[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction

[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction | proposals.app

posted 11 months ago

Voting has ended!
===============
[[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9/proposal/2616417580805522883)

### Final Votes

| **Category**         | **Result**       | **Details**                 |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| **Quorum reached**   | ✅ | 234.69M of 222.41M         |
| **Majority Support** | ✅ |                             |
| **For**              |                  | 215.70M (89.5%)    |
| **Against**          |                  | 6.31M (2.6%) |
| **Abstain**          |                  | 19.00M (7.9%) |

* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]

Tally_Support

posted 11 months ago

Voting has ended!
===============
[[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9/proposal/2616417580805522883)

### Final Votes

| **Category**         | **Result**       | **Details**                 |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| **Quorum reached**   | ✅ | 234.69M of 222.41M         |
| **Majority Support** | ✅ |                             |
| **For**              |                  | 215.70M (89.5%)    |
| **Against**          |                  | 6.31M (2.6%) |
| **Abstain**          |                  | 19.00M (7.9%) |

* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]

Tally_Support

posted 11 months ago

Onchain voting for this proposal is ending within 24 hours:
[Vote on Tally: [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9/proposal/2616417580805522883)
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I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]

Tally_Support

posted 11 months ago

Onchain voting for this proposal is ending within 24 hours:
[Vote on Tally: [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0xf07DeD9dC292157749B6Fd268E37DF6EA38395B9/proposal/2616417580805522883)
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Vertex_Protocol

posted 1 year ago

We thought about this for a bit and are willing to support it. In a vacuum, we would be opposed to lowering quorum like this but the DAO is making a lot of big changes in favor of efficiency and we believe it's better to rip this band-aid off now along with everything else instead of making this a problem that we will have to deal with while trying to keep things streamlined later. In response to one thing that was mentioned:

Quoted from Arbitrum

Constitutional proposals typically apply to software upgrades

Quoted from Arbitrum

Constitutional proposals typically apply to software upgrades

jump to post →

We'd like to note that this scenario is addressed in the governance docs, and the Security Council could keep the chain running, but it's obviously a worst case situation and if we can avoid it through social consensus, we should.

Scenario 8: The Arbitrum DAO experiences a season of voter apathy. Will this prevent work from being done on the chains that the Arbitrum DAO owns? No, voter apathy won't prevent work from being done on the chains that the Arbitrum DAO owns. The Constitution allows for non-emergency actions to be taken, which don't require the approval of token holders. The Security Council has the power to perform emergency actions with a 9-of-12 approval, which can be used to address critical issues that cannot wait for voter approval. While voter participation is important for the proper functioning of the DAO, the Constitution has built-in mechanisms to ensure that work can continue to be done even in the event of low voter turnout. Note that voter apathy could have an impact on the governance of the DAO, and certain decisions and actions might not be as representative of the community's collective will if voter turnout is low.

Non-emergency action Routine actions taken by the Security Council, such as software upgrades and maintenance.

We also remain generally pessimistic about increases in governance participation and we anticipate there will be more ARB coming out of the treasury in the near future further increasing quorum so we think it's best to get ahead of this now. Lastly, we want to mention that while this is meant to be a short-term change, we've seen that technical upgrades to the DAO's governance systems can take a while to get through the whole pipeline of deliberation, development, and implementation. If we know that a technical way to adjust quorum or increase governance participation isn't likely to come soon, we might want to define a way now to adjust quorum as needed instead of having this discussion repeatedly. For example allowing the AAEs to monitor delegate voting activity and make changes as they see fit. As mentioned by other delegates, the Security Council can also take Emergency Actions to mitigate any potential harm to the chain.

Vertex_Protocol

posted 1 year ago

Quoted from Arbitrum

Constitutional proposals typically apply to software upgrades

Quoted from Arbitrum

Constitutional proposals typically apply to software upgrades

jump to post →

Scenario 8: The Arbitrum DAO experiences a season of voter apathy. Will this prevent work from being done on the chains that the Arbitrum DAO owns? No, voter apathy won't prevent work from being done on the chains that the Arbitrum DAO owns. The Constitution allows for non-emergency actions to be taken, which don't require the approval of token holders. The Security Council has the power to perform emergency actions with a 9-of-12 approval, which can be used to address critical issues that cannot wait for voter approval. While voter participation is important for the proper functioning of the DAO, the Constitution has built-in mechanisms to ensure that work can continue to be done even in the event of low voter turnout. Note that voter apathy could have an impact on the governance of the DAO, and certain decisions and actions might not be as representative of the community's collective will if voter turnout is low.

Non-emergency action Routine actions taken by the Security Council, such as software upgrades and maintenance.

Chris_Areta from aretagov.eth

3.1M TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

We will be voting against this proposal. Sharing our rationale here:

Quoted from Chris_Areta

Rationale: We’d like to thank the AF for their work in raising this important issue and for proposing a path forward.

We will be voting against this proposal. Sharing our rationale here:

Quoted from Chris_Areta

Rationale: We’d like to thank the AF for their work in raising this important issue and for proposing a path forward.

We will be voting AGAINST this proposal to reduce the constitutional quorum threshold from 5% to 4.5%. While we acknowledge the practical challenges of meeting current quorum requirements, we believe this proposal represents a band-aid solution, and the DAO should focus on implementing long-term solutions now.

We believe this proposal sets a precedent of reactive governance parameter adjustments that could potentially degrade governance quality down the line. If participation declines further, will we lower quorum again? Conversely, if participation increases, would the DAO raise the threshold again? We see this as unsustainable and a potential slippery slope.

Quoted from Arbitrum

The 0.5% reduction represents a minimal-risk, fast-to-implement interim solution, while other long-term solutions can be considered, such as flexible quorum, or franchiser contract.

Our view is that the DAO should be advancing longer-term options now rather than waiting. The proposal frames the quorum change as an interim solution, yet there are no ongoing efforts to suggest a path towards developing a complementary long-term solution. Lowering quorum to match declining participation treats the symptom, not the cause. Instead of accommodating the problem, we suggest the DAO focus on:

Expanding voter education and engagement efforts;
Designing incentives for active voting or delegation (for example, models combining staking rewards with voting-power decay, as seen SummerFi and MODE);
Reviewing past initiatives, incl. grants to initiatives like ARB Staking and others, to identify any implementation gaps and provide targeted support.

Quorum thresholds serve as critical safeguards in decentralized governance. Adjustments to core parameters like quorum deserve thorough justification. In our view, such adjustments should generally lean towards making parameters more stringent and secure, rather than weakening standards for convenience.

To address this issue, we encourage exploring quorum models that balance flexibility with stability, such as:

A two-tier quorum model:
- Fixed minimum threshold (e.g., 3.5%);
- An additional variable component based on historical participation averages over a rolling period.

This approach would provide quorum flexibility while avoiding successive threshold adjustments.

jump to post →

Tane from tanegov.eth

43.6K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

We voted FOR this proposal.

While we fundamentally agree that quorum thresholds are an important friction in democratic processes, ensuring proposals only pass with genuine and substantial support, we also recognize the pragmatic need for adaptability, given Arbitrum's current governance landscape. Lowering quorum thresholds carries inherent risks, including increasing vulnerability to governance attacks or allowing insufficiently supported proposals to pass. We analyzed the potential risk of lowering quorum in the perspective of unintended DAO treasury leakage, and for constitutional proposals, we believe we should take more conservative approach as some protocol vulerbility or malicous upgrade could cost Arbitrum's TVL. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-aip-constitutional-quorum-threshold-reduction/29145/9

We voted FOR this proposal.

However, considering Arbitrum’s current developmental phase as an evolving project rather than a matured governance system, maintaining a high quorum threshold could impede progress. Temporarily adjusting the threshold is acceptable as an interim measure to mitigate immediate governance gridlock, particularly when factoring in the safety net provided by the Security Council.

