This proposal seeks approval for the extension of the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [V2] for an additional 6-month term through a Snapshot proposal, utilising the remaining 50% of funds originally approved by the DAO in the ARDC V2 proposal. The initial 6-month term concludes on July 12, 2025. If approved, this extension would activate the second phase of funding as outlined in the original ARDC V2 framework, bringing the total duration to one (1) year.
The Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [V2] was approved by the ArbitrumDAO with a structured funding mechanism designed to provide accountability and community oversight. As outlined in the original proposal:
"In the immediate, only 50% of the budget voted in favour by the DAO will be used with the remaining 50% subject to utilisation via Snapshot vote as explained in the extension mechanics."
The original ARDC V2 framework established a two-phase approach:
This proposal is designed to activate Phase 2 without requiring a new proposal cycle, allowing continuity in research and development efforts without disruption.
Supervisory Council
Per the ARDC V2 proposal, Supervisory Council elections will not be repeated to minimise voter fatigue, as their election was conducted through a single Snapshot vote.
Current Working Members
The DAO may choose to retain the existing working members for faster continuation, or alternatively, trigger a re-election as per the framework established in the original ARDC V2 proposal. If a re-election is pursued, it will be coordinated by Entropy, the Supervisory Council member responsible for operations.
This extension would release the remaining ~ 50% of funds approved in the original ARDC V2 approval. The only modifications to the original proposal relate to (i) MSS responsibilities being transferred to the Arbitrum Foundation, (ii) the Supervisory Council's compensation, whereby Entropy has waived compensation and Juanrah is receiving 8,750 ARB/month, representing a monthly cost saving compared to the previous structure.
If the DAO votes to extend the ARDC V2, this will result in the ARDC operating with a combined budget consisting of:
These additional funds for the second 6-month term are as follows:
As stated in the original ARDC V2 proposal, this combined budget per vertical represents maximum caps, not guaranteed disbursements. They define the upper limits of what may be spent in each vertical, with actual disbursement contingent on necessity and approval.
If the DAO chooses not to extend the ARDC after the completion of this initial term, then the AF will return the remaining USDC + ARB to the Treasury. There will be no subsequent OTC to buy back ARB with the USDC.
This extension proposal outlines the following options for the ArbitrumDAO to consider, with the decision to be made through a weighted voting mechanism:
Option A: Extend ARDC V2 with current working members → Approve the 6-month extension using the current Supervisory Council and working members, releasing the remaining 50% of funds.
Option B: Extend ARDC V2 with a re-election for working members → Approve the 6-month extension using the current Supervisory Council, but hold new elections for Research, Risk and Security members, releasing the remaining 50% of funds.
Option C: Do Not Extend ARDC V2 → Conclude the initiative at the end of the initial 6-month term, with AF returning all unused funds to the Treasury
Option D: Abstain
This proposal seeks approval for the extension of the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [V2] for an additional 6-month term through a Snapshot proposal, utilising the remaining 50% of funds originally approved by the DAO in the ARDC V2 proposal. The initial 6-month term concludes on July 12, 2025. If approved, this extension would activate the second phase of funding as outlined in the original ARDC V2 framework, bringing the total duration to one (1) year.
The Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [V2] was approved by the ArbitrumDAO with a structured funding mechanism designed to provide accountability and community oversight. As outlined in the original proposal:
"In the immediate, only 50% of the budget voted in favour by the DAO will be used with the remaining 50% subject to utilisation via Snapshot vote as explained in the extension mechanics."
The original ARDC V2 framework established a two-phase approach:
This proposal is designed to activate Phase 2 without requiring a new proposal cycle, allowing continuity in research and development efforts without disruption.
Supervisory Council
Per the ARDC V2 proposal, Supervisory Council elections will not be repeated to minimise voter fatigue, as their election was conducted through a single Snapshot vote.
Current Working Members
The DAO may choose to retain the existing working members for faster continuation, or alternatively, trigger a re-election as per the framework established in the original ARDC V2 proposal. If a re-election is pursued, it will be coordinated by Entropy, the Supervisory Council member responsible for operations.
This extension would release the remaining ~ 50% of funds approved in the original ARDC V2 approval. The only modifications to the original proposal relate to (i) MSS responsibilities being transferred to the Arbitrum Foundation, (ii) the Supervisory Council's compensation, whereby Entropy has waived compensation and Juanrah is receiving 8,750 ARB/month, representing a monthly cost saving compared to the previous structure.
If the DAO votes to extend the ARDC V2, this will result in the ARDC operating with a combined budget consisting of:
These additional funds for the second 6-month term are as follows:
As stated in the original ARDC V2 proposal, this combined budget per vertical represents maximum caps, not guaranteed disbursements. They define the upper limits of what may be spent in each vertical, with actual disbursement contingent on necessity and approval.
If the DAO chooses not to extend the ARDC after the completion of this initial term, then the AF will return the remaining USDC + ARB to the Treasury. There will be no subsequent OTC to buy back ARB with the USDC.
This extension proposal outlines the following options for the ArbitrumDAO to consider, with the decision to be made through a weighted voting mechanism:
Option A: Extend ARDC V2 with current working members → Approve the 6-month extension using the current Supervisory Council and working members, releasing the remaining 50% of funds.
Option B: Extend ARDC V2 with a re-election for working members → Approve the 6-month extension using the current Supervisory Council, but hold new elections for Research, Risk and Security members, releasing the remaining 50% of funds.
Option C: Do Not Extend ARDC V2 → Conclude the initiative at the end of the initial 6-month term, with AF returning all unused funds to the Treasury
Option D: Abstain
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https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/36?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/35
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/36?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/35
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/34
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/32
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/24?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/28?u=maxlomu
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/27?u=danielm
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/26?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/23
There is no mentioning of what they achieved in first 6 months and why they need an extension. There should be a milestone based conditions similar to grants given to startups. If you can provide what you achieved in past 6 months and why do you need an extension, then i can change my vote. Thank you.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/34
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/32
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/24?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/28?u=maxlomu
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/27?u=danielm
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/26?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-v2-extension/29476/23
There is no mentioning of what they achieved in first 6 months and why they need an extension. There should be a milestone based conditions similar to grants given to startups. If you can provide what you achieved in past 6 months and why do you need an extension, then i can change my vote. Thank you.
I have declined this coz i dont see any updates on what they achieved in first 6 months and why do they need an extension. There is no clear roadmap and milestones mentioned. If startups who are getting grants, are forced to have milestone based conditions then why cant the research team? If you can provide the detailed report card of what was achieved in first 6 months and also a plan for next 6 months, i will happily change my vote. Thanks.
I have declined this coz i dont see any updates on what they achieved in first 6 months and why do they need an extension. There is no clear roadmap and milestones mentioned. If startups who are getting grants, are forced to have milestone based conditions then why cant the research team? If you can provide the detailed report card of what was achieved in first 6 months and also a plan for next 6 months, i will happily change my vote. Thanks.
**Supporting Option B **
I support Option B, which approves the 6-month extension of ARDC V2 using the current Supervisory Council, but triggers a re-election for the working groups (Research, Risk, and Security).
**Supporting Option B **
I support Option B, which approves the 6-month extension of ARDC V2 using the current Supervisory Council, but triggers a re-election for the working groups (Research, Risk, and Security).
While I agree that the initial proposal has been successfully executed and that the second tranche of funds should be released as per the original framework, I believe this extension represents a new operational phase—and therefore merits renewed legitimacy through elections.
The original ARDC V2 framework clearly allows the DAO to decide whether to retain the current working members or initiate a re-election. Since the composition of these verticals plays a crucial role in the effectiveness of the initiative, reconfirming or refreshing those seats is both healthy and aligned with DAO values.
Importantly, a re-election process does not exclude current contributors from continuing—it simply invites community reaffirmation. This upholds transparency, encourages broader participation, and ensures accountability as we enter the final stage of the ARDC V2 cycle.
The decline in transparency appears to be a recurring theme within Arbitrum.
**Supporting Option B **
I support Option B, which approves the 6-month extension of ARDC V2 using the current Supervisory Council, but triggers a re-election for the working groups (Research, Risk, and Security).
**Supporting Option B **
I support Option B, which approves the 6-month extension of ARDC V2 using the current Supervisory Council, but triggers a re-election for the working groups (Research, Risk, and Security).
While I agree that the initial proposal has been successfully executed and that the second tranche of funds should be released as per the original framework, I believe this extension represents a new operational phase—and therefore merits renewed legitimacy through elections.
The original ARDC V2 framework clearly allows the DAO to decide whether to retain the current working members or initiate a re-election. Since the composition of these verticals plays a crucial role in the effectiveness of the initiative, reconfirming or refreshing those seats is both healthy and aligned with DAO values.
Importantly, a re-election process does not exclude current contributors from continuing—it simply invites community reaffirmation. This upholds transparency, encourages broader participation, and ensures accountability as we enter the final stage of the ARDC V2 cycle.
The decline in transparency appears to be a recurring theme within Arbitrum.
We're planning to vote for option C. From Entropy's retrospective post and the call it seems clear that the current model isn't sustainable. There is always some useful research to be done but identifying what it is and how it might be actionable doesn't necessarily happen on timelines that line up neatly with how this is being funded.
However, there are some things we'd like to keep in part even while winding down the wider program. While we expect that the AAEs will commission their own research as they come up with questions they want answered, we believe that good ideas can come from anywhere and appreciated the willingness of the ARDC to add delegate requests to their list of potential projects. Requests for more research might occur through 'informal feedback loops between the idea generator and the relevant AAE' in the future but we're not sure that something like that is necessarily possible tomorrow. We think that in the immediate period after ending this program leaving avenues to funding for researchers who can define what they want to look into and how it could be beneficial to the DAO would encourage idea generation from wider sources and could potentially lead us down paths we wouldn't have considered otherwise. We agree with Entropy that the USD-denominated funds should be reallocated to STEP 2, but think it might be useful to keep a portion of the ARB held separately in a pool explicitly for this purpose instead of the entire amount returned to the treasury.
We're planning to vote for option C. From Entropy's retrospective post and the call it seems clear that the current model isn't sustainable. There is always some useful research to be done but identifying what it is and how it might be actionable doesn't necessarily happen on timelines that line up neatly with how this is being funded.
However, there are some things we'd like to keep in part even while winding down the wider program. While we expect that the AAEs will commission their own research as they come up with questions they want answered, we believe that good ideas can come from anywhere and appreciated the willingness of the ARDC to add delegate requests to their list of potential projects. Requests for more research might occur through 'informal feedback loops between the idea generator and the relevant AAE' in the future but we're not sure that something like that is necessarily possible tomorrow. We think that in the immediate period after ending this program leaving avenues to funding for researchers who can define what they want to look into and how it could be beneficial to the DAO would encourage idea generation from wider sources and could potentially lead us down paths we wouldn't have considered otherwise. We agree with Entropy that the USD-denominated funds should be reallocated to STEP 2, but think it might be useful to keep a portion of the ARB held separately in a pool explicitly for this purpose instead of the entire amount returned to the treasury.
This proposal seeks approval for the extension of the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [V2] for an additional 6-month term through a Snapshot proposal, utilising the remaining 50% of funds originally approved by the DAO in the ARDC V2 proposal. The initial 6-month term concludes on July 12, 2025. If approved, this extension would activate the second phase of funding as outlined in the original ARDC V2 framework, bringing the total duration to one (1) year.
The Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [V2] was approved by the ArbitrumDAO with a structured funding mechanism designed to provide accountability and community oversight. As outlined in the original proposal:
“In the immediate, only 50% of the budget voted in favour by the DAO will be used with the remaining 50% subject to utilisation via Snapshot vote as explained in the extension mechanics.”
The original ARDC V2 framework established a two-phase approach:
This proposal is designed to activate Phase 2 without requiring a new proposal cycle, allowing continuity in research and development efforts without disruption.
The DAO may choose to retain the existing working members for faster continuation, or alternatively, trigger a re-election as per the framework established in the original ARDC V2 proposal. If a re-election is pursued, it will be coordinated by Entropy, the Supervisory Council member responsible for operations.
This extension would release the remaining ~ 50% of funds approved in the original ARDC V2 approval. The only modifications to the original proposal relate to (i) MSS responsibilities being transferred to the Arbitrum Foundation, (ii) the Supervisory Council’s compensation, whereby Entropy has waived compensation and Juanrah is receiving 8,750 ARB/month, representing a monthly cost saving compared to the previous structure.
If the DAO votes to extend the ARDC V2, this will result in the ARDC operating with a combined budget consisting of:
These additional funds for the second 6-month term are as follows:
As stated in the original ARDC V2 proposal, this combined budget per vertical represents maximum caps, not guaranteed disbursements. They define the upper limits of what may be spent in each vertical, with actual disbursement contingent on necessity and approval.
If the DAO chooses not to extend the ARDC after the completion of this initial term, then the AF will return the remaining USDC + ARB to the Treasury. There will be no subsequent OTC to buy back ARB with the USDC.
This extension proposal outlines the following options for the ArbitrumDAO to consider, with the decision to be made through a weighted voting mechanism:
Option A: Extend ARDC V2 with current working members → Approve the 6-month extension using the current Supervisory Council and working members, releasing the remaining 50% of funds.
Option B: Extend ARDC V2 with a re-election for working members → Approve the 6-month extension using the current Supervisory Council, but hold new elections for Research, Risk and Security members, releasing the remaining 50% of funds.
Option C: Do Not Extend ARDC V2 → Conclude the initiative at the end of the initial 6-month term, with AF returning all unused funds to the Treasury
Option D: Abstain
Fully in support of Option A — extend ARDC V2 with the current team!
The first 6 months have shown strong coordination, operational transparency, and clear cost-efficiency (shoutout to Entropy for waiving comp & Juanrah for stepping up solo).
Continuity is key — why hit pause on progress?
Research, Security, and Risk are too critical to risk a reset. Let’s double down on what’s working and keep building momentum through the full 12-month cycle as originally planned.
This isn’t about reinventing the wheel, it’s about letting it roll further.
This proposal seeks approval for the extension of the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [V2] for an additional 6-month term through a Snapshot proposal, utilising the remaining 50% of funds originally approved by the DAO in the ARDC V2 proposal. The initial 6-month term concludes on July 12, 2025. If approved, this extension would activate the second phase of funding as outlined in the original ARDC V2 framework, bringing the total duration to one (1) year.
The Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [V2] was approved by the ArbitrumDAO with a structured funding mechanism designed to provide accountability and community oversight. As outlined in the original proposal:
“In the immediate, only 50% of the budget voted in favour by the DAO will be used with the remaining 50% subject to utilisation via Snapshot vote as explained in the extension mechanics.”
The original ARDC V2 framework established a two-phase approach:
This proposal is designed to activate Phase 2 without requiring a new proposal cycle, allowing continuity in research and development efforts without disruption.
The DAO may choose to retain the existing working members for faster continuation, or alternatively, trigger a re-election as per the framework established in the original ARDC V2 proposal. If a re-election is pursued, it will be coordinated by Entropy, the Supervisory Council member responsible for operations.
This extension would release the remaining ~ 50% of funds approved in the original ARDC V2 approval. The only modifications to the original proposal relate to (i) MSS responsibilities being transferred to the Arbitrum Foundation, (ii) the Supervisory Council’s compensation, whereby Entropy has waived compensation and Juanrah is receiving 8,750 ARB/month, representing a monthly cost saving compared to the previous structure.
If the DAO votes to extend the ARDC V2, this will result in the ARDC operating with a combined budget consisting of:
These additional funds for the second 6-month term are as follows:
As stated in the original ARDC V2 proposal, this combined budget per vertical represents maximum caps, not guaranteed disbursements. They define the upper limits of what may be spent in each vertical, with actual disbursement contingent on necessity and approval.
If the DAO chooses not to extend the ARDC after the completion of this initial term, then the AF will return the remaining USDC + ARB to the Treasury. There will be no subsequent OTC to buy back ARB with the USDC.
This extension proposal outlines the following options for the ArbitrumDAO to consider, with the decision to be made through a weighted voting mechanism:
Option A: Extend ARDC V2 with current working members → Approve the 6-month extension using the current Supervisory Council and working members, releasing the remaining 50% of funds.
Option B: Extend ARDC V2 with a re-election for working members → Approve the 6-month extension using the current Supervisory Council, but hold new elections for Research, Risk and Security members, releasing the remaining 50% of funds.
Option C: Do Not Extend ARDC V2 → Conclude the initiative at the end of the initial 6-month term, with AF returning all unused funds to the Treasury
Option D: Abstain
Fully in support of Option A — extend ARDC V2 with the current team!
The first 6 months have shown strong coordination, operational transparency, and clear cost-efficiency (shoutout to Entropy for waiving comp & Juanrah for stepping up solo).
Continuity is key — why hit pause on progress?
Research, Security, and Risk are too critical to risk a reset. Let’s double down on what’s working and keep building momentum through the full 12-month cycle as originally planned.
This isn’t about reinventing the wheel, it’s about letting it roll further.
Voted “Don’t Extend”. Allowing the initiative to conclude and having the unused arb+usdc returned to the Treasury keeps the DAO flexible, and preserves the option to support future research efforts under a clearer and more accountable framework, like OpCo.
I've decided to vote for option C, "do not extend" for the following reasons.
I appreciate the work done over the past months and recognize the commitment shown by the team. However, I agree with other delegates that the structure itself is intrinsically problematic. I believe the current model does not address the DAO's needs and should be rethought, rather than simply extended, in order to find a genuine purpose moving forward. In my view, the best course of action is to stop the program now and take the time to discuss and design alternative solutions that are truly aligned with our current priorities, so that we can have a model that is actually functional. I also agree with the need for a demand-driven setup, and ARDC in its current form does not seem to fulfill this need effectively.
I've decided to vote for option C, "do not extend" for the following reasons.
I appreciate the work done over the past months and recognize the commitment shown by the team. However, I agree with other delegates that the structure itself is intrinsically problematic. I believe the current model does not address the DAO's needs and should be rethought, rather than simply extended, in order to find a genuine purpose moving forward. In my view, the best course of action is to stop the program now and take the time to discuss and design alternative solutions that are truly aligned with our current priorities, so that we can have a model that is actually functional. I also agree with the need for a demand-driven setup, and ARDC in its current form does not seem to fulfill this need effectively.
*sorry for the late post
DAOplomats voted AGAINST extending ARDC V2.
As we originally stated, the ARDC team has done good work with very insightful reports.
DAOplomats voted AGAINST extending ARDC V2.
As we originally stated, the ARDC team has done good work with very insightful reports.
However, we decided to vote against a renewal as this proposal wasn't polished to incorporate very good feedback from delegates. Plus, a solution to our questions on impact pathways and funding model rigidity wasn't given. We believe these areas should have been addressed before the vote went live.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote ABSTAIN on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
Due to our clear Conflict of Interest concerning this proposal (Juanrah is now working at SEEDGov), we have decided to abstain.
Voting for Option C: "Not to Extend"
To summarise, our belief is that the current program faces structural frictions that require a fundamental redesign before it can consistently deliver meaningful value to the DAO. Accordingly, we will be voting for Option C.
Voting for Option C: "Not to Extend"
To summarise, our belief is that the current program faces structural frictions that require a fundamental redesign before it can consistently deliver meaningful value to the DAO. Accordingly, we will be voting for Option C.
If Entropy themselves don't think it should be extended and they were on the council, I see no reason to push for it. That's not to say I skipped due diligence on this, but I think this fact holds a lot of weight.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted AGAINST
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted AGAINST
We genuinely value the work the ARDC has produced. Their reports have added depth to the forum, and the current proposal asks for no new funds and only a brief extension. Even so, with an OpCo making progress to come live, we struggle to justify running a separate research mandate in parallel. Once OpCo is active, it can bring these same contributors in as service providers when specific studies are needed, ensuring their expertise isn’t lost while avoiding duplicated structures and reporting lines.
As the options remained the same, I voted for Option C.
Based on my reasoning and personal background, my initial inclination would be to support the continuation of the program. However, a DAO is a living system, so within it every decision is interconnected with prior choices and the context surrounding them. Considering the feedback and concerns raised around Part A of the proposal, and reflecting on how things have unfolded, I’ve come to believe that the “Don’t extend” option might be the most beneficial for the DAO at this time.
Of course, I want to thank for the proposal. This isn’t about sugarcoating anything. It’s because proposals are how the DAO makes its best decisions. So, I genuinely appreciate every proposal, as without them, the very existence of the DAO would be at risk.
We’ll be voting for Option C.
While we appreciate the work the ARDC has put in, we don’t think it makes sense to keep going with the current setup.
We’ll be voting for Option C.
While we appreciate the work the ARDC has put in, we don’t think it makes sense to keep going with the current setup.
As others have highlighted, the retainer model creates incentives to do work just for the sake of it, rather than focusing on genuine impact. Even if not all of the ~$900k ends up being spent, budgeting that much for another six months without clear, actionable deliverables feels off.
We’d be more supportive of a model where most of the funding is tied directly to outcomes – like governance proposals that get passed, or recommendations that get implemented. If the research commissioned doesn’t have a clear path to tangible impact, it's probably not worth funding in the first place.
We also question the need for a dedicated research committee. If an AAE truly needs specific research, they should commission it directly from their budget. And if it’s a stakeholder or delegate suggesting research, then it’s on them to convince an AAE to fund it. This approach would make sure that only well-scoped, truly necessary research projects receive funding. If an AAE isn't willing to fund it from their own budget, it's likely not high impact enough to justify funding.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
Overall, the research contributions from Castle and DeFiLlama, along with Juanrah’s exceptional work on communications, have been top-notch. We've also seen notable changes in the ARDC structure, with some members stepping down to pursue other opportunities.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
Overall, the research contributions from Castle and DeFiLlama, along with Juanrah’s exceptional work on communications, have been top-notch. We've also seen notable changes in the ARDC structure, with some members stepping down to pursue other opportunities.
After the AAE framework being established, it would be ideal to transition these responsibilities to the new team. This would enable more targeted and effective use of the existing resources, ensuring maximum impact and efficiency moving forward.
We would be voting on Option C.
Atomist is one of the GMX governance committee members he has opted out to vote on the proposal due to COI
Hi this is Brook from TiD Research. After careful consideration, we chose to vote against the extension.
Hi this is Brook from TiD Research. After careful consideration, we chose to vote against the extension.
One of the core issues I see with the current ARDC structure is that the DAO’s research demands are often dynamic and unpredictable. At times, urgent questions emerge that require in-depth investigation; other times, there are extended periods where research demand is minimal. Maintaining a standing research team under a retainer model during these lulls creates budget inefficiencies and may even pressure contributors to generate content around topics that aren't high-priority or actionable for the DAO.
