we felt it was necessary to confirm ourselves. We feel extremely confident that Austin will excel in this position on behalf of the DAO.
On behalf of the UADP, firstly, thanks to Entropy and all of the effort here into structuring and iterating on this proposal. Treasury management is a critical function for the DAO's long-term health, and addressing idle assets alongside operational needs is a step in the right direction.
Overall, some areas that could benefit from further clarification or refinement:
On behalf of the UADP, firstly, thanks to Entropy and all of the effort here into structuring and iterating on this proposal. Treasury management is a critical function for the DAO's long-term health, and addressing idle assets alongside operational needs is a step in the right direction.
Overall, some areas that could benefit from further clarification or refinement:
A lot of the concerns seem to be around committees and maybe inefficients with coordination. We emphasize some of these concerns but above all, just think that the pre-selection of committee members has raised concerns regarding DAO participation and member accountability. Not sure best step forward here but maybe some visibility on this would be good.
Budget wise, could the committees provide interim budget recommendations while OpCo formalizes a comprehensive budget?
Overall proposal is an important step forward for the DAO and something we certainly need. Refining the operational framework and addressing key concerns around transparency in selection processes, and risk management is our only concerns.
I am generally in favour of the idea of the proposal, but I agree with @Tekr0x.eth that we should see a more precise plan (or guardrails) for selling ARB for stablecoins.
One idea is to have a daily limit (as percentage of ARB volume) on ARBs sold. Another is to perhaps also sell part of ETH, not just ARB. And also to extend the timeline of selling ARB (3 months may be too short if we don't want to impact the price too much).
Overall, I was in favor of this proposal. We need a more defined strategy for our treasury, and I believe in Entropy as a great team to do that. However, for a few reasons, I decided to vote Against this proposal.
Before moving forward to Tally, I would love to see:
Overall, I was in favor of this proposal. We need a more defined strategy for our treasury, and I believe in Entropy as a great team to do that. However, for a few reasons, I decided to vote Against this proposal.
Before moving forward to Tally, I would love to see:
As ChamaDAO, we believe in using our resources wisely to ensure our financial decisions promote long-term sustainability. This proposal outlines strategies to reduce risk from idle assets, diversify our treasury, and drive growth, all while maintaining transparency and accountability. By adopting a structured, DAO-led approach to treasury management, this proposal aligns with our goal of responsible fund allocation and making every dollar work efficiently.
Therefore, we will be supporting this proposal on Snapshot.
Im going to support this proposal at Snapshot stage. It is important to use idle asset and let them generate yield. Either by staking them like the Aave DAO does, taking out loans against ARB to fund initiatives and at the same time earn yield or any other good opportunity.
We are voting against this proposal in its current form. While we support the main overarching goals: utilizing idle ETH to generate yield and using stablecoins for operating expenses, we have identified two critical shortcomings:
Voted in favour. I like the proposal as a whole, and even though the members of the GMC and TMC were "pre-selected", the teams look interdisciplinary and I didn't think that enticed a block.
I do think however that in the future (and even if they perform well) members should be elected via election vote. As for the Treasury Diversification itself, selling ARB for USD to be used and attempt mitigating volatility for Service Providers payments is basically transferring the "disadvantage" to the open market (LPs if this is sold via DEX), but I agree it's also important to stay competitive to attract blockchain talent.
Farming with idle ARB and ETH is a good idea, especially for ETH if it's deployed to lower risk strategies like established LSTs. I'm not sure how feasible "ARB-only" lower risk opportunities are, they are all mostly multichain.
I do agree with some comments/feedback regarding the complexities of having two separate councils, but I also liked that fees are not performance-based, but rather a flat fee based on milestones. Interesting to see how this performs.
Treasury Management V1.2 is now pending for a vote on Tally. The veribiage of this proposal has been altered to reflect this:
Please note that the Foundation has elected to use this address for the 26M ARB and 7500 ETH transfers upon this proposal’s passing, which was previously used to custody the funds from Entropy Advisor’s proposal. @stonecoldpat or another Arbitrum Foundation team member can provide confirmation that this is an AF controlled multi-sig, and that funds will be transfered to 2 seperate Foundation-controlled addresses in the days following this proposal's execution.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We would like to thank @Entropy for facilitating this proposal. We genuinely believe it is a step in the right direction concerning Treasury Management. The issues of Service Provider Shortfalls and the treasury’s inactive assets are matters that need to be addressed promptly:
Despite these two solutions, there is still much to be done in establishing an integral plan that encompasses all implemented proposals in this vertical (STEP, AVI, GCP, etc.). We agree that the OpCo could serve as a structure to align these initiatives, ensuring a unified Treasury Management strategy.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal in the temperature check.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal in the temperature check.
Having discussed this proposal extensively with both Entropy Advisors and other Arbitrum delegates, we believe that this is a meaningful and reasonably contained experiment that will provide us with important lessons on how to approach treasury management in the future.
In this case, we like the fact that the board members are pre-appointed as part of the proposal, as ultimate success depends on the competence and effectiveness of these specific teams working for both pathways. We believe that Entropy's vetting and selection of the right teams increases the chances of success and also ensures clear accountability - as these teams are pre-appointed and have mandate from the DAO, they have been provided with everything we could provide to ensure their success.
We also want to ensure our full support as delegates along the way and hope to have a good, healthy relationship with them during their term. We hope that they will present their progress and be available for questions and feedback from delegates during the monthly GRC calls.
Hello SeedGov team - thank you for the questions.
The only COI's that folks should be aware of are the ones stated within the bio's of the TMC/GMC members. Austin Campbell is the newly announced CEO of an up and coming stablecoin project, and members of Make Markets are contributors to Curve. These are the two most obvious examples that could be seen as COIs - but again, the DAO must apporve any recommendations the TMC/GMC makes. If they are unable to get this passed via Snapshot, they will not recieve payment and funds can be returned to the DAO from the Arbitrum Foundation. The conflicts will be very easy for delegates to notice given how straightforward they are.
Hello SeedGov team - thank you for the questions.
The only COI's that folks should be aware of are the ones stated within the bio's of the TMC/GMC members. Austin Campbell is the newly announced CEO of an up and coming stablecoin project, and members of Make Markets are contributors to Curve. These are the two most obvious examples that could be seen as COIs - but again, the DAO must apporve any recommendations the TMC/GMC makes. If they are unable to get this passed via Snapshot, they will not recieve payment and funds can be returned to the DAO from the Arbitrum Foundation. The conflicts will be very easy for delegates to notice given how straightforward they are.
If you are asking about COI's in relation to various treasury managers that may be applying - we specifically seeked memebrs without relationships in the treasury management landscape to avoid any bias being introduced to the process.
In terms of negotiating with various committee members, we needed to ensure everyone was compensated equally accross the TMC and GMC, and when the payment structure was a lower dollar amount paid out in ARB with a vest, that was the primary critique of the proposal. We changed this based on community feedback. We also spoke with dozens of candidates prior to settling on the individuals/companies herein.
We hope this helps alleviate any concerns you may of had! Also, we recommend listening to the Q&A recording posted above in case you missed that.
We vote FOR the proposal on Snapshot.
We believe establishing a proper treasury management function in the DAO is critical as the presented key issues should be addressed sooner rather than later. We also appreciate the updated proposal that have incorporated various feedback from the other delegates including the milestone-based compensation scheme.
We vote FOR the proposal on Snapshot.
We believe establishing a proper treasury management function in the DAO is critical as the presented key issues should be addressed sooner rather than later. We also appreciate the updated proposal that have incorporated various feedback from the other delegates including the milestone-based compensation scheme.
Ultimately, the program success depends on upcoming suggestions from the TMC and GMC and we believe the selected members are capable of providing them along the way. We will closely review them and make sure they are managed in an appropriate manner via their regular reporting. In the future, as @gauntlet suggested, the DAO should explore a less manual approach to manage the treasury with minimized operations (and operating members to be elected by the DAO if needed) and we would encourage the to-be-established OpCo to propose a revised plan after the 6-months v1.2 initiative.
voting For on the current offchain proposal because I feel that this is something the DAO can experiment with at this point.
Hello Everyone. Thank you again for all of the thoughtful feedback on this proposal, and for casting your votes on Snapshot. This proposal has passed the temperature check, and will move forward to onchain vote next Thursday (12/5).
As promised, there will be a chance for anyone to ask questions to specific GMC/TMC members via an open governance call. This will take place tomorrow (11/27) at 9am ET (2pm GMT). The call is on the DAO's open governance calendar. Alternatively, please find the call link here.
We voted FOR this proposal. The system is well setup to give it a go and the benefits are significant
Entropy has confirmed with 2 separate references that previously worked at Paxos that Austin Campbell’s description provided herein is truthful/accurate.
I appreciate the follow up! Changing to a FOR since the due diligence checks out :saluting_face:
I am voting FOR this proposal as it is crucial for any project to do proper Treasury Management. As I mentioned in my initial comment, I do think having an entity (OpCo or maybe the DAO) that has the macro vision of Stable and ETH investments could be beneficial.
I'm voting in favor on Snapshot. I don’t think that this proposal is perfect, but it represents a good starting point. Having dedicated people overseeing this aspect is crucial, and while the approach can be refined over time, it’s essential to begin now to make us more competitive. Also, I think that a first 6-month term for both councils is a good timeframe for experimentation that allows flexibility. I believe that progress should be closely and frequently monitored, and reports should be reviewed regularly to decide whether to renew the initiative. Regarding the suggestion for two committees, I believe having too many people involved could complicate decision-making—more is not always better. But having clear milestones will surely help maintain focus and accountability. We can still work on it and make it better, but it’s a good start.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO (formerly ‘Lampros Labs DAO’) governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot voting.
Entropy Advisors have delivered another excellent proposal - thank you for your efforts!
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO (formerly ‘Lampros Labs DAO’) governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot voting.
Entropy Advisors have delivered another excellent proposal - thank you for your efforts!
We agree with GFXLabs’ concern about bundling multiple items in one proposal. The due diligence done by GFXLabs is what every organization should do when recruiting someone. As a DAO, this is an area we need to improve, so we appreciate GFXLabs’ diligence.
The last bi-weekly call helped us understand Sam’s explanation of Austin’s approach. The fact that payments will be milestone-based gives us confidence. This structure ensures progress, so we decided to vote FOR the proposal to get things moving in the right direction.
We support the idea of linking payments for TMC and GMC members to task completion rather than monthly payments. This approach improves accountability and sets a clear framework for what is completed and paid for. We believe this structure should apply to most proposals.
Since STEP has a similar goal of generating yield for the DAO through RWAs, how will TMC avoid overlapping with STEP? Can TMC use its allocated funds for RWA investments to generate yield?
Additionally, could you clarify what is meant by “high guarantees” in the context of ETH-backed strategies? We are particularly interested in understanding how the DAO will assess and minimize risks while ensuring the safe return of ETH. What mechanisms or safeguards will be in place to protect the DAO’s funds and ensure these strategies remain low-risk?
As mentioned earlier, clear measures to secure DAO funds are crucial. Will the service provider generating yield have risk coverage through insurance providers with players like Nexus Mutual | The crypto insurance? Alternatively, will the DAO get to review the proposal each time a milestone is completed by TMC and GMC?
Hello all - thank you to everyone who has provided thoughtful feedback on this proposal. We wanted to address some ongoing concerns on the forum with the Snapshot set to conclude on Thursday, November 19th.
With the new version of 1.2 I do feel way more comfortable. I still do think that the open call is a good chance to ask questions and get opinions from others that may have not commented yet. When will the call be scheduled cause you want to move to Snapshot already today?
As in @web3citizen representation, voting FOR in this proposal and below is our rationale.
I will be voting "For" on snapshot as ultimately I think we really need to get some type of treasury management process in place. While I have some operational disagreements, I think at it's core the proposal makes sense.
Before the Tally vote, I would like to see this question addressed however. Maybe I'm on an island with this... but I'm not really sure how the DAO voting on ETH investments is going to work if the Growth group is short-term focused
Entropy has confirmed with 2 separate references that previously worked at Paxos that Austin Campbell's description provided herein is truthful/accurate.
We saw some concerns from the community regarding Austin's credentials that were raised by GFX, and although Austin responded himself, we felt it was necessary to confirm ourselves. We feel extremely confident that Austin will excel in this position on behalf of the DAO.
On behalf of the UADP, firstly, thanks to Entropy and all of the effort here into structuring and iterating on this proposal. Treasury management is a critical function for the DAO's long-term health, and addressing idle assets alongside operational needs is a step in the right direction.
Overall, some areas that could benefit from further clarification or refinement:
On behalf of the UADP, firstly, thanks to Entropy and all of the effort here into structuring and iterating on this proposal. Treasury management is a critical function for the DAO's long-term health, and addressing idle assets alongside operational needs is a step in the right direction.
Overall, some areas that could benefit from further clarification or refinement:
A lot of the concerns seem to be around committees and maybe inefficients with coordination. We emphasize some of these concerns but above all, just think that the pre-selection of committee members has raised concerns regarding DAO participation and member accountability. Not sure best step forward here but maybe some visibility on this would be good.
Budget wise, could the committees provide interim budget recommendations while OpCo formalizes a comprehensive budget?
Overall proposal is an important step forward for the DAO and something we certainly need. Refining the operational framework and addressing key concerns around transparency in selection processes, and risk management is our only concerns.
I am generally in favour of the idea of the proposal, but I agree with @Tekr0x.eth that we should see a more precise plan (or guardrails) for selling ARB for stablecoins.
One idea is to have a daily limit (as percentage of ARB volume) on ARBs sold. Another is to perhaps also sell part of ETH, not just ARB. And also to extend the timeline of selling ARB (3 months may be too short if we don't want to impact the price too much).
Overall, I was in favor of this proposal. We need a more defined strategy for our treasury, and I believe in Entropy as a great team to do that. However, for a few reasons, I decided to vote Against this proposal.
Before moving forward to Tally, I would love to see:
Overall, I was in favor of this proposal. We need a more defined strategy for our treasury, and I believe in Entropy as a great team to do that. However, for a few reasons, I decided to vote Against this proposal.
Before moving forward to Tally, I would love to see:
As ChamaDAO, we believe in using our resources wisely to ensure our financial decisions promote long-term sustainability. This proposal outlines strategies to reduce risk from idle assets, diversify our treasury, and drive growth, all while maintaining transparency and accountability. By adopting a structured, DAO-led approach to treasury management, this proposal aligns with our goal of responsible fund allocation and making every dollar work efficiently.
Therefore, we will be supporting this proposal on Snapshot.
Im going to support this proposal at Snapshot stage. It is important to use idle asset and let them generate yield. Either by staking them like the Aave DAO does, taking out loans against ARB to fund initiatives and at the same time earn yield or any other good opportunity.
We are voting against this proposal in its current form. While we support the main overarching goals: utilizing idle ETH to generate yield and using stablecoins for operating expenses, we have identified two critical shortcomings:
Hello all - thank you to everyone who has provided thoughtful feedback on this proposal. We wanted to address some ongoing concerns on the forum with the Snapshot set to conclude on Thursday, November 19th.
With the new version of 1.2 I do feel way more comfortable. I still do think that the open call is a good chance to ask questions and get opinions from others that may have not commented yet. When will the call be scheduled cause you want to move to Snapshot already today?
The open goverance call will be scheduled prior to moving to Tally, but only if the Snapshot vote passes. Expect this call to be scheduled for next week (Between November 25-29).
The proposal is not clear enough about the use of funds and the supervision of committee members, and the details of regular reports, which need to be further clarified. the salaries of TMC and GMC compared with the salaries of other members of the DAO may lead to internal conflicts and disputes, and the content of the proposal design is too important. It should be revised with more communication and feedback. Safeguard the interests of the community.
Neither group members (TMC or GMC) will be paid unless they achieve their predefined milestones laid out in the proposal. If the TMC or GMC fail to meet the DAO’s standards, no money will be paid to committee members and funds can be returned to the DAO - thereby concluding a failed experiment at no cost. It is important to note that the committees themselves are completely powerless. The TMC and GMC both require DAO approval on recomendations via snapshot, and they never custody the funds themselves (that is the Arbitrum Foundation’s job). Therefore, the community is, as always, in full control.
"Arbitrum is part of the Ethereum ecosystem, and the Arbitrum community is part of the Ethereum community. Although the ArbitrumDAO makes its own decisions and pursues its own goals, it is deeply aligned with Ethereum and sees itself as an active and constructive participant in the Ethereum community."
I believe this alignment should be considered when selecting the strategy.
