Proceeding to Tally next week. Language added to ensure r3gen gets payment for the month of August and the report created for that month. Ask increased to 600k ARB (from 400k) to provide ample buffer for the program given the USD denominated costs.
Changes: Updated specific scope of r3gen reporting and language around the multisig "The funds in the multisigs belong to the DAO and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation."
We would like to express our gratitude to r3gen finance for authoring the Token Flow Report and querying the data that led to the ideation and creation of this proposal. Additional thanks to @krst and @coinflip for their help along the way.
We propose creating a structured multi-sig framework to facilitate funded programs within Arbitrum DAO to reduce operational spend and increase proposal efficiency.
As of April 2024, the DAO administers six programs with a designated budget for multi-sig signing. The aggregate budgeted cost across these programs for signers stands at 158,000 ARB, with an annualized total expenditure, based on estimations, of 470,000 ARB or $627,840 at an ARB price of $1.34. This is a high cost for the DAO to pay on a purely operational function, especially considering that these operational costs will likely rise as more programs are funded.
We propose creating a “Multi-sig Support Service” (MSS) to unlock significant cost-saving opportunities, lessen committee fragmentation, ensure signers are competent with multi-sigs, and reduce friction for contributors creating proposals. The MSS will comprise 12 elected individuals to all DAO-funded multi-sigs. They will be compensated a base USD amount, paid in ARB, for performing these services across the DAO.
This proposal also funds the implementation of r3gen monthly Token Flow reporting on inflows (revenue) and outflows (spend) across the DAO as well as providing detailed information and analysis on spending from MSS multisigs. Together, this proposal will help create a “backroom finance” function within the DAO that can be used across different initiatives.
The proposed changes offer the potential to generate substantial cost savings, estimated to be ~$315,000 per annum, while increasing efficiency, transparency, and security of DAO spending.
The Arbitrum DAO oversees six programs which pay multi-sig signers. Each multi-sig typically has five signers, except for the STIP and STIP backfund programs, which share the same multi-sig and have nine signers budgeted for. The table below outlines these programs, including the amount funded, duration (in months), and annualized figures to project a forecasted amount if future programs were to continue in the same manner.
Here's a breakdown of the programs:
The analysis underscores the operational unsustainability of the current expenditure level, with an annualised cost totalling $627,840 USD based on the average ARB price of $1.34 between August 7, 2023 and April 30, 2024, the period starting when Arbitrum DAO’s first multisig was funded.
The cost per transaction appears excessive when comparing these figures against the volume of unique transactions sent from each multi-sig. While analysis for all multi-sig wallets is included for completeness, the STIP/Backfund multi-sig provides the clearest picture of the “cost per transaction” due to its proximity to completion.
This analysis highlights the urgent need for restructuring and cost optimization within the Arbitrum DAO to ensure financial sustainability and operational efficiency in the long term.
It is also worth highlighting that the current structure has individuals appearing across multiple different multi-sigs, drawing income from each.
Currently, the DAO experiences a significant dispersion in its structure, where each funded program operates its own multi-sig. This fragmentation not only leads to redundancy but also elevates the overall cost of operations. Through the “Multi-sig Support Service” (MSS), we can eliminate these inefficiencies and significantly reduce unnecessary expenditure.
Additionally, individuals on multi-sigs are generally not elected, posing a challenge in consistently ensuring that only the most trusted and competent members manage these critical roles. By shifting to an elected model within the MSS, we can enhance transparency, accountability, and professionalism, ensuring that every signer meets a high standard of trust and competency.
Finally, contributors currently face friction in advancing proposals due to the need to wrangle signers, which can delay or deter the proposal process. The MSS aims to streamline this process by providing a reliable and consistent team of signers to be included in proposals, thereby reducing the time and effort of contributors, and accelerating the pace at which the DAO can execute its initiatives.
By creating a structured multisig committee, process, and reporting cadence around spending, the DAO will be better equipped to service its plethora of proposals that require payments and maintain transparency around the programs.
The proposed framework for the Arbitrum DAO aims to address these issues by:
The funds in the multisigs belong to the DAO and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation.
We suggest the program is capped at initiatives seeking funding of $50M or less. This will help ensure that the program is not bottlenecked by one single initiative. For programs seeking more than $50M in funding, we suggest inspiration in design be taken from this model while creating a dedicated multisig committee and process.
The process flow for creating new multisigs is as follows
To improve security and clarity of payments running through MSS multi-sigs, the following financial controls processes will be maintained:
Payment request: approval flow
At the outset programs using the MSS will define their payment approval flow, including
This is an important security step to mitigate the risk that a Program member's personal accounts will be compromised and used to trigger a payment by the multisig to an unintended party. (i.e. hack someone's Telegram and tell the grants program to queue a payment up to the hacker's wallet).
An example of this structure
Given the abstraction of responsibility from multisig signers and program operators, this step is important to ensure the security and integrity of fund transfers.
Payment request: format
Payment requests should be structured as follows by the “payment requestor”
Name of supplier | Category | nature of the payment | supporting evidence
This will allow for multisig approvers to better understand the details of the payment they are being asked to process. Moreover, by ensuring clear supplier name and categorization a more efficient reporting flow can be maintained. The category of payment is to be defined by the program itself (i.e. “Tooling”, “Contributor payment”, “legal fees”). If the DAO wishes to move ahead with Token Flow reporting, r3gen finance will also conduct discovery with each program team to help them define and confirm program reporting categorization at the outset of their program.
In order to maintain the integrity and impartiality of the MSS, signers must adhere to a strict Conflict of Interest Policy. This policy ensures that all decisions made by MSS signers are in the best interest of the DAO and free from personal gain or undue influence.
A conflict of interest occurs when an individual’s personal interests interfere, or appear to interfere, with their responsibilities to the DAO. Conflicts of interest include, but are not limited to:
Procedure in the Event of a Conflict: If a conflict of interest arises, or if a situation arises that could be perceived as a conflict, the signer must:
All COI executions must be documented by an MSS Chair and communicated to the DAO in a forum thread dedicated to MSS operations.
There are 2 paths to the removal of an MSS member:
If a member is removed via the DAO Snapshot or MSS Member Agreement the member will immediately lose further compensation. Once a member is removed, the following steps will be taken to ensure continuity and maintain the governance structure:
All removal proceedings, details around the new signer, and the reasons for the removal must be documented by an MSS Chair and communicated to the DAO in a forum thread dedicated to MSS operations.
Transactions are expected to be promptly (within 24 hours) reviewed by all signers, and if approved through the process outlined above, signed. While we realise that there will be times when a signer may not have internet access or some other deterrent to signing, these are expected to be few and far between. If there are more than 3 lapses in expectations over the course of a 2 month period, chairs are expected to communicate that to the DAO and potentially remove the signer.
We believe each multisig should be set up with the DAO maintaining the ability to clawback funds. In order to execute this, multisigs should be set up using the same model as the security council, by making upgradeexecutor as a module so that DAO maintains full authoritative power.
This same mechanism will be used to transfer ownership of the multisigs to new members when new elections take place in 12 months. This might require a slight technical change, awaiting confirmation from the Foundation.
Token Flow | Scope To aid in the transparency and clarity of reporting within the DAO, we are also proposing the publication of a monthly “Token Flow Report,” which will include illustrate expenditure amounts and breakdowns for all Arbitrum MSS-managed multisigs. In addition, r3gen finance will provide insights on inflows from Sequencer Flows and a high-level summary of other direct outflows from the Arbitrum Treasury to programs not coordinated under the MSS framework.
This approach will synergise with the operational execution created by the MSS to provide holistic insights into expenditures and the movement of Token in/out of the Treasury. Moreover, it will reduce the finance-admin burden on individual programs, relieving them of the need to track, draft, and publish exhaustive financial updates themselves whilst also providing the DAO with a clear mechanism to ensure spending within the organisation is consistent with the structure outlined within each proposal.
Within this role, r3gen finance will also lead the development of deeper financial insights and be open to requests by delegates and the community for further specific analysis. This can be requested either via a google form or by commenting directly on the report in the forum. Ultimately, this will enable the DAO to have, at it’s fingertips, the detailed financial insights it needs to support decision-making.
With the inclusion of Token Flow Reporting, the DAO can unlock the next layer of accounting and reporting on top of the MSS and together creates a holistic backroom finance function to provide the DAO with much-needed data around spending. This will enhance the DAO's transparency, accountability, and impact.
We encourage you to review the first iteration of the Token Flow report to get a sense of its design.
Moving forward, financial items within the report will include, but are not limited to:
This report is just the starting point. With community feedback, we will continue to develop and iterate on the monthly token flow report to provide deeper insights and analysis of what the community wants to see. This team will host a monthly finance call on the public calendar to discuss the report's outputs and collect community feedback to inform the next iteration.
If you have any specific feedback you would like to see reflected in the report we encourage you to reach out to Pepperoni_Jo3 or Jono_Gibbs on Telegram.
Token Flow | Team
Token Flow Reporting at Arbitrum DAO will be coordinated by a team of four (Elliott, Jono, Matthew and Pepperoni Joe) who bring professional “Big Four” expertise and extensive experience working across top web3 protocols, including Swell, Aave, Gitcoin, Index Coop, Inverse Finance, Squid, Vote Agora, Enzyme, Treasure.
Token Flow | Pricing for Token Flow Report:
$6650 USD per month paid upfront in ARB on the 1st of the month using USD/ARB spot price. This includes the web3 accounting sub-ledgers fee and other monthly tooling costs (approximately $750). Work has been ongoing since June to prepare the first Token Flow Reporting which will be published in August, covering the DAO’s finances from Genesis to July 2024. The full monthly payment for August will be paid on the 1st of August, OR when the Tally vote is successfully passed and multi-sig set up to receive funds, whichever is latest. Work done to prepare the report through June and July will not be billed; that will be free on us (r3gen) for the DAO.
Current Structure
Project forward estimated multisig cost for the DAO is a challenge, but assuming multisig costs project in line with historical, some future scenarios of yearly cost are displayed below:
*assuming ARB allocation cost per multi-sig breakdown as aligned with historic
Current spend on multisig with Arbitrum DAO is high, and spending could increase significantly if the number of new multisigs or ARB price increases significantly. This indicates that implementing this proposal would be of significant financial benefit to the Arbitrum DAO.
Proposed Structure For implementation of all aspects of this proposal, we estimate the structure will incur a cost of $313,800 per year.
Multisig Support Service
| Role | Role | Monthly Cost per role | Total Monthly Cost | Cost per Year (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MSS Chairs | 3 | $2500 | $7500 | $90,000 |
| Signer | 9 | $1500 | $12,000 | $144,000 |
| $234,000 |
| Role | Role | Monthly Cost per role | Total Monthly Cost | Cost per Year (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Token Flow Report (r3gen) | 1 | $6650 | $6650 | $79,800 |
| $79,800 |
We propose an allocation of 600,000 ARB to fund an approximately 1+ year multi-sig budget for the DAO. As compensation is denominated in $, but paid in ARB, the specific duration that this budget will fund signers cannot be accurately determined. Assuming the program succeeds, a renewal proposal will be drafted to top up this budget to fund continued signer payments. This will be done in parallel to a reelection process of signers performing this function.
We believe this proposal represents an important restructuring that will be a net benefit for the DAO. While the total cost of spiralling multi-sig committees has yet to be realised, this preemptive action will set the DAO up for long-term financial success. Together with Token Flow reporting, this proposal creates a structure within the DAO that can be utilized across many different initiatives while allowing the DAO transparency into those spends.
Voting (rank order)
FOR - Implementing MSS
FOR - Implementing MSS and Token Flow Reporting
ABSTAIN
AGAINST
Proceeding to Tally next week. Language added to ensure r3gen gets payment for the month of August and the report created for that month. Ask increased to 600k ARB (from 400k) to provide ample buffer for the program given the USD denominated costs.
Changes: Updated specific scope of r3gen reporting and language around the multisig "The funds in the multisigs belong to the DAO and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation."
We would like to express our gratitude to r3gen finance for authoring the Token Flow Report and querying the data that led to the ideation and creation of this proposal. Additional thanks to @krst and @coinflip for their help along the way.
We propose creating a structured multi-sig framework to facilitate funded programs within Arbitrum DAO to reduce operational spend and increase proposal efficiency.
As of April 2024, the DAO administers six programs with a designated budget for multi-sig signing. The aggregate budgeted cost across these programs for signers stands at 158,000 ARB, with an annualized total expenditure, based on estimations, of 470,000 ARB or $627,840 at an ARB price of $1.34. This is a high cost for the DAO to pay on a purely operational function, especially considering that these operational costs will likely rise as more programs are funded.
We propose creating a “Multi-sig Support Service” (MSS) to unlock significant cost-saving opportunities, lessen committee fragmentation, ensure signers are competent with multi-sigs, and reduce friction for contributors creating proposals. The MSS will comprise 12 elected individuals to all DAO-funded multi-sigs. They will be compensated a base USD amount, paid in ARB, for performing these services across the DAO.
This proposal also funds the implementation of r3gen monthly Token Flow reporting on inflows (revenue) and outflows (spend) across the DAO as well as providing detailed information and analysis on spending from MSS multisigs. Together, this proposal will help create a “backroom finance” function within the DAO that can be used across different initiatives.
The proposed changes offer the potential to generate substantial cost savings, estimated to be ~$315,000 per annum, while increasing efficiency, transparency, and security of DAO spending.
The Arbitrum DAO oversees six programs which pay multi-sig signers. Each multi-sig typically has five signers, except for the STIP and STIP backfund programs, which share the same multi-sig and have nine signers budgeted for. The table below outlines these programs, including the amount funded, duration (in months), and annualized figures to project a forecasted amount if future programs were to continue in the same manner.
Here's a breakdown of the programs:
The analysis underscores the operational unsustainability of the current expenditure level, with an annualised cost totalling $627,840 USD based on the average ARB price of $1.34 between August 7, 2023 and April 30, 2024, the period starting when Arbitrum DAO’s first multisig was funded.
The cost per transaction appears excessive when comparing these figures against the volume of unique transactions sent from each multi-sig. While analysis for all multi-sig wallets is included for completeness, the STIP/Backfund multi-sig provides the clearest picture of the “cost per transaction” due to its proximity to completion.
This analysis highlights the urgent need for restructuring and cost optimization within the Arbitrum DAO to ensure financial sustainability and operational efficiency in the long term.
It is also worth highlighting that the current structure has individuals appearing across multiple different multi-sigs, drawing income from each.
Currently, the DAO experiences a significant dispersion in its structure, where each funded program operates its own multi-sig. This fragmentation not only leads to redundancy but also elevates the overall cost of operations. Through the “Multi-sig Support Service” (MSS), we can eliminate these inefficiencies and significantly reduce unnecessary expenditure.
Additionally, individuals on multi-sigs are generally not elected, posing a challenge in consistently ensuring that only the most trusted and competent members manage these critical roles. By shifting to an elected model within the MSS, we can enhance transparency, accountability, and professionalism, ensuring that every signer meets a high standard of trust and competency.