The DAO’s needs also can shift quickly and often demand highly specialized expertise — whether it’s treasury strategy, contract security, incentive design, or ecosystem growth. It’s difficult for a fixed team to cover this breadth with the required depth at all times.
Lastly but most importantly, ARDC is a research body, not an executional one. Even high-quality reports can fail to generate impact if there isn’t a clear stakeholder responsible for follow-through. This creates a disconnect between insight and action.
Instead of maintaining a fixed research team, I suggest we move toward a Request for Proposal (RFP) model, coordinated by the relevant executional bodies (e.g. AAE, OpCo, etc.).
Under this system:
Rationale
Specialization on demand: Different research topics require different domain expertise. Through RFPs, we can engage best-fit contributors for each case. For example,
Better fit and efficiency: Each engagement is tailored to the problem at hand. We avoid generic research and reduce wasted budget.
Increased accountability: When the executional body that identified the problem also oversees the RFP, they have skin in the game. This ensures research outputs are not only relevant but also implemented.
This proposal isn’t meant to discredit the ARDC’s contributions to date — the work done has clearly been valuable. But as the DAO matures, it makes sense to revisit our funding structures and evolve toward more flexible, accountable, and context-sensitive mechanisms . I believe an RFP model led by executional bodies is a promising step in that direction.
gm, I agree with the general sentiment here and will be voting to NOT renew the ARDC.
While the reports have been insightful (thanks to all researchers involved), the new structure via the AAEs would enable direct and on demand engagement, which in turn will have a tighter information --> action+accountability loop which is critical for this type of projects.
As in @web3citizenxyz representation, voting for option C: do not extend. Below the rationale:
Voted “Don’t Extend”. Allowing the initiative to conclude and having the unused arb+usdc returned to the Treasury keeps the DAO flexible, and preserves the option to support future research efforts under a clearer and more accountable framework, like OpCo.
I've decided to vote for option C, "do not extend" for the following reasons.
I appreciate the work done over the past months and recognize the commitment shown by the team. However, I agree with other delegates that the structure itself is intrinsically problematic. I believe the current model does not address the DAO's needs and should be rethought, rather than simply extended, in order to find a genuine purpose moving forward. In my view, the best course of action is to stop the program now and take the time to discuss and design alternative solutions that are truly aligned with our current priorities, so that we can have a model that is actually functional. I also agree with the need for a demand-driven setup, and ARDC in its current form does not seem to fulfill this need effectively.
I've decided to vote for option C, "do not extend" for the following reasons.
I appreciate the work done over the past months and recognize the commitment shown by the team. However, I agree with other delegates that the structure itself is intrinsically problematic. I believe the current model does not address the DAO's needs and should be rethought, rather than simply extended, in order to find a genuine purpose moving forward. In my view, the best course of action is to stop the program now and take the time to discuss and design alternative solutions that are truly aligned with our current priorities, so that we can have a model that is actually functional. I also agree with the need for a demand-driven setup, and ARDC in its current form does not seem to fulfill this need effectively.
*sorry for the late post
DAOplomats voted AGAINST extending ARDC V2.
As we originally stated, the ARDC team has done good work with very insightful reports.
DAOplomats voted AGAINST extending ARDC V2.
As we originally stated, the ARDC team has done good work with very insightful reports.
However, we decided to vote against a renewal as this proposal wasn't polished to incorporate very good feedback from delegates. Plus, a solution to our questions on impact pathways and funding model rigidity wasn't given. We believe these areas should have been addressed before the vote went live.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote ABSTAIN on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
Due to our clear Conflict of Interest concerning this proposal (Juanrah is now working at SEEDGov), we have decided to abstain.
Voting for Option C: "Not to Extend"
To summarise, our belief is that the current program faces structural frictions that require a fundamental redesign before it can consistently deliver meaningful value to the DAO. Accordingly, we will be voting for Option C.
Voting for Option C: "Not to Extend"
To summarise, our belief is that the current program faces structural frictions that require a fundamental redesign before it can consistently deliver meaningful value to the DAO. Accordingly, we will be voting for Option C.
If Entropy themselves don't think it should be extended and they were on the council, I see no reason to push for it. That's not to say I skipped due diligence on this, but I think this fact holds a lot of weight.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted AGAINST
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted AGAINST
We genuinely value the work the ARDC has produced. Their reports have added depth to the forum, and the current proposal asks for no new funds and only a brief extension. Even so, with an OpCo making progress to come live, we struggle to justify running a separate research mandate in parallel. Once OpCo is active, it can bring these same contributors in as service providers when specific studies are needed, ensuring their expertise isn’t lost while avoiding duplicated structures and reporting lines.
As the options remained the same, I voted for Option C.
Based on my reasoning and personal background, my initial inclination would be to support the continuation of the program. However, a DAO is a living system, so within it every decision is interconnected with prior choices and the context surrounding them. Considering the feedback and concerns raised around Part A of the proposal, and reflecting on how things have unfolded, I’ve come to believe that the “Don’t extend” option might be the most beneficial for the DAO at this time.
Of course, I want to thank for the proposal. This isn’t about sugarcoating anything. It’s because proposals are how the DAO makes its best decisions. So, I genuinely appreciate every proposal, as without them, the very existence of the DAO would be at risk.
We’ll be voting for Option C.
While we appreciate the work the ARDC has put in, we don’t think it makes sense to keep going with the current setup.
We’ll be voting for Option C.
While we appreciate the work the ARDC has put in, we don’t think it makes sense to keep going with the current setup.
As others have highlighted, the retainer model creates incentives to do work just for the sake of it, rather than focusing on genuine impact. Even if not all of the ~$900k ends up being spent, budgeting that much for another six months without clear, actionable deliverables feels off.
We’d be more supportive of a model where most of the funding is tied directly to outcomes – like governance proposals that get passed, or recommendations that get implemented. If the research commissioned doesn’t have a clear path to tangible impact, it's probably not worth funding in the first place.
We also question the need for a dedicated research committee. If an AAE truly needs specific research, they should commission it directly from their budget. And if it’s a stakeholder or delegate suggesting research, then it’s on them to convince an AAE to fund it. This approach would make sure that only well-scoped, truly necessary research projects receive funding. If an AAE isn't willing to fund it from their own budget, it's likely not high impact enough to justify funding.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
Overall, the research contributions from Castle and DeFiLlama, along with Juanrah’s exceptional work on communications, have been top-notch. We've also seen notable changes in the ARDC structure, with some members stepping down to pursue other opportunities.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
Overall, the research contributions from Castle and DeFiLlama, along with Juanrah’s exceptional work on communications, have been top-notch. We've also seen notable changes in the ARDC structure, with some members stepping down to pursue other opportunities.
After the AAE framework being established, it would be ideal to transition these responsibilities to the new team. This would enable more targeted and effective use of the existing resources, ensuring maximum impact and efficiency moving forward.
We would be voting on Option C.
Atomist is one of the GMX governance committee members he has opted out to vote on the proposal due to COI
Hi this is Brook from TiD Research. After careful consideration, we chose to vote against the extension.
Hi this is Brook from TiD Research. After careful consideration, we chose to vote against the extension.
One of the core issues I see with the current ARDC structure is that the DAO’s research demands are often dynamic and unpredictable. At times, urgent questions emerge that require in-depth investigation; other times, there are extended periods where research demand is minimal. Maintaining a standing research team under a retainer model during these lulls creates budget inefficiencies and may even pressure contributors to generate content around topics that aren't high-priority or actionable for the DAO.
The DAO’s needs also can shift quickly and often demand highly specialized expertise — whether it’s treasury strategy, contract security, incentive design, or ecosystem growth. It’s difficult for a fixed team to cover this breadth with the required depth at all times.
Lastly but most importantly, ARDC is a research body, not an executional one. Even high-quality reports can fail to generate impact if there isn’t a clear stakeholder responsible for follow-through. This creates a disconnect between insight and action.
Instead of maintaining a fixed research team, I suggest we move toward a Request for Proposal (RFP) model, coordinated by the relevant executional bodies (e.g. AAE, OpCo, etc.).
Under this system:
Rationale
Specialization on demand: Different research topics require different domain expertise. Through RFPs, we can engage best-fit contributors for each case. For example,
Better fit and efficiency: Each engagement is tailored to the problem at hand. We avoid generic research and reduce wasted budget.
Increased accountability: When the executional body that identified the problem also oversees the RFP, they have skin in the game. This ensures research outputs are not only relevant but also implemented.
This proposal isn’t meant to discredit the ARDC’s contributions to date — the work done has clearly been valuable. But as the DAO matures, it makes sense to revisit our funding structures and evolve toward more flexible, accountable, and context-sensitive mechanisms . I believe an RFP model led by executional bodies is a promising step in that direction.
gm, I agree with the general sentiment here and will be voting to NOT renew the ARDC.
While the reports have been insightful (thanks to all researchers involved), the new structure via the AAEs would enable direct and on demand engagement, which in turn will have a tighter information --> action+accountability loop which is critical for this type of projects.
As in @web3citizenxyz representation, voting for option C: do not extend. Below the rationale:
I am voting to not extend this proposal because I think the first 6 months was enough. I want to see a new plan or new ideas before giving more money. It's better to stop now and use the funds in a better way later
The ARDC extension is unnecessary as current issues are known, and spending a hundreds of thousands ARB to confirm them is wasteful. Research can be handled within new approved framework, integrated with existing entities. If new research or security topics arise, they can be funded via Snapshot using existing funds.
The ARDC had their moments, but in the end we have a good idea about the problems out there right now and don't need to pay a million dollars to confirm them.
Given the big changes in DAO organization, the research can happen within the AAE's, they have huge budgets and then the research can happen in loop with the other work they are pushing.
After reviewing the proposal and reflecting on the work done by ARDC V2, along with the community's input, we’ve decided to vote for Option C: Do Not Extend.
We genuinely appreciate the effort and commitment shown by the contributors over the past six months. There have been some useful outputs, and it’s clear that the team put serious work into their roles. That said, we believe the current setup isn’t the best fit for how the DAO operates today. The structure feels a bit too rigid and doesn’t always connect the research being produced with the immediate needs or priorities of the DAO.
After reviewing the proposal and reflecting on the work done by ARDC V2, along with the community's input, we’ve decided to vote for Option C: Do Not Extend.
We genuinely appreciate the effort and commitment shown by the contributors over the past six months. There have been some useful outputs, and it’s clear that the team put serious work into their roles. That said, we believe the current setup isn’t the best fit for how the DAO operates today. The structure feels a bit too rigid and doesn’t always connect the research being produced with the immediate needs or priorities of the DAO.
In our view, research should be more flexible and closely tied to real-time questions or decisions. We think a model that allows for research to be commissioned based on specific topics or needs would be more effective. This would make it easier to match the right contributors with the right challenges and ensure that the work being done has a clearer path to impact.
We also want to highlight that our vote isn’t about undervaluing research or the people involved. On the contrary, we hope the expertise and knowledge developed through ARDC V2 continues to play a role in the DAO, just in a format that’s more responsive and better aligned with how things are evolving.
In short, we’re voting no on the extension because we believe it’s time to rethink and rebuild a structure that makes research more actionable, more targeted, and ultimately more valuable for the DAO.