As a reminder, the DAO is required to approve the TMC and GMC's recommendation and no funds can be moved without meeting this prerequisite. The DAO will maintain full control over what is allocated (or if any funds are allocated at all)
I do not support this proposal because it introduces unnecessary complexity with two separate committees and overlapping responsibilities, which could lead to inefficiency and confusion. I am also agree with @kuiclub, that before allocating this significant funds:
This was a key takeaway from the initial open governance calls. Please refer to the following open call recordings below. TL;DR - folks did not want to sell much ARB, and also did not want to pay management/performance fees on the DAO's ETH given the ability to stake it for a very safe return. The skillsets required to allocate the ETH for ecosystem growth is more BD in nature (GMC), whereas the TMC track required more experience in traditional finance/portfolio construction, familiarity with onchain strategies, risk-adjusted performance reviews, etc. Additionally, as mentioned already, if either the TMC or GMC does not produce work up to the DAO's expectations, they will not be paid anything.
This is certainly possible, but Entropy does not possess the in-house skillset to run treasury management operations required for the TMC track. This would put a ton of responsibility on one or two members and could lead to subpar results. One of the primary critiques of this proposal prior to the changes made on October 30 was that the pay for TMC and GMC members was too low, so we adjusted it higher. With that being said, we are very open to incorporating feedback that has community-wide consensus before heading to Tally.
It would also be interesting in determining what stablecoins and what the selection criteria for stablecoins (e.g., risk levels, protocol choices) are. Maybe including a whitelist of stablecoins or criteria for selecting them would add clarity and mitigate risks associated with stablecoin volatility or depegging.
This will be the job of the TMC and must be approved by the DAO on Snapshot prior to any committee member recieving any payment.
Additionally, while payments for TMC and GMC members are milestone-based, the $300K USDC cost could be considered high for a pilot initiative. Also, the GMC’s potential reliance on NDAs may conflict with DAO principles of transparency. This comment and concern is also valid, we are not a fan of this tone and it’s not productive during this time.
While the cost is high, one of the primary critiques of this proposals first iteration was the payment terms for TMC and GMC members. Therefore, we increased the payment according to community feedback. For what it's worth, the yield on the underlying should be higher than this proposal's cost.
I will be voting "For" on snapshot as ultimately I think we really need to get some type of treasury management process in place. While I have some operational disagreements, I think at it's core the proposal makes sense.
Before the Tally vote, I would like to see this question addressed however. Maybe I'm on an island with this... but I'm not really sure how the DAO voting on ETH investments is going to work if the Growth group is short-term focused
However, I think I’m still in the ‘agree to disagree’ camp here, but maybe more explanation would help. Is the expectation of Growth group a more long-term approach or short-term one? If the plan is to drop the ETH somewhere and let it sit for a year then I think this isn’t as big of a deal… but if the DAO is going to have to have constant snapshot votes because we’re putting 1000 ETH in protocol abc this month and then half the ETH is sold off to go into protocol xyz the next month and then 100 ETH a week is going into protocol 3… and so on… I think you run into those risks I noted before.
And the more I think about it, from a delegate perspective that seems to open the project up to issues with voter fatigue and conflict of interest concerns.
Edit: To save forum space, I'm editing to indicate I will maintain my "for" vote on tally. I would of liked my question addressed, but it's realtively minor and ultiamtely I think this proposal is good for the DAO as stated in this and prior posts.
I am generally in favour of the idea of the proposal, but I agree with @Tekr0x.eth that we should see a more precise plan (or guardrails) for selling ARB for stablecoins.
One idea is to have a daily limit (as percentage of ARB volume) on ARBs sold. Another is to perhaps also sell part of ETH, not just ARB. And also to extend the timeline of selling ARB (3 months may be too short if we don't want to impact the price too much).
I also echo @404DAO's suggestion of having only one committee instead of two.
That said, I'm voting FOR the proposal in the Snapshot voting. But I'd need the changes I mentioned (especially the guardrails for selling ARB) to be implemented in the proposal before supporting it in the Tally vote.
We are voting against this proposal in its current form. While we support the main overarching goals: utilizing idle ETH to generate yield and using stablecoins for operating expenses, we have identified two critical shortcomings:
By implementing these changes, the proposal would streamline operations, improve accountability, and reduce the council budget by approximately 30%. We are confident these adjustments would better serve the interests of the DAO while achieving the proposal's objectives. If these changes are included by Tally, we would be willing to change our vote in favor of the proposal.
We support the idea of improving treasury management, as outlined in this proposal, as it aims to enhance how the DAO allocates and manages its assets. However, we believe the process could be further strengthened by allowing other parties to participate in the treasury and growth management processes. Introducing competition among service providers could result in better deals and more effective strategies for the DAO. Additionally, we suggest incorporating performance-based incentives for the Treasury and Growth Management Committees to keep them motivated, ensure they maximize returns while managing risks, and align their efforts with the DAO’s long-term goals.
Updating my thoughts based on the feedback by Sam Martin (@swmartin) on today's Governance call.
As per Sam, Entropy will not define in the Tally proposal how exactly ARB will be liquidated for stablecoins. Instead, this will be a task for the TMC committee after (if) the Tally vote passes.
Updating my thoughts based on the feedback by Sam Martin (@swmartin) on today's Governance call.
As per Sam, Entropy will not define in the Tally proposal how exactly ARB will be liquidated for stablecoins. Instead, this will be a task for the TMC committee after (if) the Tally vote passes.
The good thing is that TMC will put their plan of ARB liquidation on the Snapshot vote, so if DAO members don't agree with it, ARB will not get liquidated in that way.
To me, this is sufficient enough, so I plan to vote FOR the proposal on Tally.
cc @Tekr0x.eth and others who had concerns over this point.
Right now, it seems like there are still a few major areas to discuss and confirm questions about.
Firstly, the proposal notes the absence of a formal budget but defers its creation to OpCo. Without a concrete interim budget, managing cash-like reserves might become ad hoc or misaligned with long-term goals.
Right now, it seems like there are still a few major areas to discuss and confirm questions about.
Firstly, the proposal notes the absence of a formal budget but defers its creation to OpCo. Without a concrete interim budget, managing cash-like reserves might become ad hoc or misaligned with long-term goals.
It would also be interesting in determining what stablecoins and what the selection criteria for stablecoins (e.g., risk levels, protocol choices) are. Maybe including a whitelist of stablecoins or criteria for selecting them would add clarity and mitigate risks associated with stablecoin volatility or depegging.
Additionally, while payments for TMC and GMC members are milestone-based, the $300K USDC cost could be considered high for a pilot initiative. Also, the GMC’s potential reliance on NDAs may conflict with DAO principles of transparency. This comment and concern is also valid, we are not a fan of this tone and it's not productive during this time.
I genuinely cannot tell if you are not picking up that point or you are specifically fishing for confidential information, but to be clear I take my professional obligations around these things exceptionally seriously so you can vote yes or no based on the current disclosed information and there will not be more forthcoming
Surely there is no NDA involved in giving references of people who can attest to your claims? I don’t like his patronizing tone one bit here
I initially voted FOR the proposal but changed it to AGAINST after seeing the last response from one of the nominated council members
I genuinely cannot tell if you are not picking up that point or you are specifically fishing for confidential information, but to be clear I take my professional obligations around these things exceptionally seriously so you can vote yes or no based on the current disclosed information and there will not be more forthcoming
I initially voted FOR the proposal but changed it to AGAINST after seeing the last response from one of the nominated council members
I genuinely cannot tell if you are not picking up that point or you are specifically fishing for confidential information, but to be clear I take my professional obligations around these things exceptionally seriously so you can vote yes or no based on the current disclosed information and there will not be more forthcoming
Surely there is no NDA involved in giving references of people who can attest to your claims? I don't like his patronizing tone one bit here
I am voting against this proposal. We should rethink the process of selecting GMC members, and this proposal did not take the time to address all the delegates' questions.
At first thanks @Entropy for this proposal.
I do not support this proposal because it introduces unnecessary complexity with two separate committees and overlapping responsibilities, which could lead to inefficiency and confusion. I am also agree with @kuiclub, that before allocating this significant funds:
At first thanks @Entropy for this proposal.
I do not support this proposal because it introduces unnecessary complexity with two separate committees and overlapping responsibilities, which could lead to inefficiency and confusion. I am also agree with @kuiclub, that before allocating this significant funds:
that creates uncertainty and risks mismanagement, it would be better make at first a small one to avoid risks
Thats why I am voting against.
I just voted against the proposal on Snapshot. I believe we started on the wrong foot by involving individuals with questionable track records. This raises concerns and fear about the management of funds being entrusted to them. I feel there exists capable members within the community to handle such an important responsibility. Hope we can discuss this further in the community call to gain greater clarity before this proposal moves to Tally for consideration.
I vote AGAINST this proposal in the temp-check.
I believe treasury management is a key and necessary component for the DAO.
However, I don't see this proposal as true treasury management. Instead, it seems more like an isolated allocation of a specific amount from the treasury aimed at generating returns for the DAO over a short period of six months.
As I mentioned when providing feedback:
I vote AGAINST this proposal in the temp-check.
I believe treasury management is a key and necessary component for the DAO.
However, I don't see this proposal as true treasury management. Instead, it seems more like an isolated allocation of a specific amount from the treasury aimed at generating returns for the DAO over a short period of six months.
As I mentioned when providing feedback:
the treasury manager should address, and in fact, as priority number one, the sustainability of the treasury. We need to have clear oversight of the spending executed by the DAO and how each expense impacts the treasury, its sustainability, and the impact on the DAO’s objectives
This is how I understand treasury management: this proposal is limited to just some aspects of it.
That said, if the proposal gains broad consensus for its execution, I am willing to change my vote on Tally, but with certain considerations aligned with my perspective.
Prepare quarterly reports (2 over the course of their term) for the DAO forum that provides visibility into service provider performance.
After the TMC delivers the two reports (the second at the six-month mark), I would like to propose including a third report. Considering that by that time the OpCo is expected to begin its operations, this report should cover the state of the treasury, the DAO, expenses, and recommendations for long-term sustainability.
This additional report would serve as a handover document for the OpCo, allowing it to focus on treasury management with a clear vision for long-term success.
Design and host an RFP process seeking protocol partnerships through the deployment of the DAO’s ETH, which must target the use of ETH itself or ETH-pegged assets.
On the other hand, I would like to see some strategies outlined regarding what the DAO does or does not want to execute with the ETH before the proposal is approved. According to the DAOs Constitution:
"Arbitrum is part of the Ethereum ecosystem, and the Arbitrum community is part of the Ethereum community. Although the ArbitrumDAO makes its own decisions and pursues its own goals, it is deeply aligned with Ethereum and sees itself as an active and constructive participant in the Ethereum community."
I believe this alignment should be considered when selecting the strategy.
I don't support this proposal, it should be revised with more communication and feedback to protect the interests of the community.
After reading everyone's comments and feedbacks, I do find some problem areas. 26M ARB and 7,500 ETH at one time is too risky, so I suggest to pilot the project on a small scale first, and then expand the allocation of funds after verifying the effect. The proposal is not clear enough about the use of funds and the supervision of committee members, and the details of regular reports, which need to be further clarified. the salaries of TMC and GMC compared with the salaries of other members of the DAO may lead to internal conflicts and disputes, and the content of the proposal design is too important. It should be revised with more communication and feedback. Safeguard the interests of the community.
I voted “For” on Snapshot because I believe Treasury and Grow management tracks will help Arbitrum build a stronger financial system with flexible investment options - make sure for long-term development and stability.
cp0x voted FOR this proposal
The rationale can be read in the thread
Interesting set of feedbacks so far on the votes. Let me first anticipate the vote: in favour.
The issue addressed here, to me, is broad: is about weaponizing some assets that we have in the treasury (eth) + have an environement with less friction in the dao to pay SP in stables (conversion of arb in stables), something that we failed a couple of times already. Plus at the same time find yield strategies for these assets idling, which are the stables and up to some degree the arb.
We will be moving forward to Snapshot today. We will also be hosting an open community call with the appointed candidates prior to moving forward to Tally
With the new version of 1.2 I do feel way more comfortable. I still do think that the open call is a good chance to ask questions and get opinions from others that may have not commented yet. When will the call be scheduled cause you want to move to Snapshot already today?
We will be moving forward to Snapshot today. We will also be hosting an open community call with the appointed candidates prior to moving forward to Tally, thereby giving delegates the chance to ask questions/raise any concerns to the suggested members. We (Entropy Advisors) conducted thorough due diligence on the suggested council members, and feel very confident with the group assembled herein.
ACI are supportive of the v1.2 of this proposal and would be happy to work with the committees on deploying funds to Aave on Arbitrum to achieve their goals of supporting Arbitrum DeFi.
I genuinely cannot tell if you are not picking up that point or you are specifically fishing for confidential information, but to be clear I take my professional obligations around these things exceptionally seriously so you can vote yes or no based on the current disclosed information and there will not be more forthcoming.
This was a tough decision, but I’ve decided to vote against this proposal on Snapshot. Don’t get me wrong—I believe it’s a solid proposal, and effective Treasury Management is critical for overseeing the DAO’s balance sheet. However, as I mentioned in my previous reply, I’m concerned about the absence of elections. I think appointing TMC members should be handled separately, especially given the concerns @GFXlabs raised about one of the suggested members.
I’ll be voting YES in the Snapshot vote, as I support this initiative. However, I do feel it’s important to address the concerns regarding @JAC’s past involvement with the Paxos-MakerDAO integration, as raised by @GFXlabs as they have not been fully clarified publicly. In a public DAO, transparency is foundational to trust. Providing clarity on this point before the Tally vote will reinforce our commitment to transparency and ensure everyone can proceed with confidence.
I voted FOR on this proposal. It is good to see things moving forward on the treasury management front.
Looking forward to the call with the candidates.
Hello all - thank you to everyone who has provided thoughtful feedback on this proposal. We wanted to address some ongoing concerns on the forum with the Snapshot set to conclude on Thursday, November 19th.
With the new version of 1.2 I do feel way more comfortable. I still do think that the open call is a good chance to ask questions and get opinions from others that may have not commented yet. When will the call be scheduled cause you want to move to Snapshot already today?
The open goverance call will be scheduled prior to moving to Tally, but only if the Snapshot vote passes. Expect this call to be scheduled for next week (Between November 25-29).
The proposal is not clear enough about the use of funds and the supervision of committee members, and the details of regular reports, which need to be further clarified. the salaries of TMC and GMC compared with the salaries of other members of the DAO may lead to internal conflicts and disputes, and the content of the proposal design is too important. It should be revised with more communication and feedback. Safeguard the interests of the community.
Neither group members (TMC or GMC) will be paid unless they achieve their predefined milestones laid out in the proposal. If the TMC or GMC fail to meet the DAO’s standards, no money will be paid to committee members and funds can be returned to the DAO - thereby concluding a failed experiment at no cost. It is important to note that the committees themselves are completely powerless. The TMC and GMC both require DAO approval on recomendations via snapshot, and they never custody the funds themselves (that is the Arbitrum Foundation’s job). Therefore, the community is, as always, in full control.
"Arbitrum is part of the Ethereum ecosystem, and the Arbitrum community is part of the Ethereum community. Although the ArbitrumDAO makes its own decisions and pursues its own goals, it is deeply aligned with Ethereum and sees itself as an active and constructive participant in the Ethereum community."
I believe this alignment should be considered when selecting the strategy.
As a reminder, the DAO is required to approve the TMC and GMC's recommendation and no funds can be moved without meeting this prerequisite. The DAO will maintain full control over what is allocated (or if any funds are allocated at all)
I do not support this proposal because it introduces unnecessary complexity with two separate committees and overlapping responsibilities, which could lead to inefficiency and confusion. I am also agree with @kuiclub, that before allocating this significant funds:
This was a key takeaway from the initial open governance calls. Please refer to the following open call recordings below. TL;DR - folks did not want to sell much ARB, and also did not want to pay management/performance fees on the DAO's ETH given the ability to stake it for a very safe return. The skillsets required to allocate the ETH for ecosystem growth is more BD in nature (GMC), whereas the TMC track required more experience in traditional finance/portfolio construction, familiarity with onchain strategies, risk-adjusted performance reviews, etc. Additionally, as mentioned already, if either the TMC or GMC does not produce work up to the DAO's expectations, they will not be paid anything.
This is certainly possible, but Entropy does not possess the in-house skillset to run treasury management operations required for the TMC track. This would put a ton of responsibility on one or two members and could lead to subpar results. One of the primary critiques of this proposal prior to the changes made on October 30 was that the pay for TMC and GMC members was too low, so we adjusted it higher. With that being said, we are very open to incorporating feedback that has community-wide consensus before heading to Tally.
It would also be interesting in determining what stablecoins and what the selection criteria for stablecoins (e.g., risk levels, protocol choices) are. Maybe including a whitelist of stablecoins or criteria for selecting them would add clarity and mitigate risks associated with stablecoin volatility or depegging.