Finally, contributors currently face friction in advancing proposals due to the need to wrangle signers, which can delay or deter the proposal process. The MSS aims to streamline this process by providing a reliable and consistent team of signers to be included in proposals, thereby reducing the time and effort of contributors, and accelerating the pace at which the DAO can execute its initiatives.
By creating a structured multisig committee, process, and reporting cadence around spending, the DAO will be better equipped to service its plethora of proposals that require payments and maintain transparency around the programs.
The proposed framework for the Arbitrum DAO aims to address these issues by:
The funds in the multisigs belong to the DAO and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation.
We suggest the program is capped at initiatives seeking funding of $50M or less. This will help ensure that the program is not bottlenecked by one single initiative. For programs seeking more than $50M in funding, we suggest inspiration in design be taken from this model while creating a dedicated multisig committee and process.
The process flow for creating new multisigs is as follows
To improve security and clarity of payments running through MSS multi-sigs, the following financial controls processes will be maintained:
Payment request: approval flow
At the outset programs using the MSS will define their payment approval flow, including
This is an important security step to mitigate the risk that a Program member's personal accounts will be compromised and used to trigger a payment by the multisig to an unintended party. (i.e. hack someone's Telegram and tell the grants program to queue a payment up to the hacker's wallet).
An example of this structure
Given the abstraction of responsibility from multisig signers and program operators, this step is important to ensure the security and integrity of fund transfers.
Payment request: format
Payment requests should be structured as follows by the “payment requestor”
Name of supplier | Category | nature of the payment | supporting evidence
This will allow for multisig approvers to better understand the details of the payment they are being asked to process. Moreover, by ensuring clear supplier name and categorization a more efficient reporting flow can be maintained. The category of payment is to be defined by the program itself (i.e. “Tooling”, “Contributor payment”, “legal fees”). If the DAO wishes to move ahead with Token Flow reporting, r3gen finance will also conduct discovery with each program team to help them define and confirm program reporting categorization at the outset of their program.
In order to maintain the integrity and impartiality of the MSS, signers must adhere to a strict Conflict of Interest Policy. This policy ensures that all decisions made by MSS signers are in the best interest of the DAO and free from personal gain or undue influence.
A conflict of interest occurs when an individual’s personal interests interfere, or appear to interfere, with their responsibilities to the DAO. Conflicts of interest include, but are not limited to:
Procedure in the Event of a Conflict: If a conflict of interest arises, or if a situation arises that could be perceived as a conflict, the signer must:
All COI executions must be documented by an MSS Chair and communicated to the DAO in a forum thread dedicated to MSS operations.
There are 2 paths to the removal of an MSS member:
If a member is removed via the DAO Snapshot or MSS Member Agreement the member will immediately lose further compensation. Once a member is removed, the following steps will be taken to ensure continuity and maintain the governance structure:
All removal proceedings, details around the new signer, and the reasons for the removal must be documented by an MSS Chair and communicated to the DAO in a forum thread dedicated to MSS operations.
Transactions are expected to be promptly (within 24 hours) reviewed by all signers, and if approved through the process outlined above, signed. While we realise that there will be times when a signer may not have internet access or some other deterrent to signing, these are expected to be few and far between. If there are more than 3 lapses in expectations over the course of a 2 month period, chairs are expected to communicate that to the DAO and potentially remove the signer.
We believe each multisig should be set up with the DAO maintaining the ability to clawback funds. In order to execute this, multisigs should be set up using the same model as the security council, by making upgradeexecutor as a module so that DAO maintains full authoritative power.
This same mechanism will be used to transfer ownership of the multisigs to new members when new elections take place in 12 months. This might require a slight technical change, awaiting confirmation from the Foundation.
Token Flow | Scope To aid in the transparency and clarity of reporting within the DAO, we are also proposing the publication of a monthly “Token Flow Report,” which will include illustrate expenditure amounts and breakdowns for all Arbitrum MSS-managed multisigs. In addition, r3gen finance will provide insights on inflows from Sequencer Flows and a high-level summary of other direct outflows from the Arbitrum Treasury to programs not coordinated under the MSS framework.
This approach will synergise with the operational execution created by the MSS to provide holistic insights into expenditures and the movement of Token in/out of the Treasury. Moreover, it will reduce the finance-admin burden on individual programs, relieving them of the need to track, draft, and publish exhaustive financial updates themselves whilst also providing the DAO with a clear mechanism to ensure spending within the organisation is consistent with the structure outlined within each proposal.
Within this role, r3gen finance will also lead the development of deeper financial insights and be open to requests by delegates and the community for further specific analysis. This can be requested either via a google form or by commenting directly on the report in the forum. Ultimately, this will enable the DAO to have, at it’s fingertips, the detailed financial insights it needs to support decision-making.
With the inclusion of Token Flow Reporting, the DAO can unlock the next layer of accounting and reporting on top of the MSS and together creates a holistic backroom finance function to provide the DAO with much-needed data around spending. This will enhance the DAO's transparency, accountability, and impact.
We encourage you to review the first iteration of the Token Flow report to get a sense of its design.
Moving forward, financial items within the report will include, but are not limited to:
This report is just the starting point. With community feedback, we will continue to develop and iterate on the monthly token flow report to provide deeper insights and analysis of what the community wants to see. This team will host a monthly finance call on the public calendar to discuss the report's outputs and collect community feedback to inform the next iteration.
If you have any specific feedback you would like to see reflected in the report we encourage you to reach out to Pepperoni_Jo3 or Jono_Gibbs on Telegram.
Token Flow | Team
Token Flow Reporting at Arbitrum DAO will be coordinated by a team of four (Elliott, Jono, Matthew and Pepperoni Joe) who bring professional “Big Four” expertise and extensive experience working across top web3 protocols, including Swell, Aave, Gitcoin, Index Coop, Inverse Finance, Squid, Vote Agora, Enzyme, Treasure.
Token Flow | Pricing for Token Flow Report:
$6650 USD per month paid upfront in ARB on the 1st of the month using USD/ARB spot price. This includes the web3 accounting sub-ledgers fee and other monthly tooling costs (approximately $750). Work has been ongoing since June to prepare the first Token Flow Reporting which will be published in August, covering the DAO’s finances from Genesis to July 2024. The full monthly payment for August will be paid on the 1st of August, OR when the Tally vote is successfully passed and multi-sig set up to receive funds, whichever is latest. Work done to prepare the report through June and July will not be billed; that will be free on us (r3gen) for the DAO.
Current Structure
Project forward estimated multisig cost for the DAO is a challenge, but assuming multisig costs project in line with historical, some future scenarios of yearly cost are displayed below:
*assuming ARB allocation cost per multi-sig breakdown as aligned with historic
Current spend on multisig with Arbitrum DAO is high, and spending could increase significantly if the number of new multisigs or ARB price increases significantly. This indicates that implementing this proposal would be of significant financial benefit to the Arbitrum DAO.
Proposed Structure For implementation of all aspects of this proposal, we estimate the structure will incur a cost of $313,800 per year.
Multisig Support Service
| Role | Role | Monthly Cost per role | Total Monthly Cost | Cost per Year (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MSS Chairs | 3 | $2500 | $7500 | $90,000 |
| Signer | 9 | $1500 | $12,000 | $144,000 |
| $234,000 |
| Role | Role | Monthly Cost per role | Total Monthly Cost | Cost per Year (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Token Flow Report (r3gen) | 1 | $6650 | $6650 | $79,800 |
| $79,800 |
We propose an allocation of 600,000 ARB to fund an approximately 1+ year multi-sig budget for the DAO. As compensation is denominated in $, but paid in ARB, the specific duration that this budget will fund signers cannot be accurately determined. Assuming the program succeeds, a renewal proposal will be drafted to top up this budget to fund continued signer payments. This will be done in parallel to a reelection process of signers performing this function.
We believe this proposal represents an important restructuring that will be a net benefit for the DAO. While the total cost of spiralling multi-sig committees has yet to be realised, this preemptive action will set the DAO up for long-term financial success. Together with Token Flow reporting, this proposal creates a structure within the DAO that can be utilized across many different initiatives while allowing the DAO transparency into those spends.
Voting (rank order)
FOR - Implementing MSS
FOR - Implementing MSS and Token Flow Reporting
ABSTAIN
AGAINST
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-16: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-16
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-16: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-16
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/77?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/75?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/74?u=0x_ultra
There are currently half a dozen fragmented programs performing ministerial functions around disbursement of funds. This creates a lot of duplicative effort and expenses. We support consolidating these roles as proposed. GFX supported this previously at the Snapshot level.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/72
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/71?u=ocandocrypto
I am in full support of this proposal to create a structured multi-sig framework within Arbitrum DAO. The proposed "Multi-sig Support Service" (MSS) will significantly reduce operational costs and streamline the proposal process. By consolidating multi-sig operations and electing trusted signers, we can ensure transparency, efficiency, and financial sustainability. Additionally, the inclusion of Token Flow Reporting will enhance our understanding of financial movements within the DAO, aiding in informed decision-making. This initiative represents a crucial step toward optimizing our governance and operational framework.
To create a structured multi-sig framework to facilitate funded programs within Arbitrum DAO is benefit to reduce operational spend and increase proposal efficiency.
These updates are clear, efficient, and promise to lower expenses. We are eager to see the positive changes they will bring.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/40
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/39?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/38
this is a very welcome proposal as it aims to balance efficiency, security, and transparency in managing multisig operations
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/35?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/33?u=princetonblockchain
After addressing a few issues pointed out by the delegates, the proposal will be an enhancement of the current setup we have.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/31
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476?u=larva
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/30?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/28?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/27?u=jojo
This initiative will reduce costs for multisig
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/77?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/75?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/74?u=0x_ultra
There are currently half a dozen fragmented programs performing ministerial functions around disbursement of funds. This creates a lot of duplicative effort and expenses. We support consolidating these roles as proposed. GFX supported this previously at the Snapshot level.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/72
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/71?u=ocandocrypto
I am in full support of this proposal to create a structured multi-sig framework within Arbitrum DAO. The proposed "Multi-sig Support Service" (MSS) will significantly reduce operational costs and streamline the proposal process. By consolidating multi-sig operations and electing trusted signers, we can ensure transparency, efficiency, and financial sustainability. Additionally, the inclusion of Token Flow Reporting will enhance our understanding of financial movements within the DAO, aiding in informed decision-making. This initiative represents a crucial step toward optimizing our governance and operational framework.
To create a structured multi-sig framework to facilitate funded programs within Arbitrum DAO is benefit to reduce operational spend and increase proposal efficiency.
These updates are clear, efficient, and promise to lower expenses. We are eager to see the positive changes they will bring.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/40
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/39?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/38
this is a very welcome proposal as it aims to balance efficiency, security, and transparency in managing multisig operations
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/35?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/33?u=princetonblockchain
After addressing a few issues pointed out by the delegates, the proposal will be an enhancement of the current setup we have.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/31
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476?u=larva
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/30?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/28?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/27?u=jojo
This initiative will reduce costs for multisig
The Treasure ARC is supportive and voting FOR the MSS proposal.
Overall we believe this will improve the operational efficiency of the DAO and reduce unnecessary overhead expenses. Some concerns raised around internal removal of members have been noted but the ARC believes some agency around removal of members due to conflict, compromise, or lack of execution should be permitted to allow for improved quality of service.
The Treasure ARC is supportive and voting FOR the MSS proposal.
Overall we believe this will improve the operational efficiency of the DAO and reduce unnecessary overhead expenses. Some concerns raised around internal removal of members have been noted but the ARC believes some agency around removal of members due to conflict, compromise, or lack of execution should be permitted to allow for improved quality of service.
Very impressive analysis and a well thought out proposal!
Very impressive analysis and a well thought out proposal!
The results are in for the # Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service (MSS) onchain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/701
The results are in for the # Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service (MSS) onchain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/701
I voted "FOR" because this proposal is a smart way to save the DAO a cool ~$315,000. Instead of throwing ARB at fragmented multi-sig signers, we're getting a streamlined, pro team to handle it all, cutting down on costs and chaos. Plus, with the r3gen reporting, we'll have a clear view of every ARB in and out, making it easier to track spending. It’s about efficiency, transparency, and keeping the DAO’s wallet happy.
I have supported the MSS since inception and will continue to show my support by voting "For" on Tally. I think this will help reduce cost and increases efficiencies within the DAO moving forward.
I voted FOR this proposal on Tally, for the reasons outlined below
I’m in favor of this initiative. In addition to generating cost savings, I believe it will make the DAO more efficient and safer by creating one clear set of multisig operations that can be audited and integrated with from a tooling perspective.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’ll be voting FOR this proposal during the onchain vote.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’ll be voting FOR this proposal during the onchain vote.
We supported the proposal during the Snapshot vote, participated in the elections of the MSS members, and will also support it on-chain. We’d like to resurface that in addition to signers going through KYC, we would like to see the structure of a legal agreement that binds the signers to act in good faith and protects them from any liability that comes with executing a transaction.
That is not currently not addressed in the proposal, but we’re voting in good faith that Entropy will ensure that the aforementioned agreement is introduced.
Just voted FOR in the on chain tally proposal.
Will post my rationale later.
I'm voting FOR on Tally.
On the previous snapshot vote this was my rationale. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/ultra-delegate-communication-thread/24425/3?u=0x_ultra
I'm happy feedback was incorporated into the final form of the proposal and happy to be one of the MSS members.
We vote FOR the proposal on Tally.
We maintain the rationale below on this proposal and continue to support the selected members to act as the guardians of the Arbitrum Multi-sig.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/32?u=tane
Voting "for" on Tally.
DAOplomats voted FOR this proposal on Tally.
This was a good initiative we supported during the temp check so we showed our support during the onchain vote as well.
Voted FOR as this is an easy way to increase efficiency and address holes in the current MS process per proposal.
The list of candidates I voted FOR were known figures that contributed to the DAO and are aligned with Arbitrum.
Savvy DAO voted for the following. We know it wasn't 12 people but honestly there were too many good candidates!
gm, voted for the following candidates. My selection was based on their performance and experience in the ArbitrumDAO and blockchain industry in general.
We voted FOR the following 12 candidates. As an applicant ourselves, we decided to spread our votes equally and to candidates who have been valuable and active contributors to the DAO:
I voted for in hope that this will reduce costs overall over time. But I still think that the payment made montly is way too high. Because looking at the figures given in the first year there is no benefit in having the MSS.
I voted "FOR" because this proposal is a smart way to save the DAO a cool ~$315,000. Instead of throwing ARB at fragmented multi-sig signers, we're getting a streamlined, pro team to handle it all, cutting down on costs and chaos. Plus, with the r3gen reporting, we'll have a clear view of every ARB in and out, making it easier to track spending. It’s about efficiency, transparency, and keeping the DAO’s wallet happy.
