This description has been heavily shortened due to character limits. Please refer to the forums for the full proposal. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188
This proposal introduces a delegate code of conduct for Arbitrum DAO alongside additional improvements to the DAO’s operational standards.
If approved, the Code of Conduct and operational updates will take effect on Monday, November 11th, followed by a ~6.5-month trial period ending on May 30th before being considered for permanent inclusion in the Arbitrum Constitution.
As the Arbitrum DAO continues to grow and evolve, a standardized code of conduct for delegates becomes increasingly necessary to create a culture that attracts high quality contributors. As the leading scaling solution across most notable metrics and one of the most active governance ecosystems, it is also important for the Arbitrum DAO to lead the industry in terms of professionalism and transparency.
Establishing clear and strict rules of conduct can be challenging and even counterproductive; therefore, the primary goal of the Delegate Code of Conduct is to help the Arbitrum DAO foster a culture of transparency, integrity, and civility. The Code of Conduct is a set of written principles that Arbitrum Delegates should embody. Delegates should use their best discretion and act in a way that aligns with the Code's spirit, rather than seeking to exploit loopholes or ambiguities.
Arbitrum Delegates should always strive to uphold the seven community values stated in the Arbitrum Constitution.
Disclosure and Transparency Policy: If a conflict of interest exists, it is expected the delegate discloses the nature and extent of the conflict in writing on the forum before voting. While it may not always be clear if an individual stands to gain “directly” or “indirectly”, it is recommended to lean on the side of over-communication in the name of transparency.
Delegates that disclose a conflict of interest are not expected to alter their voting in any way. However, as explained further below, a delegate that repeatedly fails to disclose a conflict of interest before self-voting or if a single instance is deemed to be severe, they risk being removed from the Delegate Incentive Program or a DAO-elected position.
The Code of Conduct has been purposefully written in a manner to establish a set principles that Arbitrum Delegates should embody rather than a complete set of enforceable rules.
Conflict Resolution between Delegates
In general, it is our belief that many conflict issues can be resolved quickly and easily if approached in good faith by each party. Delegates and community members are encouraged to first address the behavior directly in private. If the matter is unable to be resolved for any reason, or if the behavior is threatening or harassing, report it to the Arbitrum Foundation using this form.
Soft-Enforcement of the Delegate Code of Conduct
While it is not feasible to hold every governance participant accountable for upholding these principles, the DAO can hold accountable delegates compensated or individuals it elects to positions of power.
Delegate Incentive Program Removal
As stated in the Delegate Incentive Program proposal, the program administrator reserves the right to issue a suspension or permanent ban if a delegate does not meet the eligibility requirements, which includes upholding the Code of Conduct.
DAO-Elected Position Removal
Any DAO member can propose a Snapshot vote to remove a DAO-elected representative. The proposal should clearly state the reasons for removal and provide evidence supporting the claims.
As ratified in a Snapshot vote to improve predictability in the Arbitrum DAO’s operations, delegates agree to abide by the vote scheduling guidelines.
The Responsible Voting policy is an effort to strike a balance between preventing delegates from unfavorably electing themselves into a position of power and compensation while allowing them to still effectively represent their communities and tokenholders. In a normal election with multiple seats, the policy is simple: candidates may vote for themselves as long as they also cast votes to fill all the remaining positions. With token and weighted voting, there are additional nuances and guidelines must be set in place to address edge scenarios.
Shielded Elections with Weighted Voting: A few weeks ago the Entropy team posted a temperature check to gauge the DAO’s stance on shielded voting. The results indicated that a slight majority of delegates favored the use of shielded voting as the default for elections. In order to align with Security Council elections, weighted voting as opposed to approval voting will be the official default voting type.
Minimum Application Period: In order to draw a sufficient number of high quality applicants, application periods should be a minimum of 14 days.
Where n = number of seats; proposal authors should seek to have at least n+3 applicants before starting the election. Since this may not always be possible, it is simply a recommendation and not a requirement.
ARB tokens allocated to DAO initiatives are not to be used in governance. To keep circulating voting supply from increasing, whenever possible, multi-sigs holding program funds should delegate to the Arbitrum Exclude Address. This will prevent tokens from being included in quorum calculations.
Before codifying the Arbitrum Code of Conduct and updates to the DAO’s operations into the Arbitrum Constitution, we believe it is best to trial the changes for a period of 6 months post ratification of this proposal. At which point, any necessary changes or delegate feedback can be incorporated. Depending on sentiment and the changes made, the trial period can be extended another 6 months or a constitutional proposal can be put forth to update the language of the Constitution.
This description has been heavily shortened due to character limits. Please refer to the forums for the full proposal. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188
This proposal introduces a delegate code of conduct for Arbitrum DAO alongside additional improvements to the DAO’s operational standards.
If approved, the Code of Conduct and operational updates will take effect on Monday, November 11th, followed by a ~6.5-month trial period ending on May 30th before being considered for permanent inclusion in the Arbitrum Constitution.
As the Arbitrum DAO continues to grow and evolve, a standardized code of conduct for delegates becomes increasingly necessary to create a culture that attracts high quality contributors. As the leading scaling solution across most notable metrics and one of the most active governance ecosystems, it is also important for the Arbitrum DAO to lead the industry in terms of professionalism and transparency.
Establishing clear and strict rules of conduct can be challenging and even counterproductive; therefore, the primary goal of the Delegate Code of Conduct is to help the Arbitrum DAO foster a culture of transparency, integrity, and civility. The Code of Conduct is a set of written principles that Arbitrum Delegates should embody. Delegates should use their best discretion and act in a way that aligns with the Code's spirit, rather than seeking to exploit loopholes or ambiguities.
Arbitrum Delegates should always strive to uphold the seven community values stated in the Arbitrum Constitution.
Disclosure and Transparency Policy: If a conflict of interest exists, it is expected the delegate discloses the nature and extent of the conflict in writing on the forum before voting. While it may not always be clear if an individual stands to gain “directly” or “indirectly”, it is recommended to lean on the side of over-communication in the name of transparency.
Delegates that disclose a conflict of interest are not expected to alter their voting in any way. However, as explained further below, a delegate that repeatedly fails to disclose a conflict of interest before self-voting or if a single instance is deemed to be severe, they risk being removed from the Delegate Incentive Program or a DAO-elected position.
The Code of Conduct has been purposefully written in a manner to establish a set principles that Arbitrum Delegates should embody rather than a complete set of enforceable rules.
Conflict Resolution between Delegates
In general, it is our belief that many conflict issues can be resolved quickly and easily if approached in good faith by each party. Delegates and community members are encouraged to first address the behavior directly in private. If the matter is unable to be resolved for any reason, or if the behavior is threatening or harassing, report it to the Arbitrum Foundation using this form.
Soft-Enforcement of the Delegate Code of Conduct
While it is not feasible to hold every governance participant accountable for upholding these principles, the DAO can hold accountable delegates compensated or individuals it elects to positions of power.
Delegate Incentive Program Removal
As stated in the Delegate Incentive Program proposal, the program administrator reserves the right to issue a suspension or permanent ban if a delegate does not meet the eligibility requirements, which includes upholding the Code of Conduct.
DAO-Elected Position Removal
Any DAO member can propose a Snapshot vote to remove a DAO-elected representative. The proposal should clearly state the reasons for removal and provide evidence supporting the claims.
As ratified in a Snapshot vote to improve predictability in the Arbitrum DAO’s operations, delegates agree to abide by the vote scheduling guidelines.
The Responsible Voting policy is an effort to strike a balance between preventing delegates from unfavorably electing themselves into a position of power and compensation while allowing them to still effectively represent their communities and tokenholders. In a normal election with multiple seats, the policy is simple: candidates may vote for themselves as long as they also cast votes to fill all the remaining positions. With token and weighted voting, there are additional nuances and guidelines must be set in place to address edge scenarios.
Shielded Elections with Weighted Voting: A few weeks ago the Entropy team posted a temperature check to gauge the DAO’s stance on shielded voting. The results indicated that a slight majority of delegates favored the use of shielded voting as the default for elections. In order to align with Security Council elections, weighted voting as opposed to approval voting will be the official default voting type.
Minimum Application Period: In order to draw a sufficient number of high quality applicants, application periods should be a minimum of 14 days.
Where n = number of seats; proposal authors should seek to have at least n+3 applicants before starting the election. Since this may not always be possible, it is simply a recommendation and not a requirement.
ARB tokens allocated to DAO initiatives are not to be used in governance. To keep circulating voting supply from increasing, whenever possible, multi-sigs holding program funds should delegate to the Arbitrum Exclude Address. This will prevent tokens from being included in quorum calculations.
Before codifying the Arbitrum Code of Conduct and updates to the DAO’s operations into the Arbitrum Constitution, we believe it is best to trial the changes for a period of 6 months post ratification of this proposal. At which point, any necessary changes or delegate feedback can be incorporated. Depending on sentiment and the changes made, the trial period can be extended another 6 months or a constitutional proposal can be put forth to update the language of the Constitution.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/70?u=winv
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/70?u=winv
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/69?u=bloc
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/67
I think this proposal needs to abide by the constitutional level of quorum (5% and not 3% as proposed) since it’s going to be a constitutional proposal in the end of its trial period. I believe it needs to have 5% of quorum participation so that it is able to enforce the consequences outlined for the delegates that don’t follow this CoC during the trial period, otherwise the trial period would not be really testing the implementation of this proposal. Also, I don’t agree with the assumption that elections should have shielded votes, since that was not the outcome of the previous temperature check vote on that matter. In general I agree we should have a CoC for Delegates like this one, but I feel that this one is not enough since it doesn’t enforce a strict voting policy for delegates that have disclosed or obvious conflicts of interest. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/65?u=paulofonseca
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-53: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-53
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-53: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-53
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/63
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/61?u=toda
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/60?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/13?u=ezr3
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/56?u=grif
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/52
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/51?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/49
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/48?u=tekr
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/47?u=0x_u
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/45?u=0xdo
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/16?u=bruc
I am voting for because Arbitrum DAO is growing, so need rules for delegates to keep everything fair and professional, attract good people.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/44?u=pedr
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/43?u=juan
This seems like a smart move, especially with the Arbitrum DAO growing to over 800 delegates.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/12?u=duok
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/11?u=duok
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/41?u=jojo
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476/86?u=larva
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/22?u=0xta
It’s is safe to try. I’m concerned about the lack of graduated sanctions as advised by Ostroms 8 principles but it still seems ok with trial
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/69?u=bloc
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/67
I think this proposal needs to abide by the constitutional level of quorum (5% and not 3% as proposed) since it’s going to be a constitutional proposal in the end of its trial period. I believe it needs to have 5% of quorum participation so that it is able to enforce the consequences outlined for the delegates that don’t follow this CoC during the trial period, otherwise the trial period would not be really testing the implementation of this proposal. Also, I don’t agree with the assumption that elections should have shielded votes, since that was not the outcome of the previous temperature check vote on that matter. In general I agree we should have a CoC for Delegates like this one, but I feel that this one is not enough since it doesn’t enforce a strict voting policy for delegates that have disclosed or obvious conflicts of interest. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/65?u=paulofonseca
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-53: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-53
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-53: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-53
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/63
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/61?u=toda
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/60?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/13?u=ezr3
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/56?u=grif
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/52
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/51?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/49
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/48?u=tekr
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/47?u=0x_u
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/45?u=0xdo
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/16?u=bruc
I am voting for because Arbitrum DAO is growing, so need rules for delegates to keep everything fair and professional, attract good people.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/44?u=pedr
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/43?u=juan
This seems like a smart move, especially with the Arbitrum DAO growing to over 800 delegates.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/12?u=duok
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/11?u=duok
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/41?u=jojo
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476/86?u=larva
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-dao-delegate-code-of-conduct-formalizing-the-daos-operations/27188/22?u=0xta
It’s is safe to try. I’m concerned about the lack of graduated sanctions as advised by Ostroms 8 principles but it still seems ok with trial
The LevelK Delegation is voting FOR this off-chain proposal. We support the formalization of a standard for delegate accountability. We believe the best way to arrive at a final version of a Code of Conduct is to have a trial period. We expect that during this trial period, there will be many changes and refinements to the code of conduct. We look forward to further discussion on this topic.
The LevelK Delegation is voting FOR this off-chain proposal. We support the formalization of a standard for delegate accountability. We believe the best way to arrive at a final version of a Code of Conduct is to have a trial period. We expect that during this trial period, there will be many changes and refinements to the code of conduct. We look forward to further discussion on this topic.
Well said! every forum needs a moderator and this proposal acts as such; Everyone has to be accountable for their actions and this will definetly promote productive communication. I am also concerned regarding the sanctions to delegates holding their own delegation, if there is a way to prevent or audit this type of scenarios it would be of great value for the community! :pray:
I had a similar argument regarding the "token swap pilot" specifically the conflict of interests part with the dealmakers, for the sake of the community we must detect such code violations and apply sanctions accordingly.
Well said! every forum needs a moderator and this proposal acts as such; Everyone has to be accountable for their actions and this will definetly promote productive communication. I am also concerned regarding the sanctions to delegates holding their own delegation, if there is a way to prevent or audit this type of scenarios it would be of great value for the community! :pray:
I had a similar argument regarding the "token swap pilot" specifically the conflict of interests part with the dealmakers, for the sake of the community we must detect such code violations and apply sanctions accordingly.
Well said! every forum needs a moderator and this proposal acts as such; Everyone has to be accountable for their actions and this will definetly promote productive communication. I am also concerned regarding the sanctions to delegates holding their own delegation, if there is a way to prevent or audit this type of scenarios it would be of great value for the community! :pray:
I had a similar argument regarding the "token swap pilot" specifically the conflict of interests part with the dealmakers, for the sake of the community we must detect such code violations and apply sanctions accordingly.
Well said! every forum needs a moderator and this proposal acts as such; Everyone has to be accountable for their actions and this will definetly promote productive communication. I am also concerned regarding the sanctions to delegates holding their own delegation, if there is a way to prevent or audit this type of scenarios it would be of great value for the community! :pray:
I had a similar argument regarding the "token swap pilot" specifically the conflict of interests part with the dealmakers, for the sake of the community we must detect such code violations and apply sanctions accordingly.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Delegates play a crucial role as representatives of the DAO, and thus, transparency and integrity are fundamental. Thank you for putting together this comprehensive proposal.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Delegates play a crucial role as representatives of the DAO, and thus, transparency and integrity are fundamental. Thank you for putting together this comprehensive proposal.
The definitions around self-enrichment and conflicts of interest are well-articulated, yet implementation remains challenging. During your research, what methods or practices did you find to be the most effective for enforcing these standards?
Regarding weighted voting, while it has benefits, it also carries the risk of skewed voting outcomes based on individual perceptions, potentially undermining objectivity. Are you proposing that weighted voting be applied universally to all proposal types, or is it intended specifically for elections?
On the matter of soft enforcement, do you think this approach might reduce the policy’s impact, essentially rendering it ‘toothless’?
Lastly, we strongly agree with Exclude address delegation for program funds. This is an essential measure that we believe was overlooked until now.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Delegates play a crucial role as representatives of the DAO, and thus, transparency and integrity are fundamental. Thank you for putting together this comprehensive proposal.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Delegates play a crucial role as representatives of the DAO, and thus, transparency and integrity are fundamental. Thank you for putting together this comprehensive proposal.
The definitions around self-enrichment and conflicts of interest are well-articulated, yet implementation remains challenging. During your research, what methods or practices did you find to be the most effective for enforcing these standards?
Regarding weighted voting, while it has benefits, it also carries the risk of skewed voting outcomes based on individual perceptions, potentially undermining objectivity. Are you proposing that weighted voting be applied universally to all proposal types, or is it intended specifically for elections?
On the matter of soft enforcement, do you think this approach might reduce the policy’s impact, essentially rendering it ‘toothless’?
Lastly, we strongly agree with Exclude address delegation for program funds. This is an essential measure that we believe was overlooked until now.
As you rightfully noted, it's likely that the CoC may need further refinement over time. While it's designed to evolve through iteration, updating the constitution is a significantly higher-stakes move, as constitutional amendments need to meet a higher quorum threshold and are difficult to revise.
Therefore, we believe that the DAO should continue testing and refining the CoC in its current trial format and should be confident that the CoC is in a near-final state, before considering its inclusion in the constitution. Not only does this safeguard the integrity of the constitution, but it also ensures that the CoC—an important document that sets the tone for the entire DAO—is fully matured before being made permanent.
As the DAO approaches the end of its 6.5 month trial period for the Code of Conduct (CoC) and updated procedures, as ratified in this Snapshot proposal, we wanted to share our thoughts on why we believe this trial period should be extended till the end of the year.
The proposal states that once the 6.5 month trial period ends on May 30th, 2025, it should be considered for permanent inclusion in the Arbitrum Constitution. However, we believe that this would be premature, as the CoC in particular, hasn't yet been battle tested enough (i.e. no one has been removed from any DAO program as a result of it).
As the DAO approaches the end of its 6.5 month trial period for the Code of Conduct (CoC) and updated procedures, as ratified in this Snapshot proposal, we wanted to share our thoughts on why we believe this trial period should be extended till the end of the year.
The proposal states that once the 6.5 month trial period ends on May 30th, 2025, it should be considered for permanent inclusion in the Arbitrum Constitution. However, we believe that this would be premature, as the CoC in particular, hasn't yet been battle tested enough (i.e. no one has been removed from any DAO program as a result of it).
For this to be effective, the DAO would need to agree to extend the trial period along with incorporating any changes to the current Code of Conduct and/ or DAO Procedures, via a Snapshot vote. The Arbitrum Foundation has been in conversation with Entropy about what these adjustments may entail. Entropy is working on a follow up proposal that will be brought to the DAO for further community input in the coming weeks.
Gm, gm :sparkles:
The results are in for the Adopt a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalize Operations off-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1489
As you rightfully noted, it's likely that the CoC may need further refinement over time. While it's designed to evolve through iteration, updating the constitution is a significantly higher-stakes move, as constitutional amendments need to meet a higher quorum threshold and are difficult to revise.
Therefore, we believe that the DAO should continue testing and refining the CoC in its current trial format and should be confident that the CoC is in a near-final state, before considering its inclusion in the constitution. Not only does this safeguard the integrity of the constitution, but it also ensures that the CoC—an important document that sets the tone for the entire DAO—is fully matured before being made permanent.
As the DAO approaches the end of its 6.5 month trial period for the Code of Conduct (CoC) and updated procedures, as ratified in this Snapshot proposal, we wanted to share our thoughts on why we believe this trial period should be extended till the end of the year.
The proposal states that once the 6.5 month trial period ends on May 30th, 2025, it should be considered for permanent inclusion in the Arbitrum Constitution. However, we believe that this would be premature, as the CoC in particular, hasn't yet been battle tested enough (i.e. no one has been removed from any DAO program as a result of it).
As the DAO approaches the end of its 6.5 month trial period for the Code of Conduct (CoC) and updated procedures, as ratified in this Snapshot proposal, we wanted to share our thoughts on why we believe this trial period should be extended till the end of the year.
The proposal states that once the 6.5 month trial period ends on May 30th, 2025, it should be considered for permanent inclusion in the Arbitrum Constitution. However, we believe that this would be premature, as the CoC in particular, hasn't yet been battle tested enough (i.e. no one has been removed from any DAO program as a result of it).
For this to be effective, the DAO would need to agree to extend the trial period along with incorporating any changes to the current Code of Conduct and/ or DAO Procedures, via a Snapshot vote. The Arbitrum Foundation has been in conversation with Entropy about what these adjustments may entail. Entropy is working on a follow up proposal that will be brought to the DAO for further community input in the coming weeks.
