This AIP establishes a Long Term Incentives Pilot Program for the DAO to test new incentives designs and answer the necessary questions to ensure we are ready to commit to the long-term program. This Pilot Program will distribute 35M ARB to protocols that have not yet received incentives. The program will run from January 2024 until April 2024.
The Arbitrum DAO has spent the last few months experimenting with incentive programs to attract new users and liquidity to Arbitrum. There is a consensus the DAO will use what we learn from these short-term programs to establish a long-term framework. While STIP V1 brought tons of attention to Arbitrum and has resulted in upticks in protocol metrics, we have learned there were many flaws with the structure of STIP Round 1. This Pilot Program looks to implement new mechanisms to address the issues seen in STIP V1. The DAO will use this Pilot Program as a test run for a long-term framework before committing to a year-long program.
The Pilot Program will operate using a Council, have Application Advisors to ensure protocols receive adequate feedback and assistance, and allow protocols more freedom to create innovative ARB incentive plans. We believe these changes will help remedy many of the pain points seen in Round 1. Running the Pilot Program to test these new features will allow the DAO to compare different program methods before implementing a long-term framework beginning in Q2 2024. This will help ensure we have all the knowledge necessary to implement the most effective long-term incentives program for Arbitrum.
STIP was an experimental program to distribute ARB to protocols to use as incentives for their users. While it was initially intended to have two rounds, the program was substantially more popular than expected, and the entire 50M ARB budget was used in Round 1 as was permissible in the original rules.
This meant no funds remained for Round 2, leading to its cancellation. Many protocols either missed the Round 1 deadline or intentionally waited for Round 2. This left several protocols with no alternative route to apply for ARB incentives. Many STIP Round 1 grantees have seen upticks in their metrics. This Pilot Program would allow protocols that missed out on Round 1 the opportunity to apply to gain these benefits, which will help level the playing field for these protocols. The Pilot Program will replace a round 2 and will be funded with 35M ARB to accommodate the large expected protocol demand we have already seen. This will complete the incentivizing of Arbitrum-based teams to create a holistic competitive edge not against each other but against other chains.
There is a DAO consensus that Arbitrum will need a long-term incentive program in 2024. However, many delegates feel the DAO is moving too quickly and spending too much money on backfund or V2 proposals without yet receiving any of the data on STIP’s effectiveness.
We have learned a lot from STIP and can use what went wrong in STIP and the Backfund to hypothesize what changes would create a better long-term framework. However, we have little evidence to prove these new ideas would be a better solution. DAO members currently don’t have the resources or funds to create a long-term program, nor do we understand what a good long-term program looks like.
This proposal focuses on obtaining this evidence using a committed working stream to guarantee we come away from this program ready to make informed decisions on a long-term framework. The pilot program also allows the DAO to test new aspects of an incentive program such as Application Advisors, Councils, and more flexible incentive distributions before committing long-term.
This will help save the DAO money and time in the long term by preventing the need for more short-term programs before we are ready to commit to the Long-Term Framework
The specifications of the Pilot Program were designed to remedy the 3 largest complaints regarding STIP Round 1. The Pilot Program hopes to be a test run for these additions for the DAO to determine if they should also be included in the long-term framework.
In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal.
To remedy this problem, the Pilot Program will have a 5 person council approved by the DAO responsible for evaluating applications and deciding which protocol will receive ARB. This will ensure all applications are thoughtfully evaluated with only the most deserving receiving incentives. Not only will this help to reduce the burden on delegates, but it will also help expedite the process and allow protocols to receive incentives quickly and efficiently.
A major gripe from protocols was they struggled to get feedback from delegates before the deadline. This left many feeling as though the better-connected protocols had an advantage as they were able to modify their proposals based on feedback to make them more competitive during the vote. Many protocols were willing to make changes to their applications to make them more appealing to the DAO but never received the proper feedback necessary to do so.
The Pilot Program introduces Application Advisors. This will be impartial organizations tasked with providing each applicant with detailed feedback and guidance on how to improve their applications. This ensures each applicant can iterate on their proposal so they can put forward the best possible incentive plan for the council.
STIP Round 1 had strict limitations on how the ARB could be used as incentives. This was done to protect the DAO and prevent misuse of funds. However, the strict rules resulted in the stifling of many innovative incentive designs. Many protocols had interesting designs that used the ARB in ways that increased alignment, improved cost efficiency, or helped to limit the dumping of ARB. However, these designs were not permitted in Round 1 leading to almost all protocols resulting in generic liquidity incentive models.
The Pilot Program provides more flexibility to protocols to create innovative incentive structures. With the addition of the Council and Application Advisors, the Pilot Program does not require the rules to be as stringent. Malicious or inefficient designs will be first filtered out by the Application Advisors and then rejected by the council. Allowing protocols to innovate on incentive distribution mechanisms will allow Arbitrum protocols and community members to get a better idea of which designs work and which don’t work. This will help everyone as we prepare for a longer-term incentives program.
Protocols will have 2 weeks to apply using the Pilot Program application template. Applications will be posted in the Pilot Program section of the Arbitrum forum. Protocols only need to post the initial draft of their application during this period. They will then have 2 additional weeks during the feedback period to edit their applications. The template will be posted to the Forum well before the start of the application period to give protocols time to start their applications early. No late submissions will be accepted.
During the feedback period, the Applications Advisors will provide feedback and guidance on all proposals. Both Application Advisors will provide feedback on all applications on a rolling basis. Protocols will then use this time to edit their proposals according to this feedback before applications lock at the end of the 2 weeks.
StableLab will also read all submissions during this period and highlight any rule violations to allow applicants to edit their submissions to ensure they comply with all program rules.
During this period, the council will complete a rubric for each protocol to decide which protocols will receive ARB. The council will be required to publish these rubrics and provide a brief reasoning for all of their decisions on the forum to create transparency and accountability.
The council must judge applications as they are and cannot accept protocols at lower amounts than their application states. For example, if an application asks for 200,000 ARB the council can not fund them with 100,000 ARB
Selected protocols will receive their requested ARB using bi-weekly Hedgey streams until April 26th. During this time, protocols will be required to provide bi-weekly updates on the progress of their incentives using this template. Protocols will be required to finish their incentives distributions or return any unused funds to the DAO by May 10th.
The council will comprise 5 DAO members. These members should be unbiased and knowledgeable builders or delegates who will collaborate to allocate the 35 Million ARB to protocols. The council does not need to spend the entire 35M should they feel there are not enough quality applications. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO to be used in the Long Term Framework.
The council members will be responsible for creating a rubric that all protocols will be judged against. The council will design this rubric with input from the Application Advisors and will communicate what they are looking for with the Application Advisors to ensure the Application Advisors guide protocols in the right direction. The highest-scoring protocols will be awarded incentives. The council will be responsible for publishing the rubrics as well as a brief explanation for all decisions.
The council will also be responsible for determining when to halt a protocol’s stream should they violate program rules or misuse funds. All reports of violations will be evaluated by the council. It will require 4 out of 5 council members to vote in favor of halting the stream for a stream to be stopped.
Additionally, the council will be responsible for selecting who completes each research bounty. While there is 200,000 ARB allocated for research bounties. This selection will be made via a simple majority by council members and will require them to provide their reasoning for all choices made. The council does not need to spend the full amount should they receive lower budget requests or do not find an appropriate party to fill a bounty.
In the long-term incentives framework, council members will be elected by the DAO. However, as this is a short-term program designed to move quickly, the council in the Pilot Program will be predetermined and ratified by the DAO. This is to avoid an election process significantly delaying the Pilot Program.
After the Council makes its final selection on which protocols get funded, the delegates will have the opportunity to veto any protocol the Council has chosen. This will be done via a snapshot vote to signal to the multisig not to start the stream. If this occurs, the vetoed funds will be returned to the Arbitrum treasury. This aims to keep the council accountable and give delegates the final say in how DAO funds are spent.
Potential Council members are currently being discussed and vetted and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to a vote to allow the DAO to ratify the council.
Should the DAO feel a member or members of the council are not fulfilling their duty they may remove them using a snapshot vote. An emergency Snapshot vote will then be used to elect replacement member(s).
There will be two impartial organizations with research expertise that will serve as Application Advisors. Application Advisors are tasked with providing detailed feedback on all applications. Protocols will be able to use this to edit and improve their application during the review period. Protocols do not have to listen to the advisors but may consult their advisor for help. Application Advisors will schedule public office hours for protocols to meet with them to work on adjusting their applications. These calls will be open to anyone so that all applicants have access to the same advice.
The Application Advisors will also work closely with the council to create the application template and grading rubric. This will ensure the council and advisors are on the same page so they can provide the best feedback to applicants and ensure the council understands the details of the incentive mechanisms the Advisors are helping protocols design.
As this is an experimental addition to the incentives framework, having expert advisors working with protocols will help protocols and the DAO understand what is most helpful from an advisor and allow the DAO to adjust the role for the longer-term framework. This will also help protocols design more innovative incentive distribution mechanisms that can be tested to see how effective they are going into a long-term incentives framework.
Potential Application Advisors are currently being discussed and vetted and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to a vote to allow the DAO to ratify the Application Advisors.
The same STIP-ARB multisig used in Round 1 and the backfund proposal will continue for The Pilot Program. The funds in the multisig belong to the DAO, and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in DAO governance, including delegation.
The STIP-ARB multisig includes two features to ensure the accountability of signers and grantees:
Matt from StableLab will act as the program manager. StableLab will function in a similar capacity as they did for STIP Round 1. They will help coordinate between the multisig, council, Application Advisors, applicants, foundation, and community to ensure the Pilot Program program runs smoothly. StableLab will serve as a neutral party and have no power to decide which protocols receive funding or which streams are halted.
StableLab was responsible for designing this Pilot Program and will continue working on designing a long-term Framework with the help of the incentives working group and the DAO. StableLab will be responsible for publishing a research report on the effectiveness of the Pilot Program and their findings on how it operationally compared to STIP V1.
Should the DAO feel StableLab is not fulfilling their duties as program manager, they may remove them using a snapshot vote. An emergency Snapshot vote will then be used to elect a replacement program manager.
In the Long Term Incentives Framework, this position will be decided by the DAO. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, it will continue using StableLab’s services given they have experience from managing STIP V1 and already have knowledge from designing this process.
As in STIP round 1 and the Backfund proposal, the Pilot Program will use a data for data monitoring and reporting. Their exact responsibilities will be the same as they were for STIP and the backfund and can be seen in the RFP - Abitrum Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP) Data Monitoring and Reporting.
This will be an elected position in the long-term program. Additionally, given the long-term framework will have a much larger scope and will include many separate incentive categories, it will most likely require the DAO to onboard multiple different organizations to handle the long-term framework’s data monitoring and reporting. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, the Data provider will be selected and ratified by the DAO similar to STIP round 1. Potential data providers are currently being discussed and vetted and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to a vote to allow the DAO to ratify.
The Pilot Program proposal will include research bounties to ensure the DAO collects sufficient data and draws meaningful conclusions from STIP, the Backfund, and the LTIP Pilot Program. There will be up to 200,000 ARB available to those who complete bounties.
When this proposal goes live to Tally, it will include many questions the DAO wants answered. Some examples Include:
Researchers will then apply to claim these bounties by providing why they are the best fit to answer the question as well as providing a budget. The council will be responsible for selecting who completes each bounty. This process guarantees the DAO will have multiple teams working on providing meaningful conclusions regarding incentive programs. These conclusions will be essential to allow the DAO to possess all the information necessary to create the best possible long-term incentive framework.
This program is designed to reduce the large burden delegates faced during STIP round 1. While many of their responsibilities are replaced by the Council and Application Advisors, the Arbitrum delegates will still retain the final say in many aspects of this proposal.
Delegates will retain the following powers:
By streaming grant payments, the multisig will be empowered to hold grantees accountable to their proposals by halting fund streaming for any of the following reasons:
In that this proposal aims to be experimental, the multisig is not intended to provide quality control on the design of incentive programs. Rather, they are empowered to halt streaming in the event of negligence or misuse of funds.
This AIP establishes a Long Term Incentives Pilot Program for the DAO to test new incentives designs and answer the necessary questions to ensure we are ready to commit to the long-term program. This Pilot Program will distribute 35M ARB to protocols that have not yet received incentives. The program will run from January 2024 until April 2024.
The Arbitrum DAO has spent the last few months experimenting with incentive programs to attract new users and liquidity to Arbitrum. There is a consensus the DAO will use what we learn from these short-term programs to establish a long-term framework. While STIP V1 brought tons of attention to Arbitrum and has resulted in upticks in protocol metrics, we have learned there were many flaws with the structure of STIP Round 1. This Pilot Program looks to implement new mechanisms to address the issues seen in STIP V1. The DAO will use this Pilot Program as a test run for a long-term framework before committing to a year-long program.
The Pilot Program will operate using a Council, have Application Advisors to ensure protocols receive adequate feedback and assistance, and allow protocols more freedom to create innovative ARB incentive plans. We believe these changes will help remedy many of the pain points seen in Round 1. Running the Pilot Program to test these new features will allow the DAO to compare different program methods before implementing a long-term framework beginning in Q2 2024. This will help ensure we have all the knowledge necessary to implement the most effective long-term incentives program for Arbitrum.
STIP was an experimental program to distribute ARB to protocols to use as incentives for their users. While it was initially intended to have two rounds, the program was substantially more popular than expected, and the entire 50M ARB budget was used in Round 1 as was permissible in the original rules.
This meant no funds remained for Round 2, leading to its cancellation. Many protocols either missed the Round 1 deadline or intentionally waited for Round 2. This left several protocols with no alternative route to apply for ARB incentives. Many STIP Round 1 grantees have seen upticks in their metrics. This Pilot Program would allow protocols that missed out on Round 1 the opportunity to apply to gain these benefits, which will help level the playing field for these protocols. The Pilot Program will replace a round 2 and will be funded with 35M ARB to accommodate the large expected protocol demand we have already seen. This will complete the incentivizing of Arbitrum-based teams to create a holistic competitive edge not against each other but against other chains.
There is a DAO consensus that Arbitrum will need a long-term incentive program in 2024. However, many delegates feel the DAO is moving too quickly and spending too much money on backfund or V2 proposals without yet receiving any of the data on STIP’s effectiveness.
We have learned a lot from STIP and can use what went wrong in STIP and the Backfund to hypothesize what changes would create a better long-term framework. However, we have little evidence to prove these new ideas would be a better solution. DAO members currently don’t have the resources or funds to create a long-term program, nor do we understand what a good long-term program looks like.
This proposal focuses on obtaining this evidence using a committed working stream to guarantee we come away from this program ready to make informed decisions on a long-term framework. The pilot program also allows the DAO to test new aspects of an incentive program such as Application Advisors, Councils, and more flexible incentive distributions before committing long-term.
This will help save the DAO money and time in the long term by preventing the need for more short-term programs before we are ready to commit to the Long-Term Framework
The specifications of the Pilot Program were designed to remedy the 3 largest complaints regarding STIP Round 1. The Pilot Program hopes to be a test run for these additions for the DAO to determine if they should also be included in the long-term framework.
In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal.
To remedy this problem, the Pilot Program will have a 5 person council approved by the DAO responsible for evaluating applications and deciding which protocol will receive ARB. This will ensure all applications are thoughtfully evaluated with only the most deserving receiving incentives. Not only will this help to reduce the burden on delegates, but it will also help expedite the process and allow protocols to receive incentives quickly and efficiently.
A major gripe from protocols was they struggled to get feedback from delegates before the deadline. This left many feeling as though the better-connected protocols had an advantage as they were able to modify their proposals based on feedback to make them more competitive during the vote. Many protocols were willing to make changes to their applications to make them more appealing to the DAO but never received the proper feedback necessary to do so.
The Pilot Program introduces Application Advisors. This will be impartial organizations tasked with providing each applicant with detailed feedback and guidance on how to improve their applications. This ensures each applicant can iterate on their proposal so they can put forward the best possible incentive plan for the council.
STIP Round 1 had strict limitations on how the ARB could be used as incentives. This was done to protect the DAO and prevent misuse of funds. However, the strict rules resulted in the stifling of many innovative incentive designs. Many protocols had interesting designs that used the ARB in ways that increased alignment, improved cost efficiency, or helped to limit the dumping of ARB. However, these designs were not permitted in Round 1 leading to almost all protocols resulting in generic liquidity incentive models.
The Pilot Program provides more flexibility to protocols to create innovative incentive structures. With the addition of the Council and Application Advisors, the Pilot Program does not require the rules to be as stringent. Malicious or inefficient designs will be first filtered out by the Application Advisors and then rejected by the council. Allowing protocols to innovate on incentive distribution mechanisms will allow Arbitrum protocols and community members to get a better idea of which designs work and which don’t work. This will help everyone as we prepare for a longer-term incentives program.
Protocols will have 2 weeks to apply using the Pilot Program application template. Applications will be posted in the Pilot Program section of the Arbitrum forum. Protocols only need to post the initial draft of their application during this period. They will then have 2 additional weeks during the feedback period to edit their applications. The template will be posted to the Forum well before the start of the application period to give protocols time to start their applications early. No late submissions will be accepted.
During the feedback period, the Applications Advisors will provide feedback and guidance on all proposals. Both Application Advisors will provide feedback on all applications on a rolling basis. Protocols will then use this time to edit their proposals according to this feedback before applications lock at the end of the 2 weeks.
StableLab will also read all submissions during this period and highlight any rule violations to allow applicants to edit their submissions to ensure they comply with all program rules.
During this period, the council will complete a rubric for each protocol to decide which protocols will receive ARB. The council will be required to publish these rubrics and provide a brief reasoning for all of their decisions on the forum to create transparency and accountability.
The council must judge applications as they are and cannot accept protocols at lower amounts than their application states. For example, if an application asks for 200,000 ARB the council can not fund them with 100,000 ARB
Selected protocols will receive their requested ARB using bi-weekly Hedgey streams until April 26th. During this time, protocols will be required to provide bi-weekly updates on the progress of their incentives using this template. Protocols will be required to finish their incentives distributions or return any unused funds to the DAO by May 10th.
The council will comprise 5 DAO members. These members should be unbiased and knowledgeable builders or delegates who will collaborate to allocate the 35 Million ARB to protocols. The council does not need to spend the entire 35M should they feel there are not enough quality applications. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO to be used in the Long Term Framework.
The council members will be responsible for creating a rubric that all protocols will be judged against. The council will design this rubric with input from the Application Advisors and will communicate what they are looking for with the Application Advisors to ensure the Application Advisors guide protocols in the right direction. The highest-scoring protocols will be awarded incentives. The council will be responsible for publishing the rubrics as well as a brief explanation for all decisions.
The council will also be responsible for determining when to halt a protocol’s stream should they violate program rules or misuse funds. All reports of violations will be evaluated by the council. It will require 4 out of 5 council members to vote in favor of halting the stream for a stream to be stopped.
Additionally, the council will be responsible for selecting who completes each research bounty. While there is 200,000 ARB allocated for research bounties. This selection will be made via a simple majority by council members and will require them to provide their reasoning for all choices made. The council does not need to spend the full amount should they receive lower budget requests or do not find an appropriate party to fill a bounty.
In the long-term incentives framework, council members will be elected by the DAO. However, as this is a short-term program designed to move quickly, the council in the Pilot Program will be predetermined and ratified by the DAO. This is to avoid an election process significantly delaying the Pilot Program.
After the Council makes its final selection on which protocols get funded, the delegates will have the opportunity to veto any protocol the Council has chosen. This will be done via a snapshot vote to signal to the multisig not to start the stream. If this occurs, the vetoed funds will be returned to the Arbitrum treasury. This aims to keep the council accountable and give delegates the final say in how DAO funds are spent.
Potential Council members are currently being discussed and vetted and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to a vote to allow the DAO to ratify the council.
Should the DAO feel a member or members of the council are not fulfilling their duty they may remove them using a snapshot vote. An emergency Snapshot vote will then be used to elect replacement member(s).
There will be two impartial organizations with research expertise that will serve as Application Advisors. Application Advisors are tasked with providing detailed feedback on all applications. Protocols will be able to use this to edit and improve their application during the review period. Protocols do not have to listen to the advisors but may consult their advisor for help. Application Advisors will schedule public office hours for protocols to meet with them to work on adjusting their applications. These calls will be open to anyone so that all applicants have access to the same advice.
The Application Advisors will also work closely with the council to create the application template and grading rubric. This will ensure the council and advisors are on the same page so they can provide the best feedback to applicants and ensure the council understands the details of the incentive mechanisms the Advisors are helping protocols design.
As this is an experimental addition to the incentives framework, having expert advisors working with protocols will help protocols and the DAO understand what is most helpful from an advisor and allow the DAO to adjust the role for the longer-term framework. This will also help protocols design more innovative incentive distribution mechanisms that can be tested to see how effective they are going into a long-term incentives framework.
Potential Application Advisors are currently being discussed and vetted and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to a vote to allow the DAO to ratify the Application Advisors.
The same STIP-ARB multisig used in Round 1 and the backfund proposal will continue for The Pilot Program. The funds in the multisig belong to the DAO, and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in DAO governance, including delegation.
The STIP-ARB multisig includes two features to ensure the accountability of signers and grantees:
Matt from StableLab will act as the program manager. StableLab will function in a similar capacity as they did for STIP Round 1. They will help coordinate between the multisig, council, Application Advisors, applicants, foundation, and community to ensure the Pilot Program program runs smoothly. StableLab will serve as a neutral party and have no power to decide which protocols receive funding or which streams are halted.
StableLab was responsible for designing this Pilot Program and will continue working on designing a long-term Framework with the help of the incentives working group and the DAO. StableLab will be responsible for publishing a research report on the effectiveness of the Pilot Program and their findings on how it operationally compared to STIP V1.
Should the DAO feel StableLab is not fulfilling their duties as program manager, they may remove them using a snapshot vote. An emergency Snapshot vote will then be used to elect a replacement program manager.
In the Long Term Incentives Framework, this position will be decided by the DAO. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, it will continue using StableLab’s services given they have experience from managing STIP V1 and already have knowledge from designing this process.
As in STIP round 1 and the Backfund proposal, the Pilot Program will use a data for data monitoring and reporting. Their exact responsibilities will be the same as they were for STIP and the backfund and can be seen in the RFP - Abitrum Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP) Data Monitoring and Reporting.
This will be an elected position in the long-term program. Additionally, given the long-term framework will have a much larger scope and will include many separate incentive categories, it will most likely require the DAO to onboard multiple different organizations to handle the long-term framework’s data monitoring and reporting. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, the Data provider will be selected and ratified by the DAO similar to STIP round 1. Potential data providers are currently being discussed and vetted and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to a vote to allow the DAO to ratify.
The Pilot Program proposal will include research bounties to ensure the DAO collects sufficient data and draws meaningful conclusions from STIP, the Backfund, and the LTIP Pilot Program. There will be up to 200,000 ARB available to those who complete bounties.
When this proposal goes live to Tally, it will include many questions the DAO wants answered. Some examples Include:
Researchers will then apply to claim these bounties by providing why they are the best fit to answer the question as well as providing a budget. The council will be responsible for selecting who completes each bounty. This process guarantees the DAO will have multiple teams working on providing meaningful conclusions regarding incentive programs. These conclusions will be essential to allow the DAO to possess all the information necessary to create the best possible long-term incentive framework.
This program is designed to reduce the large burden delegates faced during STIP round 1. While many of their responsibilities are replaced by the Council and Application Advisors, the Arbitrum delegates will still retain the final say in many aspects of this proposal.
Delegates will retain the following powers:
By streaming grant payments, the multisig will be empowered to hold grantees accountable to their proposals by halting fund streaming for any of the following reasons:
In that this proposal aims to be experimental, the multisig is not intended to provide quality control on the design of incentive programs. Rather, they are empowered to halt streaming in the event of negligence or misuse of funds.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/55?u=krst
It is good we are trying out these initiatives now. DAOStewards is in total support
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-2: EventHorizon.vote/vote
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/55?u=krst
It is good we are trying out these initiatives now. DAOStewards is in total support
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-2: EventHorizon.vote/vote
I agree with the process outlined in the proposal and think the coordinators involved have the skills and experience to execute well
As stated in our snapshot vote, we believe the program's administrative costs are too high - especially considering the length of its duration.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/49?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/47?u=princetonblockchain
A lot of thought went into this proposal and I really like the outcome.
As the proposal Author we support the Pilot Program but will abstain to avoid any conflict of interest
I'm on the fence because I wanted to see more than a 3/5 multisig...
I'm voting FOR the Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program because it's a strategic move to refine Arbitrum's incentive strategies. By allocating 45M ARB to protocols not previously funded, this trial aims to correct past flaws and lay groundwork for a sustainable, long-term framework. It'll help us making informed decisions to foster Arbitrum's growth.
We support the development of support for projects on Arbitrum and attracting new users and liquidity. We are glad that our comments at the forum were taken into account in this proposal.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/39?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/32?u=coinflip
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/28?u=karelvuong
https://twitter.com/CarlZielinski/status/1747223754227458083
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/34?u=krst
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/29?u=cattin
While I believe this is a strong initiative for the DAO, I generally am leaning towards more conservative budgets so we can experiment more
multisig salary is so expensive
It's too simple, and the details need to be worked out.
I love the approach of a heavy filter applied before it goes to a DAO wide vote. Very middle road and manageable. Well done!
I agree with the process outlined in the proposal and think the coordinators involved have the skills and experience to execute well
As stated in our snapshot vote, we believe the program's administrative costs are too high - especially considering the length of its duration.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/49?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/47?u=princetonblockchain
A lot of thought went into this proposal and I really like the outcome.
As the proposal Author we support the Pilot Program but will abstain to avoid any conflict of interest
I'm on the fence because I wanted to see more than a 3/5 multisig...
I'm voting FOR the Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program because it's a strategic move to refine Arbitrum's incentive strategies. By allocating 45M ARB to protocols not previously funded, this trial aims to correct past flaws and lay groundwork for a sustainable, long-term framework. It'll help us making informed decisions to foster Arbitrum's growth.
We support the development of support for projects on Arbitrum and attracting new users and liquidity. We are glad that our comments at the forum were taken into account in this proposal.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/39?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/32?u=coinflip
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/28?u=karelvuong
https://twitter.com/CarlZielinski/status/1747223754227458083
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/34?u=krst
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/29?u=cattin
While I believe this is a strong initiative for the DAO, I generally am leaning towards more conservative budgets so we can experiment more
multisig salary is so expensive
It's too simple, and the details need to be worked out.
I love the approach of a heavy filter applied before it goes to a DAO wide vote. Very middle road and manageable. Well done!
any update on when it will be open for projects to apply? @Matt_StableLab
any update on when it will be open for projects to apply? @Matt_StableLab
In STIP Round 1 we saw many community members go above and beyond by providing valuable contributions without any funding. 100,000 ARB will be allocated for retroactive funding to community members who add valuable contributions during the Pilot Program. Earmarking these funds upfront lets people know there will be retro funding which will encourage community members to contribute. This section is intentionally vague to encourage all kinds of community contributions. The DAO will have the final say in how these funds will be used.
The exact methods used to distribute the funds will be selected by the DAO. The council will create a list of possible ways to retroactively distribute funds to those who have contributed to the Pilot Program. The DAO will then vote on which retroactive method(s) should be used. The DAO will also decide on who these retroactive payments will go to.
Created an issue https://github.com/OpenDataforWeb3/DataGrantsforARB/issues/19, please provide feedback on whether you believe the analysis is necessary.
Also provided a summary on https://dspyt.com/Long-Term-Incentives-Pilot-Program
In STIP Round 1 we saw many community members go above and beyond by providing valuable contributions without any funding. 100,000 ARB will be allocated for retroactive funding to community members who add valuable contributions during the Pilot Program. Earmarking these funds upfront lets people know there will be retro funding which will encourage community members to contribute. This section is intentionally vague to encourage all kinds of community contributions. The DAO will have the final say in how these funds will be used.
The exact methods used to distribute the funds will be selected by the DAO. The council will create a list of possible ways to retroactively distribute funds to those who have contributed to the Pilot Program. The DAO will then vote on which retroactive method(s) should be used. The DAO will also decide on who these retroactive payments will go to.
Created an issue https://github.com/OpenDataforWeb3/DataGrantsforARB/issues/19, please provide feedback on whether you believe the analysis is necessary.
Also provided a summary on https://dspyt.com/Long-Term-Incentives-Pilot-Program
We completely agree with your sentiment and have done our best to take a first cut at what we believe could be a way for grant programs to be tracked and compared on an even playing field. More info here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/serious-people-proposed-kpis-for-arbitrum-grant-programs/20416
Great proposl, some areas also discussed that are missing might be resolved with adding 3 roles specfically in the areas of operations, checks and balances and keeping delegates up to date. I think to have it decided by the council might not be the best as the roles presented can act as implementers.
Project Scoping Squad Role: The project scoping squad is responsible for defining the scope of the Long Term Incentives Pilot Program and ensuring that all aspects of the program are well-defined.