I have supported the MSS since inception and will continue to show my support by voting "For" on Tally. I think this will help reduce cost and increases efficiencies within the DAO moving forward.
I voted FOR this proposal on Tally, for the reasons outlined below
I’m in favor of this initiative. In addition to generating cost savings, I believe it will make the DAO more efficient and safer by creating one clear set of multisig operations that can be audited and integrated with from a tooling perspective.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’ll be voting FOR this proposal during the onchain vote.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’ll be voting FOR this proposal during the onchain vote.
We supported the proposal during the Snapshot vote, participated in the elections of the MSS members, and will also support it on-chain. We’d like to resurface that in addition to signers going through KYC, we would like to see the structure of a legal agreement that binds the signers to act in good faith and protects them from any liability that comes with executing a transaction.
That is not currently not addressed in the proposal, but we’re voting in good faith that Entropy will ensure that the aforementioned agreement is introduced.
Just voted FOR in the on chain tally proposal.
Will post my rationale later.
I'm voting FOR on Tally.
On the previous snapshot vote this was my rationale. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/ultra-delegate-communication-thread/24425/3?u=0x_ultra
I'm happy feedback was incorporated into the final form of the proposal and happy to be one of the MSS members.
We vote FOR the proposal on Tally.
We maintain the rationale below on this proposal and continue to support the selected members to act as the guardians of the Arbitrum Multi-sig.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/32?u=tane
Voting "for" on Tally.
DAOplomats voted FOR this proposal on Tally.
This was a good initiative we supported during the temp check so we showed our support during the onchain vote as well.
Voted FOR as this is an easy way to increase efficiency and address holes in the current MS process per proposal.
The list of candidates I voted FOR were known figures that contributed to the DAO and are aligned with Arbitrum.
Savvy DAO voted for the following. We know it wasn't 12 people but honestly there were too many good candidates!
gm, voted for the following candidates. My selection was based on their performance and experience in the ArbitrumDAO and blockchain industry in general.
We voted FOR the following 12 candidates. As an applicant ourselves, we decided to spread our votes equally and to candidates who have been valuable and active contributors to the DAO:
I voted for in hope that this will reduce costs overall over time. But I still think that the payment made montly is way too high. Because looking at the figures given in the first year there is no benefit in having the MSS.
Savvy DAO voted for the following. We know it wasn't 12 people but honestly there were too many good candidates!
See voting reasoning here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/21266/55?u=savvydao
I voted for in hope that this will reduce costs overall over time. But I still think that the payment made montly is way too high. Because looking at the figures given in the first year there is no benefit in having the MSS.
I know these numbers can and will change but given that there are only 1-3 transactions a month paying basically 500$ per transaction if its 3, is a lot. Yes these people are responsible for important tasks but for example I am in multiple Aave DAO multi-sigs regarding the Aave protocol embassy or Guardian and none of the signer is getting paid. Its a free service to the DAO.
On behalf of the UADP, we have voted for three members that we thought were fit for the role and have been very involved in discussions following up and during the voting process. Three votes was such that each vote made a decent impact on the results.
Voting has completed for the MSS members. Thank you to all who took part and congratulations to the winners:
The KYC process with the foundation will now begin before this proposal moves to its final stage of Tally.
I voted FOR everyone who met the following criteria in the MSS elections:
I voted for the following members:
I voted FOR everyone who met the following criteria in the MSS elections:
I voted for the following members:
After much internal debate, Blockworks Research has decided to abstain from this vote by dividing our voting power evenly across all applicants. This is to avoid any conceivable conflict of interest situations as two of the MSS applicants are employed at Blockworks Research.
We also contemplated casting votes and strictly excluding the two aforementioned applicants from consideration but ultimately decided to abstain since even with this method, there are situations where our voting rationale could theoretically be driven by self-interest instead of the quality of applicants.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the
Disclaimer: Sinkas has nominated himself to participate in the elections for the MSS as an individual and not as a representative of L2BEAT. Since there is no direct or indirect conflict of interest with voting in his favor, we will be including his application in our selection.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the
Disclaimer: Sinkas has nominated himself to participate in the elections for the MSS as an individual and not as a representative of L2BEAT. Since there is no direct or indirect conflict of interest with voting in his favor, we will be including his application in our selection.
Having said that, we have decided to vote for the following people:
We based our decision on a combination of the following criteria and our understanding of how each nominee fulfills them (in no particular order).
I have voted for the following candidates for the MSS committee. My decision was based on a mixture of experience and contributions to the Arbitrum DAO, as well as factoring in those who I believe have shown to be trustworthy for this role. My list below is in no particular order and does not indicate a ranking of any type.
We vote to select the members below based on their contributions, and the fact that they have deep knowledge and context about the DAO:
Updating vote to account for all 12 spots. @AlexLumley @jierlich
We have chosen the candidates we believe are the best fit for the MSS committee. Our selection is based on their demonstrated expertise, experience, and contributions within the Arbitrum ecosystem and other DAOs. Below are the candidates we are voting for, along with our reasons for their selection:
Sinkas - We have seen his contributions and would love to see him continue contributing to the DAO.
We have chosen the candidates we believe are the best fit for the MSS committee. Our selection is based on their demonstrated expertise, experience, and contributions within the Arbitrum ecosystem and other DAOs. Below are the candidates we are voting for, along with our reasons for their selection:
Sinkas - We have seen his contributions and would love to see him continue contributing to the DAO.
Stablelab- Governance OG with strong Arbitrum grant program experience.
Frisson - Highly involved and hardworking in Arbitrum.
Griff - We have seen great inputs from Griff, so we believe he’s suitable for this role.
Cattin - Very active delegate, and his management of the delegate incentive program has been smooth so far.
PGov - A very good delegate who fits this position well in terms of making decisions and providing excellent inputs.
JoJo - He has managed various programs from Arbitrum and did an excellent job, so we believe he will be a great fit for this role.
Disruption Joe - Joe has been very helpful in the DAO, and his leadership in leading working groups has been excellent. We believe he will be a great fit for this position.
It is exciting to see so many talented people interested in being part of this. I'm sure the DAO would be well served by any composition coming from these candidates. As I'm not a large delegate, I limited my voting choices to two: Jojo and Disruption Joe.
Since I am not a huge delegate, I have decided to allocate all my voting power to @AlexLumley this time.
When I think of someone who is consistently contributing, connecting, and driving the long-term goals of the DAO, Alex comes to mind.
I support his inclusion in this list of 12 contributors as part of this important initiative.
Michigan Blockchain distributed the vote among the following 10 candidates in no particular order based on who we think would fit best in the role. @PGov @JoJo @Avantgarde @cattin @Sinkas @AranaDigital @Matt_StableLab @Frisson @TheBlockResearch @404DAO
I believe the following 12 people are strong candidates for the MSS:
Good luck everyone~!
I'll be voting for the following individuals/teams as I feel I can strongly vouch for their reliability, technical competence, and availability.
@JoJo @Sov @slobo.eth @0x_ultra @Sinkas StableLab @DisruptionJoe @Frisson @lindsey @404DAO @AlexLumley & myself
I'll be voting for the following individuals/teams as I feel I can strongly vouch for their reliability, technical competence, and availability.
@JoJo @Sov @slobo.eth @0x_ultra @Sinkas StableLab @DisruptionJoe @Frisson @lindsey @404DAO @AlexLumley & myself
EDIT: I have broken my initial rule of limiting myself to 12 votes and added Jonah from Den Technologies to my list as I believe anyone who has worked with Safe as much as Jonah is a valuable asset to have on a multisig and he fits my initial criteria I laid out.
We are also adding in our opinions to this thread. We have chosen who we believe are 12 best candidates for this role (abstaining from ourselves) by the order in which they submitted nominations:
[continuing list from previous post]
(this is gonna be fun)
I am voting for the following 12 people, in no precise order, for the Arbitrum Multi Sig.
(this is gonna be fun)
I am voting for the following 12 people, in no precise order, for the Arbitrum Multi Sig.
[note, motivation continues into next post because I can only mention so many people in each one apparently]
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
We voted For the MSS component of this proposal as it is a much-needed initiative. Even though our team has been with Arbitrum from day-one as delegates, it does get confusing trying to keep track of all the groups that we’ve chosen to approve. Our team has been thinking about the future of how other DAOs like Uniswap can also make their operations more efficient. And we’ve more-so organically trended towards entrusting a single multisig for handling most of the Uni DAO’s costs via the Accountability Committee. Of course, the number of multisigs in Arbitrum outnumber those on Uniswap, and will continue to do so, but the principle stands–effective tracking of monetary flows enables better efficiency. The security practices are also outlined well, like the approval flow to reduce the degree of abstraction behind multisig operations and the DEN integration. One concern, however, is the delay period
A point for consideration: Maybe this can be left out? I assume some are OK with providing this info for the KYC, but not openly on the forum.
For tracking purposes, I'm copying the reasoning of my snapshot vote here:
Reason: After addressing a few issues pointed out by the delegates, the proposal will be an enhancement of the current setup we have.
Savvy DAO voted for the following. We know it wasn't 12 people but honestly there were too many good candidates!
See voting reasoning here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/21266/55?u=savvydao
I voted for in hope that this will reduce costs overall over time. But I still think that the payment made montly is way too high. Because looking at the figures given in the first year there is no benefit in having the MSS.
I know these numbers can and will change but given that there are only 1-3 transactions a month paying basically 500$ per transaction if its 3, is a lot. Yes these people are responsible for important tasks but for example I am in multiple Aave DAO multi-sigs regarding the Aave protocol embassy or Guardian and none of the signer is getting paid. Its a free service to the DAO.
On behalf of the UADP, we have voted for three members that we thought were fit for the role and have been very involved in discussions following up and during the voting process. Three votes was such that each vote made a decent impact on the results.
Voting has completed for the MSS members. Thank you to all who took part and congratulations to the winners:
The KYC process with the foundation will now begin before this proposal moves to its final stage of Tally.
I voted FOR everyone who met the following criteria in the MSS elections:
I voted for the following members:
I voted FOR everyone who met the following criteria in the MSS elections:
I voted for the following members:
After much internal debate, Blockworks Research has decided to abstain from this vote by dividing our voting power evenly across all applicants. This is to avoid any conceivable conflict of interest situations as two of the MSS applicants are employed at Blockworks Research.
We also contemplated casting votes and strictly excluding the two aforementioned applicants from consideration but ultimately decided to abstain since even with this method, there are situations where our voting rationale could theoretically be driven by self-interest instead of the quality of applicants.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the
Disclaimer: Sinkas has nominated himself to participate in the elections for the MSS as an individual and not as a representative of L2BEAT. Since there is no direct or indirect conflict of interest with voting in his favor, we will be including his application in our selection.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the
Disclaimer: Sinkas has nominated himself to participate in the elections for the MSS as an individual and not as a representative of L2BEAT. Since there is no direct or indirect conflict of interest with voting in his favor, we will be including his application in our selection.
Having said that, we have decided to vote for the following people:
We based our decision on a combination of the following criteria and our understanding of how each nominee fulfills them (in no particular order).
I have voted for the following candidates for the MSS committee. My decision was based on a mixture of experience and contributions to the Arbitrum DAO, as well as factoring in those who I believe have shown to be trustworthy for this role. My list below is in no particular order and does not indicate a ranking of any type.
We vote to select the members below based on their contributions, and the fact that they have deep knowledge and context about the DAO:
Updating vote to account for all 12 spots. @AlexLumley @jierlich
We have chosen the candidates we believe are the best fit for the MSS committee. Our selection is based on their demonstrated expertise, experience, and contributions within the Arbitrum ecosystem and other DAOs. Below are the candidates we are voting for, along with our reasons for their selection:
Sinkas - We have seen his contributions and would love to see him continue contributing to the DAO.
We have chosen the candidates we believe are the best fit for the MSS committee. Our selection is based on their demonstrated expertise, experience, and contributions within the Arbitrum ecosystem and other DAOs. Below are the candidates we are voting for, along with our reasons for their selection:
Sinkas - We have seen his contributions and would love to see him continue contributing to the DAO.
Stablelab- Governance OG with strong Arbitrum grant program experience.
Frisson - Highly involved and hardworking in Arbitrum.
Griff - We have seen great inputs from Griff, so we believe he’s suitable for this role.
Cattin - Very active delegate, and his management of the delegate incentive program has been smooth so far.
PGov - A very good delegate who fits this position well in terms of making decisions and providing excellent inputs.
JoJo - He has managed various programs from Arbitrum and did an excellent job, so we believe he will be a great fit for this role.
Disruption Joe - Joe has been very helpful in the DAO, and his leadership in leading working groups has been excellent. We believe he will be a great fit for this position.
It is exciting to see so many talented people interested in being part of this. I'm sure the DAO would be well served by any composition coming from these candidates. As I'm not a large delegate, I limited my voting choices to two: Jojo and Disruption Joe.
Since I am not a huge delegate, I have decided to allocate all my voting power to @AlexLumley this time.
When I think of someone who is consistently contributing, connecting, and driving the long-term goals of the DAO, Alex comes to mind.
I support his inclusion in this list of 12 contributors as part of this important initiative.
Michigan Blockchain distributed the vote among the following 10 candidates in no particular order based on who we think would fit best in the role. @PGov @JoJo @Avantgarde @cattin @Sinkas @AranaDigital @Matt_StableLab @Frisson @TheBlockResearch @404DAO
I believe the following 12 people are strong candidates for the MSS:
Good luck everyone~!
I'll be voting for the following individuals/teams as I feel I can strongly vouch for their reliability, technical competence, and availability.
@JoJo @Sov @slobo.eth @0x_ultra @Sinkas StableLab @DisruptionJoe @Frisson @lindsey @404DAO @AlexLumley & myself
I'll be voting for the following individuals/teams as I feel I can strongly vouch for their reliability, technical competence, and availability.
@JoJo @Sov @slobo.eth @0x_ultra @Sinkas StableLab @DisruptionJoe @Frisson @lindsey @404DAO @AlexLumley & myself
EDIT: I have broken my initial rule of limiting myself to 12 votes and added Jonah from Den Technologies to my list as I believe anyone who has worked with Safe as much as Jonah is a valuable asset to have on a multisig and he fits my initial criteria I laid out.
We are also adding in our opinions to this thread. We have chosen who we believe are 12 best candidates for this role (abstaining from ourselves) by the order in which they submitted nominations:
[continuing list from previous post]
(this is gonna be fun)
I am voting for the following 12 people, in no precise order, for the Arbitrum Multi Sig.
(this is gonna be fun)
I am voting for the following 12 people, in no precise order, for the Arbitrum Multi Sig.