Gm, gm :sparkles:
The results are in for the Adopt a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalize Operations off-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1489
We find this proposal to be thoughtfully constructed and strategically important for the ecosystem.
The proposal effectively addresses crucial aspects of delegate behavior, governance processes, and operational efficiency while maintaining appropriate flexibility.
We find this proposal to be thoughtfully constructed and strategically important for the ecosystem.
The proposal effectively addresses crucial aspects of delegate behavior, governance processes, and operational efficiency while maintaining appropriate flexibility.
In terms of the framework, the proposed code of conduct employs a balanced approach between establishing clear guidelines and avoiding overly restrictive rules that could impede governance effectiveness.
There are meaningful operational improvements attained by the standardization of operational procedures, such as the implementation of a structured voting schedule enhances predictability or the establishment of clear election standards addresses potential manipulation vectors.
The proposal's trial period approach is also appropriate as it enables practical testing of the framework, allows for refinement based on real-world application, creates a clear path to constitutional inclusion while maintaining flexibility for necessary adjustments.
The proposal has a pragmatic and concrete approach to responsible voting in elections with clear mathematical guidelines and practical examples that help prevent manipulation while maintaining voting flexibility. The inclusion of a buffer for UI rounding (0.1%) goes to show the attention to practical implementation details.
Overall, we support this proposal as it represents a meaningful step toward streamlining and professionalizing Arbitrum's governance while maintaining appropriate flexibility and increasingly nurturing a culture of transparency and accountability.
We find this proposal to be thoughtfully constructed and strategically important for the ecosystem.
The proposal effectively addresses crucial aspects of delegate behavior, governance processes, and operational efficiency while maintaining appropriate flexibility.
We find this proposal to be thoughtfully constructed and strategically important for the ecosystem.
The proposal effectively addresses crucial aspects of delegate behavior, governance processes, and operational efficiency while maintaining appropriate flexibility.
In terms of the framework, the proposed code of conduct employs a balanced approach between establishing clear guidelines and avoiding overly restrictive rules that could impede governance effectiveness.
There are meaningful operational improvements attained by the standardization of operational procedures, such as the implementation of a structured voting schedule enhances predictability or the establishment of clear election standards addresses potential manipulation vectors.
The proposal's trial period approach is also appropriate as it enables practical testing of the framework, allows for refinement based on real-world application, creates a clear path to constitutional inclusion while maintaining flexibility for necessary adjustments.
The proposal has a pragmatic and concrete approach to responsible voting in elections with clear mathematical guidelines and practical examples that help prevent manipulation while maintaining voting flexibility. The inclusion of a buffer for UI rounding (0.1%) goes to show the attention to practical implementation details.
Overall, we support this proposal as it represents a meaningful step toward streamlining and professionalizing Arbitrum's governance while maintaining appropriate flexibility and increasingly nurturing a culture of transparency and accountability.
No, just meant checking over all the places ARB was distributed to and making sure they're delegating to the exclude address. Probably should've picked a better word there, sorry for the confusion!
Thanks for sharing this @Entropy
Here are my thoughts:
Thanks for sharing this @Entropy
Here are my thoughts:
Hi, are you asking whether there has been a technical audit report of the exclude address?
ARB tokens allocated to DAO initiatives are not to be used in governance. To keep circulating voting supply from increasing, whenever possible, multi-sigs holding program funds should delegate to the Arbitrum Exclude Address. This will prevent tokens from being included in quorum calculations.
Glad to see our suggestion around this got included. Like we talked about, the current delegations from holdings of various initiatives are inconsistent. Some parts have been delegated to the exclude address, some have been delegated to specific delegates, and other have not been delegated at all. It may not be part of this proposal but is there a plan to do an audit on the current state of this and make any changes necessary?
No, just meant checking over all the places ARB was distributed to and making sure they're delegating to the exclude address. Probably should've picked a better word there, sorry for the confusion!
Thanks for sharing this @Entropy
Here are my thoughts:
Thanks for sharing this @Entropy
Here are my thoughts:
Hi, are you asking whether there has been a technical audit report of the exclude address?
ARB tokens allocated to DAO initiatives are not to be used in governance. To keep circulating voting supply from increasing, whenever possible, multi-sigs holding program funds should delegate to the Arbitrum Exclude Address. This will prevent tokens from being included in quorum calculations.
Glad to see our suggestion around this got included. Like we talked about, the current delegations from holdings of various initiatives are inconsistent. Some parts have been delegated to the exclude address, some have been delegated to specific delegates, and other have not been delegated at all. It may not be part of this proposal but is there a plan to do an audit on the current state of this and make any changes necessary?
In reference to:
Prioritizing controversy without an attempt at private mediation
I assume the motivation is to ensure that people who are widely considered as contributors to the ArbitrumDAO should always perform a best-effort to raise their opinion and provide constructive feedback on the forum alongside channels that facilitate delegate discussion (i.e., like the delegate telegram channel).
In reference to:
Prioritizing controversy without an attempt at private mediation
I assume the motivation is to ensure that people who are widely considered as contributors to the ArbitrumDAO should always perform a best-effort to raise their opinion and provide constructive feedback on the forum alongside channels that facilitate delegate discussion (i.e., like the delegate telegram channel).
If a contributor has not engaged (i.e., best effort to submit comments, feedback, improvements, or even signal a dislike alongside good reasons why), but then decides to run online campaigns in an attempt to tarnish, bully, or otherwise cause controversy that puts the ArbitrumDAO in a bad light, then there can be a judgement call made that the contributor is doing more harm than they are actually contributing to the DAO, thus breaking the code of conduct.
i.e., like Naval's quote: Ignore people playing status games. They gain status by attacking people playing wealth creation games.
So the code of conduct should act as a filter to socially ignore people playing status games and only enable contributors interested in playing long-term with other contributors in the ArbitrumDAO.
Would be great if Entropy can confirm this line of thinking, but this is how I understand the sentiment in the code of conduct, specifically on that line. If so, I'd recommend making it more clear in the code of conduct as well.
In reference to:
Prioritizing controversy without an attempt at private mediation
I assume the motivation is to ensure that people who are widely considered as contributors to the ArbitrumDAO should always perform a best-effort to raise their opinion and provide constructive feedback on the forum alongside channels that facilitate delegate discussion (i.e., like the delegate telegram channel).
In reference to:
Prioritizing controversy without an attempt at private mediation
I assume the motivation is to ensure that people who are widely considered as contributors to the ArbitrumDAO should always perform a best-effort to raise their opinion and provide constructive feedback on the forum alongside channels that facilitate delegate discussion (i.e., like the delegate telegram channel).
If a contributor has not engaged (i.e., best effort to submit comments, feedback, improvements, or even signal a dislike alongside good reasons why), but then decides to run online campaigns in an attempt to tarnish, bully, or otherwise cause controversy that puts the ArbitrumDAO in a bad light, then there can be a judgement call made that the contributor is doing more harm than they are actually contributing to the DAO, thus breaking the code of conduct.
i.e., like Naval's quote: Ignore people playing status games. They gain status by attacking people playing wealth creation games.
So the code of conduct should act as a filter to socially ignore people playing status games and only enable contributors interested in playing long-term with other contributors in the ArbitrumDAO.
Would be great if Entropy can confirm this line of thinking, but this is how I understand the sentiment in the code of conduct, specifically on that line. If so, I'd recommend making it more clear in the code of conduct as well.
@Entropy could you clarify if the Responsible Voting Policy applies to the next, onchain and therefore non shielded, security council elections?
because in the latest security council elections, I believe that policy was violated by some delegates.
@Entropy could you clarify if the Responsible Voting Policy applies to the next, onchain and therefore non shielded, security council elections?
because in the latest security council elections, I believe that policy was violated by some delegates.
of course that this latest vote and proposal hadn't pass the offchain vote at the time of the last Security Council Nominations and Elections, so no foul there, but it would be helpful to clarify this for the next Security Council elections.
Additionally, we’d like to clarify that delegates are free to post their rationale & voting choice to the forums during the election. This was a topic discussed during the temperature check for shielded voting, but was admittedly an overlooked aspect in the recently passed Election Standards. Since no specific guidelines restricting delegates from communicating rationale were included, we feel the best course of action is to let delegates retain the optionality of making their positions public.
While this may seem to go against the core premise of shielded elections, as pointed out by @krst during the first discussion on shielded voting, it keeps discussion lively during the voting process and if information is made public that perhaps changes a delegate’s mind, they can always update their vote on Snapshot. Furthermore, we believe it would be very difficult for a delegate to strategically vote based solely on forum rationales, as it would only give a partial picture of the current standings. After the trial period, the topic will be rediscussed and clarifying language will be added to the procedures for the onchain vote.
Additionally, we’d like to clarify that delegates are free to post their rationale & voting choice to the forums during the election. This was a topic discussed during the temperature check for shielded voting, but was admittedly an overlooked aspect in the recently passed Election Standards. Since no specific guidelines restricting delegates from communicating rationale were included, we feel the best course of action is to let delegates retain the optionality of making their positions public.
While this may seem to go against the core premise of shielded elections, as pointed out by @krst during the first discussion on shielded voting, it keeps discussion lively during the voting process and if information is made public that perhaps changes a delegate’s mind, they can always update their vote on Snapshot. Furthermore, we believe it would be very difficult for a delegate to strategically vote based solely on forum rationales, as it would only give a partial picture of the current standings. After the trial period, the topic will be rediscussed and clarifying language will be added to the procedures for the onchain vote.
Lastly, as outlined in the procedures, it is the responsibility of the proposal author or entity/individual managing the election to monitor post-election for breaches of the Responsible Voting Policy and instances of suspected collusion will be investigated by the Arbitrum Foundation.
Following conversations with the Arbitrum Foundation, we’d like to update delegates on a decision that was made regarding the approved procedures and Security Council Elections. The proposed Election Standards will apply only to Snapshot votes, rationale is as follows:
First, it is not currently possible to shield onchain elections. When the initial conversation on shielded voting was raised to the DAO, the title clearly communicated that it was for Snapshot votes only - “Should the DAO Default to using Shielded Voting for Snapshot Votes?”. However, we realize now that the language is not as explicit in this follow up proposal.
Following conversations with the Arbitrum Foundation, we’d like to update delegates on a decision that was made regarding the approved procedures and Security Council Elections. The proposed Election Standards will apply only to Snapshot votes, rationale is as follows:
First, it is not currently possible to shield onchain elections. When the initial conversation on shielded voting was raised to the DAO, the title clearly communicated that it was for Snapshot votes only - “Should the DAO Default to using Shielded Voting for Snapshot Votes?”. However, we realize now that the language is not as explicit in this follow up proposal.
Second, while the Arbitrum Foundation can remove candidates that have violated the Responsible Voting Policy during the nomination phase, removing a candidate that violates this policy during the election phase can only be done in two ways, each of which is very challenging:
As per the Arbitrum DAO constitution, the retroactive removal of an elected Security Council candidate would leave the seat unfilled until the following election.
Lastly, after a deeper review of the Arbitrum Constitution, the current language has been interpreted as such that an approval of an onchain Constitutional AIP is required to change the rules of future Security Council Elections. While the Constitution also grants the Arbitrum Foundation the authority to issue new procedures and guidelines for offchain components of the Security Council Elections, following a discussion with the Arbitrum Foundation, they have advised that the Election Standards as outlined in this proposal should apply only to Snapshot votes during the 6 month trial. After which, a more focused conversation can be held to discuss updating the Security Council Election procedures and incorporated into the onchain proposal. Given the Foundation’s authority on the issue, we believe this recommendation should be respected.
Clarifying language has been added to the Election Standards section in this post outlining the Updates to the Arbitrum DAO Procedures in the Announcements section. A refined version (removed sentences calling for delegate input & slight sentence restructuring to account for it passing Snapshot) of the Code of Conduct has also been posted in the Announcements section. Going forward, these posts should be regarded as the most up to date and active versions until the trial period concludes.
What is the relevance of battle testings as defined by removals from DAO programs? The policies broadly make sense, and the fact that no one has been punished wouldn't change this. Are you speaking more to the enforceability of the CoC? If that is the case, it should be able to be run and verified in simulation.
Regarding permanent invocation vs continued temporary extension: is there a benefit to an extension or a detriment to simply establishing a permanent CoC, which, like a constitution, is designed to evolve over time?
What is the relevance of battle testings as defined by removals from DAO programs? The policies broadly make sense, and the fact that no one has been punished wouldn't change this. Are you speaking more to the enforceability of the CoC? If that is the case, it should be able to be run and verified in simulation.
Regarding permanent invocation vs continued temporary extension: is there a benefit to an extension or a detriment to simply establishing a permanent CoC, which, like a constitution, is designed to evolve over time?
Further, I'd advocate for the inclusion of a section regarding a DAO-wide privacy expectations / policy as well as formalized meeting and call procedures.
I've commented further here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-enable-the-new-togethercrew-functionality-free-summarizer-and-q-a-for-delegates-telegram-chat/29024/33
but after May 30th (in 2 days) the Delegate Code of Conduct is not in place anymore, right? and it will only return once another offchain vote passes (with more than 3% quorum) with an extension of that trial as you're suggesting.
@Entropy why wasn't this done earlier? so that we wouldn't have a period without an active Delegate CoC?
The Election Standards will not apply to the upcoming Security Council elections nor any other onchain election. Rationale is explained in detail above, but they will only apply to Snapshot:
RnDAO has voted in favour of this proposal.
That being said, we see the requirement for starting voting on the same day of the week to be superfluous. Shielded voting solves the issue for large delegates who don't want to vote early, in practice allowing anyone to pick one day of the week to vote and always be able to catch all proposals, no need to extend into the weekend.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
From SEEDGov we provided feedback before this proposal was voted on in Snapshot, and our questions have been adequately addressed.
I voted "FOR" for the reasons stated above!
I’ve just cast my FOR vote on Snapshot. As I mentioned before, establishing a code of conduct for this crucial role is essential. Ideally, regular updates would help ensure that delegates remain mindful of Arbitrum's values and the responsibility entrusted to us.
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
We voted in favor of this proposal—our team believes that a clear set of explicit guidelines is prudent for ensuring cordial participation in the DAO. Beyond general decorum, this code of conduct can allow participants like the Seed team to point towards explicit violations in the agreed code to potentially blacklist certain delegates and revoke their ability to profit from Arbitrum. Such a setup is much better than pointing towards some arbitrary social handbook that hasn’t been agreed on by a majority of the DAO. The election standards are also very much welcome as we’ve seen some discord in the past regarding self-voting.
I get @Griff's concerns about conflicts of interest, I think they are totally jusified. However, this was already addressed in the August vote. Back then it was decided to focus on transparency and responsible voting rather than strict restrictions. The proposal moves forward on the assumption that delegates will act responsibly and with everyone’s best interests in mind. I understand that no framework is perfect, but I think this gives us a good foundation for ethical governance without taking away delegate flexibility. And of course, we can always improve as we see how these policies play out.
Blockworks Research is voting FOR this proposal.
We think that this proposal warrants passing an offchain vote, and that this current Code of Conduct will require additional changes moving forward; alongside more conversation around how the DAO approaches punishments/reprimandment for lack of a better term.
I think yes, of course. According to the vote that took place, the term is valid until May 30. After that, this code does not work, however, as before, for a long time we had a common understanding of the rules of action and communication of delegates on the forum and all of it.
However, I also think that there is a flaw here, since the vote on this issue should have taken place before the trial period ended
@Entropy could you clarify if the Responsible Voting Policy applies to the next, onchain and therefore non shielded, security council elections?
because in the latest security council elections, I believe that policy was violated by some delegates.
@Entropy could you clarify if the Responsible Voting Policy applies to the next, onchain and therefore non shielded, security council elections?
because in the latest security council elections, I believe that policy was violated by some delegates.
of course that this latest vote and proposal hadn't pass the offchain vote at the time of the last Security Council Nominations and Elections, so no foul there, but it would be helpful to clarify this for the next Security Council elections.
Additionally, we’d like to clarify that delegates are free to post their rationale & voting choice to the forums during the election. This was a topic discussed during the temperature check for shielded voting, but was admittedly an overlooked aspect in the recently passed Election Standards. Since no specific guidelines restricting delegates from communicating rationale were included, we feel the best course of action is to let delegates retain the optionality of making their positions public.
While this may seem to go against the core premise of shielded elections, as pointed out by @krst during the first discussion on shielded voting, it keeps discussion lively during the voting process and if information is made public that perhaps changes a delegate’s mind, they can always update their vote on Snapshot. Furthermore, we believe it would be very difficult for a delegate to strategically vote based solely on forum rationales, as it would only give a partial picture of the current standings. After the trial period, the topic will be rediscussed and clarifying language will be added to the procedures for the onchain vote.
Additionally, we’d like to clarify that delegates are free to post their rationale & voting choice to the forums during the election. This was a topic discussed during the temperature check for shielded voting, but was admittedly an overlooked aspect in the recently passed Election Standards. Since no specific guidelines restricting delegates from communicating rationale were included, we feel the best course of action is to let delegates retain the optionality of making their positions public.
While this may seem to go against the core premise of shielded elections, as pointed out by @krst during the first discussion on shielded voting, it keeps discussion lively during the voting process and if information is made public that perhaps changes a delegate’s mind, they can always update their vote on Snapshot. Furthermore, we believe it would be very difficult for a delegate to strategically vote based solely on forum rationales, as it would only give a partial picture of the current standings. After the trial period, the topic will be rediscussed and clarifying language will be added to the procedures for the onchain vote.
Lastly, as outlined in the procedures, it is the responsibility of the proposal author or entity/individual managing the election to monitor post-election for breaches of the Responsible Voting Policy and instances of suspected collusion will be investigated by the Arbitrum Foundation.
Following conversations with the Arbitrum Foundation, we’d like to update delegates on a decision that was made regarding the approved procedures and Security Council Elections. The proposed Election Standards will apply only to Snapshot votes, rationale is as follows:
First, it is not currently possible to shield onchain elections. When the initial conversation on shielded voting was raised to the DAO, the title clearly communicated that it was for Snapshot votes only - “Should the DAO Default to using Shielded Voting for Snapshot Votes?”. However, we realize now that the language is not as explicit in this follow up proposal.
Following conversations with the Arbitrum Foundation, we’d like to update delegates on a decision that was made regarding the approved procedures and Security Council Elections. The proposed Election Standards will apply only to Snapshot votes, rationale is as follows:
First, it is not currently possible to shield onchain elections. When the initial conversation on shielded voting was raised to the DAO, the title clearly communicated that it was for Snapshot votes only - “Should the DAO Default to using Shielded Voting for Snapshot Votes?”. However, we realize now that the language is not as explicit in this follow up proposal.
Second, while the Arbitrum Foundation can remove candidates that have violated the Responsible Voting Policy during the nomination phase, removing a candidate that violates this policy during the election phase can only be done in two ways, each of which is very challenging:
As per the Arbitrum DAO constitution, the retroactive removal of an elected Security Council candidate would leave the seat unfilled until the following election.
Lastly, after a deeper review of the Arbitrum Constitution, the current language has been interpreted as such that an approval of an onchain Constitutional AIP is required to change the rules of future Security Council Elections. While the Constitution also grants the Arbitrum Foundation the authority to issue new procedures and guidelines for offchain components of the Security Council Elections, following a discussion with the Arbitrum Foundation, they have advised that the Election Standards as outlined in this proposal should apply only to Snapshot votes during the 6 month trial. After which, a more focused conversation can be held to discuss updating the Security Council Election procedures and incorporated into the onchain proposal. Given the Foundation’s authority on the issue, we believe this recommendation should be respected.