This will be the job of the TMC and must be approved by the DAO on Snapshot prior to any committee member recieving any payment.
Additionally, while payments for TMC and GMC members are milestone-based, the $300K USDC cost could be considered high for a pilot initiative. Also, the GMC’s potential reliance on NDAs may conflict with DAO principles of transparency. This comment and concern is also valid, we are not a fan of this tone and it’s not productive during this time.
While the cost is high, one of the primary critiques of this proposals first iteration was the payment terms for TMC and GMC members. Therefore, we increased the payment according to community feedback. For what it's worth, the yield on the underlying should be higher than this proposal's cost.
I will be voting "For" on snapshot as ultimately I think we really need to get some type of treasury management process in place. While I have some operational disagreements, I think at it's core the proposal makes sense.
Before the Tally vote, I would like to see this question addressed however. Maybe I'm on an island with this... but I'm not really sure how the DAO voting on ETH investments is going to work if the Growth group is short-term focused
However, I think I’m still in the ‘agree to disagree’ camp here, but maybe more explanation would help. Is the expectation of Growth group a more long-term approach or short-term one? If the plan is to drop the ETH somewhere and let it sit for a year then I think this isn’t as big of a deal… but if the DAO is going to have to have constant snapshot votes because we’re putting 1000 ETH in protocol abc this month and then half the ETH is sold off to go into protocol xyz the next month and then 100 ETH a week is going into protocol 3… and so on… I think you run into those risks I noted before.
And the more I think about it, from a delegate perspective that seems to open the project up to issues with voter fatigue and conflict of interest concerns.
Edit: To save forum space, I'm editing to indicate I will maintain my "for" vote on tally. I would of liked my question addressed, but it's realtively minor and ultiamtely I think this proposal is good for the DAO as stated in this and prior posts.
I am generally in favour of the idea of the proposal, but I agree with @Tekr0x.eth that we should see a more precise plan (or guardrails) for selling ARB for stablecoins.
One idea is to have a daily limit (as percentage of ARB volume) on ARBs sold. Another is to perhaps also sell part of ETH, not just ARB. And also to extend the timeline of selling ARB (3 months may be too short if we don't want to impact the price too much).
I also echo @404DAO's suggestion of having only one committee instead of two.
That said, I'm voting FOR the proposal in the Snapshot voting. But I'd need the changes I mentioned (especially the guardrails for selling ARB) to be implemented in the proposal before supporting it in the Tally vote.
We are voting against this proposal in its current form. While we support the main overarching goals: utilizing idle ETH to generate yield and using stablecoins for operating expenses, we have identified two critical shortcomings:
By implementing these changes, the proposal would streamline operations, improve accountability, and reduce the council budget by approximately 30%. We are confident these adjustments would better serve the interests of the DAO while achieving the proposal's objectives. If these changes are included by Tally, we would be willing to change our vote in favor of the proposal.
We support the idea of improving treasury management, as outlined in this proposal, as it aims to enhance how the DAO allocates and manages its assets. However, we believe the process could be further strengthened by allowing other parties to participate in the treasury and growth management processes. Introducing competition among service providers could result in better deals and more effective strategies for the DAO. Additionally, we suggest incorporating performance-based incentives for the Treasury and Growth Management Committees to keep them motivated, ensure they maximize returns while managing risks, and align their efforts with the DAO’s long-term goals.
Updating my thoughts based on the feedback by Sam Martin (@swmartin) on today's Governance call.
As per Sam, Entropy will not define in the Tally proposal how exactly ARB will be liquidated for stablecoins. Instead, this will be a task for the TMC committee after (if) the Tally vote passes.
Updating my thoughts based on the feedback by Sam Martin (@swmartin) on today's Governance call.
As per Sam, Entropy will not define in the Tally proposal how exactly ARB will be liquidated for stablecoins. Instead, this will be a task for the TMC committee after (if) the Tally vote passes.
The good thing is that TMC will put their plan of ARB liquidation on the Snapshot vote, so if DAO members don't agree with it, ARB will not get liquidated in that way.
To me, this is sufficient enough, so I plan to vote FOR the proposal on Tally.
cc @Tekr0x.eth and others who had concerns over this point.
Right now, it seems like there are still a few major areas to discuss and confirm questions about.
Firstly, the proposal notes the absence of a formal budget but defers its creation to OpCo. Without a concrete interim budget, managing cash-like reserves might become ad hoc or misaligned with long-term goals.
Right now, it seems like there are still a few major areas to discuss and confirm questions about.
Firstly, the proposal notes the absence of a formal budget but defers its creation to OpCo. Without a concrete interim budget, managing cash-like reserves might become ad hoc or misaligned with long-term goals.
It would also be interesting in determining what stablecoins and what the selection criteria for stablecoins (e.g., risk levels, protocol choices) are. Maybe including a whitelist of stablecoins or criteria for selecting them would add clarity and mitigate risks associated with stablecoin volatility or depegging.
Additionally, while payments for TMC and GMC members are milestone-based, the $300K USDC cost could be considered high for a pilot initiative. Also, the GMC’s potential reliance on NDAs may conflict with DAO principles of transparency. This comment and concern is also valid, we are not a fan of this tone and it's not productive during this time.
I genuinely cannot tell if you are not picking up that point or you are specifically fishing for confidential information, but to be clear I take my professional obligations around these things exceptionally seriously so you can vote yes or no based on the current disclosed information and there will not be more forthcoming
Surely there is no NDA involved in giving references of people who can attest to your claims? I don’t like his patronizing tone one bit here
I initially voted FOR the proposal but changed it to AGAINST after seeing the last response from one of the nominated council members
I genuinely cannot tell if you are not picking up that point or you are specifically fishing for confidential information, but to be clear I take my professional obligations around these things exceptionally seriously so you can vote yes or no based on the current disclosed information and there will not be more forthcoming
I initially voted FOR the proposal but changed it to AGAINST after seeing the last response from one of the nominated council members
I genuinely cannot tell if you are not picking up that point or you are specifically fishing for confidential information, but to be clear I take my professional obligations around these things exceptionally seriously so you can vote yes or no based on the current disclosed information and there will not be more forthcoming
Surely there is no NDA involved in giving references of people who can attest to your claims? I don't like his patronizing tone one bit here
I am voting against this proposal. We should rethink the process of selecting GMC members, and this proposal did not take the time to address all the delegates' questions.
At first thanks @Entropy for this proposal.
I do not support this proposal because it introduces unnecessary complexity with two separate committees and overlapping responsibilities, which could lead to inefficiency and confusion. I am also agree with @kuiclub, that before allocating this significant funds:
At first thanks @Entropy for this proposal.
I do not support this proposal because it introduces unnecessary complexity with two separate committees and overlapping responsibilities, which could lead to inefficiency and confusion. I am also agree with @kuiclub, that before allocating this significant funds:
that creates uncertainty and risks mismanagement, it would be better make at first a small one to avoid risks
Thats why I am voting against.
I just voted against the proposal on Snapshot. I believe we started on the wrong foot by involving individuals with questionable track records. This raises concerns and fear about the management of funds being entrusted to them. I feel there exists capable members within the community to handle such an important responsibility. Hope we can discuss this further in the community call to gain greater clarity before this proposal moves to Tally for consideration.
I vote AGAINST this proposal in the temp-check.
I believe treasury management is a key and necessary component for the DAO.
However, I don't see this proposal as true treasury management. Instead, it seems more like an isolated allocation of a specific amount from the treasury aimed at generating returns for the DAO over a short period of six months.
As I mentioned when providing feedback:
I vote AGAINST this proposal in the temp-check.
I believe treasury management is a key and necessary component for the DAO.
However, I don't see this proposal as true treasury management. Instead, it seems more like an isolated allocation of a specific amount from the treasury aimed at generating returns for the DAO over a short period of six months.
As I mentioned when providing feedback:
the treasury manager should address, and in fact, as priority number one, the sustainability of the treasury. We need to have clear oversight of the spending executed by the DAO and how each expense impacts the treasury, its sustainability, and the impact on the DAO’s objectives
This is how I understand treasury management: this proposal is limited to just some aspects of it.
That said, if the proposal gains broad consensus for its execution, I am willing to change my vote on Tally, but with certain considerations aligned with my perspective.
Prepare quarterly reports (2 over the course of their term) for the DAO forum that provides visibility into service provider performance.
After the TMC delivers the two reports (the second at the six-month mark), I would like to propose including a third report. Considering that by that time the OpCo is expected to begin its operations, this report should cover the state of the treasury, the DAO, expenses, and recommendations for long-term sustainability.
This additional report would serve as a handover document for the OpCo, allowing it to focus on treasury management with a clear vision for long-term success.
Design and host an RFP process seeking protocol partnerships through the deployment of the DAO’s ETH, which must target the use of ETH itself or ETH-pegged assets.
On the other hand, I would like to see some strategies outlined regarding what the DAO does or does not want to execute with the ETH before the proposal is approved. According to the DAOs Constitution:
"Arbitrum is part of the Ethereum ecosystem, and the Arbitrum community is part of the Ethereum community. Although the ArbitrumDAO makes its own decisions and pursues its own goals, it is deeply aligned with Ethereum and sees itself as an active and constructive participant in the Ethereum community."
I believe this alignment should be considered when selecting the strategy.
I don't support this proposal, it should be revised with more communication and feedback to protect the interests of the community.
After reading everyone's comments and feedbacks, I do find some problem areas. 26M ARB and 7,500 ETH at one time is too risky, so I suggest to pilot the project on a small scale first, and then expand the allocation of funds after verifying the effect. The proposal is not clear enough about the use of funds and the supervision of committee members, and the details of regular reports, which need to be further clarified. the salaries of TMC and GMC compared with the salaries of other members of the DAO may lead to internal conflicts and disputes, and the content of the proposal design is too important. It should be revised with more communication and feedback. Safeguard the interests of the community.
I voted “For” on Snapshot because I believe Treasury and Grow management tracks will help Arbitrum build a stronger financial system with flexible investment options - make sure for long-term development and stability.
cp0x voted FOR this proposal
The rationale can be read in the thread
Interesting set of feedbacks so far on the votes. Let me first anticipate the vote: in favour.
The issue addressed here, to me, is broad: is about weaponizing some assets that we have in the treasury (eth) + have an environement with less friction in the dao to pay SP in stables (conversion of arb in stables), something that we failed a couple of times already. Plus at the same time find yield strategies for these assets idling, which are the stables and up to some degree the arb.
We will be moving forward to Snapshot today. We will also be hosting an open community call with the appointed candidates prior to moving forward to Tally
With the new version of 1.2 I do feel way more comfortable. I still do think that the open call is a good chance to ask questions and get opinions from others that may have not commented yet. When will the call be scheduled cause you want to move to Snapshot already today?
We will be moving forward to Snapshot today. We will also be hosting an open community call with the appointed candidates prior to moving forward to Tally, thereby giving delegates the chance to ask questions/raise any concerns to the suggested members. We (Entropy Advisors) conducted thorough due diligence on the suggested council members, and feel very confident with the group assembled herein.
ACI are supportive of the v1.2 of this proposal and would be happy to work with the committees on deploying funds to Aave on Arbitrum to achieve their goals of supporting Arbitrum DeFi.
I genuinely cannot tell if you are not picking up that point or you are specifically fishing for confidential information, but to be clear I take my professional obligations around these things exceptionally seriously so you can vote yes or no based on the current disclosed information and there will not be more forthcoming.
This was a tough decision, but I’ve decided to vote against this proposal on Snapshot. Don’t get me wrong—I believe it’s a solid proposal, and effective Treasury Management is critical for overseeing the DAO’s balance sheet. However, as I mentioned in my previous reply, I’m concerned about the absence of elections. I think appointing TMC members should be handled separately, especially given the concerns @GFXlabs raised about one of the suggested members.
I’ll be voting YES in the Snapshot vote, as I support this initiative. However, I do feel it’s important to address the concerns regarding @JAC’s past involvement with the Paxos-MakerDAO integration, as raised by @GFXlabs as they have not been fully clarified publicly. In a public DAO, transparency is foundational to trust. Providing clarity on this point before the Tally vote will reinforce our commitment to transparency and ensure everyone can proceed with confidence.
I voted FOR on this proposal. It is good to see things moving forward on the treasury management front.
Looking forward to the call with the candidates.
Interesting set of feedbacks so far on the votes. Let me first anticipate the vote: in favour.
The issue addressed here, to me, is broad: is about weaponizing some assets that we have in the treasury (eth) + have an environement with less friction in the dao to pay SP in stables (conversion of arb in stables), something that we failed a couple of times already. Plus at the same time find yield strategies for these assets idling, which are the stables and up to some degree the arb.
I can kinda agree here. This is not necessarily treasury management at full scope, but is a management of a subpart of assets, with just a certain consciousness of DAO spending (regen reports) and no DAO budget yet. It tries to address some needs that we have, plus create yield on some assets doing, effectively, nothing for now. So again: is it treasury management satisfying all the needs we have in term of spending, risk, yield etc? No. But we don't have these info, and to me is a very good way to start. It tried to go for low hanging fruits such as eth staking, stable convertion and some yield. Already with this, in the environment (our dao) that we have, historically quite resilient to these initiative, we see a decent opposition.
I think instead is good that we start exactly here, and evolve into what we need: in 6 months we might have the opco, likely another more aggressive type of market regime, we will have hopefully some insight into timeboost revenue, and other iniative laid down that will tell us if we will have to increase/decrease size, risk, type of assets, etc.
Now let's go on doubt, margin of improvements and others.
Finally, I would like to inquire about the rationale behind creating two committees to execute each of the management’s objectives.
Another big improvement part in future will be STEP: it necessarily has to converge in these initiative. While it also add a somehow very specific growth nature, even more so on a BD and advertisement level since it was also about attracting institution in our DAO, we don't have to forget how in the end the goal of that initiative was to have stables deployed in RWA to produce yield for the DAO. In 6 months it should converge into whatever we will have here, and any phase 2 for step, if started in the meantime, should be setup with this merging goal in mind.
On a final note on the people involved and the process so far proposed.
We will be moving forward to Snapshot today. We will also be hosting an open community call with the appointed candidates prior to moving forward to Tally
Thank you for the update and for arranging an open call with the candidates before the Tally vote. I trust Entropy's due diligence process regarding the assembled group. This proposal is much needed for the DAO's growth and a critical step in securing the DAO’s assets, and I believe it aligns well with its long-term goals.
I’ll be voting YES in the Snapshot vote, as I support this initiative. However, I do feel it’s important to address the concerns regarding @JAC’s past involvement with the Paxos-MakerDAO integration, as raised by @GFXlabs as they have not been fully clarified publicly. In a public DAO, transparency is foundational to trust. Providing clarity on this point before the Tally vote will reinforce our commitment to transparency and ensure everyone can proceed with confidence.
I genuinely cannot tell if you are not picking up that point or you are specifically fishing for confidential information, but to be clear I take my professional obligations around these things exceptionally seriously so you can vote yes or no based on the current disclosed information and there will not be more forthcoming.
Put yourself in our shoes.
Imagine someone applied for a job, citing a business deal that you were on the other side of. You have no recollection of them. And their work history seems to also contradict the claim. And your colleagues likewise can't locate any points of contact with that person in that time period.
Help us out here. We'd be negligent not to follow up on this. You have the benefit of the doubt, but we still have to verify.
Can you maybe provide someone to confirm your involvement? We're not looking for confidential information, just a way to verify the claim. Happy to chat in private channels as well, if it''s something that, while not under NDA, you don't/can't share publicly.
I’ll be voting YES in the Snapshot vote, as I support this initiative. However, I do feel it’s important to address the concerns regarding @JAC’s past involvement with the Paxos-MakerDAO integration, as raised by @GFXlabs as they have not been fully clarified publicly. In a public DAO, transparency is foundational to trust. Providing clarity on this point before the Tally vote will reinforce our commitment to transparency and ensure everyone can proceed with confidence.
As we communicated to Entropy privately, we are not satisfied with replies in public or private, and do not support Austin's inclusion on this committee in light of the inconsistencies and inability to provide either documentation or a human being to serve as a reference.
That said, while we are likely to vote against as a result, we do not plan to actively campaign against this proposal. We support the concept, even if we do not support all of the choices.
More broadly, GFX usually votes against proposals that bundle creation of an office and ratification of specific persons to hold that office. See here, here, and here for recent examples; and we generally want to maintain consistency (though we will continue to evaluate on a case-by-case basis for mitigating factors).
This is an excellent example of why the DAO should generally not bundle approval of an initiative with selection of the service provider -- there is no easy way to unbundle opposition to a service provider and support for a proposal.