[note, motivation continues into next post because I can only mention so many people in each one apparently]
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
We voted For the MSS component of this proposal as it is a much-needed initiative. Even though our team has been with Arbitrum from day-one as delegates, it does get confusing trying to keep track of all the groups that we’ve chosen to approve. Our team has been thinking about the future of how other DAOs like Uniswap can also make their operations more efficient. And we’ve more-so organically trended towards entrusting a single multisig for handling most of the Uni DAO’s costs via the Accountability Committee. Of course, the number of multisigs in Arbitrum outnumber those on Uniswap, and will continue to do so, but the principle stands–effective tracking of monetary flows enables better efficiency. The security practices are also outlined well, like the approval flow to reduce the degree of abstraction behind multisig operations and the DEN integration. One concern, however, is the delay period
A point for consideration: Maybe this can be left out? I assume some are OK with providing this info for the KYC, but not openly on the forum.
For tracking purposes, I'm copying the reasoning of my snapshot vote here:
Reason: After addressing a few issues pointed out by the delegates, the proposal will be an enhancement of the current setup we have.
We are also adding in our opinions to this thread. We have chosen who we believe are 12 best candidates for this role (abstaining from ourselves) by the order in which they submitted nominations:
This was a super hard decision and above all, it's great to see so many strong applicants!
[continuing list from previous post]
I'm quite excited for this election tbh, putting together these many good contributors and delegates is only possible in a program like this one. As i said initially, is gonna be fun
EDIT (something got lost in copy pasting message in 2 posts). There are a lot of good folks listed here, more than the 12 that will be elected imho. While I could have voted for more, I decided to stick to only the 12 I would like to see in this program. This doesn't mean that others are not endorsed, is just a personal preference, and I really hope to keep seeing some of these and others names more involved in operational programs like this one for the dao. Is all about trust, and trust is something that you build over time and should be rewarded by roles like the above :slight_smile:
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
We voted For the MSS component of this proposal as it is a much-needed initiative. Even though our team has been with Arbitrum from day-one as delegates, it does get confusing trying to keep track of all the groups that we’ve chosen to approve. Our team has been thinking about the future of how other DAOs like Uniswap can also make their operations more efficient. And we’ve more-so organically trended towards entrusting a single multisig for handling most of the Uni DAO’s costs via the Accountability Committee. Of course, the number of multisigs in Arbitrum outnumber those on Uniswap, and will continue to do so, but the principle stands–effective tracking of monetary flows enables better efficiency. The security practices are also outlined well, like the approval flow to reduce the degree of abstraction behind multisig operations and the DEN integration. One concern, however, is the delay period
R3gen’s report was also well-written. We are in support of hiring them for this task on a monthly basis, however, the current fee does seem high. $2500/month seems to be sufficient since after an initial month’s reporting, subsequent month’s will just get easier. Much of the analysis is simply going back to a previous spreadsheet and editing a couple of sections. Unless they are supplementing the data with more detailed explanations and descriptions, beyond a rote numerical template, the cost should be lower. We are signaling a need for this type of reporting by voting For R3gen. It would also be nice for them to provide a template for monthly reports prior to onchain vote.
All for it, I think a maximum of transparency in operations is necessary. The cost reduction is important and over time I hope this part of the DAO becomes more proceduralized. Maybe even a custom interface that is public? I think that would help make the DAO more transparent.
Savvy DAO has voted FOR the proposal. See rationale below: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/21266/37?u=savvydao
The proposal has passed with overwhelming support and the above feedback has been noted. There will be one more round of small edits to ensure the feedback has been implemented before proceeding to Tally.
Below is a draft of the Application Template for the MSS. This draft will live here for 1 week before being posted in its own thread with the 2 week nomination period opening. Please feel free to leave any feedback around the application in this time.
The proposal has passed with overwhelming support and the above feedback has been noted. There will be one more round of small edits to ensure the feedback has been implemented before proceeding to Tally.
Below is a draft of the Application Template for the MSS. This draft will live here for 1 week before being posted in its own thread with the 2 week nomination period opening. Please feel free to leave any feedback around the application in this time.
Date:
I support this proposal. The provided framework clearly addresses and standardizes many of the problems with multi-sigs, including inefficiency (corralling signers), high-cost (paying signers a non-standardized amount), "blind signing" (a lack of standardized formatting with what's being signed), conflicts of interest, and reputation/trust of signers.
One pain point of releasing payment is the KYC process. I admittedly don't fully understand the issue but after personally experiencing long payment delays after receiving a grant, I gathered that it has to do with each payer's uniquely established KYC process.
I support this proposal. The provided framework clearly addresses and standardizes many of the problems with multi-sigs, including inefficiency (corralling signers), high-cost (paying signers a non-standardized amount), "blind signing" (a lack of standardized formatting with what's being signed), conflicts of interest, and reputation/trust of signers.
One pain point of releasing payment is the KYC process. I admittedly don't fully understand the issue but after personally experiencing long payment delays after receiving a grant, I gathered that it has to do with each payer's uniquely established KYC process.
Will the proposed framework address the KYC issue described above? (I'm happy to try to provide more context if my description of the problem is not clear).
Lastly, I would like to suggest medium-length term limits for the signers in order to create opportunity for others in the DAO to be signers.
I will be voting "For" this proposal, with the reporting feature included.
As a broad concept, I think this is a great idea. Naturally there would be concerns about centralization, however as we've seen from the data points a lot of the multisig projects have the same people working on them. Plus, it looks like changes have been made to alleviate some of the possible issues. Regardless, the reduction in costs and administrative complexities outweigh any increased centralization factors (that again, can largely be mitigated and possibly already exist).
I will be voting "For" this proposal, with the reporting feature included.
As a broad concept, I think this is a great idea. Naturally there would be concerns about centralization, however as we've seen from the data points a lot of the multisig projects have the same people working on them. Plus, it looks like changes have been made to alleviate some of the possible issues. Regardless, the reduction in costs and administrative complexities outweigh any increased centralization factors (that again, can largely be mitigated and possibly already exist).
Others have brought up great ideas / concerns, of which I largely agree with or atleast feel are valid enough to warrant the discussion. Of note, I will echo others about having some more guidelines for those on the council. Whether that is term limits or shorter voting periods. The report should be be helpful as well and welcome its addition.
As for the discussion of current-running multisigs, I think the best course of action would be to let them run out as originally voted on unless there is a consensus reached by all the multi-sig signers that they would like to turn over control the new MSS.
Blockworks Research will be voting FOR the implementation of the MSS and the reporting services on Snapshot.
We think this is a great initiative, reducing expenses in a scalable way while likely also increasing operational efficiency. We also believe that the Token Flow Report is a solid addition, with accounting services seeming like a high value-add to the DAO.
Blockworks Research will be voting FOR the implementation of the MSS and the reporting services on Snapshot.
We think this is a great initiative, reducing expenses in a scalable way while likely also increasing operational efficiency. We also believe that the Token Flow Report is a solid addition, with accounting services seeming like a high value-add to the DAO.
Community members have discussed the signer committee structure quite extensively. On most points raised, we maintain a neutral stance. However, we believe that an extended term for this initiative actually makes sense, since it seems that robust guardrails are being put in place and the time spent on additional voting/operational ramp-up for new signers would be decreased. Moreover, we strongly agree with this point made by L2BEAT:
In addition to signers going through KYC, we would like to see the structure of a legal agreement that binds the signers to act in good faith and protects them from any liability that comes with executing a transaction.
Do we understand correctly that the planned finance back-office functions are intended to cover only DAO programs valued below $50M? If so, we believe it would be advantageous to broaden the scope to encompass all funding initiatives. This would prevent potential complications arising from, e.g., multiple reporting entities and community members having to go through several data sources. Additionally, a beneficial inclusion that immediately comes to mind would be the addition of forward-looking figures, such as F12M revenue and expense projections, to the report.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting in favor of the proposal as we believe the outlined multisig service has the potential to save the DAO and its contributors time and money, and it’s something worth experimenting with. We’ll also be voting in favor of having R3gen Finance's monthly report, as we believe that information is useful.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting in favor of the proposal as we believe the outlined multisig service has the potential to save the DAO and its contributors time and money, and it’s something worth experimenting with. We’ll also be voting in favor of having R3gen Finance's monthly report, as we believe that information is useful.
Having said that, with the report priced the way it is, we expect the R3gen Finance team to allocate the necessary resources in terms of time and manpower to be available to the DAO to answer any questions related to their reports. We’d also expect them to be able to handle ad-hoc requests related to their financial reporting as they arise and adapt the reports’ scope and structure to changing DAO needs.
Furthermore, we have 2 things that we’d like to see addressed before the proposal goes to an on-chain vote:
In the execution process outlined in the proposal, the multisig signers are not responsible for verifying the requested transaction or for vetoing it - that responsibility lies with the ‘payment approver.’ Therefore, we should protect the signers from any liability arising from executing a payment.
Lastly, we believe the MSS should be very responsive to ensure timely payment execution, and we’d like to point out that inactive signers should be promptly removed and replaced.
DAOplomats voted in favor of Implementing MSS and Reporting.
This is a very welcome proposal at this time as it aims to balance efficiency, security, and transparency in managing multisig operations across the DAO. Based on the analysis provided on what is already spent, implementing this proposal will definitely be protecting the interests of the DAO.
gm, the initiative sounds solid regarding cost-cutting, budget monitoring, and process improvement (signers and thresholds).
Voted FOR.
I have decided to vote FOR the Implementation and Reporting outlined in this proposal.
After reading the feedback and concerns raised by the delegates, I find them rational and am pleased to see that these issues have been addressed along the way.
I have decided to vote FOR the Implementation and Reporting outlined in this proposal.
After reading the feedback and concerns raised by the delegates, I find them rational and am pleased to see that these issues have been addressed along the way.
The idea of regular reporting is sound. I understand that it might be a tedious task, but it is undoubtedly necessary to ensure the transparency required for our DAO to make informed decisions.
I wonder if one year might be too long to evaluate whether this implementation is effective for iterative improvement, or if a shorter timeframe should be considered to allow for quicker action if it does not meet our current needs.
Overall, however, I am excited about the execution of this proposal.
Thank you for the proposal. To begin with, the framework will lower operating costs so that it can be financially suitable in the future. Furthermore, the use of a more professional MSS will enhance the security of multi-signature transactions. For this reason, Token Flow Report will ensure openness and better control over spending. Thus, as ITU Blockchain, we will vote in favor of this proposal.
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR the MSS and r3gen's reporting at the Snapshot stage. Standardizing multisig usage in the DAO would reduce costs significantly and also make things easier for proposal authors in need of a multisig.
Daniel raised a good point about this creating a potential weak spot for the DAO. However, we think that the election process (and the Foundation KYC) for the MSS members should reduce that risk. (On that note - are we just going through the regular Foundation KYC process, or adding in some kind of extra checks to assist in "[ensuring] their integrity and [reducing] the risk of coercion"?)
Thanks @Entropy for putting together the proposal. It's definitely an important issue to be addressed and we appreciate the effort to modify the proposal as the feedback from the delegates are given.
We vote FOR the proposal at its Snapshot phase with the additional report included as the first selection. As described, this change will clearly increase the efficiency of the similar operations for the various initiatives. We would also like to see the election and term systems to be included in the Tally voting as suggested by other delegates. We don't necessarily mind 1 year term, but it would be good to see staggered signer terms (e.g. 6 people cycles in 6 months.)
Makes a lot of sense, this is needed and will optimize costs. Concerns have been addressed in a valid way. Also supportive of the reports, at least as a trial, so that next iterations can include findings on new votes/elections. Voted in favour
After carefully reviewing this proposal and the additional delegate comments, we believe implementing the MSS would be a net positive for the Arbitrum DAO and the broader ecosystem. The current multi-sig structure has become operationally unsustainable due to high costs and fragmentation. Consolidating to a single elected multi-sig committee should reduce unnecessary expenditures, increase professionalism, and streamline the proposal process for contributors.
However, we share some of the concerns raised by delegates, namely around potential centralization risks, ensuring fair compensation aligned with workload, and having clear criteria for electing signers. We'd like to see further discussion on these points in the final on-chain proposal. Mechanisms like staggered signer terms could help mitigate centralization. And the payment structure may need to be reevaluated if the number of multi-sigs and associated workload changes significantly.
We will vote in favor of the MSS proposal with the additional report, as we believe this initiative will significantly enhance the overall efficiency of the DAO's financial operations.
While several concerns have been raised by other delegates, they have already been addressed:
We will vote in favor of the MSS proposal with the additional report, as we believe this initiative will significantly enhance the overall efficiency of the DAO's financial operations.
While several concerns have been raised by other delegates, they have already been addressed:
The threshold for each bucket has been increased by 1. i. 6/12: <$1M ii. 7/12: $1M-$5M iii. 8/12: $5M-$10m iiii. 9/12 $10M-$50M
The threshold for internal removal has been increased from 6 to 8. MSS Member Agreement: If at least 8 MSS members (8 out of 12 members) agree that a signer should be removed due to breach of duties or conflict of interest, they can initiate the removal process internally. The agreement must be documented and publicly disclosed to maintain transparency. Analytics on signer activity from Den may be used as supporting evidence.
The expectation that a gradual transition where current multi-sigs finish our their lifecycle has been clearly stated.
We also believe that the additional report will promote transparency and facilitate better decision-making within the community. However, we would appreciate more detailed information about the report's price breakdown and how the allocated funds will be spent. Thank you @Entropy team again for this great initiative!
After some thoughts, decided to vote "for", including the reporting implementation.
I want to clarify a few things here.
After some thoughts, decided to vote "for", including the reporting implementation.
I want to clarify a few things here.
But, this is not necessarily an endorsement on a tally vote. Initially i thought it would be hell cause signers would need to be able to create txs for all programs. And while this seems trivial for people outside of multisig world, is definitely not (ie: txs for a group of people, but excluding one that didn't kyc yet; tx that is partially paid in fixed amount of arb, and variable amount of arb cause payment is in usd equivalent at the time of the tx itself; same as before, but with the usd value that has to be on a 30day moving average; etc). Then, luckily, @dk3 educated me on the delegation feature that will allow external people to post a transactions in the safe for signers to sign. But I also understand there could effectively be issues, especially because not all programs are equal (ie: the delegate incentive program is one if the highest lift in term of number of transactions, variability of payout, problems with kyc and timing).
Regardless of the chosen solution, we need to address the above cases with a plan that will have to be integrated in every program using the MSS, in a way that scales and either allows one of the program main stakeholder to post transactions, or provide a way for a chair/signer to more actively participate to the single program. Which means, necessarily, a bigger overhead in time and costs. The latter solution also means finding a consensus mechanism between participants (=signers for that program) to choose the designated one. Either randomly, by internal election, they all fight in a room, but there is going to be one member who will effectively be paid more and also have more responsibility and will need to invest more time talking with someone from the program. If it's the chair I am not sure. But in general, my suggestion for programs in which there is the need of scalability without effectively knowing the final size of labour needed (ltipp anyone?), should be to think about both a fixed comp, and the one proposed above is to me good enough, but also a potentially variable one tied to the number of programs one should interface with. Would dare to say, potentially even further specialise this component between programs with low amount and variance of transactions and high amount of txs or heterogeneous ones. Hope the suggestion helps.
I will be voting "For".