Clarifying language has been added to the Election Standards section in this post outlining the Updates to the Arbitrum DAO Procedures in the Announcements section. A refined version (removed sentences calling for delegate input & slight sentence restructuring to account for it passing Snapshot) of the Code of Conduct has also been posted in the Announcements section. Going forward, these posts should be regarded as the most up to date and active versions until the trial period concludes.
What is the relevance of battle testings as defined by removals from DAO programs? The policies broadly make sense, and the fact that no one has been punished wouldn't change this. Are you speaking more to the enforceability of the CoC? If that is the case, it should be able to be run and verified in simulation.
Regarding permanent invocation vs continued temporary extension: is there a benefit to an extension or a detriment to simply establishing a permanent CoC, which, like a constitution, is designed to evolve over time?
What is the relevance of battle testings as defined by removals from DAO programs? The policies broadly make sense, and the fact that no one has been punished wouldn't change this. Are you speaking more to the enforceability of the CoC? If that is the case, it should be able to be run and verified in simulation.
Regarding permanent invocation vs continued temporary extension: is there a benefit to an extension or a detriment to simply establishing a permanent CoC, which, like a constitution, is designed to evolve over time?
Further, I'd advocate for the inclusion of a section regarding a DAO-wide privacy expectations / policy as well as formalized meeting and call procedures.
I've commented further here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-enable-the-new-togethercrew-functionality-free-summarizer-and-q-a-for-delegates-telegram-chat/29024/33
but after May 30th (in 2 days) the Delegate Code of Conduct is not in place anymore, right? and it will only return once another offchain vote passes (with more than 3% quorum) with an extension of that trial as you're suggesting.
@Entropy why wasn't this done earlier? so that we wouldn't have a period without an active Delegate CoC?
The Election Standards will not apply to the upcoming Security Council elections nor any other onchain election. Rationale is explained in detail above, but they will only apply to Snapshot:
RnDAO has voted in favour of this proposal.
That being said, we see the requirement for starting voting on the same day of the week to be superfluous. Shielded voting solves the issue for large delegates who don't want to vote early, in practice allowing anyone to pick one day of the week to vote and always be able to catch all proposals, no need to extend into the weekend.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
From SEEDGov we provided feedback before this proposal was voted on in Snapshot, and our questions have been adequately addressed.
I voted "FOR" for the reasons stated above!
I’ve just cast my FOR vote on Snapshot. As I mentioned before, establishing a code of conduct for this crucial role is essential. Ideally, regular updates would help ensure that delegates remain mindful of Arbitrum's values and the responsibility entrusted to us.
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
We voted in favor of this proposal—our team believes that a clear set of explicit guidelines is prudent for ensuring cordial participation in the DAO. Beyond general decorum, this code of conduct can allow participants like the Seed team to point towards explicit violations in the agreed code to potentially blacklist certain delegates and revoke their ability to profit from Arbitrum. Such a setup is much better than pointing towards some arbitrary social handbook that hasn’t been agreed on by a majority of the DAO. The election standards are also very much welcome as we’ve seen some discord in the past regarding self-voting.
I get @Griff's concerns about conflicts of interest, I think they are totally jusified. However, this was already addressed in the August vote. Back then it was decided to focus on transparency and responsible voting rather than strict restrictions. The proposal moves forward on the assumption that delegates will act responsibly and with everyone’s best interests in mind. I understand that no framework is perfect, but I think this gives us a good foundation for ethical governance without taking away delegate flexibility. And of course, we can always improve as we see how these policies play out.
Blockworks Research is voting FOR this proposal.
We think that this proposal warrants passing an offchain vote, and that this current Code of Conduct will require additional changes moving forward; alongside more conversation around how the DAO approaches punishments/reprimandment for lack of a better term.
I think yes, of course. According to the vote that took place, the term is valid until May 30. After that, this code does not work, however, as before, for a long time we had a common understanding of the rules of action and communication of delegates on the forum and all of it.
However, I also think that there is a flaw here, since the vote on this issue should have taken place before the trial period ended
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
From SEEDGov we provided feedback before this proposal was voted on in Snapshot, and our questions have been adequately addressed.
Regarding the voting outcome on the use of Shielded Voting, although it could be considered somewhat controversial, we believe the DAO has demonstrated support for its implementation, given that the total votes in favor (either option) exceed those against. Taking this into consideration and reflecting on the feedback previously given, we have decided to support this initiative.
At the time of the snapshot, 3% of votable supply was 120,022,984.51 ARB. This proposal has therefore met the specified quorum and passed with a majority of votes FOR. 
The Delegate Code of Conduct and operational updates will go into effect Monday, November 11th, 2024 with a ~6.5 month trial period till May 30th, 2025. We appreciate the suggestion from delegates about setting up a specific channel for feedback; our team will consider different options on how to best collect suggestions. As mentioned previously, Entropy will coordinate with the Foundation to make sure the Code of Conduct and the DAO’s procedures are easily accessible. Lastly, a response to the additional questions brought up by delegates during the voting period will be posted in the coming days. Thank you all for the substantive feedback and suggestions made during this discussion.
DAOplomats is voting in favor of this proposal.
This idea of a code of conduct for delegates is a good one and we are happy to see Entropy foster more transparency within the community. We also appreciate the answers you gave to our earlier questions and thus, more confident to support the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the offchain vote.
While we share some of the concerns raised above, we believe that “the perfect is the enemy of the good” applies in this case.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the offchain vote.
While we share some of the concerns raised above, we believe that “the perfect is the enemy of the good” applies in this case.
This Code of Conduct is only a social consensus and, in our experience, it will most likely require some additional changes along the way before we get it right.
It may also be necessary to set up a committee to work proactively to enforce these rules, or at least to signal violations.
All in all, we think it's worth giving it a try and seeing if it's working properly in about 6 months' time.
gm, voting FOR this proposal. It aligns with my view on delegate conduct.
voting Against the current offchain proposal because I think this proposal needs to abide by the constitutional level of quorum (5% and not 3% as proposed) since it's going to be a constitutional proposal in the end of its trial period. I believe it needs to have 5% of quorum participation so that it is able to enforce the consequences outlined for the delegates that don't follow this CoC during the trial period, otherwise the trial period would not be really testing the implementation of this proposal. Also, I don't agree with the assumption that elections should have shielded votes, since that was not the outcome of the previous temperature check vote on that matter. In general I agree we should have a CoC for Delegates like this one, but I feel that this one is not enough since it doesn't enforce a strict voting policy for delegates that have disclosed or obvious conflicts of interest.
Additional recommendations: 1. Enhanced training and support: for new representatives, regular training or mentoring, such as proposal interpretation sessions, could be set up to help them get up to speed quickly on governance. 2. more flexible conflict of interest resolution: after a conflict of interest is disclosed, consideration could be given to setting up a neutral panel to evaluate it, rather than relying on the foundation alone to decide. 3. Community feedback channel: During the trial period, it is recommended to open a special feedback channel to encourage more community members to suggest improvements.
Questions: 1. The proposal mentions that “if the Code of Conduct is violated, the applicant will be removed from the program”, but are the actual criteria and procedures for determining the eligibility of the applicant more clearly stated? - For example, is there a specific measurement framework or case study for determining “conflict of interest” or “disruptive behavior”? Otherwise, it may lead to disputes. 2. Independence of DAO conflict resolution: The proposal mentions that the Arbitrum Foundation will be responsible for conflict resolution, does this seem centralized? Can the community play a greater role in major disputes, for example through decentralized arbitration or voting mechanisms?
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in Snapshot Voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in Snapshot Voting.
This proposal will help make the Arbitrum DAO more organized by setting clear rules for delegates and creating a respectful space where everyone’s voice is valued equally.
Regarding weighted voting, while it has benefits, it also carries the risk of skewed voting outcomes based on individual perceptions, potentially undermining objectivity. Are you proposing that weighted voting be applied universally to all proposal types, or is it intended specifically for elections?
We are proposing weighted voting for only elections, not for all proposal types.
The question around weighted voting, which we raised earlier, was addressed in the discussion, which resolved our main concern.
Hello Entropy,
Here are some considerations.
Hello Entropy,
Here are some considerations.
There are quite a few working group calls on the calendar. Maybe clarify with names of the calls delegates are expected to attend.
Delegates are advised to vote abstain when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand the proposals.
This is very smart to include. Thank you.
Delegates should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels and avoid taking discussions to social media in a manner that could tarnish Arbitrum DAO’s brand and reputation.
While I generally agree that brand tarnishing should be avoided, there isn't a clear line of when IT IS APPROPRIATE to take to a broader forum. If you've pushed in private tg and on forum with no answer, it shouldn't be against the rules.
I think you leave this intentionally vague, but some clarification might help.
This is important to emphasize - some people will tell people not to self-vote at any level. Unfortunately, if it isn't enforcable onchain, then it creates a systemic advantage for the bad guys - unless we think we would catch 100% of bad actors forever. Rather than being that you can vote anyway, and having good actors peer pressured to not self-voting - this policy simply says you must be transparent about conflicts. Very smart, but requires cultural support and reinforcement.
This is wisely setup to include an appeal mechanism. It is missing "graduated sanctions". Its like one offense and you're gone forever. Consider tiered responses available to the admin and appelate courts.
Does this mean before being put to a Tally vote or to a snapshot tempcheck?
I'd rather see more temp checks sooner rather than so much time being spent discussing nuances of things that wouldn't pass anyway.
If Snapshots are up for 1 week, couldn't the Tally be posted on the Thursday when it passes. I don't understand why create an uncessessary 3 day delay.
I don't believe that is the outcome. You would need to assume the "elections only" voters would have voted "all snapshot votes" rather than "against" to make this true. I don't believe that is a fair assumption. (I voted elections only.)
Since shielded voting keeps a voter’s position private, monitoring for breaches of the responsible voting policy will be conducted post election.
Who is accountable for this?
Who is accountable for monitoring this?
Thanks for the hard work. I'm 95% ready to vote for this. I believe it is just about "safe to try".
We're voting For this proposal
As the Arbitrum DAO grows, establishing clear expectations for delegate behavior becomes increasingly necessary. The policies make sense and address potential conflicts smoothly and efficiently.
We're voting For this proposal
As the Arbitrum DAO grows, establishing clear expectations for delegate behavior becomes increasingly necessary. The policies make sense and address potential conflicts smoothly and efficiently.
Standardized voting schedule is a great idea and makes it easier to both be a delegate and make informed decisions on proposals as the schedule is more predictable and theres time given to research and discuss proposals. It should streamline DAO operations a lot.
The trial period also allows these new changes, and especially the more experimental ones like shielded voting and enforcement mechanisms to be trialed before put into place permanently, allowing for them to be tweaked based on actual results.
Voting FOR this proposal. I think @olimpio and @Griff make great points that we should work toward in the next round, but in the meantime I think @Entropy have done a great job of starting this conversation and building in room for iteration given the limited timeframe. I also think it would be premature to commit to a binding structure for delegates before ratifying a mission and vision.
We vote FOR the proposal on Snapshot.
It's been great to see the well-crafted and detailed CoC for delegates to uphold and hold each other accountable for the social layer of the governance. We also like the approach that having it as a pilot for 6.5 months and then incorporate them into the constitution.
Thanks @Entropy for this proposal. After carefully reading I can only support it.
I think this proposal will make Arbitrum DAO more organized and professional by setting clear rules for delegate behavior. It will help build a respectful and open community where all voices are welcome and treated fairly.
I am sure that with Code of Conduct,
Thanks @Entropy for this proposal. After carefully reading I can only support it.
I think this proposal will make Arbitrum DAO more organized and professional by setting clear rules for delegate behavior. It will help build a respectful and open community where all voices are welcome and treated fairly.
I am sure that with Code of Conduct,
delegates will be more honest and careful when making decisions, which benefits everyone.
And also a trial period of 6 months lets us see how it works, and we can make changes if needed later. Good work, @Entropy :clap:
I am voting against this proposal.
I agree with @olimpio that this code of conduct doesn't go far enough.
The Entropy crew did a great job at getting a solid vibe check, and I think they nailed what the overall feedback was of the delegate community on these policies... but I think we must expect better our selves and the DAO.
I am voting against this proposal.
I agree with @olimpio that this code of conduct doesn't go far enough.
The Entropy crew did a great job at getting a solid vibe check, and I think they nailed what the overall feedback was of the delegate community on these policies... but I think we must expect better our selves and the DAO.
COI’s being culturally acceptable makes us look unprofessional and undermines the perceived integrity of our DAO’s governance system to the outside world. This should be included and is long overdue, and can be enforced in some extent by the Delegate Incentive Program.
If someone votes in favor of a proposal that gives them a direct benefit, do they really need the Delegate Incentive Program’s reward? Seems like they have incentive enough. If we already have a team reviewing all these comments, it should be easy enough for that team to see if people have clear conflicts get called out for not declaring them or not voting abstain… they should get their incentives slashed, if not completely, then by some large %, and that should be in the CoC.
The large generalized incentive programs will have a large burden to overcome, it is true many delegates may have to abstain. I personally see this as a good thing. It would mean to pass an incentive program, it would have a better chance if it were more narrowly scoped. This is a bug not a feature. We just passed a vote to stop proposing any incentives for 3 months after these massive STIP, LTIPP and STIP-Bridge proposals. It is very questionable if they were good for the DAO, but there is no question, they were good for many large delegates (especially STIP and STIP Bridge).
IMO Proposal’s that benefit a large number of high ranking delegates should be put to a higher scrutiny. Our current lack of COI policies actually make proposals that benefit large delegates EASIER to pass. Imagine what this looks like to an outsider, “If I just structure my proposal so that the large delegates benefit, it will be sure to pass.”
This is DAOing it wrong, I’m sorry.
I voted FOR this proposal on Snapshot. I think most of the items outlined here will make the DAO more efficient and pleasant to contribute to. The code of conduct gives us something to fall back on in cases where contributors are creating a negative impact on the DAO. Just because DAOs are permissionless in the onchain sense, doesn't mean the social layer has to accept every type of behavior. We can and should have expectations around adhering to a constructive work environment.
I'm not sure we should move forward with shielded elections given the relatively narrow vote in favor, but this concern is not enough to block me from supporting the proposal as a whole.
I 100% agree with the sentiment of this proposal. We definitively should have a structure for this!
I vote FOR the proposal. I don’t see any issues with it, and I believe it's good for the DAO.
As for the Shielded Vote that olimpio mentioned, I think the will of the voters was clear - they support the shielded vote (56.69% approval). The difference in interpretation of this vote may arise from whether you're more familiar with the "first-past-the-post" voting system or with the "proportional" voting system. Personally, I believe the proportional system better represents the will of the voters, which means it's fair to sum up the total votes in favor of the shielded vote.
We're voting FOR this proposal.
Also really happy to see this proposal moving forward! It's a good framework that provides a solid foundation for professional governance.
As noted in my reply above, I am for this. Having formal rules like this is important to further legitimize the DAO and have agreed-upon reference points for future discussions. Especially as we (hopefully!) grow the DAO with new members.
I'll repeat my point that I think we should keep a list of who has been reprimanded by the DAO (similar to https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/list-of-projects-banned-from-the-dao/26097). In the future, that will be helpful for delegates.
I voted "FOR" on this proposal. As several stated before, it is good to have this code written, so there is a clear source of information that everyone can rely on. Awesome job once again @Entropy.
We’re voting in favor of the Delegate Code of Conduct because it feels like the right step as Arbitrum DAO continues to grow. Having some clear guidelines helps set expectations, making it easier to hold everyone accountable and creating a more transparent, respectful environment. We appreciate the focus on soft enforcement—it’s not about strict rules but rather encouraging good behavior over time. Plus, with a bit of structure around voting schedules and a holiday break, it feels like we’re setting up the DAO for smoother operations. Overall, it’s a solid foundation that will help keep Arbitrum aligned and professional as we scale.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
From SEEDGov we provided feedback before this proposal was voted on in Snapshot, and our questions have been adequately addressed.
Regarding the voting outcome on the use of Shielded Voting, although it could be considered somewhat controversial, we believe the DAO has demonstrated support for its implementation, given that the total votes in favor (either option) exceed those against. Taking this into consideration and reflecting on the feedback previously given, we have decided to support this initiative.
At the time of the snapshot, 3% of votable supply was 120,022,984.51 ARB. This proposal has therefore met the specified quorum and passed with a majority of votes FOR.
The Delegate Code of Conduct and operational updates will go into effect Monday, November 11th, 2024 with a ~6.5 month trial period till May 30th, 2025. We appreciate the suggestion from delegates about setting up a specific channel for feedback; our team will consider different options on how to best collect suggestions. As mentioned previously, Entropy will coordinate with the Foundation to make sure the Code of Conduct and the DAO’s procedures are easily accessible. Lastly, a response to the additional questions brought up by delegates during the voting period will be posted in the coming days. Thank you all for the substantive feedback and suggestions made during this discussion.
DAOplomats is voting in favor of this proposal.
This idea of a code of conduct for delegates is a good one and we are happy to see Entropy foster more transparency within the community. We also appreciate the answers you gave to our earlier questions and thus, more confident to support the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the offchain vote.
While we share some of the concerns raised above, we believe that “the perfect is the enemy of the good” applies in this case.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the offchain vote.
While we share some of the concerns raised above, we believe that “the perfect is the enemy of the good” applies in this case.
This Code of Conduct is only a social consensus and, in our experience, it will most likely require some additional changes along the way before we get it right.
It may also be necessary to set up a committee to work proactively to enforce these rules, or at least to signal violations.
All in all, we think it's worth giving it a try and seeing if it's working properly in about 6 months' time.
gm, voting FOR this proposal. It aligns with my view on delegate conduct.
voting Against the current offchain proposal because I think this proposal needs to abide by the constitutional level of quorum (5% and not 3% as proposed) since it's going to be a constitutional proposal in the end of its trial period. I believe it needs to have 5% of quorum participation so that it is able to enforce the consequences outlined for the delegates that don't follow this CoC during the trial period, otherwise the trial period would not be really testing the implementation of this proposal. Also, I don't agree with the assumption that elections should have shielded votes, since that was not the outcome of the previous temperature check vote on that matter. In general I agree we should have a CoC for Delegates like this one, but I feel that this one is not enough since it doesn't enforce a strict voting policy for delegates that have disclosed or obvious conflicts of interest.
Additional recommendations: 1. Enhanced training and support: for new representatives, regular training or mentoring, such as proposal interpretation sessions, could be set up to help them get up to speed quickly on governance. 2. more flexible conflict of interest resolution: after a conflict of interest is disclosed, consideration could be given to setting up a neutral panel to evaluate it, rather than relying on the foundation alone to decide. 3. Community feedback channel: During the trial period, it is recommended to open a special feedback channel to encourage more community members to suggest improvements.
Questions: 1. The proposal mentions that “if the Code of Conduct is violated, the applicant will be removed from the program”, but are the actual criteria and procedures for determining the eligibility of the applicant more clearly stated? - For example, is there a specific measurement framework or case study for determining “conflict of interest” or “disruptive behavior”? Otherwise, it may lead to disputes. 2. Independence of DAO conflict resolution: The proposal mentions that the Arbitrum Foundation will be responsible for conflict resolution, does this seem centralized? Can the community play a greater role in major disputes, for example through decentralized arbitration or voting mechanisms?
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in Snapshot Voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in Snapshot Voting.
This proposal will help make the Arbitrum DAO more organized by setting clear rules for delegates and creating a respectful space where everyone’s voice is valued equally.
Regarding weighted voting, while it has benefits, it also carries the risk of skewed voting outcomes based on individual perceptions, potentially undermining objectivity. Are you proposing that weighted voting be applied universally to all proposal types, or is it intended specifically for elections?
We are proposing weighted voting for only elections, not for all proposal types.
The question around weighted voting, which we raised earlier, was addressed in the discussion, which resolved our main concern.