I voted AGAINST this extension
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/cp0x-delegate-communication-thread/22217/198?u=cp0x
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting for "Option C: Not to extend ARDC" in this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting for "Option C: Not to extend ARDC" in this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
Firstly, we want to thank the ARDC team for their work over the past few months. We’ve read the research reports, attended the bi-weekly calls, and consistently followed the content being produced. As a delegate involved in analysis and ecosystem research as well, we’ve been closely tracking the development and impact of the ARDC since its inception.
To be clear, this isn’t a vote against research. It’s a vote for a more accountable and demand-driven model that better fits where the DAO is today.
One of the core structural issues is that the current retainer-based model leads to research being produced based on fixed capacity rather than real-time DAO needs. This often results in valuable research that doesn't connect to decision-making. We align with @Tane and @pedrob on this point: when outputs lack ownership or a follow-up path, the result is underutilized work and coordination drag.
We strongly believe the DAO would benefit more from a demand-driven setup, as mentioned by other delegates as well. Research should be scoped based on proposal needs, strategic challenges, or questions raised by delegates or AAEs. Contributors/SPs can be selected based on topic fit, and budgets can be tied to purpose, not retainers. This structure would also reduce idle spending and improve transparency around what’s being worked on and why.
That said, not everything fell short. Some reports were useful. For example, on top of my mind, if I recall @Entropy referencing some ARDC research reports in their recent DRIP proposal. But those kinds of examples were rare. And there’s no easy way to see which research was actually impactful. In future setups, it would help a lot to have a simple public tracker showing whether research got cited in proposals or led to actual decisions.
On the comms side, we’d like to acknowledge the work done by @Juanrah, especially organizing bi-weekly calls and consistently summarizing reports through X threads and forum posts. One area for improvement we’d suggest is around distribution: in future iterations, it might help if threads are shared through the Arbitrum official channels like Arbitrum Governance. The content itself has been strong, but visibility could improve if published from accounts followed more widely by the DAO community. Just a distribution point, not a critique of the work.
Overall, we’re voting no on the extension, but we’re not saying research isn’t valuable. We’re saying we need to rethink how it’s funded and coordinated. A structure where OpCo or another neutral entity manages a flexible budget and works with a pool of vetted contributors makes more sense to us. That way, the DAO can still fund high-quality work, but in a way that’s better aligned with its priorities.
We again thank all the contributors involved and hope to see their expertise integrated in a new, more agile format.
We vote against the extension.
This research initiative has produced some valuable research outcomes; however, as previously stated, there remain significant issues regarding the extent to which these results directly influence proposal formulation and DAO decision-making processes. Without concrete improvements ensuring more effective alignment with the DAO's strategic objectives, we cannot support extending this initiative.
We vote against the extension.
This research initiative has produced some valuable research outcomes; however, as previously stated, there remain significant issues regarding the extent to which these results directly influence proposal formulation and DAO decision-making processes. Without concrete improvements ensuring more effective alignment with the DAO's strategic objectives, we cannot support extending this initiative.
Voting to not extend the ARDC.
The value provided I think was good. I am a huge fan of a researches, and of the ability for stakeholders to be able to come and ask complex questions and get well thought answers. It's what we need just because we are in such an experimental field that we will have a lot of questions and answers might just not be trivial. But I do agree with all parties involved that the current structure doesn't create the proper incentives for smooth operations, specifically
Voting to not extend the ARDC.
The value provided I think was good. I am a huge fan of a researches, and of the ability for stakeholders to be able to come and ask complex questions and get well thought answers. It's what we need just because we are in such an experimental field that we will have a lot of questions and answers might just not be trivial. But I do agree with all parties involved that the current structure doesn't create the proper incentives for smooth operations, specifically
I also think the equivalent of an R&D department is HIGHLY needed in our DAO, and I do agree with whoever mentioned, here or in voice calls or meetings, that up to some degree every AAE should have his own department. At the same time, is impossible for all AAEs to have the expertise necessary to cover all the important questions that might arise. Defining an on-call model, with several service providers whitelisted, a preallocated budget from the DAO from which a delegate can query an AAE that takes the task of selecting the SP and negotiate with it, and even the ability for any AAE to use its own internal budget for researches, is probably the model that we need, with some check and balances over time to understand and rate the quality of these SPs and know if the company X, Y or Z did a good/bad job and so we know if we want to engage again with them or not.
EDIT I want to make a clarification to this because is important. I think @Juanrah, @Entropy, all the service providers, all the people previously involved in ops and comms, they all did a GREAT job. I do see a situation in which all these parties in future can either re-facilitate this initiative or even better knowing we want a different structure another, because they proved themself worth it. My personal vote against, and likely the vote of others, is not about the people but the structure of ARDC. Utilizing and customizing the provisioning framework created by ADPC is potentially a good first step to move forward and rework everything.
As a student-ran organization, we can offer insight into the pros and cons of different research structures:
Renewing ARDC term (Option A): As other delegates have mentioned, the current ARDC is provided compensation over a fixed amount of time to accomplish research across a broad set of DAO interests. This functions much like a public-sector research institution –– providing funding to conduct research for the sake of researching. Think Brookings, Cleveland Clinic, or universities.
As a student-ran organization, we can offer insight into the pros and cons of different research structures:
Renewing ARDC term (Option A): As other delegates have mentioned, the current ARDC is provided compensation over a fixed amount of time to accomplish research across a broad set of DAO interests. This functions much like a public-sector research institution –– providing funding to conduct research for the sake of researching. Think Brookings, Cleveland Clinic, or universities.
Reconfiguring the current ARDC structure (Option C): Assuming the ARDC would be reconfigured instead of completely abolished, the DAO suggests 2 main ways of doing this. @Tane proposed an impact based, retroactive funding model. There are a few issues:
The second idea, proposed by many delegates including @Juanrah, is to tie research to market demand. Essentially, solicit research beforehand and task the ARDC with fulfilling that specific mandate.
Will the research docket be proposed and voted on by the DAO, or will a specific group be tasked with guiding research imperatives? The former seems tedious, and requires a deep technical knowledge that many delegates do not possess. The latter is essentially the same as the current ARDC.
Conclusion: With these questions/clarifications out of the way, our tentative position is that the ARDC should be renewed. We understand that the current model is not ideal –– @Entropy brought to light important issues –– but the alternatives are impractical. On a broader level, as an on-chain democratic institution, the DAO deserves a dedicated, permanent, research arm to inform the delegates. ARDC is an imperfect, albeit working, version of this. In an effort to continue improving this valuable initiative, we will be voting for Option A.
Michigan Blockchain | Jack Verrill | TG @JackVerrill
The Operations Role can generate topics or receive requests, then source quotes from qualified service providers
In addition to the issues raised by Entropy and other esteemed delegates, I would like the authors to clarify one more point: Entropy currently plays one of the key roles in this committee. If the committee is extended for another six months, but @Entropy's contract is not extended, a problem arises, since Entropy will not receive funding. What will be the solutions in this case?
Thank you for putting this together @Immutablelawyer.
The ARDC initiative has delivered a wide range of reports and established a structured framework intended to align research with DAO needs. The continued research support can help the DAO make informed decisions on security, governance, and incentives.
Thank you for putting this together @Immutablelawyer.
The ARDC initiative has delivered a wide range of reports and established a structured framework intended to align research with DAO needs. The continued research support can help the DAO make informed decisions on security, governance, and incentives.
However, there are present structural issues and strategic questions that the DAO should address before or as part of any extension.
Two main frictions Entropy highlighted
Rigid Funding Model. A primary structural issue is the fixed-term retainer model. ARDC V2 locked in three service providers at set budget caps, and this created pressure for providers to “create work” to use up allotted hours, potentially leading to filler projects.
Unclear Impact Pathways. Some research outputs have no defined implementation plan. The DAO lacks a mechanism to tie findings to governance proposals or to ensure they are executed. This gap dilutes impact and wastes funds. In practice, ARDC has begun addressing this through recommendations and by prompting follow-on discussions, but a formal bridge like a working group that translates research into action is currently missing.
That said, we could still maximize ARDC’s value in the next term. We recommend:
Continue publishing all materials, and add concise summaries or even short videos for each report. Track and share delegate feedback. The team could create a simple post-publication survey where delegates rate each ARDC deliverable on usefulness and clarity. This data can guide subsequent research topics.
ARDC should clarify its relationship with the new operational entities. One option is to transition routine research requests to OpCo, reserving ARDC for strategic, long-horizon analysis. This proposal and Entropy’s retrospective both highlight that OpCo could handle demand-driven research more easily. The community could task ARDC in the extension term with defining this transition: for example, outlining which research topics could be absorbed by OpCo and how to implement that handoff.
As a side note, the EF has a somewhat similar structure where its Protocol research team focuses on Ethereum’s infrastructure and dev tooling research, while their Research Hub focuses on broader Proof-of-Stake, EVM improvement research.
Finally, we would love to highlight this comment from SL
if ARDC research feels under-utilized, that reflects a coordination gap, not a signal to defund it. Delegates and working groups could address this by collaborating more closely with ARDC through structured alignment mechanisms, such as using the SOS goals to define shared priorities. If research is scoped against DAO-agreed objectives, the outputs are more likely to be utilized immediately.
We are not in favor of completely shutting it down.
Addressing this coordination gap and figuring out a better mode of integration with OpCo will ensure the ARDC truly amplifies delegate decision-making, evolving in the process.
We want to express our appreciation for the work produced by the ARDC over the past few months. On a personal level, these contributions, particularly on governance participation risks and Security Council awareness, have provided meaningful context to inform critical DAO decisions. These are not just academic exercises; they are foundational to enabling responsible governance operations and timely responses to evolving threats and participation trends.
We believe these reports are already generating impact. We suggest looking at delegate mentions to published pieces as an impact measures and encourage other delegates to actively reference their claims to remain data-backed.
I am voting to not extend this proposal because I think the first 6 months was enough. I want to see a new plan or new ideas before giving more money. It's better to stop now and use the funds in a better way later
The ARDC extension is unnecessary as current issues are known, and spending a hundreds of thousands ARB to confirm them is wasteful. Research can be handled within new approved framework, integrated with existing entities. If new research or security topics arise, they can be funded via Snapshot using existing funds.
The ARDC had their moments, but in the end we have a good idea about the problems out there right now and don't need to pay a million dollars to confirm them.
Given the big changes in DAO organization, the research can happen within the AAE's, they have huge budgets and then the research can happen in loop with the other work they are pushing.
After reviewing the proposal and reflecting on the work done by ARDC V2, along with the community's input, we’ve decided to vote for Option C: Do Not Extend.
We genuinely appreciate the effort and commitment shown by the contributors over the past six months. There have been some useful outputs, and it’s clear that the team put serious work into their roles. That said, we believe the current setup isn’t the best fit for how the DAO operates today. The structure feels a bit too rigid and doesn’t always connect the research being produced with the immediate needs or priorities of the DAO.
After reviewing the proposal and reflecting on the work done by ARDC V2, along with the community's input, we’ve decided to vote for Option C: Do Not Extend.
We genuinely appreciate the effort and commitment shown by the contributors over the past six months. There have been some useful outputs, and it’s clear that the team put serious work into their roles. That said, we believe the current setup isn’t the best fit for how the DAO operates today. The structure feels a bit too rigid and doesn’t always connect the research being produced with the immediate needs or priorities of the DAO.