I find myself in agreement with most points raised by JoJo. On the expense side, costs are definitely high for what's being proposed and for that reason reporting and accountability is even more important. 12 month terms are also abnormal within the DAO and would love to see this revised.
I will be voting "For".
I find myself in agreement with most points raised by JoJo. On the expense side, costs are definitely high for what's being proposed and for that reason reporting and accountability is even more important. 12 month terms are also abnormal within the DAO and would love to see this revised.
Overall this is a positive change, but I hope this is not the final form of the proposal that makes it to Tally.
We could also benefit from a rotation (meaning ppl can not run from more than 2 terms or something like that)
Regarding the concern of centralization: the proposal’s intent is to enhance consistency and professionalism within the DAO’s operations. We are open to explore mechanisms such as staggered terms or more frequent rotations of signers to prevent excessive centralization and keep the system dynamic and inclusive if other delegates echo this thought.
We are also adding in our opinions to this thread. We have chosen who we believe are 12 best candidates for this role (abstaining from ourselves) by the order in which they submitted nominations:
This was a super hard decision and above all, it's great to see so many strong applicants!
[continuing list from previous post]
I'm quite excited for this election tbh, putting together these many good contributors and delegates is only possible in a program like this one. As i said initially, is gonna be fun
EDIT (something got lost in copy pasting message in 2 posts). There are a lot of good folks listed here, more than the 12 that will be elected imho. While I could have voted for more, I decided to stick to only the 12 I would like to see in this program. This doesn't mean that others are not endorsed, is just a personal preference, and I really hope to keep seeing some of these and others names more involved in operational programs like this one for the dao. Is all about trust, and trust is something that you build over time and should be rewarded by roles like the above :slight_smile:
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
We voted For the MSS component of this proposal as it is a much-needed initiative. Even though our team has been with Arbitrum from day-one as delegates, it does get confusing trying to keep track of all the groups that we’ve chosen to approve. Our team has been thinking about the future of how other DAOs like Uniswap can also make their operations more efficient. And we’ve more-so organically trended towards entrusting a single multisig for handling most of the Uni DAO’s costs via the Accountability Committee. Of course, the number of multisigs in Arbitrum outnumber those on Uniswap, and will continue to do so, but the principle stands–effective tracking of monetary flows enables better efficiency. The security practices are also outlined well, like the approval flow to reduce the degree of abstraction behind multisig operations and the DEN integration. One concern, however, is the delay period
R3gen’s report was also well-written. We are in support of hiring them for this task on a monthly basis, however, the current fee does seem high. $2500/month seems to be sufficient since after an initial month’s reporting, subsequent month’s will just get easier. Much of the analysis is simply going back to a previous spreadsheet and editing a couple of sections. Unless they are supplementing the data with more detailed explanations and descriptions, beyond a rote numerical template, the cost should be lower. We are signaling a need for this type of reporting by voting For R3gen. It would also be nice for them to provide a template for monthly reports prior to onchain vote.
All for it, I think a maximum of transparency in operations is necessary. The cost reduction is important and over time I hope this part of the DAO becomes more proceduralized. Maybe even a custom interface that is public? I think that would help make the DAO more transparent.
Savvy DAO has voted FOR the proposal. See rationale below: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/21266/37?u=savvydao
The proposal has passed with overwhelming support and the above feedback has been noted. There will be one more round of small edits to ensure the feedback has been implemented before proceeding to Tally.
Below is a draft of the Application Template for the MSS. This draft will live here for 1 week before being posted in its own thread with the 2 week nomination period opening. Please feel free to leave any feedback around the application in this time.
The proposal has passed with overwhelming support and the above feedback has been noted. There will be one more round of small edits to ensure the feedback has been implemented before proceeding to Tally.
Below is a draft of the Application Template for the MSS. This draft will live here for 1 week before being posted in its own thread with the 2 week nomination period opening. Please feel free to leave any feedback around the application in this time.
Date:
I support this proposal. The provided framework clearly addresses and standardizes many of the problems with multi-sigs, including inefficiency (corralling signers), high-cost (paying signers a non-standardized amount), "blind signing" (a lack of standardized formatting with what's being signed), conflicts of interest, and reputation/trust of signers.
One pain point of releasing payment is the KYC process. I admittedly don't fully understand the issue but after personally experiencing long payment delays after receiving a grant, I gathered that it has to do with each payer's uniquely established KYC process.
I support this proposal. The provided framework clearly addresses and standardizes many of the problems with multi-sigs, including inefficiency (corralling signers), high-cost (paying signers a non-standardized amount), "blind signing" (a lack of standardized formatting with what's being signed), conflicts of interest, and reputation/trust of signers.
One pain point of releasing payment is the KYC process. I admittedly don't fully understand the issue but after personally experiencing long payment delays after receiving a grant, I gathered that it has to do with each payer's uniquely established KYC process.
Will the proposed framework address the KYC issue described above? (I'm happy to try to provide more context if my description of the problem is not clear).
Lastly, I would like to suggest medium-length term limits for the signers in order to create opportunity for others in the DAO to be signers.
I will be voting "For" this proposal, with the reporting feature included.
As a broad concept, I think this is a great idea. Naturally there would be concerns about centralization, however as we've seen from the data points a lot of the multisig projects have the same people working on them. Plus, it looks like changes have been made to alleviate some of the possible issues. Regardless, the reduction in costs and administrative complexities outweigh any increased centralization factors (that again, can largely be mitigated and possibly already exist).
I will be voting "For" this proposal, with the reporting feature included.
As a broad concept, I think this is a great idea. Naturally there would be concerns about centralization, however as we've seen from the data points a lot of the multisig projects have the same people working on them. Plus, it looks like changes have been made to alleviate some of the possible issues. Regardless, the reduction in costs and administrative complexities outweigh any increased centralization factors (that again, can largely be mitigated and possibly already exist).
Others have brought up great ideas / concerns, of which I largely agree with or atleast feel are valid enough to warrant the discussion. Of note, I will echo others about having some more guidelines for those on the council. Whether that is term limits or shorter voting periods. The report should be be helpful as well and welcome its addition.
As for the discussion of current-running multisigs, I think the best course of action would be to let them run out as originally voted on unless there is a consensus reached by all the multi-sig signers that they would like to turn over control the new MSS.
Blockworks Research will be voting FOR the implementation of the MSS and the reporting services on Snapshot.
We think this is a great initiative, reducing expenses in a scalable way while likely also increasing operational efficiency. We also believe that the Token Flow Report is a solid addition, with accounting services seeming like a high value-add to the DAO.
Blockworks Research will be voting FOR the implementation of the MSS and the reporting services on Snapshot.
We think this is a great initiative, reducing expenses in a scalable way while likely also increasing operational efficiency. We also believe that the Token Flow Report is a solid addition, with accounting services seeming like a high value-add to the DAO.
Community members have discussed the signer committee structure quite extensively. On most points raised, we maintain a neutral stance. However, we believe that an extended term for this initiative actually makes sense, since it seems that robust guardrails are being put in place and the time spent on additional voting/operational ramp-up for new signers would be decreased. Moreover, we strongly agree with this point made by L2BEAT:
In addition to signers going through KYC, we would like to see the structure of a legal agreement that binds the signers to act in good faith and protects them from any liability that comes with executing a transaction.
Do we understand correctly that the planned finance back-office functions are intended to cover only DAO programs valued below $50M? If so, we believe it would be advantageous to broaden the scope to encompass all funding initiatives. This would prevent potential complications arising from, e.g., multiple reporting entities and community members having to go through several data sources. Additionally, a beneficial inclusion that immediately comes to mind would be the addition of forward-looking figures, such as F12M revenue and expense projections, to the report.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting in favor of the proposal as we believe the outlined multisig service has the potential to save the DAO and its contributors time and money, and it’s something worth experimenting with. We’ll also be voting in favor of having R3gen Finance's monthly report, as we believe that information is useful.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting in favor of the proposal as we believe the outlined multisig service has the potential to save the DAO and its contributors time and money, and it’s something worth experimenting with. We’ll also be voting in favor of having R3gen Finance's monthly report, as we believe that information is useful.
Having said that, with the report priced the way it is, we expect the R3gen Finance team to allocate the necessary resources in terms of time and manpower to be available to the DAO to answer any questions related to their reports. We’d also expect them to be able to handle ad-hoc requests related to their financial reporting as they arise and adapt the reports’ scope and structure to changing DAO needs.
Furthermore, we have 2 things that we’d like to see addressed before the proposal goes to an on-chain vote:
In the execution process outlined in the proposal, the multisig signers are not responsible for verifying the requested transaction or for vetoing it - that responsibility lies with the ‘payment approver.’ Therefore, we should protect the signers from any liability arising from executing a payment.
Lastly, we believe the MSS should be very responsive to ensure timely payment execution, and we’d like to point out that inactive signers should be promptly removed and replaced.
DAOplomats voted in favor of Implementing MSS and Reporting.
This is a very welcome proposal at this time as it aims to balance efficiency, security, and transparency in managing multisig operations across the DAO. Based on the analysis provided on what is already spent, implementing this proposal will definitely be protecting the interests of the DAO.
gm, the initiative sounds solid regarding cost-cutting, budget monitoring, and process improvement (signers and thresholds).
Voted FOR.
I have decided to vote FOR the Implementation and Reporting outlined in this proposal.
After reading the feedback and concerns raised by the delegates, I find them rational and am pleased to see that these issues have been addressed along the way.
I have decided to vote FOR the Implementation and Reporting outlined in this proposal.
After reading the feedback and concerns raised by the delegates, I find them rational and am pleased to see that these issues have been addressed along the way.
The idea of regular reporting is sound. I understand that it might be a tedious task, but it is undoubtedly necessary to ensure the transparency required for our DAO to make informed decisions.
I wonder if one year might be too long to evaluate whether this implementation is effective for iterative improvement, or if a shorter timeframe should be considered to allow for quicker action if it does not meet our current needs.
Overall, however, I am excited about the execution of this proposal.
Thank you for the proposal. To begin with, the framework will lower operating costs so that it can be financially suitable in the future. Furthermore, the use of a more professional MSS will enhance the security of multi-signature transactions. For this reason, Token Flow Report will ensure openness and better control over spending. Thus, as ITU Blockchain, we will vote in favor of this proposal.
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR the MSS and r3gen's reporting at the Snapshot stage. Standardizing multisig usage in the DAO would reduce costs significantly and also make things easier for proposal authors in need of a multisig.
Daniel raised a good point about this creating a potential weak spot for the DAO. However, we think that the election process (and the Foundation KYC) for the MSS members should reduce that risk. (On that note - are we just going through the regular Foundation KYC process, or adding in some kind of extra checks to assist in "[ensuring] their integrity and [reducing] the risk of coercion"?)
Thanks @Entropy for putting together the proposal. It's definitely an important issue to be addressed and we appreciate the effort to modify the proposal as the feedback from the delegates are given.
We vote FOR the proposal at its Snapshot phase with the additional report included as the first selection. As described, this change will clearly increase the efficiency of the similar operations for the various initiatives. We would also like to see the election and term systems to be included in the Tally voting as suggested by other delegates. We don't necessarily mind 1 year term, but it would be good to see staggered signer terms (e.g. 6 people cycles in 6 months.)
Makes a lot of sense, this is needed and will optimize costs. Concerns have been addressed in a valid way. Also supportive of the reports, at least as a trial, so that next iterations can include findings on new votes/elections. Voted in favour
After carefully reviewing this proposal and the additional delegate comments, we believe implementing the MSS would be a net positive for the Arbitrum DAO and the broader ecosystem. The current multi-sig structure has become operationally unsustainable due to high costs and fragmentation. Consolidating to a single elected multi-sig committee should reduce unnecessary expenditures, increase professionalism, and streamline the proposal process for contributors.
However, we share some of the concerns raised by delegates, namely around potential centralization risks, ensuring fair compensation aligned with workload, and having clear criteria for electing signers. We'd like to see further discussion on these points in the final on-chain proposal. Mechanisms like staggered signer terms could help mitigate centralization. And the payment structure may need to be reevaluated if the number of multi-sigs and associated workload changes significantly.
We will vote in favor of the MSS proposal with the additional report, as we believe this initiative will significantly enhance the overall efficiency of the DAO's financial operations.
While several concerns have been raised by other delegates, they have already been addressed:
We will vote in favor of the MSS proposal with the additional report, as we believe this initiative will significantly enhance the overall efficiency of the DAO's financial operations.
While several concerns have been raised by other delegates, they have already been addressed:
The threshold for each bucket has been increased by 1. i. 6/12: <$1M ii. 7/12: $1M-$5M iii. 8/12: $5M-$10m iiii. 9/12 $10M-$50M
The threshold for internal removal has been increased from 6 to 8. MSS Member Agreement: If at least 8 MSS members (8 out of 12 members) agree that a signer should be removed due to breach of duties or conflict of interest, they can initiate the removal process internally. The agreement must be documented and publicly disclosed to maintain transparency. Analytics on signer activity from Den may be used as supporting evidence.
The expectation that a gradual transition where current multi-sigs finish our their lifecycle has been clearly stated.
We also believe that the additional report will promote transparency and facilitate better decision-making within the community. However, we would appreciate more detailed information about the report's price breakdown and how the allocated funds will be spent. Thank you @Entropy team again for this great initiative!
After some thoughts, decided to vote "for", including the reporting implementation.
I want to clarify a few things here.
After some thoughts, decided to vote "for", including the reporting implementation.
I want to clarify a few things here.
But, this is not necessarily an endorsement on a tally vote. Initially i thought it would be hell cause signers would need to be able to create txs for all programs. And while this seems trivial for people outside of multisig world, is definitely not (ie: txs for a group of people, but excluding one that didn't kyc yet; tx that is partially paid in fixed amount of arb, and variable amount of arb cause payment is in usd equivalent at the time of the tx itself; same as before, but with the usd value that has to be on a 30day moving average; etc). Then, luckily, @dk3 educated me on the delegation feature that will allow external people to post a transactions in the safe for signers to sign. But I also understand there could effectively be issues, especially because not all programs are equal (ie: the delegate incentive program is one if the highest lift in term of number of transactions, variability of payout, problems with kyc and timing).
Regardless of the chosen solution, we need to address the above cases with a plan that will have to be integrated in every program using the MSS, in a way that scales and either allows one of the program main stakeholder to post transactions, or provide a way for a chair/signer to more actively participate to the single program. Which means, necessarily, a bigger overhead in time and costs. The latter solution also means finding a consensus mechanism between participants (=signers for that program) to choose the designated one. Either randomly, by internal election, they all fight in a room, but there is going to be one member who will effectively be paid more and also have more responsibility and will need to invest more time talking with someone from the program. If it's the chair I am not sure. But in general, my suggestion for programs in which there is the need of scalability without effectively knowing the final size of labour needed (ltipp anyone?), should be to think about both a fixed comp, and the one proposed above is to me good enough, but also a potentially variable one tied to the number of programs one should interface with. Would dare to say, potentially even further specialise this component between programs with low amount and variance of transactions and high amount of txs or heterogeneous ones. Hope the suggestion helps.