Hello Entropy,
Here are some considerations.
Hello Entropy,
Here are some considerations.
There are quite a few working group calls on the calendar. Maybe clarify with names of the calls delegates are expected to attend.
Delegates are advised to vote abstain when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand the proposals.
This is very smart to include. Thank you.
Delegates should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels and avoid taking discussions to social media in a manner that could tarnish Arbitrum DAO’s brand and reputation.
While I generally agree that brand tarnishing should be avoided, there isn't a clear line of when IT IS APPROPRIATE to take to a broader forum. If you've pushed in private tg and on forum with no answer, it shouldn't be against the rules.
I think you leave this intentionally vague, but some clarification might help.
This is important to emphasize - some people will tell people not to self-vote at any level. Unfortunately, if it isn't enforcable onchain, then it creates a systemic advantage for the bad guys - unless we think we would catch 100% of bad actors forever. Rather than being that you can vote anyway, and having good actors peer pressured to not self-voting - this policy simply says you must be transparent about conflicts. Very smart, but requires cultural support and reinforcement.
This is wisely setup to include an appeal mechanism. It is missing "graduated sanctions". Its like one offense and you're gone forever. Consider tiered responses available to the admin and appelate courts.
Does this mean before being put to a Tally vote or to a snapshot tempcheck?
I'd rather see more temp checks sooner rather than so much time being spent discussing nuances of things that wouldn't pass anyway.
If Snapshots are up for 1 week, couldn't the Tally be posted on the Thursday when it passes. I don't understand why create an uncessessary 3 day delay.
I don't believe that is the outcome. You would need to assume the "elections only" voters would have voted "all snapshot votes" rather than "against" to make this true. I don't believe that is a fair assumption. (I voted elections only.)
Since shielded voting keeps a voter’s position private, monitoring for breaches of the responsible voting policy will be conducted post election.
Who is accountable for this?
Who is accountable for monitoring this?
Thanks for the hard work. I'm 95% ready to vote for this. I believe it is just about "safe to try".
We're voting For this proposal
As the Arbitrum DAO grows, establishing clear expectations for delegate behavior becomes increasingly necessary. The policies make sense and address potential conflicts smoothly and efficiently.
We're voting For this proposal
As the Arbitrum DAO grows, establishing clear expectations for delegate behavior becomes increasingly necessary. The policies make sense and address potential conflicts smoothly and efficiently.
Standardized voting schedule is a great idea and makes it easier to both be a delegate and make informed decisions on proposals as the schedule is more predictable and theres time given to research and discuss proposals. It should streamline DAO operations a lot.
The trial period also allows these new changes, and especially the more experimental ones like shielded voting and enforcement mechanisms to be trialed before put into place permanently, allowing for them to be tweaked based on actual results.
Voting FOR this proposal. I think @olimpio and @Griff make great points that we should work toward in the next round, but in the meantime I think @Entropy have done a great job of starting this conversation and building in room for iteration given the limited timeframe. I also think it would be premature to commit to a binding structure for delegates before ratifying a mission and vision.
We vote FOR the proposal on Snapshot.
It's been great to see the well-crafted and detailed CoC for delegates to uphold and hold each other accountable for the social layer of the governance. We also like the approach that having it as a pilot for 6.5 months and then incorporate them into the constitution.
Thanks @Entropy for this proposal. After carefully reading I can only support it.
I think this proposal will make Arbitrum DAO more organized and professional by setting clear rules for delegate behavior. It will help build a respectful and open community where all voices are welcome and treated fairly.
I am sure that with Code of Conduct,
Thanks @Entropy for this proposal. After carefully reading I can only support it.
I think this proposal will make Arbitrum DAO more organized and professional by setting clear rules for delegate behavior. It will help build a respectful and open community where all voices are welcome and treated fairly.
I am sure that with Code of Conduct,
delegates will be more honest and careful when making decisions, which benefits everyone.
And also a trial period of 6 months lets us see how it works, and we can make changes if needed later. Good work, @Entropy :clap:
I am voting against this proposal.
I agree with @olimpio that this code of conduct doesn't go far enough.
The Entropy crew did a great job at getting a solid vibe check, and I think they nailed what the overall feedback was of the delegate community on these policies... but I think we must expect better our selves and the DAO.
I am voting against this proposal.
I agree with @olimpio that this code of conduct doesn't go far enough.
The Entropy crew did a great job at getting a solid vibe check, and I think they nailed what the overall feedback was of the delegate community on these policies... but I think we must expect better our selves and the DAO.
COI’s being culturally acceptable makes us look unprofessional and undermines the perceived integrity of our DAO’s governance system to the outside world. This should be included and is long overdue, and can be enforced in some extent by the Delegate Incentive Program.
If someone votes in favor of a proposal that gives them a direct benefit, do they really need the Delegate Incentive Program’s reward? Seems like they have incentive enough. If we already have a team reviewing all these comments, it should be easy enough for that team to see if people have clear conflicts get called out for not declaring them or not voting abstain… they should get their incentives slashed, if not completely, then by some large %, and that should be in the CoC.
The large generalized incentive programs will have a large burden to overcome, it is true many delegates may have to abstain. I personally see this as a good thing. It would mean to pass an incentive program, it would have a better chance if it were more narrowly scoped. This is a bug not a feature. We just passed a vote to stop proposing any incentives for 3 months after these massive STIP, LTIPP and STIP-Bridge proposals. It is very questionable if they were good for the DAO, but there is no question, they were good for many large delegates (especially STIP and STIP Bridge).
IMO Proposal’s that benefit a large number of high ranking delegates should be put to a higher scrutiny. Our current lack of COI policies actually make proposals that benefit large delegates EASIER to pass. Imagine what this looks like to an outsider, “If I just structure my proposal so that the large delegates benefit, it will be sure to pass.”
This is DAOing it wrong, I’m sorry.
I voted FOR this proposal on Snapshot. I think most of the items outlined here will make the DAO more efficient and pleasant to contribute to. The code of conduct gives us something to fall back on in cases where contributors are creating a negative impact on the DAO. Just because DAOs are permissionless in the onchain sense, doesn't mean the social layer has to accept every type of behavior. We can and should have expectations around adhering to a constructive work environment.
I'm not sure we should move forward with shielded elections given the relatively narrow vote in favor, but this concern is not enough to block me from supporting the proposal as a whole.
I 100% agree with the sentiment of this proposal. We definitively should have a structure for this!
I vote FOR the proposal. I don’t see any issues with it, and I believe it's good for the DAO.
As for the Shielded Vote that olimpio mentioned, I think the will of the voters was clear - they support the shielded vote (56.69% approval). The difference in interpretation of this vote may arise from whether you're more familiar with the "first-past-the-post" voting system or with the "proportional" voting system. Personally, I believe the proportional system better represents the will of the voters, which means it's fair to sum up the total votes in favor of the shielded vote.
We're voting FOR this proposal.
Also really happy to see this proposal moving forward! It's a good framework that provides a solid foundation for professional governance.
As noted in my reply above, I am for this. Having formal rules like this is important to further legitimize the DAO and have agreed-upon reference points for future discussions. Especially as we (hopefully!) grow the DAO with new members.
I'll repeat my point that I think we should keep a list of who has been reprimanded by the DAO (similar to https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/list-of-projects-banned-from-the-dao/26097). In the future, that will be helpful for delegates.
I voted "FOR" on this proposal. As several stated before, it is good to have this code written, so there is a clear source of information that everyone can rely on. Awesome job once again @Entropy.
We’re voting in favor of the Delegate Code of Conduct because it feels like the right step as Arbitrum DAO continues to grow. Having some clear guidelines helps set expectations, making it easier to hold everyone accountable and creating a more transparent, respectful environment. We appreciate the focus on soft enforcement—it’s not about strict rules but rather encouraging good behavior over time. Plus, with a bit of structure around voting schedules and a holiday break, it feels like we’re setting up the DAO for smoother operations. Overall, it’s a solid foundation that will help keep Arbitrum aligned and professional as we scale.
I 100% agree with the sentiment of this proposal. We definitively should have a structure for this!
I also do not agree with this. The top choice of this vote was "Against" shielded vote. Suggesting that for elections people would prefer "Shielded vote" because it was the second most voted alternative in the snapshot is an inference and it could be wrong. I would have personally voted for no shielding on either option (general proposals, or election proposals).
For this, I will be voting against this proposal on its current form. The two points mentioned above (which I have already expressed myself and voted on in the past) are incompatible with my views on the structure presented.
This aside, all other points and guidelines look very good, and I look forward to the DAO adopting some for of conflict of interest direction and COC!
As noted in my reply above, I am for this. Having formal rules like this is important to further legitimize the DAO and have agreed-upon reference points for future discussions. Especially as we (hopefully!) grow the DAO with new members.
I'll repeat my point that I think we should keep a list of who has been reprimanded by the DAO (similar to https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/list-of-projects-banned-from-the-dao/26097). In the future, that will be helpful for delegates.
Voting "For"
Voted For: As one of the biggest DAOs in the space, we need to lead by example for other DAOs. Having a Code of Conduct is a necessary step. This serves as a rulebook for situations that might arise, allowing us to refer to it as needed. In practice, it’s now up to us (delegates) to follow this code in real life.
I vote in favor of this proposal in Snapshot, although I reiterate my previous comments.
I vote in favor of this proposal in Snapshot, although I reiterate my previous comments.
This way, it’s clear that the aim is to avoid noise for the sake of noise itself. Although it was clarified in the thread, Private mediation still sounds as if things should be resolved privately, when the ideal place for discussion—at least in my opinion—is the public forum.
On another note, why not simply call this proposal the “Arbitrum Code of Conduct”? I believe it goes well beyond just the expected behavior of delegates.
Lastly, I have a question regarding the following:
Unless otherwise justified by a proposal author, the standard removal process will be a simple majority of votes cast by delegates with at least 3% of all votable tokens having cast votes in favor of the removal or abstaining.
Why are we tightening an oversight requirement of the DAO? Maybe it was discussed somewhere, and I missed it. tbh, I’m not sure if I’m for or against it, but in practice, it makes it more complicated to remove someone. I’d love to understand the rationale. I understand that this would align the threshold required for on-chain votes, but in reality, this is an off-chain vote. I’d be okay with it being a simple majority of the total votes, without a threshold.
Furthermore, I believe it would be valuable to implement this code for one year, after which a report should be made on the studied situations and whether any sanctions were considered. This would allow us to refine the language afterwards.
Even if I always did my best to act accordingly to these principles, I think that a clear formalization can only bring benefits. We are a growing community and, as we grow, we need things to be written somewhere in order to avoid informal behaviors to happen. This would also allow to take clear actions if bad behaviors happen, or to discourage them through a form of 'deterrence'. Good fences make good neighbors. Voting in favor.
This seems like a smart move, especially with the Arbitrum DAO growing to over 800 delegates (data from Kamar). Btw, I know it’s tough for the mods to keep track of everyone’s actions and make sure they meet the standards for professionalism, transparency ,.. So having a clear set of values and behaviors will help hold each delegate responsible for what they do.
I have a question, though. Will there be a clear penalty for delegates who break the Code of Conduct in the Delegate Incentive Program? For example, will a delegate be removed right away for any mistake, or will it depend on how serious it is? I’m asking because I plan to run in December :)
This seems like a smart move, especially with the Arbitrum DAO growing to over 800 delegates (data from Kamar). Btw, I know it’s tough for the mods to keep track of everyone’s actions and make sure they meet the standards for professionalism, transparency ,.. So having a clear set of values and behaviors will help hold each delegate responsible for what they do.
I have a question, though. Will there be a clear penalty for delegates who break the Code of Conduct in the Delegate Incentive Program? For example, will a delegate be removed right away for any mistake, or will it depend on how serious it is? I’m asking because I plan to run in December :)
By the way, really happy to see this proposal moving forward!
Just finished casting my FOR vote in Snapshot, as I mentioned earlier; we can all benefit as delegates from having a civil code of conduct to hold us accountable and encourage productive discussions.
Agreed with previous commenters, part of the language around avoiding controversy is problematic. Sometimes, raising attention to something going wrong requires creating a buzz around it. Trying to mediate with someone who's actively trying to manipulate the DAO doesn't make sense - and people most certainly will try to do that. At that point would you punish the person creating the controversy?
The rest of the code of conduct is good, pretty standard, not much to add.
Supporting this proposal. I think that a Code of Conduct is an important part of every organization. A DAO should be no different, this would be a key step in professionalizing the role of delegates and reinforcing the values that guide our mission. It is essential to have clear standards for behavior and integrity, especially as Arbitrum continues to grow and establish itself in the Ethereum ecosystem.
Also, I don't think his framework isn’t just about formality, it’s about safeguarding Arbitrum’s core mission: to create a transparent, secure, and inclusive protocol for everyone involved. This Code should help delegates make decisions that reflect the best interests of the whole community by outlining values like integrity, responsibility, and fairness. By prioritizing transparency and respect this will help build trust between delegates and the community, which I think its very important as the DAO continues to grow.
Supporting this proposal. I think that a Code of Conduct is an important part of every organization. A DAO should be no different, this would be a key step in professionalizing the role of delegates and reinforcing the values that guide our mission. It is essential to have clear standards for behavior and integrity, especially as Arbitrum continues to grow and establish itself in the Ethereum ecosystem.
Also, I don't think his framework isn’t just about formality, it’s about safeguarding Arbitrum’s core mission: to create a transparent, secure, and inclusive protocol for everyone involved. This Code should help delegates make decisions that reflect the best interests of the whole community by outlining values like integrity, responsibility, and fairness. By prioritizing transparency and respect this will help build trust between delegates and the community, which I think its very important as the DAO continues to grow.
Additionally, formalizing operational standards and conflict-of-interest policies brings structure and accountability to our governance model. Having clear voting guidelines, predictable schedules, and conflict-resolution practices enable delegates to stay answerable to the community and work more efficiently. It will also help increase the level of professionalism and organization for Arbitrum. A Code of Conduct sets an example for how DAOs can build a culture of responsibility and professionalism.
We appreciate the other delegates who have brought up rightful concerns about the lack of hard enforcement and ability to subvert certain proposed policies such as Responsible Voting. We hope the additional rationale below appeases some of these concerns.
To reiterate, the Arbitrum DAO Code of Conduct is a set of guiding principles for interactions between delegates, it is the standard we should hold each other to meet. These guiding principles were written in a “positive” framing as opposed to listing rules or prohibiting certain behavior; the only exceptions being the obvious severe violations, which are as follows:
We appreciate the other delegates who have brought up rightful concerns about the lack of hard enforcement and ability to subvert certain proposed policies such as Responsible Voting. We hope the additional rationale below appeases some of these concerns.
To reiterate, the Arbitrum DAO Code of Conduct is a set of guiding principles for interactions between delegates, it is the standard we should hold each other to meet. These guiding principles were written in a “positive” framing as opposed to listing rules or prohibiting certain behavior; the only exceptions being the obvious severe violations, which are as follows:
Publicly or privately harassing or intimidating others
Sharing someone’s private information without their consent
Using sexualized language or imagery, or making unwanted advances
Making insulting or derogatory comments about others
The soft-enforcement proposed is based on the idea that a delegate who demonstrates repeated disregard for the Code of Conduct, say for example by repeatedly leaving toxic, non-constructive feedback or multiple instances of failing to disclose a COI, should not be receiving compensation from the DAO in the form of the DIP or an elected position.
Hard enforcement in the form of suspensions or bans from all DAO discussions would only be somewhat effective. As correctly identified by other delegates, any individual can just transfer their voting power to another address and make a new anon forum account. While social reputation can't be transferred, it can be rebuilt under a new name.
Overall, our team strongly believes that hard enforcement of specific behaviors is not advisable and would be counterproductive. In addition to being difficult to fully monitor, we fear that creating an extensive list of prohibited behaviors will only grow over time, adding even more bureaucracy and eventually crossing a threshold where delegate speech/actions are too constrained, thus smothering healthy debate.
Conflict Resolution
We’d also like to also clarify which aspects of the Code of Conduct involve the Arbitrum Foundation. The Arbitrum Foundation is currently responsible for upholding the Community Guidelines. As explained in the proposal, we are proposing that their role be slightly expanded in two ways:
They are not responsible for enforcing the guideline principles of the Code of Conduct.
Our team is currently talking with the Foundation about updating the Community Guidelines so that they are a bit more comprehensive and also include the severe violations listed in the Code of Conduct. However, we view this as a responsibility of the Foundation and should be something brought forward by their team.
We just have one question regarding the Conflict Resolution Form: Will individuals have an opportunity to provide a rebuttal or defense? Clarifying this would help ensure a fair and transparent process for all parties involved.
Once a party submits a request using the Conflict Resolution Form, the matter is in the hands of the Arbitrum Foundation and resolved through their own internal procedures. In general though, yes, the accused individual will have an opportunity for rebuttal and to present their side of the story.
Again, we encourage delegates and contributors to resolve conflicts privately. Once taken to the Foundation, their decision and resolution is final. The process has been designed in this matter so that the DAO is not involved in resolving or hearing appeals in regards to delegate <> delegate conflicts.
Additional Questions
As for conflict of interest, disclosure is certainly appropriate after the DAO vote on the topic. That said, posting before self-voting seems redundant, assuming this is communicated in a delegate’s rationale posting.
This is a valid concern and Entropy does not wish to create redundant work for delegates. However, in this case, we feel it is important for a delegate to disclose a COI before voting. Some delegates wait until the end of the month to communicate rationale; it would be unfortunate if a COI that would have influenced the voting decision of delegates came out weeks later. This could be especially impactful in the case of elections.
I concur with @SEEDGov that taking a holiday break is necessary, but it could also potentially open us up to governance attacks. Is it possible to prevent new proposals on Tally during this period as a precaution? If an emergency arises, the Security Council could address it. Would this approach be technically feasible, and are there any potential drawbacks?
This is a good question, when drafting the Improving Predictability proposal, our team considered if it was worth preventing proposals from even being posted on Tally during the Holiday Break. After weighing the tradeoffs, we deemed that it was not worth sacrificing the flexibility to post an emergency proposal if for an unforeseen reason it was necessary. We’ll refer to our response above for additional rationale:
Delegate availability during the holiday season is an appropriate concern. When created, the main purpose of the holiday was to at least give delegates some time off from voting on proposals. We expect that conversations and comments will still occur both on the forums and other adjacent DAO-related chats. The break just creates a time where the expectation of delegates is reduced compared to a normal week. Additionally, with the Holiday Break being shorter (18 days) than the time required to move a proposal through an onchain vote (~20 days), we view the likelihood of a governance attack or emergency situation going unnoticed as low.
Regarding weighted voting, while it has benefits, it also carries the risk of skewed voting outcomes based on individual perceptions, potentially undermining objectivity. Are you proposing that weighted voting be applied universally to all proposal types, or is it intended specifically for elections?
We are proposing weighted voting for only elections, not for all proposal types.
Glad to see our suggestion around this got included. Like we talked about, the current delegations from holdings of various initiatives are inconsistent. Some parts have been delegated to the exclude address, some have been delegated to specific delegates, and other have not been delegated at all. It may not be part of this proposal but is there a plan to do an audit on the current state of this and make any changes necessary?
This would only apply to DAO approved initiatives going forward, but Entropy has been working on a transparency page for funds in the MSS and other multi-sigs. While not part of this proposal, we can do a quick audit to see which programs are not yet delegated to the Exclude Address.
Updates to the Proposal
We have updated the proposal to include some of the suggestions from @raam. This included extra language and instructions about how to delegate to the Exclude Address, adding a COI section to the recommended proposal structure, and updating the Due Care and Attention section with a few suggestions on how delegates can stay up to date with DAO initiatives.