Great proposl, some areas also discussed that are missing might be resolved with adding 3 roles specfically in the areas of operations, checks and balances and keeping delegates up to date. I think to have it decided by the council might not be the best as the roles presented can act as implementers.
Project Scoping Squad Role: The project scoping squad is responsible for defining the scope of the Long Term Incentives Pilot Program and ensuring that all aspects of the program are well-defined.
What area does it currently solve missing from the proposal Transparency: The project scoping squad can ensure that transparency mechanisms are well-defined in the program scope. They can specify that all decisions and discussions related to applications, council decisions, and program progress will be made publicly available, promoting transparency.
Council Assessment Administrators: Role: The council assessment administrator is responsible for tracking the work of the council and communicating their actions to delegates and the community.
What area does it currently solve missing from the proposal
Content Designers Role: Content designers are responsible for creating process flows, documentation, and communication materials to streamline program operations and ensure checks and balances.
Some areas also discussed that seem to be missing in the current proposal form and also something worth noting for future proposals or intitives as wel.
Here are some potential issues in the proposal to think about durng the implementation phase or even before slection process.
Hi, everyone! It’s Paul from OpenBlock Labs.
Thank you to Matt and the entire Liquidity Incentive WG for their collaborative efforts in orchestrating this initiative.
Hi, everyone! It’s Paul from OpenBlock Labs.
Thank you to Matt and the entire Liquidity Incentive WG for their collaborative efforts in orchestrating this initiative.
As many of you know, OpenBlock has been engaged in conducting incentive efficacy analysis for the STIP + Backfund. It has been wonderful to work with over 56 projects across both programs. Throughout this process, our team has developed various frameworks, encompassing tasks such as onboarding projects, auditing existing queries, identifying KPIs for various sectors, building granular insights at the protocol level, contributing to open-source data, analyzing overall trends, presenting results in an easily digestible format, and much more. We've provided bi-weekly updates to the DAO and are on track to deliver a comprehensive final report by the April 2024 deadline. In each update, we've actively sought feedback from dozens of founders and community members. It's great to see numerous projects incorporating our developments to monitor and grow their KPIs, along with a large community involvement in monitoring the use of funds.
Inevitably, these insights will play a pivotal role in optimizing the long-term incentive pilot outlined in this proposal, and we're enthusiastic about the prospect of extending our role as a data provider for this initiative.
I look forward to seeing the continued discussion and engaging with the community.
We completely agree with your sentiment and have done our best to take a first cut at what we believe could be a way for grant programs to be tracked and compared on an even playing field. More info here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/serious-people-proposed-kpis-for-arbitrum-grant-programs/20416
Great proposl, some areas also discussed that are missing might be resolved with adding 3 roles specfically in the areas of operations, checks and balances and keeping delegates up to date. I think to have it decided by the council might not be the best as the roles presented can act as implementers.
Project Scoping Squad Role: The project scoping squad is responsible for defining the scope of the Long Term Incentives Pilot Program and ensuring that all aspects of the program are well-defined.
Great proposl, some areas also discussed that are missing might be resolved with adding 3 roles specfically in the areas of operations, checks and balances and keeping delegates up to date. I think to have it decided by the council might not be the best as the roles presented can act as implementers.
Project Scoping Squad Role: The project scoping squad is responsible for defining the scope of the Long Term Incentives Pilot Program and ensuring that all aspects of the program are well-defined.
What area does it currently solve missing from the proposal Transparency: The project scoping squad can ensure that transparency mechanisms are well-defined in the program scope. They can specify that all decisions and discussions related to applications, council decisions, and program progress will be made publicly available, promoting transparency.
Council Assessment Administrators: Role: The council assessment administrator is responsible for tracking the work of the council and communicating their actions to delegates and the community.
What area does it currently solve missing from the proposal
Content Designers Role: Content designers are responsible for creating process flows, documentation, and communication materials to streamline program operations and ensure checks and balances.
Some areas also discussed that seem to be missing in the current proposal form and also something worth noting for future proposals or intitives as wel.
Here are some potential issues in the proposal to think about durng the implementation phase or even before slection process.
Hi, everyone! It’s Paul from OpenBlock Labs.
Thank you to Matt and the entire Liquidity Incentive WG for their collaborative efforts in orchestrating this initiative.
Hi, everyone! It’s Paul from OpenBlock Labs.
Thank you to Matt and the entire Liquidity Incentive WG for their collaborative efforts in orchestrating this initiative.
As many of you know, OpenBlock has been engaged in conducting incentive efficacy analysis for the STIP + Backfund. It has been wonderful to work with over 56 projects across both programs. Throughout this process, our team has developed various frameworks, encompassing tasks such as onboarding projects, auditing existing queries, identifying KPIs for various sectors, building granular insights at the protocol level, contributing to open-source data, analyzing overall trends, presenting results in an easily digestible format, and much more. We've provided bi-weekly updates to the DAO and are on track to deliver a comprehensive final report by the April 2024 deadline. In each update, we've actively sought feedback from dozens of founders and community members. It's great to see numerous projects incorporating our developments to monitor and grow their KPIs, along with a large community involvement in monitoring the use of funds.
Inevitably, these insights will play a pivotal role in optimizing the long-term incentive pilot outlined in this proposal, and we're enthusiastic about the prospect of extending our role as a data provider for this initiative.
I look forward to seeing the continued discussion and engaging with the community.
This is a great start to a LTIP for protocol-funded incentives and I definitely support StableLab’s offer to run a pilot program as a proof-of-concept prior to requesting a larger administrative budget. It's great to see @Matt_StableLab independently drive forward a long-term program for protocol grants after great execution on STIP.
A few considerations prior to the publication of a snapshot might be:
This is a great start to a LTIP for protocol-funded incentives and I definitely support StableLab’s offer to run a pilot program as a proof-of-concept prior to requesting a larger administrative budget. It's great to see @Matt_StableLab independently drive forward a long-term program for protocol grants after great execution on STIP.
A few considerations prior to the publication of a snapshot might be:
Adding preliminary ideas of a rubric would instill confidence of the Council’s capability. Incentives are complicated, and the team should have clear goals/KPIs to work back from to establish their decision rubric.
The Application Advisors are a great addition, but I’d define specific a purpose (or even KPI’s) for the role to hammer home the expertise and quality required. In my mind, this role would serve two purposes:
Ideally, I’d expect the quality of this role to be in the vein of a quant/analyst from a Gauntlet, OpenBlock, SixDegrees, etc.
Selected protocols will receive their requested ARB using bi-weekly Hedgey streams until April 26th. During this time, protocols will be required to provide bi-weekly updates on the progress of their incentives using this template . Protocols will be required to finish their incentives distributions or return any unused funds to the DAO by May 10th.
A key issue with STIP was that both the program’s size and streaming design limited the ability for milestone-based applications.
For example, multiple proposals (I think Vertex/Radiant/GMX?) had offered to do iterative/performance based incentives, where funding for consecutive disbursements increased or decreased (10%, 15%, etc.) depending on performance. With stronger admin powers, it’d be great to accommodate these structures.
This might increase the multisig workload, but considering this is a trial program, additional compensation for extra admin would be justified.
As in STIP round 1 and the Backfund proposal, the Pilot Program will use a data for data monitoring and reporting. Their exact responsibilities will be the same as they were for STIP and the backfund and can be seen in the RFP - Abitrum Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP) Data Monitoring and Reporting .
There’s a subtle difference in scope for a data provider vs. data analysis. To realize the vision for the research bounties (which I love), the DAO requires open data for analysts to work with. The way the Data Provider is articulated here doesn’t quite make that clear, and it seems to be asking more for a provider build everything turnkey (data pipeline, collection, and analysis) but potentially gatekeep the data itself as IP/private data pipelines.
I’m not sure if I’m articulating this as I’m not a data science guru, but it’d be better to build open-source data here. We should fund a pipeline for public data availability via Dune spells, or an open-data repo. Maybe have Carl Cervone or the Open Data folks brainstorm how to build a pipeline on each incentive program that’s available/query-able the full community?
@Bobbay brings up a good idea around having the council create their preferred list and having the delegates have final say. Not sure if that doesn’t put the same headache back on the delegates, but perhaps if there’s a thorough review process w/ tons of notes on every project by the delegate committee + a recommended list of qualified applicants it could make the process more fluid.
If delegates want a final say an optimistic funding route might lower the pain for delegates, while ensuring oversight. I think each app going to a vote will be burdensome and prob adds unnecessary pain.
Might look something like: Program Proposal —> Multisig —> Council Approves Grants —> Multisig Approves Transactions —> One-Week Grace Period where delegates can veto a grant w/ XX Voting Power —> Grants are streamed.
Does that make sense?
Great proposal @Matt_StableLab.
The problems / solutions you've outlined from STIP 1 are pretty spot on. I like the shift towards having a group of dedicated reviewers / advisors more ownership over the review process.
Great proposal @Matt_StableLab.
The problems / solutions you've outlined from STIP 1 are pretty spot on. I like the shift towards having a group of dedicated reviewers / advisors more ownership over the review process.
I see what @thedevanshmehta is saying around his concerns on 5 people being the final say on how 35m ARB grants are distributed, but think you've mentioned in some of the commentary already that this is something meant to be discussed during this part of the process.
My first question around these council members / advisors would be
Other than that, I would wonder if 5 is the right number. Would 10 or 12 allow for a more diverse group of contributors?
@Bobbay brings up a good idea around having the council create their preferred list and having the delegates have final say. Not sure if that doesn't put the same headache back on the delegates, but perhaps if there's a thorough review process w/ tons of notes on every project by the delegate committee + a recommended list of qualified applicants it could make the process more fluid.
Cool stuff- looking forward to seeing how it develops
Succesful results from a development grant from the DAO should be a major signal FOR incentive eligibility, not a deterrent. If the DAO is giving an impression that development support is antagonistic to incentive support, that is likely a signal something is seriously wrong with the culture.
IMHO the idea of fairness/equality in outcome is what is toxic. The DAO should prob be more worried about wasting tokens on low quality projects, forks, etc. in the name of “equality”, rather than overfunding great ones.
Succesful results from a development grant from the DAO should be a major signal FOR incentive eligibility, not a deterrent. If the DAO is giving an impression that development support is antagonistic to incentive support, that is likely a signal something is seriously wrong with the culture.
IMHO the idea of fairness/equality in outcome is what is toxic. The DAO should prob be more worried about wasting tokens on low quality projects, forks, etc. in the name of “equality”, rather than overfunding great ones.
Great projects with innovative solutions to market needs should 100% be supported and rewarded. Not punished.
This is a great start to a LTIP for protocol-funded incentives and I definitely support StableLab’s offer to run a pilot program as a proof-of-concept prior to requesting a larger administrative budget. It's great to see @Matt_StableLab independently drive forward a long-term program for protocol grants after great execution on STIP.
A few considerations prior to the publication of a snapshot might be:
This is a great start to a LTIP for protocol-funded incentives and I definitely support StableLab’s offer to run a pilot program as a proof-of-concept prior to requesting a larger administrative budget. It's great to see @Matt_StableLab independently drive forward a long-term program for protocol grants after great execution on STIP.
A few considerations prior to the publication of a snapshot might be:
Adding preliminary ideas of a rubric would instill confidence of the Council’s capability. Incentives are complicated, and the team should have clear goals/KPIs to work back from to establish their decision rubric.
The Application Advisors are a great addition, but I’d define specific a purpose (or even KPI’s) for the role to hammer home the expertise and quality required. In my mind, this role would serve two purposes:
Ideally, I’d expect the quality of this role to be in the vein of a quant/analyst from a Gauntlet, OpenBlock, SixDegrees, etc.
Selected protocols will receive their requested ARB using bi-weekly Hedgey streams until April 26th. During this time, protocols will be required to provide bi-weekly updates on the progress of their incentives using this template . Protocols will be required to finish their incentives distributions or return any unused funds to the DAO by May 10th.
A key issue with STIP was that both the program’s size and streaming design limited the ability for milestone-based applications.
For example, multiple proposals (I think Vertex/Radiant/GMX?) had offered to do iterative/performance based incentives, where funding for consecutive disbursements increased or decreased (10%, 15%, etc.) depending on performance. With stronger admin powers, it’d be great to accommodate these structures.
This might increase the multisig workload, but considering this is a trial program, additional compensation for extra admin would be justified.
As in STIP round 1 and the Backfund proposal, the Pilot Program will use a data for data monitoring and reporting. Their exact responsibilities will be the same as they were for STIP and the backfund and can be seen in the RFP - Abitrum Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP) Data Monitoring and Reporting .
There’s a subtle difference in scope for a data provider vs. data analysis. To realize the vision for the research bounties (which I love), the DAO requires open data for analysts to work with. The way the Data Provider is articulated here doesn’t quite make that clear, and it seems to be asking more for a provider build everything turnkey (data pipeline, collection, and analysis) but potentially gatekeep the data itself as IP/private data pipelines.
I’m not sure if I’m articulating this as I’m not a data science guru, but it’d be better to build open-source data here. We should fund a pipeline for public data availability via Dune spells, or an open-data repo. Maybe have Carl Cervone or the Open Data folks brainstorm how to build a pipeline on each incentive program that’s available/query-able the full community?
@Bobbay brings up a good idea around having the council create their preferred list and having the delegates have final say. Not sure if that doesn’t put the same headache back on the delegates, but perhaps if there’s a thorough review process w/ tons of notes on every project by the delegate committee + a recommended list of qualified applicants it could make the process more fluid.
If delegates want a final say an optimistic funding route might lower the pain for delegates, while ensuring oversight. I think each app going to a vote will be burdensome and prob adds unnecessary pain.
Might look something like: Program Proposal —> Multisig —> Council Approves Grants —> Multisig Approves Transactions —> One-Week Grace Period where delegates can veto a grant w/ XX Voting Power —> Grants are streamed.
Does that make sense?
Great proposal @Matt_StableLab.
The problems / solutions you've outlined from STIP 1 are pretty spot on. I like the shift towards having a group of dedicated reviewers / advisors more ownership over the review process.
Great proposal @Matt_StableLab.
The problems / solutions you've outlined from STIP 1 are pretty spot on. I like the shift towards having a group of dedicated reviewers / advisors more ownership over the review process.
I see what @thedevanshmehta is saying around his concerns on 5 people being the final say on how 35m ARB grants are distributed, but think you've mentioned in some of the commentary already that this is something meant to be discussed during this part of the process.
My first question around these council members / advisors would be
Other than that, I would wonder if 5 is the right number. Would 10 or 12 allow for a more diverse group of contributors?
@Bobbay brings up a good idea around having the council create their preferred list and having the delegates have final say. Not sure if that doesn't put the same headache back on the delegates, but perhaps if there's a thorough review process w/ tons of notes on every project by the delegate committee + a recommended list of qualified applicants it could make the process more fluid.
Cool stuff- looking forward to seeing how it develops
Succesful results from a development grant from the DAO should be a major signal FOR incentive eligibility, not a deterrent. If the DAO is giving an impression that development support is antagonistic to incentive support, that is likely a signal something is seriously wrong with the culture.
IMHO the idea of fairness/equality in outcome is what is toxic. The DAO should prob be more worried about wasting tokens on low quality projects, forks, etc. in the name of “equality”, rather than overfunding great ones.
Succesful results from a development grant from the DAO should be a major signal FOR incentive eligibility, not a deterrent. If the DAO is giving an impression that development support is antagonistic to incentive support, that is likely a signal something is seriously wrong with the culture.
IMHO the idea of fairness/equality in outcome is what is toxic. The DAO should prob be more worried about wasting tokens on low quality projects, forks, etc. in the name of “equality”, rather than overfunding great ones.
Great projects with innovative solutions to market needs should 100% be supported and rewarded. Not punished.
After carefully reviewing the LTIPP applications and the Council's feedback, I've decided to vote in favor of all the proposals currently up for a vote, with the exception of the Bunni proposal. As a contributor to the Bunni project, I've abstained from voting on their application to avoid any potential conflict of interest.
To make an informed decision, I took a close look at the Council's Feedback for each application. When there were differing opinions among the Council members, like in the case of 3/5 vote scenarios, I made sure to examine the applications in more detail. This extra scrutiny helped me gain a clearer picture of the projects and how they could benefit the Arbitrum ecosystem. In the end, I found that my views were in line with the Council's overall recommendations.
After carefully reviewing the LTIPP applications and the Council's feedback, I've decided to vote in favor of all the proposals currently up for a vote, with the exception of the Bunni proposal. As a contributor to the Bunni project, I've abstained from voting on their application to avoid any potential conflict of interest.
To make an informed decision, I took a close look at the Council's Feedback for each application. When there were differing opinions among the Council members, like in the case of 3/5 vote scenarios, I made sure to examine the applications in more detail. This extra scrutiny helped me gain a clearer picture of the projects and how they could benefit the Arbitrum ecosystem. In the end, I found that my views were in line with the Council's overall recommendations.
The Arbitrum ecosystem has been growing at an impressive pace, and I believe the LTIPP programs play a crucial role in maintaining this momentum. The applications demonstrate a deep understanding of the ecosystem's needs and propose innovative solutions to facilitate further growth.
I'm particularly impressed by the teams behind these proposals. They've shown adaptability, attention to detail, and a willingness to iterate based on feedback. These qualities are essential for the successful execution of the LTIPP programs.
Considering the total ARB requested is within the approved budget, I firmly believe that supporting these applications is a step in the right direction for the continued growth and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
In order to inform our decision for the LTIPP vote, we carefully reviewed the Council’s Feedback on all the applications, and turned to the applications themselves when there was conflicting feedback (e.g. on 3/5 votes). After reviewing everything, we found ourselves not having any objections with the Council’s recommendation.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
In order to inform our decision for the LTIPP vote, we carefully reviewed the Council’s Feedback on all the applications, and turned to the applications themselves when there was conflicting feedback (e.g. on 3/5 votes). After reviewing everything, we found ourselves not having any objections with the Council’s recommendation.
All the applications that are currently up for a vote on Snapshot are the outcome of the LTIPP process, and since the sum of the amount of ARB requested is within the available budget, we’ll be following the Council’s recommendations and voting in favor of all the applications.
Hello @Matt_StableLab ,
Sorry to bug you.
I wanted to know the details about Research bounties and Retroactive Community Funding.
For Retroactive Community Funding, I wanted to know what kind of contributions and how meaningful we can contribute for LTIPP to be eligible for this funding.
Hello @Matt_StableLab ,
Sorry to bug you.
I wanted to know the details about Research bounties and Retroactive Community Funding.
For Retroactive Community Funding, I wanted to know what kind of contributions and how meaningful we can contribute for LTIPP to be eligible for this funding.
And for Research bounties, I wanted to know where we can find the details about Research bounties and how we can apply for the same.
Can you please help me out with the details regarding the same?
Thank you in advance.
Congratulations to all the protocols that passed the LTIPP Council Recommended snapshot votes! I will be contacting you all shortly to help facilitate the start of the compliance period.
We know there have been many questions regarding the process for LTIPP applicants who did not make it to a Council Recommended snapshot vote. The council, advisors, and I have been discussing exactly how to handle this process. We will be releasing more information and guidelines tomorrow on how these applicants can go about being included in the program as well as our plans for future incentive programs. Stay tuned!
L2BEAT has been actively involved in the discussion around both STIP and LTIP/LTIPP programs. While we believe these initiatives to be imperfect, we agree with the arguments that in this case we need to experiment on a scale and with a significant amount to better understand the potential for such programs in the future.
Therefore, following our previous signal of support for this program, we are voting FOR it in the on-chain vote.
The Savvy DeFi DAO’s Arbitrum Council has decisively voted FOR this proposal.
We have been following this proposal for several months, and we value the detailed analysis from previous experiments to iterate and continue incentivizing protocols within the ecosystem to facilitate the growth of Arbitrum.
The Savvy DeFi DAO’s Arbitrum Council has decisively voted FOR this proposal.
We have been following this proposal for several months, and we value the detailed analysis from previous experiments to iterate and continue incentivizing protocols within the ecosystem to facilitate the growth of Arbitrum.
Moreover, we believe that the team behind it possesses all the necessary tools to execute this program with meticulous attention to detail. Above all, their adaptability to take feedback, iterate, and drive continuous improvement for this project.
The Savvy DeFi DAO’s Arbitrum Council has decisively voted FOR this proposal.
We have been following this proposal for several months, and we value the detailed analysis from previous experiments to iterate and continue incentivizing protocols within the ecosystem to facilitate the growth of Arbitrum.
The Savvy DeFi DAO’s Arbitrum Council has decisively voted FOR this proposal.
We have been following this proposal for several months, and we value the detailed analysis from previous experiments to iterate and continue incentivizing protocols within the ecosystem to facilitate the growth of Arbitrum.
Moreover, we believe that the team behind it possesses all the necessary tools to execute this program with meticulous attention to detail. Above all, their adaptability to take feedback, iterate, and drive continuous improvement for this project.
I want to share this idea here because it builds on this conversation.
The ThankARB governance framework is attempting to set standards for how we assign the deciders at each level of funding throughout a contributors pathway.
I want to share this idea here because it builds on this conversation.
The ThankARB governance framework is attempting to set standards for how we assign the deciders at each level of funding throughout a contributors pathway.
It is easy to see that different "categories" of grant funding have different pathways to success for those who need them. Fill in the blanks here for each category to say how do we go from a first grant to scale? Who makes the decision to move forward at each level? What do we offer at each level?
To learn more about these categories, check out this chart:
Echoing my sentiment from the Snapshot vote, I will be voting "For" this on Tally.
I will add that since the Snapshot vote I am very pleased to see delegate feedback addressed in the Tally vote. I look forward to see how this next iteration of the grants program looks and am confident in those who were elected to the Council / Advisor roles to do a great job!
Vela Exchange has voted FOR regarding this proposal.
Many folks have been waiting for a round 2 during the STIP, and assumed there would be funding left over for their proposals
The addition of councils and other new mechanics enriches the overall experiment of the incentives programming
Our team voted FOR this proposal. We support the development of support for projects on Arbitrum and attracting new users and liquidity. We are glad that our comments at the forum were taken into account in this proposal.
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting in favor of the LTIPP on Tally.
Although we didn't comment on the forums for the Snapshot vote, we've been very supportive of the LTIPP on Twitter, and our reasoning hasn't changed. The LTIPP builds on what we've learned from the STIP and addresses many of the challenges we faced. We hope that the LTIPP will help the DAO establish continuous support for the Arbitrum ecosystem moving forward!
Hello everyone,
We (Lampros Labs DAO) have created a live voting dashboard for LTIPP to track the voting of all 77 protocols in real-time.
This dashboard provides info about all the application's snapshot voting links, forum proposal application links, asks and live voting statuses for each proposal, all in one accessible dashboard.
Hello everyone,
We (Lampros Labs DAO) have created a live voting dashboard for LTIPP to track the voting of all 77 protocols in real-time.
This dashboard provides info about all the application's snapshot voting links, forum proposal application links, asks and live voting statuses for each proposal, all in one accessible dashboard.
Delegates can personalize the dashboard for them by creating a copy of the sheet, allowing them to update the status of voted proposals in the last column of the dashboard and see dynamic changes in cell background colours for the first four columns to track their own votes. (P.S. - Please note that while personal copies enable personalization, the sheet will not be updated for personal copies, the main public link remains active and is updated every 5 minutes for all community members.)
I would love to receive feedback, suggestions or any changes you would like to look into this sheet.
This sheet was completely inspired by the Voting Dashboard created by Inspex for STIP.
And lastly thanks to Applicant advisors and Council members for working tirelessly for the past few weeks to bring the best applications up for voting.
Check out the dashboard from the below link and do share your feedback for the dashboard.
Dashboard link - https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gBzO34v_YRQnR9ABTXjtTHMbqDylDGa54DT7LPekuqI/edit?usp=sharing.
After carefully reviewing the LTIPP applications and the Council's feedback, I've decided to vote in favor of all the proposals currently up for a vote, with the exception of the Bunni proposal. As a contributor to the Bunni project, I've abstained from voting on their application to avoid any potential conflict of interest.
To make an informed decision, I took a close look at the Council's Feedback for each application. When there were differing opinions among the Council members, like in the case of 3/5 vote scenarios, I made sure to examine the applications in more detail. This extra scrutiny helped me gain a clearer picture of the projects and how they could benefit the Arbitrum ecosystem. In the end, I found that my views were in line with the Council's overall recommendations.
After carefully reviewing the LTIPP applications and the Council's feedback, I've decided to vote in favor of all the proposals currently up for a vote, with the exception of the Bunni proposal. As a contributor to the Bunni project, I've abstained from voting on their application to avoid any potential conflict of interest.
To make an informed decision, I took a close look at the Council's Feedback for each application. When there were differing opinions among the Council members, like in the case of 3/5 vote scenarios, I made sure to examine the applications in more detail. This extra scrutiny helped me gain a clearer picture of the projects and how they could benefit the Arbitrum ecosystem. In the end, I found that my views were in line with the Council's overall recommendations.
The Arbitrum ecosystem has been growing at an impressive pace, and I believe the LTIPP programs play a crucial role in maintaining this momentum. The applications demonstrate a deep understanding of the ecosystem's needs and propose innovative solutions to facilitate further growth.
I'm particularly impressed by the teams behind these proposals. They've shown adaptability, attention to detail, and a willingness to iterate based on feedback. These qualities are essential for the successful execution of the LTIPP programs.
Considering the total ARB requested is within the approved budget, I firmly believe that supporting these applications is a step in the right direction for the continued growth and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
In order to inform our decision for the LTIPP vote, we carefully reviewed the Council’s Feedback on all the applications, and turned to the applications themselves when there was conflicting feedback (e.g. on 3/5 votes). After reviewing everything, we found ourselves not having any objections with the Council’s recommendation.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
In order to inform our decision for the LTIPP vote, we carefully reviewed the Council’s Feedback on all the applications, and turned to the applications themselves when there was conflicting feedback (e.g. on 3/5 votes). After reviewing everything, we found ourselves not having any objections with the Council’s recommendation.
All the applications that are currently up for a vote on Snapshot are the outcome of the LTIPP process, and since the sum of the amount of ARB requested is within the available budget, we’ll be following the Council’s recommendations and voting in favor of all the applications.
Hello @Matt_StableLab ,
Sorry to bug you.
I wanted to know the details about Research bounties and Retroactive Community Funding.
For Retroactive Community Funding, I wanted to know what kind of contributions and how meaningful we can contribute for LTIPP to be eligible for this funding.
Hello @Matt_StableLab ,
Sorry to bug you.
I wanted to know the details about Research bounties and Retroactive Community Funding.
For Retroactive Community Funding, I wanted to know what kind of contributions and how meaningful we can contribute for LTIPP to be eligible for this funding.
And for Research bounties, I wanted to know where we can find the details about Research bounties and how we can apply for the same.
Can you please help me out with the details regarding the same?
Thank you in advance.
Congratulations to all the protocols that passed the LTIPP Council Recommended snapshot votes! I will be contacting you all shortly to help facilitate the start of the compliance period.
We know there have been many questions regarding the process for LTIPP applicants who did not make it to a Council Recommended snapshot vote. The council, advisors, and I have been discussing exactly how to handle this process. We will be releasing more information and guidelines tomorrow on how these applicants can go about being included in the program as well as our plans for future incentive programs. Stay tuned!
L2BEAT has been actively involved in the discussion around both STIP and LTIP/LTIPP programs. While we believe these initiatives to be imperfect, we agree with the arguments that in this case we need to experiment on a scale and with a significant amount to better understand the potential for such programs in the future.
Therefore, following our previous signal of support for this program, we are voting FOR it in the on-chain vote.
The Savvy DeFi DAO’s Arbitrum Council has decisively voted FOR this proposal.
We have been following this proposal for several months, and we value the detailed analysis from previous experiments to iterate and continue incentivizing protocols within the ecosystem to facilitate the growth of Arbitrum.
The Savvy DeFi DAO’s Arbitrum Council has decisively voted FOR this proposal.
We have been following this proposal for several months, and we value the detailed analysis from previous experiments to iterate and continue incentivizing protocols within the ecosystem to facilitate the growth of Arbitrum.
Moreover, we believe that the team behind it possesses all the necessary tools to execute this program with meticulous attention to detail. Above all, their adaptability to take feedback, iterate, and drive continuous improvement for this project.
The Savvy DeFi DAO’s Arbitrum Council has decisively voted FOR this proposal.
We have been following this proposal for several months, and we value the detailed analysis from previous experiments to iterate and continue incentivizing protocols within the ecosystem to facilitate the growth of Arbitrum.
The Savvy DeFi DAO’s Arbitrum Council has decisively voted FOR this proposal.
We have been following this proposal for several months, and we value the detailed analysis from previous experiments to iterate and continue incentivizing protocols within the ecosystem to facilitate the growth of Arbitrum.