In our view, research should be more flexible and closely tied to real-time questions or decisions. We think a model that allows for research to be commissioned based on specific topics or needs would be more effective. This would make it easier to match the right contributors with the right challenges and ensure that the work being done has a clearer path to impact.
We also want to highlight that our vote isn’t about undervaluing research or the people involved. On the contrary, we hope the expertise and knowledge developed through ARDC V2 continues to play a role in the DAO, just in a format that’s more responsive and better aligned with how things are evolving.
In short, we’re voting no on the extension because we believe it’s time to rethink and rebuild a structure that makes research more actionable, more targeted, and ultimately more valuable for the DAO.
I voted AGAINST this extension
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/cp0x-delegate-communication-thread/22217/198?u=cp0x
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting for "Option C: Not to extend ARDC" in this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting for "Option C: Not to extend ARDC" in this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
Firstly, we want to thank the ARDC team for their work over the past few months. We’ve read the research reports, attended the bi-weekly calls, and consistently followed the content being produced. As a delegate involved in analysis and ecosystem research as well, we’ve been closely tracking the development and impact of the ARDC since its inception.
To be clear, this isn’t a vote against research. It’s a vote for a more accountable and demand-driven model that better fits where the DAO is today.
One of the core structural issues is that the current retainer-based model leads to research being produced based on fixed capacity rather than real-time DAO needs. This often results in valuable research that doesn't connect to decision-making. We align with @Tane and @pedrob on this point: when outputs lack ownership or a follow-up path, the result is underutilized work and coordination drag.
We strongly believe the DAO would benefit more from a demand-driven setup, as mentioned by other delegates as well. Research should be scoped based on proposal needs, strategic challenges, or questions raised by delegates or AAEs. Contributors/SPs can be selected based on topic fit, and budgets can be tied to purpose, not retainers. This structure would also reduce idle spending and improve transparency around what’s being worked on and why.
That said, not everything fell short. Some reports were useful. For example, on top of my mind, if I recall @Entropy referencing some ARDC research reports in their recent DRIP proposal. But those kinds of examples were rare. And there’s no easy way to see which research was actually impactful. In future setups, it would help a lot to have a simple public tracker showing whether research got cited in proposals or led to actual decisions.
On the comms side, we’d like to acknowledge the work done by @Juanrah, especially organizing bi-weekly calls and consistently summarizing reports through X threads and forum posts. One area for improvement we’d suggest is around distribution: in future iterations, it might help if threads are shared through the Arbitrum official channels like Arbitrum Governance. The content itself has been strong, but visibility could improve if published from accounts followed more widely by the DAO community. Just a distribution point, not a critique of the work.
Overall, we’re voting no on the extension, but we’re not saying research isn’t valuable. We’re saying we need to rethink how it’s funded and coordinated. A structure where OpCo or another neutral entity manages a flexible budget and works with a pool of vetted contributors makes more sense to us. That way, the DAO can still fund high-quality work, but in a way that’s better aligned with its priorities.
We again thank all the contributors involved and hope to see their expertise integrated in a new, more agile format.
We vote against the extension.
This research initiative has produced some valuable research outcomes; however, as previously stated, there remain significant issues regarding the extent to which these results directly influence proposal formulation and DAO decision-making processes. Without concrete improvements ensuring more effective alignment with the DAO's strategic objectives, we cannot support extending this initiative.
We vote against the extension.
This research initiative has produced some valuable research outcomes; however, as previously stated, there remain significant issues regarding the extent to which these results directly influence proposal formulation and DAO decision-making processes. Without concrete improvements ensuring more effective alignment with the DAO's strategic objectives, we cannot support extending this initiative.
Voting to not extend the ARDC.
The value provided I think was good. I am a huge fan of a researches, and of the ability for stakeholders to be able to come and ask complex questions and get well thought answers. It's what we need just because we are in such an experimental field that we will have a lot of questions and answers might just not be trivial. But I do agree with all parties involved that the current structure doesn't create the proper incentives for smooth operations, specifically
Voting to not extend the ARDC.
The value provided I think was good. I am a huge fan of a researches, and of the ability for stakeholders to be able to come and ask complex questions and get well thought answers. It's what we need just because we are in such an experimental field that we will have a lot of questions and answers might just not be trivial. But I do agree with all parties involved that the current structure doesn't create the proper incentives for smooth operations, specifically
I also think the equivalent of an R&D department is HIGHLY needed in our DAO, and I do agree with whoever mentioned, here or in voice calls or meetings, that up to some degree every AAE should have his own department. At the same time, is impossible for all AAEs to have the expertise necessary to cover all the important questions that might arise. Defining an on-call model, with several service providers whitelisted, a preallocated budget from the DAO from which a delegate can query an AAE that takes the task of selecting the SP and negotiate with it, and even the ability for any AAE to use its own internal budget for researches, is probably the model that we need, with some check and balances over time to understand and rate the quality of these SPs and know if the company X, Y or Z did a good/bad job and so we know if we want to engage again with them or not.
EDIT I want to make a clarification to this because is important. I think @Juanrah, @Entropy, all the service providers, all the people previously involved in ops and comms, they all did a GREAT job. I do see a situation in which all these parties in future can either re-facilitate this initiative or even better knowing we want a different structure another, because they proved themself worth it. My personal vote against, and likely the vote of others, is not about the people but the structure of ARDC. Utilizing and customizing the provisioning framework created by ADPC is potentially a good first step to move forward and rework everything.
As a student-ran organization, we can offer insight into the pros and cons of different research structures:
Renewing ARDC term (Option A): As other delegates have mentioned, the current ARDC is provided compensation over a fixed amount of time to accomplish research across a broad set of DAO interests. This functions much like a public-sector research institution –– providing funding to conduct research for the sake of researching. Think Brookings, Cleveland Clinic, or universities.
As a student-ran organization, we can offer insight into the pros and cons of different research structures:
Renewing ARDC term (Option A): As other delegates have mentioned, the current ARDC is provided compensation over a fixed amount of time to accomplish research across a broad set of DAO interests. This functions much like a public-sector research institution –– providing funding to conduct research for the sake of researching. Think Brookings, Cleveland Clinic, or universities.
Reconfiguring the current ARDC structure (Option C): Assuming the ARDC would be reconfigured instead of completely abolished, the DAO suggests 2 main ways of doing this. @Tane proposed an impact based, retroactive funding model. There are a few issues:
The second idea, proposed by many delegates including @Juanrah, is to tie research to market demand. Essentially, solicit research beforehand and task the ARDC with fulfilling that specific mandate.
Will the research docket be proposed and voted on by the DAO, or will a specific group be tasked with guiding research imperatives? The former seems tedious, and requires a deep technical knowledge that many delegates do not possess. The latter is essentially the same as the current ARDC.
Conclusion: With these questions/clarifications out of the way, our tentative position is that the ARDC should be renewed. We understand that the current model is not ideal –– @Entropy brought to light important issues –– but the alternatives are impractical. On a broader level, as an on-chain democratic institution, the DAO deserves a dedicated, permanent, research arm to inform the delegates. ARDC is an imperfect, albeit working, version of this. In an effort to continue improving this valuable initiative, we will be voting for Option A.
Michigan Blockchain | Jack Verrill | TG @JackVerrill
The Operations Role can generate topics or receive requests, then source quotes from qualified service providers
In addition to the issues raised by Entropy and other esteemed delegates, I would like the authors to clarify one more point: Entropy currently plays one of the key roles in this committee. If the committee is extended for another six months, but @Entropy's contract is not extended, a problem arises, since Entropy will not receive funding. What will be the solutions in this case?
Thank you for putting this together @Immutablelawyer.
The ARDC initiative has delivered a wide range of reports and established a structured framework intended to align research with DAO needs. The continued research support can help the DAO make informed decisions on security, governance, and incentives.
Thank you for putting this together @Immutablelawyer.
The ARDC initiative has delivered a wide range of reports and established a structured framework intended to align research with DAO needs. The continued research support can help the DAO make informed decisions on security, governance, and incentives.
However, there are present structural issues and strategic questions that the DAO should address before or as part of any extension.
Two main frictions Entropy highlighted
Rigid Funding Model. A primary structural issue is the fixed-term retainer model. ARDC V2 locked in three service providers at set budget caps, and this created pressure for providers to “create work” to use up allotted hours, potentially leading to filler projects.
Unclear Impact Pathways. Some research outputs have no defined implementation plan. The DAO lacks a mechanism to tie findings to governance proposals or to ensure they are executed. This gap dilutes impact and wastes funds. In practice, ARDC has begun addressing this through recommendations and by prompting follow-on discussions, but a formal bridge like a working group that translates research into action is currently missing.
That said, we could still maximize ARDC’s value in the next term. We recommend:
Continue publishing all materials, and add concise summaries or even short videos for each report. Track and share delegate feedback. The team could create a simple post-publication survey where delegates rate each ARDC deliverable on usefulness and clarity. This data can guide subsequent research topics.
ARDC should clarify its relationship with the new operational entities. One option is to transition routine research requests to OpCo, reserving ARDC for strategic, long-horizon analysis. This proposal and Entropy’s retrospective both highlight that OpCo could handle demand-driven research more easily. The community could task ARDC in the extension term with defining this transition: for example, outlining which research topics could be absorbed by OpCo and how to implement that handoff.
As a side note, the EF has a somewhat similar structure where its Protocol research team focuses on Ethereum’s infrastructure and dev tooling research, while their Research Hub focuses on broader Proof-of-Stake, EVM improvement research.
Finally, we would love to highlight this comment from SL
if ARDC research feels under-utilized, that reflects a coordination gap, not a signal to defund it. Delegates and working groups could address this by collaborating more closely with ARDC through structured alignment mechanisms, such as using the SOS goals to define shared priorities. If research is scoped against DAO-agreed objectives, the outputs are more likely to be utilized immediately.
We are not in favor of completely shutting it down.
Addressing this coordination gap and figuring out a better mode of integration with OpCo will ensure the ARDC truly amplifies delegate decision-making, evolving in the process.
We want to express our appreciation for the work produced by the ARDC over the past few months. On a personal level, these contributions, particularly on governance participation risks and Security Council awareness, have provided meaningful context to inform critical DAO decisions. These are not just academic exercises; they are foundational to enabling responsible governance operations and timely responses to evolving threats and participation trends.
We believe these reports are already generating impact. We suggest looking at delegate mentions to published pieces as an impact measures and encourage other delegates to actively reference their claims to remain data-backed.
The Operations Role can generate topics or receive requests, then source quotes from qualified service providers
This brings up an interesting debate. Should we conduct research in-house or should we outsource to the cheapest provider? Choosing a research partner and using them as our sole provider has the advantage of generating a knowledge base within that organization, on top of familiarity with the DAO and its needs. Alternatively, outsourcing has the benefit of cost-savings and efficiency,
We want to express our appreciation for the work produced by the ARDC over the past few months. On a personal level, these contributions, particularly on governance participation risks and Security Council awareness, have provided meaningful context to inform critical DAO decisions. These are not just academic exercises; they are foundational to enabling responsible governance operations and timely responses to evolving threats and participation trends.
We believe these reports are already generating impact. We suggest looking at delegate mentions to published pieces as an impact measures and encourage other delegates to actively reference their claims to remain data-backed.
TVL is an attractive vanity metric to optimize, the utilization of that capital is what ultimately determines the efficacy and success of lending protocols.