Additional language was added for both the Holiday Break and for how contributors should report suspected collusion in elections (participants teaming up to circumvent the Responsible Voting policy) to the Foundation:
Proposal authors should be cognizant of timelines and aim to having all voting wrapped up by Thursday, December 19th.
Contributors that suspect collusion should message the Arbitrum Foundation team privately to notify them of the situation.
Lastly, the following line has been removed:
And replaced with the following guiding principle under the Civility and Professionalism section:
Delegates should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels and avoid taking discussions to social media in a manner that could tarnish Arbitrum DAO’s brand and reputation.
We will be posting this proposal to Snapshot shortly.
Voting in favour of the code of conduct.
First, we are getting big enough that we need at least a piece of paper in which is stated: this is good, this is ok, this can likely have bad consequences. Otherwise, with the amount of people we have, there will be at some point malicious actor that would just justify their action by saying that it was not written anywhere.
Voting in favour of the code of conduct.
First, we are getting big enough that we need at least a piece of paper in which is stated: this is good, this is ok, this can likely have bad consequences. Otherwise, with the amount of people we have, there will be at some point malicious actor that would just justify their action by saying that it was not written anywhere.
While I can understand that most are concerned about hard implementation, I think the soft one is fine, for one reason: if we come to the point of having to exclude someone from the dao life (dip, or other), it is unlikely to come from just a single event. It will come from a behaviour, over time, that will show poor alignment with the dao as a whole, likely culminating with a single event that can be used as a proxy. I am again positive, and optimist, on the fact that all the og and good delegates we have in here will just constantly observe what happens in the forum, in the chat, in the vote rationale, and also in twitter, and will do their best to solve conflicts and realign parties before we come to the point of having to take actions based on violation of the code of conduct.
Also thanks entropy for this!
Thank you to Entropy for bringing this proposal forward. We agree that establishing a core set of values and behaviors is essential to fostering a professional culture grounded in integrity and transparency. We also appreciate the thorough research behind this proposal and the inspiration drawn from other DAOs.
We just have one question regarding the Conflict Resolution Form: Will individuals have an opportunity to provide a rebuttal or defense? Clarifying this would help ensure a fair and transparent process for all parties involved.
As a new Delegate, I fully support this code of conduct and am eager to adhere to it. I also appreciate the resources @raam shared; they are very helpful for keeping up with DAO activities.
Several delegates have mentioned that enforcement and monitoring can be challenging due to the DAO's permissionless nature. While there may not be a perfect solution, one approach could be to foster a vigilant community and encourage key contributors to have skin in the game and not remain entirely anonymous.
As a new Delegate, I fully support this code of conduct and am eager to adhere to it. I also appreciate the resources @raam shared; they are very helpful for keeping up with DAO activities.
Several delegates have mentioned that enforcement and monitoring can be challenging due to the DAO's permissionless nature. While there may not be a perfect solution, one approach could be to foster a vigilant community and encourage key contributors to have skin in the game and not remain entirely anonymous.
I concur with @SEEDGov that taking a holiday break is necessary, but it could also potentially open us up to governance attacks. Is it possible to prevent new proposals on Tally during this period as a precaution? If an emergency arises, the Security Council could address it. Would this approach be technically feasible, and are there any potential drawbacks?
Thank you for your excellent work, @Entropy !
Hello! Thank you very much for this proposal. Like most people, I agree with almost everything in its content.
Regarding the point raised by everyone
We are in FAVOUR of adopting a Code of Conduct to improve the operations of the Arbitrum DAO.
However, we share similar concerns than other delegates have highlighted.
We are in FAVOUR of adopting a Code of Conduct to improve the operations of the Arbitrum DAO.
However, we share similar concerns than other delegates have highlighted.
In particular, we believe more information needs to be presented in terms of the clear procedures for monitoring and accountability, as well as “hard enforcement” (e.g., how to enforce a COI for a delegate, an organism, or a framework to proceed in case of malicious behavior). This is necessary to avoid situations where proposals have been approved and there is no designated entity to monitor - while anyone can bring a violation forward we believe it is important the incentives are aligned and we ensure the creation of an overall framework on this part as well.
Furthermore, there may be an issue around the re-delegation of voting power away from bad actors (who might have infringed the code of conduct or COI). Perhaps this could be analysed within the context of stARB and other delegator incentive mechanisms to link delegation and staking.
We support this proposal and encourage all delegates to uphold the highest standards of conduct.
A few thoughts:
Great work @Entropy! We believe the proposed Code of Conduct is well crafted and are happy to support it.
Great questions @WinVerse! When it comes to the length of a suspension or issuing a permeant ban from the Delegate Incentive Program, that decision remains up to the program administrator. Say for example a delegate repeatedly fails to disclose a conflict of interest. The program administrator of the DIP may decide that the delegate is failing to meet the eligibility requirements of the program and should be suspended for 12 months (this number was arbitrarily chosen as an example). The delegate would have the ability to appeal this decision to the DAO, arguing for example the punishment is excessive (should be say 6 months) or their actions do not warrant a suspension at all. This would be a one-time appeal by the delegate, and the results from the vote would be final.
As it is written currently, an individual/entity who is forcibly removed from a DAO-elected position is not suspended or banned from the DAO. We imagine that if an elected representative refuses to resign and has to be removed through a vote, it would be unlikely for them to be elected to another position of power. However, if that individual/entity is also a delegate participating in the DIP, the program administrator has the right to suspend/ban them based on the severity of their actions.
Hi, it's great work of combining best practices from other DAOs. Very detailed code.
I am confused by the requirements for Responsible Voting: these restrictions can be circumvented by formally observing all the rules of the code, temporarily redistributing your tokens to other addresses.
Hi, it's great work of combining best practices from other DAOs. Very detailed code.
I am confused by the requirements for Responsible Voting: these restrictions can be circumvented by formally observing all the rules of the code, temporarily redistributing your tokens to other addresses.
The second point is a conflict of interest. Many delegates represent companies that do not provide their employees with information about conflicts of interest. If a delegate votes in accordance with the interests of the Arbitration, it would be wrong to punish him for ignorance. Besides - who will monitor all this?
I also believe that immediate disqualification should not be applied. Any accusation should have the possibility of acquittal.
Thanks for putting this up @Entropy. A delegate code of conduct is more than welcome at this time given the size and engagement of the Arbitrum DAO.
I initially had a question regarding monitoring/policing of these violators but I see you have answered them here.
Thanks for putting this up @Entropy. A delegate code of conduct is more than welcome at this time given the size and engagement of the Arbitrum DAO.
I initially had a question regarding monitoring/policing of these violators but I see you have answered them here.
Most clauses in the code of conduct are written as guiding principles that delegates should seek to embody. The responsibility falls on all delegates to hold each other accountable. It takes the entire community to create and maintain a professional culture. Similar to the Arbitrum DAO Constitution’s community values, with these principles actually written out, the code of conduct provides contributors a basis for behavior that should be promoted.
Zooming out though, another question that ties to the above would be this: On the discovery and ban of the violators of this CoC, for how long would they be banned/suspended? Would it span over a six-month/12-month period? Or more?
Finally, is there a rationale behind this 3% of all votable tokens? Just wondering, and please point me in the right direction if there is one already.
Attended the meeting last night, a process in which your contribution not only helped clarify the mechanisms for implementing the code of conduct, but also highlighted how to find a balance between openness and transparency in the DAO and maintaining the brand's reputation
I 100% agree with the sentiment of this proposal. We definitively should have a structure for this!
I also do not agree with this. The top choice of this vote was "Against" shielded vote. Suggesting that for elections people would prefer "Shielded vote" because it was the second most voted alternative in the snapshot is an inference and it could be wrong. I would have personally voted for no shielding on either option (general proposals, or election proposals).
For this, I will be voting against this proposal on its current form. The two points mentioned above (which I have already expressed myself and voted on in the past) are incompatible with my views on the structure presented.
This aside, all other points and guidelines look very good, and I look forward to the DAO adopting some for of conflict of interest direction and COC!
As noted in my reply above, I am for this. Having formal rules like this is important to further legitimize the DAO and have agreed-upon reference points for future discussions. Especially as we (hopefully!) grow the DAO with new members.
I'll repeat my point that I think we should keep a list of who has been reprimanded by the DAO (similar to https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/list-of-projects-banned-from-the-dao/26097). In the future, that will be helpful for delegates.
Voting "For"
Voted For: As one of the biggest DAOs in the space, we need to lead by example for other DAOs. Having a Code of Conduct is a necessary step. This serves as a rulebook for situations that might arise, allowing us to refer to it as needed. In practice, it’s now up to us (delegates) to follow this code in real life.
I vote in favor of this proposal in Snapshot, although I reiterate my previous comments.
I vote in favor of this proposal in Snapshot, although I reiterate my previous comments.
This way, it’s clear that the aim is to avoid noise for the sake of noise itself. Although it was clarified in the thread, Private mediation still sounds as if things should be resolved privately, when the ideal place for discussion—at least in my opinion—is the public forum.
On another note, why not simply call this proposal the “Arbitrum Code of Conduct”? I believe it goes well beyond just the expected behavior of delegates.
Lastly, I have a question regarding the following:
Unless otherwise justified by a proposal author, the standard removal process will be a simple majority of votes cast by delegates with at least 3% of all votable tokens having cast votes in favor of the removal or abstaining.
Why are we tightening an oversight requirement of the DAO? Maybe it was discussed somewhere, and I missed it. tbh, I’m not sure if I’m for or against it, but in practice, it makes it more complicated to remove someone. I’d love to understand the rationale. I understand that this would align the threshold required for on-chain votes, but in reality, this is an off-chain vote. I’d be okay with it being a simple majority of the total votes, without a threshold.
Furthermore, I believe it would be valuable to implement this code for one year, after which a report should be made on the studied situations and whether any sanctions were considered. This would allow us to refine the language afterwards.
Even if I always did my best to act accordingly to these principles, I think that a clear formalization can only bring benefits. We are a growing community and, as we grow, we need things to be written somewhere in order to avoid informal behaviors to happen. This would also allow to take clear actions if bad behaviors happen, or to discourage them through a form of 'deterrence'. Good fences make good neighbors. Voting in favor.
This seems like a smart move, especially with the Arbitrum DAO growing to over 800 delegates (data from Kamar). Btw, I know it’s tough for the mods to keep track of everyone’s actions and make sure they meet the standards for professionalism, transparency ,.. So having a clear set of values and behaviors will help hold each delegate responsible for what they do.
I have a question, though. Will there be a clear penalty for delegates who break the Code of Conduct in the Delegate Incentive Program? For example, will a delegate be removed right away for any mistake, or will it depend on how serious it is? I’m asking because I plan to run in December :)
This seems like a smart move, especially with the Arbitrum DAO growing to over 800 delegates (data from Kamar). Btw, I know it’s tough for the mods to keep track of everyone’s actions and make sure they meet the standards for professionalism, transparency ,.. So having a clear set of values and behaviors will help hold each delegate responsible for what they do.
I have a question, though. Will there be a clear penalty for delegates who break the Code of Conduct in the Delegate Incentive Program? For example, will a delegate be removed right away for any mistake, or will it depend on how serious it is? I’m asking because I plan to run in December :)
By the way, really happy to see this proposal moving forward!
Just finished casting my FOR vote in Snapshot, as I mentioned earlier; we can all benefit as delegates from having a civil code of conduct to hold us accountable and encourage productive discussions.
Agreed with previous commenters, part of the language around avoiding controversy is problematic. Sometimes, raising attention to something going wrong requires creating a buzz around it. Trying to mediate with someone who's actively trying to manipulate the DAO doesn't make sense - and people most certainly will try to do that. At that point would you punish the person creating the controversy?
The rest of the code of conduct is good, pretty standard, not much to add.
Supporting this proposal. I think that a Code of Conduct is an important part of every organization. A DAO should be no different, this would be a key step in professionalizing the role of delegates and reinforcing the values that guide our mission. It is essential to have clear standards for behavior and integrity, especially as Arbitrum continues to grow and establish itself in the Ethereum ecosystem.
Also, I don't think his framework isn’t just about formality, it’s about safeguarding Arbitrum’s core mission: to create a transparent, secure, and inclusive protocol for everyone involved. This Code should help delegates make decisions that reflect the best interests of the whole community by outlining values like integrity, responsibility, and fairness. By prioritizing transparency and respect this will help build trust between delegates and the community, which I think its very important as the DAO continues to grow.
Supporting this proposal. I think that a Code of Conduct is an important part of every organization. A DAO should be no different, this would be a key step in professionalizing the role of delegates and reinforcing the values that guide our mission. It is essential to have clear standards for behavior and integrity, especially as Arbitrum continues to grow and establish itself in the Ethereum ecosystem.
Also, I don't think his framework isn’t just about formality, it’s about safeguarding Arbitrum’s core mission: to create a transparent, secure, and inclusive protocol for everyone involved. This Code should help delegates make decisions that reflect the best interests of the whole community by outlining values like integrity, responsibility, and fairness. By prioritizing transparency and respect this will help build trust between delegates and the community, which I think its very important as the DAO continues to grow.
Additionally, formalizing operational standards and conflict-of-interest policies brings structure and accountability to our governance model. Having clear voting guidelines, predictable schedules, and conflict-resolution practices enable delegates to stay answerable to the community and work more efficiently. It will also help increase the level of professionalism and organization for Arbitrum. A Code of Conduct sets an example for how DAOs can build a culture of responsibility and professionalism.
We appreciate the other delegates who have brought up rightful concerns about the lack of hard enforcement and ability to subvert certain proposed policies such as Responsible Voting. We hope the additional rationale below appeases some of these concerns.
To reiterate, the Arbitrum DAO Code of Conduct is a set of guiding principles for interactions between delegates, it is the standard we should hold each other to meet. These guiding principles were written in a “positive” framing as opposed to listing rules or prohibiting certain behavior; the only exceptions being the obvious severe violations, which are as follows:
We appreciate the other delegates who have brought up rightful concerns about the lack of hard enforcement and ability to subvert certain proposed policies such as Responsible Voting. We hope the additional rationale below appeases some of these concerns.
To reiterate, the Arbitrum DAO Code of Conduct is a set of guiding principles for interactions between delegates, it is the standard we should hold each other to meet. These guiding principles were written in a “positive” framing as opposed to listing rules or prohibiting certain behavior; the only exceptions being the obvious severe violations, which are as follows:
Publicly or privately harassing or intimidating others
Sharing someone’s private information without their consent
Using sexualized language or imagery, or making unwanted advances
Making insulting or derogatory comments about others
The soft-enforcement proposed is based on the idea that a delegate who demonstrates repeated disregard for the Code of Conduct, say for example by repeatedly leaving toxic, non-constructive feedback or multiple instances of failing to disclose a COI, should not be receiving compensation from the DAO in the form of the DIP or an elected position.
Hard enforcement in the form of suspensions or bans from all DAO discussions would only be somewhat effective. As correctly identified by other delegates, any individual can just transfer their voting power to another address and make a new anon forum account. While social reputation can't be transferred, it can be rebuilt under a new name.
Overall, our team strongly believes that hard enforcement of specific behaviors is not advisable and would be counterproductive. In addition to being difficult to fully monitor, we fear that creating an extensive list of prohibited behaviors will only grow over time, adding even more bureaucracy and eventually crossing a threshold where delegate speech/actions are too constrained, thus smothering healthy debate.
Conflict Resolution
We’d also like to also clarify which aspects of the Code of Conduct involve the Arbitrum Foundation. The Arbitrum Foundation is currently responsible for upholding the Community Guidelines. As explained in the proposal, we are proposing that their role be slightly expanded in two ways:
They are not responsible for enforcing the guideline principles of the Code of Conduct.
Our team is currently talking with the Foundation about updating the Community Guidelines so that they are a bit more comprehensive and also include the severe violations listed in the Code of Conduct. However, we view this as a responsibility of the Foundation and should be something brought forward by their team.
We just have one question regarding the Conflict Resolution Form: Will individuals have an opportunity to provide a rebuttal or defense? Clarifying this would help ensure a fair and transparent process for all parties involved.
Once a party submits a request using the Conflict Resolution Form, the matter is in the hands of the Arbitrum Foundation and resolved through their own internal procedures. In general though, yes, the accused individual will have an opportunity for rebuttal and to present their side of the story.
Again, we encourage delegates and contributors to resolve conflicts privately. Once taken to the Foundation, their decision and resolution is final. The process has been designed in this matter so that the DAO is not involved in resolving or hearing appeals in regards to delegate <> delegate conflicts.
Additional Questions
As for conflict of interest, disclosure is certainly appropriate after the DAO vote on the topic. That said, posting before self-voting seems redundant, assuming this is communicated in a delegate’s rationale posting.
This is a valid concern and Entropy does not wish to create redundant work for delegates. However, in this case, we feel it is important for a delegate to disclose a COI before voting. Some delegates wait until the end of the month to communicate rationale; it would be unfortunate if a COI that would have influenced the voting decision of delegates came out weeks later. This could be especially impactful in the case of elections.
I concur with @SEEDGov that taking a holiday break is necessary, but it could also potentially open us up to governance attacks. Is it possible to prevent new proposals on Tally during this period as a precaution? If an emergency arises, the Security Council could address it. Would this approach be technically feasible, and are there any potential drawbacks?
This is a good question, when drafting the Improving Predictability proposal, our team considered if it was worth preventing proposals from even being posted on Tally during the Holiday Break. After weighing the tradeoffs, we deemed that it was not worth sacrificing the flexibility to post an emergency proposal if for an unforeseen reason it was necessary. We’ll refer to our response above for additional rationale:
Delegate availability during the holiday season is an appropriate concern. When created, the main purpose of the holiday was to at least give delegates some time off from voting on proposals. We expect that conversations and comments will still occur both on the forums and other adjacent DAO-related chats. The break just creates a time where the expectation of delegates is reduced compared to a normal week. Additionally, with the Holiday Break being shorter (18 days) than the time required to move a proposal through an onchain vote (~20 days), we view the likelihood of a governance attack or emergency situation going unnoticed as low.
Regarding weighted voting, while it has benefits, it also carries the risk of skewed voting outcomes based on individual perceptions, potentially undermining objectivity. Are you proposing that weighted voting be applied universally to all proposal types, or is it intended specifically for elections?
We are proposing weighted voting for only elections, not for all proposal types.
Glad to see our suggestion around this got included. Like we talked about, the current delegations from holdings of various initiatives are inconsistent. Some parts have been delegated to the exclude address, some have been delegated to specific delegates, and other have not been delegated at all. It may not be part of this proposal but is there a plan to do an audit on the current state of this and make any changes necessary?
This would only apply to DAO approved initiatives going forward, but Entropy has been working on a transparency page for funds in the MSS and other multi-sigs. While not part of this proposal, we can do a quick audit to see which programs are not yet delegated to the Exclude Address.
Updates to the Proposal
We have updated the proposal to include some of the suggestions from @raam. This included extra language and instructions about how to delegate to the Exclude Address, adding a COI section to the recommended proposal structure, and updating the Due Care and Attention section with a few suggestions on how delegates can stay up to date with DAO initiatives.
Additional language was added for both the Holiday Break and for how contributors should report suspected collusion in elections (participants teaming up to circumvent the Responsible Voting policy) to the Foundation:
Proposal authors should be cognizant of timelines and aim to having all voting wrapped up by Thursday, December 19th.
Contributors that suspect collusion should message the Arbitrum Foundation team privately to notify them of the situation.
Lastly, the following line has been removed:
And replaced with the following guiding principle under the Civility and Professionalism section:
Delegates should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels and avoid taking discussions to social media in a manner that could tarnish Arbitrum DAO’s brand and reputation.
We will be posting this proposal to Snapshot shortly.