Moreover, we believe that the team behind it possesses all the necessary tools to execute this program with meticulous attention to detail. Above all, their adaptability to take feedback, iterate, and drive continuous improvement for this project.
I want to share this idea here because it builds on this conversation.
The ThankARB governance framework is attempting to set standards for how we assign the deciders at each level of funding throughout a contributors pathway.
I want to share this idea here because it builds on this conversation.
The ThankARB governance framework is attempting to set standards for how we assign the deciders at each level of funding throughout a contributors pathway.
It is easy to see that different "categories" of grant funding have different pathways to success for those who need them. Fill in the blanks here for each category to say how do we go from a first grant to scale? Who makes the decision to move forward at each level? What do we offer at each level?
To learn more about these categories, check out this chart:
Echoing my sentiment from the Snapshot vote, I will be voting "For" this on Tally.
I will add that since the Snapshot vote I am very pleased to see delegate feedback addressed in the Tally vote. I look forward to see how this next iteration of the grants program looks and am confident in those who were elected to the Council / Advisor roles to do a great job!
Vela Exchange has voted FOR regarding this proposal.
Many folks have been waiting for a round 2 during the STIP, and assumed there would be funding left over for their proposals
The addition of councils and other new mechanics enriches the overall experiment of the incentives programming
Our team voted FOR this proposal. We support the development of support for projects on Arbitrum and attracting new users and liquidity. We are glad that our comments at the forum were taken into account in this proposal.
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting in favor of the LTIPP on Tally.
Although we didn't comment on the forums for the Snapshot vote, we've been very supportive of the LTIPP on Twitter, and our reasoning hasn't changed. The LTIPP builds on what we've learned from the STIP and addresses many of the challenges we faced. We hope that the LTIPP will help the DAO establish continuous support for the Arbitrum ecosystem moving forward!
Hello everyone,
We (Lampros Labs DAO) have created a live voting dashboard for LTIPP to track the voting of all 77 protocols in real-time.
This dashboard provides info about all the application's snapshot voting links, forum proposal application links, asks and live voting statuses for each proposal, all in one accessible dashboard.
Hello everyone,
We (Lampros Labs DAO) have created a live voting dashboard for LTIPP to track the voting of all 77 protocols in real-time.
This dashboard provides info about all the application's snapshot voting links, forum proposal application links, asks and live voting statuses for each proposal, all in one accessible dashboard.
Delegates can personalize the dashboard for them by creating a copy of the sheet, allowing them to update the status of voted proposals in the last column of the dashboard and see dynamic changes in cell background colours for the first four columns to track their own votes. (P.S. - Please note that while personal copies enable personalization, the sheet will not be updated for personal copies, the main public link remains active and is updated every 5 minutes for all community members.)
I would love to receive feedback, suggestions or any changes you would like to look into this sheet.
This sheet was completely inspired by the Voting Dashboard created by Inspex for STIP.
And lastly thanks to Applicant advisors and Council members for working tirelessly for the past few weeks to bring the best applications up for voting.
Check out the dashboard from the below link and do share your feedback for the dashboard.
Dashboard link - https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gBzO34v_YRQnR9ABTXjtTHMbqDylDGa54DT7LPekuqI/edit?usp=sharing.
Echoing my sentiment from the Snapshot vote, I will be voting "For" this on Tally.
I will add that since the Snapshot vote I am very pleased to see delegate feedback addressed in the Tally vote. I look forward to see how this next iteration of the grants program looks and am confident in those who were elected to the Council / Advisor roles to do a great job!
Thank you all who helped make this happen!
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting in favor of the LTIPP on Tally.
Although we didn't comment on the forums for the Snapshot vote, we've been very supportive of the LTIPP on Twitter, and our reasoning hasn't changed. The LTIPP builds on what we've learned from the STIP and addresses many of the challenges we faced. We hope that the LTIPP will help the DAO establish continuous support for the Arbitrum ecosystem moving forward!
Best of luck to the Council and the Application Advisors!
I voted for this onchain proposal on Tally.
I think funding incentives is an important and valuable use of the DAO's treasury. I appreciate the work the LTIP program team has done to put together a pilot program that builds on the learnings from STIP. Going forward, I think it's important that we rigorously analyze the impact of the pilot program incentives to establish reliable models to direct DAO funding on an ongoing basis.
Treasure’s Arbitrum Representative Council voted “For” this proposal.
We have consistently backed this program as it navigates through the governance process. Arbitrum operates in a fiercely competitive environment, where incentives play a crucial role in enticing and retaining users while fostering ecosystem growth. Though STIP had its flaws, it served as a valuable first experiment, with lessons learned integrated into the more comprehensive incentive program outlined here.
Treasure’s Arbitrum Representative Council voted “For” this proposal.
We have consistently backed this program as it navigates through the governance process. Arbitrum operates in a fiercely competitive environment, where incentives play a crucial role in enticing and retaining users while fostering ecosystem growth. Though STIP had its flaws, it served as a valuable first experiment, with lessons learned integrated into the more comprehensive incentive program outlined here.
Moving forward, we are eager to see data analysis taking a pivotal role in guiding the continuous funding of projects and commend the efforts of OBL and @paulsengh thus far. Through rigorous analysis, the Council and DAO should be empowered to more effectively evaluate the highest return on investment for its funds and concentrate distribution toward protocols that demonstrate the most efficient utilization of incentives to stimulate sustained user growth. While defining "success" with incentives may not always be straightforward, we have faith in the multitude of highly skilled individuals collaborating within LTIPP and throughout the DAO to formulate comprehensive solutions to this question.
It is worth highlighting that we were dissatisfied with the mechanism behind the election. Our comments on this topic can be viewed here. However, we are keen that perfect not be the enemy of good and so will continue to offer our overall support for the program.
We wish the LTIPP Council and Advisors the best of luck and they step up to take on this critical role for the DAO :saluting_face:
Steps to Implement
- The Council and Advisors have already started creating the application template and rubric
- When the Tally vote ends the Application period will begin the next business day. Protocols will apply using the application template
- At the same time, applicants will begin the KYC process with the foundation to expedite the process should they receive funding.
Will the application template be available before the Tally vote ends? The Tally vote just went live, and based on the "Flow of Pilot Program" the application period is only 2 weeks. Based on that it sounds like the application template won't be published until the vote is over?
Steps to Implement
- The Council and Advisors have already started creating the application template and rubric
- When the Tally vote ends the Application period will begin the next business day. Protocols will apply using the application template
- At the same time, applicants will begin the KYC process with the foundation to expedite the process should they receive funding.
Will the application template be available before the Tally vote ends? The Tally vote just went live, and based on the "Flow of Pilot Program" the application period is only 2 weeks. Based on that it sounds like the application template won't be published until the vote is over?
Also, can the KYC process be explained a little further. Under the "Flow of Pilot Program" the 3 Week Compliance Period has Arbitrum Foundation reaching out to programs that pass Snapshot vote.
Compliance Period (3 weeks)
All protocols that successfully pass the voting period will undergo a KYC period during these three weeks. Arbitrum Foundation members will reach out to coordinate these KYCs. All protocols will be required to complete the KYC during this period or they may be disqualified from receiving funds.
Once all KYCs are completed, there will be one vote to ratify the DAOs selection of screened and KYC’d protocols. In the event that the Snapshot vote is favorably concluded, protocols will commence receiving its funding through an Hedgey stream, facilitated by oSnap execution.
But the steps to implement reads as if KYC process should be done at the same time the Application Period begins, and KYC must be passed before going to Snapshot
Steps to Implement
- The Council and Advisors have already started creating the application template and rubric
- When the Tally vote ends the Application period will begin the next business day. Protocols will apply using the application template
- At the same time, applicants will begin the KYC process with the foundation to expedite the process should they receive funding. [...]
- All protocols that pass through the council screening phase, pass KYC, and sign grant agreements will move to a snapshot.
Hi @Matt_StableLab, I've noticed that in the updated proposal for the on-chain vote—there's a change in the selection process of data providers from the initial temp-check proposal that was voted on the snapshot.
In the LTIP pilot program temp-check proposal, as I understand it, it will follow a selection process similar to STIP in selecting the provider for this position.
Hi @Matt_StableLab, I've noticed that in the updated proposal for the on-chain vote—there's a change in the selection process of data providers from the initial temp-check proposal that was voted on the snapshot.
In the LTIP pilot program temp-check proposal, as I understand it, it will follow a selection process similar to STIP in selecting the provider for this position.
Temp-check:
Abitrum Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP) Data Monitoring and Reporting]
RFP Live - Oct 8
RFP Submissions Open: Oct, 08 to Oct 015, 2023.
RFP Interview and Submission Reviews: Oct 15 to Oct 22, 2023.
RFP Decision: Oct 22 - Oct 27 2023.
Grant awarded - Oct 27
On-chain vote:
The Pilot Program will onboard OpenBlock Labs as a service provider for data and analytics monitoring and reporting.
Could you provide details on when these processes were carried out for this pilot program? I'm interested in knowing about the other data provider applications that were considered, besides OpenBlock Lab.
Thank you to everyone who has left comments regarding LTIPP and those who voted in the snapshot proposal and council/advisor elections!
Below are the changes and clarifications added to LTIPP after feedback from the community during the Snapshot vote.
Thank you to everyone who has left comments regarding LTIPP and those who voted in the snapshot proposal and council/advisor elections!
Below are the changes and clarifications added to LTIPP after feedback from the community during the Snapshot vote.
The updated proposal has been posted above. We will allow a couple of days for the community to review these changes before we move the proposal to Tally later this week.
This can be discussed should the DAO feel they would prefer this program to be open to all applicants.
Budgets: Added clear budgets with hourly expectations and responsibilities for the Council, Advisor, Program Manager, and Data Provider positions.
Council Conflict of Interest: Council members will have to disclose any COIs and provide a reason. If they are unsure or there is a dispute, other council members will vote on whether or not the situation warrants the council members abstaining from grading that applicant.
Bounties: The council will work with the advisors to create the RFPs for the research bounties. The DAO delegates will then select who will complete each of these RFPs
Maximum Budget Spend: 45M ARB is the maximum budget. The council will screen and only select proposals they think should move a vote. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO. The council can not spend more than 45M arb
Additionally, making it clear the DAO can vote down any proposals during the snapshot phase, saving even more funds which will also be returned to the treasury.
Multisig signer compensation: Reduced to 1000 ARB per signer. This is due to many of their responsibilities being alleviated by the council as well as community feedback.
New Multisig: This is done to avoid conflict of interest as many individuals on the past incentives multisig are now serving as council members. This will also help to prevent confusion regarding which funds are from STIP and which belong to LTIPP.
Data provider role: OBL has clarified their role by providing the exact services they will offer as well as to fill this position. Further info can be found in their SoW
Retrofunding: The council will create a list of possible ways to retroactively distribute funds to those who have contributed to the Pilot Program. The DAO will then vote on which retroactive method(s) should be used. The DAO will also decide on who these retroactive payments will go to.
This AIP establishes a Long-term Term Incentives Pilot Program for the DAO to test new incentive designs and answer the necessary questions to ensure we are ready to commit to the long-term program. This Pilot Program will distribute a maximum of 45M ARB to protocols building on Arbitrum that were not funded during STIP or the Backfund. The program will distribute ARB to protocols for 12 weeks.
This AIP establishes a Long-term Term Incentives Pilot Program for the DAO to test new incentive designs and answer the necessary questions to ensure we are ready to commit to the long-term program. This Pilot Program will distribute a maximum of 45M ARB to protocols building on Arbitrum that were not funded during STIP or the Backfund. The program will distribute ARB to protocols for 12 weeks.
The Arbitrum DAO has spent the last few months experimenting with incentive programs to attract new users and liquidity to Arbitrum. There is a consensus the DAO will use what we learn from these short-term programs to establish a long-term framework. While STIP V1 brought tons of attention to Arbitrum and has resulted in upticks in protocol metrics, we have learned there were many flaws with the structure of STIP Round 1. This Pilot Program looks to implement new mechanisms to address the issues seen during STIP. The DAO will use this Pilot Program as a test run for a long-term framework before committing to a year-long program.
The Pilot Program will operate using a Council, have Advisors to ensure protocols receive adequate feedback and assistance, and allow protocols more freedom to create innovative ARB incentive plans. We believe these changes will help remedy many of the pain points seen in Round 1. Running the Pilot Program to test these new features will allow the DAO to compare different program methods before implementing a long-term framework beginning in Q2 2024. This will help ensure we have all the knowledge necessary to implement the most effective long-term incentives program for Arbitrum.
STIP was an experimental program to distribute ARB to protocols to use as incentives for their users. While it was initially intended to have two rounds, the program was substantially more popular than expected, and the entire 50M ARB budget was used in Round 1 and an additional 21.4M ARB was passed through STIP Backfund for teams that were “approved but not funded”.
This meant no funds remained for Round 2, leading to its cancellation. Many protocols either missed the Round 1 deadline, intentionally waited for Round 2 or simply did not know about STIP. This left several protocols with no alternative route to apply for ARB incentives.
Many STIP Round 1 grantees have seen upticks in their metrics. This Pilot Program would allow protocols that missed out on Round 1 the opportunity to apply to gain these benefits, which will help level the playing field for these protocols. The Pilot Program will replace a round 2 and will be funded with 45M ARB to accommodate the large expected protocol demand we have already seen. This will complete the incentivizing of Arbitrum-based teams to create a holistic competitive edge not against each other but against other chains.
There is a DAO consensus that Arbitrum will need a long-term incentive program in 2024. However, many delegates feel the DAO is moving too quickly and spending too much money on backfund or V2 proposals without yet receiving any of the data on STIP’s effectiveness.
We have learned a lot from STIP and can use what went wrong in STIP and the Backfund to hypothesize what changes would create a better long-term framework. However, we have little evidence to prove these new ideas would be a better solution. DAO members currently don’t have the resources or funds to create a long-term program, nor do we understand what a good long-term program looks like.
This proposal focuses on obtaining this evidence using a committed working stream to guarantee we come away from this program ready to make informed decisions on a long-term framework. The pilot program also allows the DAO to test new aspects of an incentive program such as Advisors, Councils, and more flexible incentive distributions before committing long-term.
This will help save the DAO money and time in the long term by preventing the need for more short-term programs before we are ready to commit to the Long-Term Framework.
The specifications of the Pilot Program were designed to remedy the 3 largest complaints regarding STIP. The Pilot Program hopes to be a test run for these additions for the DAO to determine if they should also be included in the long-term framework.
In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal.
To remedy this problem, the Pilot Program will have a 5 person council elected by the DAO responsible for evaluating applications and selecting which protocols will advance to a snapshot vote to receive ARB. This will ensure all applications are thoughtfully evaluated with only the most deserving receiving incentives. Not only will this help to reduce the burden on delegates, but it will also help expedite the process and allow protocols to receive incentives quickly and efficiently.
A major gripe from protocols was they struggled to get feedback from delegates before the deadline. This left many feeling as though the better-connected protocols had an advantage as they were able to modify their proposals based on feedback to make them more competitive during the vote. Many protocols were willing to make changes to their applications to make them more appealing to the DAO but never received the proper feedback necessary to do so.
The Pilot Program introduces Advisors to assist protocols throughout the pilot program. This will be impartial organizations tasked with providing each applicant with detailed feedback and guidance on how to improve their applications and eventually their incentive programs. This ensures each applicant can iterate on their proposal so they can put forward the best possible incentive plan for the council.
STIP Round 1 had strict limitations on how the ARB could be used as incentives. This was done to protect the DAO and prevent misuse of funds. However, the strict rules resulted in the stifling of many innovative incentive designs. Many protocols had interesting designs that used the ARB in ways that increased alignment, improved cost efficiency, or helped to limit the dumping of ARB. However, these designs were not permitted in Round 1 leading to almost all protocols resulting in generic liquidity incentive models.
The Pilot Program provides more flexibility to protocols to create innovative incentive structures. With the addition of the Council and Advisors, the Pilot Program does not require the rules to be as stringent. Malicious or inefficient designs will be first filtered out by the Advisors and then rejected by the council. Allowing protocols to innovate on incentive distribution mechanisms will allow Arbitrum protocols and community members to get a better idea of which designs work and which don’t work. This will help everyone as we prepare for a longer-term incentives program.
Protocols will have 2 weeks to apply using the Pilot Program application template. The application template will be created by the Council and the Advisors to ensure everyone has the same goals and make it easier for the council to process applications. Applications will be posted in the Pilot Program section of the Arbitrum forum. Protocols only need to post the initial draft of their application during this period. They will then have 2 additional weeks during the feedback period to edit their applications. No late submissions will be accepted.
During the feedback period, the Applications Advisors will provide feedback and guidance on all proposals. Protocols will be assigned an Application Advisor who will provide feedback and guidance on applications on a rolling basis. Protocols will then use this time to work with the Advisors to edit their proposals before applications lock at the end of the 2 weeks.
Protocols can continuously adjust their requested ARB amounts until the feedback period is finished. No changes can be to the requested ARB amount during the screening period.
StableLab will also read all submissions during this period and highlight any rule violations to allow applicants to edit their submissions to ensure they comply with all program rules.
During this period, the council will use the pre-determined rubric to grade each protocol and decide which protocols will advance to the voting period to receive ARB. The Council will use the rubric to select which applications will progress to a snapshot vote. The protocols that the council selects to advance to a snapshot vote must have a total funding amount that is equal to or lower than the incentives budget. This will ensure the DAO does not overspend should all Snapshot votes pass. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO.
The rubric will be created by the Council and Advisors during the Tally voting period and will be publicly available by the time protocols begin to apply. The council will be required to publish a brief reasoning for all of their decisions on the forum to create transparency and accountability.
The council must judge applications as they are and cannot accept protocols at lower amounts than their application states. For example, if an application asks for 200,000 ARB the council can not fund them with 100,000 ARB
EXAMPLE: This is a hypothetical example using a budget of 10 ARB with 50 applicants that each request 1 ARB
50 protocols apply requesting 1 Arb Each -> Council grades all 50 applications using the rubric and narrows the selection down to the top 10 applicants to not exceed the budget -> 10 snapshot votes are created to allow the DAO to confirm the council's decisions -> 9/10 Snapshot votes receive a majority of “fund” votes -> 9 protocols are funded with 1 ARB each and 1 Arb is returned to the DAO
Upon completion of the preliminary applicant screening process by the council, the selected applications will be formally presented to the DAO for consideration. Each application will then be subject to a voting process via Snapshot, allowing Arbitrum delegates to vote on the allocation of funds.
All protocols that successfully pass the voting period will undergo a KYC period during these three weeks. Arbitrum Foundation members will reach out to coordinate these KYCs. All protocols will be required to complete the KYC during this period or they may be disqualified from receiving funds.
Once all KYCs are completed, there will be one vote to ratify the DAOs selection of screened and KYC’d protocols. In the event that the Snapshot vote is favorably concluded, protocols will commence receiving its funding through an Hedgey stream, facilitated by oSnap execution.
Selected protocols will receive their requested ARB using bi-weekly Hedgey streams for 12 weeks. During this time, protocols will be required to provide bi-weekly updates on the progress of their incentives using a template created by the Council and Advisors. Protocols will be required to finish their incentive distributions or return any unused funds two weeks after their final disbursement is available.
During this period Advisors will continue to work with the protocols to help them analyze and improve their distribution mechanisms. Protocols will be allowed to adjust their incentive plans as long as they do not violate any rules and provide their updated plans in their next bi-weekly update.
The council will comprise 5 members. These members should be unbiased and knowledgeable builders, delegates, or organizations with experience in incentive programs, grants councils, or growing a protocol.
The council will decide which protocols will progress to a snapshot vote to be awarded the ARB incentives. The council does not need to spend the entire incentives budget should they feel there are not enough quality applications. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO to be used in the Long Term Framework.
The council members will be responsible for creating a rubric that all protocols will be judged against. The council will design this rubric with input from the Advisors and will communicate what they are looking for with the Advisors to ensure the Advisors guide protocols in the right direction. The highest-scoring protocols will progress to Snapshot votes to allow the DAO to determine if they should receive ARB. The council will be responsible for publishing the graded rubrics as well as a brief explanation for all decisions.
The council will also be responsible for determining when to halt a protocol’s stream should they violate program rules or misuse funds. All reports of violations will be evaluated by the council. It will require 4 out of 5 council members to vote in favor of halting the stream for a stream to be stopped. Council members will coordinate with the multi-sig signers to halt a stream. Streams can also be halted via a DAO snapshot vote should the DAO disagree with the council’s judgment.
While 45 million was the DAO's selected budget, the Council does not need to allocate the full amount. The council is responsible for screening applications and will only progress applications they view as worthy of moving to Snapshot. The total funding amount of applications moved to snapshot can be anywhere between 0 and 45M ARB. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO treasury by the multisig.
The council will create the RFPs for the research bounties.
Each RFP will include the research question that should be answered as well as the maximum budget for the bounty. While there is 200,000 ARB allocated for research bounties the council does not need to allocate the entire budget. Arbitrum delegates will then select who will complete each of these RFPs via a snapshot election.
The 5 council members have been selected by DAO vote. The 5 Council Applicants with the most votes were elected to serve on the council for the Pilot Program.
Those who serve on the Pilot Program Council are not guaranteed to be included on a council in the full Long Term Incentives Program. There will be new elections to select council members when it comes time for the full long-term program.
Council members have been elected via Snapshot vote and are listed below.
Should a Council member have a conflict of interest with an applicant they may excuse themselves from grading said applicant. A conflict of interest can include an investment or close personal ties to an applying protocol. Should this happen the council member will have to disclose they are not grading and provide a reason.
Should there be a dispute over whether the circumstances qualify as a conflict of interest the other council members will vote on whether or not the situation warrants the council members abstaining from grading that applicant.
Should the DAO feel a member or members of the council are not fulfilling their duty they may remove them using a snapshot vote.
Anyone with sufficient voting power can initiate a Snapshot poll to remove council member(s). Should the poll receive a majority “remove” votes the council member(s) will be immediately removed.
Should this occur there will then be a week-long application process where replacement council members can apply via the forum. This will be followed by a Snapshot vote to elect replacement member(s)
Each council seat will receive 25,000 ARB streamed biweekly throughout the program.
The council will be compensated at 83.33 ARB per hour. The amount is denominated in ARB to incentivize council members to try to maximize the Value of ARB. Additionally, offering compensation in ARB helps to attract contributors who believe in the future success of Arbitrum.
Below is a breakdown of the council's responsibilities as well as the expected amount of time they will take to complete.
Three Advisors will help protocols design, implement, and iterate their incentive programs. Advisors are integral to the proposal process, serving as impartial entities with DeFi expertise. Their primary function is to provide detailed, unbiased feedback on applications, aiding protocols in refining and improving their submissions.
The Advisors will also work closely with the council to create the application template and grading rubric. This will ensure the council and advisors are on the same page so they can provide the best feedback to applicants and ensure the council understands the details of the incentive mechanisms the Advisors are helping protocols design.
As this is an experimental addition to the incentives framework, having expert advisors working with protocols will help protocols and the DAO understand what is most helpful from an advisor and allow the DAO to adjust the role for the longer-term framework. This will also help protocols design more innovative incentive distribution mechanisms that can be tested to see how effective they are going into a long-term incentives framework.
Collaboration with Council and Program Manager: Work jointly to design the application template, KPIs, and a grading rubric, ensuring alignment with council expectations and clarity in the evaluation process.
Feedback and Recommendations: Offer detailed feedback on each eligible application assigned to your team during the review period.
Communication with Applicants: Engage actively with applicants to streamline the application process, aiding in proposal improvements and clarifications.
Hosting Office Hours: Schedule and conduct public office hours 3 times per week while the program is running for protocols to seek advice. This will focus on transparency and accessibility. All interactions during these sessions will be recorded and summarized for everyone. Order of speaking during office hours will be on a first come first serve basis.
Impartiality: Advisors must remain unbiased, especially as they do not have the final say in proposal acceptance. While Advisors will work closely with the council members to create the Rubric, advisors should not interfere with the votes from the council nor guarantee any outcome to projects they speak with.
Continuous Engagement: Post-application feedback is crucial, as is ongoing involvement in the later stages of the process, subject to discussion and agreement with relevant parties. There may also be later involvement in the process when the program is running or over.
Pre-Application Phase: Advisors we assist the Council with the design of the application template and grading rubric. Advisors are required to hold open office hours, focusing on guiding applicants in preparing their proposals.
Application Review Phase: Each proposal receives at least one detailed feedback report addressing key criteria established by the DAO.
Post-Application Feedback: After the submission of proposals, advisors provide insights on the process and suggest improvements for future cycles.
Those who serve as a Pilot Program Advisor are not guaranteed to be included onboarded in the full Long Term Incentives Program. There will be new elections to select Advisors when it comes time for the full long-term program.
The Advisors have been elected via Snapshot vote and are listed below.
Each Advisor will receive 35,000 ARB streamed biweekly throughout the program.
The council will be compensated at 83.33 ARB per hour. The amount is denominated in ARB to incentivize Advisors to try to maximize the Value of ARB. Additionally, offering compensation in ARB helps to attract contributors who believe in the future success of Arbitrum.
Below is a breakdown of the Advisor’s responsibilities as well as the expected amount of time they will take to complete.
A new multisig will be created for this program. A few individuals from the original STIP-ARB multisig used in Round 1 and the backfund proposal are now serving as council members in LTIPP which could create a conflict of interest. Additionally, a new multisig will help to prevent confusion regarding which funds are from STIP and which belong to LTIPP. Finally, a new multisig reduces redundancy of signers across multiple DAO programs which helps to protect the DAO by increasing decentralization.
The new multisig will be a ⅗ multisig and include:
Multi-sig address: 0x544cBe6698E2e3b676C76097305bBa588dEfB13A
The funds in the multisig belong to the DAO, and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. In LTIPP, the council is responsible for deciding when to halt streams and can coordinate with the multi-sig signers so they can enact this request. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in DAO governance, including delegation.
The multisig includes two features to ensure the accountability of signers and grantees:
Each Multisig signer will receive 1,000 ARB streamed biweekly throughout the program.
In LTIPP, the council is responsible for deciding when to halt streams. This has decreased a significant amount of the multisig’s workload. Due to this, the budget has been lowered from the STIP budget.
The Program Manager will be responsible for coordinating between all parties involved to ensure the Pilot Program runs smoothly. They will be available to answer any questions the DAO has regarding the Pilot Program and will publish bi-weekly reports so the community understands the status of the program. This role is designed to add efficiency and clarity to all aspects of the Pilot Program. The Program Manager will have no input into which protocols receive funds. However, they will be responsible for handling any operational tasks that arise throughout the Pilot Program.
Matt from StableLab will act as the program manager. StableLab will function in a similar capacity as they did for STIP Round 1. They will help coordinate between the multisig, council, Advisors, applicants, foundation, and community to ensure the Pilot Program program runs smoothly. StableLab will serve as a neutral party and have no power to decide which protocols receive funding or which streams are halted.
StableLab was responsible for designing this Pilot Program and will continue working on designing a long-term Framework with the help of the incentives working group and the DAO. StableLab will be responsible for publishing a research report on the effectiveness of the Pilot Program and their findings on how it operationally compared to STIP V1.
Should the DAO feel StableLab is not fulfilling their duties as program manager, they may remove them using a snapshot vote. An emergency Snapshot vote will then be used to elect a replacement program manager.
In the Long Term Incentives Framework, this position will be decided by the DAO. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, it will continue using StableLab’s services given they have experience from managing STIP V1 and already have knowledge from designing this process.
The Program Manager will receive 70,000 ARB total streamed biweekly throughout the program.
The Program Manager will be compensated at 83.33 ARB per hour. The amount is denominated in ARB to incentivize Advisors to try to maximize the Value of ARB. Additionally, offering compensation in ARB helps to attract contributors who believe in the future success of Arbitrum.
Below is a breakdown of the Program Manager's responsibilities and the expected amount of time they will take to complete.
| Responsibility | Estimated time Spent | Compensation |
|---|---|---|
| Pre Application period | 40 hours per week for 2 weeks = 80 hours | 6,666.4 ARB |
| Application Period | 40 hours per week for 4 weeks = 160 hours | 13,332.8 ARB |
| Screening / Voting Period | 40 hours per week for 2 weeks = 80 hours | 6,666.4 ARB |
| Incentives Period: | 30 hours per week for 12 weeks = 360 hours | 29,998.8 ARB |
| Post Incentives | 40 hours per week for 4 weeks = 160 hours | 13,332.8 ARB |
| Total | = 840 hours | 70,000 ARB |
The Pilot Program will onboard OpenBlock Labs as a service provider for data and analytics monitoring and reporting.
To optimize each initiative, the DAO must collect and analyze data regarding the efficacy of incentives. For the two prior incentive programs, the DAO has partnered with OpenBlock Labs to provide robust incentive data, which can be found here. In addition to the data, OpenBlock provides biweekly updates to the forum, and has collaborated with dozens of protocols and delegates to share meaningful insights; our most recent analysis can be found here.