Support the vote at snapshot 🗳️. The direction of this proposal is fine, the details would be more actionable if they were more refined. The proposal mentions quarterly reports as a very important means of transparency, and I think it is possible to add some hard indicators, such as the rate of return on funds, the efficiency of funds deployment, etc., so that the community can more intuitively feel the results of the work of TMC and GMC. From the description of the proposal, the functional distinction between the two has been relatively clear, but it is still recommended that some boundary issues be clarified in the process of implementation, for example, the focus of growth management is on the ETH strategy, so if there is a need for ARB and ETH linkage, which committee will lead the way? If these details can be clarified earlier, it may reduce the friction in the implementation.
The point is that such a solution does not require any working groups, it is an obvious solution.
Therefore, it is logical that this source of income alone is not enough to justify the creation of working groups.
We sympathize with this point of view, but given the limited DAO ETH holdings and the significant size in dollar-denominated terms, we feel that it is important for the DAO to remain in full control of how the funds are allocated. For clarification, only a Snapshot vote with 3% of the votable token supply would be required to vote in favor/abstain of the deals on a case-by-case basis, rather than the entire governance process (onchain Tally vote). This is in an effort to reduce unnecessary friction that you have pointed out.
Additionally, we have adjusted the GMC members to include a risk-focused member that can alert the Foundation if funds ever need to be withdrawn from a specific partner protocol due to changing market conditions or other risk-related reasons, and this would not be a decision required to go through Snapshot, but rather would be up to the Foundation to act in the best interest of the DAO.
We sympathize with this point of view, but given the limited DAO ETH holdings and the significant size in dollar-denominated terms, we feel that it is important for the DAO to remain in full control of how the funds are allocated. For clarification, only a Snapshot vote with 3% of the votable token supply would be required to vote in favor/abstain of the deals on a case-by-case basis, rather than the entire governance process (onchain Tally vote). This is in an effort to reduce unnecessary friction that you have pointed out.
Additionally, we have adjusted the GMC members to include a risk-focused member that can alert the Foundation if funds ever need to be withdrawn from a specific partner protocol due to changing market conditions or other risk-related reasons, and this would not be a decision required to go through Snapshot, but rather would be up to the Foundation to act in the best interest of the DAO.
Appreciate taking the time to respond to this. Hearing it would a) only be Snapshot & b) there is a non-voting escape mechanism alleviates some concerns.
However, I think I'm still in the 'agree to disagree' camp here, but maybe more explanation would help. Is the expectation of Growth group a more long-term approach or short-term one? If the plan is to drop the ETH somewhere and let it sit for a year then I think this isn't as big of a deal... but if the DAO is going to have to have constant because we're putting 1000 ETH in protocol abc this month and then half the ETH is sold off to go into protocol xyz the next month and then 100 ETH a week is going into protocol 3... and so on... I think you run into those risks I noted before.
And the more I think about it, from a delegate perspective that seems to open the project up to issues with voter fatigue and conflict of interest concerns.
Just my thoughts, I'm really for Treasury Management (I've seen too many DAOs die from avoiding this) so I'm don't want to throw the baby out with the bathwater, but I think this really something to think about.
If the staking rewards source working group arrives at the recommendation of subsidizing stARB rewards by spending ETH that had previously accrued to the DAO treasury, that would be considered a failure from our perspective. The rewards source must be sustainable, and not spend more than the DAO can fund into perpetuity. Therefore, no historically accrued yield should fall into the staking rewards group conversation. These two proposals do not overlap.
If the staking rewards source working group arrives at the recommendation of subsidizing stARB rewards by spending ETH that had previously accrued to the DAO treasury, that would be considered a failure from our perspective. The rewards source must be sustainable, and not spend more than the DAO can fund into perpetuity. Therefore, no historically accrued yield should fall into the staking rewards group conversation. These two proposals do not overlap.
I'm sorry for coming back at this only now, and for my apparent lack of clarity:
The ETH can be used in different ways and accrue yield. And this be a source for the staking program. So yes, this ETH can be seen a type of asset for that other initiative.
Following additional feedback from delegates, 2 additional changes have been made to the proposal on November 6, 2024:
Following additional feedback from delegates, 2 additional changes have been made to the proposal on November 6, 2024:
In terms of the GMC, the three milestones, each of which will unlock a 20K USDC payment per member (excluding Entropy), are as follows: 1) RFP process finalized and the GMC’s first recommendation to which project(s) to allocate capital to approved through Snapshot; 2) given the DAO approves an allocation to a project, the first quarterly report posted on the forum and continuous risk monitoring having been performed; 3) given the DAO approves an allocation to a project, the second quarterly report posted on the forum and continuous risk monitoring having been performed.
We’d like to request some confirmation on this qualification. This does not match our recollection as longtime MakerDAO contributors, and occurred while Austin was still working at Citi, according to LinkedIn.
We’d like to request some confirmation on this qualification. This does not match our recollection as longtime MakerDAO contributors, and occurred while Austin was still working at Citi, according to LinkedIn.
Hey GFX! We reached out to Austin and highlighted this question, and in order to get back to you very quickly given it's a serious consideration for the wider DAO, we are posting his response below:
"At Citi we were interacting with multiple stablecoin issuers and advising them. I cannot speak further about that given confidentiality issues but you can perhaps draw some conclusions. Additionally while at Paxos I ran many of our stablecoin partnerships to keep Paxos coins deployed throughout the ecosystem and part of key facilities, including interest sharing deals, which you can also likely draw conclusions from even though I can't give specific terms."
We hope this helps alleivate any skepticism.
Lastly, we are happy to host an open governance call with both TMC and GMC members prior to a Tally vote where anyone can ask questions/raise any concerns with the appointed members. It is of utmost importance to us that the DAO feels confident with these two groups' members. Please let us know if you think this type of call would be helpful.
Austin has helped with previous efforts in this space when at Paxos, including the inclusion of USDP into the PSM for MakerDAO, as well as partnering with protocols to ensure strong economic design and stability when integrating stablecoins and real assets.
Austin has helped with previous efforts in this space when at Paxos, including the inclusion of USDP into the PSM for MakerDAO, as well as partnering with protocols to ensure strong economic design and stability when integrating stablecoins and real assets.
We'd like to request some confirmation on this qualification. This does not match our recollection as longtime MakerDAO contributors, and occurred while Austin was still working at Citi, according to LinkedIn.
I think you missed the point as well.
There is a potential conflict between what this proposal see as available assets to manage and the assets the staking WG sees as assets avaliable to generate yield for staking.
Is it a big deal? Probably not. But if the staking proposal earmarked them beforethis one, this proposal will have:
I think you missed the point as well.
There is a potential conflict between what this proposal see as available assets to manage and the assets the staking WG sees as assets avaliable to generate yield for staking.
Is it a big deal? Probably not. But if the staking proposal earmarked them beforethis one, this proposal will have:
Put differently - if you have serious concerns or think I actually lack risk management or treasury expertise despite having built the modern reserves, disclosure, and risk management framework for the only stablecoin in the entire industry to go from double digit billions to nearly zero without losing anyone’s money in the process, I’m more than happy to step aside and let someone else attempt this. Is that your ask?
Put differently - if you have serious concerns or think I actually lack risk management or treasury expertise despite having built the modern reserves, disclosure, and risk management framework for the only stablecoin in the entire industry to go from double digit billions to nearly zero without losing anyone’s money in the process, I’m more than happy to step aside and let someone else attempt this. Is that your ask?
No, we don't really have an opinion on portfolio management at Paxos because we don't have much insight into it.
It's more that you did clearly not address this:
Austin has helped with previous efforts in this space when at Paxos, including the inclusion of USDP into the PSM for MakerDAO, as well as partnering with protocols to ensure strong economic design and stability when integrating stablecoins and real assets.
This is simple diligence in response to a discrepancy in one of the main credentials presented, our own recollection, and documentation we could locate today. We look forward to resolving that discrepancy.
Thank you for this great proposal ! I agree that Arbitrum DAO requires effective Treasury Management for its long-term sustainability, including using stablecoins to pay service providers and generating 'safe' yields on ETH.
I believe that Treasury Management should be conducted by a single entity with clear objectives rather than by two committees. I understand your answer about the rationale of having two committees with different skill set but imo it is crucial to have a macro overview and a comprehensive perspective that oversee the balance between ETH exposure, stablecoins, and ARB tokens. I guess the OpCo position you mentioned will be accountable and will have this role and responsibility ?
Thank you for this great proposal ! I agree that Arbitrum DAO requires effective Treasury Management for its long-term sustainability, including using stablecoins to pay service providers and generating 'safe' yields on ETH.
I believe that Treasury Management should be conducted by a single entity with clear objectives rather than by two committees. I understand your answer about the rationale of having two committees with different skill set but imo it is crucial to have a macro overview and a comprehensive perspective that oversee the balance between ETH exposure, stablecoins, and ARB tokens. I guess the OpCo position you mentioned will be accountable and will have this role and responsibility ?
The following comments are more ideas that can be useful for the future TMC and GMC:
Regarding the conversion of ARB to stablecoins, which could impact its price, have we considered using ARB tokens as collateral on AAVE to borrow stablecoins? There is still a capacity for supplying 12 million ARB before reaching the cap, as seen here: AAVE Reserve Overview this could be a way to get Stables without selling ARB token.
To demonstrate alignment with Ethereum, it could be good to allocate ETH to some LSTs/LRTs that support minority Clients to avoid having one that represents >66% of the total. You can learn more about this in this tweet from our Treasurer at Kleros Cooperative, Juan.
Good to see Arbitrum DAO moving forward with Treasury Management !
- Service Provider Shortfalls: DAO-funded programs as well as service providers that have proved valuable to the DAO (the ARDC, Steakhouse’s services as a part of STEP, etc.) have run into the problem of having dollar-denominated contracts and not enough ARB to meet the agreed upon rate for services rendered.
IMO, unless I'm misunderstanding a stipulation of the payments of these groups, a lot of this falls on these projects for not immediately selling their ARB into dollar-denominated equivalents. I'm not understanding why they have an expected $X,XXX a month in admin expenses yet hold ARB over a stable coin.
The proposal is a practical and necessary plan for Arbitrum DAO’s financial management and growth. Thank you for your proposal and hard work. Here are some questions and suggestions:
Fund Management Authority: The proposal states that funds will be held by the Arbitrum Foundation and executed according to DAO votes. However, is there a contingency plan for emergencies or situations requiring rapid response? Are there any restrictions on the authority of TMC and GMC for emergency decisions?
The proposal is a practical and necessary plan for Arbitrum DAO’s financial management and growth. Thank you for your proposal and hard work. Here are some questions and suggestions:
Fund Management Authority: The proposal states that funds will be held by the Arbitrum Foundation and executed according to DAO votes. However, is there a contingency plan for emergencies or situations requiring rapid response? Are there any restrictions on the authority of TMC and GMC for emergency decisions?
GMC Partner Selection Criteria: Although all ETH investments require DAO approval, what are the standards and processes for GMC when selecting and recommending partners? Will there be an independent risk assessment report available for DAO members?
Suggestions: :grinning: 1. It is recommended that TMC and GMC provide a detailed monthly or quarterly report, including fund usage, investment returns, and partnership progress, to ensure transparency in fund management across the DAO community. 2. In addition to converting ARB to stablecoins for service payments, has consideration been given to signing long-term contracts with high-quality service providers to ensure their stability and loyalty, thereby reducing uncertainties caused by market fluctuations?
Thank you to everyone who provided highly valuable feedback. Please find the relevant responses below.
How will 15M ARB be swapped to stablecoins within 3 months? Will it be sold directly on CEXs or via OTC? Could this cause significant market volatility? Given the current liquidity shortage, 15M ARB represents a large selling pressure. If not handled properly, it could harm all ARB holders and the overall interests of Arbitrum DAO. Is there a detailed plan in place?
This proposal is very helpful for optimizing DAO fund management, improving governance efficiency, and enhancing ecosystem value, addressing the main issues in current fund management. Establishing the TMC and GMC committees is essential, as it not only enables more professional management of ARB and ETH assets but also provides a more stable payment solution for service providers. By alleviating concerns over ARB price fluctuations, it also improves the professionalism and appeal of the DAO.
Questions:
This proposal is very helpful for optimizing DAO fund management, improving governance efficiency, and enhancing ecosystem value, addressing the main issues in current fund management. Establishing the TMC and GMC committees is essential, as it not only enables more professional management of ARB and ETH assets but also provides a more stable payment solution for service providers. By alleviating concerns over ARB price fluctuations, it also improves the professionalism and appeal of the DAO.
Questions:
Selection process for TMC and GMC members: While the proposal mentions an appointment process, are there more details on specific qualifications, selection criteria, and how independence and alignment with DAO’s long-term interests will be ensured?
Long-term fund management strategy: Could the proposal further elaborate on how TMC and GMC will manage the funds and whether there will be dynamic adjustments based on market conditions?
Proposal Suggestions:
Phased evaluation and feedback: It is recommended to establish a regular evaluation mechanism for TMC and GMC performance, allowing the community to track the effectiveness of fund management and growth strategies and ensure continuous optimization.
Transparency reports: Increase transparency by adding quarterly or semi-annual reports that detail fund operations and revenue outcomes.
Hi! Thank you very much for starting the discussion about treasury management, which I think should be addressed asap.
Overall, I am supportive of the idea of having a treasury manager. However, I have some concerns about the proposed execution.
Hi! Thank you very much for starting the discussion about treasury management, which I think should be addressed asap.
Overall, I am supportive of the idea of having a treasury manager. However, I have some concerns about the proposed execution.
But first, I believe the DAO's Mission & Vission recently initiated discussion is crucial, and there cannot be treasury management without first defining them. Once the mission and vision are defined, management must focus on their fulfillment (not just on generating returns for the sake of having returns).
On another note, I would like to see, among the Key Issues that the treasury manager should address, and in fact, as priority number one, the sustainability of the treasury. We need to have clear oversight of the spending executed by the DAO and how each expense impacts the treasury, its sustainability, and the impact on the DAO’s objectives. In fact, I believe that an additional function that should be added to the listed ones is for the treasury manager to comment on each proposal requesting more than "XX" funds and provide an opinion (non-binding for the delegates) regarding its sustainability and impact on the treasury.
Finally, I would like to inquire about the rationale behind creating two committees to execute each of the management's objectives. In my opinion, we should appoint a single person -or entity- to carry out all the tasks. I don’t understand why we would add operational costs and additional discussions. One person, with clear objectives and KPIs, should be able to perform well and be subject to revalidation by the DAO after a set period. In this sense, I align with and support Gauntlet’s comment on prioritizing automation and tools that enable DAO oversight whenever possible.
I’m in favor of this proposal; I think securing and growing the DAO’s funds is key for continued progress. I support exploring diverse strategies to secure ETH holdings, particularly in ways that promote decentralization within the Ethereum ecosystem.
Thanks for the proposal!
As the DAO has a lot of moving parts (and proposals running in parallel) I wanted to highlight these two points:
Thanks for the proposal!
As the DAO has a lot of moving parts (and proposals running in parallel) I wanted to highlight these two points:
Growth Management (GM): 7,500 ETH allotted (about 75% of the DAOs ETH after BoLD bootstrapping), but all spend must be DAO-approved on a case-by-case basis.
Ans, from the ARB Staking proposal:
In parallel with the development of ARB Staking, we will lead two separate DAO working groups that are focused on aspects of the system that will be implemented after development is complete.
There is a non-zero chance that both proposals are going after the same resources here (the ETH from the sequencer fees). Is there a plan to better coordinate (or to adjust one proposal) so we don't "double-spend" the resources? Mostly likely, the Staking Rewards WG will present a study/proposal before this one is approved on Tally.
We hope this helps alleivate any skepticism.
We'd like you to inquire a little more, or we can do it at the governance call. For more context, our confusion arises from the following:
The rework of the proposal as of October 30th is good, the only thing I'm missing is a focus on investing the treasury on protocols/projects that are value-aligned with the Arbitrum DAO. In this case, this would be a focus on transparency and decentralization. I know that the DeFi collective will son release DeFiScan, which is kind of an L2BEAT for DeFi protocol decentralization. I think while it's still ramping up, we can go for a much simpler system with a couple of questions like:
Appointing committee members without a DAO election might lead to questions about transparency and accountability. Could we consider a hybrid approach where nominees are proposed based on qualifications but still require DAO approval through a voting process? Or at least disclose the names of the members of each group before launching on Snapshot?
Also, ensuring that committee members have no conflicts of interest is important. What measures will be in place to prevent potential self-dealing or favoritism towards certain service providers or partners?
Appointing committee members without a DAO election might lead to questions about transparency and accountability. Could we consider a hybrid approach where nominees are proposed based on qualifications but still require DAO approval through a voting process? Or at least disclose the names of the members of each group before launching on Snapshot?