I will be voting "For".
I find myself in agreement with most points raised by JoJo. On the expense side, costs are definitely high for what's being proposed and for that reason reporting and accountability is even more important. 12 month terms are also abnormal within the DAO and would love to see this revised.
I will be voting "For".
I find myself in agreement with most points raised by JoJo. On the expense side, costs are definitely high for what's being proposed and for that reason reporting and accountability is even more important. 12 month terms are also abnormal within the DAO and would love to see this revised.
Overall this is a positive change, but I hope this is not the final form of the proposal that makes it to Tally.
We could also benefit from a rotation (meaning ppl can not run from more than 2 terms or something like that)
Regarding the concern of centralization: the proposal’s intent is to enhance consistency and professionalism within the DAO’s operations. We are open to explore mechanisms such as staggered terms or more frequent rotations of signers to prevent excessive centralization and keep the system dynamic and inclusive if other delegates echo this thought.
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR the MSS and r3gen's reporting at the Snapshot stage. Standardizing multisig usage in the DAO would reduce costs significantly and also make things easier for proposal authors in need of a multisig.
Daniel raised a good point about this creating a potential weak spot for the DAO. However, we think that the election process (and the Foundation KYC) for the MSS members should reduce that risk. (On that note - are we just going through the regular Foundation KYC process, or adding in some kind of extra checks to assist in "[ensuring] their integrity and [reducing] the risk of coercion"?)
Perhaps more closely modeling the election process after the one we use for the Security Council (staggered terms, elections every 6 months) would also help reduce risks?
The Token Flow Report would be pretty helpful for transparency's sake, so we're in favor of that addon.
After carefully reviewing this proposal and the additional delegate comments, we believe implementing the MSS would be a net positive for the Arbitrum DAO and the broader ecosystem. The current multi-sig structure has become operationally unsustainable due to high costs and fragmentation. Consolidating to a single elected multi-sig committee should reduce unnecessary expenditures, increase professionalism, and streamline the proposal process for contributors.
However, we share some of the concerns raised by delegates, namely around potential centralization risks, ensuring fair compensation aligned with workload, and having clear criteria for electing signers. We'd like to see further discussion on these points in the final on-chain proposal. Mechanisms like staggered signer terms could help mitigate centralization. And the payment structure may need to be reevaluated if the number of multi-sigs and associated workload changes significantly.
Overall though, we believe the MSS is a well-thought-out framework that will benefit the DAO and ecosystem. The addition of Token Flow reporting is also a valuable step to increase transparency around DAO spending. While not perfect, this proposal represents an important restructuring to set the DAO up for long-term success as it scales.
On behalf of the Arbitrum community members who delegated their voting power to Bacon Labs, we're voting FOR implementing the Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service.
Regarding the concern of centralization: the proposal’s intent is to enhance consistency and professionalism within the DAO’s operations. We are open to explore mechanisms such as staggered terms or more frequent rotations of signers to prevent excessive centralization and keep the system dynamic and inclusive if other delegates echo this thought.
I want to raise this point again to argue that a 12 months term is too long. Other initiatives like the ARDC or ADPC have shorter terms.
If I'm not mistaken, no service provider has a term closer to this. We could also benefit from a rotation (meaning ppl can not run from more than 2 terms or something like that)
One more small edit has been made specifying that if token flow reporting is accepted by the DAO, it will begin the 1st of the month following the proposal passing tally.
Pricing for Token Flow Report: $6650 USD per month paid in ARB on the 1st of the month using USD/ARB spot price. This includes the fee for the web3 accounting sub-ledgers and other tooling costs. Token Flow Reporting will commence in the first calendar month after the proposal passes Tally.
The following edits have been made to the proposal:
The threshold for each bucket has been increased by 1. i. 6/12: <$1M ii. 7/12: $1M-$5M iii. 8/12: $5M-$10m iiii. 9/12 $10M-$50M
The threshold for internal removal has been increased from 6 to 8. MSS Member Agreement: If at least 8 MSS members (8 out of 12 members) agree that a signer should be removed due to breach of duties or conflict of interest, they can initiate the removal process internally. The agreement must be documented and publicly disclosed to maintain transparency. Analytics on signer activity from Den may be used as supporting evidence.
The expectation that a gradual transition where current multi-sigs finish our their lifecycle has been clearly stated.
The following edits have been made to the proposal:
The threshold for each bucket has been increased by 1. i. 6/12: <$1M ii. 7/12: $1M-$5M iii. 8/12: $5M-$10m iiii. 9/12 $10M-$50M
The threshold for internal removal has been increased from 6 to 8. MSS Member Agreement: If at least 8 MSS members (8 out of 12 members) agree that a signer should be removed due to breach of duties or conflict of interest, they can initiate the removal process internally. The agreement must be documented and publicly disclosed to maintain transparency. Analytics on signer activity from Den may be used as supporting evidence.
The expectation that a gradual transition where current multi-sigs finish our their lifecycle has been clearly stated.
We thank everyone for their feedback and plan to proceed to Snapshot on Wednesday!
The practical side of me looks at the cost savings, which every Arb holder wants. 9-10k per transaction is ridiculous cost which no delegate wants and the sooner we cut the flab the better
I do agree with entropys approach of letting multisig signers decide for themselves. Weve elected them so they are empowered to make decisions in the best interest of the DAO
I think it would be right to wait for the expiration of the existing multisigs
Everyone voted for the past decisions, so it is incorrect to violate them
One question i had was whether we would wait for the existing multi-sigs to phase out normally, or if the option to use this multisig would be immediately applicable
One question i had was whether we would wait for the existing multi-sigs to phase out normally, or if the option to use this multisig would be immediately applicable
Thank you for your support and for raising this question. We are also excited about the potential for r3gen to make the MSS a more comprehensive 'accounting' arm for the DAO and thought the Token Flow report was excellent.
Regarding transitioning from current multisigs to the proposed model, we we were considering a gradual phase-out rather than an immediate switch to be the most likely scenario given the incentives at play. To encourage current programs to transition, we're discussing potential incentives, such as allowing signers to receive 50% of their expected compensation following a turnover.
We are revising the proposal to incorporate feedback from the community with some small changes. This includes increasing the thresholds by 1 and quorum requirement for internal removals to 8. During this edit we'll also clarify the process for transitioning from current multisigs. Each change will be clearly outlined in a proceeding comment. This will take place Monday, followed by expecting to proceed to Snapshot Wednesday, assuming no more critical feedback.
I am in favor of this proposal and would like to see it move to snapshot sooner rather than later.
One question i had was whether we would wait for the existing multi-sigs to phase out normally, or if the option to use this multisig would be immediately applicable
I am in favor of this proposal and would like to see it move to snapshot sooner rather than later.
One question i had was whether we would wait for the existing multi-sigs to phase out normally, or if the option to use this multisig would be immediately applicable
I am also in favor of getting a Token Flow Report, any large company of Arbitrum's size would require accounting to understand what is happening. I was impressed with r3gen earlier report documenting this and think we should see more of it. i would have liked for greater dissemination of the findings though - not sure how many people actually engaged with the numbers once they were crunched
gmgm.
First of all, congrats @MattOnChain for the successful onboarding of @Entropy. You quickly put together a very well-thought-out and needed proposal. I like it, I think it addresses an issue that needs resolution.
Optional Extra - Token Flow Reporting
gmgm.
First of all, congrats @MattOnChain for the successful onboarding of @Entropy. You quickly put together a very well-thought-out and needed proposal. I like it, I think it addresses an issue that needs resolution.
My only concern is that I'm unconvinced about needing a third party to report on the msig expenses. Wouldn't it be simpler to pay one of the signatories a little extra (like the chair one) to handle the reports? As the data above shows, the transactions are few.
Additionally, regarding the tasks assigned to this third party, it seems that several are quite out of scope to justify the budget. The tasks listed have value and could provide a valuable service to the DAO, but shouldn't they be included in a separate proposal? I believe this would also be on the scope of the proposed OpCo.
Besides this great proposal, something that comes to my mind is that a future iteration of this could include an optimistic framework for executing approved proposals. Have you considered it when drafting it?
Instead of paying for multisig signers, a cheaper and more efficient system would be to create a Guardian Council role that would act as a gateway for malicious proposals. That Guardian Council could be the hereby proposed msig.
Tagging @Bobbay from UMA and @0xAlex from Kleros in case this is an option that might be of interest and consideration by the DAO, so they can have visibility and, if interested, put together a plan to try it out.
@pedrob, thanks for sharing your perspective :pray:
Wouldn’t it be simpler to pay one of the signatories a little extra (like the chair one) to handle the reports?
@pedrob, thanks for sharing your perspective :pray:
Wouldn’t it be simpler to pay one of the signatories a little extra (like the chair one) to handle the reports?
Whilst the MSS Chair could complete very basic reporting, for detailed reporting and analysis (which ultimately led to this proposal), Arbitrum requires experienced Web3 finance professionals.
The tasks listed have value and could provide a valuable service to the DAO, but shouldn’t they be included in a separate proposal?
The consensus seems to be that Arbitrum should be tracking inflows and expenditures. No DAO will operate effectively at scale if it is blind to its core financial metrics.
By allowing Arbitrum to integrate its financial operations and reporting functions, we can create a seamless finance back office function for all DAO programs below 50 million in value. Larger programs above 50 million (such as the GCP, AVI, and OpCo) may, in turn, set up their own financial structures and define their reporting cadence within their proposal, similarly to how we have done here.
Ultimately, reporting is about improving transparency, clarity, and decision-making. Giving the DAO the option to start doing that sooner rather than later seems a good thing. Integrating "the processing of spend" with "the reporting on spend" feels logical, as this will create an effective back-office function fully equipped to service Arbitrum DAO's immediate financial needs.
I'm in favor of this initiative. In addition to generating cost savings, I believe it will make the DAO more efficient and safer by creating one clear set of multisig operations that can be audited and integrated with from a tooling perspective.
thanks for the quick reply!
Realistically, the pool of individuals interested and qualified to sit on the DAO’s multisigs isn’t vast
thanks for the quick reply!
Realistically, the pool of individuals interested and qualified to sit on the DAO’s multisigs isn’t vast
Please see the section titled “Processing payments through MSS multisigs” and let us know if this addresses your concern.
I re-read the "Processing payments through MSS multisigs", but can't understand how it would intersect with oversight specifically. I roughly understand approvers would signal through telegram emoji-reactions. Is that correct?
What if new multisigs were created with the oversight members for each project, and thus the MSS can "bulk up" the number to ensure safety while still the whole thing benefits from Web3 security (as opposed to social media's)? This is not a strong opposition to the proposed design btw, more of a suggestion for improvement.
We agree whole heartedly that the DAO needs an oversight committee. We think it would pair well with the MSS given the payment processing mechanism alluded to above, and are currently working on a proposal in this regard.
I'd suggest it shouldn't be a committee, but rather a pool from which members can be drawn via sortition, thus enabling multiple committees to be created. Centralising oversight too much will have the same issues of capture risk I mentioned for the MSS and I see no reason for it other than concerns about talent shortage.
Having multiple multisgi committees does help with decentralisation, which is quite critical to ensure resilience in the DAO. Wouldn’t the current proposal make the DAO quite fragile to 12 individuals being bribed/blackmailed? (or even only 5-7 out of 12 who could approve/block virtually everything)
I had made this thread a couple of days before this proposal was posted to discuss oversight specifically and there's a pol.is exercise to find consensus and key points for discussion. Maybe something that can be valuable for the discussion here https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/oversight-committee/23669
I see a lot of merit on this initiative but also significant downsides.
Having multiple multisgi committees does help with decentralisation, which is quite critical to ensure resilience in the DAO. Wouldn't the current proposal make the DAO quite fragile to 12 individuals being bribed/blackmailed? (or even only 5-7 out of 12 who could approve/block virtually everything)
I see a lot of merit on this initiative but also significant downsides.
Having multiple multisgi committees does help with decentralisation, which is quite critical to ensure resilience in the DAO. Wouldn't the current proposal make the DAO quite fragile to 12 individuals being bribed/blackmailed? (or even only 5-7 out of 12 who could approve/block virtually everything)
Also, when designing the RnDAO proposal, a key concern for us was, above signing payments, was oversight i.e. reviewing the delivery of milestones to approve payments. I don't see how the proposed solution nor problem definition takes that into account and I'm concerned it can clash.
do you think increasing the threshold for internal removal here to 8/12 would suffice?
On the flow above, to me, is not clear if the multisig is responsible to only create and execute the tx or to effectively give the green light about the tx.
I assume is the former, but want to clarify.
One thought immediately jumps to mind - if we provide a fixed cost to each member that doesn't allow much flexibility with workload. Signers would be paid the same amount whether there is one active multisig or 20. The current model is expensive, but comes at the benefit of greater flexibility thru variable costs depending on workload.
I do believe as a broader idea it is a good one however.
We think this proposal as a whole should set the standard as to how multisig signers operate within most DAOs, especially ones with many different multisigs. In this case, this should decrease overall expenses significantly going forward and we urge the current programs to onboard if this were to pass.
Want to echo @cp0x's points regarding the removal of MSS and also think upping the requirements in each of the categories by one is appropriate.
We think this proposal as a whole should set the standard as to how multisig signers operate within most DAOs, especially ones with many different multisigs. In this case, this should decrease overall expenses significantly going forward and we urge the current programs to onboard if this were to pass.
Want to echo @cp0x's points regarding the removal of MSS and also think upping the requirements in each of the categories by one is appropriate.
One point we think most elections do that is helpful here is switching steps 4 and 5. It doesn't make sense to KYC everyone if a good chunk won't be elected. It seems more reasonable to elect and then KYC. If they fail to do so, the spot goes to the next one in line that can.
- ~10 days: MSS forum period requesting comments and time to edit proposal with delegate feedback.
- 1 week: Snapshot to signal approval/disapproval of the MSS program.
- 2 weeks: Application period for MSS Members. Entropy Advisors is happy to handle application > template creation for free and will be ready to post directly after the above Snapshot is complete.
- 2 weeks: Foundation KYC/Compliance process
- 1 week: Snapshot to elect 9 signers and 3 Chairs.
- 3 weeks: Tally proposal to fund MSS
Thanks for your proposal! It is refreshing to see people trying to improve the DAO as a whole.
However, I have a few issues with the problme analysis and with the proposed solution.
Thanks for your proposal! It is refreshing to see people trying to improve the DAO as a whole.
However, I have a few issues with the problme analysis and with the proposed solution.
The first one is about the cost. While the values are true, the reasoning seems not, IMO. First the overall value extrapollated to a yearly one. ONE program is responsible for HALF of the costs presented. The DAO evolved a lot on handling multisigs since the deployment of the STIP program, and the other ones following it proposed to pay a value way lower to the signers. And we take a program that ran for 3 months and multiply it by 4 to justify a high number.