Voting in favour of the code of conduct.
First, we are getting big enough that we need at least a piece of paper in which is stated: this is good, this is ok, this can likely have bad consequences. Otherwise, with the amount of people we have, there will be at some point malicious actor that would just justify their action by saying that it was not written anywhere.
Voting in favour of the code of conduct.
First, we are getting big enough that we need at least a piece of paper in which is stated: this is good, this is ok, this can likely have bad consequences. Otherwise, with the amount of people we have, there will be at some point malicious actor that would just justify their action by saying that it was not written anywhere.
While I can understand that most are concerned about hard implementation, I think the soft one is fine, for one reason: if we come to the point of having to exclude someone from the dao life (dip, or other), it is unlikely to come from just a single event. It will come from a behaviour, over time, that will show poor alignment with the dao as a whole, likely culminating with a single event that can be used as a proxy. I am again positive, and optimist, on the fact that all the og and good delegates we have in here will just constantly observe what happens in the forum, in the chat, in the vote rationale, and also in twitter, and will do their best to solve conflicts and realign parties before we come to the point of having to take actions based on violation of the code of conduct.
Also thanks entropy for this!
Thank you to Entropy for bringing this proposal forward. We agree that establishing a core set of values and behaviors is essential to fostering a professional culture grounded in integrity and transparency. We also appreciate the thorough research behind this proposal and the inspiration drawn from other DAOs.
We just have one question regarding the Conflict Resolution Form: Will individuals have an opportunity to provide a rebuttal or defense? Clarifying this would help ensure a fair and transparent process for all parties involved.
As a new Delegate, I fully support this code of conduct and am eager to adhere to it. I also appreciate the resources @raam shared; they are very helpful for keeping up with DAO activities.
Several delegates have mentioned that enforcement and monitoring can be challenging due to the DAO's permissionless nature. While there may not be a perfect solution, one approach could be to foster a vigilant community and encourage key contributors to have skin in the game and not remain entirely anonymous.
As a new Delegate, I fully support this code of conduct and am eager to adhere to it. I also appreciate the resources @raam shared; they are very helpful for keeping up with DAO activities.
Several delegates have mentioned that enforcement and monitoring can be challenging due to the DAO's permissionless nature. While there may not be a perfect solution, one approach could be to foster a vigilant community and encourage key contributors to have skin in the game and not remain entirely anonymous.
I concur with @SEEDGov that taking a holiday break is necessary, but it could also potentially open us up to governance attacks. Is it possible to prevent new proposals on Tally during this period as a precaution? If an emergency arises, the Security Council could address it. Would this approach be technically feasible, and are there any potential drawbacks?
Thank you for your excellent work, @Entropy !
Hello! Thank you very much for this proposal. Like most people, I agree with almost everything in its content.
Regarding the point raised by everyone
We are in FAVOUR of adopting a Code of Conduct to improve the operations of the Arbitrum DAO.
However, we share similar concerns than other delegates have highlighted.
We are in FAVOUR of adopting a Code of Conduct to improve the operations of the Arbitrum DAO.
However, we share similar concerns than other delegates have highlighted.
In particular, we believe more information needs to be presented in terms of the clear procedures for monitoring and accountability, as well as “hard enforcement” (e.g., how to enforce a COI for a delegate, an organism, or a framework to proceed in case of malicious behavior). This is necessary to avoid situations where proposals have been approved and there is no designated entity to monitor - while anyone can bring a violation forward we believe it is important the incentives are aligned and we ensure the creation of an overall framework on this part as well.
Furthermore, there may be an issue around the re-delegation of voting power away from bad actors (who might have infringed the code of conduct or COI). Perhaps this could be analysed within the context of stARB and other delegator incentive mechanisms to link delegation and staking.
We support this proposal and encourage all delegates to uphold the highest standards of conduct.
A few thoughts:
Great work @Entropy! We believe the proposed Code of Conduct is well crafted and are happy to support it.
Great questions @WinVerse! When it comes to the length of a suspension or issuing a permeant ban from the Delegate Incentive Program, that decision remains up to the program administrator. Say for example a delegate repeatedly fails to disclose a conflict of interest. The program administrator of the DIP may decide that the delegate is failing to meet the eligibility requirements of the program and should be suspended for 12 months (this number was arbitrarily chosen as an example). The delegate would have the ability to appeal this decision to the DAO, arguing for example the punishment is excessive (should be say 6 months) or their actions do not warrant a suspension at all. This would be a one-time appeal by the delegate, and the results from the vote would be final.
As it is written currently, an individual/entity who is forcibly removed from a DAO-elected position is not suspended or banned from the DAO. We imagine that if an elected representative refuses to resign and has to be removed through a vote, it would be unlikely for them to be elected to another position of power. However, if that individual/entity is also a delegate participating in the DIP, the program administrator has the right to suspend/ban them based on the severity of their actions.
Hi, it's great work of combining best practices from other DAOs. Very detailed code.
I am confused by the requirements for Responsible Voting: these restrictions can be circumvented by formally observing all the rules of the code, temporarily redistributing your tokens to other addresses.
Hi, it's great work of combining best practices from other DAOs. Very detailed code.
I am confused by the requirements for Responsible Voting: these restrictions can be circumvented by formally observing all the rules of the code, temporarily redistributing your tokens to other addresses.
The second point is a conflict of interest. Many delegates represent companies that do not provide their employees with information about conflicts of interest. If a delegate votes in accordance with the interests of the Arbitration, it would be wrong to punish him for ignorance. Besides - who will monitor all this?
I also believe that immediate disqualification should not be applied. Any accusation should have the possibility of acquittal.
Thanks for putting this up @Entropy. A delegate code of conduct is more than welcome at this time given the size and engagement of the Arbitrum DAO.
I initially had a question regarding monitoring/policing of these violators but I see you have answered them here.
Thanks for putting this up @Entropy. A delegate code of conduct is more than welcome at this time given the size and engagement of the Arbitrum DAO.
I initially had a question regarding monitoring/policing of these violators but I see you have answered them here.
Most clauses in the code of conduct are written as guiding principles that delegates should seek to embody. The responsibility falls on all delegates to hold each other accountable. It takes the entire community to create and maintain a professional culture. Similar to the Arbitrum DAO Constitution’s community values, with these principles actually written out, the code of conduct provides contributors a basis for behavior that should be promoted.
Zooming out though, another question that ties to the above would be this: On the discovery and ban of the violators of this CoC, for how long would they be banned/suspended? Would it span over a six-month/12-month period? Or more?
Finally, is there a rationale behind this 3% of all votable tokens? Just wondering, and please point me in the right direction if there is one already.
Attended the meeting last night, a process in which your contribution not only helped clarify the mechanisms for implementing the code of conduct, but also highlighted how to find a balance between openness and transparency in the DAO and maintaining the brand's reputation
Hello! Thank you very much for this proposal. Like most people, I agree with almost everything in its content.
Regarding the point raised by everyone
my suggestion is to modify the wording as follows: "Prioritize the controversy itself"
This way, it’s clear that the aim is to avoid noise for the sake of noise itself. Although it was clarified in the thread, Private mediation still sounds as if things should be resolved privately, when the ideal place for discussion—at least in my opinion—is the public forum.
On another note, why not simply call this proposal the "Arbitrum Code of Conduct"? I believe it goes well beyond just the expected behavior of delegates.
Lastly, I have a question regarding the following:
Unless otherwise justified by a proposal author, the standard removal process will be a simple majority of votes cast by delegates with at least 3% of all votable tokens having cast votes in favor of the removal or abstaining.
Why are we tightening an oversight requirement of the DAO? Maybe it was discussed somewhere, and I missed it. tbh, I’m not sure if I’m for or against it, but in practice, it makes it more complicated to remove someone. I'd love to understand the rationale. I understand that this would align the threshold required for on-chain votes, but in reality, this is an off-chain vote. I’d be okay with it being a simple majority of the total votes, without a threshold.
A few thoughts:
Lastly, and more generally, it is worth flagging that as the DAO matures, several inclusions here make the DAO significantly more bureaucratic. The changes aren't bad, but the vision of DAOs is to trend away from human intervention by leveraging onchain execution to handle enforcement rather than bureaucratic policies. If the DAO is serious about these changes, it's worth translating some of these social principles, which will inevitably get buried in the forum, into more robust onchain parameters, so we do not waste time re-posting votes, canceling votes, etc.
Great questions @WinVerse! When it comes to the length of a suspension or issuing a permeant ban from the Delegate Incentive Program, that decision remains up to the program administrator. Say for example a delegate repeatedly fails to disclose a conflict of interest. The program administrator of the DIP may decide that the delegate is failing to meet the eligibility requirements of the program and should be suspended for 12 months (this number was arbitrarily chosen as an example). The delegate would have the ability to appeal this decision to the DAO, arguing for example the punishment is excessive (should be say 6 months) or their actions do not warrant a suspension at all. This would be a one-time appeal by the delegate, and the results from the vote would be final.
As it is written currently, an individual/entity who is forcibly removed from a DAO-elected position is not suspended or banned from the DAO. We imagine that if an elected representative refuses to resign and has to be removed through a vote, it would be unlikely for them to be elected to another position of power. However, if that individual/entity is also a delegate participating in the DIP, the program administrator has the right to suspend/ban them based on the severity of their actions.
The 3% of all votable tokens quorum comes from the Arbitrum Constitution and is the requirement for a non-constitutional proposal to pass onchain. Temperature checks technically don't have a quorum requirement as stated in the Constitution, but Entropy has made it standard practice to include this threshold in our proposals.
I agree with this proposal. It is essential to have a code of conduct for such an important position. If possible, there should be different versions that are updated so that delegates do not forget Arbitrum's values and the significant responsibility we have.
We could also mention that a good practice is participating in the discussions where the delegate believes they can add value. This way, the delegate is not obligated to participate in every discussion, and we lay the foundation for a more professional DAO, with delegates focusing on their area of expertise.
I agree with this proposal. It is essential to have a code of conduct for such an important position. If possible, there should be different versions that are updated so that delegates do not forget Arbitrum's values and the significant responsibility we have.
We could also mention that a good practice is participating in the discussions where the delegate believes they can add value. This way, the delegate is not obligated to participate in every discussion, and we lay the foundation for a more professional DAO, with delegates focusing on their area of expertise.
I believe it's important to identify the area of expertise of the delegate, perhaps by visually displaying their badges without needing to enter their profile. Something that would be visually appealing for the proposal creator or someone reviewing a proposal for the first time would be to see how valuable their comments have been throughout their time in the forum. This would help filter out the most relevant comments from those that are not.
Feedback on code of conduct implementation, delegate oversight, definition of urgent proposals, etc. is very important... great feedback last night!
We're glad to see great discussion already underway! Thank you to all for contributing to this important topic. Below are responses to some of the questions and points brought up by delegates.
We're glad to see great discussion already underway! Thank you to all for contributing to this important topic. Below are responses to some of the questions and points brought up by delegates.
Several delegates mentioned Optimism DAO and its code of conduct / resolution processes, so we’d first like to provide some additional rationale for how the code was written and why the Arbitrum Foundation was chosen as the mediator in conflicts between delegates. Of all the DAOs reviewed, Optimism DAO has experimented the most with enforcement mechanisms for their code of conduct and rules of engagement (their term for community guidelines). After its creation, the code was initially enforced by the Optimism Foundation. In an effort to decentralize moderation, the process was shifted so that violations were brought forward and voted on by delegates directly. After just two instances this was determined to be a sub-optimal approach. It was concluded that delegates did not want to be responsible for voting on conduct cases. From this a dedicated code of conduct committee was established, but over the last year its powers have been rescoped twice. Now it only handles severe instances of conduct breaches and upholds the rules of engagement, while all unenforceable policies in the original code of conduct were transformed into guiding principles now known as the “Optimist Expectations”.
We encourage all delegates to read through the materials linked above. In many ways they have come full circle, but their experimentation has provided valuable insights for DAOs of a similar size.
The Arbitrum Delegate Code of Conduct and its enforcement mechanism were written in a manner specifically taking those learnings into account. Most importantly, we believe that many conflicts can be handled first in private and only in serious instances need to be raised to a 3rd-party mediator. The Arbitrum Foundation is already responsible for enforcing the community guidelines, so while a committee was mentioned first by @PGov and other delegates, our team believes the tradeoffs involved with introducing additional bureaucracy & overhead to monitor/resolve conflict issues outweighs the benefits.
First, it does not clearly specify who will monitor the Delegates and how that monitoring will take place. Many violations of the code of conduct could occur discreetly.
Most clauses in the code of conduct are written as guiding principles that delegates should seek to embody. The responsibility falls on all delegates to hold each other accountable. It takes the entire community to create and maintain a professional culture. Similar to the Arbitrum DAO Constitution’s community values, with these principles actually written out, the code of conduct provides contributors a basis for behavior that should be promoted.
The only violations that result in direct punishment are the behaviors prohibited by the community guidelines - ex. harassment, doxxing, inappropriate language. Mediation and conflict resolution will be handled by the Arbitrum Foundation, but any Arbitrum DAO contributor can use this google form to report instances.
For these Delegates, how do we regulate their behavior? It seems difficult to disqualify them as Delegates, as they could simply transfer their $ARB to another wallet and reapply.
This is just one scenario that makes conduct enforcement in DAOs so difficult. Any individual can spin up a new wallet, transfer ARB, and begin voting. Holding anon delegates accountable is close to impossible. However, while Arbitrum DAO is open to anyone that wishes to participate, it does not mean the DAO is required to pay everyone. When it comes to the Delegate Incentive Program, participants are required to KYC to receive rewards and those applying for committee/council positions normally have to maintain a level of social credibility/reputation to be elected. These mechanisms prevent an individual from at least immediately transferring ARB to another wallet and reapplying to the DIP or an elected-position. Overall, this scenario and reasoning contributed to the code of conduct being written as a set of guiding principles that delegates should aspire to embody, rather than a strict set of rules that can be “violated”.
Any DAO member can propose a Snapshot vote to remove a DAO-elected representative.
Recommend this be caveated explicitly that it must adhere to the new standards about minimum proposal times and posting dates. Just to clearly avoid a quick weekend vote to remove someone. Because this has no onchain execution, we can explicitly invalidate nonconforming proposals on this subject.
This is a great call out; the proposal has been updated to clarify that elected representative removal votes must adhere to the other agreed upon proposal guidelines.
As for the delegate appeal system in the DIP, should we add the 3% requirement? From our side, there wouldn’t be an issue if the DAO considers the modification valid in this proposal (since it wasn’t contemplated in the text of the DIP 1.5).
This is also a good addition, a quorum requirement of at least 3% of circulating supply has been added for the DIP removal appeal process.
Several delegates have asked for clarification on what constitutes an emergency proposal. We are hesitant to create exact criteria, but generally speaking, emergency proposals should be limited to security related protocol upgrades. Another example of an emergency could include a heinous unethical activity such as stealing funds, that requires immediate removal from a committee. Non-constitutional proposals that are to spin up new initiatives, grants, or any other funding requests are not considered an emergency, and should therefore wait until after the Holiday Period. There were recently two proposals that went to Tally a day late, and while justification was given, in our opinion they did not really qualify as an emergency. We recognize that there is a tricky tradeoff in strictly adhering to procedures and perhaps slowing down operations unnecessarily. The community has thus far adapted well to the voting schedule, and we trust that delegates will be able to discern when an emergency is actually required.
If we all assume it’s holiday time and most people plan their absence accordingly, the DAO’s ability to respond to potential governance attacks or emergency votes will be reduced compared to the rest of the year.
Delegate availability during the holiday season is an appropriate concern. When created, the main purpose of the holiday was to at least give delegates some time off from voting on proposals. We expect that conversations and comments will still occur both on the forums and other adjacent DAO-related chats. The break just creates a time where the expectation of delegates is reduced compared to a normal week. Additionally, with the Holiday Break being shorter (18 days) than the time required to move a proposal through an onchain vote (~20 days), we view the likelihood of a governance attack or emergency situation going unnoticed as low.
The proposal has been updated to include a link to the conflict resolution reporting google form. Responses will be sent to the Arbitrum Foundation team.
We appreciate delegates calling out this line, as upon reflection, we agree that it needs clarification and did not accurately communicate the intent behind the statement.
@stonecoldpat correctly summarized our motivation behind this statement and code of conduct as a whole. This document intends to be something that delegates can point to in order to help filter out those playing status or short-term games. A professional and civil culture can be brought down by just one or two individuals who purposefully introduce toxicity. Drawing hard lines on what is acceptable speech is a fool’s errand, but the DAO needs to acquire the ability to defend itself from bad actors that seek to subvert its operations.
The phrase “private mediation” was added after recent instances of individuals taking critiques public to social media without engaging in a minimal level of due diligence. As @JoJo stated, mistakes happen and we in no way are suggesting that the recent instances were malicious in nature, but taking conversations to social media can have unintended consequences. It is our view that delegates should take caution in unnecessarily tarnishing the Arbitrum brand and painting the DAO in a negative light. Constructive feedback starts with seeking a deep understanding on a topic from those most familiar and prioritizes a polite demeanor in practice.
We propose removing this line from prohibited behavior and replacing it with an additional guiding principle under the Civility and Professionalism section:
Delegates should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels and avoid taking discussions to social media in a manner that could tarnish Arbitrum DAO's brand and reputation.
Before updating the proposal, we welcome additional feedback on the topic and proposed changes.
Lastly, thank you to @jameskbh and @Argonaut for calling out some minor mistakes. They have now been fixed.
thank you for iterating this much on all the feedbacks, it is not an easy task, especially in something as abstract as a code of conduct. Looking forward to vote on this.
Thanks for the excellent proposal!
It may be only me, but this example doesn't seem right.
Thanks for the excellent proposal!
It may be only me, but this example doesn't seem right.
The "unacceptable example" would occur when the vote surpasses that threshold, like:
Unacceptable Example: In an election for 7 seats, a candidate’s self-vote exceeds 14.286%.
Otherwise, awesome work!
Hello @Entropy,
For the sake of transparency, we would like to mention that we had the opportunity to provide early feedback on the draft of this proposal, and we are pleased to see that the final version is even more robust than the initial one.
Hello @Entropy,
For the sake of transparency, we would like to mention that we had the opportunity to provide early feedback on the draft of this proposal, and we are pleased to see that the final version is even more robust than the initial one.
At SEEDGov, we understand that every community operates under certain customs, rules, and other social agreements, and it is vital to establish them for Arbitrum DAO. The process applied here is also a strong point of the proposed code of conduct:
Most of this proposal's content has already been addressed separately in various temperature checks before being codified, similar to how legislative bodies vote on general and specific matters. Thus, this Code of Conduct is the product of the DAO’s previously expressed will.
Our reasons for supporting the implementation of the code of conduct and its soft-enforcement mechanisms align with our stance when voting on previous initiatives: from our perspective, Shielded Voting only for elections, Responsible Voting, Voting Calendarization, and CoI disclosures are good practices to start with, and we can iterate as we encounter new situations.
Best practices of responsible delegates:
Participation: delegates should make an effort to vote (even if abstain) on all proposals.
Communication: delegates should clearly communicate their rationale behind votes and discussions to the Arbitrum community.
Accountability: delegates should maintain knowledge of funded initiatives and hold managing parties or elected representatives accountable.
Responsiveness: delegates should use their best efforts to connect with the Arbitrum community and be accessible to answer questions or concerns.
We could also mention that a good practice is participating in the discussions where the delegate believes they can add value. This way, the delegate is not obligated to participate in every discussion, and we lay the foundation for a more professional DAO, with delegates focusing on their area of expertise.