In the following section, we outline OpenBlock’s scope for the LTIPP.
Incorporate Past Learnings: Collaborate with LTIPP advisors to strategically distribute incentive budgets across categories and protocols, utilizing insights derived from OpenBlock’s STIP efficacy analysis. Our previous endeavors have uncovered millions of dollars in unoptimized spending, and we are confident that OpenBlock is well-positioned to guide the DAO in implementing improvements based on these insights.
To illustrate these insights more vividly, we present two examples of real scenarios within the STIP where OBL's recommendations could effectively guide substantial capital allocation in a meaningful direction, showcasing the potential ROI of OBL’s work:
1. Concentration of Rewards: A handful of protocols have dispersed the majority of their rewards (50-70% or more) to a small group of users (less than 10). In such cases, the DAO is essentially committing millions of dollars to highly concentrated bets on user acquisition. Frequently, these major stakeholders have vested interests in the protocol, resulting in rewards flowing toward rent-seeking participants. The underlying data is available in the “User Claim Activity” section here. 2. Excessive Spending: Some protocols have distributed significant rewards without showing substantial additional growth compared to their pre-STIP trajectory, as observed in our competitive analysis control groups. Leveraging the data, OBL can offer insights on optimizing allocations and implementing mechanisms to enhance the efficiency of incentive spending. This includes setting specific performance targets to guide the continued deployment of funds. Since we have already spent a lot of time investing in these relationships with protocols, we are in a prime position to efficiently offer these services. The underlying data is available in the “Protocol Metrics Normalized” section here.
Protocol Data Aggregation: Interface with each protocol to audit and aggregate data on their KPIs. Monitor efficacy through a diverse set of metrics, mirroring the approach taken in the STIP (such as nominal TVL/volume/fees/DAU growth at the protocol level, normalized by claimed ARB, competitive intelligence, aggregated data at the category and ecosystem levels, etc.). Leverage any additional resources to help teams optimize their incentive mechanisms by building more granular insights. To provide more clarity on the resources required for this section, we have detailed the scope below:
Protocol-Specific:
Aggregate:
Making Data Publically Available: The Data provider will be responsible for making the data behind each dashboard publicly available. This will ensure those completing the Research Bounties have access to this information so they can provide proper analysis of this data. Easy access to data will allow for the Bounty completers to provide better reports and data visualizations for the community. This provides the DAO with a decentralized method for analyzing and understanding how effective this program is as well as better setting up the DAO for the Long Term Framework.
Monitor For Misuse of Funds: The data provider will monitor data from all funded protocols to detect any misuse of funds. Should they find suspicious activity the data Provider will be responsible for sharing this with the Council.
Create a Recap Report: The Data provider will be responsible for creating a recap report that tells the story of the Pilot Program and breaks down the successes and failures of the different incentive strategies.
Biweekly updates: The data provider will provide biweekly updates of the overall themes, trends, and findings from the program.
Interface with the council, advisors and protocols: The analytics providers have access to a wealth of incentive data, thus they are expected to leverage this data to provide feedback to teams who are designing incentive programs.
Interface with the research bounties and community: The analytics provider should work with the research bounty teams and any interested community members to ensure all data is open source and available for teams to access and interact with.
Impartiality: The Data Provider must remain unbiased. While the Data providers will not have the power to halt streams themselves, they must be impartial when it comes to reporting the data and examining for any misuse of funds. Any suspicious behavior they find must be communicated to the council for further review.
Continuous Monitoring: The Data Provider must continually update the data to reflect the latest updates. This will ensure the bounty researchers and community have access to the correct information. They also must continually monitor for misuse of funds to allow the council to act quickly should any issues arise
This will be an elected position in the long-term program. Additionally, given the long-term framework will have a much larger scope and will include many separate incentive categories, it will most likely require the DAO to onboard multiple different organizations to handle the long-term framework’s data monitoring and reporting. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, the Data provider will be selected and ratified by the DAO similar to STIP round 1.
The Data and Analytics Provider will receive 100,000 ARB streamed throughout the program.
For this budget, OpenBlock Labs will commit 3 full-time equivalent data scientists.
During this time they will be responsible for:
This proposal has been continuously worked on by the authors since the middle of November after requests from the DAO emerged to create an alternative round 2 of STIP. The protocol authors have drafted the proposal, met with delegates for feedback, presented open workshopping calls, implemented feedback, and progressed the proposal towards a vote for the past few months. This funding section retroactively compensates the proposal authors for the hundreds of hours of work put into creating this proposal.
Below is a breakdown of the three contributors as well as their time commitments over the past few months of creating this proposal.
Total Cost 30,000 ARB
| Contributor | Responsibility | Estimated time Spent | Compensation |
|---|---|---|---|
| StableLab | Authoring the proposal, leading efforts to gather delegate feedback, co-hosting workshop calls and working group pitches | 30 hours per week for 8 weeks = 240 hours | 15,000 ARB |
| Alex Lumley | Assisting in proposal design, leading efforts to gather delegate feedback, co-hosting workshop calls and working group pitches | 20 hours per week for 8 weeks = 160 hours | 10,000 ARB |
| Bobby Bola | Advising proposal design, assisting with delegate outreach and feedback | 10 hours per week for 8 weeks = 80 hours | 5,000 ARB |
| Total | 450 hours | 30,000 ARB |
The Pilot Program proposal will include research bounties to ensure the DAO collects sufficient data and draws meaningful conclusions from STIP, the Backfund, and the LTIP Pilot Program to help inform the future LTIP design. There will be up to 200,000 ARB available to those who complete bounties.
This process guarantees the DAO will have multiple teams working on providing meaningful conclusions regarding incentive programs. These conclusions will be essential to allow the DAO to possess all the information necessary to create the best possible long-term incentive framework.
The Council will be responsible for creating the research bounties RFPs that will include what question the research should answer as well as a maximum budget.
Some possible questions the bounties could address are:
Note: See more community-created research buckets in the forum here
Researchers will then apply to claim these bounties by providing why they are the best fit to answer the question as well as providing a budget.
The DAO will be responsible for selecting who completes each bounty based on the applicant's experience and proposed budget.
The 200,000 ARB is the maximum amount spent on research bounties. Should the DAO choose to fund lower budgets, any unused funds will be returned to the DAO.
In STIP Round 1 we saw many community members go above and beyond by providing valuable contributions without any funding. 100,000 ARB will be allocated for retroactive funding to community members who add valuable contributions during the Pilot Program. Earmarking these funds upfront lets people know there will be retro funding which will encourage community members to contribute. This section is intentionally vague to encourage all kinds of community contributions. The DAO will have the final say in how these funds will be used.
The exact methods used to distribute the funds will be selected by the DAO. The council will create a list of possible ways to retroactively distribute funds to those who have contributed to the Pilot Program. The DAO will then vote on which retroactive method(s) should be used. The DAO will also decide on who these retroactive payments will go to.
This program is designed to reduce the large burden delegates faced during STIP round 1. While many of their responsibilities will be taken on by the Council and Advisors, the Arbitrum delegates will still retain the final say in many aspects of this proposal.
Delegates will retain the following powers:
The pilot program is for protocols that did not receive ARB during STIP or the Backfund. However, protocols that received grants from the Arbitrum Foundation, Questbook’s grant program, or any other Arbitrum Grants program are eligible to receive Pilot Program funding. Additionally, receiving funding from the Pilot Program does not prohibit protocols from applying for funding from other DAO or foundation programs including the Long Term Incentives Program.
By streaming grant payments, the multisig will be empowered to hold grantees accountable to their proposals by halting fund streaming for any of the following reasons:
In that this proposal aims to be experimental, the multisig is not intended to provide quality control on the design of incentive programs. Rather, they are empowered to halt streaming in the event of negligence or misuse of funds.
The ITU Blockchain Delegation Committee acknowledges the challenges faced during the STIP voting process and aims to turn them into constructive opportunities. Notably, ITU Blockchain has demonstrated commitment by thoroughly voting on all 97 proposals in the STIP, accompanied by detailed rationales available here. The committee is excited about replicating this engagement in the LTIP and emphasizes the positive impact of retroactive community funding in encouraging project votes. While appreciating the innovative concept of the research treasury, the committee suggests enhancing clarity on research grants, defining expectations for researchers, and specifying response times for inquiries to foster community involvement and inspire creative ideas. In a positive light, a comparison between LTIP and STIP treasuries indicates potential growth, attributed to an extended timeline (18 weeks) and consistent ARB token allocations. Consequently, the committee lists its votes as follows: Fund with program 45.815.000, Fund with program 35.815.000, Fund with program 25.815.000, and against.
We believe electing a council to speed up the delivery of proposals to a final vote would be of great benefit to the broader Arbitrum ecosystem, ensuring delegates are not overloaded.
As competition continues to increase with newer launches and market sentiment increasing, we want to ensure that governance proposals achieve an efficient delivery mechanism to voting which we believe a council and advisor structure can achieve. We fully support this proposal as it aims to serve the good of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
We believe electing a council to speed up the delivery of proposals to a final vote would be of great benefit to the broader Arbitrum ecosystem, ensuring delegates are not overloaded.
As competition continues to increase with newer launches and market sentiment increasing, we want to ensure that governance proposals achieve an efficient delivery mechanism to voting which we believe a council and advisor structure can achieve. We fully support this proposal as it aims to serve the good of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
We have a few concerns regarding the length of the pilot, the barrier against STIP recipients, and the overhead size.
Even with the concerns above, we fully support the LTIP if wider concerns are appropriately addressed before a Tally vote.
Thanks, @Bob-Rossi for correcting me. I appreciate your input and assistance.
I have voted FOR this proposal. I appreciate that this next iteration of the grants program has taken STIP pain points into consideration and I think the changes will help alleviate the issues.
The grant program has to keep growing in some manner, and at this 'exploratory' stage of ARB's grant ecosystem I believe the changes are a great step towards a final product. I'll add that I think the applicant advisor roles are a nice addition as I have gotten feedback from a few would-be applicants now that they have had trouble knowing where to start when applying. This should help make sure projects that are great on their own merit but not so great at drafting a request won't be behind the 8 ball against others.
I have voted FOR this proposal. I appreciate that this next iteration of the grants program has taken STIP pain points into consideration and I think the changes will help alleviate the issues.
The grant program has to keep growing in some manner, and at this 'exploratory' stage of ARB's grant ecosystem I believe the changes are a great step towards a final product. I'll add that I think the applicant advisor roles are a nice addition as I have gotten feedback from a few would-be applicants now that they have had trouble knowing where to start when applying. This should help make sure projects that are great on their own merit but not so great at drafting a request won't be behind the 8 ball against others.
I'll add I'm glad to see that there are research components and emphasis on gathering data, as arguably one of the most import parts of this LTIPP is growing into whatever the 'final' form of the Arbitrum Grants program looks like.
I don't believe the 45M option pays 125k ARB per council member, but 125k ARB total at 25k per member regardless of size.
Thank you, @Matt_StableLab , and everyone who were involved in drafting this proposal. The initiative to transition from short-term incentive strategies to a more sustainable long-term framework is commendable and aligns with the growing demand and lessons learned from the STIP.
Support for the Proposal:
Thank you, @Matt_StableLab , and everyone who were involved in drafting this proposal. The initiative to transition from short-term incentive strategies to a more sustainable long-term framework is commendable and aligns with the growing demand and lessons learned from the STIP.
Support for the Proposal:
Alignment with Previous Success: The pilot program is well-structured to address the shortcomings of STIP Round 1, proposing more efficient mechanisms like a dedicated council and Application Advisors. These improvements are crucial for the effective distribution of incentives.
Testing New Mechanisms: As a pilot, this program offers a valuable opportunity to test and refine incentive mechanisms, providing essential data to shape the future long-term framework.
Areas of Consideration:
Cost Considerations: The proposed compensation for the election position appears significantly high, particularly for an initial pilot program. We recognize that this proposal was developed during a period when the ARB value was comparatively lower than it is now. Considering the magnitude of the allocated funds, it would be great to have some detail on the basis of this amount justification. Hence, we are leaning toward the lower end of the program funding size.
Council and Advisor Roles: Diversifying expertise in the council and advisor roles to cover specific sectors like gaming, DeFi, and NFTs could enhance the program's effectiveness. This specialization would ensure deeper understanding and tailored support across various segments.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
After following the development of the proposal through the relevant working group, we have decided to vote in its favour during temp-check.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
After following the development of the proposal through the relevant working group, we have decided to vote in its favour during temp-check.
It is apparent that the LTIP working group put a lot of thought into addressing the challenges delegates faced during STIP and although the proposal isn’t perfect, it’s a huge step forward. And, considering this is a pilot program, it’s a good stepping stone upon which the DAO can iterate in the future.
Having a council screen applications before having the delegates vote on them is a great way to ease the burden put on delegates, while at the same time letting them retain the decision-making power. On a similar note, enabling applying protocols to have someone to turn to (Application Advisors) to get feedback will allow them to create even better proposals, thus increasing their chances of being accepted, and in turn potentially increasing the positive impact they can have on the broader Arbitrum ecosystem.
The biggest improvement in our eyes however, is the fact that this proposal, contrary to the STIP (although OpenBlock Labs did retroactively analyse the STIP), includes a data provider to monitor and report on the data from each protocol receiving funding. Understanding the impact the LTIPP has (and STIP had) is crucial in order to create a sustainable, long-term incentives program that has a positive and lasting effect on Arbitrum.
@AbdullahUmar and I have shared our thoughts on this vote here. Overall, we're in favor and are excited to see this get going. One thing to note and consider we think is reevaluating some of the compensations, for example the Multi-sig signer.
Voting order
If the option to Abstain was available this would have been availed but it was not possible on this snapshot vote, so voting and providing feedback.
gm all, nice to see the hard work of the last few months coming to fruition.
I am supportive of this intiative and voted FOR the pilot program of the LTIP.
Rationale:
I think the 3 key problems identified are tackling the right frictions that currently exist for such a program to be lean, effective, yet fair and open.
Good day, @cattin I like your rationale for rejecting the offer. In addition to payment, in order to avoid centralization of grant decisions, perhaps if @att_StableLab adds the following changes to his work, we may consider the proposal again:
@TreasureDAO's Arbitrum Council (ARC) will vote FOR this proposal on Snapshot to fund the program with 45,815,000 (ranked in descending order of ARB amount).
Treasure has been involved in the pre-forum socialization process for the Long-Term Incentive Pilot Program (LTIPP) and believes it addresses many of the challenges identified through STIP Round 1, further builds upon it, and will set the foundation to establish a long-term, sustainable incentives/grants program that will support the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.
I want to say that I appreciate all the effort that went into drafting this proposal. I understand that the whole STIP was a bit chaotic, so I really like seeing a proposal that aims to make its successor more efficient, but I'm not sure if this is the best way.
Hello, @Matt_StableLab! Thanks for the proposal, it's great. A small note, we think that 2500 ARB for a multisig is atoo much. In all other proposals on the platform it was 1000 (taking into account the fact that the cost of the ARB increased to $2)
Echoing my sentiment from the Snapshot vote, I will be voting "For" this on Tally.
I will add that since the Snapshot vote I am very pleased to see delegate feedback addressed in the Tally vote. I look forward to see how this next iteration of the grants program looks and am confident in those who were elected to the Council / Advisor roles to do a great job!
Thank you all who helped make this happen!
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting in favor of the LTIPP on Tally.
Although we didn't comment on the forums for the Snapshot vote, we've been very supportive of the LTIPP on Twitter, and our reasoning hasn't changed. The LTIPP builds on what we've learned from the STIP and addresses many of the challenges we faced. We hope that the LTIPP will help the DAO establish continuous support for the Arbitrum ecosystem moving forward!
Best of luck to the Council and the Application Advisors!
I voted for this onchain proposal on Tally.
I think funding incentives is an important and valuable use of the DAO's treasury. I appreciate the work the LTIP program team has done to put together a pilot program that builds on the learnings from STIP. Going forward, I think it's important that we rigorously analyze the impact of the pilot program incentives to establish reliable models to direct DAO funding on an ongoing basis.
Treasure’s Arbitrum Representative Council voted “For” this proposal.
We have consistently backed this program as it navigates through the governance process. Arbitrum operates in a fiercely competitive environment, where incentives play a crucial role in enticing and retaining users while fostering ecosystem growth. Though STIP had its flaws, it served as a valuable first experiment, with lessons learned integrated into the more comprehensive incentive program outlined here.
Treasure’s Arbitrum Representative Council voted “For” this proposal.
We have consistently backed this program as it navigates through the governance process. Arbitrum operates in a fiercely competitive environment, where incentives play a crucial role in enticing and retaining users while fostering ecosystem growth. Though STIP had its flaws, it served as a valuable first experiment, with lessons learned integrated into the more comprehensive incentive program outlined here.
Moving forward, we are eager to see data analysis taking a pivotal role in guiding the continuous funding of projects and commend the efforts of OBL and @paulsengh thus far. Through rigorous analysis, the Council and DAO should be empowered to more effectively evaluate the highest return on investment for its funds and concentrate distribution toward protocols that demonstrate the most efficient utilization of incentives to stimulate sustained user growth. While defining "success" with incentives may not always be straightforward, we have faith in the multitude of highly skilled individuals collaborating within LTIPP and throughout the DAO to formulate comprehensive solutions to this question.
It is worth highlighting that we were dissatisfied with the mechanism behind the election. Our comments on this topic can be viewed here. However, we are keen that perfect not be the enemy of good and so will continue to offer our overall support for the program.
We wish the LTIPP Council and Advisors the best of luck and they step up to take on this critical role for the DAO :saluting_face:
Steps to Implement
- The Council and Advisors have already started creating the application template and rubric
- When the Tally vote ends the Application period will begin the next business day. Protocols will apply using the application template
- At the same time, applicants will begin the KYC process with the foundation to expedite the process should they receive funding.
Will the application template be available before the Tally vote ends? The Tally vote just went live, and based on the "Flow of Pilot Program" the application period is only 2 weeks. Based on that it sounds like the application template won't be published until the vote is over?
Steps to Implement
- The Council and Advisors have already started creating the application template and rubric
- When the Tally vote ends the Application period will begin the next business day. Protocols will apply using the application template
- At the same time, applicants will begin the KYC process with the foundation to expedite the process should they receive funding.
Will the application template be available before the Tally vote ends? The Tally vote just went live, and based on the "Flow of Pilot Program" the application period is only 2 weeks. Based on that it sounds like the application template won't be published until the vote is over?
Also, can the KYC process be explained a little further. Under the "Flow of Pilot Program" the 3 Week Compliance Period has Arbitrum Foundation reaching out to programs that pass Snapshot vote.
Compliance Period (3 weeks)
All protocols that successfully pass the voting period will undergo a KYC period during these three weeks. Arbitrum Foundation members will reach out to coordinate these KYCs. All protocols will be required to complete the KYC during this period or they may be disqualified from receiving funds.
Once all KYCs are completed, there will be one vote to ratify the DAOs selection of screened and KYC’d protocols. In the event that the Snapshot vote is favorably concluded, protocols will commence receiving its funding through an Hedgey stream, facilitated by oSnap execution.
But the steps to implement reads as if KYC process should be done at the same time the Application Period begins, and KYC must be passed before going to Snapshot
Steps to Implement
- The Council and Advisors have already started creating the application template and rubric
- When the Tally vote ends the Application period will begin the next business day. Protocols will apply using the application template
- At the same time, applicants will begin the KYC process with the foundation to expedite the process should they receive funding. [...]
- All protocols that pass through the council screening phase, pass KYC, and sign grant agreements will move to a snapshot.
Hi @Matt_StableLab, I've noticed that in the updated proposal for the on-chain vote—there's a change in the selection process of data providers from the initial temp-check proposal that was voted on the snapshot.
In the LTIP pilot program temp-check proposal, as I understand it, it will follow a selection process similar to STIP in selecting the provider for this position.
Hi @Matt_StableLab, I've noticed that in the updated proposal for the on-chain vote—there's a change in the selection process of data providers from the initial temp-check proposal that was voted on the snapshot.
In the LTIP pilot program temp-check proposal, as I understand it, it will follow a selection process similar to STIP in selecting the provider for this position.
Temp-check:
Abitrum Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP) Data Monitoring and Reporting]
RFP Live - Oct 8
RFP Submissions Open: Oct, 08 to Oct 015, 2023.
RFP Interview and Submission Reviews: Oct 15 to Oct 22, 2023.
RFP Decision: Oct 22 - Oct 27 2023.
Grant awarded - Oct 27
On-chain vote:
The Pilot Program will onboard OpenBlock Labs as a service provider for data and analytics monitoring and reporting.
Could you provide details on when these processes were carried out for this pilot program? I'm interested in knowing about the other data provider applications that were considered, besides OpenBlock Lab.
Thank you to everyone who has left comments regarding LTIPP and those who voted in the snapshot proposal and council/advisor elections!
Below are the changes and clarifications added to LTIPP after feedback from the community during the Snapshot vote.
Thank you to everyone who has left comments regarding LTIPP and those who voted in the snapshot proposal and council/advisor elections!
Below are the changes and clarifications added to LTIPP after feedback from the community during the Snapshot vote.
The updated proposal has been posted above. We will allow a couple of days for the community to review these changes before we move the proposal to Tally later this week.
This can be discussed should the DAO feel they would prefer this program to be open to all applicants.
Budgets: Added clear budgets with hourly expectations and responsibilities for the Council, Advisor, Program Manager, and Data Provider positions.
Council Conflict of Interest: Council members will have to disclose any COIs and provide a reason. If they are unsure or there is a dispute, other council members will vote on whether or not the situation warrants the council members abstaining from grading that applicant.
Bounties: The council will work with the advisors to create the RFPs for the research bounties. The DAO delegates will then select who will complete each of these RFPs
Maximum Budget Spend: 45M ARB is the maximum budget. The council will screen and only select proposals they think should move a vote. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO. The council can not spend more than 45M arb
Additionally, making it clear the DAO can vote down any proposals during the snapshot phase, saving even more funds which will also be returned to the treasury.
Multisig signer compensation: Reduced to 1000 ARB per signer. This is due to many of their responsibilities being alleviated by the council as well as community feedback.
New Multisig: This is done to avoid conflict of interest as many individuals on the past incentives multisig are now serving as council members. This will also help to prevent confusion regarding which funds are from STIP and which belong to LTIPP.
Data provider role: OBL has clarified their role by providing the exact services they will offer as well as to fill this position. Further info can be found in their SoW
Retrofunding: The council will create a list of possible ways to retroactively distribute funds to those who have contributed to the Pilot Program. The DAO will then vote on which retroactive method(s) should be used. The DAO will also decide on who these retroactive payments will go to.
This AIP establishes a Long-term Term Incentives Pilot Program for the DAO to test new incentive designs and answer the necessary questions to ensure we are ready to commit to the long-term program. This Pilot Program will distribute a maximum of 45M ARB to protocols building on Arbitrum that were not funded during STIP or the Backfund. The program will distribute ARB to protocols for 12 weeks.
This AIP establishes a Long-term Term Incentives Pilot Program for the DAO to test new incentive designs and answer the necessary questions to ensure we are ready to commit to the long-term program. This Pilot Program will distribute a maximum of 45M ARB to protocols building on Arbitrum that were not funded during STIP or the Backfund. The program will distribute ARB to protocols for 12 weeks.
The Arbitrum DAO has spent the last few months experimenting with incentive programs to attract new users and liquidity to Arbitrum. There is a consensus the DAO will use what we learn from these short-term programs to establish a long-term framework. While STIP V1 brought tons of attention to Arbitrum and has resulted in upticks in protocol metrics, we have learned there were many flaws with the structure of STIP Round 1. This Pilot Program looks to implement new mechanisms to address the issues seen during STIP. The DAO will use this Pilot Program as a test run for a long-term framework before committing to a year-long program.
The Pilot Program will operate using a Council, have Advisors to ensure protocols receive adequate feedback and assistance, and allow protocols more freedom to create innovative ARB incentive plans. We believe these changes will help remedy many of the pain points seen in Round 1. Running the Pilot Program to test these new features will allow the DAO to compare different program methods before implementing a long-term framework beginning in Q2 2024. This will help ensure we have all the knowledge necessary to implement the most effective long-term incentives program for Arbitrum.
STIP was an experimental program to distribute ARB to protocols to use as incentives for their users. While it was initially intended to have two rounds, the program was substantially more popular than expected, and the entire 50M ARB budget was used in Round 1 and an additional 21.4M ARB was passed through STIP Backfund for teams that were “approved but not funded”.
This meant no funds remained for Round 2, leading to its cancellation. Many protocols either missed the Round 1 deadline, intentionally waited for Round 2 or simply did not know about STIP. This left several protocols with no alternative route to apply for ARB incentives.
Many STIP Round 1 grantees have seen upticks in their metrics. This Pilot Program would allow protocols that missed out on Round 1 the opportunity to apply to gain these benefits, which will help level the playing field for these protocols. The Pilot Program will replace a round 2 and will be funded with 45M ARB to accommodate the large expected protocol demand we have already seen. This will complete the incentivizing of Arbitrum-based teams to create a holistic competitive edge not against each other but against other chains.
There is a DAO consensus that Arbitrum will need a long-term incentive program in 2024. However, many delegates feel the DAO is moving too quickly and spending too much money on backfund or V2 proposals without yet receiving any of the data on STIP’s effectiveness.
We have learned a lot from STIP and can use what went wrong in STIP and the Backfund to hypothesize what changes would create a better long-term framework. However, we have little evidence to prove these new ideas would be a better solution. DAO members currently don’t have the resources or funds to create a long-term program, nor do we understand what a good long-term program looks like.
This proposal focuses on obtaining this evidence using a committed working stream to guarantee we come away from this program ready to make informed decisions on a long-term framework. The pilot program also allows the DAO to test new aspects of an incentive program such as Advisors, Councils, and more flexible incentive distributions before committing long-term.
This will help save the DAO money and time in the long term by preventing the need for more short-term programs before we are ready to commit to the Long-Term Framework.
The specifications of the Pilot Program were designed to remedy the 3 largest complaints regarding STIP. The Pilot Program hopes to be a test run for these additions for the DAO to determine if they should also be included in the long-term framework.
In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal.
To remedy this problem, the Pilot Program will have a 5 person council elected by the DAO responsible for evaluating applications and selecting which protocols will advance to a snapshot vote to receive ARB. This will ensure all applications are thoughtfully evaluated with only the most deserving receiving incentives. Not only will this help to reduce the burden on delegates, but it will also help expedite the process and allow protocols to receive incentives quickly and efficiently.
A major gripe from protocols was they struggled to get feedback from delegates before the deadline. This left many feeling as though the better-connected protocols had an advantage as they were able to modify their proposals based on feedback to make them more competitive during the vote. Many protocols were willing to make changes to their applications to make them more appealing to the DAO but never received the proper feedback necessary to do so.
The Pilot Program introduces Advisors to assist protocols throughout the pilot program. This will be impartial organizations tasked with providing each applicant with detailed feedback and guidance on how to improve their applications and eventually their incentive programs. This ensures each applicant can iterate on their proposal so they can put forward the best possible incentive plan for the council.
STIP Round 1 had strict limitations on how the ARB could be used as incentives. This was done to protect the DAO and prevent misuse of funds. However, the strict rules resulted in the stifling of many innovative incentive designs. Many protocols had interesting designs that used the ARB in ways that increased alignment, improved cost efficiency, or helped to limit the dumping of ARB. However, these designs were not permitted in Round 1 leading to almost all protocols resulting in generic liquidity incentive models.
The Pilot Program provides more flexibility to protocols to create innovative incentive structures. With the addition of the Council and Advisors, the Pilot Program does not require the rules to be as stringent. Malicious or inefficient designs will be first filtered out by the Advisors and then rejected by the council. Allowing protocols to innovate on incentive distribution mechanisms will allow Arbitrum protocols and community members to get a better idea of which designs work and which don’t work. This will help everyone as we prepare for a longer-term incentives program.
Protocols will have 2 weeks to apply using the Pilot Program application template. The application template will be created by the Council and the Advisors to ensure everyone has the same goals and make it easier for the council to process applications. Applications will be posted in the Pilot Program section of the Arbitrum forum. Protocols only need to post the initial draft of their application during this period. They will then have 2 additional weeks during the feedback period to edit their applications. No late submissions will be accepted.
During the feedback period, the Applications Advisors will provide feedback and guidance on all proposals. Protocols will be assigned an Application Advisor who will provide feedback and guidance on applications on a rolling basis. Protocols will then use this time to work with the Advisors to edit their proposals before applications lock at the end of the 2 weeks.
Protocols can continuously adjust their requested ARB amounts until the feedback period is finished. No changes can be to the requested ARB amount during the screening period.
StableLab will also read all submissions during this period and highlight any rule violations to allow applicants to edit their submissions to ensure they comply with all program rules.