Nonetheless, this approach should be seen explicitly as a temporary solution. Moving forward, we strongly encourage the DAO to address the root issues, such as low voter participation and engagement, rather than repeatedly adjusting quorum thresholds. Alternative approaches like treasury delegation and targeted incentives to boost voter participation should be explored in greater depth to ensure the long-term integrity and effectiveness of Arbitrum’s governance structure.

Chris_Areta from aretagov.eth

3.1M TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

We will be voting against this proposal. Sharing our rationale here:

Quoted from Chris_Areta

Rationale: We’d like to thank the AF for their work in raising this important issue and for proposing a path forward.

We will be voting against this proposal. Sharing our rationale here:

Quoted from Chris_Areta

Rationale: We’d like to thank the AF for their work in raising this important issue and for proposing a path forward.

Quoted from Arbitrum

The 0.5% reduction represents a minimal-risk, fast-to-implement interim solution, while other long-term solutions can be considered, such as flexible quorum, or franchiser contract.

Expanding voter education and engagement efforts;
Designing incentives for active voting or delegation (for example, models combining staking rewards with voting-power decay, as seen SummerFi and MODE);
Reviewing past initiatives, incl. grants to initiatives like ARB Staking and others, to identify any implementation gaps and provide targeted support.

To address this issue, we encourage exploring quorum models that balance flexibility with stability, such as:

A two-tier quorum model:
- Fixed minimum threshold (e.g., 3.5%);
- An additional variable component based on historical participation averages over a rolling period.

This approach would provide quorum flexibility while avoiding successive threshold adjustments.

jump to post →

Tane from tanegov.eth

43.6K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

We voted FOR this proposal.

Hey everyone,

I’ve been following the Constitutional AIP to drop the quorum threshold from 5% to 4.5% for constitutional votes, and I gotta say, I’m not a fan. I get that voter turnout’s been low and it’s tough to hit quorum, but this feels like a band-aid fix that could seriously mess with Arbitrum’s decentralized vibe.

Why I’m Worried

This Screams Centralization Dropping the quorum, even by just 0.5%, makes it easier for a small group of big players or super-active delegates to push through major changes. That’s a slippery slope to a few “governing elites” calling the shots. I mean, isn’t the whole point of the DAO to make sure lots of $ARB holders have a say? This feels like we’re handing more power to the whales or the hyper-engaged few.
Temporary Fixes Always Stick Around Every time I’ve seen a “temporary” change like this in governance—crypto or otherwise—it ends up permanent. The proposal doesn’t say how we’d go back to 5% or what happens if voter turnout doesn’t improve. Without a clear plan, this could just become the new normal, and that’s not great for keeping things decentralized.
Why Aren’t We Fixing Voter Fatigue? The proposal blames low turnout, but why aren’t we tackling why people aren’t voting? Is the process too complicated? Are small holders feeling like their vote doesn’t matter? Instead of lowering the bar, how about:

Making voting easier, like a cleaner interface or AI generated summary about what's up on Arb gov.
Tossing in some rewards for voting or delegating (maybe a few $ARB or some kind of governance badge outside the delegates program?).
Doing more to explain proposals in plain English so everyone gets what’s at stake. Lowering the quorum feels like giving up on getting more people involved.

This Could Look Bad Arbitrum’s supposed to be a leader in DeFi governance. If we start loosening rules to make things easier, it might send a message that we’re okay with less community input.

What I’d Rather See

I don’t think lowering the quorum is the answer. Here’s what I’d love to see instead:

Rewards for Voting and Delegating: Give people a reason to show up or trust a delegate, like small $ARB payouts or something fun like governance NFTs.
Make Voting Simple: The process can be a hassle—let’s streamline it so anyone can vote without jumping through hoops.
Educate the Community: More guides, AMAs, or even short videos breaking down proposals could get more $ARB holders excited to join in.
If We Must Lower It, Add a Time Limit: If the quorum drop happens, put a hard 6-month expiration on it and only keep it if we see turnout improve.

I’m all for making governance work better, but lowering the quorum feels like a shortcut that could lead to more centralization and less community voice. We should be doubling down on getting more people to vote, not making it easier for a smaller group to control things. This kind of move could set a precedent that’s hard to undo, and I’m worried it’s a step toward governance being dominated by a few.

I'm ARB holder since day 1, never sold my stack nor my delegate incentives, watched bleeding my bag month after month, and I have a feeling that the current direction is more centralization for the sake of speed or under the disguise of efficiency. It feels like something we all have read in history books regarding despotic grab of city or country governance that leads to catastrophic failure. Would love to hear from delegates, the Foundation, or other $ARB holders on this.

0x_ultra from 0x-ultra-gov.eth

94.0K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

I support lowering the constitutional quorum threshold as a necessary short-term fix. Without this adjustment, we risk slowing down governance and potentially blocking valuable proposals simply because they can’t reach quorum. In the current environment, this change is much needed to keep the governance process functional.

However, it’s clear that a longer-term solution is also needed. Even with strong participation from the most active delegates - such as those in the DIP program, who together represent 61% of the 5% quorum as of March 2025 - a significant portion of voting power remains inactive. This is a common challenge for DAOs: most token holders simply don't participate in governance, and realistically, it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to change this behavior.

In my view, redelegation is the only way to realistically address this problem. Since we can't expect passive holders to suddenly become active, the best path forward is to make it easy and rewarding for them to redelegate their tokens to engaged delegates. The ARB Staking proposal was designed to do exactly this, requiring holders to delegate in order to earn yield and I think that this is exactly the kind of approach we need. Unfortunately, there haven't been updates or concerning ARB Staking to date and, as things stand, I don't see any other solution being put into practice.

Beyond the quorum issue, I believe this problem highlights a broader challenge: declining participation is a symptom of waning interest in the DAO itself, which if left unaddressed, could threaten both its effectiveness and long-term viability.

Federico

6.3M TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

I'm supportive of lowering the constitutional quorum by 0.5%. It’s a pragmatic step to avoid governance deadlock, and we don't put ourselves in a scenario where critical votes consistently struggle to meet quorum.

While the reduction increases the risk of governance attacks, the 14-day voting period and Security Council backstop provide meaningful protection. A successful attack would require both (i) accumulating enough ARB and (ii) getting the Security Council to cooperate – similar to hostile takeovers in traditional finance, where gaining both stake and board alignment is extremely difficult, and arguably justified if successful.

I'm against delegating ARB from the treasury to boost participation, as I don’t see a viable way to do it effectively. Allocating delegations based on objective metrics (like governance participation) can be easily gamed, while subjective ones introduce conflicts of interest, as delegates may feel pressure to align with those allocating the stake. And either way, it’s a short-term fix just as much as lowering the quorum is.

A more sustainable solution would be proactive outreach to large ARB holders. Has the Foundation already engaged top holders to encourage delegation? Given the power-law distribution, I'd expect a relatively small number of holders to control most of the votable supply – getting them to delegate seems like the most scalable long-term solution to make sure participation keeps up with threshold increases.

CastleCapital

169.2K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

We recognize the immediate challenge this proposal aims to address. While we do not fully agree with the recommendation to lower the constitutional quorum threshold from 5% to 4.5%, we understand the rationale behind it and acknowledge the practical need for short-term adjustments.

Tane raises an important concern: reducing the quorum does carry tradeoffs. In particular, it marginally increases the risk of governance capture and could, over time, dilute the strength of constitutional safeguards if similar reductions continue. We share the view that any change to quorum thresholds should be made with caution.