Also, ensuring that committee members have no conflicts of interest is important. What measures will be in place to prevent potential self-dealing or favoritism towards certain service providers or partners?
Also, while converting ARB to stablecoins to pay service providers is a practical solution. How does this align with long-term considerations for the value of ARB? If the DAO itself isn't holding ARB, why would people choose to hold it?
Interesting set of feedbacks so far on the votes. Let me first anticipate the vote: in favour.
The issue addressed here, to me, is broad: is about weaponizing some assets that we have in the treasury (eth) + have an environement with less friction in the dao to pay SP in stables (conversion of arb in stables), something that we failed a couple of times already. Plus at the same time find yield strategies for these assets idling, which are the stables and up to some degree the arb.
I can kinda agree here. This is not necessarily treasury management at full scope, but is a management of a subpart of assets, with just a certain consciousness of DAO spending (regen reports) and no DAO budget yet. It tries to address some needs that we have, plus create yield on some assets doing, effectively, nothing for now. So again: is it treasury management satisfying all the needs we have in term of spending, risk, yield etc? No. But we don't have these info, and to me is a very good way to start. It tried to go for low hanging fruits such as eth staking, stable convertion and some yield. Already with this, in the environment (our dao) that we have, historically quite resilient to these initiative, we see a decent opposition.
I think instead is good that we start exactly here, and evolve into what we need: in 6 months we might have the opco, likely another more aggressive type of market regime, we will have hopefully some insight into timeboost revenue, and other iniative laid down that will tell us if we will have to increase/decrease size, risk, type of assets, etc.
Now let's go on doubt, margin of improvements and others.
Finally, I would like to inquire about the rationale behind creating two committees to execute each of the management’s objectives.
Another big improvement part in future will be STEP: it necessarily has to converge in these initiative. While it also add a somehow very specific growth nature, even more so on a BD and advertisement level since it was also about attracting institution in our DAO, we don't have to forget how in the end the goal of that initiative was to have stables deployed in RWA to produce yield for the DAO. In 6 months it should converge into whatever we will have here, and any phase 2 for step, if started in the meantime, should be setup with this merging goal in mind.
On a final note on the people involved and the process so far proposed.
We will be moving forward to Snapshot today. We will also be hosting an open community call with the appointed candidates prior to moving forward to Tally
Thank you for the update and for arranging an open call with the candidates before the Tally vote. I trust Entropy's due diligence process regarding the assembled group. This proposal is much needed for the DAO's growth and a critical step in securing the DAO’s assets, and I believe it aligns well with its long-term goals.
I’ll be voting YES in the Snapshot vote, as I support this initiative. However, I do feel it’s important to address the concerns regarding @JAC’s past involvement with the Paxos-MakerDAO integration, as raised by @GFXlabs as they have not been fully clarified publicly. In a public DAO, transparency is foundational to trust. Providing clarity on this point before the Tally vote will reinforce our commitment to transparency and ensure everyone can proceed with confidence.
I genuinely cannot tell if you are not picking up that point or you are specifically fishing for confidential information, but to be clear I take my professional obligations around these things exceptionally seriously so you can vote yes or no based on the current disclosed information and there will not be more forthcoming.
Put yourself in our shoes.
Imagine someone applied for a job, citing a business deal that you were on the other side of. You have no recollection of them. And their work history seems to also contradict the claim. And your colleagues likewise can't locate any points of contact with that person in that time period.
Help us out here. We'd be negligent not to follow up on this. You have the benefit of the doubt, but we still have to verify.
Can you maybe provide someone to confirm your involvement? We're not looking for confidential information, just a way to verify the claim. Happy to chat in private channels as well, if it''s something that, while not under NDA, you don't/can't share publicly.
I’ll be voting YES in the Snapshot vote, as I support this initiative. However, I do feel it’s important to address the concerns regarding @JAC’s past involvement with the Paxos-MakerDAO integration, as raised by @GFXlabs as they have not been fully clarified publicly. In a public DAO, transparency is foundational to trust. Providing clarity on this point before the Tally vote will reinforce our commitment to transparency and ensure everyone can proceed with confidence.
As we communicated to Entropy privately, we are not satisfied with replies in public or private, and do not support Austin's inclusion on this committee in light of the inconsistencies and inability to provide either documentation or a human being to serve as a reference.
That said, while we are likely to vote against as a result, we do not plan to actively campaign against this proposal. We support the concept, even if we do not support all of the choices.
More broadly, GFX usually votes against proposals that bundle creation of an office and ratification of specific persons to hold that office. See here, here, and here for recent examples; and we generally want to maintain consistency (though we will continue to evaluate on a case-by-case basis for mitigating factors).
This is an excellent example of why the DAO should generally not bundle approval of an initiative with selection of the service provider -- there is no easy way to unbundle opposition to a service provider and support for a proposal.
Support the vote at snapshot 🗳️. The direction of this proposal is fine, the details would be more actionable if they were more refined. The proposal mentions quarterly reports as a very important means of transparency, and I think it is possible to add some hard indicators, such as the rate of return on funds, the efficiency of funds deployment, etc., so that the community can more intuitively feel the results of the work of TMC and GMC. From the description of the proposal, the functional distinction between the two has been relatively clear, but it is still recommended that some boundary issues be clarified in the process of implementation, for example, the focus of growth management is on the ETH strategy, so if there is a need for ARB and ETH linkage, which committee will lead the way? If these details can be clarified earlier, it may reduce the friction in the implementation.
The point is that such a solution does not require any working groups, it is an obvious solution.
Therefore, it is logical that this source of income alone is not enough to justify the creation of working groups.
We sympathize with this point of view, but given the limited DAO ETH holdings and the significant size in dollar-denominated terms, we feel that it is important for the DAO to remain in full control of how the funds are allocated. For clarification, only a Snapshot vote with 3% of the votable token supply would be required to vote in favor/abstain of the deals on a case-by-case basis, rather than the entire governance process (onchain Tally vote). This is in an effort to reduce unnecessary friction that you have pointed out.
Additionally, we have adjusted the GMC members to include a risk-focused member that can alert the Foundation if funds ever need to be withdrawn from a specific partner protocol due to changing market conditions or other risk-related reasons, and this would not be a decision required to go through Snapshot, but rather would be up to the Foundation to act in the best interest of the DAO.
We sympathize with this point of view, but given the limited DAO ETH holdings and the significant size in dollar-denominated terms, we feel that it is important for the DAO to remain in full control of how the funds are allocated. For clarification, only a Snapshot vote with 3% of the votable token supply would be required to vote in favor/abstain of the deals on a case-by-case basis, rather than the entire governance process (onchain Tally vote). This is in an effort to reduce unnecessary friction that you have pointed out.
Additionally, we have adjusted the GMC members to include a risk-focused member that can alert the Foundation if funds ever need to be withdrawn from a specific partner protocol due to changing market conditions or other risk-related reasons, and this would not be a decision required to go through Snapshot, but rather would be up to the Foundation to act in the best interest of the DAO.
Appreciate taking the time to respond to this. Hearing it would a) only be Snapshot & b) there is a non-voting escape mechanism alleviates some concerns.
However, I think I'm still in the 'agree to disagree' camp here, but maybe more explanation would help. Is the expectation of Growth group a more long-term approach or short-term one? If the plan is to drop the ETH somewhere and let it sit for a year then I think this isn't as big of a deal... but if the DAO is going to have to have constant because we're putting 1000 ETH in protocol abc this month and then half the ETH is sold off to go into protocol xyz the next month and then 100 ETH a week is going into protocol 3... and so on... I think you run into those risks I noted before.
And the more I think about it, from a delegate perspective that seems to open the project up to issues with voter fatigue and conflict of interest concerns.
Just my thoughts, I'm really for Treasury Management (I've seen too many DAOs die from avoiding this) so I'm don't want to throw the baby out with the bathwater, but I think this really something to think about.
If the staking rewards source working group arrives at the recommendation of subsidizing stARB rewards by spending ETH that had previously accrued to the DAO treasury, that would be considered a failure from our perspective. The rewards source must be sustainable, and not spend more than the DAO can fund into perpetuity. Therefore, no historically accrued yield should fall into the staking rewards group conversation. These two proposals do not overlap.
If the staking rewards source working group arrives at the recommendation of subsidizing stARB rewards by spending ETH that had previously accrued to the DAO treasury, that would be considered a failure from our perspective. The rewards source must be sustainable, and not spend more than the DAO can fund into perpetuity. Therefore, no historically accrued yield should fall into the staking rewards group conversation. These two proposals do not overlap.
I'm sorry for coming back at this only now, and for my apparent lack of clarity:
The ETH can be used in different ways and accrue yield. And this be a source for the staking program. So yes, this ETH can be seen a type of asset for that other initiative.
Following additional feedback from delegates, 2 additional changes have been made to the proposal on November 6, 2024:
Following additional feedback from delegates, 2 additional changes have been made to the proposal on November 6, 2024:
In terms of the GMC, the three milestones, each of which will unlock a 20K USDC payment per member (excluding Entropy), are as follows: 1) RFP process finalized and the GMC’s first recommendation to which project(s) to allocate capital to approved through Snapshot; 2) given the DAO approves an allocation to a project, the first quarterly report posted on the forum and continuous risk monitoring having been performed; 3) given the DAO approves an allocation to a project, the second quarterly report posted on the forum and continuous risk monitoring having been performed.
We’d like to request some confirmation on this qualification. This does not match our recollection as longtime MakerDAO contributors, and occurred while Austin was still working at Citi, according to LinkedIn.
We’d like to request some confirmation on this qualification. This does not match our recollection as longtime MakerDAO contributors, and occurred while Austin was still working at Citi, according to LinkedIn.
Hey GFX! We reached out to Austin and highlighted this question, and in order to get back to you very quickly given it's a serious consideration for the wider DAO, we are posting his response below:
"At Citi we were interacting with multiple stablecoin issuers and advising them. I cannot speak further about that given confidentiality issues but you can perhaps draw some conclusions. Additionally while at Paxos I ran many of our stablecoin partnerships to keep Paxos coins deployed throughout the ecosystem and part of key facilities, including interest sharing deals, which you can also likely draw conclusions from even though I can't give specific terms."
We hope this helps alleivate any skepticism.
Lastly, we are happy to host an open governance call with both TMC and GMC members prior to a Tally vote where anyone can ask questions/raise any concerns with the appointed members. It is of utmost importance to us that the DAO feels confident with these two groups' members. Please let us know if you think this type of call would be helpful.
Austin has helped with previous efforts in this space when at Paxos, including the inclusion of USDP into the PSM for MakerDAO, as well as partnering with protocols to ensure strong economic design and stability when integrating stablecoins and real assets.
Austin has helped with previous efforts in this space when at Paxos, including the inclusion of USDP into the PSM for MakerDAO, as well as partnering with protocols to ensure strong economic design and stability when integrating stablecoins and real assets.
We'd like to request some confirmation on this qualification. This does not match our recollection as longtime MakerDAO contributors, and occurred while Austin was still working at Citi, according to LinkedIn.
I think you missed the point as well.
There is a potential conflict between what this proposal see as available assets to manage and the assets the staking WG sees as assets avaliable to generate yield for staking.
Is it a big deal? Probably not. But if the staking proposal earmarked them beforethis one, this proposal will have:
I think you missed the point as well.
There is a potential conflict between what this proposal see as available assets to manage and the assets the staking WG sees as assets avaliable to generate yield for staking.
Is it a big deal? Probably not. But if the staking proposal earmarked them beforethis one, this proposal will have:
Put differently - if you have serious concerns or think I actually lack risk management or treasury expertise despite having built the modern reserves, disclosure, and risk management framework for the only stablecoin in the entire industry to go from double digit billions to nearly zero without losing anyone’s money in the process, I’m more than happy to step aside and let someone else attempt this. Is that your ask?
Put differently - if you have serious concerns or think I actually lack risk management or treasury expertise despite having built the modern reserves, disclosure, and risk management framework for the only stablecoin in the entire industry to go from double digit billions to nearly zero without losing anyone’s money in the process, I’m more than happy to step aside and let someone else attempt this. Is that your ask?
No, we don't really have an opinion on portfolio management at Paxos because we don't have much insight into it.
It's more that you did clearly not address this:
Austin has helped with previous efforts in this space when at Paxos, including the inclusion of USDP into the PSM for MakerDAO, as well as partnering with protocols to ensure strong economic design and stability when integrating stablecoins and real assets.
This is simple diligence in response to a discrepancy in one of the main credentials presented, our own recollection, and documentation we could locate today. We look forward to resolving that discrepancy.
Thank you for this great proposal ! I agree that Arbitrum DAO requires effective Treasury Management for its long-term sustainability, including using stablecoins to pay service providers and generating 'safe' yields on ETH.
I believe that Treasury Management should be conducted by a single entity with clear objectives rather than by two committees. I understand your answer about the rationale of having two committees with different skill set but imo it is crucial to have a macro overview and a comprehensive perspective that oversee the balance between ETH exposure, stablecoins, and ARB tokens. I guess the OpCo position you mentioned will be accountable and will have this role and responsibility ?
Thank you for this great proposal ! I agree that Arbitrum DAO requires effective Treasury Management for its long-term sustainability, including using stablecoins to pay service providers and generating 'safe' yields on ETH.
I believe that Treasury Management should be conducted by a single entity with clear objectives rather than by two committees. I understand your answer about the rationale of having two committees with different skill set but imo it is crucial to have a macro overview and a comprehensive perspective that oversee the balance between ETH exposure, stablecoins, and ARB tokens. I guess the OpCo position you mentioned will be accountable and will have this role and responsibility ?
The following comments are more ideas that can be useful for the future TMC and GMC:
Regarding the conversion of ARB to stablecoins, which could impact its price, have we considered using ARB tokens as collateral on AAVE to borrow stablecoins? There is still a capacity for supplying 12 million ARB before reaching the cap, as seen here: AAVE Reserve Overview this could be a way to get Stables without selling ARB token.
To demonstrate alignment with Ethereum, it could be good to allocate ETH to some LSTs/LRTs that support minority Clients to avoid having one that represents >66% of the total. You can learn more about this in this tweet from our Treasurer at Kleros Cooperative, Juan.
Good to see Arbitrum DAO moving forward with Treasury Management !
- Service Provider Shortfalls: DAO-funded programs as well as service providers that have proved valuable to the DAO (the ARDC, Steakhouse’s services as a part of STEP, etc.) have run into the problem of having dollar-denominated contracts and not enough ARB to meet the agreed upon rate for services rendered.
IMO, unless I'm misunderstanding a stipulation of the payments of these groups, a lot of this falls on these projects for not immediately selling their ARB into dollar-denominated equivalents. I'm not understanding why they have an expected $X,XXX a month in admin expenses yet hold ARB over a stable coin.
The proposal is a practical and necessary plan for Arbitrum DAO’s financial management and growth. Thank you for your proposal and hard work. Here are some questions and suggestions:
Fund Management Authority: The proposal states that funds will be held by the Arbitrum Foundation and executed according to DAO votes. However, is there a contingency plan for emergencies or situations requiring rapid response? Are there any restrictions on the authority of TMC and GMC for emergency decisions?
The proposal is a practical and necessary plan for Arbitrum DAO’s financial management and growth. Thank you for your proposal and hard work. Here are some questions and suggestions:
Fund Management Authority: The proposal states that funds will be held by the Arbitrum Foundation and executed according to DAO votes. However, is there a contingency plan for emergencies or situations requiring rapid response? Are there any restrictions on the authority of TMC and GMC for emergency decisions?
GMC Partner Selection Criteria: Although all ETH investments require DAO approval, what are the standards and processes for GMC when selecting and recommending partners? Will there be an independent risk assessment report available for DAO members?
Suggestions: :grinning: 1. It is recommended that TMC and GMC provide a detailed monthly or quarterly report, including fund usage, investment returns, and partnership progress, to ensure transparency in fund management across the DAO community. 2. In addition to converting ARB to stablecoins for service payments, has consideration been given to signing long-term contracts with high-quality service providers to ensure their stability and loyalty, thereby reducing uncertainties caused by market fluctuations?
Thank you to everyone who provided highly valuable feedback. Please find the relevant responses below.
How will 15M ARB be swapped to stablecoins within 3 months? Will it be sold directly on CEXs or via OTC? Could this cause significant market volatility? Given the current liquidity shortage, 15M ARB represents a large selling pressure. If not handled properly, it could harm all ARB holders and the overall interests of Arbitrum DAO. Is there a detailed plan in place?