We agree TVL is often misused as a vanity metric for protocol performance. In addition, Arbitrum benefits from network activity and not value accrual.
Thank you to the Arbitrum Foundation for raising this important and timely topic. As noted in recent ARDC reports, quorum risk has been flagged as a significant governance concern, and we appreciate the initiative to proactively address it.
The recent ARDC research highlighted systemic risks in DAO governance, including limited voter turnout and difficulties reaching quorum on constitutional proposals, issues that have prompted discussions about lowering quorum thresholds, which in turn raises new governance risks.
This kind of context setting, which helps align DAO decision-making with informed analysis, is exactly what high-quality research should enable.
That said, we are saddened, but not surprised, by the recurring opinion that research must be "immediately actionable" to be considered valuable. This misconception mirrors the kind of short-termism often seen in academic research funding: a tendency to dismiss foundational analysis because it doesn't translate instantly into a discrete execution step. In decentralized governance, context is action-enabling, especially when decisions impact multi-million dollar programs.
In our view, if ARDC research feels under-utilized, that reflects a coordination gap, not a signal to defund it. Delegates and working groups could address this by collaborating more closely with ARDC through structured alignment mechanisms, such as using the SOS goals to define shared priorities. If research is scoped targeting DAO-agreed objectives, the outputs are more likely to be utilized immediately.
Finally, we believe there is a disproportionate level of scrutiny applied to research spending compared to other DAO verticals. This is partly because impact is harder to measure. But based on historical DAO expenditure history, even a 1% improvement in incentive efficiency could justify multiples of ARDC's current budget. Similarly, well-timed security reports could prevent targeted DAO attacks, avoiding reputational or financial losses far exceeding research costs.
In short: we believe in the ARDC mission, we see evidence of growing value, and we encourage the DAO to extend and refine, not retract, this experiment.
After reviewing this proposal, Juanrah’s detailed response, Entropy’s retrospective, and reflecting on the role of the OpCo, we’ve formed an opinion about the future of the ARDC.
To start, we want to acknowledge that we’ve personally found the reports produced by the ARDC to be valuable and appreciate the work that went into them. That said, we share the broader concern that research, while informative, must ultimately be actionable to serve the DAO effectively.
After reviewing this proposal, Juanrah’s detailed response, Entropy’s retrospective, and reflecting on the role of the OpCo, we’ve formed an opinion about the future of the ARDC.
To start, we want to acknowledge that we’ve personally found the reports produced by the ARDC to be valuable and appreciate the work that went into them. That said, we share the broader concern that research, while informative, must ultimately be actionable to serve the DAO effectively.
Research should enable smarter DAO decision-making. It should be retrospective to help the DAO reflect on what has and hasn’t worked and where iteration is needed, and forward-looking, providing a clear, evidence-backed narrative for what the DAO should do next. In both cases, actionable insights and concrete recommendations are critical.
A consistent challenge in DAO research is the feedback loop. As Entropy noted:
As the ARDC V2’s term progressed, we found that the Service Providers were able to make progress in acquiring sufficient context, but the most valuable work came after several rounds of feedback with relevant stakeholders.
This points to a structural gap. Many service providers remain one or more steps removed from the day-to-day context of the DAO. Embedding research teams within each Arbitrum Aligned Entity (AAE) could address this by placing researchers closer to both the operational realities and the decision-makers. Unlike external service providers, in-house teams benefit from ongoing context, tighter feedback loops, and clearer lines of accountability—making it more likely their work will translate into action.
ARDC’s output has felt more educational than operational. That isn’t inherently negative, but it reinforces the need to revisit the model.
We agree that the ARDC needs to evolve. The proposed extension offers a natural transitional window. Over the next six months, we believe the Communications Lead and Supervisory Council should work alongside AAEs to capture institutional knowledge and co-design the next phase of DAO-aligned research. Ending the program abruptly would short-circuit this opportunity and unnecessarily (and unexpectedly) disrupt the current contributors. We support the extension as a way to responsibly wind down or transition the model.
Hey @Immutablelawyer!
Thank you very much for the proposal.
At the OAT, we have been reviewing the work of the ARDC. I have personally had conversations with @Juanrah , and we have read the recent retrospective published by @Entropy about their work.
Hey @Immutablelawyer!
Thank you very much for the proposal.
At the OAT, we have been reviewing the work of the ARDC. I have personally had conversations with @Juanrah , and we have read the recent retrospective published by @Entropy about their work.
We believe that allocating a budget for research has brought valuable results to the DAO and the Arbitrum ecosystem in general. Despite this, the current structure has shown certain inefficiencies and frictions in the interaction among stakeholders, Council members, and service providers.
As Entropy mentions in their retrospective:
In our opinion, the way the ARDC model currently functions faces two main frictions:
Fixed-Term Research Commitments: With a specific number of service providers locked in for a set time and budget, there is somewhat of a pressure to “create work” just to justify the pre-allocated funding. Moreover, the DAO can’t assign providers or price reports based on demand, perceived importance of research, and competitive fit of researchers.
Lack of Defined Expectations: With the research request process being so open-ended, requests often aren’t accompanied by a laid-out path for who (or how) will turn possible research findings into deliverables. Given the high cost of quality research, reports that lead to no tangible recommendations or have no party attached to them to own the initiative are, in our opinion, an inefficient use of time & resources for the DAO.
From the last Wednesday call hosted by Entropy, it was also mentioned that ARDC research requests from key stakeholders or delegates often begin as broad ideas that require substantial refinement to clearly define the scope, objectives, and success criteria. However, once the service provider completes the work and publishes the report on the forum, there is often a lack of ownership or follow-up, resulting in stalled or abandoned outcomes.
So the current situation of most of the deliverables is that they are documents in the forum with no follow up or proposals that build over that information.
Another point of friction is the supply-based model: service providers have been allocated a retainer budget which means that ARCD has to allocate resources and work, even if it might not be valuable or demanded from the DAO or AAEs. In practice, that resulted in research that didn’t always include actionable findings, and often felt more like a standalone study or analysis disconnected from the DAO’s context or needs.
During the call, JuanRah mentioned that it makes sense to have a different structure, and that he would prefer having a list of service providers that can be engaged as needed rather than relying on a retainer model. That line of thinking was reinforced by @tamara, who supported the idea of a demand-focused model rather than a supply-driven one. She pointed out that service providers often ended up being used simply because they had won an election and were assigned a retainer fee rather than because their research was genuinely needed based on the proposals at hand.
That was ratified in his post:
I agree that a more flexible, on-demand model with a pre-vetted vendor list could prove more efficient and wold enable request-driven research with flexible engagement terms. However, the current structure remains valuable, and the lessons learned during this first phase will help us address many of the concerns raised.
For all these reasons, we believe the best path forward is not to extend ARDC, at least not in its current structure and operating model.
That said, we do see strong value in having a pre-approved budget to fund research, but based on what we've learned from experience, it’s clear this needs to be demand-based, aligned with the DAO’s needs, and overseen by a party capable of negotiating with service providers and guiding the research toward clear deliverables.
When first contemplating the future of the ARDC after a few months into the initial 6-month term, our team felt that there was value in having researchers available as needed, and with the introduction of OpCo, a demand-based program could be internalized by the entity. In such a structure, delegates could make requests directly to OpCo, which could then utilize a vetted pool of service providers to facilitate the research.
At the OAT, we believe this is the direction the ARDC should take, not as a standalone structure or initiative, but rather as a USDC-denominated budget that the OpCo can draw from to engage a pool of service providers for research needs.
The idea behind having a Supervisory Council was to carry out the work that, given its mandate and the composition of the OAT, the OpCo is now better positioned than anyone else to perform: bridging the gap between the DAO, the Arbitrum Foundation, and Offchain Labs
Once operational in the coming months, the OpCo will have a team dedicated to executing DAO initiatives, along with the necessary context on the activities of other AAEs. This will allow it to take a holistic view of Arbitrum’s ecosystem development and identify research opportunities that lay the groundwork for future DAO proposals, while ensuring they neither overlap with nor interfere in the work of other AAEs and ideally, amplify their impact.
This vision was expressed by several delegates when approving this second iteration of the ARDC, and we believe it is the right path forward:
Lastly, we want to highlight that if the OpCo is set up during the ARDC’s tenure, we expect it to take ownership of the initiative and be responsible for its oversight. We think that in the event that happens, the Supervisory Council should work with the OpCo to figure out how to transition properly into the new structure.
As a final thought, I hope that when we are going to have to renew this initiative in 6 months, we will have opco capable of internalize this whole structure. I really think we will need risk and data analyst, constantly, moving forward.
I look forward an opCO or similar structure that can better oversee these initiatives and increase their efficiency.
I believe OpCo could play a valuable role in research operational activities, this would bring direct alignment with operational needs while reducing coordination overhead. The retainer model has created some pressure from service providers to justify their pre-paid hours, which has led the Supervisory Council to spend valuable time analyzing whether specific research initiatives are truly needed.
Therefore, we propose that the current proposal be amended to include this option among the alternatives to be voted on:
Option D: Do not Extend ARDC V2 & transfer the remaining funds to the OpCo and have them reserved for research under a demand-based model.
As mentioned on the call, I continue to believe that the ARDC V2 would have been a stronger fit as a demand-focused model.
That said, the two key partners— @CastleCapital and @DefiLlama_Research —contributed significantly to the research effort and developed deep knowledge of both the DAO and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem. It would be a shame for this expertise to go unused moving forward.
As mentioned on the call, I continue to believe that the ARDC V2 would have been a stronger fit as a demand-focused model.
That said, the two key partners— @CastleCapital and @DefiLlama_Research —contributed significantly to the research effort and developed deep knowledge of both the DAO and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem. It would be a shame for this expertise to go unused moving forward.
One of the shortcomings of the ARDC structure was that it operated as a standalone research unit, with only limited coordination with AF and OCL—both of which are also active in research efforts.
My preference is Option C. However, I believe someone within the OpCo (though I lack full visibility into current roles and planned structure) should take partial responsibility for consolidating research needs across AAEs and the DAO. This person should be tasked with identifying ongoing and missing research, and executing accordingly—leveraging trusted partners from ARDC V1 & V2 as well as new service providers where appropriate
I believe the Arbitrum DAO is undergoing structural changes that make the current ARDC setup less suitable. It may be time to rethink its purpose and composition. If the proposal does not include any alternative paths, I would vote for option C.
However, if alternative suggestions are welcome, I’d propose a hybrid approach that incorporates ideas from both @Entropy and @Vertex_Protocol:
I believe the Arbitrum DAO is undergoing structural changes that make the current ARDC setup less suitable. It may be time to rethink its purpose and composition. If the proposal does not include any alternative paths, I would vote for option C.
However, if alternative suggestions are welcome, I’d propose a hybrid approach that incorporates ideas from both @Entropy and @Vertex_Protocol:
Since the funds are currently available in stablecoins, rather than sending them to STEP, they could be deployed using the stablecoin strategies already approved by the TMC—especially if the ARB conversion hasn’t occurred yet. The budget should remain earmarked for research initiatives relevant to the DAO, with the Operations Role of the council overseeing its allocation.
We already have a strong pool of recognized contributors from ARDC v1 and v2. Similar to the ADPC audit program, we could request quotes from them for specific research topics.