Quoted from Tane

jump to post →

At the same time, we align with Curia's perspective that the current issue reflects deeper structural shortcomings, namely, voter apathy and low delegate engagement. Lowering the quorum alone does not address the root cause. What’s needed is a longer-term solution that makes participation more dynamic and reflective of actual delegate activity. We believe this is where the DAO's attention must shift next.

Quoted from Curia

Next: research a dynamic quorum that flexes with recent delegate activity or other engagement metrics so it remains realistic as conditions change.

jump to post →

With that in mind, we will support this proposal as a temporary and pragmatic step but not as a permanent fix. It is a pressure valve, not a cure. We recommend further research into dynamic quorum mechanisms or alternative models such as Treasury Delegation that better align participation, and the security of Arbitrum’s governance.

Jose_StableLab from stablelab.eth

152.0K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

Thank you to the Arbitrum Foundation for raising this important and timely topic. As noted in recent ARDC reports, quorum risk has been flagged as a significant governance concern, and we appreciate the initiative to proactively address it.

However, while the proposal to reduce quorum thresholds seeks to improve operational efficiency, we believe it does so at the cost of increasing long-term governance risk. Reducing the quorum requirement may offer a short-term fix for participation challenges, but without addressing the underlying issues, it risks setting a precedent that could erode the integrity of DAO decision-making over time.

We would like to highlight that the current proposal lacks clear, data-driven justification for the chosen reduction targets, as well as a systematic framework for future adjustments. The assumption that quorum will need to be repeatedly lowered over time suggests a need for more robust structural responses rather than ongoing threshold erosion.

We would be inclined to support this proposal if it were presented as part of a broader strategy that included complementary initiatives to mitigate governance risk and increase sustainable participation. In our view, some of the most impactful mitigation strategies could include:

Delegating Treasury-held ARB to trusted delegates, especially those participating in the Delegate Incentive Program. The program already includes a rigorous review of delegate performance, making it a natural mechanism to align capital and accountability.
Activating Tally's stARB governance staking. StableLab has recently proposed the first governance staking rewards for Rari DAO, using stRARI staking to direct delegation power in Rari Chain (an Arbitrum Orbit L3). The Obol Collective has already implemented it and is discussing metrics to determine active delegates. This system helps convert passive token holders into active governance participants by tying delegation to staking yield, using the same infrastructure the governace staking in Arbitrum would use. It would also help reconnect the correlation between total ARB supply and the share actively participating in votes.

Ultimately, we agree that quorum management is a critical issue. But reducing thresholds without simultaneously building participation infrastructure introduces long-term risks to the DAO’s legitimacy and resilience. We encourage the Foundation and other governance stakeholders to consider bundling quorum reductions with these or other strategic initiatives aimed at improving turnout and representation in the long run.

Michigan_Blockchain from michiganblockchain.eth

333.9K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

Reducing Constitutional Quorum Threshold form 5% to 4.5% (~25m ARB)

POSITION: This past year saw voter turnout fall from ~8% to 4-5% –– a clear threat to effective DAO functionality. Arbitrum’s proposal addresses this issue by lowering the quorum threshold for constitutional reforms, thereby increasing the chances of completing more votes. Michigan Blockchain supports this proposal for 2 reasons:

Reducing Constitutional Quorum Threshold form 5% to 4.5% (~25m ARB)

Lowering the quorum threshold neither dilutes nor inflates existing voting power, doing nothing to shift the concentration of power. The DAO’s core functionality remains the same, there is merely a lower barrier to entry for proposals to be voted on.
This proposal is free of cost, incurring only standard gas fees.

CONCERNS: Michigan Blockchain is sympathetic to security concerns arising from a lowered constitutional quorum threshold. However, as @Tane points out, acquiring the ARB necessary for a hostile takeover (given a 4.5% threshold) would inflate the price of ARB, making an attack significantly more expensive. Secondly, the Arbitrum DAO Security Council retains the power to take emergency action against malicious activity, further enhancing prootcal security irrespective of quorum threshold. For these reasons, Michigan Blockchain does not foresee significant security risks arising from this proposal.

ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL: @cupojoseph suggested allocating 22 million ARB to top contributors to increase their voting power and help meet quorum. Despite this proposal’s upfront cost, Michigan Blockchain views it as a better alternative as it temporarily fixes the DAO participation problem and justly rewards top contributors.

We are wary of the centralization risk posed by this proposal; however, top contributors to the DAO have no history of malicious activity –– increasing their voting power does not pose centralization risk. If anything it is an added incentive to contribute to the DAO, with the understanding that top contributors can be rewarded through previously established incentive programs, as well as spontaneous increases to their voting power, such as this proposal.

While Arbitrum values the opinion of every DAO participant, top contributors (many of whom devote significant time toward governance) are likely to be better informed than less active participants. Increasing their delegation accelerates the best ideas. While this proposal comes at a 22m Arb cost, it is a reasonable price to pay for vastly improving DAO functionality.

CONCLUSION: Michigan Blockchain believes both proposals are better than inaction. Nevertheless, @cupojoseph’s alternative proposal is superior to the original for the following reason:

The original proposal accommodates bad behavior. People are participating less (bad) and lowering the quorum threshold (accommodating) allows for governance to remain strong despite decreased participation. This accommodates bad behavior while doing nothing to reward good behavior.

Alternatively, increasing delegation to top contributors addresses the issue by incentivizing/rewarding strong participation. Rather than lowering standards to meet turnout, it raises participation to meet standards.

Jack Verrill; TG @JackVerrill

EventHorizonDAO from eventhorizonarbitrum.eth

102.4K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

edited 1 year ago

Below is a v1 pre-vote feedback report from the Event Horizon community and agents:

Summary of the Rationales:

Below is a v1 pre-vote feedback report from the Event Horizon community and agents:

Summary of the Rationales:

178 of 191 Voters Support this proposal as is. Nearly all voters emphasize that the current 5% quorum is hard to meet in light of stagnant voter turnout and increasing token supply and that 0.5% is a safe and immediate remedy. A few voices express caution, warning that any reduction—even if small—might undermine the perceived legitimacy or security of the governance process if not paired with longer‑term reforms.

Most Compelling Arguments AGAINST:

Security & Legitimacy Concerns: One notable perspective cautions that even a modest reduction might undermine the system’s credibility.
Considerations of Precedent There is a worry that if quorum reduction is the preferred mode of addressing issues of votable supply, it may become a tempting and easy future solution rather than harder efforts to address the root issue.

Potential Improvements to Mitigate Weaknesses

For Proponents...

Metrics and Monitoring: Clearly outline metrics and monitoring tools to ensure that the reduced quorum does not become a backdoor for low-signature proposals.
Periodic Reviews: Commit to a periodic review of voter participation and propose a framework for a dynamic or “flexible quorum” in the future if conditions change further.

For Skeptics...

Sunset Date: Pair the quorum reduction with a temporary-nature / sunset clause or a follow‑up review to ensure that if the lower threshold adversely affects governance, adjustments can be quickly reversed.
Couple with Search for Alternative Approaches: Commit effort to explore supplementary measures for long‑term reform that may involve flexible, context‑dependent quorum settings rather than a fixed percentage.
Increased Requirements for Future Quorum Reductions: to assure quorum reductions don't become a solution of convenience, guardrails and requirements around further and future reductions could be added.

Condensed Representation of Inter-Agent Discourse

— Alice (Proponent): “While Constitutional AIPs have passed, in almost every case, doing so has required high-effort coordination—either from the Foundation, the MSS, or a small cluster of high-capacity delegates like L2BEAT, Blockworks, and others. These stakeholders have done remarkable work to uphold quorum, but the reality is that the threshold is increasingly mismatched with organic participation levels. The Security Council renewal votes and several STIP proposals, despite strong ecosystem support and broad alignment across power centers, came dangerously close to failure due to this static quorum.