This proposal is very helpful for optimizing DAO fund management, improving governance efficiency, and enhancing ecosystem value, addressing the main issues in current fund management. Establishing the TMC and GMC committees is essential, as it not only enables more professional management of ARB and ETH assets but also provides a more stable payment solution for service providers. By alleviating concerns over ARB price fluctuations, it also improves the professionalism and appeal of the DAO.
Questions:
This proposal is very helpful for optimizing DAO fund management, improving governance efficiency, and enhancing ecosystem value, addressing the main issues in current fund management. Establishing the TMC and GMC committees is essential, as it not only enables more professional management of ARB and ETH assets but also provides a more stable payment solution for service providers. By alleviating concerns over ARB price fluctuations, it also improves the professionalism and appeal of the DAO.
Questions:
Selection process for TMC and GMC members: While the proposal mentions an appointment process, are there more details on specific qualifications, selection criteria, and how independence and alignment with DAO’s long-term interests will be ensured?
Long-term fund management strategy: Could the proposal further elaborate on how TMC and GMC will manage the funds and whether there will be dynamic adjustments based on market conditions?
Proposal Suggestions:
Phased evaluation and feedback: It is recommended to establish a regular evaluation mechanism for TMC and GMC performance, allowing the community to track the effectiveness of fund management and growth strategies and ensure continuous optimization.
Transparency reports: Increase transparency by adding quarterly or semi-annual reports that detail fund operations and revenue outcomes.
Hi! Thank you very much for starting the discussion about treasury management, which I think should be addressed asap.
Overall, I am supportive of the idea of having a treasury manager. However, I have some concerns about the proposed execution.
Hi! Thank you very much for starting the discussion about treasury management, which I think should be addressed asap.
Overall, I am supportive of the idea of having a treasury manager. However, I have some concerns about the proposed execution.
But first, I believe the DAO's Mission & Vission recently initiated discussion is crucial, and there cannot be treasury management without first defining them. Once the mission and vision are defined, management must focus on their fulfillment (not just on generating returns for the sake of having returns).
On another note, I would like to see, among the Key Issues that the treasury manager should address, and in fact, as priority number one, the sustainability of the treasury. We need to have clear oversight of the spending executed by the DAO and how each expense impacts the treasury, its sustainability, and the impact on the DAO’s objectives. In fact, I believe that an additional function that should be added to the listed ones is for the treasury manager to comment on each proposal requesting more than "XX" funds and provide an opinion (non-binding for the delegates) regarding its sustainability and impact on the treasury.
Finally, I would like to inquire about the rationale behind creating two committees to execute each of the management's objectives. In my opinion, we should appoint a single person -or entity- to carry out all the tasks. I don’t understand why we would add operational costs and additional discussions. One person, with clear objectives and KPIs, should be able to perform well and be subject to revalidation by the DAO after a set period. In this sense, I align with and support Gauntlet’s comment on prioritizing automation and tools that enable DAO oversight whenever possible.
I’m in favor of this proposal; I think securing and growing the DAO’s funds is key for continued progress. I support exploring diverse strategies to secure ETH holdings, particularly in ways that promote decentralization within the Ethereum ecosystem.
Thanks for the proposal!
As the DAO has a lot of moving parts (and proposals running in parallel) I wanted to highlight these two points:
Thanks for the proposal!
As the DAO has a lot of moving parts (and proposals running in parallel) I wanted to highlight these two points:
Growth Management (GM): 7,500 ETH allotted (about 75% of the DAOs ETH after BoLD bootstrapping), but all spend must be DAO-approved on a case-by-case basis.
Ans, from the ARB Staking proposal:
In parallel with the development of ARB Staking, we will lead two separate DAO working groups that are focused on aspects of the system that will be implemented after development is complete.
There is a non-zero chance that both proposals are going after the same resources here (the ETH from the sequencer fees). Is there a plan to better coordinate (or to adjust one proposal) so we don't "double-spend" the resources? Mostly likely, the Staking Rewards WG will present a study/proposal before this one is approved on Tally.
We hope this helps alleivate any skepticism.
We'd like you to inquire a little more, or we can do it at the governance call. For more context, our confusion arises from the following:
The rework of the proposal as of October 30th is good, the only thing I'm missing is a focus on investing the treasury on protocols/projects that are value-aligned with the Arbitrum DAO. In this case, this would be a focus on transparency and decentralization. I know that the DeFi collective will son release DeFiScan, which is kind of an L2BEAT for DeFi protocol decentralization. I think while it's still ramping up, we can go for a much simpler system with a couple of questions like:
Appointing committee members without a DAO election might lead to questions about transparency and accountability. Could we consider a hybrid approach where nominees are proposed based on qualifications but still require DAO approval through a voting process? Or at least disclose the names of the members of each group before launching on Snapshot?
Also, ensuring that committee members have no conflicts of interest is important. What measures will be in place to prevent potential self-dealing or favoritism towards certain service providers or partners?
Appointing committee members without a DAO election might lead to questions about transparency and accountability. Could we consider a hybrid approach where nominees are proposed based on qualifications but still require DAO approval through a voting process? Or at least disclose the names of the members of each group before launching on Snapshot?
Also, ensuring that committee members have no conflicts of interest is important. What measures will be in place to prevent potential self-dealing or favoritism towards certain service providers or partners?
Also, while converting ARB to stablecoins to pay service providers is a practical solution. How does this align with long-term considerations for the value of ARB? If the DAO itself isn't holding ARB, why would people choose to hold it?
- Service Provider Shortfalls: DAO-funded programs as well as service providers that have proved valuable to the DAO (the ARDC, Steakhouse’s services as a part of STEP, etc.) have run into the problem of having dollar-denominated contracts and not enough ARB to meet the agreed upon rate for services rendered.
IMO, unless I'm misunderstanding a stipulation of the payments of these groups, a lot of this falls on these projects for not immediately selling their ARB into dollar-denominated equivalents. I'm not understanding why they have an expected $X,XXX a month in admin expenses yet hold ARB over a stable coin.
Growth Management (GM): 7,500 ETH allotted (about 75% of the DAOs ETH after BoLD bootstrapping), but all spend must be DAO-approved on a case-by-case basis.
Having the DAO approve spend for each investment decision creates a lot of negatives with really no positives. I think needing DAO approval needs to be removed here. The DAO either trusts the people in charge of this or not, forcing them to come back to us every investment:
All that said, as noted in the proposal the DAO can at any time clawback the funds. So having to approve case-by-case just adds an unnecessary layer of control. Given there already is an 'approval' mechanism built in.
Thank you to everyone who provided highly valuable feedback. Please find the relevant responses below.
How will 15M ARB be swapped to stablecoins within 3 months? Will it be sold directly on CEXs or via OTC? Could this cause significant market volatility? Given the current liquidity shortage, 15M ARB represents a large selling pressure. If not handled properly, it could harm all ARB holders and the overall interests of Arbitrum DAO. Is there a detailed plan in place?
This will be up to the TMC to decide/design (and ultimately the DAO to ratify via Snapshot), but some options include OTC, an Aera or Enzyme-like product that can TWAP out of ARB over a specified time period, periodic CEX spot sells, putting the burden on the Arbitrum Foundation, etc.
How can we ensure the security of funds during transfers and subsequent management? Will the ARB and ETH stay on-chain, or be moved to CEXs? If transferred to CEXs, maintaining full transparency will be challenging. What contingency plans are in place in case of a hack or theft?
The Foundation will serve as the counterparty/custodian for these funds. When researching other treasury management programs, it became apparent that the DAO as the direct counterparty for treasury funds is a legal gray area, and having a foundation with clear jurisdiction and laws to abide by is the proper path forward.
For the TM track, this will again be up to the TMC and ultimately the DAO once it ratifies the path forward. Our personal opinion here is to keep all TM funds onchain with non-custodial infrastructure, but that is just our opinion.
For the GM track, hack or theft is a legitimate concern. Some of the deals that are brought forth to the DAO will inevitably include smart contract risk, require sacrificing the element of non-custodial, among other things. But please note that the DAO must approve these deals on a case-by-case basis and weigh the pros and cons of each offer brought forward by the GMC. It’s very difficult to define all of the risks given how different every deal could be in nature. But in our opinion, the important point is that the DAO is the ultimate decision-maker on all deals and no funds can be allocated unless it garners support.
It’s good to finally address this conversation. Given the overlap between the proposed Treasury Committee and the Growth Committee, what are the plans for STEP II and its Steering Committee? Should we consider these as completely separate initiatives?
For now, Yes. But we believe that it’s possible for OpCo to consolidate the roles of the TMC, GMC, and even the STEP Committee over time once it's established, creating a unified treasury management function for the DAO (assuming the DAO wants OpCo tasked with doing so, which would of course require a DAO vote). As the OpCo is drafted now, there will be an individual who has extensive expertise in finance on the OpCo team. It is difficult to predict what the DAO will want and how OpCo will evolve, but we do believe it makes sense for OpCo to play a role in budgeting, treasury management, etc.
what happened to dao budgeting? wasn’t there a consensus that dao-wide budget needs to be figured out before deploying any capital and treasury-management in general? like this treasury is not gonna go anywhere, why the rush?
We agree with you that a DAO budget is sorely needed. However, as mentioned in the proposal, this task seems better suited for OpCo if we truly want it done the right way. Also included in the proposal is the foregone yield on the DAO’s ETH by doing nothing to date, which has led to an opportunity cost of $1M thus far. We feel as though the DAO needs a “checking account” in stables to hedge against lower offchain yields (STEP) that can also cover service provider short falls due to ARB volatility to enhance the service provider experience of working with Arbitrum. Setting up such a structure will take some time, and it’s beneficial to start putting the foundational pieces in place. 15M ARB is a lot of money, but it isn’t in relation to the DAO’s historical spending. The remaining 10M ARB is for ARB-only onchain strategies, so even though the yield will be extremely low, it's good to have the service providers onboarded and the infrastructure in place so that the DAO can have many options at its disposal in the future for treasury allocation.
This is a small amount and therefore, it may not be as effective if you do not use incentives for these committees.
Very often, when giving funds to management, performers can count on an additional bonus for achieving the result. I think this is worth considering.
You are not the only one to call this out. Thank you for doing so. The original rationale was aligning committee members with the Treasury/DAO’s long-term success, hence the ARB-denominated payment terms with a vest. Additionally, the amount was small considering the project returns / small size of the allocation. For example, 7.5M stables earning 10% and 10M ARB earning 2% would ultimately return 750k stables and 200k ARB per annum. If the overhead of the program gets too high, it hardly makes sense to conduct the exercise in the first place. We must also consider the fees of the service providers themselves. Frankly, we would like to increase the TM allotment to 35M ARB, but given the reluctance of community members on this topic, we need to gather more information before making changes to the sizing.
With all that being said, we have changed the compensation structure for the committee members to 10k USDC per member per month, totaling 60k USDC for each member over the course of their term. Additionally, payment to committee members has been amended to ensure deliverables are met.
do you expect the committee to earn at least 1.24 million USD per month from these funds? If not, then why exactly this amount?
The monthly expenses were provided solely to give the DAO some added context into how much we spend on general operations (service providers, grants, and council members) given some community members’ requests for a DAO budget. The goal should, in our opinion, be to cover a significant portion of DAO OpEx through treasury activities over time, but we felt this data point helped justify a 15M ARB conversion to a stablecoin balance to cover service provider shortfalls / other stablecoin needs.
15M ARB being sold over the course of 3 months is, in our opinion, being overstated in terms of market impact. This represents a fraction of the amount of ARB that has been released into the market when compared to incentives programs and other DAO expenditures. With that being said, and in line with our response above, the TMC will be tasked with determining the optimal conversion process, which will ultimately need to be approved by the DAO via Snapshot (thus ensuring the DAO has the final say).
Another potential pain point is scalability. Assuming the DAO selects multiple vendors and demand increases for a larger USDC allocation, how is this increase managed? What will the standard be for reporting and accounting? Establishing guardrails around the approved protocols, strategies, and contracts would be prudent to ensure managers act responsibly and toward the appropriate KPIs as they participate in the TMC.
These are 2 excellent callouts. As we mentioned above, we also think it makes more sense to increase the ARB budget for this proposal by 5-10M ARB (bringing the total to 30-35M ARB). However, we need more input from the wider DAO on this topic, as this was a primary point of contention in Karpatkey’s proposal and the working group calls on treasury management, and we do not want to derail the progress of this proposal.
In regards to the clarification regarding the withdrawal process for stablecoins, the reporting and accounting standards, the process for onboarding new treasury managers, whitelisted strategies/protocols, etc… this recommendation will be provided by the TMC and ultimately approved by the DAO via snapshot. We have updated the proposal to include some of the aforementioned points in the TMC deliverables section.
There is a non-zero chance that both proposals are going after the same resources here (the ETH from the sequencer fees). Is there a plan to better coordinate (or to adjust one proposal) so we don’t “double-spend” the resources? Mostly likely, the Staking Rewards WG will present a study/proposal before this one is approved on Tally.
If the staking rewards source working group arrives at the recommendation of subsidizing stARB rewards by spending ETH that had previously accrued to the DAO treasury, that would be considered a failure from our perspective. The rewards source must be sustainable, and not spend more than the DAO can fund into perpetuity. Therefore, no historically accrued yield should fall into the staking rewards group conversation. These two proposals do not overlap.
We understand the need to appoint members with the right skills and experience to the specific committees. However, a process should be in place to propose and vote out committee members to ensure the governance process continues to be upheld.
Regarding the allocation of ARB and ETH now without a defined budget, we suggest a timeline be included in this proposal when the respective committees will revert with a budget breakdown and schedule for regular updates on planned budget utilization.
The plan for converting ARB tokens into stables should also be a point for the committee responsible to revert to the DAO prior to execution.
How will the committees under Treasury Management be aligned with other initiatives?
There should be a performance component to the Committee compensation and not solely be reliant on a fixed fee… we want to ensure the committee is incentivized to achieve the best possible result for the funds managed
This is a great point. We have edited the language of the proposal to include a course of action for committee members who are not performing and need to be removed. Please see the updated proposal.
Please refer to the above replies.
The proposal has been updated in the “TMC deliverables” section to ensure this point is clear. Thank you for pointing this out alongside Gauntlet.
The aim of this proposal is to ensure the infrastructure is in place for treasury management so the DAO can move nimbly in the future if a heavier allocation towards onchain strategies is desired. We expect more cohesion across the DAO’s overall treasury strategy (to include things such as STEP) once the OpCo has been established.
Payment terms have been updated after overwhelming feedback from interested committee members that the pay was not sufficient. We opted for a fixed rate given the problems that arise from performance-based compensation. We do not want to incentivize riskier strategy deployment due to committee payment structures. With all of that being said, we did add some protections for the DAO by anchoring pay to deliverables by only unlocking ⅓ of payment for each deliverable that is met (RFP approved via Snapshot, and each quarterly report). Please see the updated terms in the revised proposal above.
We sympathize with this point of view, but given the limited DAO ETH holdings and the significant size in dollar-denominated terms, we feel that it is important for the DAO to remain in full control of how the funds are allocated. For clarification, only a Snapshot vote with 3% of the votable token supply would be required to vote in favor/abstain of the deals on a case-by-case basis, rather than the entire governance process (onchain Tally vote). This is in an effort to reduce unnecessary friction that you have pointed out.
Additionally, we have adjusted the GMC members to include a risk-focused member that can alert the Foundation if funds ever need to be withdrawn from a specific partner protocol due to changing market conditions or other risk-related reasons, and this would not be a decision required to go through Snapshot, but rather would be up to the Foundation to act in the best interest of the DAO.
Finally, I would like to inquire about the rationale behind creating two committees to execute each of the management’s objectives. In my opinion, we should appoint a single person -or entity- to carry out all the tasks. I don’t understand why we would add operational costs and additional discussions. One person, with clear objectives and KPIs, should be able to perform well and be subject to revalidation by the DAO after a set period. In this sense, I align with and support Gauntlet’s comment on prioritizing automation and tools that enable DAO oversight whenever possible.
We went with two committees based on the information gathered from the first two working group calls. Additionally, many community members were against treasury managers charging a performance/AUM fee on ETH strategies given the DAO’s ability to simply stake it. While the DAO could take this approach, and this could end up being the recommendation of the GMC, it makes sense to first see what type of concessions other protocols are willing to make to deepen their alliance with the Arbitrum DAO. This type of work requires risk assessment and BD skills, whereas the TMC requires more traditional financial skills mixed with risk and portfolio construction. The OpCo proposal recently hit the forum, which makes clear there will be an individual in charge of making recommendations on the DAO’s treasury operations with clear objectives and KPIs.
I’m in favor of this proposal; I think securing and growing the DAO’s funds is key for continued progress. I support exploring diverse strategies to secure ETH holdings, particularly in ways that promote decentralization within the Ethereum ecosystem.