Delegate Incentive Program Removal
As stated in the Delegate Incentive Program proposal, the program administrator reserves the right to issue a suspension or permanent ban if a delegate does not meet the eligibility requirements, which includes upholding the Code of Conduct. In the event of a suspension or expulsion from the program, the affected delegate may request a Snapshot vote to ratify, change, or revoke the administrator’s decision. This serves as a one-time appeal, and the decision made by the DAO will be final. It is expected that any party involved in the dispute refrains from actively voting (they may vote abstain or not vote at all) in the Snapshot appeal. Failure to do so will render the appeal mute and the administrator’s decision will stand as final.
DAO-Elected Position Removal
Any DAO member can propose a Snapshot vote to remove a DAO-elected representative. The proposal should clearly state the reasons for removal and provide evidence supporting the claims. Unless otherwise justified by a proposal author, the standard removal process will be a simple majority of votes cast by delegates with at least 3% of all votable tokens having cast votes in favor of the removal or abstaining. This should be a last resort and many other steps, including asking the DAO member to resign, should be taken first.
As for the delegate appeal system in the DIP, should we add the 3% requirement? From our side, there wouldn’t be an issue if the DAO considers the modification valid in this proposal (since it wasn't contemplated in the text of the DIP 1.5).
The DAO agrees to a holiday break, where no new votes will be created and/or voted on from December 20 - January 6 annually. This is to ensure delegates have a break and can return refreshed for the new year. During this time it is advised that no new proposals are posted to the forums, and only emergency proposals are put up to a vote.
Something here concerned us:
If we all assume it’s holiday time and most people plan their absence accordingly, the DAO's ability to respond to potential governance attacks or emergency votes will be reduced compared to the rest of the year. This is why it’s important to leave a message urging delegates to act with due diligence so that they can respond to unexpected situations. We understand that there is also a Security Council, but it’s important not to rely solely on them, and it’s also reasonable to expect that the availability of the Council members may not be the same during the holiday season.
Thank you for the whole Delegate Code of Conduct, The governance is always my favorite part in Arbitrum DAO. This Coda is a commendable effort to formalize the DAO's operations, providing a clearer structure and guidelines for delegates. By establishing a well-defined code of conduct, it enhances transparency and predictability in governance, which will greatly benefit the community in the long run.
Thank you for the whole Delegate Code of Conduct, The governance is always my favorite part in Arbitrum DAO. This Coda is a commendable effort to formalize the DAO's operations, providing a clearer structure and guidelines for delegates. By establishing a well-defined code of conduct, it enhances transparency and predictability in governance, which will greatly benefit the community in the long run.
Thank you!
As I already have to follow a code of conduct at the Aave DAO im happy to see it finally being discussed here. Previous comments already mentioned multiple times some controversial things, so I don't see any benefit in highlighting them again.
Glad to see something like this is finally making its way to be passed. I think this will be a huge help towards making the DAO more professional (not imply it isn't already, but it will definitively make it even better!). And something that is important to hammer out now before the DAO grows too large.
I don't have much to add, as it is pretty well thought out and some of the more controversial items have been already temp checked. A point to add for the sake of discussion... I think it would be helpful if there is a singular place to view anyone who has been reprimanded by the DAO. Similar to the https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/list-of-projects-banned-from-the-dao/26097?u=bob-rossi thread. I really don't want it to be a 'wall of shame' situation, but I think its important if this type of information is easily accessible.
I am supportive of the general direction of this proposal and believe it provides a strong foundation for Arbitrum DAO to further build transparency, accountability and community trust. There are the following suggestions regarding transparency + enforcement + voting times + selection rules. 1. Transparency and accountability: the proposal requires delegates to disclose conflicts of interest, which helps to make the community trust us more and prevent governance abuses. 2. Difficulty of enforcement: While a code of conduct is good, it may be difficult to enforce in practice. If someone violates it, relying on the reputation mechanism may not be enough. It is proposed to set up a governance arbitration team, so that problems can be dealt with quickly. 3. Voting schedule and holidays: The proposal clarifies the voting schedule and holidays, so that everyone can be more organized and won't miss voting due to time conflicts. 4. Election rules: it is reasonable to limit the percentage of representatives voting on their own to avoid positions being monopolized, but technical means can be considered subsequently to further prevent cheating.
Thank you for your proposal, it is very well written, the implementation process may be a bit challenging, we can just improve it together!
I support this proposal and believe we can all benefit as delegates from having a civil code of conduct to hold us accountable and encourage productive discussions. One question that comes to mind is how sanctions would apply to delegates who primarily hold their own delegation. If they face issues, they could simply create a new address and delegate their ARB to it, potentially bypassing sanctions. I also want to highlight something I hadn’t considered before but appreciate in this proposal: the exclusion of tokens/addresses allocated to DAO initiatives, this will def prevent unintended voting power from accumulating in the hands of certain individuals or groups.
We are in favor of this entire proposal. Below are some observations.
This is an excellent proposal and a significant step forward in addressing future conflicts within the DAO. A code of conduct will play a crucial role in shaping the future of Arbitrum governance. Personally, I believe the OP team has done a fantastic job with their code of conduct, and we should draw on their experience to create a stronger and more equitable version.
We are broadly in favor of the proposed Delegate Code of Conduct and the associated operational improvements for the DAO. Establishing clear expectations around transparency, integrity, and professionalism will only become more crucial.The updates to operational standards, including voting schedules and election processes, should help streamline governance and promote more responsible delegate behavior.
Some pts and bumping of prior good pts on the thread: Conflict Resolution and Enforcement Mechanisms: While soft enforcement through reputational damage and delegation removal is mentioned, the proposal leaves much of the actual decision factor here; for example OP has a code of conduct council for stuff like this. Responsible Voting Policy: The rules for self-voting are well-intentioned, but still some ambiguity in how edge cases will be handled, especially with shielded voting. Post-election monitoring could lead to complications if violations are discovered late. Shielded Voting and Transparency: Shielded voting may improve the integrity of elections, but it also reduces transparency during the voting process, which could make it harder for the community to verify that delegates are adhering to the Code of Conduct. Generally speaking for now, we're not in favor of this but could be convinced if adapted or tweaked a little. Trial Period and Feedback Incorporation: Will there be regular checkpoints for gathering input or how will we know what's done well and not during the 6 months. Specific violations might be fwe and sparse between and have a hard time extrapolating to overall success when numbers are minimal as is.
Thank you for this great proposal. I carefully reviewed the entire content, and I generally agree with the points made. Delegates indeed need to follow a certain code of conduct, especially those participating in DIP and receiving incentives. I don’t want to see a situation where someone benefits from the system but undermines it at the same time. It would be terrible if some Delegates kept receiving compensation from Arbitrum DAO but continuously opposed its collective decisions, both inside and outside the community.
This brings us to the punishment mechanism mentioned in the proposal, which I believe is the key to the entire plan. Without a robust and enforceable punishment mechanism, the code of conduct will have little binding effect on Delegates and will remain ineffective, leading to a situation where "Code is code" rather than "Code is law."
Support this proposal, the idea of making governance more efficient and attractive is something that I think can be explored and tried out gradually during the implementation process.
Regarding the trial period: the 6.5 month trial period is a good idea. When the trial is over, it is suggested to collect feedback from people again to see if adjustments should be made. 2. Covert Voting: This is very good, it avoids the pressure of voting and ensures fairness. 3. Education and training: In order to make everyone understand the rules better, DAO can do some training and explanation to avoid violation due to lack of understanding. We should encourage more participation: The code of conduct and voting standardization in the proposal, while helping to improve the transparency and accountability of governance, may also make some new delegates feel that there is a threshold, especially newcomers to governance. Therefore, I suggest that greater support can be provided to new delegates during the probationary period, such as simplified guidelines, quick-start resources, or even a mechanism for governance veterans to bring in newcomers, which could reduce concerns about complex rules and encourage more active participation. Avoid being overly cumbersome, complex content and procedures are really annoying
It's quite difficult to find anybody against any of this. The most controversial thing as highlighted by others is the following
Hello! Thank you very much for this proposal. Like most people, I agree with almost everything in its content.
Regarding the point raised by everyone
my suggestion is to modify the wording as follows: "Prioritize the controversy itself"
This way, it’s clear that the aim is to avoid noise for the sake of noise itself. Although it was clarified in the thread, Private mediation still sounds as if things should be resolved privately, when the ideal place for discussion—at least in my opinion—is the public forum.
On another note, why not simply call this proposal the "Arbitrum Code of Conduct"? I believe it goes well beyond just the expected behavior of delegates.
Lastly, I have a question regarding the following:
Unless otherwise justified by a proposal author, the standard removal process will be a simple majority of votes cast by delegates with at least 3% of all votable tokens having cast votes in favor of the removal or abstaining.
Why are we tightening an oversight requirement of the DAO? Maybe it was discussed somewhere, and I missed it. tbh, I’m not sure if I’m for or against it, but in practice, it makes it more complicated to remove someone. I'd love to understand the rationale. I understand that this would align the threshold required for on-chain votes, but in reality, this is an off-chain vote. I’d be okay with it being a simple majority of the total votes, without a threshold.
A few thoughts:
Lastly, and more generally, it is worth flagging that as the DAO matures, several inclusions here make the DAO significantly more bureaucratic. The changes aren't bad, but the vision of DAOs is to trend away from human intervention by leveraging onchain execution to handle enforcement rather than bureaucratic policies. If the DAO is serious about these changes, it's worth translating some of these social principles, which will inevitably get buried in the forum, into more robust onchain parameters, so we do not waste time re-posting votes, canceling votes, etc.
Great questions @WinVerse! When it comes to the length of a suspension or issuing a permeant ban from the Delegate Incentive Program, that decision remains up to the program administrator. Say for example a delegate repeatedly fails to disclose a conflict of interest. The program administrator of the DIP may decide that the delegate is failing to meet the eligibility requirements of the program and should be suspended for 12 months (this number was arbitrarily chosen as an example). The delegate would have the ability to appeal this decision to the DAO, arguing for example the punishment is excessive (should be say 6 months) or their actions do not warrant a suspension at all. This would be a one-time appeal by the delegate, and the results from the vote would be final.
As it is written currently, an individual/entity who is forcibly removed from a DAO-elected position is not suspended or banned from the DAO. We imagine that if an elected representative refuses to resign and has to be removed through a vote, it would be unlikely for them to be elected to another position of power. However, if that individual/entity is also a delegate participating in the DIP, the program administrator has the right to suspend/ban them based on the severity of their actions.
The 3% of all votable tokens quorum comes from the Arbitrum Constitution and is the requirement for a non-constitutional proposal to pass onchain. Temperature checks technically don't have a quorum requirement as stated in the Constitution, but Entropy has made it standard practice to include this threshold in our proposals.
I agree with this proposal. It is essential to have a code of conduct for such an important position. If possible, there should be different versions that are updated so that delegates do not forget Arbitrum's values and the significant responsibility we have.
We could also mention that a good practice is participating in the discussions where the delegate believes they can add value. This way, the delegate is not obligated to participate in every discussion, and we lay the foundation for a more professional DAO, with delegates focusing on their area of expertise.
I agree with this proposal. It is essential to have a code of conduct for such an important position. If possible, there should be different versions that are updated so that delegates do not forget Arbitrum's values and the significant responsibility we have.
We could also mention that a good practice is participating in the discussions where the delegate believes they can add value. This way, the delegate is not obligated to participate in every discussion, and we lay the foundation for a more professional DAO, with delegates focusing on their area of expertise.
I believe it's important to identify the area of expertise of the delegate, perhaps by visually displaying their badges without needing to enter their profile. Something that would be visually appealing for the proposal creator or someone reviewing a proposal for the first time would be to see how valuable their comments have been throughout their time in the forum. This would help filter out the most relevant comments from those that are not.
Feedback on code of conduct implementation, delegate oversight, definition of urgent proposals, etc. is very important... great feedback last night!
We're glad to see great discussion already underway! Thank you to all for contributing to this important topic. Below are responses to some of the questions and points brought up by delegates.
We're glad to see great discussion already underway! Thank you to all for contributing to this important topic. Below are responses to some of the questions and points brought up by delegates.
Several delegates mentioned Optimism DAO and its code of conduct / resolution processes, so we’d first like to provide some additional rationale for how the code was written and why the Arbitrum Foundation was chosen as the mediator in conflicts between delegates. Of all the DAOs reviewed, Optimism DAO has experimented the most with enforcement mechanisms for their code of conduct and rules of engagement (their term for community guidelines). After its creation, the code was initially enforced by the Optimism Foundation. In an effort to decentralize moderation, the process was shifted so that violations were brought forward and voted on by delegates directly. After just two instances this was determined to be a sub-optimal approach. It was concluded that delegates did not want to be responsible for voting on conduct cases. From this a dedicated code of conduct committee was established, but over the last year its powers have been rescoped twice. Now it only handles severe instances of conduct breaches and upholds the rules of engagement, while all unenforceable policies in the original code of conduct were transformed into guiding principles now known as the “Optimist Expectations”.
We encourage all delegates to read through the materials linked above. In many ways they have come full circle, but their experimentation has provided valuable insights for DAOs of a similar size.
The Arbitrum Delegate Code of Conduct and its enforcement mechanism were written in a manner specifically taking those learnings into account. Most importantly, we believe that many conflicts can be handled first in private and only in serious instances need to be raised to a 3rd-party mediator. The Arbitrum Foundation is already responsible for enforcing the community guidelines, so while a committee was mentioned first by @PGov and other delegates, our team believes the tradeoffs involved with introducing additional bureaucracy & overhead to monitor/resolve conflict issues outweighs the benefits.
First, it does not clearly specify who will monitor the Delegates and how that monitoring will take place. Many violations of the code of conduct could occur discreetly.
Most clauses in the code of conduct are written as guiding principles that delegates should seek to embody. The responsibility falls on all delegates to hold each other accountable. It takes the entire community to create and maintain a professional culture. Similar to the Arbitrum DAO Constitution’s community values, with these principles actually written out, the code of conduct provides contributors a basis for behavior that should be promoted.
The only violations that result in direct punishment are the behaviors prohibited by the community guidelines - ex. harassment, doxxing, inappropriate language. Mediation and conflict resolution will be handled by the Arbitrum Foundation, but any Arbitrum DAO contributor can use this google form to report instances.
For these Delegates, how do we regulate their behavior? It seems difficult to disqualify them as Delegates, as they could simply transfer their $ARB to another wallet and reapply.
This is just one scenario that makes conduct enforcement in DAOs so difficult. Any individual can spin up a new wallet, transfer ARB, and begin voting. Holding anon delegates accountable is close to impossible. However, while Arbitrum DAO is open to anyone that wishes to participate, it does not mean the DAO is required to pay everyone. When it comes to the Delegate Incentive Program, participants are required to KYC to receive rewards and those applying for committee/council positions normally have to maintain a level of social credibility/reputation to be elected. These mechanisms prevent an individual from at least immediately transferring ARB to another wallet and reapplying to the DIP or an elected-position. Overall, this scenario and reasoning contributed to the code of conduct being written as a set of guiding principles that delegates should aspire to embody, rather than a strict set of rules that can be “violated”.
Any DAO member can propose a Snapshot vote to remove a DAO-elected representative.
Recommend this be caveated explicitly that it must adhere to the new standards about minimum proposal times and posting dates. Just to clearly avoid a quick weekend vote to remove someone. Because this has no onchain execution, we can explicitly invalidate nonconforming proposals on this subject.
This is a great call out; the proposal has been updated to clarify that elected representative removal votes must adhere to the other agreed upon proposal guidelines.
As for the delegate appeal system in the DIP, should we add the 3% requirement? From our side, there wouldn’t be an issue if the DAO considers the modification valid in this proposal (since it wasn’t contemplated in the text of the DIP 1.5).
This is also a good addition, a quorum requirement of at least 3% of circulating supply has been added for the DIP removal appeal process.
Several delegates have asked for clarification on what constitutes an emergency proposal. We are hesitant to create exact criteria, but generally speaking, emergency proposals should be limited to security related protocol upgrades. Another example of an emergency could include a heinous unethical activity such as stealing funds, that requires immediate removal from a committee. Non-constitutional proposals that are to spin up new initiatives, grants, or any other funding requests are not considered an emergency, and should therefore wait until after the Holiday Period. There were recently two proposals that went to Tally a day late, and while justification was given, in our opinion they did not really qualify as an emergency. We recognize that there is a tricky tradeoff in strictly adhering to procedures and perhaps slowing down operations unnecessarily. The community has thus far adapted well to the voting schedule, and we trust that delegates will be able to discern when an emergency is actually required.
If we all assume it’s holiday time and most people plan their absence accordingly, the DAO’s ability to respond to potential governance attacks or emergency votes will be reduced compared to the rest of the year.
Delegate availability during the holiday season is an appropriate concern. When created, the main purpose of the holiday was to at least give delegates some time off from voting on proposals. We expect that conversations and comments will still occur both on the forums and other adjacent DAO-related chats. The break just creates a time where the expectation of delegates is reduced compared to a normal week. Additionally, with the Holiday Break being shorter (18 days) than the time required to move a proposal through an onchain vote (~20 days), we view the likelihood of a governance attack or emergency situation going unnoticed as low.
The proposal has been updated to include a link to the conflict resolution reporting google form. Responses will be sent to the Arbitrum Foundation team.
We appreciate delegates calling out this line, as upon reflection, we agree that it needs clarification and did not accurately communicate the intent behind the statement.
@stonecoldpat correctly summarized our motivation behind this statement and code of conduct as a whole. This document intends to be something that delegates can point to in order to help filter out those playing status or short-term games. A professional and civil culture can be brought down by just one or two individuals who purposefully introduce toxicity. Drawing hard lines on what is acceptable speech is a fool’s errand, but the DAO needs to acquire the ability to defend itself from bad actors that seek to subvert its operations.
The phrase “private mediation” was added after recent instances of individuals taking critiques public to social media without engaging in a minimal level of due diligence. As @JoJo stated, mistakes happen and we in no way are suggesting that the recent instances were malicious in nature, but taking conversations to social media can have unintended consequences. It is our view that delegates should take caution in unnecessarily tarnishing the Arbitrum brand and painting the DAO in a negative light. Constructive feedback starts with seeking a deep understanding on a topic from those most familiar and prioritizes a polite demeanor in practice.
We propose removing this line from prohibited behavior and replacing it with an additional guiding principle under the Civility and Professionalism section:
Delegates should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels and avoid taking discussions to social media in a manner that could tarnish Arbitrum DAO's brand and reputation.
Before updating the proposal, we welcome additional feedback on the topic and proposed changes.
Lastly, thank you to @jameskbh and @Argonaut for calling out some minor mistakes. They have now been fixed.
thank you for iterating this much on all the feedbacks, it is not an easy task, especially in something as abstract as a code of conduct. Looking forward to vote on this.
Thanks for the excellent proposal!
It may be only me, but this example doesn't seem right.
Thanks for the excellent proposal!
It may be only me, but this example doesn't seem right.
The "unacceptable example" would occur when the vote surpasses that threshold, like:
Unacceptable Example: In an election for 7 seats, a candidate’s self-vote exceeds 14.286%.
Otherwise, awesome work!
Hello @Entropy,
For the sake of transparency, we would like to mention that we had the opportunity to provide early feedback on the draft of this proposal, and we are pleased to see that the final version is even more robust than the initial one.
Hello @Entropy,
For the sake of transparency, we would like to mention that we had the opportunity to provide early feedback on the draft of this proposal, and we are pleased to see that the final version is even more robust than the initial one.
At SEEDGov, we understand that every community operates under certain customs, rules, and other social agreements, and it is vital to establish them for Arbitrum DAO. The process applied here is also a strong point of the proposed code of conduct:
Most of this proposal's content has already been addressed separately in various temperature checks before being codified, similar to how legislative bodies vote on general and specific matters. Thus, this Code of Conduct is the product of the DAO’s previously expressed will.