This proposal doesn’t introduce any technical or procedural overhaul—it simply adjusts the quorum for Constitutional AIPs specifically from 5% to 4.5%, reflecting the turnout patterns we’ve seen even on broadly supported initiatives. It’s deliberately conservative in scale, and explicitly scoped: it doesn’t touch other proposal types. The aim is to prevent a situation where only hyper-coordinated, heavily whipped efforts can pass proposals, even when there’s clear support across diverse delegate groups.”

— Bob (Opponent): "I want to challenge a deeper assumption: that friction in reaching quorum is inherently bad. I’d argue that it’s deliberate. Governance—especially Constitutional governance—should be hard. The need to coordinate across diverse stakeholders isn’t just a hurdle; it’s a proof of legitimacy.

If we begin shifting the quorum downward based on participation trends, we risk making quorum feel negotiable. The danger is precedent. If turnout stagnates or the supply grows again, do we revisit this in six months? To me, this isn’t about rejecting this proposal outright—but about building in strong guardrails: a sunset clause, a formal re-ratification, and a broader commitment to solving the underlying problem, not just patching it.”

— Alice (Proponent): I would support adding a formal sunset mechanism—say, a two-quarter trial period. We could even codify that further quorum reductions require an entirely separate governance process to avoid normalization. This way, we protect against the slippery slope while addressing the governance bottleneck we’ve clearly observed. With regards to future improvement, static percentage thresholds were a rational first step, but they don’t adapt well to evolving conditions. We should be exploring flexible quorum models—ones that adjust dynamically based on voter participation, proposal type, or on-chain signal strength. Optimism and Gitcoin have both experimented here, and Arbitrum should lead on this front too.”

Strength of Conviction – Before and After Discourse

-- Before Discourse:

Proponents: Approximately 85/100 conviction, based on strong data and a focus on efficiency.
Opponents: Approximately 60/100 conviction, concerned with the validity of decreasing safeguards and absence of durable future solution.

-- After Discourse (with proposed improvements integrated):

Proponents: Increase to about 90/100 due to the reassurance provided by review mechanisms and commitment to future evolution.
Opponents: Increase to about 80/100 as the modifications address many of the concerns around precedent and legitimacy while still allowing necessary future flexibility.

Conclusion

A compromise grounded in a temporary quorum reduction—paired with formal review timelines, transparent turnout metrics, limitations on future reductions absent a new governance process, and a shared commitment to explore adaptive quorum models—provides a pragmatic near-term solution. It addresses current coordination constraints while preserving the legitimacy and resilience of Arbitrum’s Constitutional governance framework.

Hey everyone,

Why I’m Worried

This Screams Centralization Dropping the quorum, even by just 0.5%, makes it easier for a small group of big players or super-active delegates to push through major changes. That’s a slippery slope to a few “governing elites” calling the shots. I mean, isn’t the whole point of the DAO to make sure lots of $ARB holders have a say? This feels like we’re handing more power to the whales or the hyper-engaged few.
Temporary Fixes Always Stick Around Every time I’ve seen a “temporary” change like this in governance—crypto or otherwise—it ends up permanent. The proposal doesn’t say how we’d go back to 5% or what happens if voter turnout doesn’t improve. Without a clear plan, this could just become the new normal, and that’s not great for keeping things decentralized.
Why Aren’t We Fixing Voter Fatigue? The proposal blames low turnout, but why aren’t we tackling why people aren’t voting? Is the process too complicated? Are small holders feeling like their vote doesn’t matter? Instead of lowering the bar, how about:

Making voting easier, like a cleaner interface or AI generated summary about what's up on Arb gov.
Tossing in some rewards for voting or delegating (maybe a few $ARB or some kind of governance badge outside the delegates program?).
Doing more to explain proposals in plain English so everyone gets what’s at stake. Lowering the quorum feels like giving up on getting more people involved.

This Could Look Bad Arbitrum’s supposed to be a leader in DeFi governance. If we start loosening rules to make things easier, it might send a message that we’re okay with less community input.

What I’d Rather See

I don’t think lowering the quorum is the answer. Here’s what I’d love to see instead:

Rewards for Voting and Delegating: Give people a reason to show up or trust a delegate, like small $ARB payouts or something fun like governance NFTs.
Make Voting Simple: The process can be a hassle—let’s streamline it so anyone can vote without jumping through hoops.
Educate the Community: More guides, AMAs, or even short videos breaking down proposals could get more $ARB holders excited to join in.
If We Must Lower It, Add a Time Limit: If the quorum drop happens, put a hard 6-month expiration on it and only keep it if we see turnout improve.

0x_ultra from 0x-ultra-gov.eth

posted 1 year ago

posted 1 year ago

posted 1 year ago

Quoted from Tane

jump to post →

Quoted from Curia

Next: research a dynamic quorum that flexes with recent delegate activity or other engagement metrics so it remains realistic as conditions change.

jump to post →

Jose_StableLab from stablelab.eth

152.0K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

Delegating Treasury-held ARB to trusted delegates, especially those participating in the Delegate Incentive Program. The program already includes a rigorous review of delegate performance, making it a natural mechanism to align capital and accountability.
Activating Tally's stARB governance staking. StableLab has recently proposed the first governance staking rewards for Rari DAO, using stRARI staking to direct delegation power in Rari Chain (an Arbitrum Orbit L3). The Obol Collective has already implemented it and is discussing metrics to determine active delegates. This system helps convert passive token holders into active governance participants by tying delegation to staking yield, using the same infrastructure the governace staking in Arbitrum would use. It would also help reconnect the correlation between total ARB supply and the share actively participating in votes.

Michigan_Blockchain from michiganblockchain.eth

333.9K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

Reducing Constitutional Quorum Threshold form 5% to 4.5% (~25m ARB)

Lowering the quorum threshold neither dilutes nor inflates existing voting power, doing nothing to shift the concentration of power. The DAO’s core functionality remains the same, there is merely a lower barrier to entry for proposals to be voted on.
This proposal is free of cost, incurring only standard gas fees.

CONCLUSION: Michigan Blockchain believes both proposals are better than inaction. Nevertheless, @cupojoseph’s alternative proposal is superior to the original for the following reason:

Jack Verrill; TG @JackVerrill

EventHorizonDAO from eventhorizonarbitrum.eth

102.4K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

edited 1 year ago

Below is a v1 pre-vote feedback report from the Event Horizon community and agents:

Summary of the Rationales:

Below is a v1 pre-vote feedback report from the Event Horizon community and agents:

Summary of the Rationales:

178 of 191 Voters Support this proposal as is. Nearly all voters emphasize that the current 5% quorum is hard to meet in light of stagnant voter turnout and increasing token supply and that 0.5% is a safe and immediate remedy. A few voices express caution, warning that any reduction—even if small—might undermine the perceived legitimacy or security of the governance process if not paired with longer‑term reforms.

Most Compelling Arguments AGAINST:

Security & Legitimacy Concerns: One notable perspective cautions that even a modest reduction might undermine the system’s credibility.
Considerations of Precedent There is a worry that if quorum reduction is the preferred mode of addressing issues of votable supply, it may become a tempting and easy future solution rather than harder efforts to address the root issue.

Potential Improvements to Mitigate Weaknesses

For Proponents...

Metrics and Monitoring: Clearly outline metrics and monitoring tools to ensure that the reduced quorum does not become a backdoor for low-signature proposals.
Periodic Reviews: Commit to a periodic review of voter participation and propose a framework for a dynamic or “flexible quorum” in the future if conditions change further.

For Skeptics...