I think its a good idea to consider allocating ETH to Liquid Staking Tokens (LSTs) or Liquid Re-staking Tokens (LRTs), especially those supporting minority clients, as well as exploring Distributed Validator Technology (DVT). These mechanisms align well with diversified staking approach, protecting against over-centralization and increasing resilience.
This proposal should include a risk management framework to establish a systematic process to evaluate smart contract, counterparty, and market risks. I understand the TMC will be in charge of building this framework but an overview would be very helpful. About the TMC and GMC members, more visibility into their backgrounds would be useful, not to question their qualifications but to better inform our decisions as delegates.
Finally, I believe its important to consider insurance solutions for on-chain and CEX assets as a proactive measure. Of course, integrating KPIs such as target yield, liquidity improvement, and risk-adjusted returns is always a good idea and will provide transparency to the DAO.
We'd like you to inquire a little more, or we can do it at the governance call. For more context, our confusion arises from the following:
Carl Vogel was the point of contact at Paxos for the USDP (then still called PAX) in summer of 2021. Carl proposed the USDP PSM. Inquiries to other contributors, while anecdotal, couldn't locate records of contact with Austin until the following summer of 2022.
It's also notable that Paxos broke its commitment that was part of the onboarding terms. This was partly while Austin was at Paxos for 10 months of 2022:
While there was a later revenue-sharing agreement between Maker and Paxos, this was after Austin's tenure at Paxos and was negotiated by a third party consultant in 2023.
We're not saying it's impossible Citi was advising Paxos on what to do here unbeknownst to Maker, but it was Carl Vogel who got the deal approved at Maker as the Paxos representative. Austin was not at Paxos until half a year after the USDP PSM was approved, and had left half a year before the interest-sharing deal with Maker was proposed.
Perhaps Austin has great qualifications, but we wonder if there is confusion about the extent of his involvement to negotiate USDP's inclusion at MakerDAO. The original deal also was not honored to the best of our knowledge, so it's not a recommendation in our eyes, (though we are biased as longterm MakerDAO contributors who helped approve the original onboarding).
I think we should rethink the 15m ARB convertion to stables as ARB has underperformed the market and this has hurt holders and stakeholders.
Maybe we should explore OTC sales or a really long sale in a 6 month period.
First, I would like to know how this proposal is progressing. I do not see any proposed committee members and the plans for voting are clearly not relevant. And I also didn't see any respond on question in this thread.
And second:
First, I would like to know how this proposal is progressing. I do not see any proposed committee members and the plans for voting are clearly not relevant. And I also didn't see any respond on question in this thread.
And second:
Can you explain why? We already have a precedent with the Arbitrum Foundation, who do not disclose most of their expenses. How can we vote for decisions that we do not fully understand?
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team.
We appreciate the well-structured proposal and the thorough thought process behind Treasury Management v1.1. However, we have a few questions regarding certain aspects of the proposal that we believe require further clarification:
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team.
We appreciate the well-structured proposal and the thorough thought process behind Treasury Management v1.1. However, we have a few questions regarding certain aspects of the proposal that we believe require further clarification:
Could you elaborate on the specific performance metrics that will be used to assess the success of both the Treasury Management and Growth Management committees?
Additionally, could you clarify what is meant by "high guarantees" in the context of ETH-backed strategies? We are particularly interested in understanding how the DAO will assess and minimize risks while ensuring the safe return of ETH. What mechanisms or safeguards will be in place to protect the DAO’s funds and ensure these strategies remain low-risk?
with high guarantees of returning (at minimum) the original number of ETH deployed to the DAO treasury at a certain point in the future.
The proposal addresses several pressing issues hindering the DAO's efficiency and growth potential. By establishing the Treasury Management and Growth Management committees, Arbitrum DAO can strategically manage its assets to ensure operational stability and foster ecosystem expansion.
This proposal is a comprehensive and well-considered approach to optimizing the Arbitrum DAO's treasury management. We at Castle are in favour of this, with some caveats:
The proposal addresses several pressing issues hindering the DAO's efficiency and growth potential. By establishing the Treasury Management and Growth Management committees, Arbitrum DAO can strategically manage its assets to ensure operational stability and foster ecosystem expansion.
This proposal is a comprehensive and well-considered approach to optimizing the Arbitrum DAO's treasury management. We at Castle are in favour of this, with some caveats:
This proposal proposes too many shortcuts, and more needs to be detailed out and verbalized to mitigate and potentially address potential risks by selecting this path forward. We look forward to a response clarifying the above concerns.
It would be useful to more explicitly establish performance metrics and accountability mechanisms. Otherwise, there is a risk that these committees may operate without effective oversight, which could lead to problems in the future. Additionally, the plan to reinvest sequencer revenues seems promising, but it would be beneficial to have greater transparency regarding the specific strategies that could be adopted to ensure the security of the funds and mitigate risks.
Given the current state of ARB token liquidity, how is the plan to convert 15M ARB to stablecoins anticipated to affect relationships with service providers and the overall growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem?
Would be great to see a more detailed framework on how the DAO will evaluate and remove committee members if they are underperforming or acting against the DAO's interests. This would address concerns about the lack of elections and build trust in the proposed governance structure.
It’s good to finally address this conversation. Given the overlap between the proposed Treasury Committee and the Growth Committee, what are the plans for STEP II and its Steering Committee? Should we consider these as completely separate initiatives?
We agree that the ARB token is in poor standing. Referencing Sidd's State of ARB report, we can see that liquidity for ARB on centralized exchanges has dropped significantly, with trades as small as $2 million possibly causing a 20% price impact. With this in mind, swapping into stables on CEXes seems somewhat difficult; to echo @Larva here, is there a plan to OTC the ARB instead? Additionally, in general it has been observed that ARB's liquidity is low compared to its market cap.
It’s good to finally address this conversation. Given the overlap between the proposed Treasury Committee and the Growth Committee, what are the plans for STEP II and its Steering Committee? Should we consider these as completely separate initiatives?
We agree that the ARB token is in poor standing. Referencing Sidd's State of ARB report, we can see that liquidity for ARB on centralized exchanges has dropped significantly, with trades as small as $2 million possibly causing a 20% price impact. With this in mind, swapping into stables on CEXes seems somewhat difficult; to echo @Larva here, is there a plan to OTC the ARB instead? Additionally, in general it has been observed that ARB's liquidity is low compared to its market cap.
Given the current state of the ARB token, what steps can we take to increase its liquidity on centralized exchanges? Regarding on-chain liquidity, the token has improved, but is there a long-term plan to expand its DeFi capabilities to drive up demand? It may benefit the DAO to get ARB accepted as collateral in more lending protocols. While ARB is accepted on Aave as collateral, this is within our own ecosystem. Should we consider enhancing ARB’s cross-chain liquidity or increasing listings?
From a management perspective, will these committees use Zodiac modules to manage the ARB token and optimize DAO security? We agree with the core idea here—improving ARB with on-chain strategies and addressing our idle ETH. Our questions are intended more as future considerations than immediate concerns, although CEX liquidity remains an important consideration here.
Thanks for the great proposal. I have 2 questions:
How will 15M ARB be swapped to stablecoins within 3 months? Will it be sold directly on CEXs or via OTC? Could this cause significant market volatility? Given the current liquidity shortage, 15M ARB represents a large selling pressure. If not handled properly, it could harm all ARB holders and the overall interests of Arbitrum DAO. Is there a detailed plan in place?
How can we ensure the security of funds during transfers and subsequent management? Will the ARB and ETH stay on-chain, or be moved to CEXs? If transferred to CEXs, maintaining full transparency will be challenging. What contingency plans are in place in case of a hack or theft?
Gauntlet supports Entropy's initiative to advance discussions on DAO treasury management and appreciates the progress made. The persistent challenge of converting ARB to USDC for operational budgets highlights the urgent need for a non-custodial toolset that allows the DAO to deposit and withdraw USDC and/or earn risk-adjusted yield on those idle assets. Gauntlet would also support an RFP process, with a disclosure that Gauntlet supports and powers the Aera Protocol, a non-custodial treasury management solution allowing autonomous treasury management with minimal governance input.
Before proceeding to a Snapshot vote, we urge the DAO to consider the amount of ARB the DAO is comfortable depositing into this initiative if its intended use is to be used for funding DAO working groups. We’d also ask for clarification around the withdrawal process (e.g., are funds accessible only after six months?) and how the committee will decide which vendor(s) funds will be withdrawn.
Gauntlet supports Entropy's initiative to advance discussions on DAO treasury management and appreciates the progress made. The persistent challenge of converting ARB to USDC for operational budgets highlights the urgent need for a non-custodial toolset that allows the DAO to deposit and withdraw USDC and/or earn risk-adjusted yield on those idle assets. Gauntlet would also support an RFP process, with a disclosure that Gauntlet supports and powers the Aera Protocol, a non-custodial treasury management solution allowing autonomous treasury management with minimal governance input.
Before proceeding to a Snapshot vote, we urge the DAO to consider the amount of ARB the DAO is comfortable depositing into this initiative if its intended use is to be used for funding DAO working groups. We’d also ask for clarification around the withdrawal process (e.g., are funds accessible only after six months?) and how the committee will decide which vendor(s) funds will be withdrawn.
Another potential pain point is scalability. Assuming the DAO selects multiple vendors and demand increases for a larger USDC allocation, how is this increase managed? What will the standard be for reporting and accounting? Establishing guardrails around the approved protocols, strategies, and contracts would be prudent to ensure managers act responsibly and toward the appropriate KPIs as they participate in the TMC.
Lastly, it’s worth highlighting that there’s an opportunity for meaningful technical advancement in how the DAO manages its treasury. As we progress, we'd urge the DAO to explore alternatives to committees and leverage onchain tooling that minimizes governance and advances toward more autonomous and transparent stewardship in each of its workstreams, including treasury management.
One goal might be establishing onchain functionality that allows the Arbitrum DAO to maintain custody of its active treasury. Even better would be integrating these assets into Tally frontends, enabling the community to view them, create withdrawal proposals directly, and adjust, rebalance, and evaluate automated strategies (or active managers) in real-time.
I like the direction of thought when we start thinking about strategies for storing and growing our funds. However, there are a few points that are unclear to me:
You wrote that you do not want an election.
we believe that it would be more efficient to appoint these individuals/entities given the specific qualifications required of the members
You are offering 30k ARB, which is 5k ARB per month for committee members.
be eligible to receive 30k ARB each vesting linearly over 2 years beginning within 2 weeks of their start date
I like the direction of thought when we start thinking about strategies for storing and growing our funds. However, there are a few points that are unclear to me:
You wrote that you do not want an election.
we believe that it would be more efficient to appoint these individuals/entities given the specific qualifications required of the members
You are offering 30k ARB, which is 5k ARB per month for committee members.
be eligible to receive 30k ARB each vesting linearly over 2 years beginning within 2 weeks of their start date
Very often, when giving funds to management, performers can count on an additional bonus for achieving the result. I think this is worth considering.
do you expect the committee to earn at least 1.24 million USD per month from these funds? If not, then why exactly this amount?
- Service Provider Shortfalls: DAO-funded programs as well as service providers that have proved valuable to the DAO (the ARDC, Steakhouse’s services as a part of STEP, etc.) have run into the problem of having dollar-denominated contracts and not enough ARB to meet the agreed upon rate for services rendered.
IMO, unless I'm misunderstanding a stipulation of the payments of these groups, a lot of this falls on these projects for not immediately selling their ARB into dollar-denominated equivalents. I'm not understanding why they have an expected $X,XXX a month in admin expenses yet hold ARB over a stable coin.
Growth Management (GM): 7,500 ETH allotted (about 75% of the DAOs ETH after BoLD bootstrapping), but all spend must be DAO-approved on a case-by-case basis.
Having the DAO approve spend for each investment decision creates a lot of negatives with really no positives. I think needing DAO approval needs to be removed here. The DAO either trusts the people in charge of this or not, forcing them to come back to us every investment:
All that said, as noted in the proposal the DAO can at any time clawback the funds. So having to approve case-by-case just adds an unnecessary layer of control. Given there already is an 'approval' mechanism built in.
Thank you to everyone who provided highly valuable feedback. Please find the relevant responses below.
How will 15M ARB be swapped to stablecoins within 3 months? Will it be sold directly on CEXs or via OTC? Could this cause significant market volatility? Given the current liquidity shortage, 15M ARB represents a large selling pressure. If not handled properly, it could harm all ARB holders and the overall interests of Arbitrum DAO. Is there a detailed plan in place?
This will be up to the TMC to decide/design (and ultimately the DAO to ratify via Snapshot), but some options include OTC, an Aera or Enzyme-like product that can TWAP out of ARB over a specified time period, periodic CEX spot sells, putting the burden on the Arbitrum Foundation, etc.
How can we ensure the security of funds during transfers and subsequent management? Will the ARB and ETH stay on-chain, or be moved to CEXs? If transferred to CEXs, maintaining full transparency will be challenging. What contingency plans are in place in case of a hack or theft?
The Foundation will serve as the counterparty/custodian for these funds. When researching other treasury management programs, it became apparent that the DAO as the direct counterparty for treasury funds is a legal gray area, and having a foundation with clear jurisdiction and laws to abide by is the proper path forward.
For the TM track, this will again be up to the TMC and ultimately the DAO once it ratifies the path forward. Our personal opinion here is to keep all TM funds onchain with non-custodial infrastructure, but that is just our opinion.
For the GM track, hack or theft is a legitimate concern. Some of the deals that are brought forth to the DAO will inevitably include smart contract risk, require sacrificing the element of non-custodial, among other things. But please note that the DAO must approve these deals on a case-by-case basis and weigh the pros and cons of each offer brought forward by the GMC. It’s very difficult to define all of the risks given how different every deal could be in nature. But in our opinion, the important point is that the DAO is the ultimate decision-maker on all deals and no funds can be allocated unless it garners support.
It’s good to finally address this conversation. Given the overlap between the proposed Treasury Committee and the Growth Committee, what are the plans for STEP II and its Steering Committee? Should we consider these as completely separate initiatives?
For now, Yes. But we believe that it’s possible for OpCo to consolidate the roles of the TMC, GMC, and even the STEP Committee over time once it's established, creating a unified treasury management function for the DAO (assuming the DAO wants OpCo tasked with doing so, which would of course require a DAO vote). As the OpCo is drafted now, there will be an individual who has extensive expertise in finance on the OpCo team. It is difficult to predict what the DAO will want and how OpCo will evolve, but we do believe it makes sense for OpCo to play a role in budgeting, treasury management, etc.
what happened to dao budgeting? wasn’t there a consensus that dao-wide budget needs to be figured out before deploying any capital and treasury-management in general? like this treasury is not gonna go anywhere, why the rush?
We agree with you that a DAO budget is sorely needed. However, as mentioned in the proposal, this task seems better suited for OpCo if we truly want it done the right way. Also included in the proposal is the foregone yield on the DAO’s ETH by doing nothing to date, which has led to an opportunity cost of $1M thus far. We feel as though the DAO needs a “checking account” in stables to hedge against lower offchain yields (STEP) that can also cover service provider short falls due to ARB volatility to enhance the service provider experience of working with Arbitrum. Setting up such a structure will take some time, and it’s beneficial to start putting the foundational pieces in place. 15M ARB is a lot of money, but it isn’t in relation to the DAO’s historical spending. The remaining 10M ARB is for ARB-only onchain strategies, so even though the yield will be extremely low, it's good to have the service providers onboarded and the infrastructure in place so that the DAO can have many options at its disposal in the future for treasury allocation.
This is a small amount and therefore, it may not be as effective if you do not use incentives for these committees.
Very often, when giving funds to management, performers can count on an additional bonus for achieving the result. I think this is worth considering.
You are not the only one to call this out. Thank you for doing so. The original rationale was aligning committee members with the Treasury/DAO’s long-term success, hence the ARB-denominated payment terms with a vest. Additionally, the amount was small considering the project returns / small size of the allocation. For example, 7.5M stables earning 10% and 10M ARB earning 2% would ultimately return 750k stables and 200k ARB per annum. If the overhead of the program gets too high, it hardly makes sense to conduct the exercise in the first place. We must also consider the fees of the service providers themselves. Frankly, we would like to increase the TM allotment to 35M ARB, but given the reluctance of community members on this topic, we need to gather more information before making changes to the sizing.
With all that being said, we have changed the compensation structure for the committee members to 10k USDC per member per month, totaling 60k USDC for each member over the course of their term. Additionally, payment to committee members has been amended to ensure deliverables are met.
do you expect the committee to earn at least 1.24 million USD per month from these funds? If not, then why exactly this amount?