Our reasons for supporting the implementation of the code of conduct and its soft-enforcement mechanisms align with our stance when voting on previous initiatives: from our perspective, Shielded Voting only for elections, Responsible Voting, Voting Calendarization, and CoI disclosures are good practices to start with, and we can iterate as we encounter new situations.
Best practices of responsible delegates:
Participation: delegates should make an effort to vote (even if abstain) on all proposals.
Communication: delegates should clearly communicate their rationale behind votes and discussions to the Arbitrum community.
Accountability: delegates should maintain knowledge of funded initiatives and hold managing parties or elected representatives accountable.
Responsiveness: delegates should use their best efforts to connect with the Arbitrum community and be accessible to answer questions or concerns.
We could also mention that a good practice is participating in the discussions where the delegate believes they can add value. This way, the delegate is not obligated to participate in every discussion, and we lay the foundation for a more professional DAO, with delegates focusing on their area of expertise.
Delegate Incentive Program Removal
As stated in the Delegate Incentive Program proposal, the program administrator reserves the right to issue a suspension or permanent ban if a delegate does not meet the eligibility requirements, which includes upholding the Code of Conduct. In the event of a suspension or expulsion from the program, the affected delegate may request a Snapshot vote to ratify, change, or revoke the administrator’s decision. This serves as a one-time appeal, and the decision made by the DAO will be final. It is expected that any party involved in the dispute refrains from actively voting (they may vote abstain or not vote at all) in the Snapshot appeal. Failure to do so will render the appeal mute and the administrator’s decision will stand as final.
DAO-Elected Position Removal
Any DAO member can propose a Snapshot vote to remove a DAO-elected representative. The proposal should clearly state the reasons for removal and provide evidence supporting the claims. Unless otherwise justified by a proposal author, the standard removal process will be a simple majority of votes cast by delegates with at least 3% of all votable tokens having cast votes in favor of the removal or abstaining. This should be a last resort and many other steps, including asking the DAO member to resign, should be taken first.
As for the delegate appeal system in the DIP, should we add the 3% requirement? From our side, there wouldn’t be an issue if the DAO considers the modification valid in this proposal (since it wasn't contemplated in the text of the DIP 1.5).
The DAO agrees to a holiday break, where no new votes will be created and/or voted on from December 20 - January 6 annually. This is to ensure delegates have a break and can return refreshed for the new year. During this time it is advised that no new proposals are posted to the forums, and only emergency proposals are put up to a vote.
Something here concerned us:
If we all assume it’s holiday time and most people plan their absence accordingly, the DAO's ability to respond to potential governance attacks or emergency votes will be reduced compared to the rest of the year. This is why it’s important to leave a message urging delegates to act with due diligence so that they can respond to unexpected situations. We understand that there is also a Security Council, but it’s important not to rely solely on them, and it’s also reasonable to expect that the availability of the Council members may not be the same during the holiday season.
Thank you for the whole Delegate Code of Conduct, The governance is always my favorite part in Arbitrum DAO. This Coda is a commendable effort to formalize the DAO's operations, providing a clearer structure and guidelines for delegates. By establishing a well-defined code of conduct, it enhances transparency and predictability in governance, which will greatly benefit the community in the long run.
Thank you for the whole Delegate Code of Conduct, The governance is always my favorite part in Arbitrum DAO. This Coda is a commendable effort to formalize the DAO's operations, providing a clearer structure and guidelines for delegates. By establishing a well-defined code of conduct, it enhances transparency and predictability in governance, which will greatly benefit the community in the long run.
Thank you!
As I already have to follow a code of conduct at the Aave DAO im happy to see it finally being discussed here. Previous comments already mentioned multiple times some controversial things, so I don't see any benefit in highlighting them again.
Glad to see something like this is finally making its way to be passed. I think this will be a huge help towards making the DAO more professional (not imply it isn't already, but it will definitively make it even better!). And something that is important to hammer out now before the DAO grows too large.
I don't have much to add, as it is pretty well thought out and some of the more controversial items have been already temp checked. A point to add for the sake of discussion... I think it would be helpful if there is a singular place to view anyone who has been reprimanded by the DAO. Similar to the https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/list-of-projects-banned-from-the-dao/26097?u=bob-rossi thread. I really don't want it to be a 'wall of shame' situation, but I think its important if this type of information is easily accessible.
I am supportive of the general direction of this proposal and believe it provides a strong foundation for Arbitrum DAO to further build transparency, accountability and community trust. There are the following suggestions regarding transparency + enforcement + voting times + selection rules. 1. Transparency and accountability: the proposal requires delegates to disclose conflicts of interest, which helps to make the community trust us more and prevent governance abuses. 2. Difficulty of enforcement: While a code of conduct is good, it may be difficult to enforce in practice. If someone violates it, relying on the reputation mechanism may not be enough. It is proposed to set up a governance arbitration team, so that problems can be dealt with quickly. 3. Voting schedule and holidays: The proposal clarifies the voting schedule and holidays, so that everyone can be more organized and won't miss voting due to time conflicts. 4. Election rules: it is reasonable to limit the percentage of representatives voting on their own to avoid positions being monopolized, but technical means can be considered subsequently to further prevent cheating.
Thank you for your proposal, it is very well written, the implementation process may be a bit challenging, we can just improve it together!
I support this proposal and believe we can all benefit as delegates from having a civil code of conduct to hold us accountable and encourage productive discussions. One question that comes to mind is how sanctions would apply to delegates who primarily hold their own delegation. If they face issues, they could simply create a new address and delegate their ARB to it, potentially bypassing sanctions. I also want to highlight something I hadn’t considered before but appreciate in this proposal: the exclusion of tokens/addresses allocated to DAO initiatives, this will def prevent unintended voting power from accumulating in the hands of certain individuals or groups.
We are in favor of this entire proposal. Below are some observations.
This is an excellent proposal and a significant step forward in addressing future conflicts within the DAO. A code of conduct will play a crucial role in shaping the future of Arbitrum governance. Personally, I believe the OP team has done a fantastic job with their code of conduct, and we should draw on their experience to create a stronger and more equitable version.
We are broadly in favor of the proposed Delegate Code of Conduct and the associated operational improvements for the DAO. Establishing clear expectations around transparency, integrity, and professionalism will only become more crucial.The updates to operational standards, including voting schedules and election processes, should help streamline governance and promote more responsible delegate behavior.
Some pts and bumping of prior good pts on the thread: Conflict Resolution and Enforcement Mechanisms: While soft enforcement through reputational damage and delegation removal is mentioned, the proposal leaves much of the actual decision factor here; for example OP has a code of conduct council for stuff like this. Responsible Voting Policy: The rules for self-voting are well-intentioned, but still some ambiguity in how edge cases will be handled, especially with shielded voting. Post-election monitoring could lead to complications if violations are discovered late. Shielded Voting and Transparency: Shielded voting may improve the integrity of elections, but it also reduces transparency during the voting process, which could make it harder for the community to verify that delegates are adhering to the Code of Conduct. Generally speaking for now, we're not in favor of this but could be convinced if adapted or tweaked a little. Trial Period and Feedback Incorporation: Will there be regular checkpoints for gathering input or how will we know what's done well and not during the 6 months. Specific violations might be fwe and sparse between and have a hard time extrapolating to overall success when numbers are minimal as is.
Thank you for this great proposal. I carefully reviewed the entire content, and I generally agree with the points made. Delegates indeed need to follow a certain code of conduct, especially those participating in DIP and receiving incentives. I don’t want to see a situation where someone benefits from the system but undermines it at the same time. It would be terrible if some Delegates kept receiving compensation from Arbitrum DAO but continuously opposed its collective decisions, both inside and outside the community.
This brings us to the punishment mechanism mentioned in the proposal, which I believe is the key to the entire plan. Without a robust and enforceable punishment mechanism, the code of conduct will have little binding effect on Delegates and will remain ineffective, leading to a situation where "Code is code" rather than "Code is law."
Support this proposal, the idea of making governance more efficient and attractive is something that I think can be explored and tried out gradually during the implementation process.
Regarding the trial period: the 6.5 month trial period is a good idea. When the trial is over, it is suggested to collect feedback from people again to see if adjustments should be made. 2. Covert Voting: This is very good, it avoids the pressure of voting and ensures fairness. 3. Education and training: In order to make everyone understand the rules better, DAO can do some training and explanation to avoid violation due to lack of understanding. We should encourage more participation: The code of conduct and voting standardization in the proposal, while helping to improve the transparency and accountability of governance, may also make some new delegates feel that there is a threshold, especially newcomers to governance. Therefore, I suggest that greater support can be provided to new delegates during the probationary period, such as simplified guidelines, quick-start resources, or even a mechanism for governance veterans to bring in newcomers, which could reduce concerns about complex rules and encourage more active participation. Avoid being overly cumbersome, complex content and procedures are really annoying
It's quite difficult to find anybody against any of this. The most controversial thing as highlighted by others is the following
We are in favor of this entire proposal. Below are some observations.
The link to the temperature check does not seem to be correct. If this is the case, it should be modified.
During this time it is advised that no new proposals are posted to the forums, and only emergency proposals are put up to a vote.
Just for clarification, could you please explain in more detail what will be considered as emergency proposals?
I don't think this constitutes unacceptable behavior and should be either removed from the proposal as it is written or more properly defined. Who will deem that someone is "prioritizing controversy" over any other possible motivation? This assumes that there will be some "judge" that would be able to infer the motivation behind each delegate communication and determine if that delegate is prioritizing controversy or not.
requiring a majority approval and quorum set as at least 3% of all votable tokens having cast votes in favor or abstaining
Also, as pointed out in the delegates telegram chat, I believe this proposal should adhere to the constitutional governance process, where the quorum requirement is 5% of votable supply. I believe this is a crucial enough proposal that would need the legitimacy of a bigger buy-in to be put in place. Even for the 6.5 months trial, this proposal should aim for a 5% quorum on snapshot to be considered approved. And of course, if and when it gets implemented for real, it would need to be written in the Arbitrum Constitution, which by definition would definitely need to be an onchain Arbitrum Core gov contract proposal that needs 5% quorum.
We are broadly in favor of the proposed Delegate Code of Conduct and the associated operational improvements for the DAO. Establishing clear expectations around transparency, integrity, and professionalism will only become more crucial.The updates to operational standards, including voting schedules and election processes, should help streamline governance and promote more responsible delegate behavior.
Some pts and bumping of prior good pts on the thread: Conflict Resolution and Enforcement Mechanisms: While soft enforcement through reputational damage and delegation removal is mentioned, the proposal leaves much of the actual decision factor here; for example OP has a code of conduct council for stuff like this. Responsible Voting Policy: The rules for self-voting are well-intentioned, but still some ambiguity in how edge cases will be handled, especially with shielded voting. Post-election monitoring could lead to complications if violations are discovered late. Shielded Voting and Transparency: Shielded voting may improve the integrity of elections, but it also reduces transparency during the voting process, which could make it harder for the community to verify that delegates are adhering to the Code of Conduct. Generally speaking for now, we're not in favor of this but could be convinced if adapted or tweaked a little. Trial Period and Feedback Incorporation: Will there be regular checkpoints for gathering input or how will we know what's done well and not during the 6 months. Specific violations might be fwe and sparse between and have a hard time extrapolating to overall success when numbers are minimal as is.
Looking forward to future convos on this topic, it's something that we def want to structure out in the future.
Thank you for this great proposal. I carefully reviewed the entire content, and I generally agree with the points made. Delegates indeed need to follow a certain code of conduct, especially those participating in DIP and receiving incentives. I don’t want to see a situation where someone benefits from the system but undermines it at the same time. It would be terrible if some Delegates kept receiving compensation from Arbitrum DAO but continuously opposed its collective decisions, both inside and outside the community.
This brings us to the punishment mechanism mentioned in the proposal, which I believe is the key to the entire plan. Without a robust and enforceable punishment mechanism, the code of conduct will have little binding effect on Delegates and will remain ineffective, leading to a situation where "Code is code" rather than "Code is law."
I reflected on the punishment mechanism outlined in the document and found two shortcomings. First, it does not clearly specify who will monitor the Delegates and how that monitoring will take place. Many violations of the code of conduct could occur discreetly. Second, some Delegates have only a few Delegators, or they may simply represent themselves, having bought and held a large amount of $ARB. For these Delegates, how do we regulate their behavior? It seems difficult to disqualify them as Delegates, as they could simply transfer their $ARB to another wallet and reapply.
Perhaps I’m mistaken in my words, and I’m open to correction. I’d be happy to hear more thoughts on this! Thank you!
It's quite difficult to find anybody against any of this. The most controversial thing as highlighted by others is the following
But i want to keep a positive approach to it: while is difficult to establish what is the threshold between saying "there was an attempt to private mediation" and an action that can just be a conscius deceptive attempt (i send you a dm in an old secondary twitter account you control), I entrust the DAO and its members on the fact that they will try to do the best for our ecosystem.
While mistakes can be made, maliciousness is way less likely. We have seen, even in recent time, public info going on twitter that did indeed hurt the reputation of the dao, that could have been at least partially cleared with some due diligence or some internal requests, but that can't necessarily be seen as attempt to jeopardize our ecosystem. In cases like these, I don't think we should invoce a full out ban from certain dao activities.
At the same time, in cases like the pattern above repeating over time, it could indeed show a violation of prioritizing controversy. I guess at that point, we will need delegates able to stick their necks out and move forward with a potential dao vote. The vote per se is not important, everybody will vote what they want, the controversial aspect will be someone explicitely triggering a vote.
I trust that we have enough diversity, and enough delegates (big and small) with enough skin in the game to do the right thing if and when is going to be the time to do so.
Recommend further defining this, since as written it could be interpreted that any public opposition or criticism is out of bounds until there is a DM conversation. It also seems to drive substantive discussions out of public and into private channels, which is contrary to the openness of DAOs. Backroom negotiations will always occur, but shouldn’t be mandated, and we doubt that was the intent here anyway.
Any DAO member can propose a Snapshot vote to remove a DAO-elected representative.
Recommend this be caveated explicitly that it must adhere to the new standards about minimum proposal times and posting dates. Just to clearly avoid a quick weekend vote to remove someone. Because this has no onchain execution, we can explicitly invalidate nonconforming proposals on this subject.
We are in favor of this entire proposal. Below are some observations.
The link to the temperature check does not seem to be correct. If this is the case, it should be modified.
During this time it is advised that no new proposals are posted to the forums, and only emergency proposals are put up to a vote.
Just for clarification, could you please explain in more detail what will be considered as emergency proposals?
I don't think this constitutes unacceptable behavior and should be either removed from the proposal as it is written or more properly defined. Who will deem that someone is "prioritizing controversy" over any other possible motivation? This assumes that there will be some "judge" that would be able to infer the motivation behind each delegate communication and determine if that delegate is prioritizing controversy or not.
requiring a majority approval and quorum set as at least 3% of all votable tokens having cast votes in favor or abstaining
Also, as pointed out in the delegates telegram chat, I believe this proposal should adhere to the constitutional governance process, where the quorum requirement is 5% of votable supply. I believe this is a crucial enough proposal that would need the legitimacy of a bigger buy-in to be put in place. Even for the 6.5 months trial, this proposal should aim for a 5% quorum on snapshot to be considered approved. And of course, if and when it gets implemented for real, it would need to be written in the Arbitrum Constitution, which by definition would definitely need to be an onchain Arbitrum Core gov contract proposal that needs 5% quorum.
We are broadly in favor of the proposed Delegate Code of Conduct and the associated operational improvements for the DAO. Establishing clear expectations around transparency, integrity, and professionalism will only become more crucial.The updates to operational standards, including voting schedules and election processes, should help streamline governance and promote more responsible delegate behavior.
Some pts and bumping of prior good pts on the thread: Conflict Resolution and Enforcement Mechanisms: While soft enforcement through reputational damage and delegation removal is mentioned, the proposal leaves much of the actual decision factor here; for example OP has a code of conduct council for stuff like this. Responsible Voting Policy: The rules for self-voting are well-intentioned, but still some ambiguity in how edge cases will be handled, especially with shielded voting. Post-election monitoring could lead to complications if violations are discovered late. Shielded Voting and Transparency: Shielded voting may improve the integrity of elections, but it also reduces transparency during the voting process, which could make it harder for the community to verify that delegates are adhering to the Code of Conduct. Generally speaking for now, we're not in favor of this but could be convinced if adapted or tweaked a little. Trial Period and Feedback Incorporation: Will there be regular checkpoints for gathering input or how will we know what's done well and not during the 6 months. Specific violations might be fwe and sparse between and have a hard time extrapolating to overall success when numbers are minimal as is.
Looking forward to future convos on this topic, it's something that we def want to structure out in the future.
Thank you for this great proposal. I carefully reviewed the entire content, and I generally agree with the points made. Delegates indeed need to follow a certain code of conduct, especially those participating in DIP and receiving incentives. I don’t want to see a situation where someone benefits from the system but undermines it at the same time. It would be terrible if some Delegates kept receiving compensation from Arbitrum DAO but continuously opposed its collective decisions, both inside and outside the community.
This brings us to the punishment mechanism mentioned in the proposal, which I believe is the key to the entire plan. Without a robust and enforceable punishment mechanism, the code of conduct will have little binding effect on Delegates and will remain ineffective, leading to a situation where "Code is code" rather than "Code is law."
I reflected on the punishment mechanism outlined in the document and found two shortcomings. First, it does not clearly specify who will monitor the Delegates and how that monitoring will take place. Many violations of the code of conduct could occur discreetly. Second, some Delegates have only a few Delegators, or they may simply represent themselves, having bought and held a large amount of $ARB. For these Delegates, how do we regulate their behavior? It seems difficult to disqualify them as Delegates, as they could simply transfer their $ARB to another wallet and reapply.
Perhaps I’m mistaken in my words, and I’m open to correction. I’d be happy to hear more thoughts on this! Thank you!
It's quite difficult to find anybody against any of this. The most controversial thing as highlighted by others is the following
But i want to keep a positive approach to it: while is difficult to establish what is the threshold between saying "there was an attempt to private mediation" and an action that can just be a conscius deceptive attempt (i send you a dm in an old secondary twitter account you control), I entrust the DAO and its members on the fact that they will try to do the best for our ecosystem.
While mistakes can be made, maliciousness is way less likely. We have seen, even in recent time, public info going on twitter that did indeed hurt the reputation of the dao, that could have been at least partially cleared with some due diligence or some internal requests, but that can't necessarily be seen as attempt to jeopardize our ecosystem. In cases like these, I don't think we should invoce a full out ban from certain dao activities.
At the same time, in cases like the pattern above repeating over time, it could indeed show a violation of prioritizing controversy. I guess at that point, we will need delegates able to stick their necks out and move forward with a potential dao vote. The vote per se is not important, everybody will vote what they want, the controversial aspect will be someone explicitely triggering a vote.
I trust that we have enough diversity, and enough delegates (big and small) with enough skin in the game to do the right thing if and when is going to be the time to do so.
Recommend further defining this, since as written it could be interpreted that any public opposition or criticism is out of bounds until there is a DM conversation. It also seems to drive substantive discussions out of public and into private channels, which is contrary to the openness of DAOs. Backroom negotiations will always occur, but shouldn’t be mandated, and we doubt that was the intent here anyway.
Any DAO member can propose a Snapshot vote to remove a DAO-elected representative.
Recommend this be caveated explicitly that it must adhere to the new standards about minimum proposal times and posting dates. Just to clearly avoid a quick weekend vote to remove someone. Because this has no onchain execution, we can explicitly invalidate nonconforming proposals on this subject.