Sunset Date: Pair the quorum reduction with a temporary-nature / sunset clause or a follow‑up review to ensure that if the lower threshold adversely affects governance, adjustments can be quickly reversed.
Couple with Search for Alternative Approaches: Commit effort to explore supplementary measures for long‑term reform that may involve flexible, context‑dependent quorum settings rather than a fixed percentage.
Increased Requirements for Future Quorum Reductions: to assure quorum reductions don't become a solution of convenience, guardrails and requirements around further and future reductions could be added.

Condensed Representation of Inter-Agent Discourse

Strength of Conviction – Before and After Discourse

-- Before Discourse:

Proponents: Approximately 85/100 conviction, based on strong data and a focus on efficiency.
Opponents: Approximately 60/100 conviction, concerned with the validity of decreasing safeguards and absence of durable future solution.

-- After Discourse (with proposed improvements integrated):

Proponents: Increase to about 90/100 due to the reassurance provided by review mechanisms and commitment to future evolution.
Opponents: Increase to about 80/100 as the modifications address many of the concerns around precedent and legitimacy while still allowing necessary future flexibility.

Conclusion

Below are the opinions of the UADP:

Quorum isn't meant to be an easy threshold to reach. It's purposefully designed to induce a degree of friction in the voting process—but the friction shouldn't impede governance functionality.

Screenshot 2025-05-15 at 1.32.09 AM|690x100

The drastic quorum margin reduction stats presented by the ARDC surprised us. This increasingly narrower buffer means proposals are more vulnerable to failure due to even small drop-offs in voter turnout, hence the rationale for reducing the quorum threshold makes sense here.

As mentioned by a handful of other folks, this quorum alteration is more or less a bandaid solution in reaction to a deeper problem: general voter participation. Regardless of programs like the DIP, for example, it seems that the overall active voting power remains stagnant. The exceeding reliance on a small number of large delegates to pass a vote is also worrying. A sale occurring from a large delegator could cause serious issues.

image|690x424, 75%

A last resort scenario would be a large treasury delegation initiative. This adds a predictable degree of stability towards meeting quorum. Compound conducted this last year after the governance attack. Conversations should be had with larger token holders as well if they don't actively delegate. Staking-based fees of course makes the case a lot more compelling, especially if an entity is worried about the potential legal recourse associated with governance participation.

The clear risk with a one-time reduction is that it makes the DAO more comfortable with continually lowering the quorum threshold based on increasing votable supply. Simultaneous efforts have to be in place to counteract increasing supply with increased ARB involved in voting. Dynamic quorum thresholds based on trailing or projected voting metrics, or even ARB supply metrics, feels flimsy. As a delegate, we feel more comfortable with a hard-set quorum that is predetermined and unalterable unless decided on by an onchain vote. That's why it's with a degree of reluctancy that we are in favor of reducing the quorum in this case.

Quoted from bertani

Treasury delegation, as suggested by several delegates, is a promising alternative that aligns with this long-term vision. The Uniswap DAO offers a valuable precedent—having implemented a treasury delegation program since December 2023 with positive outcomes, and now entering a second round. Adopting a similar model in Arbitrum could help ensure sufficient quorum without compromising governance integrity. I support this short-term solution.

jump to post →

I agree that the use of treasury delegations is a valuable tool. Further, as example, the current Event Horizon community pool has served to add 7M in active votable supply with 100% uptime. This pool is fully accessible to all Arbitrum delegates and community members. But, treasury delegations are only one avenue of votable supply expansion.

I'd like to open discussions around increasing VS through:

A. Investor Holdings: many of the early investors have been sidelined from voting participation. Often, this is due to workload requirements and legal limitations. To the former, myself and the Event Horizon team would gladly set up bespoke agents to ease the workload required and make voter participation seamless for any early Arbitrum investors. We would gladly work with @Arbitrum @offchainlabs to make governance easy for and mobilize Arbitrum investors.

B. Retail Engagement (individuals and organizations): Tremendous sums of ARB tokens are held on exchange and in wallets with no engagement in actual DAO governance. At Event Horizon, we have been experimenting with the use of grant-funded incentives to encourage the delegation of retail-held tokens. To date, and until staking goes live, this is a completely untapped source of votable supply. Benefitting our capital efficiency, at present (and again until staking), DAO tokens offer 0% APR. As such, with just $1,500 in emitted rewards, Event Horizon has garnered >$1.5M in votable supply. And, again, unlike vote buying, this voting power goes immediately back to the community members who leverage the public good community voting pool. I would be interested in exploring an expansion of this emissions model to work toward a more durable solution than simply perpetually lowering quorum requirements.

Thank you for putting this up, Arbitrum.

We agree that the 5% bar has been a significant hurdle for constitutional proposals, and a reduction offers a reasonable short-term remedy. However, we have a few observations and alternative suggestions.

Quoted from Arbitrum

As of April 2025, with ~4.3B ARB in votable tokens (formula is total supply of ARB token, which is 10B, minus the amount delegated to the exclude address), the quorum reduction would decrease the requirement by approximately 25 million ARB tokens, bringing the effective quorum from ~215M to ~190M ARB.

Is ~190M really a sweet spot? Arbitrum DAO on Tally|527x500

Reviewing the last eight non-constitutional proposals, six have surpassed 190M votes. While 215M may indeed be prohibitive, 190M risks swinging the pendulum too far in the opposite direction, effectively lowering the hurdle below what most ordinary proposals already achieve. Constitutional votes are, by definition, more impactful and arguably should carry a higher bar than routine treasury or mechanics changes.

Possible Alternative Solutions

Phased or Tiered Reduction

Short term (4.75% → ~204M ARB) Reduces immediate friction but stays above the 200M threshold—a psychologically significant barrier that most recent votes have hovered around.
Medium term (after 3–6 months) Reassess on-chain turnout data. If participation remains stagnant, then consider a further reduction to 4.5% (~193M ARB) or lower.

DIP Utilization

The strategy utilized by SEED for the Security Council elections demonstrated how DIP can boost early turnout. Mandating a first week vote might be a drag, but we could implement a similar approach where we:

Offer a small ARB bonus to delegates who vote within the first week of the voting period.
Structure the bonus to decline over time, encouraging prompt engagement without over-rewarding late voters.

By combining a phased quorum adjustment with targeted incentives for early voting, we can balance accessibility and rigor, ensuring constitutional changes maintain high legitimacy while reducing unnecessary barriers.

We understand and appreciate the rationale behind this proposal. Reaching a quorum for constitutional proposals has become increasingly difficult, and this is clearly an issue that needs to be addressed to keep the DAO functional.

That said, we believe @Tane raised a critical concern regarding the governance attack surface that this proposal may inadvertently widen.

Quoted from Tane

The proposed 4.5 % quorum equates to roughly 213.8 M ARB ≈ 66.3 M USD, only ~9 M USD above the treasury’s liquid holdings. If ARB fell below 0.27 USD or ETH printed new local highs, the attack could turn profitable.

jump to post →

According to @Tane's analysis, the market value of ARB required to reach the proposed 4.5% quorum is approximately $66.3M, while the value of the DAO’s liquid treasury holdings (USD and ETH) is $57.1M. This means the cost to reach quorum is only ~$9M above the liquid value of the treasury. When factoring in the significant ARB holdings in the treasury, the total market value approaches $1B. While ARB can't be instantly sold without slippage, this still represents an added incentive for a potential attacker. While acquiring >200 M ARB would have a market impact and increase the attacker's cost, alternatives like borrowing ARB do exist (as mentioned in the ARDC's analysis of governance risks).

We’ve already seen real-world examples like Compound where governance attacks have occurred. Given Arbitrum DAO's large treasury, it is a prime target for such threats.

As highlighted in the ARDC's analysis of governance risks, the core problem isn’t just high quorum thresholds—it's that these thresholds are increasing while participation remains stagnant. Over the past year, participation as a percentage of votable supply has dropped from around 8% to just 4–5%.