In the current setup, we have 19 signers on multiple multisigs. While some are on more than one multisig, this is a way to promote more participation, and their "mandate" is short (only through the duration of the program). The proposed structure calls for 12 signers with an yearly mandate. This is concentration/centralization in a hand of a few, for a long period of time.
Now, if we see this as a problem (the cost of paying peolpe to sign transaction in a multisig), and we want an "execution layer" for the payments and other stuff related with it, IMO, it makes more sense to have this in a structure like the proposed OpCo, rather a standalone committee which responsability is to manage multisig transactions (and, ofc, all the reporting atttached to it),
My 2 cents on the matter.
I think this is a great offer. Thanks for it. There is one thing that seems wrong to me:
MSS Member Agreement: If at least 50% of MSS members (6 out of 12 members) agree that a signer should be removed due to breach of duties or conflict of interest, they can initiate the removal process internally. The agreement must be documented and publicly disclosed to maintain transparency. Analytics on signer activity from Den may be used as supporting evidence
Than you for this proposal.
I think is sensitive to try and cut costs when is possible, plus have a framework (i know i know cursed work) for operations that are both critical and widely used. I have a few questions on the above.
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR the MSS and r3gen's reporting at the Snapshot stage. Standardizing multisig usage in the DAO would reduce costs significantly and also make things easier for proposal authors in need of a multisig.
Daniel raised a good point about this creating a potential weak spot for the DAO. However, we think that the election process (and the Foundation KYC) for the MSS members should reduce that risk. (On that note - are we just going through the regular Foundation KYC process, or adding in some kind of extra checks to assist in "[ensuring] their integrity and [reducing] the risk of coercion"?)
Perhaps more closely modeling the election process after the one we use for the Security Council (staggered terms, elections every 6 months) would also help reduce risks?
The Token Flow Report would be pretty helpful for transparency's sake, so we're in favor of that addon.
After carefully reviewing this proposal and the additional delegate comments, we believe implementing the MSS would be a net positive for the Arbitrum DAO and the broader ecosystem. The current multi-sig structure has become operationally unsustainable due to high costs and fragmentation. Consolidating to a single elected multi-sig committee should reduce unnecessary expenditures, increase professionalism, and streamline the proposal process for contributors.
However, we share some of the concerns raised by delegates, namely around potential centralization risks, ensuring fair compensation aligned with workload, and having clear criteria for electing signers. We'd like to see further discussion on these points in the final on-chain proposal. Mechanisms like staggered signer terms could help mitigate centralization. And the payment structure may need to be reevaluated if the number of multi-sigs and associated workload changes significantly.
Overall though, we believe the MSS is a well-thought-out framework that will benefit the DAO and ecosystem. The addition of Token Flow reporting is also a valuable step to increase transparency around DAO spending. While not perfect, this proposal represents an important restructuring to set the DAO up for long-term success as it scales.
On behalf of the Arbitrum community members who delegated their voting power to Bacon Labs, we're voting FOR implementing the Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service.
Regarding the concern of centralization: the proposal’s intent is to enhance consistency and professionalism within the DAO’s operations. We are open to explore mechanisms such as staggered terms or more frequent rotations of signers to prevent excessive centralization and keep the system dynamic and inclusive if other delegates echo this thought.
I want to raise this point again to argue that a 12 months term is too long. Other initiatives like the ARDC or ADPC have shorter terms.
If I'm not mistaken, no service provider has a term closer to this. We could also benefit from a rotation (meaning ppl can not run from more than 2 terms or something like that)
One more small edit has been made specifying that if token flow reporting is accepted by the DAO, it will begin the 1st of the month following the proposal passing tally.
Pricing for Token Flow Report: $6650 USD per month paid in ARB on the 1st of the month using USD/ARB spot price. This includes the fee for the web3 accounting sub-ledgers and other tooling costs. Token Flow Reporting will commence in the first calendar month after the proposal passes Tally.
The following edits have been made to the proposal:
The threshold for each bucket has been increased by 1. i. 6/12: <$1M ii. 7/12: $1M-$5M iii. 8/12: $5M-$10m iiii. 9/12 $10M-$50M
The threshold for internal removal has been increased from 6 to 8. MSS Member Agreement: If at least 8 MSS members (8 out of 12 members) agree that a signer should be removed due to breach of duties or conflict of interest, they can initiate the removal process internally. The agreement must be documented and publicly disclosed to maintain transparency. Analytics on signer activity from Den may be used as supporting evidence.
The expectation that a gradual transition where current multi-sigs finish our their lifecycle has been clearly stated.
The following edits have been made to the proposal:
The threshold for each bucket has been increased by 1. i. 6/12: <$1M ii. 7/12: $1M-$5M iii. 8/12: $5M-$10m iiii. 9/12 $10M-$50M
The threshold for internal removal has been increased from 6 to 8. MSS Member Agreement: If at least 8 MSS members (8 out of 12 members) agree that a signer should be removed due to breach of duties or conflict of interest, they can initiate the removal process internally. The agreement must be documented and publicly disclosed to maintain transparency. Analytics on signer activity from Den may be used as supporting evidence.
The expectation that a gradual transition where current multi-sigs finish our their lifecycle has been clearly stated.
We thank everyone for their feedback and plan to proceed to Snapshot on Wednesday!
The practical side of me looks at the cost savings, which every Arb holder wants. 9-10k per transaction is ridiculous cost which no delegate wants and the sooner we cut the flab the better
I do agree with entropys approach of letting multisig signers decide for themselves. Weve elected them so they are empowered to make decisions in the best interest of the DAO
I think it would be right to wait for the expiration of the existing multisigs
Everyone voted for the past decisions, so it is incorrect to violate them
One question i had was whether we would wait for the existing multi-sigs to phase out normally, or if the option to use this multisig would be immediately applicable
One question i had was whether we would wait for the existing multi-sigs to phase out normally, or if the option to use this multisig would be immediately applicable
Thank you for your support and for raising this question. We are also excited about the potential for r3gen to make the MSS a more comprehensive 'accounting' arm for the DAO and thought the Token Flow report was excellent.
Regarding transitioning from current multisigs to the proposed model, we we were considering a gradual phase-out rather than an immediate switch to be the most likely scenario given the incentives at play. To encourage current programs to transition, we're discussing potential incentives, such as allowing signers to receive 50% of their expected compensation following a turnover.
We are revising the proposal to incorporate feedback from the community with some small changes. This includes increasing the thresholds by 1 and quorum requirement for internal removals to 8. During this edit we'll also clarify the process for transitioning from current multisigs. Each change will be clearly outlined in a proceeding comment. This will take place Monday, followed by expecting to proceed to Snapshot Wednesday, assuming no more critical feedback.
I am in favor of this proposal and would like to see it move to snapshot sooner rather than later.
One question i had was whether we would wait for the existing multi-sigs to phase out normally, or if the option to use this multisig would be immediately applicable
I am in favor of this proposal and would like to see it move to snapshot sooner rather than later.
One question i had was whether we would wait for the existing multi-sigs to phase out normally, or if the option to use this multisig would be immediately applicable
I am also in favor of getting a Token Flow Report, any large company of Arbitrum's size would require accounting to understand what is happening. I was impressed with r3gen earlier report documenting this and think we should see more of it. i would have liked for greater dissemination of the findings though - not sure how many people actually engaged with the numbers once they were crunched
gmgm.
First of all, congrats @MattOnChain for the successful onboarding of @Entropy. You quickly put together a very well-thought-out and needed proposal. I like it, I think it addresses an issue that needs resolution.
Optional Extra - Token Flow Reporting
gmgm.
First of all, congrats @MattOnChain for the successful onboarding of @Entropy. You quickly put together a very well-thought-out and needed proposal. I like it, I think it addresses an issue that needs resolution.
My only concern is that I'm unconvinced about needing a third party to report on the msig expenses. Wouldn't it be simpler to pay one of the signatories a little extra (like the chair one) to handle the reports? As the data above shows, the transactions are few.
Additionally, regarding the tasks assigned to this third party, it seems that several are quite out of scope to justify the budget. The tasks listed have value and could provide a valuable service to the DAO, but shouldn't they be included in a separate proposal? I believe this would also be on the scope of the proposed OpCo.
Besides this great proposal, something that comes to my mind is that a future iteration of this could include an optimistic framework for executing approved proposals. Have you considered it when drafting it?
Instead of paying for multisig signers, a cheaper and more efficient system would be to create a Guardian Council role that would act as a gateway for malicious proposals. That Guardian Council could be the hereby proposed msig.
Tagging @Bobbay from UMA and @0xAlex from Kleros in case this is an option that might be of interest and consideration by the DAO, so they can have visibility and, if interested, put together a plan to try it out.
@pedrob, thanks for sharing your perspective :pray:
Wouldn’t it be simpler to pay one of the signatories a little extra (like the chair one) to handle the reports?
@pedrob, thanks for sharing your perspective :pray:
Wouldn’t it be simpler to pay one of the signatories a little extra (like the chair one) to handle the reports?
Whilst the MSS Chair could complete very basic reporting, for detailed reporting and analysis (which ultimately led to this proposal), Arbitrum requires experienced Web3 finance professionals.
The tasks listed have value and could provide a valuable service to the DAO, but shouldn’t they be included in a separate proposal?
The consensus seems to be that Arbitrum should be tracking inflows and expenditures. No DAO will operate effectively at scale if it is blind to its core financial metrics.
By allowing Arbitrum to integrate its financial operations and reporting functions, we can create a seamless finance back office function for all DAO programs below 50 million in value. Larger programs above 50 million (such as the GCP, AVI, and OpCo) may, in turn, set up their own financial structures and define their reporting cadence within their proposal, similarly to how we have done here.
Ultimately, reporting is about improving transparency, clarity, and decision-making. Giving the DAO the option to start doing that sooner rather than later seems a good thing. Integrating "the processing of spend" with "the reporting on spend" feels logical, as this will create an effective back-office function fully equipped to service Arbitrum DAO's immediate financial needs.
I'm in favor of this initiative. In addition to generating cost savings, I believe it will make the DAO more efficient and safer by creating one clear set of multisig operations that can be audited and integrated with from a tooling perspective.
thanks for the quick reply!
Realistically, the pool of individuals interested and qualified to sit on the DAO’s multisigs isn’t vast
thanks for the quick reply!
Realistically, the pool of individuals interested and qualified to sit on the DAO’s multisigs isn’t vast
Please see the section titled “Processing payments through MSS multisigs” and let us know if this addresses your concern.
I re-read the "Processing payments through MSS multisigs", but can't understand how it would intersect with oversight specifically. I roughly understand approvers would signal through telegram emoji-reactions. Is that correct?
What if new multisigs were created with the oversight members for each project, and thus the MSS can "bulk up" the number to ensure safety while still the whole thing benefits from Web3 security (as opposed to social media's)? This is not a strong opposition to the proposed design btw, more of a suggestion for improvement.
We agree whole heartedly that the DAO needs an oversight committee. We think it would pair well with the MSS given the payment processing mechanism alluded to above, and are currently working on a proposal in this regard.
I'd suggest it shouldn't be a committee, but rather a pool from which members can be drawn via sortition, thus enabling multiple committees to be created. Centralising oversight too much will have the same issues of capture risk I mentioned for the MSS and I see no reason for it other than concerns about talent shortage.
Having multiple multisgi committees does help with decentralisation, which is quite critical to ensure resilience in the DAO. Wouldn’t the current proposal make the DAO quite fragile to 12 individuals being bribed/blackmailed? (or even only 5-7 out of 12 who could approve/block virtually everything)
I had made this thread a couple of days before this proposal was posted to discuss oversight specifically and there's a pol.is exercise to find consensus and key points for discussion. Maybe something that can be valuable for the discussion here https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/oversight-committee/23669
I see a lot of merit on this initiative but also significant downsides.
Having multiple multisgi committees does help with decentralisation, which is quite critical to ensure resilience in the DAO. Wouldn't the current proposal make the DAO quite fragile to 12 individuals being bribed/blackmailed? (or even only 5-7 out of 12 who could approve/block virtually everything)
I see a lot of merit on this initiative but also significant downsides.
Having multiple multisgi committees does help with decentralisation, which is quite critical to ensure resilience in the DAO. Wouldn't the current proposal make the DAO quite fragile to 12 individuals being bribed/blackmailed? (or even only 5-7 out of 12 who could approve/block virtually everything)
Also, when designing the RnDAO proposal, a key concern for us was, above signing payments, was oversight i.e. reviewing the delivery of milestones to approve payments. I don't see how the proposed solution nor problem definition takes that into account and I'm concerned it can clash.
do you think increasing the threshold for internal removal here to 8/12 would suffice?
On the flow above, to me, is not clear if the multisig is responsible to only create and execute the tx or to effectively give the green light about the tx.
I assume is the former, but want to clarify.
One thought immediately jumps to mind - if we provide a fixed cost to each member that doesn't allow much flexibility with workload. Signers would be paid the same amount whether there is one active multisig or 20. The current model is expensive, but comes at the benefit of greater flexibility thru variable costs depending on workload.
I do believe as a broader idea it is a good one however.
We think this proposal as a whole should set the standard as to how multisig signers operate within most DAOs, especially ones with many different multisigs. In this case, this should decrease overall expenses significantly going forward and we urge the current programs to onboard if this were to pass.
Want to echo @cp0x's points regarding the removal of MSS and also think upping the requirements in each of the categories by one is appropriate.
We think this proposal as a whole should set the standard as to how multisig signers operate within most DAOs, especially ones with many different multisigs. In this case, this should decrease overall expenses significantly going forward and we urge the current programs to onboard if this were to pass.
Want to echo @cp0x's points regarding the removal of MSS and also think upping the requirements in each of the categories by one is appropriate.
One point we think most elections do that is helpful here is switching steps 4 and 5. It doesn't make sense to KYC everyone if a good chunk won't be elected. It seems more reasonable to elect and then KYC. If they fail to do so, the spot goes to the next one in line that can.
- ~10 days: MSS forum period requesting comments and time to edit proposal with delegate feedback.
- 1 week: Snapshot to signal approval/disapproval of the MSS program.
- 2 weeks: Application period for MSS Members. Entropy Advisors is happy to handle application > template creation for free and will be ready to post directly after the above Snapshot is complete.
- 2 weeks: Foundation KYC/Compliance process
- 1 week: Snapshot to elect 9 signers and 3 Chairs.
- 3 weeks: Tally proposal to fund MSS
Thanks for your proposal! It is refreshing to see people trying to improve the DAO as a whole.
However, I have a few issues with the problme analysis and with the proposed solution.
Thanks for your proposal! It is refreshing to see people trying to improve the DAO as a whole.
However, I have a few issues with the problme analysis and with the proposed solution.
The first one is about the cost. While the values are true, the reasoning seems not, IMO. First the overall value extrapollated to a yearly one. ONE program is responsible for HALF of the costs presented. The DAO evolved a lot on handling multisigs since the deployment of the STIP program, and the other ones following it proposed to pay a value way lower to the signers. And we take a program that ran for 3 months and multiply it by 4 to justify a high number.