During this period, the council will use the pre-determined rubric to grade each protocol and decide which protocols will advance to the voting period to receive ARB. The Council will use the rubric to select which applications will progress to a snapshot vote. The protocols that the council selects to advance to a snapshot vote must have a total funding amount that is equal to or lower than the incentives budget. This will ensure the DAO does not overspend should all Snapshot votes pass. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO.
The rubric will be created by the Council and Advisors during the Tally voting period and will be publicly available by the time protocols begin to apply. The council will be required to publish a brief reasoning for all of their decisions on the forum to create transparency and accountability.
The council must judge applications as they are and cannot accept protocols at lower amounts than their application states. For example, if an application asks for 200,000 ARB the council can not fund them with 100,000 ARB
EXAMPLE: This is a hypothetical example using a budget of 10 ARB with 50 applicants that each request 1 ARB
50 protocols apply requesting 1 Arb Each -> Council grades all 50 applications using the rubric and narrows the selection down to the top 10 applicants to not exceed the budget -> 10 snapshot votes are created to allow the DAO to confirm the council's decisions -> 9/10 Snapshot votes receive a majority of “fund” votes -> 9 protocols are funded with 1 ARB each and 1 Arb is returned to the DAO
Upon completion of the preliminary applicant screening process by the council, the selected applications will be formally presented to the DAO for consideration. Each application will then be subject to a voting process via Snapshot, allowing Arbitrum delegates to vote on the allocation of funds.
All protocols that successfully pass the voting period will undergo a KYC period during these three weeks. Arbitrum Foundation members will reach out to coordinate these KYCs. All protocols will be required to complete the KYC during this period or they may be disqualified from receiving funds.
Once all KYCs are completed, there will be one vote to ratify the DAOs selection of screened and KYC’d protocols. In the event that the Snapshot vote is favorably concluded, protocols will commence receiving its funding through an Hedgey stream, facilitated by oSnap execution.
Selected protocols will receive their requested ARB using bi-weekly Hedgey streams for 12 weeks. During this time, protocols will be required to provide bi-weekly updates on the progress of their incentives using a template created by the Council and Advisors. Protocols will be required to finish their incentive distributions or return any unused funds two weeks after their final disbursement is available.
During this period Advisors will continue to work with the protocols to help them analyze and improve their distribution mechanisms. Protocols will be allowed to adjust their incentive plans as long as they do not violate any rules and provide their updated plans in their next bi-weekly update.
The council will comprise 5 members. These members should be unbiased and knowledgeable builders, delegates, or organizations with experience in incentive programs, grants councils, or growing a protocol.
The council will decide which protocols will progress to a snapshot vote to be awarded the ARB incentives. The council does not need to spend the entire incentives budget should they feel there are not enough quality applications. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO to be used in the Long Term Framework.
The council members will be responsible for creating a rubric that all protocols will be judged against. The council will design this rubric with input from the Advisors and will communicate what they are looking for with the Advisors to ensure the Advisors guide protocols in the right direction. The highest-scoring protocols will progress to Snapshot votes to allow the DAO to determine if they should receive ARB. The council will be responsible for publishing the graded rubrics as well as a brief explanation for all decisions.
The council will also be responsible for determining when to halt a protocol’s stream should they violate program rules or misuse funds. All reports of violations will be evaluated by the council. It will require 4 out of 5 council members to vote in favor of halting the stream for a stream to be stopped. Council members will coordinate with the multi-sig signers to halt a stream. Streams can also be halted via a DAO snapshot vote should the DAO disagree with the council’s judgment.
While 45 million was the DAO's selected budget, the Council does not need to allocate the full amount. The council is responsible for screening applications and will only progress applications they view as worthy of moving to Snapshot. The total funding amount of applications moved to snapshot can be anywhere between 0 and 45M ARB. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO treasury by the multisig.
The council will create the RFPs for the research bounties.
Each RFP will include the research question that should be answered as well as the maximum budget for the bounty. While there is 200,000 ARB allocated for research bounties the council does not need to allocate the entire budget. Arbitrum delegates will then select who will complete each of these RFPs via a snapshot election.
The 5 council members have been selected by DAO vote. The 5 Council Applicants with the most votes were elected to serve on the council for the Pilot Program.
Those who serve on the Pilot Program Council are not guaranteed to be included on a council in the full Long Term Incentives Program. There will be new elections to select council members when it comes time for the full long-term program.
Council members have been elected via Snapshot vote and are listed below.
Should a Council member have a conflict of interest with an applicant they may excuse themselves from grading said applicant. A conflict of interest can include an investment or close personal ties to an applying protocol. Should this happen the council member will have to disclose they are not grading and provide a reason.
Should there be a dispute over whether the circumstances qualify as a conflict of interest the other council members will vote on whether or not the situation warrants the council members abstaining from grading that applicant.
Should the DAO feel a member or members of the council are not fulfilling their duty they may remove them using a snapshot vote.
Anyone with sufficient voting power can initiate a Snapshot poll to remove council member(s). Should the poll receive a majority “remove” votes the council member(s) will be immediately removed.
Should this occur there will then be a week-long application process where replacement council members can apply via the forum. This will be followed by a Snapshot vote to elect replacement member(s)
Each council seat will receive 25,000 ARB streamed biweekly throughout the program.
The council will be compensated at 83.33 ARB per hour. The amount is denominated in ARB to incentivize council members to try to maximize the Value of ARB. Additionally, offering compensation in ARB helps to attract contributors who believe in the future success of Arbitrum.
Below is a breakdown of the council's responsibilities as well as the expected amount of time they will take to complete.
Three Advisors will help protocols design, implement, and iterate their incentive programs. Advisors are integral to the proposal process, serving as impartial entities with DeFi expertise. Their primary function is to provide detailed, unbiased feedback on applications, aiding protocols in refining and improving their submissions.
The Advisors will also work closely with the council to create the application template and grading rubric. This will ensure the council and advisors are on the same page so they can provide the best feedback to applicants and ensure the council understands the details of the incentive mechanisms the Advisors are helping protocols design.
As this is an experimental addition to the incentives framework, having expert advisors working with protocols will help protocols and the DAO understand what is most helpful from an advisor and allow the DAO to adjust the role for the longer-term framework. This will also help protocols design more innovative incentive distribution mechanisms that can be tested to see how effective they are going into a long-term incentives framework.
Collaboration with Council and Program Manager: Work jointly to design the application template, KPIs, and a grading rubric, ensuring alignment with council expectations and clarity in the evaluation process.
Feedback and Recommendations: Offer detailed feedback on each eligible application assigned to your team during the review period.
Communication with Applicants: Engage actively with applicants to streamline the application process, aiding in proposal improvements and clarifications.
Hosting Office Hours: Schedule and conduct public office hours 3 times per week while the program is running for protocols to seek advice. This will focus on transparency and accessibility. All interactions during these sessions will be recorded and summarized for everyone. Order of speaking during office hours will be on a first come first serve basis.
Impartiality: Advisors must remain unbiased, especially as they do not have the final say in proposal acceptance. While Advisors will work closely with the council members to create the Rubric, advisors should not interfere with the votes from the council nor guarantee any outcome to projects they speak with.
Continuous Engagement: Post-application feedback is crucial, as is ongoing involvement in the later stages of the process, subject to discussion and agreement with relevant parties. There may also be later involvement in the process when the program is running or over.
Pre-Application Phase: Advisors we assist the Council with the design of the application template and grading rubric. Advisors are required to hold open office hours, focusing on guiding applicants in preparing their proposals.
Application Review Phase: Each proposal receives at least one detailed feedback report addressing key criteria established by the DAO.
Post-Application Feedback: After the submission of proposals, advisors provide insights on the process and suggest improvements for future cycles.
Those who serve as a Pilot Program Advisor are not guaranteed to be included onboarded in the full Long Term Incentives Program. There will be new elections to select Advisors when it comes time for the full long-term program.
The Advisors have been elected via Snapshot vote and are listed below.
Each Advisor will receive 35,000 ARB streamed biweekly throughout the program.
The council will be compensated at 83.33 ARB per hour. The amount is denominated in ARB to incentivize Advisors to try to maximize the Value of ARB. Additionally, offering compensation in ARB helps to attract contributors who believe in the future success of Arbitrum.
Below is a breakdown of the Advisor’s responsibilities as well as the expected amount of time they will take to complete.
A new multisig will be created for this program. A few individuals from the original STIP-ARB multisig used in Round 1 and the backfund proposal are now serving as council members in LTIPP which could create a conflict of interest. Additionally, a new multisig will help to prevent confusion regarding which funds are from STIP and which belong to LTIPP. Finally, a new multisig reduces redundancy of signers across multiple DAO programs which helps to protect the DAO by increasing decentralization.
The new multisig will be a ⅗ multisig and include:
Multi-sig address: 0x544cBe6698E2e3b676C76097305bBa588dEfB13A
The funds in the multisig belong to the DAO, and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. In LTIPP, the council is responsible for deciding when to halt streams and can coordinate with the multi-sig signers so they can enact this request. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in DAO governance, including delegation.
The multisig includes two features to ensure the accountability of signers and grantees:
Each Multisig signer will receive 1,000 ARB streamed biweekly throughout the program.
In LTIPP, the council is responsible for deciding when to halt streams. This has decreased a significant amount of the multisig’s workload. Due to this, the budget has been lowered from the STIP budget.
The Program Manager will be responsible for coordinating between all parties involved to ensure the Pilot Program runs smoothly. They will be available to answer any questions the DAO has regarding the Pilot Program and will publish bi-weekly reports so the community understands the status of the program. This role is designed to add efficiency and clarity to all aspects of the Pilot Program. The Program Manager will have no input into which protocols receive funds. However, they will be responsible for handling any operational tasks that arise throughout the Pilot Program.
Matt from StableLab will act as the program manager. StableLab will function in a similar capacity as they did for STIP Round 1. They will help coordinate between the multisig, council, Advisors, applicants, foundation, and community to ensure the Pilot Program program runs smoothly. StableLab will serve as a neutral party and have no power to decide which protocols receive funding or which streams are halted.
StableLab was responsible for designing this Pilot Program and will continue working on designing a long-term Framework with the help of the incentives working group and the DAO. StableLab will be responsible for publishing a research report on the effectiveness of the Pilot Program and their findings on how it operationally compared to STIP V1.
Should the DAO feel StableLab is not fulfilling their duties as program manager, they may remove them using a snapshot vote. An emergency Snapshot vote will then be used to elect a replacement program manager.
In the Long Term Incentives Framework, this position will be decided by the DAO. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, it will continue using StableLab’s services given they have experience from managing STIP V1 and already have knowledge from designing this process.
The Program Manager will receive 70,000 ARB total streamed biweekly throughout the program.
The Program Manager will be compensated at 83.33 ARB per hour. The amount is denominated in ARB to incentivize Advisors to try to maximize the Value of ARB. Additionally, offering compensation in ARB helps to attract contributors who believe in the future success of Arbitrum.
Below is a breakdown of the Program Manager's responsibilities and the expected amount of time they will take to complete.
| Responsibility | Estimated time Spent | Compensation |
|---|---|---|
| Pre Application period | 40 hours per week for 2 weeks = 80 hours | 6,666.4 ARB |
| Application Period | 40 hours per week for 4 weeks = 160 hours | 13,332.8 ARB |
| Screening / Voting Period | 40 hours per week for 2 weeks = 80 hours | 6,666.4 ARB |
| Incentives Period: | 30 hours per week for 12 weeks = 360 hours | 29,998.8 ARB |
| Post Incentives | 40 hours per week for 4 weeks = 160 hours | 13,332.8 ARB |
| Total | = 840 hours | 70,000 ARB |
The Pilot Program will onboard OpenBlock Labs as a service provider for data and analytics monitoring and reporting.
To optimize each initiative, the DAO must collect and analyze data regarding the efficacy of incentives. For the two prior incentive programs, the DAO has partnered with OpenBlock Labs to provide robust incentive data, which can be found here. In addition to the data, OpenBlock provides biweekly updates to the forum, and has collaborated with dozens of protocols and delegates to share meaningful insights; our most recent analysis can be found here.
In the following section, we outline OpenBlock’s scope for the LTIPP.
Incorporate Past Learnings: Collaborate with LTIPP advisors to strategically distribute incentive budgets across categories and protocols, utilizing insights derived from OpenBlock’s STIP efficacy analysis. Our previous endeavors have uncovered millions of dollars in unoptimized spending, and we are confident that OpenBlock is well-positioned to guide the DAO in implementing improvements based on these insights.
To illustrate these insights more vividly, we present two examples of real scenarios within the STIP where OBL's recommendations could effectively guide substantial capital allocation in a meaningful direction, showcasing the potential ROI of OBL’s work:
1. Concentration of Rewards: A handful of protocols have dispersed the majority of their rewards (50-70% or more) to a small group of users (less than 10). In such cases, the DAO is essentially committing millions of dollars to highly concentrated bets on user acquisition. Frequently, these major stakeholders have vested interests in the protocol, resulting in rewards flowing toward rent-seeking participants. The underlying data is available in the “User Claim Activity” section here. 2. Excessive Spending: Some protocols have distributed significant rewards without showing substantial additional growth compared to their pre-STIP trajectory, as observed in our competitive analysis control groups. Leveraging the data, OBL can offer insights on optimizing allocations and implementing mechanisms to enhance the efficiency of incentive spending. This includes setting specific performance targets to guide the continued deployment of funds. Since we have already spent a lot of time investing in these relationships with protocols, we are in a prime position to efficiently offer these services. The underlying data is available in the “Protocol Metrics Normalized” section here.
Protocol Data Aggregation: Interface with each protocol to audit and aggregate data on their KPIs. Monitor efficacy through a diverse set of metrics, mirroring the approach taken in the STIP (such as nominal TVL/volume/fees/DAU growth at the protocol level, normalized by claimed ARB, competitive intelligence, aggregated data at the category and ecosystem levels, etc.). Leverage any additional resources to help teams optimize their incentive mechanisms by building more granular insights. To provide more clarity on the resources required for this section, we have detailed the scope below:
Protocol-Specific:
Aggregate:
Making Data Publically Available: The Data provider will be responsible for making the data behind each dashboard publicly available. This will ensure those completing the Research Bounties have access to this information so they can provide proper analysis of this data. Easy access to data will allow for the Bounty completers to provide better reports and data visualizations for the community. This provides the DAO with a decentralized method for analyzing and understanding how effective this program is as well as better setting up the DAO for the Long Term Framework.
Monitor For Misuse of Funds: The data provider will monitor data from all funded protocols to detect any misuse of funds. Should they find suspicious activity the data Provider will be responsible for sharing this with the Council.
Create a Recap Report: The Data provider will be responsible for creating a recap report that tells the story of the Pilot Program and breaks down the successes and failures of the different incentive strategies.
Biweekly updates: The data provider will provide biweekly updates of the overall themes, trends, and findings from the program.
Interface with the council, advisors and protocols: The analytics providers have access to a wealth of incentive data, thus they are expected to leverage this data to provide feedback to teams who are designing incentive programs.
Interface with the research bounties and community: The analytics provider should work with the research bounty teams and any interested community members to ensure all data is open source and available for teams to access and interact with.
Impartiality: The Data Provider must remain unbiased. While the Data providers will not have the power to halt streams themselves, they must be impartial when it comes to reporting the data and examining for any misuse of funds. Any suspicious behavior they find must be communicated to the council for further review.
Continuous Monitoring: The Data Provider must continually update the data to reflect the latest updates. This will ensure the bounty researchers and community have access to the correct information. They also must continually monitor for misuse of funds to allow the council to act quickly should any issues arise
This will be an elected position in the long-term program. Additionally, given the long-term framework will have a much larger scope and will include many separate incentive categories, it will most likely require the DAO to onboard multiple different organizations to handle the long-term framework’s data monitoring and reporting. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, the Data provider will be selected and ratified by the DAO similar to STIP round 1.
The Data and Analytics Provider will receive 100,000 ARB streamed throughout the program.
For this budget, OpenBlock Labs will commit 3 full-time equivalent data scientists.
During this time they will be responsible for:
This proposal has been continuously worked on by the authors since the middle of November after requests from the DAO emerged to create an alternative round 2 of STIP. The protocol authors have drafted the proposal, met with delegates for feedback, presented open workshopping calls, implemented feedback, and progressed the proposal towards a vote for the past few months. This funding section retroactively compensates the proposal authors for the hundreds of hours of work put into creating this proposal.
Below is a breakdown of the three contributors as well as their time commitments over the past few months of creating this proposal.
Total Cost 30,000 ARB
| Contributor | Responsibility | Estimated time Spent | Compensation |
|---|---|---|---|
| StableLab | Authoring the proposal, leading efforts to gather delegate feedback, co-hosting workshop calls and working group pitches | 30 hours per week for 8 weeks = 240 hours | 15,000 ARB |
| Alex Lumley | Assisting in proposal design, leading efforts to gather delegate feedback, co-hosting workshop calls and working group pitches | 20 hours per week for 8 weeks = 160 hours | 10,000 ARB |
| Bobby Bola | Advising proposal design, assisting with delegate outreach and feedback | 10 hours per week for 8 weeks = 80 hours | 5,000 ARB |
| Total | 450 hours | 30,000 ARB |
The Pilot Program proposal will include research bounties to ensure the DAO collects sufficient data and draws meaningful conclusions from STIP, the Backfund, and the LTIP Pilot Program to help inform the future LTIP design. There will be up to 200,000 ARB available to those who complete bounties.
This process guarantees the DAO will have multiple teams working on providing meaningful conclusions regarding incentive programs. These conclusions will be essential to allow the DAO to possess all the information necessary to create the best possible long-term incentive framework.
The Council will be responsible for creating the research bounties RFPs that will include what question the research should answer as well as a maximum budget.
Some possible questions the bounties could address are:
Note: See more community-created research buckets in the forum here
Researchers will then apply to claim these bounties by providing why they are the best fit to answer the question as well as providing a budget.
The DAO will be responsible for selecting who completes each bounty based on the applicant's experience and proposed budget.
The 200,000 ARB is the maximum amount spent on research bounties. Should the DAO choose to fund lower budgets, any unused funds will be returned to the DAO.
In STIP Round 1 we saw many community members go above and beyond by providing valuable contributions without any funding. 100,000 ARB will be allocated for retroactive funding to community members who add valuable contributions during the Pilot Program. Earmarking these funds upfront lets people know there will be retro funding which will encourage community members to contribute. This section is intentionally vague to encourage all kinds of community contributions. The DAO will have the final say in how these funds will be used.
The exact methods used to distribute the funds will be selected by the DAO. The council will create a list of possible ways to retroactively distribute funds to those who have contributed to the Pilot Program. The DAO will then vote on which retroactive method(s) should be used. The DAO will also decide on who these retroactive payments will go to.
This program is designed to reduce the large burden delegates faced during STIP round 1. While many of their responsibilities will be taken on by the Council and Advisors, the Arbitrum delegates will still retain the final say in many aspects of this proposal.
Delegates will retain the following powers:
The pilot program is for protocols that did not receive ARB during STIP or the Backfund. However, protocols that received grants from the Arbitrum Foundation, Questbook’s grant program, or any other Arbitrum Grants program are eligible to receive Pilot Program funding. Additionally, receiving funding from the Pilot Program does not prohibit protocols from applying for funding from other DAO or foundation programs including the Long Term Incentives Program.
By streaming grant payments, the multisig will be empowered to hold grantees accountable to their proposals by halting fund streaming for any of the following reasons:
In that this proposal aims to be experimental, the multisig is not intended to provide quality control on the design of incentive programs. Rather, they are empowered to halt streaming in the event of negligence or misuse of funds.
The ITU Blockchain Delegation Committee acknowledges the challenges faced during the STIP voting process and aims to turn them into constructive opportunities. Notably, ITU Blockchain has demonstrated commitment by thoroughly voting on all 97 proposals in the STIP, accompanied by detailed rationales available here. The committee is excited about replicating this engagement in the LTIP and emphasizes the positive impact of retroactive community funding in encouraging project votes. While appreciating the innovative concept of the research treasury, the committee suggests enhancing clarity on research grants, defining expectations for researchers, and specifying response times for inquiries to foster community involvement and inspire creative ideas. In a positive light, a comparison between LTIP and STIP treasuries indicates potential growth, attributed to an extended timeline (18 weeks) and consistent ARB token allocations. Consequently, the committee lists its votes as follows: Fund with program 45.815.000, Fund with program 35.815.000, Fund with program 25.815.000, and against.
We believe electing a council to speed up the delivery of proposals to a final vote would be of great benefit to the broader Arbitrum ecosystem, ensuring delegates are not overloaded.
As competition continues to increase with newer launches and market sentiment increasing, we want to ensure that governance proposals achieve an efficient delivery mechanism to voting which we believe a council and advisor structure can achieve. We fully support this proposal as it aims to serve the good of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
We believe electing a council to speed up the delivery of proposals to a final vote would be of great benefit to the broader Arbitrum ecosystem, ensuring delegates are not overloaded.
As competition continues to increase with newer launches and market sentiment increasing, we want to ensure that governance proposals achieve an efficient delivery mechanism to voting which we believe a council and advisor structure can achieve. We fully support this proposal as it aims to serve the good of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
We have a few concerns regarding the length of the pilot, the barrier against STIP recipients, and the overhead size.
Even with the concerns above, we fully support the LTIP if wider concerns are appropriately addressed before a Tally vote.
Thanks, @Bob-Rossi for correcting me. I appreciate your input and assistance.
I have voted FOR this proposal. I appreciate that this next iteration of the grants program has taken STIP pain points into consideration and I think the changes will help alleviate the issues.
The grant program has to keep growing in some manner, and at this 'exploratory' stage of ARB's grant ecosystem I believe the changes are a great step towards a final product. I'll add that I think the applicant advisor roles are a nice addition as I have gotten feedback from a few would-be applicants now that they have had trouble knowing where to start when applying. This should help make sure projects that are great on their own merit but not so great at drafting a request won't be behind the 8 ball against others.
I have voted FOR this proposal. I appreciate that this next iteration of the grants program has taken STIP pain points into consideration and I think the changes will help alleviate the issues.
The grant program has to keep growing in some manner, and at this 'exploratory' stage of ARB's grant ecosystem I believe the changes are a great step towards a final product. I'll add that I think the applicant advisor roles are a nice addition as I have gotten feedback from a few would-be applicants now that they have had trouble knowing where to start when applying. This should help make sure projects that are great on their own merit but not so great at drafting a request won't be behind the 8 ball against others.
I'll add I'm glad to see that there are research components and emphasis on gathering data, as arguably one of the most import parts of this LTIPP is growing into whatever the 'final' form of the Arbitrum Grants program looks like.
I don't believe the 45M option pays 125k ARB per council member, but 125k ARB total at 25k per member regardless of size.
Thank you, @Matt_StableLab , and everyone who were involved in drafting this proposal. The initiative to transition from short-term incentive strategies to a more sustainable long-term framework is commendable and aligns with the growing demand and lessons learned from the STIP.
Support for the Proposal:
Thank you, @Matt_StableLab , and everyone who were involved in drafting this proposal. The initiative to transition from short-term incentive strategies to a more sustainable long-term framework is commendable and aligns with the growing demand and lessons learned from the STIP.
Support for the Proposal:
Alignment with Previous Success: The pilot program is well-structured to address the shortcomings of STIP Round 1, proposing more efficient mechanisms like a dedicated council and Application Advisors. These improvements are crucial for the effective distribution of incentives.
Testing New Mechanisms: As a pilot, this program offers a valuable opportunity to test and refine incentive mechanisms, providing essential data to shape the future long-term framework.
Areas of Consideration:
Cost Considerations: The proposed compensation for the election position appears significantly high, particularly for an initial pilot program. We recognize that this proposal was developed during a period when the ARB value was comparatively lower than it is now. Considering the magnitude of the allocated funds, it would be great to have some detail on the basis of this amount justification. Hence, we are leaning toward the lower end of the program funding size.
Council and Advisor Roles: Diversifying expertise in the council and advisor roles to cover specific sectors like gaming, DeFi, and NFTs could enhance the program's effectiveness. This specialization would ensure deeper understanding and tailored support across various segments.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
After following the development of the proposal through the relevant working group, we have decided to vote in its favour during temp-check.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
After following the development of the proposal through the relevant working group, we have decided to vote in its favour during temp-check.
It is apparent that the LTIP working group put a lot of thought into addressing the challenges delegates faced during STIP and although the proposal isn’t perfect, it’s a huge step forward. And, considering this is a pilot program, it’s a good stepping stone upon which the DAO can iterate in the future.
Having a council screen applications before having the delegates vote on them is a great way to ease the burden put on delegates, while at the same time letting them retain the decision-making power. On a similar note, enabling applying protocols to have someone to turn to (Application Advisors) to get feedback will allow them to create even better proposals, thus increasing their chances of being accepted, and in turn potentially increasing the positive impact they can have on the broader Arbitrum ecosystem.
The biggest improvement in our eyes however, is the fact that this proposal, contrary to the STIP (although OpenBlock Labs did retroactively analyse the STIP), includes a data provider to monitor and report on the data from each protocol receiving funding. Understanding the impact the LTIPP has (and STIP had) is crucial in order to create a sustainable, long-term incentives program that has a positive and lasting effect on Arbitrum.
@AbdullahUmar and I have shared our thoughts on this vote here. Overall, we're in favor and are excited to see this get going. One thing to note and consider we think is reevaluating some of the compensations, for example the Multi-sig signer.
Voting order
If the option to Abstain was available this would have been availed but it was not possible on this snapshot vote, so voting and providing feedback.
gm all, nice to see the hard work of the last few months coming to fruition.
I am supportive of this intiative and voted FOR the pilot program of the LTIP.
Rationale:
I think the 3 key problems identified are tackling the right frictions that currently exist for such a program to be lean, effective, yet fair and open.
Good day, @cattin I like your rationale for rejecting the offer. In addition to payment, in order to avoid centralization of grant decisions, perhaps if @att_StableLab adds the following changes to his work, we may consider the proposal again:
@TreasureDAO's Arbitrum Council (ARC) will vote FOR this proposal on Snapshot to fund the program with 45,815,000 (ranked in descending order of ARB amount).
Treasure has been involved in the pre-forum socialization process for the Long-Term Incentive Pilot Program (LTIPP) and believes it addresses many of the challenges identified through STIP Round 1, further builds upon it, and will set the foundation to establish a long-term, sustainable incentives/grants program that will support the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.
I want to say that I appreciate all the effort that went into drafting this proposal. I understand that the whole STIP was a bit chaotic, so I really like seeing a proposal that aims to make its successor more efficient, but I'm not sure if this is the best way.
Hello, @Matt_StableLab! Thanks for the proposal, it's great. A small note, we think that 2500 ARB for a multisig is atoo much. In all other proposals on the platform it was 1000 (taking into account the fact that the cost of the ARB increased to $2)
Voting order
If the option to Abstain was available this would have been availed but it was not possible on this snapshot vote, so voting and providing feedback.
Highly supportive of the idea of running a V2 to the original STIP with those protocols having weighted months, while the backfund worked through voting, funding and now disbursment before their proposal finally came to vote. Voting in support instead of to not Fund the Piliot Program is to ensure the V2 opportunity does exist, despite misgivings on the proposed size of this Pilot program at between $52.5 and $105 million + overheads.
Concerns Voting on Tally in support will be contingent on seeing progress on the below concerns.
Size of the Pilot program
Eligibility
Additional Budgets
No doubt the role of the council we elect will be very important, and it would be prudent for everyone to understand the philosophy of candidates including with regards to their view on how the budget reflects a mandate to spend.
gm all, nice to see the hard work of the last few months coming to fruition.
I am supportive of this intiative and voted FOR the pilot program of the LTIP.
Rationale:
I think the 3 key problems identified are tackling the right frictions that currently exist for such a program to be lean, effective, yet fair and open.
The council and advisors are tasked with supporting applications and ensuring a minimum agreed-upon quality, while still preserving the ultimate decision-making power of the delegates.
Still, I want to echo @cp0x and @cattin : the proposed compensation for some positions are not aligned with the current market. While people involved in the different roles take the downside risk of the market if the ARB tokens go down, I would encourage to review the different compensation packages before submitting the final proposal on Tally.
@TreasureDAO's Arbitrum Council (ARC) will vote FOR this proposal on Snapshot to fund the program with 45,815,000 (ranked in descending order of ARB amount).
Treasure has been involved in the pre-forum socialization process for the Long-Term Incentive Pilot Program (LTIPP) and believes it addresses many of the challenges identified through STIP Round 1, further builds upon it, and will set the foundation to establish a long-term, sustainable incentives/grants program that will support the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
With our support of this proposal, we also urge the DAO to consider the following:
The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.
I want to say that I appreciate all the effort that went into drafting this proposal. I understand that the whole STIP was a bit chaotic, so I really like seeing a proposal that aims to make its successor more efficient, but I'm not sure if this is the best way.