While we support the need to reduce the constitutional quorum to enable necessary protocol upgrades, we believe the Arbitrum Foundation and delegates should first prioritise implementing some of the ARDC's recommendations. In particular, we’d like to highlight the following:

Partner with vote-buying platforms to implement automatic "No" votes for proposals flagged by the Security Council or exceeding specific funding thresholds.
Cap token transfers per governance proposal.
Enhance Security Council oversight for high-stakes votes.
Focus on increasing active delegated participation.
Encourage new delegation to improve voter engagement.

In short, let’s not rush a quorum change without taking parallel steps to harden governance security and improve participation.

bertani

posted 1 year ago

edited 1 year ago

Thank you for putting forward this important proposal. I agree that the current 5% quorum requirement for constitutional proposals is becoming increasingly difficult to meet as more ARB tokens are distributed across a wider base of holders. This creates a real risk of DAO paralysis, and I support the initiative to address it.

That said, while reducing the quorum to 4.5% may offer a short-term fix, I share the concerns raised by @Tane and others about the security implications. Lowering the quorum threshold does reduce friction, but it also opens the door to potential governance attacks. Striking the right balance between operational efficiency and long-term resilience is crucial.

More importantly, I don’t believe that reducing quorum requirements addresses the root of the issue: persistent voter apathy and low engagement among ARB holders. Active participation remains a significant challenge across the DAO landscape. Rather than lowering standards, we should be focusing our efforts on increasing engagement and expanding the base of active governance participants.

But, as @EzR3aL pointed out, we need to answer deeper questions about why voting power is stagnating and what structural barriers are preventing broader participation. While projects like the Governance Bootcamp and ARB Delegation Week are a step in the right direction, they are one-off initiatives. We need recurring, well-resourced initiatives to improve governance literacy, streamline delegation, reduce friction for participation, and create bite-sized, digestible formats that make it easier for the average ARB holder to stay informed and engaged. Not everyone has the time to wade through long forum posts, but many would gladly delegate if given trusted, accessible summaries and delegation tools.

To continue the parallel with Uniswap DAO, the DAO is actively tackling this issue with solutions like Unistaker and UVN. In Arbitrum, we need to find our own solutions to have more ARB tokens engaged with the DAO. To help with this, I suggest expanding the Arbitrum D.A.O. grants program with a track dedicated to governance grants inspired by Optimism governance grants (examples one and two).

Curia from curia-delegates.eth

74.7K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

edited 1 year ago

Thanks for bringing this proposal forward. Governance data is something we’ve been tracking closely in the Arbitrum ecosystem, and we’d like to add context that may clarify the rationale for adjusting the quorum threshold.

Key observations

Stable votable supply vs. rising votable ARB.
- The overall votable supply has barely moved—about 353.46 M ARB in Jan 2024 vs. 363.65 M ARB in May 2025.

image|690x306

Key observations

Stable votable supply vs. rising votable ARB.
- The overall votable supply has barely moved—about 353.46 M ARB in Jan 2024 vs. 363.65 M ARB in May 2025.

image|690x306

Votable ARB (the amount that could be used for voting) keeps edging upward, but the share that is actually delegated and participating has not.

image|690x417

Result: the quorum bar drifts higher even though real engagement is flat.

Participation is concentrating, not expanding.
- Average voting power per delegate is climbing, while the number of delegates who vote is falling.
  
  For Voting power cast for both onchain & onchain ( from 1st Jan 2024- 7th May 2025)
  
  For Voting power cast for only onchain ( from 1st Jan 2024- 7th May 2025)
Number of delegate that participate
- Voting power are migrating from smaller voters to larger ones; total voting power cast is not the bottleneck—breadth of participation is.

Given these observations, we agree that this proposal is necessary. Reducing the constitutional quorum threshold from 5% to 4.5% is a reasonable and timely short-term adjustment that can help ensure well-supported proposals are not blocked due to insufficient participation. However, we believe this should be treated as an interim fix. Because quorum is tied to votable ARB (a figure that continues to grow), with the same problem will re-emerge. A longer-term solution should align quorum with actual participation rather than theoretical capacity.

All in all, we see two potential complementary levers going foward:

1. Adjust governance parameters

Immediate: adopt the 4.5 % threshold (this proposal).
Next: research a dynamic quorum that flexes with recent delegate activity or other engagement metrics so it remains realistic as conditions change.

2. Address token-holder & delegate behaviour

Idle, non-delegated ARB is at the heart of the gap between supply and participation. Ways to bring it into play:

image|645x241

Overall, we support lowering the quorum to 4.5 % as a timely step. In parallel, revisiting the quorum calculation itself and launching initiatives that boost genuine participation will help bolster ArbitrumDAO’s long-term governance resilience.

TodayInDeFi from tidresearch.eth

1.0M TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

We believe lowering the quorum is reasonable measure to keep DAO functioning and avoid governance deadlock.

Rationale Just based on tokenomics alone, according to the ARB emission rate and the known unlock schedule, the circulating supply of ARB will increase at a pace that makes it hard for the current voting participation for constitutional proposals to stay at the current level of 4-5% - which is already barely at the level needed for Quorum

We believe lowering the quorum is reasonable measure to keep DAO functioning and avoid governance deadlock.

chart|689x427 (Source: Arbitrum DAO: Delegates Dune Dashboard by Entropy)

But while lowering the quorum modestly to 4.5% is a good short term fix with few downsides, it's not a total long-term solution; more is needed: The root cause of the situation is the dampened interest for ARB holders to participate in the governance, and i think there are two reasons why that's the case.

1 Knowledge Gap

The knowledge required for newcomers to keep up is overwhelming, especially for constitutional proposals. there are always a lot of jargons and technical terms, and it can be very discouraging to understand the contexts, participate, and make contributions.

2. No incentive to participate

the other reason is that there's no incentives to participate. there are DAOs out there with higher quorum but has no problem meeting the threshold, such as Lido. In addition to the fast track setup, it's also because there are direct incentives for protocols and chains to participate in Lido governance, such as wstETH integration or reward programs that can help those protocols grow.

For Arb, as a chain and infrastructure we don't have such direct incentive to attract participation thus far outside of occasional STEP proposals

Solutions

To bridge the knowledge gap for new participants to keep track of the ongoing discussions or live votes, a weekly/biweekly newsletter to explain contexts, explain jargons, technical terms or backgrounds, and summarize relevant information can really help. this can be done with reasonable cost and we also have expertise in the field to make it happen.

To incentivize participation, I think it might make sense to direct a portion of the sequencer fee sharing from ARB staking program to incentivize governance participation. for example, ARB stakers who either delegate or participate can earn a higher share of the yield.

Regarding ARB treasury delegation: I don't believe it's an ideal solution. Not only because it's also an one-time fix, but it also contradicts with what we want to achieve with the delegate incentive program. I believe the purpose of DIP is to encourage those who have expertise and insight to contribute to the relevant fields to shape Arb ecosystem while also taking the delegates' monetray stake into account. Delegating treasury can overshadow these well designed design principles and overly empower delegates who may not have the best insights or stake.

In summary, I do think this proposal to lower the quorum is needed just to address the mechanical issue of emissions making it harder to achieve quorum at curretn participationrates, but if we don't solve the underlying issues of a knowledge gap for voting and reasons to participate. we might need to lower the quorum again in the near future as ARB circulating supply will keep growing.

Tane from tanegov.eth

43.6K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

Thanks for the detailed proposal! Here is our analysis and thought on this proposal.

TL;DR

Thanks for the detailed proposal! Here is our analysis and thought on this proposal.