In the current setup, we have 19 signers on multiple multisigs. While some are on more than one multisig, this is a way to promote more participation, and their "mandate" is short (only through the duration of the program). The proposed structure calls for 12 signers with an yearly mandate. This is concentration/centralization in a hand of a few, for a long period of time.
Now, if we see this as a problem (the cost of paying peolpe to sign transaction in a multisig), and we want an "execution layer" for the payments and other stuff related with it, IMO, it makes more sense to have this in a structure like the proposed OpCo, rather a standalone committee which responsability is to manage multisig transactions (and, ofc, all the reporting atttached to it),
My 2 cents on the matter.
I think this is a great offer. Thanks for it. There is one thing that seems wrong to me:
MSS Member Agreement: If at least 50% of MSS members (6 out of 12 members) agree that a signer should be removed due to breach of duties or conflict of interest, they can initiate the removal process internally. The agreement must be documented and publicly disclosed to maintain transparency. Analytics on signer activity from Den may be used as supporting evidence
Than you for this proposal.
I think is sensitive to try and cut costs when is possible, plus have a framework (i know i know cursed work) for operations that are both critical and widely used. I have a few questions on the above.
Having multiple multisgi committees does help with decentralisation, which is quite critical to ensure resilience in the DAO. Wouldn’t the current proposal make the DAO quite fragile to 12 individuals being bribed/blackmailed? (or even only 5-7 out of 12 who could approve/block virtually everything)
Thank you for your feedback. Currently, as shown in image 4, a small number of signers are reused across multiple proposals. Our proposal aims to assign these responsibilities to 12 carefully selected, highly trustworthy, and competent signers. We believe that having the highest quality signers, rather than increasing the number simply for diversity's sake, will better serve the DAO. Realistically, the pool of individuals interested and qualified to sit on the DAO's multisigs isn't vast. Each selected signer will undergo a rigorous KYC process conducted by the foundation to ensure their integrity and reduce the risk of coercion. We remain open to exploring additional mechanisms to enhance both trust and decentralization within the MSS's structure.
Also, when designing the RnDAO proposal, a key concern for us was, above signing payments, was oversight i.e. reviewing the delivery of milestones to approve payments. I don’t see how the proposed solution nor problem definition takes that into account and I’m concerned it can clash.
I had made this thread a couple of days before this proposal was posted to discuss oversight specifically and there’s a pol.is exercise to find consensus and key points for discussion. Maybe something that can be valuable for the discussion here
do you think increasing the threshold for internal removal here to 8/12 would suffice?
I think that no one from MSS members can remove another member. I know from the implementation of such decisions in real politics and they always lead to bad results for community.
A member can only be removed in advance according to the rules, such as failure to fulfill his obligations and only after a general vote.
On the flow above, to me, is not clear if the multisig is responsible to only create and execute the tx or to effectively give the green light about the tx.
I assume is the former, but want to clarify.
If it’s the latter, is likely a problem. Just taking the example above: who takes the responsebility to vet the invoce? the milestone? and so on?
Thank you kindly for your helpful feedback (as always :). You’re right, the example is not clear. The format for approvals allows proposals to name who are fulfilling the roles of “payment requestor” and “payment approver.” The ARDC is likely a better example where there are clearly defined positions involved. In this proposal, a member of Chaos Labs would be listed as one “payment requestor” and the DAO Advocate would be the “payment approver.” This model fits into our next proposal, which will aim to create oversight mechanisms in the DAO, where this oversight party can be named as “payment approver” in proposals.
The second question is about performances. While the group should not turn into a “who sign first” for the sake of metric, because is also where security issues due to rush could arise, there is a merit in measuring the effectiveness of signers. In a natural and fair way, everyone should sign as soon as possible, compatible with their IRL and online commitment and others. But also, we want to avoid people just going for “someone else is gonna sign it”. Wanted to ask if you had a check and balance for it.
Same applies for tx creations. Is usually different lift to create a new batched tx versus verify it. This should be done in a fair way, same as of the above.
Regarding performance metrics and efficiency, we acknowledge the importance of balancing promptness with thoroughness. One of the reasons we want to give the MSS the ability to internally remove a remember is for exactly this purpose. We struggle to ideate a good mechanism for adding checks around the effectiveness portion of this problem, besides clearly stating and stressing to the DAO that who signs first is not a valuable metric.
You cannot remove a MSS members by internal vote of the members themselves - this is contrary to democracy and the fact that they were elected by others, therefore it is possible to decide to exclude them only by a full vote of the community.
This would be if members of the Republican Party removed members of the Democratic Party from the US Congress, since they have a majority.
Thanks for your insightful and true thoughts. We would like to give the MSS the ability to efficiently remove incompetent signer since their fellow members will have the most insight into their efficiency and effectiveness, do you think increasing the threshold for internal removal here to 8/12 would suffice?
Probably worth raising by 1 vote in each category: 6/12, 7/12, 8/12, 9/12 respectively
To be candid, we aren’t sure what the correct balance between efficient action and security is. We are more than open to increasing the threshold by 1 for each initiative. We would love to make a call to action for more delegates to weigh in here.
One point we think most elections do that is helpful here is switching steps 4 and 5. It doesn’t make sense to KYC everyone if a good chunk won’t be elected. It seems more reasonable to elect and then KYC. If they fail to do so, the spot goes to the next one in line that can.
Thank you for this call out, the proposal will be edited with this suggestion now.
Thank you for your thoughtful feedback. Regarding the cost extrapolation: Our intention was to provide a clear example of how costs can escalate under the current system. However, we agree that this could give the impression of overstating the problem.
Regarding the concern of centralization: the proposal's intent is to enhance consistency and professionalism within the DAO's operations. We are open to explore mechanisms such as staggered terms or more frequent rotations of signers to prevent excessive centralization and keep the system dynamic and inclusive if other delegates echo this thought.
Lastly, on integrating the OpCo versus a standalone committee. Our 2 primary thoughts here surround checks and balances being good for the DAO and the fact that the OpCo is not currently in a form where it is executable and may face friction in getting there.
The current model is expensive, but comes at the benefit of greater flexibility thru variable costs depending on workload.
Thank you for sharing your thoughts, and we appreciate your support for the broader idea. We understand your concern about the fixed compensation structure. Our approach to standardize the payments to $1500/$2500 per month aims to attract and retain highly qualified and trustworthy signers as we anticipate an increase in initiatives requiring their expertise and competency. This fixed rate is primarily set to ensure reliability and commitment from the signers, rather than being a direct reflection of workload (it is likely still a high payment in that context.) If the number of multi-sigs significantly fluctuates to the downside, it certainly merits a discussion to align the compensation with the workload. That said we believe the evolving dynamics in the DAO show an increased number and velocity of proposals requiring multisigs.
I think this is a great offer. Thanks for it. There is one thing that seems wrong to me:
MSS Member Agreement: If at least 50% of MSS members (6 out of 12 members) agree that a signer should be removed due to breach of duties or conflict of interest, they can initiate the removal process internally. The agreement must be documented and publicly disclosed to maintain transparency. Analytics on signer activity from Den may be used as supporting evidence
This would be if members of the Republican Party removed members of the Democratic Party from the US Congress, since they have a majority.
And the second problem is in this:
i. 5/12: <$1M ii. 6/12: $1M-$5M iii. 7/12: $5M-$10m iiii. 8/12 $10M-$50M
Than you for this proposal.
I think is sensitive to try and cut costs when is possible, plus have a framework (i know i know cursed work) for operations that are both critical and widely used. I have a few questions on the above.
The second question is about performances. While the group should not turn into a "who sign first" for the sake of metric, because is also where security issues due to rush could arise, there is a merit in measuring the effectiveness of signers. In a natural and fair way, everyone should sign as soon as possible, compatible with their IRL and online commitment and others. But also, we want to avoid people just going for "someone else is gonna sign it". Wanted to ask if you had a check and balance for it.
Same applies for tx creations. Is usually different lift to create a new batched tx versus verify it. This should be done in a fair way, same as of the above.
Thanks for this proposal, and looking forward to see it implemented!
Having multiple multisgi committees does help with decentralisation, which is quite critical to ensure resilience in the DAO. Wouldn’t the current proposal make the DAO quite fragile to 12 individuals being bribed/blackmailed? (or even only 5-7 out of 12 who could approve/block virtually everything)
Thank you for your feedback. Currently, as shown in image 4, a small number of signers are reused across multiple proposals. Our proposal aims to assign these responsibilities to 12 carefully selected, highly trustworthy, and competent signers. We believe that having the highest quality signers, rather than increasing the number simply for diversity's sake, will better serve the DAO. Realistically, the pool of individuals interested and qualified to sit on the DAO's multisigs isn't vast. Each selected signer will undergo a rigorous KYC process conducted by the foundation to ensure their integrity and reduce the risk of coercion. We remain open to exploring additional mechanisms to enhance both trust and decentralization within the MSS's structure.
Also, when designing the RnDAO proposal, a key concern for us was, above signing payments, was oversight i.e. reviewing the delivery of milestones to approve payments. I don’t see how the proposed solution nor problem definition takes that into account and I’m concerned it can clash.
I had made this thread a couple of days before this proposal was posted to discuss oversight specifically and there’s a pol.is exercise to find consensus and key points for discussion. Maybe something that can be valuable for the discussion here
do you think increasing the threshold for internal removal here to 8/12 would suffice?
I think that no one from MSS members can remove another member. I know from the implementation of such decisions in real politics and they always lead to bad results for community.
A member can only be removed in advance according to the rules, such as failure to fulfill his obligations and only after a general vote.
On the flow above, to me, is not clear if the multisig is responsible to only create and execute the tx or to effectively give the green light about the tx.
I assume is the former, but want to clarify.
If it’s the latter, is likely a problem. Just taking the example above: who takes the responsebility to vet the invoce? the milestone? and so on?
Thank you kindly for your helpful feedback (as always :). You’re right, the example is not clear. The format for approvals allows proposals to name who are fulfilling the roles of “payment requestor” and “payment approver.” The ARDC is likely a better example where there are clearly defined positions involved. In this proposal, a member of Chaos Labs would be listed as one “payment requestor” and the DAO Advocate would be the “payment approver.” This model fits into our next proposal, which will aim to create oversight mechanisms in the DAO, where this oversight party can be named as “payment approver” in proposals.
The second question is about performances. While the group should not turn into a “who sign first” for the sake of metric, because is also where security issues due to rush could arise, there is a merit in measuring the effectiveness of signers. In a natural and fair way, everyone should sign as soon as possible, compatible with their IRL and online commitment and others. But also, we want to avoid people just going for “someone else is gonna sign it”. Wanted to ask if you had a check and balance for it.
Same applies for tx creations. Is usually different lift to create a new batched tx versus verify it. This should be done in a fair way, same as of the above.
Regarding performance metrics and efficiency, we acknowledge the importance of balancing promptness with thoroughness. One of the reasons we want to give the MSS the ability to internally remove a remember is for exactly this purpose. We struggle to ideate a good mechanism for adding checks around the effectiveness portion of this problem, besides clearly stating and stressing to the DAO that who signs first is not a valuable metric.
You cannot remove a MSS members by internal vote of the members themselves - this is contrary to democracy and the fact that they were elected by others, therefore it is possible to decide to exclude them only by a full vote of the community.
This would be if members of the Republican Party removed members of the Democratic Party from the US Congress, since they have a majority.
Thanks for your insightful and true thoughts. We would like to give the MSS the ability to efficiently remove incompetent signer since their fellow members will have the most insight into their efficiency and effectiveness, do you think increasing the threshold for internal removal here to 8/12 would suffice?
Probably worth raising by 1 vote in each category: 6/12, 7/12, 8/12, 9/12 respectively
To be candid, we aren’t sure what the correct balance between efficient action and security is. We are more than open to increasing the threshold by 1 for each initiative. We would love to make a call to action for more delegates to weigh in here.
One point we think most elections do that is helpful here is switching steps 4 and 5. It doesn’t make sense to KYC everyone if a good chunk won’t be elected. It seems more reasonable to elect and then KYC. If they fail to do so, the spot goes to the next one in line that can.
Thank you for this call out, the proposal will be edited with this suggestion now.
Thank you for your thoughtful feedback. Regarding the cost extrapolation: Our intention was to provide a clear example of how costs can escalate under the current system. However, we agree that this could give the impression of overstating the problem.
Regarding the concern of centralization: the proposal's intent is to enhance consistency and professionalism within the DAO's operations. We are open to explore mechanisms such as staggered terms or more frequent rotations of signers to prevent excessive centralization and keep the system dynamic and inclusive if other delegates echo this thought.
Lastly, on integrating the OpCo versus a standalone committee. Our 2 primary thoughts here surround checks and balances being good for the DAO and the fact that the OpCo is not currently in a form where it is executable and may face friction in getting there.
The current model is expensive, but comes at the benefit of greater flexibility thru variable costs depending on workload.
Thank you for sharing your thoughts, and we appreciate your support for the broader idea. We understand your concern about the fixed compensation structure. Our approach to standardize the payments to $1500/$2500 per month aims to attract and retain highly qualified and trustworthy signers as we anticipate an increase in initiatives requiring their expertise and competency. This fixed rate is primarily set to ensure reliability and commitment from the signers, rather than being a direct reflection of workload (it is likely still a high payment in that context.) If the number of multi-sigs significantly fluctuates to the downside, it certainly merits a discussion to align the compensation with the workload. That said we believe the evolving dynamics in the DAO show an increased number and velocity of proposals requiring multisigs.
I think this is a great offer. Thanks for it. There is one thing that seems wrong to me:
MSS Member Agreement: If at least 50% of MSS members (6 out of 12 members) agree that a signer should be removed due to breach of duties or conflict of interest, they can initiate the removal process internally. The agreement must be documented and publicly disclosed to maintain transparency. Analytics on signer activity from Den may be used as supporting evidence
This would be if members of the Republican Party removed members of the Democratic Party from the US Congress, since they have a majority.
And the second problem is in this:
i. 5/12: <$1M ii. 6/12: $1M-$5M iii. 7/12: $5M-$10m iiii. 8/12 $10M-$50M
Than you for this proposal.
I think is sensitive to try and cut costs when is possible, plus have a framework (i know i know cursed work) for operations that are both critical and widely used. I have a few questions on the above.
The second question is about performances. While the group should not turn into a "who sign first" for the sake of metric, because is also where security issues due to rush could arise, there is a merit in measuring the effectiveness of signers. In a natural and fair way, everyone should sign as soon as possible, compatible with their IRL and online commitment and others. But also, we want to avoid people just going for "someone else is gonna sign it". Wanted to ask if you had a check and balance for it.
Same applies for tx creations. Is usually different lift to create a new batched tx versus verify it. This should be done in a fair way, same as of the above.
Thanks for this proposal, and looking forward to see it implemented!