The monthly expenses were provided solely to give the DAO some added context into how much we spend on general operations (service providers, grants, and council members) given some community members’ requests for a DAO budget. The goal should, in our opinion, be to cover a significant portion of DAO OpEx through treasury activities over time, but we felt this data point helped justify a 15M ARB conversion to a stablecoin balance to cover service provider shortfalls / other stablecoin needs.
15M ARB being sold over the course of 3 months is, in our opinion, being overstated in terms of market impact. This represents a fraction of the amount of ARB that has been released into the market when compared to incentives programs and other DAO expenditures. With that being said, and in line with our response above, the TMC will be tasked with determining the optimal conversion process, which will ultimately need to be approved by the DAO via Snapshot (thus ensuring the DAO has the final say).
Another potential pain point is scalability. Assuming the DAO selects multiple vendors and demand increases for a larger USDC allocation, how is this increase managed? What will the standard be for reporting and accounting? Establishing guardrails around the approved protocols, strategies, and contracts would be prudent to ensure managers act responsibly and toward the appropriate KPIs as they participate in the TMC.
These are 2 excellent callouts. As we mentioned above, we also think it makes more sense to increase the ARB budget for this proposal by 5-10M ARB (bringing the total to 30-35M ARB). However, we need more input from the wider DAO on this topic, as this was a primary point of contention in Karpatkey’s proposal and the working group calls on treasury management, and we do not want to derail the progress of this proposal.
In regards to the clarification regarding the withdrawal process for stablecoins, the reporting and accounting standards, the process for onboarding new treasury managers, whitelisted strategies/protocols, etc… this recommendation will be provided by the TMC and ultimately approved by the DAO via snapshot. We have updated the proposal to include some of the aforementioned points in the TMC deliverables section.
There is a non-zero chance that both proposals are going after the same resources here (the ETH from the sequencer fees). Is there a plan to better coordinate (or to adjust one proposal) so we don’t “double-spend” the resources? Mostly likely, the Staking Rewards WG will present a study/proposal before this one is approved on Tally.
If the staking rewards source working group arrives at the recommendation of subsidizing stARB rewards by spending ETH that had previously accrued to the DAO treasury, that would be considered a failure from our perspective. The rewards source must be sustainable, and not spend more than the DAO can fund into perpetuity. Therefore, no historically accrued yield should fall into the staking rewards group conversation. These two proposals do not overlap.
We understand the need to appoint members with the right skills and experience to the specific committees. However, a process should be in place to propose and vote out committee members to ensure the governance process continues to be upheld.
Regarding the allocation of ARB and ETH now without a defined budget, we suggest a timeline be included in this proposal when the respective committees will revert with a budget breakdown and schedule for regular updates on planned budget utilization.
The plan for converting ARB tokens into stables should also be a point for the committee responsible to revert to the DAO prior to execution.
How will the committees under Treasury Management be aligned with other initiatives?
There should be a performance component to the Committee compensation and not solely be reliant on a fixed fee… we want to ensure the committee is incentivized to achieve the best possible result for the funds managed
This is a great point. We have edited the language of the proposal to include a course of action for committee members who are not performing and need to be removed. Please see the updated proposal.
Please refer to the above replies.
The proposal has been updated in the “TMC deliverables” section to ensure this point is clear. Thank you for pointing this out alongside Gauntlet.
The aim of this proposal is to ensure the infrastructure is in place for treasury management so the DAO can move nimbly in the future if a heavier allocation towards onchain strategies is desired. We expect more cohesion across the DAO’s overall treasury strategy (to include things such as STEP) once the OpCo has been established.
Payment terms have been updated after overwhelming feedback from interested committee members that the pay was not sufficient. We opted for a fixed rate given the problems that arise from performance-based compensation. We do not want to incentivize riskier strategy deployment due to committee payment structures. With all of that being said, we did add some protections for the DAO by anchoring pay to deliverables by only unlocking ⅓ of payment for each deliverable that is met (RFP approved via Snapshot, and each quarterly report). Please see the updated terms in the revised proposal above.
We sympathize with this point of view, but given the limited DAO ETH holdings and the significant size in dollar-denominated terms, we feel that it is important for the DAO to remain in full control of how the funds are allocated. For clarification, only a Snapshot vote with 3% of the votable token supply would be required to vote in favor/abstain of the deals on a case-by-case basis, rather than the entire governance process (onchain Tally vote). This is in an effort to reduce unnecessary friction that you have pointed out.
Additionally, we have adjusted the GMC members to include a risk-focused member that can alert the Foundation if funds ever need to be withdrawn from a specific partner protocol due to changing market conditions or other risk-related reasons, and this would not be a decision required to go through Snapshot, but rather would be up to the Foundation to act in the best interest of the DAO.
Finally, I would like to inquire about the rationale behind creating two committees to execute each of the management’s objectives. In my opinion, we should appoint a single person -or entity- to carry out all the tasks. I don’t understand why we would add operational costs and additional discussions. One person, with clear objectives and KPIs, should be able to perform well and be subject to revalidation by the DAO after a set period. In this sense, I align with and support Gauntlet’s comment on prioritizing automation and tools that enable DAO oversight whenever possible.
We went with two committees based on the information gathered from the first two working group calls. Additionally, many community members were against treasury managers charging a performance/AUM fee on ETH strategies given the DAO’s ability to simply stake it. While the DAO could take this approach, and this could end up being the recommendation of the GMC, it makes sense to first see what type of concessions other protocols are willing to make to deepen their alliance with the Arbitrum DAO. This type of work requires risk assessment and BD skills, whereas the TMC requires more traditional financial skills mixed with risk and portfolio construction. The OpCo proposal recently hit the forum, which makes clear there will be an individual in charge of making recommendations on the DAO’s treasury operations with clear objectives and KPIs.
I’m in favor of this proposal; I think securing and growing the DAO’s funds is key for continued progress. I support exploring diverse strategies to secure ETH holdings, particularly in ways that promote decentralization within the Ethereum ecosystem.
I think its a good idea to consider allocating ETH to Liquid Staking Tokens (LSTs) or Liquid Re-staking Tokens (LRTs), especially those supporting minority clients, as well as exploring Distributed Validator Technology (DVT). These mechanisms align well with diversified staking approach, protecting against over-centralization and increasing resilience.
This proposal should include a risk management framework to establish a systematic process to evaluate smart contract, counterparty, and market risks. I understand the TMC will be in charge of building this framework but an overview would be very helpful. About the TMC and GMC members, more visibility into their backgrounds would be useful, not to question their qualifications but to better inform our decisions as delegates.
Finally, I believe its important to consider insurance solutions for on-chain and CEX assets as a proactive measure. Of course, integrating KPIs such as target yield, liquidity improvement, and risk-adjusted returns is always a good idea and will provide transparency to the DAO.
We'd like you to inquire a little more, or we can do it at the governance call. For more context, our confusion arises from the following:
Carl Vogel was the point of contact at Paxos for the USDP (then still called PAX) in summer of 2021. Carl proposed the USDP PSM. Inquiries to other contributors, while anecdotal, couldn't locate records of contact with Austin until the following summer of 2022.
It's also notable that Paxos broke its commitment that was part of the onboarding terms. This was partly while Austin was at Paxos for 10 months of 2022:
While there was a later revenue-sharing agreement between Maker and Paxos, this was after Austin's tenure at Paxos and was negotiated by a third party consultant in 2023.
We're not saying it's impossible Citi was advising Paxos on what to do here unbeknownst to Maker, but it was Carl Vogel who got the deal approved at Maker as the Paxos representative. Austin was not at Paxos until half a year after the USDP PSM was approved, and had left half a year before the interest-sharing deal with Maker was proposed.
Perhaps Austin has great qualifications, but we wonder if there is confusion about the extent of his involvement to negotiate USDP's inclusion at MakerDAO. The original deal also was not honored to the best of our knowledge, so it's not a recommendation in our eyes, (though we are biased as longterm MakerDAO contributors who helped approve the original onboarding).
I think we should rethink the 15m ARB convertion to stables as ARB has underperformed the market and this has hurt holders and stakeholders.
Maybe we should explore OTC sales or a really long sale in a 6 month period.
First, I would like to know how this proposal is progressing. I do not see any proposed committee members and the plans for voting are clearly not relevant. And I also didn't see any respond on question in this thread.
And second:
First, I would like to know how this proposal is progressing. I do not see any proposed committee members and the plans for voting are clearly not relevant. And I also didn't see any respond on question in this thread.
And second:
Can you explain why? We already have a precedent with the Arbitrum Foundation, who do not disclose most of their expenses. How can we vote for decisions that we do not fully understand?
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team.
We appreciate the well-structured proposal and the thorough thought process behind Treasury Management v1.1. However, we have a few questions regarding certain aspects of the proposal that we believe require further clarification:
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team.
We appreciate the well-structured proposal and the thorough thought process behind Treasury Management v1.1. However, we have a few questions regarding certain aspects of the proposal that we believe require further clarification:
Could you elaborate on the specific performance metrics that will be used to assess the success of both the Treasury Management and Growth Management committees?
Additionally, could you clarify what is meant by "high guarantees" in the context of ETH-backed strategies? We are particularly interested in understanding how the DAO will assess and minimize risks while ensuring the safe return of ETH. What mechanisms or safeguards will be in place to protect the DAO’s funds and ensure these strategies remain low-risk?
with high guarantees of returning (at minimum) the original number of ETH deployed to the DAO treasury at a certain point in the future.
The proposal addresses several pressing issues hindering the DAO's efficiency and growth potential. By establishing the Treasury Management and Growth Management committees, Arbitrum DAO can strategically manage its assets to ensure operational stability and foster ecosystem expansion.
This proposal is a comprehensive and well-considered approach to optimizing the Arbitrum DAO's treasury management. We at Castle are in favour of this, with some caveats:
The proposal addresses several pressing issues hindering the DAO's efficiency and growth potential. By establishing the Treasury Management and Growth Management committees, Arbitrum DAO can strategically manage its assets to ensure operational stability and foster ecosystem expansion.
This proposal is a comprehensive and well-considered approach to optimizing the Arbitrum DAO's treasury management. We at Castle are in favour of this, with some caveats:
This proposal proposes too many shortcuts, and more needs to be detailed out and verbalized to mitigate and potentially address potential risks by selecting this path forward. We look forward to a response clarifying the above concerns.
It would be useful to more explicitly establish performance metrics and accountability mechanisms. Otherwise, there is a risk that these committees may operate without effective oversight, which could lead to problems in the future. Additionally, the plan to reinvest sequencer revenues seems promising, but it would be beneficial to have greater transparency regarding the specific strategies that could be adopted to ensure the security of the funds and mitigate risks.
Given the current state of ARB token liquidity, how is the plan to convert 15M ARB to stablecoins anticipated to affect relationships with service providers and the overall growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem?
Would be great to see a more detailed framework on how the DAO will evaluate and remove committee members if they are underperforming or acting against the DAO's interests. This would address concerns about the lack of elections and build trust in the proposed governance structure.
It’s good to finally address this conversation. Given the overlap between the proposed Treasury Committee and the Growth Committee, what are the plans for STEP II and its Steering Committee? Should we consider these as completely separate initiatives?
We agree that the ARB token is in poor standing. Referencing Sidd's State of ARB report, we can see that liquidity for ARB on centralized exchanges has dropped significantly, with trades as small as $2 million possibly causing a 20% price impact. With this in mind, swapping into stables on CEXes seems somewhat difficult; to echo @Larva here, is there a plan to OTC the ARB instead? Additionally, in general it has been observed that ARB's liquidity is low compared to its market cap.
It’s good to finally address this conversation. Given the overlap between the proposed Treasury Committee and the Growth Committee, what are the plans for STEP II and its Steering Committee? Should we consider these as completely separate initiatives?
We agree that the ARB token is in poor standing. Referencing Sidd's State of ARB report, we can see that liquidity for ARB on centralized exchanges has dropped significantly, with trades as small as $2 million possibly causing a 20% price impact. With this in mind, swapping into stables on CEXes seems somewhat difficult; to echo @Larva here, is there a plan to OTC the ARB instead? Additionally, in general it has been observed that ARB's liquidity is low compared to its market cap.
Given the current state of the ARB token, what steps can we take to increase its liquidity on centralized exchanges? Regarding on-chain liquidity, the token has improved, but is there a long-term plan to expand its DeFi capabilities to drive up demand? It may benefit the DAO to get ARB accepted as collateral in more lending protocols. While ARB is accepted on Aave as collateral, this is within our own ecosystem. Should we consider enhancing ARB’s cross-chain liquidity or increasing listings?
From a management perspective, will these committees use Zodiac modules to manage the ARB token and optimize DAO security? We agree with the core idea here—improving ARB with on-chain strategies and addressing our idle ETH. Our questions are intended more as future considerations than immediate concerns, although CEX liquidity remains an important consideration here.
Thanks for the great proposal. I have 2 questions:
How will 15M ARB be swapped to stablecoins within 3 months? Will it be sold directly on CEXs or via OTC? Could this cause significant market volatility? Given the current liquidity shortage, 15M ARB represents a large selling pressure. If not handled properly, it could harm all ARB holders and the overall interests of Arbitrum DAO. Is there a detailed plan in place?
How can we ensure the security of funds during transfers and subsequent management? Will the ARB and ETH stay on-chain, or be moved to CEXs? If transferred to CEXs, maintaining full transparency will be challenging. What contingency plans are in place in case of a hack or theft?
Gauntlet supports Entropy's initiative to advance discussions on DAO treasury management and appreciates the progress made. The persistent challenge of converting ARB to USDC for operational budgets highlights the urgent need for a non-custodial toolset that allows the DAO to deposit and withdraw USDC and/or earn risk-adjusted yield on those idle assets. Gauntlet would also support an RFP process, with a disclosure that Gauntlet supports and powers the Aera Protocol, a non-custodial treasury management solution allowing autonomous treasury management with minimal governance input.
Before proceeding to a Snapshot vote, we urge the DAO to consider the amount of ARB the DAO is comfortable depositing into this initiative if its intended use is to be used for funding DAO working groups. We’d also ask for clarification around the withdrawal process (e.g., are funds accessible only after six months?) and how the committee will decide which vendor(s) funds will be withdrawn.
Gauntlet supports Entropy's initiative to advance discussions on DAO treasury management and appreciates the progress made. The persistent challenge of converting ARB to USDC for operational budgets highlights the urgent need for a non-custodial toolset that allows the DAO to deposit and withdraw USDC and/or earn risk-adjusted yield on those idle assets. Gauntlet would also support an RFP process, with a disclosure that Gauntlet supports and powers the Aera Protocol, a non-custodial treasury management solution allowing autonomous treasury management with minimal governance input.
Before proceeding to a Snapshot vote, we urge the DAO to consider the amount of ARB the DAO is comfortable depositing into this initiative if its intended use is to be used for funding DAO working groups. We’d also ask for clarification around the withdrawal process (e.g., are funds accessible only after six months?) and how the committee will decide which vendor(s) funds will be withdrawn.
Another potential pain point is scalability. Assuming the DAO selects multiple vendors and demand increases for a larger USDC allocation, how is this increase managed? What will the standard be for reporting and accounting? Establishing guardrails around the approved protocols, strategies, and contracts would be prudent to ensure managers act responsibly and toward the appropriate KPIs as they participate in the TMC.
Lastly, it’s worth highlighting that there’s an opportunity for meaningful technical advancement in how the DAO manages its treasury. As we progress, we'd urge the DAO to explore alternatives to committees and leverage onchain tooling that minimizes governance and advances toward more autonomous and transparent stewardship in each of its workstreams, including treasury management.
One goal might be establishing onchain functionality that allows the Arbitrum DAO to maintain custody of its active treasury. Even better would be integrating these assets into Tally frontends, enabling the community to view them, create withdrawal proposals directly, and adjust, rebalance, and evaluate automated strategies (or active managers) in real-time.
I like the direction of thought when we start thinking about strategies for storing and growing our funds. However, there are a few points that are unclear to me:
You wrote that you do not want an election.
we believe that it would be more efficient to appoint these individuals/entities given the specific qualifications required of the members
You are offering 30k ARB, which is 5k ARB per month for committee members.
be eligible to receive 30k ARB each vesting linearly over 2 years beginning within 2 weeks of their start date
I like the direction of thought when we start thinking about strategies for storing and growing our funds. However, there are a few points that are unclear to me:
You wrote that you do not want an election.
we believe that it would be more efficient to appoint these individuals/entities given the specific qualifications required of the members
You are offering 30k ARB, which is 5k ARB per month for committee members.
be eligible to receive 30k ARB each vesting linearly over 2 years beginning within 2 weeks of their start date
Very often, when giving funds to management, performers can count on an additional bonus for achieving the result. I think this is worth considering.
do you expect the committee to earn at least 1.24 million USD per month from these funds? If not, then why exactly this amount?