First of all, I feel like relying so heavily on a council could end up centralizing Arbitrum's governance a bit too much, especially if it's related to protocol incentives since they are essential for the development of the ecosystem. Because, even though I understand that it was a burden for most delegates, I think that we could just give them more time to review proposals (with longer review windows and feedback periods). This, coupled with compensations for delegates, could alleviate the burden.
Replacing delegates with a council might be more efficient in a way, but it also takes away value from governance - if I'm not wrong, many protocols started engaging with the DAOs governance thanks to STIP.
Second, I think some expenses are a bit too high and might not be necessary. I understand that the DAO has a massive treasury but it doesn't mean we shouldn't be a bit more careful with it ~ excluding the incentives, there's an additional 815,000 ARB requested for various purposes, this amounts to roughly $1.7M. For example, I think that the program shouldn't include the role of the advisor since, ideally, with a longer timeframe, feedback should come from the delegates + it would encourage protocols to learn the DAO governance process. As a side note, I noticed that @SEEDGov applied to this role, but I just wanted to state that our delegation decides independently from the organization.
Eventhough I like the direction towards this proposal is going, I think we have to develop a program that seeks more involvement from the delegates and relies less on centralized committees.
Simplified Version of the Updated Proposal:
Abstract: The proposal aims to address past incentive program issues and test new mechanisms through the Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program, distributing 35M ARB to protocols from January 2024 to April 2024.
Motivation:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Simplified Version of the Updated Proposal:
Abstract: The proposal aims to address past incentive program issues and test new mechanisms through the Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program, distributing 35M ARB to protocols from January 2024 to April 2024.
Motivation:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Why Protocols Need a Round 2:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Rationale:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Specifications - Problem/Solutions:
Advantages:
Feedback:
V2 Flow:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Roles and Responsibilities:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Research Bounties:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Arbitrum Delegates:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Eligibility Requirements:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Steps to Implement:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Overall Cost:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Conclusion: The proposed Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program shows promise in addressing past issues and preparing for a comprehensive long-term framework. Improving communication effectiveness and simplifying language could further enhance clarity and implementation efficiency.
This proposal is now live for vote! Please cast your vote on Snapshot
Hey @thedevanshmehta thank you for your support and valuable feedback!
Just to clarify, this is how much the council can approve right? but if 45 million is allocated and the delegates reject 15 million of it, only 30 million would be spent. Is my understanding correct?
Hey @thedevanshmehta thank you for your support and valuable feedback!
Just to clarify, this is how much the council can approve right? but if 45 million is allocated and the delegates reject 15 million of it, only 30 million would be spent. Is my understanding correct?
Yes, this would be the maximum amount spent. The funds from any applications the delegates reject will be returned to the DAO.
In my view we should not overcomplicate this by involving the entire DAO and just let the council members/application advisors give it to community members that have helped reduce their workload. But curious to know yours and others thoughts on this.
This is very valuable feedback and we are still finalizing the exact mechanism. This will be figured out and clearly defined by the Tally vote!
Proposal Edit Note: We have added a small funding amount to compensate @AlexLumley and @Bobbay for the many hours they spent helping design the proposal and advancing it to the voting stage. This was done to reward DAO members for their hard work on the proposal and to avoid relying on other programs such as Plurality Labs to reward valuable contributions
Proposal Creation Assistance: 15,000 ARB - 10,000 ARB for Alex Lumley and 5,000 ARB for Bobby Bola for their time spent assisting with proposal design, hosting proposal office hour calls, and communicating with delegates to gather feedback.
Really appreciate Matt and the team being so receptive to feedback. I am now in a position to support the LTIPP!
To avoid too much centralization of power with the council the delegates will now get the chance to vote to confirm all of the council’s choices.
Really appreciate Matt and the team being so receptive to feedback. I am now in a position to support the LTIPP!
To avoid too much centralization of power with the council the delegates will now get the chance to vote to confirm all of the council’s choices.
This is a great move because in their negotiations with applicants, the council has the ability to say "we don't have all the power so make XYZ change else the delegates might not vote for approval." Creating this check on the councils power will lead to a better outcome.
Additionally the DAO will now have the ability to choose the size of the Pilot Program with voting options of 25M, 35M, and 45M in incentives budgets
Just to clarify, this is how much the council can approve right? but if 45 million is allocated and the delegates reject 15 million of it, only 30 million would be spent. Is my understanding correct?
Retroactive Community Funding has been added to encourage community members to provide valuable contributions throughout the program
100,000 ARB will be allocated for retroactive funding to community members who add valuable contributions during the Pilot Program. The DAO will have the final say in how these funds will be used.
This might have intentionally been left vague (DAO will have the final say?) Its not necessary for this stage of the proposal, but I would like some details on who gets to allocate the 100k ARB. Would it be via Gitcoin matching funds to Arbitrum citizens? A JokeRace/snapshot weighted voting for anyone with delegated ARB to vote on those competing?
In my view we should not overcomplicate this by involving the entire DAO and just let the council members/application advisors give it to community members that have helped reduce their workload. But curious to know yours and others thoughts on this.
After receiving amazing feedbackin the forum, speaking with many delegates, and sharing the proposal in multiple community calls we have improved the proposal in the following ways:
After receiving amazing feedbackin the forum, speaking with many delegates, and sharing the proposal in multiple community calls we have improved the proposal in the following ways:
EXAMPLE: This is a hypothetical example using a budget of 10 ARB with 50 applicants that each request 1 ARB
50 protocols apply requesting 1 Arb Each -> Councils grades all 50 applications using the rubric and narrow the selection down to the top 10 applicants to not exceed the budget -> 10 snapshot votes are created to allow the DAO to confirm the council's decisions -> 9/10 Snapshot votes receive a majority of “fund” votes -> 9 protocols are funded with 1 ARB each and 1 Arb is returned to the DAO
Additionally the DAO will now have the ability to choose the size of the Pilot Program with voting options of 25M, 35M, and 45M in incentives budgets. This will be voted on during the proposal Snapshot
The Application Advisors and Council members will now be elected via Snapshot to allow the DAO to choose who they want to fill these positions.
Added role responsibilities, goals, and selection criteria to provide more clarity to the community and assure accountability for these positions.
There are now 3 Application Advisors to accomadate the expected application demand and ensure each applicant is able to recieve sufficient attention from advisors. Additionally, Application Advisors will now help protocols throughout the entire incentive period to help protocols manage, evaluate, and tweak their incentive plans.
Clarified how this Incentives program relates to eligibility for other DAO grant programs
“The pilot program is intended for protocols that did not receive ARB during STIP or the Backfund. However, protocols that received grants from the Arbitrum Foundation, Questbook’s grant program, or any other Arbitrum Grants program are eligible to receive Pilot Program funding. Additionally, receiving funding from the Pilot Program does not prohibit protocols from applying for funding from other DAO or foundation programs including the Long Term Incentives Program.”
Thanks again to everyone who has provided feedback on this program! Please read the entire updated proposal here.
Additionally, anyone interested in being an Application Advisor or Council Member is encouraged to apply here
This AIP establishes a Long Term Incentives Pilot Program for the DAO to test new incentives designs and answer the necessary questions to ensure we are ready to commit to the long-term program. This Pilot Program will distribute 25-45M ARB to protocols building on Arbitrum. The exact amount will be determined by the DAO via Snapshot vote and will be ratified via Tally vote. The program will distribute ARB to protocols for 12 weeks.
This AIP establishes a Long Term Incentives Pilot Program for the DAO to test new incentives designs and answer the necessary questions to ensure we are ready to commit to the long-term program. This Pilot Program will distribute 25-45M ARB to protocols building on Arbitrum. The exact amount will be determined by the DAO via Snapshot vote and will be ratified via Tally vote. The program will distribute ARB to protocols for 12 weeks.
The Arbitrum DAO has spent the last few months experimenting with incentive programs to attract new users and liquidity to Arbitrum. There is a consensus the DAO will use what we learn from these short-term programs to establish a long-term framework. While STIP V1 brought tons of attention to Arbitrum and has resulted in upticks in protocol metrics, we have learned there were many flaws with the structure of STIP Round 1. This Pilot Program looks to implement new mechanisms to address the issues seen in STIP V1. The DAO will use this Pilot Program as a test run for a long-term framework before committing to a year-long program.
The Pilot Program will operate using a Council, have Application Advisors to ensure protocols receive adequate feedback and assistance, and allow protocols more freedom to create innovative ARB incentive plans. We believe these changes will help remedy many of the pain points seen in Round 1. Running the Pilot Program to test these new features will allow the DAO to compare different program methods before implementing a long-term framework beginning in Q2 2024. This will help ensure we have all the knowledge necessary to implement the most effective long-term incentives program for Arbitrum.
STIP was an experimental program to distribute ARB to protocols to use as incentives for their users. While it was initially intended to have two rounds, the program was substantially more popular than expected, and the entire 50M ARB budget was used in Round 1 as was permissible in the original rules.
This meant no funds remained for Round 2, leading to its cancellation. Many protocols either missed the Round 1 deadline or intentionally waited for Round 2. This left several protocols with no alternative route to apply for ARB incentives. Many STIP Round 1 grantees have seen upticks in their metrics. This Pilot Program would allow protocols that missed out on Round 1 the opportunity to apply to gain these benefits, which will help level the playing field for these protocols. The Pilot Program will replace a round 2 and will be funded with 25M-45M ARB to accommodate the large expected protocol demand we have already seen. This will complete the incentivizing of Arbitrum-based teams to create a holistic competitive edge not against each other but against other chains.
There is a DAO consensus that Arbitrum will need a long-term incentive program in 2024. However, many delegates feel the DAO is moving too quickly and spending too much money on backfund or V2 proposals without yet receiving any of the data on STIP’s effectiveness.
We have learned a lot from STIP and can use what went wrong in STIP and the Backfund to hypothesize what changes would create a better long-term framework. However, we have little evidence to prove these new ideas would be a better solution. DAO members currently don’t have the resources or funds to create a long-term program, nor do we understand what a good long-term program looks like.
This proposal focuses on obtaining this evidence using a committed working stream to guarantee we come away from this program ready to make informed decisions on a long-term framework. The pilot program also allows the DAO to test new aspects of an incentive program such as Application Advisors, Councils, and more flexible incentive distributions before committing long-term.
This will help save the DAO money and time in the long term by preventing the need for more short-term programs before we are ready to commit to the Long-Term Framework.
The specifications of the Pilot Program were designed to remedy the 3 largest complaints regarding STIP Round 1. The Pilot Program hopes to be a test run for these additions for the DAO to determine if they should also be included in the long-term framework.
In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal.
To remedy this problem, the Pilot Program will have a 5 person council elected by the DAO responsible for evaluating applications and selecting which protocols will advance to a snapshot vote to receive ARB. This will ensure all applications are thoughtfully evaluated with only the most deserving receiving incentives. Not only will this help to reduce the burden on delegates, but it will also help expedite the process and allow protocols to receive incentives quickly and efficiently.
A major gripe from protocols was they struggled to get feedback from delegates before the deadline. This left many feeling as though the better-connected protocols had an advantage as they were able to modify their proposals based on feedback to make them more competitive during the vote. Many protocols were willing to make changes to their applications to make them more appealing to the DAO but never received the proper feedback necessary to do so.
The Pilot Program introduces Application Advisors. This will be impartial organizations tasked with providing each applicant with detailed feedback and guidance on how to improve their applications. This ensures each applicant can iterate on their proposal so they can put forward the best possible incentive plan for the council.
STIP Round 1 had strict limitations on how the ARB could be used as incentives. This was done to protect the DAO and prevent misuse of funds. However, the strict rules resulted in the stifling of many innovative incentive designs. Many protocols had interesting designs that used the ARB in ways that increased alignment, improved cost efficiency, or helped to limit the dumping of ARB. However, these designs were not permitted in Round 1 leading to almost all protocols resulting in generic liquidity incentive models.
The Pilot Program provides more flexibility to protocols to create innovative incentive structures. With the addition of the Council and Application Advisors, the Pilot Program does not require the rules to be as stringent. Malicious or inefficient designs will be first filtered out by the Application Advisors and then rejected by the council. Allowing protocols to innovate on incentive distribution mechanisms will allow Arbitrum protocols and community members to get a better idea of which designs work and which don’t work. This will help everyone as we prepare for a longer-term incentives program.
Protocols will have 2 weeks to apply using the Pilot Program application template. The application template will be created by the Council and the Application Advisors to ensure everyone has the same goals and make it easier for the council to process applications. Applications will be posted in the Pilot Program section of the Arbitrum forum. Protocols only need to post the initial draft of their application during this period. They will then have 2 additional weeks during the feedback period to edit their applications. No late submissions will be accepted.
During the feedback period, the Applications Advisors will provide feedback and guidance on all proposals. Protocols will be assigned an Application Advisor who will provide feedback and guidance on applications on a rolling basis. Protocols will then use this time to work with the Advisors to edit their proposals before applications lock at the end of the 2 weeks.
StableLab will also read all submissions during this period and highlight any rule violations to allow applicants to edit their submissions to ensure they comply with all program rules.
During this period, the council will use the pre-determined rubric to grade each protocol and decide which protocols will advance to the voting period to receive ARB. The Council will use the rubric to select which applications will progress to a snapshot vote. The protocols that the council selects to advance to a snapshot vote must have a total funding amount that is equal to or lower than the incentives budget. This will ensure the DAO does not overspend should all Snapshot votes pass. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO.
The rubric will be created by the Council and Application Advisors during the Tally voting period and will be publicly available by the time protocols begin to apply. The council will be required to publish a brief reasoning for all of their decisions on the forum to create transparency and accountability.
The council must judge applications as they are and cannot accept protocols at lower amounts than their application states. For example, if an application asks for 200,000 ARB the council can not fund them with 100,000 ARB
EXAMPLE: This is a hypothetical example using a budget of 10 ARB with 50 applicants that each request 1 ARB
50 protocols apply requesting 1 Arb Each -> Councils grades all 50 applications using the rubric and narrow the selection down to the top 10 applicants to not exceed the budget -> 10 snapshot votes are created to allow the DAO to confirm the council's decisions -> 9/10 Snapshot votes receive a majority of “fund” votes -> 9 protocols are funded with 1 ARB each and 1 Arb is returned to the DAO
Upon completion of the preliminary applicant screening process by the council, the selected applications will be formally presented for consideration. Each application will then be subject to a voting process via Snapshot, allowing Arbitrum delegates to vote on the allocation of funds. In the event that the Snapshot vote is favorably concluded, the respective protocol will commence receiving its funding through an Hedgey stream, facilitated by oSnap execution pending the protocol successfully passing KYC.
Selected protocols will receive their requested ARB using bi-weekly Hedgey streams for 12 weeks. During this time, protocols will be required to provide bi-weekly updates on the progress of their incentives using this template. Protocols will be required to finish their incentive distributions or return any unused funds two weeks after their final disbursement is available.
During this period Application Advisors will continue to work with the protocols to help them analyze and improve their distribution mechanisms. Protocols will be allowed to adjust their incentive plans as long as they do not violate any rules and provide their updated plans in their next bi-weekly update.
The council will comprise 5 DAO members. These members should be unbiased and knowledgeable builders or delegates with experience in incentive programs, grants councils, or growing a protocol.
The council will decide which protocols will progress to a snapshot vote to be awarded the ARB incentives. The council does not need to spend the entire incentives budget should they feel there are not enough quality applications. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO to be used in the Long Term Framework.
The council members will be responsible for creating a rubric that all protocols will be judged against. The council will design this rubric with input from the Application Advisors and will communicate what they are looking for with the Application Advisors to ensure the Application Advisors guide protocols in the right direction. The highest-scoring protocols will progress to Snapshot votes to allow the DAO to determine if they should receive ARB. The council will be responsible for publishing the graded rubrics as well as a brief explanation for all decisions.
The council will also be responsible for determining when to halt a protocol’s stream should they violate program rules or misuse funds. All reports of violations will be evaluated by the council. It will require 4 out of 5 council members to vote in favor of halting the stream for a stream to be stopped. Streams can also be halted via a DAO snapshot vote should the DAO disagree with the council’s judgment.
Additionally, the council will select who completes each research bounty. While there is 200,000 ARB allocated for research bounties. This selection will be made via a simple majority by council members and will require them to provide their reasoning for all choices made. The council does not need to spend the full amount should they receive lower budget requests or do not find an appropriate party to fill a bounty.
The 5 council members will be selected by DAO vote. The 5 Council Applicants with the most votes will be elected to serve on the council for the Pilot Program.
Those who wish to serve on the council can apply here. Once the Pilot Program moves to a snapshot vote, anyone who applied to be a council member will be included in a simultaneous snapshot poll to allow the DAO to select who will sit on the council.
Those who serve on the Pilot Program Council are not guaranteed to be included on a council in the full Long Term Incentives Program. There will be new elections to select council members when it comes time for the full long-term program.
The exact amount of hours the Council position will require is difficult to estimate given this is the first time the DAO will use a council for incentives. However, the following is an estimated breakdown.
Designing Rubric and Application Template: 20 hours
Grading Protocols and providing Reasoning: 4 hours per protocol.
Determining if a stream should be halted: 5 hours per week
Selecting Research Bounties: 4 hours per applicant
Council members will be elected via a Snapshot vote and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to an on-chain vote to allow the DAO to ratify the council. Those who wish to serve on the council can apply here.
Should the DAO feel a member or members of the council are not fulfilling their duty they may remove them using a snapshot vote.
Anyone will sufficient voting power can initiate a Snapshot poll to remove council member(s). Should the poll receive a majority “remove” votes the council member(s) will be immediately removed.
Should this occur there will then be a week-long application process where replacement council members can apply via the forum. This will be followed by a Snapshot vote to elect replacement member(s).
Three Application Advisors will help protocols design, implement, and update their incentive plans. Application Advisors are integral to the proposal process, serving as impartial entities with DeFi expertise. Their primary function is to provide detailed, unbiased feedback on applications, aiding protocols in refining and improving their submissions.
The Application Advisors will also work closely with the council to create the application template and grading rubric. This will ensure the council and advisors are on the same page so they can provide the best feedback to applicants and ensure the council understands the details of the incentive mechanisms the Advisors are helping protocols design.
As this is an experimental addition to the incentives framework, having expert advisors working with protocols will help protocols and the DAO understand what is most helpful from an advisor and allow the DAO to adjust the role for the longer-term framework. This will also help protocols design more innovative incentive distribution mechanisms that can be tested to see how effective they are going into a long-term incentives framework.
Collaboration with Council and Program Manager: Work jointly to design the application template, KPIs, and a grading rubric, ensuring alignment with council expectations and clarity in the evaluation process.
Feedback and Recommendations: Offer detailed feedback on each eligible application assigned to your team during the review period.
Communication with Applicants: Engage actively with applicants to streamline the application process, aiding in proposal improvements and clarifications.
Hosting Office Hours: Schedule and conduct public office hours 3 times per week while the program is running for protocols to seek advice. This will focus on transparency and accessibility. All interactions during these sessions will be recorded and summarized for everyone. Order of speaking during office hours will be on a first come first serve basis.
Impartiality: Advisors must remain unbiased, especially as they do not have the final say in proposal acceptance. While application advisors will work closely with the council members to create the Rubric, advisors should not interfere with the votes from the council nor guarantee any outcome to projects they speak with.
Continuous Engagement: Post-application feedback is crucial, as is ongoing involvement in the later stages of the process, subject to discussion and agreement with relevant parties. There may also be later involvement in the process when the program is running or over.
Pre-Application Phase: Advisors are required to hold open office hours, focusing on guiding applicants in preparing their proposals.
Application Review Phase: Each proposal receives at least one detailed feedback report addressing key criteria established by the DAO.
Post-Application Feedback: After the submission of proposals, advisors provide insights on the process and suggest improvements for future cycles.
Application Advisors will be elected via a Snapshot vote and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to an on-chain vote to allow the DAO to ratify. Those who wish to serve on the council can apply here.
Once the Pilot Program moves to a snapshot vote, anyone who applied to be an Application Advisor will be included in a simultaneous snapshot poll to allow the DAO to select the Advisors.
Those who serve as a Pilot Program Advisor are not guaranteed to be included onboarded in the full Long Term Incentives Program. There will be new elections to select Advisors when it comes time for the full long-term program.
The application to be an advisor is currently open here: LTI Pilot Program Position Application Thread
The same STIP-ARB multisig used in Round 1 and the backfund proposal will continue for The Pilot Program. The funds in the multisig belong to the DAO, and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in DAO governance, including delegation.
The STIP-ARB multisig includes two features to ensure the accountability of signers and grantees:
The Program Manager will be responsible for coordinating between all parties involved to ensure the Pilot Program runs smoothly. They will be available to answer any questions the DAO has regarding the Pilot Program and will publish bi-weekly reports so the community understands the status of the program. The Project Manager will be available to the community at least 40 hours a week. This role is designed to add efficiency and clarity to all aspects of the Pilot Program. The Program Manager will have no input into which protocols receive funds. However, they will be responsible for handling any operational tasks that arise throughout the Pilot Program.
Matt from StableLab will act as the program manager. StableLab will function in a similar capacity as they did for STIP Round 1. They will help coordinate between the multisig, council, Application Advisors, applicants, foundation, and community to ensure the Pilot Program program runs smoothly. StableLab will serve as a neutral party and have no power to decide which protocols receive funding or which streams are halted.
StableLab was responsible for designing this Pilot Program and will continue working on designing a long-term Framework with the help of the incentives working group and the DAO. StableLab will be responsible for publishing a research report on the effectiveness of the Pilot Program and their findings on how it operationally compared to STIP V1.
Should the DAO feel StableLab is not fulfilling their duties as program manager, they may remove them using a snapshot vote. An emergency Snapshot vote will then be used to elect a replacement program manager.
In the Long Term Incentives Framework, this position will be decided by the DAO. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, it will continue using StableLab’s services given they have experience from managing STIP V1 and already have knowledge from designing this process.
As in STIP round 1 and the Backfund proposal, the Pilot Program will use a service provider for data monitoring and reporting.
Making Data Publically Available: The Data provider will be responsible for publically displaying data from all funded protocols. This will serve two purposes. First, it will allow the entire community to see the success of the program. Second, it will ensure those completing the Research Bounties have access to this information so they can provide proper analysis of this data. This will allow for the Bounty completers to provide better reports and data visualizations for the community. This provides the DAO with a decentralized method for analyzing and understanding how effective this program is as well as better setting up the DAO for the Long Term Framework.
Data required to report:
Communication with Protocols: Engage actively with funded protocols to collect all data necessary.
Monitor For Misuse of Funds: The data provider will monitor data from all funded protocols to detect any misuse of funds. Should they find suspicious activity the data Provider will be responsible for sharing this with the Council.
Create a Recap Report: The Data provider will be responsible for creating a recap report that tells the story of the Pilot Program and breaks down the successes and failures of the different incentive strategies.
Impartiality: The Data Provider must remain unbiased. While the Data providers will not have the power to halt streams themselves, they must be impartial when it comes to reporting the data and examining for any misuse of funds. Any suspicious behavior they find must be communicated to the council for further review.
Continuous Monitoring: The Data Provider must continually update the data to reflect the latest updates. This will ensure the bounty researchers and community have access to the correct information. They also must continually monitor for misuse of funds to allow the council to act quickly should any issues arise
Post-Selection Phase: The Data Provider will communicate with all funded protocols to ensure they can collect all necessary data and understand which contracts are being incentivized.
Incentives Phase: The Data Provider will continually update the data and monitor for any violations.
This will be an elected position in the long-term program. Additionally, given the long-term framework will have a much larger scope and will include many separate incentive categories, it will most likely require the DAO to onboard multiple different organizations to handle the long-term framework’s data monitoring and reporting. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, the Data provider will be selected and ratified by the DAO similar to STIP round 1. Potential data providers are currently being discussed and vetted and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to a vote to allow the DAO to ratify.
The Pilot Program proposal will include research bounties to ensure the DAO collects sufficient data and draws meaningful conclusions from STIP, the Backfund, and the LTIP Pilot Program. There will be up to 200,000 ARB available to those who complete bounties.
When this proposal goes live to Tally, it will include many questions the DAO wants answered. Some examples Include:
Researchers will then apply to claim these bounties by providing why they are the best fit to answer the question as well as providing a budget. The council will be responsible for selecting who completes each bounty. This process guarantees the DAO will have multiple teams working on providing meaningful conclusions regarding incentive programs. These conclusions will be essential to allow the DAO to possess all the information necessary to create the best possible long-term incentive framework.
In STIP Round 1 we saw many community members go above and beyond by providing valuable contributions without any funding. 100,000 ARB will be allocated for retroactive funding to community members who add valuable contributions during the Pilot Program. Earmarking these funds upfront lets people know there will be retro funding which will encourage community members to contribute. This section is intentionally vague to encourage all kinds of community contributions. The DAO will have the final say in how these funds will be used.
This program is designed to reduce the large burden delegates faced during STIP round 1. While many of their responsibilities are replaced by the Council and Application Advisors, the Arbitrum delegates will still retain the final say in many aspects of this proposal.
Delegates will retain the following powers:
The pilot program is intended for protocols that did not receive ARB during STIP or the Backfund. However, protocols that received grants from the Arbitrum Foundation, Questbook’s grant program, or any other Arbitrum Grants program are eligible to receive Pilot Program funding. Additionally, receiving funding from the Pilot Program does not prohibit protocols from applying for funding from other DAO or foundation programs including the Long Term Incentives Program.
By streaming grant payments, the multisig will be empowered to hold grantees accountable to their proposals by halting fund streaming for any of the following reasons:
In that this proposal aims to be experimental, the multisig is not intended to provide quality control on the design of incentive programs. Rather, they are empowered to halt streaming in the event of negligence or misuse of funds.
Hi all! Thank you so much for your feedback on the Pilot Program - we are currently incorporating it into the proposal.
Taking a break for the holidays but in the next week, we will continue responding to forum comments and editing the proposal to make positions and workflows clearer. We will post an update next week explaining all the changes and how we have addressed the forum feedback.
Hi all! Thank you so much for your feedback on the Pilot Program - we are currently incorporating it into the proposal.
Taking a break for the holidays but in the next week, we will continue responding to forum comments and editing the proposal to make positions and workflows clearer. We will post an update next week explaining all the changes and how we have addressed the forum feedback.
After feedback regarding concerns over how the council and advisors would be chosen, we have decided to include an election process for these positions.
Anyone interested in these positions can apply by responding to the Pilot Program Position Application Thread
Additionally, we will be hosting our next open proposal discussion meeting next Friday, January 5th at 11 am EST
Hey @Matt_StableLab, I suppose the proposal covers many aspects including drawing attention from contributors & I support this initiative.
Within the last few days, it has come to my attention that there are projects that are holding back from applying to Questbook’s current grants program due to uncertainty on how that would affect their ability to then get accepted into the next round of STIP / LTIP grants. The issue is simply they are concerned if they are getting a Questbook grant they will then automatically be denied in the next STIP / LTIP round.
I can maybe bring a bit of an light in this.
There are problems currently in the several grant programs for one reason:
Thank you Matt / StableLabs for putting in the work on this proposal. I believe focusing on a more long-term outlook is the natural evolution of the grant process. I'm also glad to see this proposal has taken the feedback from the STIP and incorporated potential solutions to the issues.
Along the lines of things to learn from the initial STIP, I'd like to bring up the important topic of applicant behavior for discussion. Within the last few days, it has come to my attention that there are projects that are holding back from applying to Questbook's current grants program due to uncertainty on how that would affect their ability to then get accepted into the next round of STIP / LTIP grants. The issue is simply they are concerned if they are getting a Questbook grant they will then automatically be denied in the next STIP / LTIP round. As, fairly or not, they feel they will be seen as double dipping in the grant pool and automatically rejected. Or if not rejected, pushed to the back of the line because non-benefiting projects will get priority.
I appreciate StableLab's efforts in drafting the Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program for the Arbitrum DAO. However, I am concerned about the centralization of decision-making in the hands of a 5-member council. It's essential that the final decision on which projects to fund rest with the DAO community, not just a select few. The council should focus on screening applications, ensuring only high-quality proposals reach the voting stage.
Overall, while the proposal is a step in the right direction, further adjustments are needed to ensure it aligns with the decentralized and community-driven values of the DAO.
Succesful results from a development grant from the DAO should be a major signal FOR incentive eligibility, not a deterrent.
Great projects with innovative solutions to market needs should 100% be supported and rewarded. Not punished.
Hello everybody.
After reading the proposal, and discussing it a bit with @AlexLumley in term of how the LTIP was conceived, I would like to propose myself in the role of advisor. I currently serve in Questook Arbitrum Grant Program for the domain "New protocols and Ideas", as well as in the Uniswap Arbitrum Grant Program. This, inheretly, means that I can't be in the council, realistically it would be too much power concentration; on the other hand, I have probably accumulated enough experience to have an advisory role with no specific decision power.