TL;DR: Extend the program using only the Operations Role, with a demand-driven model rather than a supply-driven one. The Operations Role can generate topics or receive requests, then source quotes from qualified service providers. Meanwhile, idle funds generate yield for the treasury. This structure could remain in place until either OpCo becomes operational or the end of the six-month extension period.
Having been elected into the ARDC’s operations role, Entropy has had a front-row seat to the initiative. To provide delegates with additional context, we are cross-posting a detailed summary of our views on the ARDC (the thread additionally includes a DAO call where the matter was discussed further).
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/entropy-s-retrospective-on-the-ardc-v2/29438?u=entropy
We appreciate @Immutablelawyer and other ARDC members bringing forward this extension.
We also strongly resonate with Entropy’s recent retrospective, which identified the core structural issue: by fixing six-month budget caps and effectively keeping providers on retainer, ARDC risks incentivizing research to meet budget allocations rather than to genuinely address DAO needs, and it lacks detailed consensus on expectation and thus, failing to make a real impact from research. The true value of research is not the quantity or even technical quality of the outputs, but rather their tangible influence on delegate opinions, budgeting decisions, and broader DAO strategy.
I'm curious,
Why not address any of these critiques?
(copying from the AI generated summary of the async retrospective done with Harmonica.chat)
❌ What Didn't Work Well Organizational Challenges
Thank you for your comment, @danielo, and for sharing the summary from the async retrospective. Critical feedback is needed for the ARDC and DAO programs to iterate and improve. As the communications lead for the ARDC, I'd like to address the points raised, providing context and referencing the work we've done over the past term.
Thank you for your comment, @danielo, and for sharing the summary from the async retrospective. Critical feedback is needed for the ARDC and DAO programs to iterate and improve. As the communications lead for the ARDC, I'd like to address the points raised, providing context and referencing the work we've done over the past term.
A core focus from the beginning of ARDC V2 was to establish a high degree of transparency and create multiple channels for delegate engagement.
The ARDC's research agenda was designed to be a collaborative process, drawing from key stakeholders while remaining open to the entire community.
We have strived to deliver high-value, actionable research and welcome feedback, while also recognizing the scope of our mandate.
I also want to share some observations on potential structural improvements for future iterations.
I believe OpCo could play a valuable role in research operational activities, this would bring direct alignment with operational needs while reducing coordination overhead. The retainer model has created some pressure from service providers to justify their pre-paid hours, which has led the Supervisory Council to spend valuable time analyzing whether specific research initiatives are truly needed.
I agree that a more flexible, on-demand model with a pre-vetted vendor list could prove more efficient and would enable request-driven research with flexible engagement terms. However, the current structure remains valuable, and the lessons learned during this first phase will help us address many of the concerns raised.
We appreciate your engagement and view this feedback as a vital part of the ARDC's evolution, should this extension get approved. We are committed to continuing our work through the remainder of this term transparently and delivering impactful research for the Arbitrum DAO.
Finally, I'd like to invite all delegates to our next bi-weekly call this Thursday, June 26, where we'll open discussion for feedback and provide a comprehensive overview of our first six months of work.
Thank you.
The Operations Role can generate topics or receive requests, then source quotes from qualified service providers
This brings up an interesting debate. Should we conduct research in-house or should we outsource to the cheapest provider? Choosing a research partner and using them as our sole provider has the advantage of generating a knowledge base within that organization, on top of familiarity with the DAO and its needs. Alternatively, outsourcing has the benefit of cost-savings and efficiency,
We want to express our appreciation for the work produced by the ARDC over the past few months. On a personal level, these contributions, particularly on governance participation risks and Security Council awareness, have provided meaningful context to inform critical DAO decisions. These are not just academic exercises; they are foundational to enabling responsible governance operations and timely responses to evolving threats and participation trends.
We believe these reports are already generating impact. We suggest looking at delegate mentions to published pieces as an impact measures and encourage other delegates to actively reference their claims to remain data-backed.
TVL is an attractive vanity metric to optimize, the utilization of that capital is what ultimately determines the efficacy and success of lending protocols.
We agree TVL is often misused as a vanity metric for protocol performance. In addition, Arbitrum benefits from network activity and not value accrual.
Thank you to the Arbitrum Foundation for raising this important and timely topic. As noted in recent ARDC reports, quorum risk has been flagged as a significant governance concern, and we appreciate the initiative to proactively address it.
The recent ARDC research highlighted systemic risks in DAO governance, including limited voter turnout and difficulties reaching quorum on constitutional proposals, issues that have prompted discussions about lowering quorum thresholds, which in turn raises new governance risks.
This kind of context setting, which helps align DAO decision-making with informed analysis, is exactly what high-quality research should enable.
That said, we are saddened, but not surprised, by the recurring opinion that research must be "immediately actionable" to be considered valuable. This misconception mirrors the kind of short-termism often seen in academic research funding: a tendency to dismiss foundational analysis because it doesn't translate instantly into a discrete execution step. In decentralized governance, context is action-enabling, especially when decisions impact multi-million dollar programs.
In our view, if ARDC research feels under-utilized, that reflects a coordination gap, not a signal to defund it. Delegates and working groups could address this by collaborating more closely with ARDC through structured alignment mechanisms, such as using the SOS goals to define shared priorities. If research is scoped targeting DAO-agreed objectives, the outputs are more likely to be utilized immediately.
Finally, we believe there is a disproportionate level of scrutiny applied to research spending compared to other DAO verticals. This is partly because impact is harder to measure. But based on historical DAO expenditure history, even a 1% improvement in incentive efficiency could justify multiples of ARDC's current budget. Similarly, well-timed security reports could prevent targeted DAO attacks, avoiding reputational or financial losses far exceeding research costs.
In short: we believe in the ARDC mission, we see evidence of growing value, and we encourage the DAO to extend and refine, not retract, this experiment.
After reviewing this proposal, Juanrah’s detailed response, Entropy’s retrospective, and reflecting on the role of the OpCo, we’ve formed an opinion about the future of the ARDC.
To start, we want to acknowledge that we’ve personally found the reports produced by the ARDC to be valuable and appreciate the work that went into them. That said, we share the broader concern that research, while informative, must ultimately be actionable to serve the DAO effectively.
After reviewing this proposal, Juanrah’s detailed response, Entropy’s retrospective, and reflecting on the role of the OpCo, we’ve formed an opinion about the future of the ARDC.
To start, we want to acknowledge that we’ve personally found the reports produced by the ARDC to be valuable and appreciate the work that went into them. That said, we share the broader concern that research, while informative, must ultimately be actionable to serve the DAO effectively.
Research should enable smarter DAO decision-making. It should be retrospective to help the DAO reflect on what has and hasn’t worked and where iteration is needed, and forward-looking, providing a clear, evidence-backed narrative for what the DAO should do next. In both cases, actionable insights and concrete recommendations are critical.
A consistent challenge in DAO research is the feedback loop. As Entropy noted:
As the ARDC V2’s term progressed, we found that the Service Providers were able to make progress in acquiring sufficient context, but the most valuable work came after several rounds of feedback with relevant stakeholders.
This points to a structural gap. Many service providers remain one or more steps removed from the day-to-day context of the DAO. Embedding research teams within each Arbitrum Aligned Entity (AAE) could address this by placing researchers closer to both the operational realities and the decision-makers. Unlike external service providers, in-house teams benefit from ongoing context, tighter feedback loops, and clearer lines of accountability—making it more likely their work will translate into action.
ARDC’s output has felt more educational than operational. That isn’t inherently negative, but it reinforces the need to revisit the model.
We agree that the ARDC needs to evolve. The proposed extension offers a natural transitional window. Over the next six months, we believe the Communications Lead and Supervisory Council should work alongside AAEs to capture institutional knowledge and co-design the next phase of DAO-aligned research. Ending the program abruptly would short-circuit this opportunity and unnecessarily (and unexpectedly) disrupt the current contributors. We support the extension as a way to responsibly wind down or transition the model.
Hey @Immutablelawyer!
Thank you very much for the proposal.
At the OAT, we have been reviewing the work of the ARDC. I have personally had conversations with @Juanrah , and we have read the recent retrospective published by @Entropy about their work.
Hey @Immutablelawyer!
Thank you very much for the proposal.
At the OAT, we have been reviewing the work of the ARDC. I have personally had conversations with @Juanrah , and we have read the recent retrospective published by @Entropy about their work.
We believe that allocating a budget for research has brought valuable results to the DAO and the Arbitrum ecosystem in general. Despite this, the current structure has shown certain inefficiencies and frictions in the interaction among stakeholders, Council members, and service providers.
As Entropy mentions in their retrospective:
In our opinion, the way the ARDC model currently functions faces two main frictions:
Fixed-Term Research Commitments: With a specific number of service providers locked in for a set time and budget, there is somewhat of a pressure to “create work” just to justify the pre-allocated funding. Moreover, the DAO can’t assign providers or price reports based on demand, perceived importance of research, and competitive fit of researchers.
Lack of Defined Expectations: With the research request process being so open-ended, requests often aren’t accompanied by a laid-out path for who (or how) will turn possible research findings into deliverables. Given the high cost of quality research, reports that lead to no tangible recommendations or have no party attached to them to own the initiative are, in our opinion, an inefficient use of time & resources for the DAO.
From the last Wednesday call hosted by Entropy, it was also mentioned that ARDC research requests from key stakeholders or delegates often begin as broad ideas that require substantial refinement to clearly define the scope, objectives, and success criteria. However, once the service provider completes the work and publishes the report on the forum, there is often a lack of ownership or follow-up, resulting in stalled or abandoned outcomes.
So the current situation of most of the deliverables is that they are documents in the forum with no follow up or proposals that build over that information.
Another point of friction is the supply-based model: service providers have been allocated a retainer budget which means that ARCD has to allocate resources and work, even if it might not be valuable or demanded from the DAO or AAEs. In practice, that resulted in research that didn’t always include actionable findings, and often felt more like a standalone study or analysis disconnected from the DAO’s context or needs.
During the call, JuanRah mentioned that it makes sense to have a different structure, and that he would prefer having a list of service providers that can be engaged as needed rather than relying on a retainer model. That line of thinking was reinforced by @tamara, who supported the idea of a demand-focused model rather than a supply-driven one. She pointed out that service providers often ended up being used simply because they had won an election and were assigned a retainer fee rather than because their research was genuinely needed based on the proposals at hand.
That was ratified in his post:
I agree that a more flexible, on-demand model with a pre-vetted vendor list could prove more efficient and wold enable request-driven research with flexible engagement terms. However, the current structure remains valuable, and the lessons learned during this first phase will help us address many of the concerns raised.
For all these reasons, we believe the best path forward is not to extend ARDC, at least not in its current structure and operating model.
That said, we do see strong value in having a pre-approved budget to fund research, but based on what we've learned from experience, it’s clear this needs to be demand-based, aligned with the DAO’s needs, and overseen by a party capable of negotiating with service providers and guiding the research toward clear deliverables.
When first contemplating the future of the ARDC after a few months into the initial 6-month term, our team felt that there was value in having researchers available as needed, and with the introduction of OpCo, a demand-based program could be internalized by the entity. In such a structure, delegates could make requests directly to OpCo, which could then utilize a vetted pool of service providers to facilitate the research.
At the OAT, we believe this is the direction the ARDC should take, not as a standalone structure or initiative, but rather as a USDC-denominated budget that the OpCo can draw from to engage a pool of service providers for research needs.
The idea behind having a Supervisory Council was to carry out the work that, given its mandate and the composition of the OAT, the OpCo is now better positioned than anyone else to perform: bridging the gap between the DAO, the Arbitrum Foundation, and Offchain Labs
Once operational in the coming months, the OpCo will have a team dedicated to executing DAO initiatives, along with the necessary context on the activities of other AAEs. This will allow it to take a holistic view of Arbitrum’s ecosystem development and identify research opportunities that lay the groundwork for future DAO proposals, while ensuring they neither overlap with nor interfere in the work of other AAEs and ideally, amplify their impact.
This vision was expressed by several delegates when approving this second iteration of the ARDC, and we believe it is the right path forward:
Lastly, we want to highlight that if the OpCo is set up during the ARDC’s tenure, we expect it to take ownership of the initiative and be responsible for its oversight. We think that in the event that happens, the Supervisory Council should work with the OpCo to figure out how to transition properly into the new structure.
As a final thought, I hope that when we are going to have to renew this initiative in 6 months, we will have opco capable of internalize this whole structure. I really think we will need risk and data analyst, constantly, moving forward.
I look forward an opCO or similar structure that can better oversee these initiatives and increase their efficiency.
I believe OpCo could play a valuable role in research operational activities, this would bring direct alignment with operational needs while reducing coordination overhead. The retainer model has created some pressure from service providers to justify their pre-paid hours, which has led the Supervisory Council to spend valuable time analyzing whether specific research initiatives are truly needed.
Therefore, we propose that the current proposal be amended to include this option among the alternatives to be voted on:
Option D: Do not Extend ARDC V2 & transfer the remaining funds to the OpCo and have them reserved for research under a demand-based model.
As mentioned on the call, I continue to believe that the ARDC V2 would have been a stronger fit as a demand-focused model.
That said, the two key partners— @CastleCapital and @DefiLlama_Research —contributed significantly to the research effort and developed deep knowledge of both the DAO and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem. It would be a shame for this expertise to go unused moving forward.
As mentioned on the call, I continue to believe that the ARDC V2 would have been a stronger fit as a demand-focused model.
That said, the two key partners— @CastleCapital and @DefiLlama_Research —contributed significantly to the research effort and developed deep knowledge of both the DAO and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem. It would be a shame for this expertise to go unused moving forward.
One of the shortcomings of the ARDC structure was that it operated as a standalone research unit, with only limited coordination with AF and OCL—both of which are also active in research efforts.
My preference is Option C. However, I believe someone within the OpCo (though I lack full visibility into current roles and planned structure) should take partial responsibility for consolidating research needs across AAEs and the DAO. This person should be tasked with identifying ongoing and missing research, and executing accordingly—leveraging trusted partners from ARDC V1 & V2 as well as new service providers where appropriate
I believe the Arbitrum DAO is undergoing structural changes that make the current ARDC setup less suitable. It may be time to rethink its purpose and composition. If the proposal does not include any alternative paths, I would vote for option C.
However, if alternative suggestions are welcome, I’d propose a hybrid approach that incorporates ideas from both @Entropy and @Vertex_Protocol:
I believe the Arbitrum DAO is undergoing structural changes that make the current ARDC setup less suitable. It may be time to rethink its purpose and composition. If the proposal does not include any alternative paths, I would vote for option C.
However, if alternative suggestions are welcome, I’d propose a hybrid approach that incorporates ideas from both @Entropy and @Vertex_Protocol:
Since the funds are currently available in stablecoins, rather than sending them to STEP, they could be deployed using the stablecoin strategies already approved by the TMC—especially if the ARB conversion hasn’t occurred yet. The budget should remain earmarked for research initiatives relevant to the DAO, with the Operations Role of the council overseeing its allocation.
We already have a strong pool of recognized contributors from ARDC v1 and v2. Similar to the ADPC audit program, we could request quotes from them for specific research topics.
TL;DR: Extend the program using only the Operations Role, with a demand-driven model rather than a supply-driven one. The Operations Role can generate topics or receive requests, then source quotes from qualified service providers. Meanwhile, idle funds generate yield for the treasury. This structure could remain in place until either OpCo becomes operational or the end of the six-month extension period.
Having been elected into the ARDC’s operations role, Entropy has had a front-row seat to the initiative. To provide delegates with additional context, we are cross-posting a detailed summary of our views on the ARDC (the thread additionally includes a DAO call where the matter was discussed further).
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/entropy-s-retrospective-on-the-ardc-v2/29438?u=entropy
We appreciate @Immutablelawyer and other ARDC members bringing forward this extension.
We also strongly resonate with Entropy’s recent retrospective, which identified the core structural issue: by fixing six-month budget caps and effectively keeping providers on retainer, ARDC risks incentivizing research to meet budget allocations rather than to genuinely address DAO needs, and it lacks detailed consensus on expectation and thus, failing to make a real impact from research. The true value of research is not the quantity or even technical quality of the outputs, but rather their tangible influence on delegate opinions, budgeting decisions, and broader DAO strategy.
I'm curious,
Why not address any of these critiques?
(copying from the AI generated summary of the async retrospective done with Harmonica.chat)
❌ What Didn't Work Well Organizational Challenges
Thank you for your comment, @danielo, and for sharing the summary from the async retrospective. Critical feedback is needed for the ARDC and DAO programs to iterate and improve. As the communications lead for the ARDC, I'd like to address the points raised, providing context and referencing the work we've done over the past term.
Thank you for your comment, @danielo, and for sharing the summary from the async retrospective. Critical feedback is needed for the ARDC and DAO programs to iterate and improve. As the communications lead for the ARDC, I'd like to address the points raised, providing context and referencing the work we've done over the past term.
A core focus from the beginning of ARDC V2 was to establish a high degree of transparency and create multiple channels for delegate engagement.
The ARDC's research agenda was designed to be a collaborative process, drawing from key stakeholders while remaining open to the entire community.
We have strived to deliver high-value, actionable research and welcome feedback, while also recognizing the scope of our mandate.
I also want to share some observations on potential structural improvements for future iterations.
I believe OpCo could play a valuable role in research operational activities, this would bring direct alignment with operational needs while reducing coordination overhead. The retainer model has created some pressure from service providers to justify their pre-paid hours, which has led the Supervisory Council to spend valuable time analyzing whether specific research initiatives are truly needed.
I agree that a more flexible, on-demand model with a pre-vetted vendor list could prove more efficient and would enable request-driven research with flexible engagement terms. However, the current structure remains valuable, and the lessons learned during this first phase will help us address many of the concerns raised.
We appreciate your engagement and view this feedback as a vital part of the ARDC's evolution, should this extension get approved. We are committed to continuing our work through the remainder of this term transparently and delivering impactful research for the Arbitrum DAO.
Finally, I'd like to invite all delegates to our next bi-weekly call this Thursday, June 26, where we'll open discussion for feedback and provide a comprehensive overview of our first six months of work.
Thank you.
Having been elected into the ARDC’s operations role, Entropy has had a front-row seat to the initiative. To provide delegates with additional context, we are cross-posting a detailed summary of our views on the ARDC (the thread additionally includes a DAO call where the matter was discussed further).
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/entropy-s-retrospective-on-the-ardc-v2/29438?u=entropy
To summarise, our belief is that the current program faces structural frictions that require a fundamental redesign before it can consistently deliver meaningful value to the DAO. Accordingly, we will be voting for Option C.
If there is soft consensus around not extending ARDC V2, we would strongly prefer to see the extension proposal modified such that USD-denominated funds are allocated to STEP 2 rather than left idle in the treasury.
We appreciate @Immutablelawyer and other ARDC members bringing forward this extension.
We also strongly resonate with Entropy’s recent retrospective, which identified the core structural issue: by fixing six-month budget caps and effectively keeping providers on retainer, ARDC risks incentivizing research to meet budget allocations rather than to genuinely address DAO needs, and it lacks detailed consensus on expectation and thus, failing to make a real impact from research. The true value of research is not the quantity or even technical quality of the outputs, but rather their tangible influence on delegate opinions, budgeting decisions, and broader DAO strategy.
We recognize two main ways the DAO could structurally address this issue. First is an impact-based funding model, where upfront base payments are reduced (e.g., 30–40% of current levels), and the remainder released only after retroactive evaluation by delegates or proposal authors who would score reports quarterly based on their actual impact. The second approach involves introducing a detailed pre-research scoping phase to explicitly define how each deliverable would benefit DAO decision-making, which is to expand the role of the Supervisory Council and involve more participants in the process. However, we suspect that this second option may introduce considerable overhead and slow down processes, making it less desirable in practice.
We therefore encourage exploring better design for coordinating this inititiave, one potential path being modifying the proposal to incorporate a lightweight yet explicit retroactive impact-assessment mechanism. Without such a change, or a similarly effective structural revision, we hesitate to support extending the current model for another six months.
I'm curious,
Why not address any of these critiques?
(copying from the AI generated summary of the async retrospective done with Harmonica.chat)
❌ What Didn't Work Well Organizational Challenges
Accessibility & Awareness Issues
Value Concerns
Implementation Challenges
🔄 Improvement Suggestions Structural Changes
Process Improvements
Communication Enhancements
Having been elected into the ARDC’s operations role, Entropy has had a front-row seat to the initiative. To provide delegates with additional context, we are cross-posting a detailed summary of our views on the ARDC (the thread additionally includes a DAO call where the matter was discussed further).
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/entropy-s-retrospective-on-the-ardc-v2/29438?u=entropy
To summarise, our belief is that the current program faces structural frictions that require a fundamental redesign before it can consistently deliver meaningful value to the DAO. Accordingly, we will be voting for Option C.
If there is soft consensus around not extending ARDC V2, we would strongly prefer to see the extension proposal modified such that USD-denominated funds are allocated to STEP 2 rather than left idle in the treasury.
We appreciate @Immutablelawyer and other ARDC members bringing forward this extension.
We also strongly resonate with Entropy’s recent retrospective, which identified the core structural issue: by fixing six-month budget caps and effectively keeping providers on retainer, ARDC risks incentivizing research to meet budget allocations rather than to genuinely address DAO needs, and it lacks detailed consensus on expectation and thus, failing to make a real impact from research. The true value of research is not the quantity or even technical quality of the outputs, but rather their tangible influence on delegate opinions, budgeting decisions, and broader DAO strategy.
We recognize two main ways the DAO could structurally address this issue. First is an impact-based funding model, where upfront base payments are reduced (e.g., 30–40% of current levels), and the remainder released only after retroactive evaluation by delegates or proposal authors who would score reports quarterly based on their actual impact. The second approach involves introducing a detailed pre-research scoping phase to explicitly define how each deliverable would benefit DAO decision-making, which is to expand the role of the Supervisory Council and involve more participants in the process. However, we suspect that this second option may introduce considerable overhead and slow down processes, making it less desirable in practice.
We therefore encourage exploring better design for coordinating this inititiave, one potential path being modifying the proposal to incorporate a lightweight yet explicit retroactive impact-assessment mechanism. Without such a change, or a similarly effective structural revision, we hesitate to support extending the current model for another six months.
I'm curious,
Why not address any of these critiques?
(copying from the AI generated summary of the async retrospective done with Harmonica.chat)
❌ What Didn't Work Well Organizational Challenges
Accessibility & Awareness Issues
Value Concerns
Implementation Challenges
🔄 Improvement Suggestions Structural Changes
Process Improvements
Communication Enhancements