TL;DR

We agree that a quorum misaligned with voter participation can paralyze ArbitrumDAO, but we believe lowering the constitutional threshold from 5 % → 4.5 % exposes the treasury to avoidable economic risk. Under today’s conservative prices (ARB = 0.31 USD), the cost to buy the new quorum nearly approaches the 57 M USD of liquid assets in the treasury; a modest ETH rally or further ARB weakness could flip the cost‑benefit equation in favor of an attacker.

Numbers & Assumptions

Parameter	Value	Note
Votable supply (conservative)	4.75 B ARB
ARB price (conservative)	0.31 USD	conservative assumption
Treasury USD stables	33.9 M USD	STEP report Apr‑2025
Treasury ETH	12.9 k ETH ≈ 23.2 M USD	ETH @ 1 799 USD STEP report Apr‑2025
Total liquid assets	57.1 M USD	Sum of the above

Why a lower quorum creates a larger target

Lowering the quorum reduces the number of tokens required to govern, so the cost of a hostile take‑over falls one‑for‑one with the threshold. Because the treasury holds liquid ETH and stablecoins, an adversary could, in theory, borrow or purchase the necessary ARB, pass a withdrawal proposal, and exit with more value than they spent. This scenario is not merely academic; it is the same playbook that almost succeeded in Compound when a single whale (known as humpy) accumulated voting power and tried to funnel funds to a personal address, only to be stopped by emergency guardians and community outcry (see the incident analysis).

Limitations of the simple break‑even model

The calculation above is intentionally conservative. In reality, (1) acquiring >200 M ARB would likely push the price up and inflate the attacker’s bill; (2) a hostile actor could also dump the treasury’s own ARB on the market, extracting value well beyond our 57 M USD estimate; and
(3) OTC liquidity premiums and on‑chain slippage further distort the arithmetic.

At the same time, Arbitrum’s Security Council can pause malicious execution, so an incentive alone does not equal instant compromises, but the narrower the economic margin, the greater the reliance on emergency intervention.

Possible alternative – Treasury Delegation

Rather than lowering the quorum, we advocate treasury delegation. By delegating a slice of the DAO‑owned ARB. say ≈ 22 M ARB, to a curated set of active, accountable delegates, the DAO lifts effective participation while keeping the constitutional threshold intact, as described by @cupojoseph.

Quoted from cupojoseph

instead of lowering the threshold by ~22M votes, why dont we move 22M ARB from the treasury into 1/1 gnosis-safes controlled by the DAO. And use them to delegate to existing contributors.

jump to post →

To be more concrete, we believe a treasury delegation scheme should follow three principles. First, it must avoid over-concentrating voting power: the allocation should be evenly spread across a fixed, moderate-sized cohort of delegates. Second, delegate selection should rely on transparent, objective metrics, such as past voting attendance and alignment scores, so that anyone can independently verify fairness. Third, every delegation should carry a hard expiry that auto-revokes voting power unless the DAO explicitly renews it, preventing perpetual entrenchment.

At the same time, we understand that this is not the ideal solution, but rather something temporal. We also believe that there needs to be a fundamental solution implemented so that token holders are encouraged to vote/delegate to strengthen this DAO governance.

Quoted from EzR3aL

Why are delegates loosing voting power? Why is it hard to gain new voting power? What can be done to tackle this and whats the main reason?

jump to post →

Quoted from Zeptimus

this is treating a symptom, not the disease

jump to post →

Conclusion

Lowering the quorum fixes a short‑term participation symptom, but it shifts systemic risk onto the Security Council and narrows the economic moat around the treasury. Delegating dormant ARB from the treasury to proven delegates achieves the same practical goal, more votes, while preserving the cost of a buy‑out. We therefore oppose the 4.5 % proposal and urge the DAO to pursue treasury delegation or other alternatives instead.

Entropy

31.7M TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

edited 1 year ago

Entropy is supportive of the Arbitrum Foundation’s proposal to lower the constitutional quorum threshold to 4.5% of votable tokens. As the ARDC’s research highlighted, the current quorum margin is quite thin for constitutional proposals with the current requirement now exceeding the average turnout rate. It is particularly concerning to consider that at the current threshold of ~218.6m ARB, the only proposal to even meet this threshold in the history of the Arbitrum DAO is the recent vote to adopt Timeboost (~243.9m ARB). Similar to the Arbitrum Foundation and many other delegates, we feel it is prudent to address this issue before a legitimate proposal fails to pass due to quorum requirements. Moreso, a proposal to reduce quorum is a constitutional proposal in itself, making the risk of not getting ahead of the problem all that much greater.

Adding some additional context to the current state of delegated ARB and votable supply, since the ARDC posted its research on governance attack risks, total delegated votes has rebounded back to ~364m ARB and is close to its sustained peak of ~372m ARB back in late 2023.

|624x339

While the recent uptick shows the efforts of the Arbitrum Foundation and top delegates to activate non-delegated ARB have been mildly successful, the unfortunate truth is that the resulting delegations from this work are not keeping pace with the rate of increase of the quorum threshold. In Q4 of 2023, the percentage of delegated tokens out of votable tokens peaked at around 15% with non-delegated votable ARB sitting at around ~2.05B. Since then the amount of non-delegated ARB has nearly doubled to ~4B, while the amount of delegated tokens has remained relatively flat, pushing the ratio down to almost 8.3% today.

|588x320

@cupojoseph makes an interesting suggestion to delegate ARB from the DAO treasury, something members of our team have previously proposed. In reality though, a number much larger than 22m would be required to make a substantial difference given the current rate of quorum’s increase we would be faced with a similar situation in just a few months. This rate of increase is primarily why Entropy is in favor of lowering the calculation from 5% to 4.5%. Such a change not only immediately reduces constitutional quorum, but it will also slightly slow the rate of quorum increase in the future (~500k ARB per month based solely on ARB unlocks). Additionally, after a lot of collective thought from our team on this matter, we do not believe delegating treasury ARB is an ideal solution given that ARB governance power is one of the core value propositions of holding ARB today. We hope to return value to token holders in the future, but we want to ensure the voter base that shapes our path to value accrual has “skin in the game” rather than receiving delegation with no monetary stake. We are open to changing our opinions on this matter, but for now, we view the decrease in quorum as the most sensible near-term solution. It is worth noting that reducing quorum comes with its own tradeoff, increasing the likelihood of a governance attack, but Entropy still views it as a necessary step to take today.

Overall, we acknowledge the concerns around governance resiliency, but at this point in time lowering the constitutional threshold is warranted and provides the DAO a short-term solution while it continues to make improvements to its operational efficiency that make organic engagement from large token holders more appealing.

Hawheik

posted 1 year ago

The objective is to ensure that we do not "lock ourselves out of reasonable reach of quorum", which is without a doubt very important for the continued smooth operation of the DAO.

We could do this by adjusting as in this proposal, then continuously monitoring and passing further proposals to adjust whenever needed, up and down. But that relies on our continued vigilance and essentially rubber-stamping routine adjustments regularly, which while doable, doesn't seem ideal.

The objective is to ensure that we do not "lock ourselves out of reasonable reach of quorum", which is without a doubt very important for the continued smooth operation of the DAO.

Is it viable to instead augment the smart contract stack to automatically calculate the quorum requirements to be whatever is the largest number of the following: a) 80% of the average total votes cast for all the above-quorum votes the last 3 months a) 65% of the average total votes cast for all the above-quorum votes the last 6 months b) 50% of the average total votes cast for all the above-quorum votes the last 12 months (with an option for the security council to override the quorum number at any time, in case of exceptional circumstances such as intentional manipulation of the quorum numbers through inflated voting, to create a lockout)

The percentages and periods are not important, but it's the principle of automatic continuous quorum level-setting I want to bring to the table. This would automatically adjust the quorum level up or downwards according to voter interest over time, while maintain a reasonable margin to not make quorum a prohibitively high bar.