We think that creating a longer-term framework for a steady cadence of grants is a very positive step forward. GFX Labs has a lot of experience in running a multi-tens-of-millions grants program (we, like another major Arbitrum delegate, L2Beat, hold a seat on the Optimism Grants Council since its inception).
Because of this, we propose ourselves as a Council Member.
Following on from @thedevanshmehta feedback, here are some practical steps that we can incorporate to make this framework more open.
Potential new voting workflow
Following on from @thedevanshmehta feedback, here are some practical steps that we can incorporate to make this framework more open.
Potential new voting workflow
(Delegates that vote on X% (75-90%) of these grantee applications should receive a small retroactive grant since these applications take a lot of time to go through too. The council should have reduced this effort with their screening too.)
ARB Ask
Regarding the 35M Arb ask - Similar to how @tnorm did it in STIP v1, lets present a range of options for the DAO to decide on via a forum poll post. 25M, 35M and 45M ARB can be a starting point to temp check the range.
It makes sense for the ask to be lower than STIP 1 since this is a pilot program and the idea is to test a new voting flow and learn from this pilot before going for LTIP.
Voting order
If the option to Abstain was available this would have been availed but it was not possible on this snapshot vote, so voting and providing feedback.
Highly supportive of the idea of running a V2 to the original STIP with those protocols having weighted months, while the backfund worked through voting, funding and now disbursment before their proposal finally came to vote. Voting in support instead of to not Fund the Piliot Program is to ensure the V2 opportunity does exist, despite misgivings on the proposed size of this Pilot program at between $52.5 and $105 million + overheads.
Concerns Voting on Tally in support will be contingent on seeing progress on the below concerns.
Size of the Pilot program
Eligibility
Additional Budgets
No doubt the role of the council we elect will be very important, and it would be prudent for everyone to understand the philosophy of candidates including with regards to their view on how the budget reflects a mandate to spend.
gm all, nice to see the hard work of the last few months coming to fruition.
I am supportive of this intiative and voted FOR the pilot program of the LTIP.
Rationale:
I think the 3 key problems identified are tackling the right frictions that currently exist for such a program to be lean, effective, yet fair and open.
The council and advisors are tasked with supporting applications and ensuring a minimum agreed-upon quality, while still preserving the ultimate decision-making power of the delegates.
Still, I want to echo @cp0x and @cattin : the proposed compensation for some positions are not aligned with the current market. While people involved in the different roles take the downside risk of the market if the ARB tokens go down, I would encourage to review the different compensation packages before submitting the final proposal on Tally.
@TreasureDAO's Arbitrum Council (ARC) will vote FOR this proposal on Snapshot to fund the program with 45,815,000 (ranked in descending order of ARB amount).
Treasure has been involved in the pre-forum socialization process for the Long-Term Incentive Pilot Program (LTIPP) and believes it addresses many of the challenges identified through STIP Round 1, further builds upon it, and will set the foundation to establish a long-term, sustainable incentives/grants program that will support the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
With our support of this proposal, we also urge the DAO to consider the following:
The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.
I want to say that I appreciate all the effort that went into drafting this proposal. I understand that the whole STIP was a bit chaotic, so I really like seeing a proposal that aims to make its successor more efficient, but I'm not sure if this is the best way.
First of all, I feel like relying so heavily on a council could end up centralizing Arbitrum's governance a bit too much, especially if it's related to protocol incentives since they are essential for the development of the ecosystem. Because, even though I understand that it was a burden for most delegates, I think that we could just give them more time to review proposals (with longer review windows and feedback periods). This, coupled with compensations for delegates, could alleviate the burden.
Replacing delegates with a council might be more efficient in a way, but it also takes away value from governance - if I'm not wrong, many protocols started engaging with the DAOs governance thanks to STIP.
Second, I think some expenses are a bit too high and might not be necessary. I understand that the DAO has a massive treasury but it doesn't mean we shouldn't be a bit more careful with it ~ excluding the incentives, there's an additional 815,000 ARB requested for various purposes, this amounts to roughly $1.7M. For example, I think that the program shouldn't include the role of the advisor since, ideally, with a longer timeframe, feedback should come from the delegates + it would encourage protocols to learn the DAO governance process. As a side note, I noticed that @SEEDGov applied to this role, but I just wanted to state that our delegation decides independently from the organization.
Eventhough I like the direction towards this proposal is going, I think we have to develop a program that seeks more involvement from the delegates and relies less on centralized committees.
Simplified Version of the Updated Proposal:
Abstract: The proposal aims to address past incentive program issues and test new mechanisms through the Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program, distributing 35M ARB to protocols from January 2024 to April 2024.
Motivation:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Simplified Version of the Updated Proposal:
Abstract: The proposal aims to address past incentive program issues and test new mechanisms through the Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program, distributing 35M ARB to protocols from January 2024 to April 2024.
Motivation:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Why Protocols Need a Round 2:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Rationale:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Specifications - Problem/Solutions:
Advantages:
Feedback:
V2 Flow:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Roles and Responsibilities:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Research Bounties:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Arbitrum Delegates:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Eligibility Requirements:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Steps to Implement:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Overall Cost:
Advantages:
Feedback:
Conclusion: The proposed Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program shows promise in addressing past issues and preparing for a comprehensive long-term framework. Improving communication effectiveness and simplifying language could further enhance clarity and implementation efficiency.
This proposal is now live for vote! Please cast your vote on Snapshot
Hey @thedevanshmehta thank you for your support and valuable feedback!
Just to clarify, this is how much the council can approve right? but if 45 million is allocated and the delegates reject 15 million of it, only 30 million would be spent. Is my understanding correct?
Hey @thedevanshmehta thank you for your support and valuable feedback!
Just to clarify, this is how much the council can approve right? but if 45 million is allocated and the delegates reject 15 million of it, only 30 million would be spent. Is my understanding correct?
Yes, this would be the maximum amount spent. The funds from any applications the delegates reject will be returned to the DAO.
In my view we should not overcomplicate this by involving the entire DAO and just let the council members/application advisors give it to community members that have helped reduce their workload. But curious to know yours and others thoughts on this.
This is very valuable feedback and we are still finalizing the exact mechanism. This will be figured out and clearly defined by the Tally vote!
Proposal Edit Note: We have added a small funding amount to compensate @AlexLumley and @Bobbay for the many hours they spent helping design the proposal and advancing it to the voting stage. This was done to reward DAO members for their hard work on the proposal and to avoid relying on other programs such as Plurality Labs to reward valuable contributions
Proposal Creation Assistance: 15,000 ARB - 10,000 ARB for Alex Lumley and 5,000 ARB for Bobby Bola for their time spent assisting with proposal design, hosting proposal office hour calls, and communicating with delegates to gather feedback.
Really appreciate Matt and the team being so receptive to feedback. I am now in a position to support the LTIPP!
To avoid too much centralization of power with the council the delegates will now get the chance to vote to confirm all of the council’s choices.
Really appreciate Matt and the team being so receptive to feedback. I am now in a position to support the LTIPP!
To avoid too much centralization of power with the council the delegates will now get the chance to vote to confirm all of the council’s choices.
This is a great move because in their negotiations with applicants, the council has the ability to say "we don't have all the power so make XYZ change else the delegates might not vote for approval." Creating this check on the councils power will lead to a better outcome.
Additionally the DAO will now have the ability to choose the size of the Pilot Program with voting options of 25M, 35M, and 45M in incentives budgets
Just to clarify, this is how much the council can approve right? but if 45 million is allocated and the delegates reject 15 million of it, only 30 million would be spent. Is my understanding correct?
Retroactive Community Funding has been added to encourage community members to provide valuable contributions throughout the program
100,000 ARB will be allocated for retroactive funding to community members who add valuable contributions during the Pilot Program. The DAO will have the final say in how these funds will be used.
This might have intentionally been left vague (DAO will have the final say?) Its not necessary for this stage of the proposal, but I would like some details on who gets to allocate the 100k ARB. Would it be via Gitcoin matching funds to Arbitrum citizens? A JokeRace/snapshot weighted voting for anyone with delegated ARB to vote on those competing?
In my view we should not overcomplicate this by involving the entire DAO and just let the council members/application advisors give it to community members that have helped reduce their workload. But curious to know yours and others thoughts on this.
After receiving amazing feedbackin the forum, speaking with many delegates, and sharing the proposal in multiple community calls we have improved the proposal in the following ways:
After receiving amazing feedbackin the forum, speaking with many delegates, and sharing the proposal in multiple community calls we have improved the proposal in the following ways:
EXAMPLE: This is a hypothetical example using a budget of 10 ARB with 50 applicants that each request 1 ARB
50 protocols apply requesting 1 Arb Each -> Councils grades all 50 applications using the rubric and narrow the selection down to the top 10 applicants to not exceed the budget -> 10 snapshot votes are created to allow the DAO to confirm the council's decisions -> 9/10 Snapshot votes receive a majority of “fund” votes -> 9 protocols are funded with 1 ARB each and 1 Arb is returned to the DAO
Additionally the DAO will now have the ability to choose the size of the Pilot Program with voting options of 25M, 35M, and 45M in incentives budgets. This will be voted on during the proposal Snapshot
The Application Advisors and Council members will now be elected via Snapshot to allow the DAO to choose who they want to fill these positions.
Added role responsibilities, goals, and selection criteria to provide more clarity to the community and assure accountability for these positions.
There are now 3 Application Advisors to accomadate the expected application demand and ensure each applicant is able to recieve sufficient attention from advisors. Additionally, Application Advisors will now help protocols throughout the entire incentive period to help protocols manage, evaluate, and tweak their incentive plans.
Clarified how this Incentives program relates to eligibility for other DAO grant programs
“The pilot program is intended for protocols that did not receive ARB during STIP or the Backfund. However, protocols that received grants from the Arbitrum Foundation, Questbook’s grant program, or any other Arbitrum Grants program are eligible to receive Pilot Program funding. Additionally, receiving funding from the Pilot Program does not prohibit protocols from applying for funding from other DAO or foundation programs including the Long Term Incentives Program.”
Thanks again to everyone who has provided feedback on this program! Please read the entire updated proposal here.
Additionally, anyone interested in being an Application Advisor or Council Member is encouraged to apply here
This AIP establishes a Long Term Incentives Pilot Program for the DAO to test new incentives designs and answer the necessary questions to ensure we are ready to commit to the long-term program. This Pilot Program will distribute 25-45M ARB to protocols building on Arbitrum. The exact amount will be determined by the DAO via Snapshot vote and will be ratified via Tally vote. The program will distribute ARB to protocols for 12 weeks.
This AIP establishes a Long Term Incentives Pilot Program for the DAO to test new incentives designs and answer the necessary questions to ensure we are ready to commit to the long-term program. This Pilot Program will distribute 25-45M ARB to protocols building on Arbitrum. The exact amount will be determined by the DAO via Snapshot vote and will be ratified via Tally vote. The program will distribute ARB to protocols for 12 weeks.
The Arbitrum DAO has spent the last few months experimenting with incentive programs to attract new users and liquidity to Arbitrum. There is a consensus the DAO will use what we learn from these short-term programs to establish a long-term framework. While STIP V1 brought tons of attention to Arbitrum and has resulted in upticks in protocol metrics, we have learned there were many flaws with the structure of STIP Round 1. This Pilot Program looks to implement new mechanisms to address the issues seen in STIP V1. The DAO will use this Pilot Program as a test run for a long-term framework before committing to a year-long program.
The Pilot Program will operate using a Council, have Application Advisors to ensure protocols receive adequate feedback and assistance, and allow protocols more freedom to create innovative ARB incentive plans. We believe these changes will help remedy many of the pain points seen in Round 1. Running the Pilot Program to test these new features will allow the DAO to compare different program methods before implementing a long-term framework beginning in Q2 2024. This will help ensure we have all the knowledge necessary to implement the most effective long-term incentives program for Arbitrum.
STIP was an experimental program to distribute ARB to protocols to use as incentives for their users. While it was initially intended to have two rounds, the program was substantially more popular than expected, and the entire 50M ARB budget was used in Round 1 as was permissible in the original rules.
This meant no funds remained for Round 2, leading to its cancellation. Many protocols either missed the Round 1 deadline or intentionally waited for Round 2. This left several protocols with no alternative route to apply for ARB incentives. Many STIP Round 1 grantees have seen upticks in their metrics. This Pilot Program would allow protocols that missed out on Round 1 the opportunity to apply to gain these benefits, which will help level the playing field for these protocols. The Pilot Program will replace a round 2 and will be funded with 25M-45M ARB to accommodate the large expected protocol demand we have already seen. This will complete the incentivizing of Arbitrum-based teams to create a holistic competitive edge not against each other but against other chains.
There is a DAO consensus that Arbitrum will need a long-term incentive program in 2024. However, many delegates feel the DAO is moving too quickly and spending too much money on backfund or V2 proposals without yet receiving any of the data on STIP’s effectiveness.
We have learned a lot from STIP and can use what went wrong in STIP and the Backfund to hypothesize what changes would create a better long-term framework. However, we have little evidence to prove these new ideas would be a better solution. DAO members currently don’t have the resources or funds to create a long-term program, nor do we understand what a good long-term program looks like.
This proposal focuses on obtaining this evidence using a committed working stream to guarantee we come away from this program ready to make informed decisions on a long-term framework. The pilot program also allows the DAO to test new aspects of an incentive program such as Application Advisors, Councils, and more flexible incentive distributions before committing long-term.
This will help save the DAO money and time in the long term by preventing the need for more short-term programs before we are ready to commit to the Long-Term Framework.
The specifications of the Pilot Program were designed to remedy the 3 largest complaints regarding STIP Round 1. The Pilot Program hopes to be a test run for these additions for the DAO to determine if they should also be included in the long-term framework.
In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal.
To remedy this problem, the Pilot Program will have a 5 person council elected by the DAO responsible for evaluating applications and selecting which protocols will advance to a snapshot vote to receive ARB. This will ensure all applications are thoughtfully evaluated with only the most deserving receiving incentives. Not only will this help to reduce the burden on delegates, but it will also help expedite the process and allow protocols to receive incentives quickly and efficiently.
A major gripe from protocols was they struggled to get feedback from delegates before the deadline. This left many feeling as though the better-connected protocols had an advantage as they were able to modify their proposals based on feedback to make them more competitive during the vote. Many protocols were willing to make changes to their applications to make them more appealing to the DAO but never received the proper feedback necessary to do so.
The Pilot Program introduces Application Advisors. This will be impartial organizations tasked with providing each applicant with detailed feedback and guidance on how to improve their applications. This ensures each applicant can iterate on their proposal so they can put forward the best possible incentive plan for the council.
STIP Round 1 had strict limitations on how the ARB could be used as incentives. This was done to protect the DAO and prevent misuse of funds. However, the strict rules resulted in the stifling of many innovative incentive designs. Many protocols had interesting designs that used the ARB in ways that increased alignment, improved cost efficiency, or helped to limit the dumping of ARB. However, these designs were not permitted in Round 1 leading to almost all protocols resulting in generic liquidity incentive models.
The Pilot Program provides more flexibility to protocols to create innovative incentive structures. With the addition of the Council and Application Advisors, the Pilot Program does not require the rules to be as stringent. Malicious or inefficient designs will be first filtered out by the Application Advisors and then rejected by the council. Allowing protocols to innovate on incentive distribution mechanisms will allow Arbitrum protocols and community members to get a better idea of which designs work and which don’t work. This will help everyone as we prepare for a longer-term incentives program.
Protocols will have 2 weeks to apply using the Pilot Program application template. The application template will be created by the Council and the Application Advisors to ensure everyone has the same goals and make it easier for the council to process applications. Applications will be posted in the Pilot Program section of the Arbitrum forum. Protocols only need to post the initial draft of their application during this period. They will then have 2 additional weeks during the feedback period to edit their applications. No late submissions will be accepted.
During the feedback period, the Applications Advisors will provide feedback and guidance on all proposals. Protocols will be assigned an Application Advisor who will provide feedback and guidance on applications on a rolling basis. Protocols will then use this time to work with the Advisors to edit their proposals before applications lock at the end of the 2 weeks.
StableLab will also read all submissions during this period and highlight any rule violations to allow applicants to edit their submissions to ensure they comply with all program rules.
During this period, the council will use the pre-determined rubric to grade each protocol and decide which protocols will advance to the voting period to receive ARB. The Council will use the rubric to select which applications will progress to a snapshot vote. The protocols that the council selects to advance to a snapshot vote must have a total funding amount that is equal to or lower than the incentives budget. This will ensure the DAO does not overspend should all Snapshot votes pass. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO.
The rubric will be created by the Council and Application Advisors during the Tally voting period and will be publicly available by the time protocols begin to apply. The council will be required to publish a brief reasoning for all of their decisions on the forum to create transparency and accountability.
The council must judge applications as they are and cannot accept protocols at lower amounts than their application states. For example, if an application asks for 200,000 ARB the council can not fund them with 100,000 ARB
EXAMPLE: This is a hypothetical example using a budget of 10 ARB with 50 applicants that each request 1 ARB
50 protocols apply requesting 1 Arb Each -> Councils grades all 50 applications using the rubric and narrow the selection down to the top 10 applicants to not exceed the budget -> 10 snapshot votes are created to allow the DAO to confirm the council's decisions -> 9/10 Snapshot votes receive a majority of “fund” votes -> 9 protocols are funded with 1 ARB each and 1 Arb is returned to the DAO
Upon completion of the preliminary applicant screening process by the council, the selected applications will be formally presented for consideration. Each application will then be subject to a voting process via Snapshot, allowing Arbitrum delegates to vote on the allocation of funds. In the event that the Snapshot vote is favorably concluded, the respective protocol will commence receiving its funding through an Hedgey stream, facilitated by oSnap execution pending the protocol successfully passing KYC.
Selected protocols will receive their requested ARB using bi-weekly Hedgey streams for 12 weeks. During this time, protocols will be required to provide bi-weekly updates on the progress of their incentives using this template. Protocols will be required to finish their incentive distributions or return any unused funds two weeks after their final disbursement is available.
During this period Application Advisors will continue to work with the protocols to help them analyze and improve their distribution mechanisms. Protocols will be allowed to adjust their incentive plans as long as they do not violate any rules and provide their updated plans in their next bi-weekly update.
The council will comprise 5 DAO members. These members should be unbiased and knowledgeable builders or delegates with experience in incentive programs, grants councils, or growing a protocol.
The council will decide which protocols will progress to a snapshot vote to be awarded the ARB incentives. The council does not need to spend the entire incentives budget should they feel there are not enough quality applications. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO to be used in the Long Term Framework.
The council members will be responsible for creating a rubric that all protocols will be judged against. The council will design this rubric with input from the Application Advisors and will communicate what they are looking for with the Application Advisors to ensure the Application Advisors guide protocols in the right direction. The highest-scoring protocols will progress to Snapshot votes to allow the DAO to determine if they should receive ARB. The council will be responsible for publishing the graded rubrics as well as a brief explanation for all decisions.
The council will also be responsible for determining when to halt a protocol’s stream should they violate program rules or misuse funds. All reports of violations will be evaluated by the council. It will require 4 out of 5 council members to vote in favor of halting the stream for a stream to be stopped. Streams can also be halted via a DAO snapshot vote should the DAO disagree with the council’s judgment.
Additionally, the council will select who completes each research bounty. While there is 200,000 ARB allocated for research bounties. This selection will be made via a simple majority by council members and will require them to provide their reasoning for all choices made. The council does not need to spend the full amount should they receive lower budget requests or do not find an appropriate party to fill a bounty.
The 5 council members will be selected by DAO vote. The 5 Council Applicants with the most votes will be elected to serve on the council for the Pilot Program.
Those who wish to serve on the council can apply here. Once the Pilot Program moves to a snapshot vote, anyone who applied to be a council member will be included in a simultaneous snapshot poll to allow the DAO to select who will sit on the council.
Those who serve on the Pilot Program Council are not guaranteed to be included on a council in the full Long Term Incentives Program. There will be new elections to select council members when it comes time for the full long-term program.
The exact amount of hours the Council position will require is difficult to estimate given this is the first time the DAO will use a council for incentives. However, the following is an estimated breakdown.
Designing Rubric and Application Template: 20 hours
Grading Protocols and providing Reasoning: 4 hours per protocol.
Determining if a stream should be halted: 5 hours per week
Selecting Research Bounties: 4 hours per applicant
Council members will be elected via a Snapshot vote and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to an on-chain vote to allow the DAO to ratify the council. Those who wish to serve on the council can apply here.
Should the DAO feel a member or members of the council are not fulfilling their duty they may remove them using a snapshot vote.
Anyone will sufficient voting power can initiate a Snapshot poll to remove council member(s). Should the poll receive a majority “remove” votes the council member(s) will be immediately removed.
Should this occur there will then be a week-long application process where replacement council members can apply via the forum. This will be followed by a Snapshot vote to elect replacement member(s).
Three Application Advisors will help protocols design, implement, and update their incentive plans. Application Advisors are integral to the proposal process, serving as impartial entities with DeFi expertise. Their primary function is to provide detailed, unbiased feedback on applications, aiding protocols in refining and improving their submissions.
The Application Advisors will also work closely with the council to create the application template and grading rubric. This will ensure the council and advisors are on the same page so they can provide the best feedback to applicants and ensure the council understands the details of the incentive mechanisms the Advisors are helping protocols design.
As this is an experimental addition to the incentives framework, having expert advisors working with protocols will help protocols and the DAO understand what is most helpful from an advisor and allow the DAO to adjust the role for the longer-term framework. This will also help protocols design more innovative incentive distribution mechanisms that can be tested to see how effective they are going into a long-term incentives framework.
Collaboration with Council and Program Manager: Work jointly to design the application template, KPIs, and a grading rubric, ensuring alignment with council expectations and clarity in the evaluation process.
Feedback and Recommendations: Offer detailed feedback on each eligible application assigned to your team during the review period.
Communication with Applicants: Engage actively with applicants to streamline the application process, aiding in proposal improvements and clarifications.
Hosting Office Hours: Schedule and conduct public office hours 3 times per week while the program is running for protocols to seek advice. This will focus on transparency and accessibility. All interactions during these sessions will be recorded and summarized for everyone. Order of speaking during office hours will be on a first come first serve basis.
Impartiality: Advisors must remain unbiased, especially as they do not have the final say in proposal acceptance. While application advisors will work closely with the council members to create the Rubric, advisors should not interfere with the votes from the council nor guarantee any outcome to projects they speak with.
Continuous Engagement: Post-application feedback is crucial, as is ongoing involvement in the later stages of the process, subject to discussion and agreement with relevant parties. There may also be later involvement in the process when the program is running or over.
Pre-Application Phase: Advisors are required to hold open office hours, focusing on guiding applicants in preparing their proposals.
Application Review Phase: Each proposal receives at least one detailed feedback report addressing key criteria established by the DAO.
Post-Application Feedback: After the submission of proposals, advisors provide insights on the process and suggest improvements for future cycles.
Application Advisors will be elected via a Snapshot vote and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to an on-chain vote to allow the DAO to ratify. Those who wish to serve on the council can apply here.
Once the Pilot Program moves to a snapshot vote, anyone who applied to be an Application Advisor will be included in a simultaneous snapshot poll to allow the DAO to select the Advisors.
Those who serve as a Pilot Program Advisor are not guaranteed to be included onboarded in the full Long Term Incentives Program. There will be new elections to select Advisors when it comes time for the full long-term program.
The application to be an advisor is currently open here: LTI Pilot Program Position Application Thread
The same STIP-ARB multisig used in Round 1 and the backfund proposal will continue for The Pilot Program. The funds in the multisig belong to the DAO, and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in DAO governance, including delegation.
The STIP-ARB multisig includes two features to ensure the accountability of signers and grantees:
The Program Manager will be responsible for coordinating between all parties involved to ensure the Pilot Program runs smoothly. They will be available to answer any questions the DAO has regarding the Pilot Program and will publish bi-weekly reports so the community understands the status of the program. The Project Manager will be available to the community at least 40 hours a week. This role is designed to add efficiency and clarity to all aspects of the Pilot Program. The Program Manager will have no input into which protocols receive funds. However, they will be responsible for handling any operational tasks that arise throughout the Pilot Program.
Matt from StableLab will act as the program manager. StableLab will function in a similar capacity as they did for STIP Round 1. They will help coordinate between the multisig, council, Application Advisors, applicants, foundation, and community to ensure the Pilot Program program runs smoothly. StableLab will serve as a neutral party and have no power to decide which protocols receive funding or which streams are halted.
StableLab was responsible for designing this Pilot Program and will continue working on designing a long-term Framework with the help of the incentives working group and the DAO. StableLab will be responsible for publishing a research report on the effectiveness of the Pilot Program and their findings on how it operationally compared to STIP V1.
Should the DAO feel StableLab is not fulfilling their duties as program manager, they may remove them using a snapshot vote. An emergency Snapshot vote will then be used to elect a replacement program manager.
In the Long Term Incentives Framework, this position will be decided by the DAO. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, it will continue using StableLab’s services given they have experience from managing STIP V1 and already have knowledge from designing this process.
As in STIP round 1 and the Backfund proposal, the Pilot Program will use a service provider for data monitoring and reporting.
Making Data Publically Available: The Data provider will be responsible for publically displaying data from all funded protocols. This will serve two purposes. First, it will allow the entire community to see the success of the program. Second, it will ensure those completing the Research Bounties have access to this information so they can provide proper analysis of this data. This will allow for the Bounty completers to provide better reports and data visualizations for the community. This provides the DAO with a decentralized method for analyzing and understanding how effective this program is as well as better setting up the DAO for the Long Term Framework.
Data required to report:
Communication with Protocols: Engage actively with funded protocols to collect all data necessary.
Monitor For Misuse of Funds: The data provider will monitor data from all funded protocols to detect any misuse of funds. Should they find suspicious activity the data Provider will be responsible for sharing this with the Council.
Create a Recap Report: The Data provider will be responsible for creating a recap report that tells the story of the Pilot Program and breaks down the successes and failures of the different incentive strategies.
Impartiality: The Data Provider must remain unbiased. While the Data providers will not have the power to halt streams themselves, they must be impartial when it comes to reporting the data and examining for any misuse of funds. Any suspicious behavior they find must be communicated to the council for further review.
Continuous Monitoring: The Data Provider must continually update the data to reflect the latest updates. This will ensure the bounty researchers and community have access to the correct information. They also must continually monitor for misuse of funds to allow the council to act quickly should any issues arise
Post-Selection Phase: The Data Provider will communicate with all funded protocols to ensure they can collect all necessary data and understand which contracts are being incentivized.
Incentives Phase: The Data Provider will continually update the data and monitor for any violations.
This will be an elected position in the long-term program. Additionally, given the long-term framework will have a much larger scope and will include many separate incentive categories, it will most likely require the DAO to onboard multiple different organizations to handle the long-term framework’s data monitoring and reporting. However, because the Pilot Program is intended to move quickly, the Data provider will be selected and ratified by the DAO similar to STIP round 1. Potential data providers are currently being discussed and vetted and will be added to this proposal before it progresses to a vote to allow the DAO to ratify.
The Pilot Program proposal will include research bounties to ensure the DAO collects sufficient data and draws meaningful conclusions from STIP, the Backfund, and the LTIP Pilot Program. There will be up to 200,000 ARB available to those who complete bounties.
When this proposal goes live to Tally, it will include many questions the DAO wants answered. Some examples Include:
Researchers will then apply to claim these bounties by providing why they are the best fit to answer the question as well as providing a budget. The council will be responsible for selecting who completes each bounty. This process guarantees the DAO will have multiple teams working on providing meaningful conclusions regarding incentive programs. These conclusions will be essential to allow the DAO to possess all the information necessary to create the best possible long-term incentive framework.
In STIP Round 1 we saw many community members go above and beyond by providing valuable contributions without any funding. 100,000 ARB will be allocated for retroactive funding to community members who add valuable contributions during the Pilot Program. Earmarking these funds upfront lets people know there will be retro funding which will encourage community members to contribute. This section is intentionally vague to encourage all kinds of community contributions. The DAO will have the final say in how these funds will be used.
This program is designed to reduce the large burden delegates faced during STIP round 1. While many of their responsibilities are replaced by the Council and Application Advisors, the Arbitrum delegates will still retain the final say in many aspects of this proposal.
Delegates will retain the following powers:
The pilot program is intended for protocols that did not receive ARB during STIP or the Backfund. However, protocols that received grants from the Arbitrum Foundation, Questbook’s grant program, or any other Arbitrum Grants program are eligible to receive Pilot Program funding. Additionally, receiving funding from the Pilot Program does not prohibit protocols from applying for funding from other DAO or foundation programs including the Long Term Incentives Program.
By streaming grant payments, the multisig will be empowered to hold grantees accountable to their proposals by halting fund streaming for any of the following reasons:
In that this proposal aims to be experimental, the multisig is not intended to provide quality control on the design of incentive programs. Rather, they are empowered to halt streaming in the event of negligence or misuse of funds.
Hi all! Thank you so much for your feedback on the Pilot Program - we are currently incorporating it into the proposal.
Taking a break for the holidays but in the next week, we will continue responding to forum comments and editing the proposal to make positions and workflows clearer. We will post an update next week explaining all the changes and how we have addressed the forum feedback.
Hi all! Thank you so much for your feedback on the Pilot Program - we are currently incorporating it into the proposal.
Taking a break for the holidays but in the next week, we will continue responding to forum comments and editing the proposal to make positions and workflows clearer. We will post an update next week explaining all the changes and how we have addressed the forum feedback.
After feedback regarding concerns over how the council and advisors would be chosen, we have decided to include an election process for these positions.
Anyone interested in these positions can apply by responding to the Pilot Program Position Application Thread
Additionally, we will be hosting our next open proposal discussion meeting next Friday, January 5th at 11 am EST
Hey @Matt_StableLab, I suppose the proposal covers many aspects including drawing attention from contributors & I support this initiative.
Within the last few days, it has come to my attention that there are projects that are holding back from applying to Questbook’s current grants program due to uncertainty on how that would affect their ability to then get accepted into the next round of STIP / LTIP grants. The issue is simply they are concerned if they are getting a Questbook grant they will then automatically be denied in the next STIP / LTIP round.
I can maybe bring a bit of an light in this.
There are problems currently in the several grant programs for one reason:
Thank you Matt / StableLabs for putting in the work on this proposal. I believe focusing on a more long-term outlook is the natural evolution of the grant process. I'm also glad to see this proposal has taken the feedback from the STIP and incorporated potential solutions to the issues.
Along the lines of things to learn from the initial STIP, I'd like to bring up the important topic of applicant behavior for discussion. Within the last few days, it has come to my attention that there are projects that are holding back from applying to Questbook's current grants program due to uncertainty on how that would affect their ability to then get accepted into the next round of STIP / LTIP grants. The issue is simply they are concerned if they are getting a Questbook grant they will then automatically be denied in the next STIP / LTIP round. As, fairly or not, they feel they will be seen as double dipping in the grant pool and automatically rejected. Or if not rejected, pushed to the back of the line because non-benefiting projects will get priority.
I appreciate StableLab's efforts in drafting the Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program for the Arbitrum DAO. However, I am concerned about the centralization of decision-making in the hands of a 5-member council. It's essential that the final decision on which projects to fund rest with the DAO community, not just a select few. The council should focus on screening applications, ensuring only high-quality proposals reach the voting stage.
Overall, while the proposal is a step in the right direction, further adjustments are needed to ensure it aligns with the decentralized and community-driven values of the DAO.
Succesful results from a development grant from the DAO should be a major signal FOR incentive eligibility, not a deterrent.
Great projects with innovative solutions to market needs should 100% be supported and rewarded. Not punished.
Hello everybody.
After reading the proposal, and discussing it a bit with @AlexLumley in term of how the LTIP was conceived, I would like to propose myself in the role of advisor. I currently serve in Questook Arbitrum Grant Program for the domain "New protocols and Ideas", as well as in the Uniswap Arbitrum Grant Program. This, inheretly, means that I can't be in the council, realistically it would be too much power concentration; on the other hand, I have probably accumulated enough experience to have an advisory role with no specific decision power.
We think that creating a longer-term framework for a steady cadence of grants is a very positive step forward. GFX Labs has a lot of experience in running a multi-tens-of-millions grants program (we, like another major Arbitrum delegate, L2Beat, hold a seat on the Optimism Grants Council since its inception).
Because of this, we propose ourselves as a Council Member.
Following on from @thedevanshmehta feedback, here are some practical steps that we can incorporate to make this framework more open.
Potential new voting workflow
Following on from @thedevanshmehta feedback, here are some practical steps that we can incorporate to make this framework more open.
Potential new voting workflow
(Delegates that vote on X% (75-90%) of these grantee applications should receive a small retroactive grant since these applications take a lot of time to go through too. The council should have reduced this effort with their screening too.)
ARB Ask
Regarding the 35M Arb ask - Similar to how @tnorm did it in STIP v1, lets present a range of options for the DAO to decide on via a forum poll post. 25M, 35M and 45M ARB can be a starting point to temp check the range.
It makes sense for the ask to be lower than STIP 1 since this is a pilot program and the idea is to test a new voting flow and learn from this pilot before going for LTIP.
Hey @Matt_StableLab, I suppose the proposal covers many aspects including drawing attention from contributors & I support this initiative.
The Pilot Program proposal will include research bounties to ensure the DAO collects sufficient data and draws meaningful conclusions from STIP, the Backfund, and the LTIP Pilot Program. There will be up to 200,000 ARB available to those who complete bounties.
Where will these bounties to posted and how will it be managed? I would suggest using platforms like DeWork budget is stated instead of asked to propose. This can simplify the task and increase the number of contributors working for Arbitrum DAO.
Also, I would love to see the dashboard creation open up partially or run parallelly to "Data Provider" on public platforms which can allow more members to contribute at their level.
Within the last few days, it has come to my attention that there are projects that are holding back from applying to Questbook’s current grants program due to uncertainty on how that would affect their ability to then get accepted into the next round of STIP / LTIP grants. The issue is simply they are concerned if they are getting a Questbook grant they will then automatically be denied in the next STIP / LTIP round.
This a huge problem. We need pathways for grantees to be successful. Grants aren't one-off allocations, they should be pathways that fund ideas to become prototypes and prototypes to become legit projects. Then Incentive Programs can follow up by attracting users.
This focus on pathways will be one of the primary focus areas for our second milestone. Thanks for pointing this out. I'd love to connect with someone who was feeling hesitant about applying to better understand their perspective.
I don’t think there is anything wrong in a project applying to more than 1 program, as long as they don’t apply to get capital to be utilized for the very same things (ie: grant K to build X through questbook, and grant Y to build X through the AF). It can have a “bad” optic in some cases, but again is a case by case scenario depending on how the whole thing developed. No hard rule. And so, to me, someone can apply to questbook AND to the stip/ltip being the scope different.
A project we are funding is tentatively called the "Grant Routing System". This system does three things:
This project's next major milestone is Jan 15 with expected completion Jan 30th.
Also, thanks for the diligence behind the work you've done!
I can maybe bring a bit of an light in this.
There are problems currently in the several grant programs for one reason:
On the former: I pinged, the other day, Nina from the AF specifying that more than once I have had projects applying both to Questbook and to AF (because either the project disclosed, or it was a direct question on my side). I can also so far say that nobody tried to game the current environment and, in a few occasion, I have personally explained the whole grant eco to the applicant up to the point in which they decided to withdraw the Questbook application in favour of an AF one. I don't think there is anything wrong in a project applying to more than 1 program, as long as they don't apply to get capital to be utilized for the very same things (ie: grant K to build X through questbook, and grant Y to build X through the AF). It can have a "bad" optic in some cases, but again is a case by case scenario depending on how the whole thing developed. No hard rule. And so, to me, someone can apply to questbook AND to the stip/ltip being the scope different. Council, or committee, can always decide for a now due to also a previous grant, but in my opinion never because of a previous grant such as in this case. With a few exception of course, ie protocol pocketed the money without properly deliver.
On the latter, is a problem of overall framework + marketing. I think AF should be more explicit in term of what can and can't be done by protocols through multiple grant. This also, in my opinion, should also be just an indication. If an independent council is elected, as long as the council follows the rules in their election/proposal, can technically guarantee a grant to an entity even if this goes against the reccomendation of the AF. I also see this as quite unlikely. But, in general, we need an overall effort in term of creating rules for protocols applying in different grant programs, marketing in the sense of explaining what is out there as programs and what is the scope, and also general reccomendations from AF regarding multiple applications.
Which again, to me, are possible, as long as we clarify the scope.
For what it matters, a few times I evaluated with the project that them applying to questbook was not the best way, usually due to the size of max grant (25k), and so advised, and sometimes helped, creating a proposal directly for the AF, for the very same goals, while putting on pause the application in questbook. I have also killed a few cross application that were live both in questbook and in uniswap arbitrum grant program because they were a match, as well as applications that requested a grant for something already build through a grant from another chain. This requires a decent level of DD on the committee side tho... Not easy.
But I don't know if most committee work this way just cause maybe they don't know about all the programs out there.
Thank you Matt / StableLabs for putting in the work on this proposal. I believe focusing on a more long-term outlook is the natural evolution of the grant process. I'm also glad to see this proposal has taken the feedback from the STIP and incorporated potential solutions to the issues.
Along the lines of things to learn from the initial STIP, I'd like to bring up the important topic of applicant behavior for discussion. Within the last few days, it has come to my attention that there are projects that are holding back from applying to Questbook's current grants program due to uncertainty on how that would affect their ability to then get accepted into the next round of STIP / LTIP grants. The issue is simply they are concerned if they are getting a Questbook grant they will then automatically be denied in the next STIP / LTIP round. As, fairly or not, they feel they will be seen as double dipping in the grant pool and automatically rejected. Or if not rejected, pushed to the back of the line because non-benefiting projects will get priority.
The issue has then been compounded by the fact that Questbook's grants are smaller in size then the STIP round. This creates a situation where applicants have to decide if they want to get a smaller grant now that risks their chances of a larger grant in the future.
I'm concerned this is causing issues for all parties involved:
I don't want to turn this into an issue of pitting the grant programs against each other, but it's something I hadn't really thought of until I was told this recently and I'm not sure it's been widely discussed or addressed by the DAO... so I wanted to bring this up as we look towards the next iterations of the STIP/LTIP projects. I'd love to see others input on this.
To close with my personal thoughts, I do think it is something that needs to be learned from and addressed. I know the easiest answer will be to only run one grant program, but I'd be hesitant to just do that. I do really think Questbook has shown success so far and I don't know if throwing that all away is the best solution either (or blocking out potential future grant ideas). I think we need to find a way to have the STIP / LTIP and the Questbook programs (as well as any future grant programs) be structured with each other mind. Versus sort of passing individual projects and hoping they mesh together.
For example, running these grant projects for similar durations during similar timeframes. Or setting the structures up with each other in mind - maybe differentiate what grant project handles which projects as determined by size / scope / subject matter. Or out of fear of becoming to complex... maybe the solution may just be as simple as all grant programs must include language that approval in one grant project does not affect eligibility for another grant project.
Succesful results from a development grant from the DAO should be a major signal FOR incentive eligibility, not a deterrent.
Great projects with innovative solutions to market needs should 100% be supported and rewarded. Not punished.
I agree on both these points and is part of why I think the simplest solution to the problem is making sure approval in one program does not preclude or provide prejudice to approval in another program.
Which I should probably add to clarify, I personally don't believe that the grant programs ran so far have actively pushed that message / acted in that manner. I'd imagine in the scenario I was presented it was more the lack of that distinction within the way the grants were set up that lead to this line of thinking. I don't know if there is necessarily a 'culture' issue, as much as it just being a miscommunication through absence of direction. One that the DAO wouldn't have reasonably forseen, especially given the early stages of the DAO.
The conversation simply to say that I have now seen an example where that is the perception of active builders in the space. Even if the group I'm talking about is a smaller, isolated case... I think adding wording to clarify this is pretty low effort for the benefit. As ultimately I don't want any project to feel they have to withhold applications for certain grants because it may affect their chances in another grant.
Hello everybody.
After reading the proposal, and discussing it a bit with @AlexLumley in term of how the LTIP was conceived, I would like to propose myself in the role of advisor. I currently serve in Questook Arbitrum Grant Program for the domain "New protocols and Ideas", as well as in the Uniswap Arbitrum Grant Program. This, inheretly, means that I can't be in the council, realistically it would be too much power concentration; on the other hand, I have probably accumulated enough experience to have an advisory role with no specific decision power.
A bit of background on me
A bit on the motivations as well. I mainly want to push further my role as contributor to the Arbitrum ecosystem as a whole. What I have learned, especially in the last few months, is that you need to be able to asses a few key things: how good the team submitting a proposal is, how good the idea is, how good the plan to implement and execute this idea is. Three things that, sometimes, require an external point of view to be able to be focused and spinned in the right way in term of product market fit, in term of viability going forward and in term of chances of success. This practically means that a few times I have found myself advising and helping protocols in changing from a few stuff to a full pivot of a proposal because there was something not working, or because there was an even better possibility to create value overall.
Giving informed feedbacks to delegates, protocols and the council is something in which I can definitely give a contribution: act as the "bridge" between the proposals, the protocols and all the stakeholders involved.
We think that creating a longer-term framework for a steady cadence of grants is a very positive step forward. GFX Labs has a lot of experience in running a multi-tens-of-millions grants program (we, like another major Arbitrum delegate, L2Beat, hold a seat on the Optimism Grants Council since its inception).
Because of this, we propose ourselves as a Council Member.
We understand the substantial time commitment, have experience in developing a smooth process, are committed to helping applicants tweak their proposals to be as strong as possible, have seen what types of milestones tend to hold grantees accountable to the DAO.
Grants have a lifecycle -- they are not simply an evaluation and disbursement process. Because of this, we recommend there be a clear separation between those who approve grants and those that manage the grantees' milestone reporting and the closeout process at the end of the grant plan. That allows those who evaluate grants and report on their success/failure to be 1) specialized to the task, and 2) not have a stake in claiming.
The good news is that creating an additional role for that is probably unnecessary initially because there is not an existing cohort of grant plans to monitor or close out.
This is an exciting step in Arbitrum's continuing maturation, and GFX would be proud to bring to Arbitrum the hard-won lessons from other grant programs we have served.
Congratulations to Matt and the Liquidity Incentives WG, I've been following their efforts over the last few months and I'm glad to see a draft put out for feedback.
In its present form, I would urge all delegates to vote AGAINST this proposal. Giving 5 people the power to allocate 35 million ARB is not only deeply corrupting and against the spirit of DAOs, its also just bad marketing. For all the faults of STIP or RetroPGF, they take over Twitter and the collective mindspace for the time it was live; I don't see that happening here when 5 people call all the shots.
Congratulations to Matt and the Liquidity Incentives WG, I've been following their efforts over the last few months and I'm glad to see a draft put out for feedback.
In its present form, I would urge all delegates to vote AGAINST this proposal. Giving 5 people the power to allocate 35 million ARB is not only deeply corrupting and against the spirit of DAOs, its also just bad marketing. For all the faults of STIP or RetroPGF, they take over Twitter and the collective mindspace for the time it was live; I don't see that happening here when 5 people call all the shots.
In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal.
You have identified a valid issue here ; rather than moving to a traditional philanthropy structure where a 5 person board allocates funds, are there other ways to overcome this issue?
One solution we are working on with our groups STEP proposal is having a council similar to what you propose, except their role is to screen applications and ensure only high quality providers are able to enter the round. After that, delegates can use weighted voting (dividing their voting power among different options) to show how much they support individual proposals.
Weighted voting would also free up delegates from having to review each proposal as they could allocate all their voting power to the few proposals they have confidence in.
the Pilot Program will have a 5 person council approved by the DAO responsible for evaluating applications and deciding which protocol will receive ARB
At another level, I do wonder how this is different from the Questbook proposal. They too have domain allocators elected by the DAO for allocating grants; is this proposal just Questbook except for liquidity incentives only?
I also want to know how you have come up with this number - is it based on discussions with potential applicants and extrapolating from there? Or just taking half the amount of STIP 1?
I also wonder why you propose a specific number and not let the DAO vote on a range, similar to the earlier proposal.
Overall, I confess to being a bit disappointed with the proposal - its just a regular grantmaking structure where a 5 person board makes all the decisions. Boohoo
This proposal is still a work in progress and will continue to be improved with delegates' feedback.
We are in the process of filling the Council and Application Advisor positions and will update the proposal to include the potential candidates before progressing to a Snapshot vote.
This proposal is still a work in progress and will continue to be improved with delegates' feedback.
We are in the process of filling the Council and Application Advisor positions and will update the proposal to include the potential candidates before progressing to a Snapshot vote.
The proposal is being posted to the forum now to allow all delegates to view the progress of the proposal. We are open to any feedback on the proposal so we can make any necessary improvements before the proposal is ready to move to an off-chain vote.
The remaining open questions for the proposal are:
Who will be the candidates for the council and application advisor roles?
How will the checks and balances work for the delegates and their ability to veto council decisions?
What will the specific responsibilities be for each role (council, application advisors, etc.), how many hours and how long will their commitment be?
Conflict of interest forms and agreements
Additionally, we are hosting office hours Friday December 22nd at 11am EST to answer any questions and explain the proposal. Join Via the link here
After tomorrow’s call, we will edit the proposal to incorporate community feedback.
We look forward to hearing the community’s thoughts!
Hey @Matt_StableLab, I suppose the proposal covers many aspects including drawing attention from contributors & I support this initiative.
The Pilot Program proposal will include research bounties to ensure the DAO collects sufficient data and draws meaningful conclusions from STIP, the Backfund, and the LTIP Pilot Program. There will be up to 200,000 ARB available to those who complete bounties.
Where will these bounties to posted and how will it be managed? I would suggest using platforms like DeWork budget is stated instead of asked to propose. This can simplify the task and increase the number of contributors working for Arbitrum DAO.
Also, I would love to see the dashboard creation open up partially or run parallelly to "Data Provider" on public platforms which can allow more members to contribute at their level.
Within the last few days, it has come to my attention that there are projects that are holding back from applying to Questbook’s current grants program due to uncertainty on how that would affect their ability to then get accepted into the next round of STIP / LTIP grants. The issue is simply they are concerned if they are getting a Questbook grant they will then automatically be denied in the next STIP / LTIP round.
This a huge problem. We need pathways for grantees to be successful. Grants aren't one-off allocations, they should be pathways that fund ideas to become prototypes and prototypes to become legit projects. Then Incentive Programs can follow up by attracting users.
This focus on pathways will be one of the primary focus areas for our second milestone. Thanks for pointing this out. I'd love to connect with someone who was feeling hesitant about applying to better understand their perspective.
I don’t think there is anything wrong in a project applying to more than 1 program, as long as they don’t apply to get capital to be utilized for the very same things (ie: grant K to build X through questbook, and grant Y to build X through the AF). It can have a “bad” optic in some cases, but again is a case by case scenario depending on how the whole thing developed. No hard rule. And so, to me, someone can apply to questbook AND to the stip/ltip being the scope different.
A project we are funding is tentatively called the "Grant Routing System". This system does three things:
This project's next major milestone is Jan 15 with expected completion Jan 30th.
Also, thanks for the diligence behind the work you've done!
I can maybe bring a bit of an light in this.
There are problems currently in the several grant programs for one reason:
On the former: I pinged, the other day, Nina from the AF specifying that more than once I have had projects applying both to Questbook and to AF (because either the project disclosed, or it was a direct question on my side). I can also so far say that nobody tried to game the current environment and, in a few occasion, I have personally explained the whole grant eco to the applicant up to the point in which they decided to withdraw the Questbook application in favour of an AF one. I don't think there is anything wrong in a project applying to more than 1 program, as long as they don't apply to get capital to be utilized for the very same things (ie: grant K to build X through questbook, and grant Y to build X through the AF). It can have a "bad" optic in some cases, but again is a case by case scenario depending on how the whole thing developed. No hard rule. And so, to me, someone can apply to questbook AND to the stip/ltip being the scope different. Council, or committee, can always decide for a now due to also a previous grant, but in my opinion never because of a previous grant such as in this case. With a few exception of course, ie protocol pocketed the money without properly deliver.
On the latter, is a problem of overall framework + marketing. I think AF should be more explicit in term of what can and can't be done by protocols through multiple grant. This also, in my opinion, should also be just an indication. If an independent council is elected, as long as the council follows the rules in their election/proposal, can technically guarantee a grant to an entity even if this goes against the reccomendation of the AF. I also see this as quite unlikely. But, in general, we need an overall effort in term of creating rules for protocols applying in different grant programs, marketing in the sense of explaining what is out there as programs and what is the scope, and also general reccomendations from AF regarding multiple applications.
Which again, to me, are possible, as long as we clarify the scope.
For what it matters, a few times I evaluated with the project that them applying to questbook was not the best way, usually due to the size of max grant (25k), and so advised, and sometimes helped, creating a proposal directly for the AF, for the very same goals, while putting on pause the application in questbook. I have also killed a few cross application that were live both in questbook and in uniswap arbitrum grant program because they were a match, as well as applications that requested a grant for something already build through a grant from another chain. This requires a decent level of DD on the committee side tho... Not easy.
But I don't know if most committee work this way just cause maybe they don't know about all the programs out there.
Thank you Matt / StableLabs for putting in the work on this proposal. I believe focusing on a more long-term outlook is the natural evolution of the grant process. I'm also glad to see this proposal has taken the feedback from the STIP and incorporated potential solutions to the issues.
Along the lines of things to learn from the initial STIP, I'd like to bring up the important topic of applicant behavior for discussion. Within the last few days, it has come to my attention that there are projects that are holding back from applying to Questbook's current grants program due to uncertainty on how that would affect their ability to then get accepted into the next round of STIP / LTIP grants. The issue is simply they are concerned if they are getting a Questbook grant they will then automatically be denied in the next STIP / LTIP round. As, fairly or not, they feel they will be seen as double dipping in the grant pool and automatically rejected. Or if not rejected, pushed to the back of the line because non-benefiting projects will get priority.
The issue has then been compounded by the fact that Questbook's grants are smaller in size then the STIP round. This creates a situation where applicants have to decide if they want to get a smaller grant now that risks their chances of a larger grant in the future.
I'm concerned this is causing issues for all parties involved:
I don't want to turn this into an issue of pitting the grant programs against each other, but it's something I hadn't really thought of until I was told this recently and I'm not sure it's been widely discussed or addressed by the DAO... so I wanted to bring this up as we look towards the next iterations of the STIP/LTIP projects. I'd love to see others input on this.
To close with my personal thoughts, I do think it is something that needs to be learned from and addressed. I know the easiest answer will be to only run one grant program, but I'd be hesitant to just do that. I do really think Questbook has shown success so far and I don't know if throwing that all away is the best solution either (or blocking out potential future grant ideas). I think we need to find a way to have the STIP / LTIP and the Questbook programs (as well as any future grant programs) be structured with each other mind. Versus sort of passing individual projects and hoping they mesh together.
For example, running these grant projects for similar durations during similar timeframes. Or setting the structures up with each other in mind - maybe differentiate what grant project handles which projects as determined by size / scope / subject matter. Or out of fear of becoming to complex... maybe the solution may just be as simple as all grant programs must include language that approval in one grant project does not affect eligibility for another grant project.
Succesful results from a development grant from the DAO should be a major signal FOR incentive eligibility, not a deterrent.
Great projects with innovative solutions to market needs should 100% be supported and rewarded. Not punished.
I agree on both these points and is part of why I think the simplest solution to the problem is making sure approval in one program does not preclude or provide prejudice to approval in another program.
Which I should probably add to clarify, I personally don't believe that the grant programs ran so far have actively pushed that message / acted in that manner. I'd imagine in the scenario I was presented it was more the lack of that distinction within the way the grants were set up that lead to this line of thinking. I don't know if there is necessarily a 'culture' issue, as much as it just being a miscommunication through absence of direction. One that the DAO wouldn't have reasonably forseen, especially given the early stages of the DAO.
The conversation simply to say that I have now seen an example where that is the perception of active builders in the space. Even if the group I'm talking about is a smaller, isolated case... I think adding wording to clarify this is pretty low effort for the benefit. As ultimately I don't want any project to feel they have to withhold applications for certain grants because it may affect their chances in another grant.
Hello everybody.
After reading the proposal, and discussing it a bit with @AlexLumley in term of how the LTIP was conceived, I would like to propose myself in the role of advisor. I currently serve in Questook Arbitrum Grant Program for the domain "New protocols and Ideas", as well as in the Uniswap Arbitrum Grant Program. This, inheretly, means that I can't be in the council, realistically it would be too much power concentration; on the other hand, I have probably accumulated enough experience to have an advisory role with no specific decision power.
A bit of background on me
A bit on the motivations as well. I mainly want to push further my role as contributor to the Arbitrum ecosystem as a whole. What I have learned, especially in the last few months, is that you need to be able to asses a few key things: how good the team submitting a proposal is, how good the idea is, how good the plan to implement and execute this idea is. Three things that, sometimes, require an external point of view to be able to be focused and spinned in the right way in term of product market fit, in term of viability going forward and in term of chances of success. This practically means that a few times I have found myself advising and helping protocols in changing from a few stuff to a full pivot of a proposal because there was something not working, or because there was an even better possibility to create value overall.
Giving informed feedbacks to delegates, protocols and the council is something in which I can definitely give a contribution: act as the "bridge" between the proposals, the protocols and all the stakeholders involved.
We think that creating a longer-term framework for a steady cadence of grants is a very positive step forward. GFX Labs has a lot of experience in running a multi-tens-of-millions grants program (we, like another major Arbitrum delegate, L2Beat, hold a seat on the Optimism Grants Council since its inception).
Because of this, we propose ourselves as a Council Member.
We understand the substantial time commitment, have experience in developing a smooth process, are committed to helping applicants tweak their proposals to be as strong as possible, have seen what types of milestones tend to hold grantees accountable to the DAO.
Grants have a lifecycle -- they are not simply an evaluation and disbursement process. Because of this, we recommend there be a clear separation between those who approve grants and those that manage the grantees' milestone reporting and the closeout process at the end of the grant plan. That allows those who evaluate grants and report on their success/failure to be 1) specialized to the task, and 2) not have a stake in claiming.
The good news is that creating an additional role for that is probably unnecessary initially because there is not an existing cohort of grant plans to monitor or close out.
This is an exciting step in Arbitrum's continuing maturation, and GFX would be proud to bring to Arbitrum the hard-won lessons from other grant programs we have served.
Congratulations to Matt and the Liquidity Incentives WG, I've been following their efforts over the last few months and I'm glad to see a draft put out for feedback.
In its present form, I would urge all delegates to vote AGAINST this proposal. Giving 5 people the power to allocate 35 million ARB is not only deeply corrupting and against the spirit of DAOs, its also just bad marketing. For all the faults of STIP or RetroPGF, they take over Twitter and the collective mindspace for the time it was live; I don't see that happening here when 5 people call all the shots.
Congratulations to Matt and the Liquidity Incentives WG, I've been following their efforts over the last few months and I'm glad to see a draft put out for feedback.
In its present form, I would urge all delegates to vote AGAINST this proposal. Giving 5 people the power to allocate 35 million ARB is not only deeply corrupting and against the spirit of DAOs, its also just bad marketing. For all the faults of STIP or RetroPGF, they take over Twitter and the collective mindspace for the time it was live; I don't see that happening here when 5 people call all the shots.
In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal.
You have identified a valid issue here ; rather than moving to a traditional philanthropy structure where a 5 person board allocates funds, are there other ways to overcome this issue?
One solution we are working on with our groups STEP proposal is having a council similar to what you propose, except their role is to screen applications and ensure only high quality providers are able to enter the round. After that, delegates can use weighted voting (dividing their voting power among different options) to show how much they support individual proposals.
Weighted voting would also free up delegates from having to review each proposal as they could allocate all their voting power to the few proposals they have confidence in.
the Pilot Program will have a 5 person council approved by the DAO responsible for evaluating applications and deciding which protocol will receive ARB
At another level, I do wonder how this is different from the Questbook proposal. They too have domain allocators elected by the DAO for allocating grants; is this proposal just Questbook except for liquidity incentives only?
I also want to know how you have come up with this number - is it based on discussions with potential applicants and extrapolating from there? Or just taking half the amount of STIP 1?
I also wonder why you propose a specific number and not let the DAO vote on a range, similar to the earlier proposal.
Overall, I confess to being a bit disappointed with the proposal - its just a regular grantmaking structure where a 5 person board makes all the decisions. Boohoo
This proposal is still a work in progress and will continue to be improved with delegates' feedback.
We are in the process of filling the Council and Application Advisor positions and will update the proposal to include the potential candidates before progressing to a Snapshot vote.
This proposal is still a work in progress and will continue to be improved with delegates' feedback.
We are in the process of filling the Council and Application Advisor positions and will update the proposal to include the potential candidates before progressing to a Snapshot vote.
The proposal is being posted to the forum now to allow all delegates to view the progress of the proposal. We are open to any feedback on the proposal so we can make any necessary improvements before the proposal is ready to move to an off-chain vote.
The remaining open questions for the proposal are:
Who will be the candidates for the council and application advisor roles?
How will the checks and balances work for the delegates and their ability to veto council decisions?
What will the specific responsibilities be for each role (council, application advisors, etc.), how many hours and how long will their commitment be?
Conflict of interest forms and agreements
Additionally, we are hosting office hours Friday December 22nd at 11am EST to answer any questions and explain the proposal. Join Via the link here
After tomorrow’s call, we will edit the proposal to incorporate community feedback.
We look forward to hearing the community’s thoughts!