Would it be better to have that than to have to make regular manual adjustments?

Would it be viable to add to the current set of smart contracts?

Below are the opinions of the UADP:

Quorum isn't meant to be an easy threshold to reach. It's purposefully designed to induce a degree of friction in the voting process—but the friction shouldn't impede governance functionality.

Screenshot 2025-05-15 at 1.32.09 AM|690x100

image|690x424, 75%

Quoted from bertani

jump to post →

I'd like to open discussions around increasing VS through:

Thank you for putting this up, Arbitrum.

Quoted from Arbitrum

Is ~190M really a sweet spot? Arbitrum DAO on Tally|527x500

Possible Alternative Solutions

Phased or Tiered Reduction

Short term (4.75% → ~204M ARB) Reduces immediate friction but stays above the 200M threshold—a psychologically significant barrier that most recent votes have hovered around.
Medium term (after 3–6 months) Reassess on-chain turnout data. If participation remains stagnant, then consider a further reduction to 4.5% (~193M ARB) or lower.

DIP Utilization

Offer a small ARB bonus to delegates who vote within the first week of the voting period.
Structure the bonus to decline over time, encouraging prompt engagement without over-rewarding late voters.

That said, we believe @Tane raised a critical concern regarding the governance attack surface that this proposal may inadvertently widen.

Quoted from Tane

jump to post →

We’ve already seen real-world examples like Compound where governance attacks have occurred. Given Arbitrum DAO's large treasury, it is a prime target for such threats.

Partner with vote-buying platforms to implement automatic "No" votes for proposals flagged by the Security Council or exceeding specific funding thresholds.
Cap token transfers per governance proposal.
Enhance Security Council oversight for high-stakes votes.
Focus on increasing active delegated participation.
Encourage new delegation to improve voter engagement.

In short, let’s not rush a quorum change without taking parallel steps to harden governance security and improve participation.

bertani

posted 1 year ago

edited 1 year ago

Curia from curia-delegates.eth

74.7K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

edited 1 year ago

Key observations

Stable votable supply vs. rising votable ARB.
- The overall votable supply has barely moved—about 353.46 M ARB in Jan 2024 vs. 363.65 M ARB in May 2025.

image|690x306

Key observations

Stable votable supply vs. rising votable ARB.
- The overall votable supply has barely moved—about 353.46 M ARB in Jan 2024 vs. 363.65 M ARB in May 2025.

image|690x306

Votable ARB (the amount that could be used for voting) keeps edging upward, but the share that is actually delegated and participating has not.

image|690x417

Result: the quorum bar drifts higher even though real engagement is flat.

Participation is concentrating, not expanding.
- Average voting power per delegate is climbing, while the number of delegates who vote is falling.
  
  For Voting power cast for both onchain & onchain ( from 1st Jan 2024- 7th May 2025)
  
  For Voting power cast for only onchain ( from 1st Jan 2024- 7th May 2025)
Number of delegate that participate
- Voting power are migrating from smaller voters to larger ones; total voting power cast is not the bottleneck—breadth of participation is.

All in all, we see two potential complementary levers going foward:

1. Adjust governance parameters

Immediate: adopt the 4.5 % threshold (this proposal).
Next: research a dynamic quorum that flexes with recent delegate activity or other engagement metrics so it remains realistic as conditions change.

2. Address token-holder & delegate behaviour

Idle, non-delegated ARB is at the heart of the gap between supply and participation. Ways to bring it into play:

image|645x241

TodayInDeFi from tidresearch.eth

1.0M TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

We believe lowering the quorum is reasonable measure to keep DAO functioning and avoid governance deadlock.

chart|689x427 (Source: Arbitrum DAO: Delegates Dune Dashboard by Entropy)

1 Knowledge Gap

2. No incentive to participate

For Arb, as a chain and infrastructure we don't have such direct incentive to attract participation thus far outside of occasional STEP proposals

Solutions

Tane from tanegov.eth

43.6K TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

Thanks for the detailed proposal! Here is our analysis and thought on this proposal.

TL;DR

Thanks for the detailed proposal! Here is our analysis and thought on this proposal.

TL;DR

Numbers & Assumptions

Parameter	Value	Note
Votable supply (conservative)	4.75 B ARB
ARB price (conservative)	0.31 USD	conservative assumption
Treasury USD stables	33.9 M USD	STEP report Apr‑2025
Treasury ETH	12.9 k ETH ≈ 23.2 M USD	ETH @ 1 799 USD STEP report Apr‑2025
Total liquid assets	57.1 M USD	Sum of the above

Why a lower quorum creates a larger target

Limitations of the simple break‑even model

Possible alternative – Treasury Delegation

Quoted from cupojoseph

instead of lowering the threshold by ~22M votes, why dont we move 22M ARB from the treasury into 1/1 gnosis-safes controlled by the DAO. And use them to delegate to existing contributors.

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Quoted from EzR3aL

Why are delegates loosing voting power? Why is it hard to gain new voting power? What can be done to tackle this and whats the main reason?

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Quoted from Zeptimus

this is treating a symptom, not the disease

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Conclusion

Entropy

31.7M TOKEN

posted 1 year ago

edited 1 year ago

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Hawheik

posted 1 year ago

The objective is to ensure that we do not "lock ourselves out of reasonable reach of quorum", which is without a doubt very important for the continued smooth operation of the DAO.

Would it be better to have that than to have to make regular manual adjustments?

Would it be viable to add to the current set of smart contracts?

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

Quoted from Arbitrum

As the circulating supply of $ARB continues to grow and voter turnout remains relatively flat, quorum requirements are becoming increasingly difficult to meet.

We fully agree with this observation. Voter participation has dropped to around 4 to 5% in recent months, and the relative voting power of delegates has also slightly declined. Keeping the quorum at 5% under these conditions could unintentionally stall governance processes. The DAO must adapt its quorum requirements to reflect actual participation levels and ensure that sound initiatives are not blocked by procedural thresholds.

Quoted from Arbitrum

Reducing the constitutional quorum threshold by 0.5% provides a short-term adjustment that enables critical governance to move forward while longer-term reforms are considered and developed.

We see this 4.5% quorum as a practical interim measure. It helps prevent governance gridlock without weakening the legitimacy of outcomes. As delegates, we also recognize the need to address the long-term issue, which is declining engagement. Exploring future reforms like flexible quorum mechanisms is a logical next step, but this proposal offers the right fix for the current context. It keeps governance moving while broader participation strategies take shape.

That said, quorum is only one part of the picture of what we see. In parallel, the DAO should invest in mechanisms to attract more voters and increase participation from token holders. Over time, the goal should be to raise engagement, not just adjust thresholds downward.

Importantly, we see no red flags in this 0.5% reduction. It is a modest and well-reasoned calibration based on turnout data, not a radical departure from current safeguards. One forward-looking question we have is, how will we monitor whether 4.5% remains appropriate? What metrics will guide future adjustments? Can we set a periodic review to meet the current level of requirements in the future?

We are in support of this proposal as it addresses a current governance constraint. As we mentioned above, we also recommend that the DAO consider periodic quorum reviews to ensure thresholds evolve alongside participation. This approach helps keep Arbitrum governance responsive, inclusive, and secure over time.

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

Quoted from Arbitrum

As the circulating supply of $ARB continues to grow and voter turnout remains relatively flat, quorum requirements are becoming increasingly difficult to meet.

Quoted from Arbitrum

Reducing the constitutional quorum threshold by 0.5% provides a short-term adjustment that enables critical governance to move forward while longer-term reforms are considered and developed.

[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction

[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction

[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction