Note: This proposal has been drafted on behalf of the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group as a result of multiple community calls and workshops between multiple stakeholders. It does not exclude external incentive proposals from outside of the proposed structure.*
This proposal outlines a one-time, community-created consensus framework to distribute up to 50,000,000 ARB of DAO-funded incentives targeting active Arbitrum protocols. Aimed at fulfilling short-term community needs, the program plans to allocate DAO-owned ARB towards incentives while ensuring transparent consensus and distribution methods. It spans two voting rounds and provides incentives to eligible programs designed to fund incentives through January 31, 2024.
Granted funds are expected to be distributed by the end of January 31, 2024. Participating grantees will be expected to self report data, dashboards, and summarize grant performance on an ongoing basis.
This provisional framework aims to allow delegates to distribute incentives fairly and effectively using transparent criteria agreed upon by the community, while a thorough system is developed (1, 2, 3, 4).
The goals of the framework are to:
By incentivizing the use of existing Arbitrum dApps through this proposal, we anticipate increased volume, transactions, users, and liquidity, laying the groundwork for a dynamic ecosystem. While the proposal acts as an experimental program, its primary goal is to ensure basic safeguards while promoting innovative incentive strategies.
Given that this proposal aims to be a one-time, short term incentive distribution, it lacks the accountability and operational rigor that a full program may provide. As such, we encourage protocols to consider that the use of funds will be both evaluated, and monitored by the community. Any misbehavior, or failure to comply with grant requests will likely result in ineligibility, or at the very least significant discernment, in future incentive or grant programs.
The Arbitrum Short-Term Incentive Program will comprise up to a 50,000,000 ARB budget earmarked for incentive grants for eligible protocols. In order to expedite the distribution of this capital to the ecosystem, the DAO will adopt a bifurcated process comprising two separate processes: the Financial Proposal and Application Process.
Following a successful Snapshot Temperature Check, the DAO will launch an expedited application and review process, allowing applicants to apply to delegates for grants concurrent with the on-chain vote to distribute DAO funds from the treasury.
The Snapshot Temperature Check achieved consensus and approved funding of up to 50,000,000 ARB through the end of January 31, 2024.
The Financial Proposal will comprise the following:
Multisig Setup
The STIP-ARB 5/9 multisig is being created. The funds in the multisig belong to the DAO and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in DAO governance including delegation. The multisig includes the signers from the original PL-ARB multisig with the addition of to three community members (pending KYC):
This new multisig, the STIP-ARB multisig, includes two features to ensure accountability of signers and grantees:
Clawback capability so the DAO can retrieve funds if the multisig violates the agreement.
Streaming of funds to grantees every second week for the grants duration using Hedgey. This allows for the halting of funds if misuse is discovered with the goal to stop bad actors, not punish bad designs.
Grant Requirements:
By streaming grant payments, the multisig will be empowered to hold grantees accountable to their proposals by halting fund streaming for any of the following reasons:
In that this proposal aims to be experimental, the multisig is not intended to provide quality control on the design of incentive programs. Rather, they are empowered to halt streaming in the event of negligence or misuse of funds.
Grants span two award cycles, but projects can only be awarded once. Projects rejected in the first cycle are invited to address delegate/community feedback and reapply for the second cycle.
Protocols can submit grant applications for amounts they feel appropriate. While there's no ARB limit, delegates and voters will assess each grant individually.
As such, the Arbitrum Working Group has included four grant categories, as well as some recommended metrics by which the community might consider evaluating the grants:
Beacon Grants (<= 200K ARB)
Siren Grants (Up to 750K ARB)
Lighthouse Grants* (Up to 2M ARB)
Pinnacle Grants* (> 2M ARB)
One could reasonably use the date of publication for this proposal to inform these metrics.
Grants will be approved via a three week process across two cycles.
During the Application Stage of the program, eligible protocols will be invited to post proposals in the “Incentive Grant Applications” Category of the Arbitrum Forum using the official Application Template.
Once posted, the community may provide feedback on the proposal through the end of the Review Period.
Delegates and network stakeholders will be asked to provide feedback on grant applications upon each specific forum post. Delegates should engage with the goal of ensuring the responsible use of funds. This means an application should represent a comprehensive strategy for incentive distribution, align with the program goals and requirements, and present their plan to adhere to the aforementioned data standards.
Applicants are expected to adjust, amend, and update their proposals in line with community feedback over this time period. Due to the accelerated timeline of the program, feedback and communication between delegates and applicants will be critical.
A delegate will sponsor the proposal throughout the governance process for each grant application. ARB holders and ARB delegates will be invited to vote on each submitted proposal via Snapshot Poll.
To succeed, eligible applications must receive a greater than 50% majority in favor of the proposal, and receive greater than 71.51 million ARB.. If successful, applicants will coordinate with the Arbitrum Foundation and the STIP-ARB multisig to secure the completion of KYC, and receive funding to the address included in their application.
Repeat the process outlined in Cycle 1, with the exception that the review period for the second round will comprise a 2 week review period.
Sep. 01, 2023 - Forum Post Sep. 10, 2023 - Snapshot Vote Begins Sep. 20, 2023 - On-Chain Vote Begins
Round 1
Round 2 (Subject to changes)
50,094,000 ARB.
What happens if the budget is exceeded?
We do not expect applications to exceed the funding budget of 50M ARB. However, if requested grants do exceed the allocated budget, funding will be allocated based on the amount of votes in favor of a proposal, and then on a first-come, first-serve basis dependent upon the time the proposal was submitted to the Arbitrum Forum. In the event that the budget is exceeded, the DAO may choose to unlock further funds for a third round, or backfund successful incentive proposals.
What will happen to excess funds?
Following Cycle 2, excess funds remaining in the multisig will be returned to the Arbitrum Treasury address by the multisig.
What is the plan after the Short Term Incentive Program?
The Short Term Incentive Program is designed specifically as a one-time program, with the intention of empowering delegates to process incentives while the DAO designs a more robust, sustainable program in the months throughout the end of the year.
At the end of the year, if there is no program in place, protocols can put forth direct votes to on-chain governance to extend their programs. This program offers an opportunity for participating protocols to demonstrate mission-aligned conduct as justification for future funding.
How does the program determine whether to halt funding streams?
Funds can be stopped by the STIP-ARB Multisig with a 5/9 consensus. Funds will be stopped in the event of negligent actions in violation of the previously defined grant requirements. If halted, the multisig must publish the justification of its decision on the Arbitrum Forum. The stream can restart either through a Snapshot Veto or if the multisig decides the grantee has corrected their actions and it’s appropriate to continue.
What are the specific KPIs for this program - what determines its success?
*Regarding the StableLab Engagement StableLab has offered to handle management of the forum process starting September 22, 2023 and has agreed to accept back pay (from the proposal's passing) via weekly streams forward through January 31, 2023. This arrangement was initiated due to their proactive outreach regarding a competitive rate and interest under unique time-constraints and circumstances. If at any point the multisig feels StableLab has not upheld diligence in its responsibilities the multisig is empowered to halt the stream and appoint a new service provided by election.
Further, due to these last-minute circumstances, the DAO is entitled to elect competitive service providers during the first voting round by signaling a competitive offer in this proposal thread. If a counteroffer(s) is endorsed by a delegate with over 500,000 ARB VP the DAO will hold an election for the remainder of the contract length (endorsement to avoid spam).
Note: This proposal has been drafted on behalf of the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group as a result of multiple community calls and workshops between multiple stakeholders. It does not exclude external incentive proposals from outside of the proposed structure.*
This proposal outlines a one-time, community-created consensus framework to distribute up to 50,000,000 ARB of DAO-funded incentives targeting active Arbitrum protocols. Aimed at fulfilling short-term community needs, the program plans to allocate DAO-owned ARB towards incentives while ensuring transparent consensus and distribution methods. It spans two voting rounds and provides incentives to eligible programs designed to fund incentives through January 31, 2024.
Granted funds are expected to be distributed by the end of January 31, 2024. Participating grantees will be expected to self report data, dashboards, and summarize grant performance on an ongoing basis.
This provisional framework aims to allow delegates to distribute incentives fairly and effectively using transparent criteria agreed upon by the community, while a thorough system is developed (1, 2, 3, 4).
The goals of the framework are to:
By incentivizing the use of existing Arbitrum dApps through this proposal, we anticipate increased volume, transactions, users, and liquidity, laying the groundwork for a dynamic ecosystem. While the proposal acts as an experimental program, its primary goal is to ensure basic safeguards while promoting innovative incentive strategies.
Given that this proposal aims to be a one-time, short term incentive distribution, it lacks the accountability and operational rigor that a full program may provide. As such, we encourage protocols to consider that the use of funds will be both evaluated, and monitored by the community. Any misbehavior, or failure to comply with grant requests will likely result in ineligibility, or at the very least significant discernment, in future incentive or grant programs.
The Arbitrum Short-Term Incentive Program will comprise up to a 50,000,000 ARB budget earmarked for incentive grants for eligible protocols. In order to expedite the distribution of this capital to the ecosystem, the DAO will adopt a bifurcated process comprising two separate processes: the Financial Proposal and Application Process.
Following a successful Snapshot Temperature Check, the DAO will launch an expedited application and review process, allowing applicants to apply to delegates for grants concurrent with the on-chain vote to distribute DAO funds from the treasury.
The Snapshot Temperature Check achieved consensus and approved funding of up to 50,000,000 ARB through the end of January 31, 2024.
The Financial Proposal will comprise the following:
Multisig Setup
The STIP-ARB 5/9 multisig is being created. The funds in the multisig belong to the DAO and the signers act as grant managers on behalf of the DAO in coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation. Funds held in the multisig are explicitly banned from usage in DAO governance including delegation. The multisig includes the signers from the original PL-ARB multisig with the addition of to three community members (pending KYC):
This new multisig, the STIP-ARB multisig, includes two features to ensure accountability of signers and grantees:
Clawback capability so the DAO can retrieve funds if the multisig violates the agreement.
Streaming of funds to grantees every second week for the grants duration using Hedgey. This allows for the halting of funds if misuse is discovered with the goal to stop bad actors, not punish bad designs.
Grant Requirements:
By streaming grant payments, the multisig will be empowered to hold grantees accountable to their proposals by halting fund streaming for any of the following reasons:
In that this proposal aims to be experimental, the multisig is not intended to provide quality control on the design of incentive programs. Rather, they are empowered to halt streaming in the event of negligence or misuse of funds.
Grants span two award cycles, but projects can only be awarded once. Projects rejected in the first cycle are invited to address delegate/community feedback and reapply for the second cycle.
Protocols can submit grant applications for amounts they feel appropriate. While there's no ARB limit, delegates and voters will assess each grant individually.
As such, the Arbitrum Working Group has included four grant categories, as well as some recommended metrics by which the community might consider evaluating the grants:
Beacon Grants (<= 200K ARB)
Siren Grants (Up to 750K ARB)
Lighthouse Grants* (Up to 2M ARB)
Pinnacle Grants* (> 2M ARB)
One could reasonably use the date of publication for this proposal to inform these metrics.
Grants will be approved via a three week process across two cycles.
During the Application Stage of the program, eligible protocols will be invited to post proposals in the “Incentive Grant Applications” Category of the Arbitrum Forum using the official Application Template.
Once posted, the community may provide feedback on the proposal through the end of the Review Period.
Delegates and network stakeholders will be asked to provide feedback on grant applications upon each specific forum post. Delegates should engage with the goal of ensuring the responsible use of funds. This means an application should represent a comprehensive strategy for incentive distribution, align with the program goals and requirements, and present their plan to adhere to the aforementioned data standards.
Applicants are expected to adjust, amend, and update their proposals in line with community feedback over this time period. Due to the accelerated timeline of the program, feedback and communication between delegates and applicants will be critical.
A delegate will sponsor the proposal throughout the governance process for each grant application. ARB holders and ARB delegates will be invited to vote on each submitted proposal via Snapshot Poll.
To succeed, eligible applications must receive a greater than 50% majority in favor of the proposal, and receive greater than 71.51 million ARB.. If successful, applicants will coordinate with the Arbitrum Foundation and the STIP-ARB multisig to secure the completion of KYC, and receive funding to the address included in their application.
Repeat the process outlined in Cycle 1, with the exception that the review period for the second round will comprise a 2 week review period.
Sep. 01, 2023 - Forum Post Sep. 10, 2023 - Snapshot Vote Begins Sep. 20, 2023 - On-Chain Vote Begins
Round 1
Round 2 (Subject to changes)
50,094,000 ARB.
What happens if the budget is exceeded?
We do not expect applications to exceed the funding budget of 50M ARB. However, if requested grants do exceed the allocated budget, funding will be allocated based on the amount of votes in favor of a proposal, and then on a first-come, first-serve basis dependent upon the time the proposal was submitted to the Arbitrum Forum. In the event that the budget is exceeded, the DAO may choose to unlock further funds for a third round, or backfund successful incentive proposals.
What will happen to excess funds?
Following Cycle 2, excess funds remaining in the multisig will be returned to the Arbitrum Treasury address by the multisig.
What is the plan after the Short Term Incentive Program?
The Short Term Incentive Program is designed specifically as a one-time program, with the intention of empowering delegates to process incentives while the DAO designs a more robust, sustainable program in the months throughout the end of the year.
At the end of the year, if there is no program in place, protocols can put forth direct votes to on-chain governance to extend their programs. This program offers an opportunity for participating protocols to demonstrate mission-aligned conduct as justification for future funding.
How does the program determine whether to halt funding streams?
Funds can be stopped by the STIP-ARB Multisig with a 5/9 consensus. Funds will be stopped in the event of negligent actions in violation of the previously defined grant requirements. If halted, the multisig must publish the justification of its decision on the Arbitrum Forum. The stream can restart either through a Snapshot Veto or if the multisig decides the grantee has corrected their actions and it’s appropriate to continue.
What are the specific KPIs for this program - what determines its success?
*Regarding the StableLab Engagement StableLab has offered to handle management of the forum process starting September 22, 2023 and has agreed to accept back pay (from the proposal's passing) via weekly streams forward through January 31, 2023. This arrangement was initiated due to their proactive outreach regarding a competitive rate and interest under unique time-constraints and circumstances. If at any point the multisig feels StableLab has not upheld diligence in its responsibilities the multisig is empowered to halt the stream and appoint a new service provided by election.
Further, due to these last-minute circumstances, the DAO is entitled to elect competitive service providers during the first voting round by signaling a competitive offer in this proposal thread. If a counteroffer(s) is endorsed by a delegate with over 500,000 ARB VP the DAO will hold an election for the remainder of the contract length (endorsement to avoid spam).
This empowers the DAO by accelerating network growth, fostering innovation, and gathering valuable data. The program ensures accountability and governance while supporting the Arbitrum ecosystem's expansion.
This empowers the DAO by accelerating network growth, fostering innovation, and gathering valuable data. The program ensures accountability and governance while supporting the Arbitrum ecosystem's expansion.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/120?u=krst
As voted by SPELL holders, AbracadabraDAO supports this proposal and the STIP.
These are very large amounts of funding being proposed to be spent in a very short amount of time. Historically, bringing many grant proposals to a delegate-wide vote has not resulted in prudent spending (Optimism’s early grants are an excellent example). Realistically, most will receive de minimis review and likely be approved. We recognize, however, that there is a strong desire in the community to do something and this is something. So we will not play the role of obstructionist, to get the gears of governance moving until the more formal grants programs can become operational. Already there are several high-quality grant plans put forward, and trust other delegates will recognize those and prioritize them for funding.
I voted against in the forum, but always happy to support the DAO in executing it's decision! https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/85?u=griff
We think that 50m arb is too much to distribute in one proposal.
Very supportive of using DAO funds to grow the Arbitrum ecosystem. This community-run incentive program was thoughtfully planned. Let's do it!
cus we're not pussies
Check our forum profile
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/94
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/85
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/82?u=krst
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/76
Decision taken following SPELL holders will
Voting for 75m makes a budget it doesn't authoriz spending it. Delegates vote and decide proposals on their merit. #arbitrumNOW
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/120?u=krst
As voted by SPELL holders, AbracadabraDAO supports this proposal and the STIP.
These are very large amounts of funding being proposed to be spent in a very short amount of time. Historically, bringing many grant proposals to a delegate-wide vote has not resulted in prudent spending (Optimism’s early grants are an excellent example). Realistically, most will receive de minimis review and likely be approved. We recognize, however, that there is a strong desire in the community to do something and this is something. So we will not play the role of obstructionist, to get the gears of governance moving until the more formal grants programs can become operational. Already there are several high-quality grant plans put forward, and trust other delegates will recognize those and prioritize them for funding.
I voted against in the forum, but always happy to support the DAO in executing it's decision! https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/85?u=griff
We think that 50m arb is too much to distribute in one proposal.
Very supportive of using DAO funds to grow the Arbitrum ecosystem. This community-run incentive program was thoughtfully planned. Let's do it!
cus we're not pussies
Check our forum profile
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/94
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/85
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/82?u=krst
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/76
Decision taken following SPELL holders will
Voting for 75m makes a budget it doesn't authoriz spending it. Delegates vote and decide proposals on their merit. #arbitrumNOW
I have a question. To participate in the incentive program, is it necessary for the project to be onboarded with Arbitrum? Please provide additional information or specify what other conditions need to be considered.
The authors (grant recipient) of any DAO-endorsed grants will need to work with the Arbitrum Foundation on KYC/compliance. I always recommend to start that process sooner rather than later.
Thanks for the quick reply. Just to confirm, the 1 week application window will be the same as previously planned, correct? Applications due by Oct 18th?
Also, do you happen to know what they'll use as criteria to determine what is meant by meaningful budget?
We are considering applying for round 2 of the current grant cycle, but it is looking increasingly like the entire 50M tokens could be allocated during the first round. As of right now, 30M are spoken for, and another 11M are pretty close to reaching quorum with 3 days left in the voting period. Do we have an idea of if/how the second round will proceed? Are there any active conversations on this that I could join?
I have a question. To participate in the incentive program, is it necessary for the project to be onboarded with Arbitrum? Please provide additional information or specify what other conditions need to be considered.
The authors (grant recipient) of any DAO-endorsed grants will need to work with the Arbitrum Foundation on KYC/compliance. I always recommend to start that process sooner rather than later.
Thanks for the quick reply. Just to confirm, the 1 week application window will be the same as previously planned, correct? Applications due by Oct 18th?
Also, do you happen to know what they'll use as criteria to determine what is meant by meaningful budget?
We are considering applying for round 2 of the current grant cycle, but it is looking increasingly like the entire 50M tokens could be allocated during the first round. As of right now, 30M are spoken for, and another 11M are pretty close to reaching quorum with 3 days left in the voting period. Do we have an idea of if/how the second round will proceed? Are there any active conversations on this that I could join?
it reads like it requires both 1. 50% in favor; 2.71.45m FOR vote (not quorum).
it reads like it requires both 1. 50% in favor; 2.71.45m FOR vote (not quorum).
Hi @tnorm,
As this is my first time posting on the Arbitrum forums, by way of introduction I am API3 DAO's ecosystem lead and work closely with our ecosystem, developer relations and business development functions to engage various elements of the Arbitrum community. Thank you for your efforts in driving this initiative and facilitating an open discussion around the Arbitrum DAO. It is great to see somebody taking ownership of ecosystem engagement and by no means is this as easy of a task as it may seem. Kudos to yourself for taking the lead and for the retrospective support from the DAO.
Hi @tnorm,
As this is my first time posting on the Arbitrum forums, by way of introduction I am API3 DAO's ecosystem lead and work closely with our ecosystem, developer relations and business development functions to engage various elements of the Arbitrum community. Thank you for your efforts in driving this initiative and facilitating an open discussion around the Arbitrum DAO. It is great to see somebody taking ownership of ecosystem engagement and by no means is this as easy of a task as it may seem. Kudos to yourself for taking the lead and for the retrospective support from the DAO.
Overview
To date, API3 DAO has deployed a range of oracle services that are accessible to the Arbitrum community. Specifically, we have:
Building on that last point, as of August 2023 decentralized data feeds called dAPIs were accessible to builders on Arbitrum One. dAPIs are data feeds powered by first-party oracles, which means that the API provider is running the required Oracle infrastructure without introducing additional third parties between the data producer and data consumer. Managed dAPIs see multiple first-party oracles aggregated on Arbitrum to provide a verifiably decentralized data feed that significantly enhances transparency within decentralized oracles. Since August we have seen dAPIs be utilized in a small number of DeFi dApps within the Arbitrum ecosystem with some updates to official TVS imminent.
What is the query?
Since the introduction of managed dAPIs, API3 has been utilizing the ARB grant from the Arbitrum DAO distribution to activate data feed required within the ecosystem. As of writing, we have utilized just over 1/3 of the initial 75k ARB to subsidize price feed operation for DeFi protocols on Arbitrum. With the introduction of this initiative, we have been considering how we can best support the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem through the provision of oracle infrastructure within this framework.
- Support Network Growth: Accelerate the distribution of incentives to Arbitrum dApps to drive network and ecosystem growth.
With the operation of API3 data feeds, we need to cover gas costs associated with oracle transactions. This means if we are to activate a feed on Arbitrum we would require a conversion from Arbitrum to Eth. With consideration of the below, we wanted to openly communicate this and understand if this is an acceptable scenario or whether we should consider alternate mechanisms to reach this end goal within a request. Or consider an alternate framework.
- Grantees are required to keep distributions in ARB without converting to other assets.
When considering this it is worth noting that API3 does not have margins built into our data feed pricing. Any funds provided for data feed operation exclusively cover gas overheads associated with maintaining price on-chain from multiple first-party oracles, with a small buffer to account for abnormal chain behaviors that may see these costs spike. This does not include operational overheads such as contributor grants or API access costs.
Many thanks Ben
Post the Short Term Incentive Program, what are the long-term plans for sustaining the growth and engagement within the Arbitrum ecosystem?
Hello! @tnorm
Looks like new projects aren't eligible to participate, is this intentional?
i respect the engagement and well written post but 'serving everyone and making everyone happy' was never really in the cards. there was always going to have to be discrimination and decision-making on the part of the delegates, and deciding which proposals deserve to be funded and which don't. nothing's changed in that respect.
it seems unlikely to me that the dao would approve more than 50 million worth of grants individually when it capped the aggregate to that amount, but in the event that happens then we'll just have to go through the governance process again to decide what to do. like you pointed out, a lot of the grants are not objectively reasonable and we should expect delegate voting to reflect that.
Hi @tnorm,
As this is my first time posting on the Arbitrum forums, by way of introduction I am API3 DAO's ecosystem lead and work closely with our ecosystem, developer relations and business development functions to engage various elements of the Arbitrum community. Thank you for your efforts in driving this initiative and facilitating an open discussion around the Arbitrum DAO. It is great to see somebody taking ownership of ecosystem engagement and by no means is this as easy of a task as it may seem. Kudos to yourself for taking the lead and for the retrospective support from the DAO.
Hi @tnorm,
As this is my first time posting on the Arbitrum forums, by way of introduction I am API3 DAO's ecosystem lead and work closely with our ecosystem, developer relations and business development functions to engage various elements of the Arbitrum community. Thank you for your efforts in driving this initiative and facilitating an open discussion around the Arbitrum DAO. It is great to see somebody taking ownership of ecosystem engagement and by no means is this as easy of a task as it may seem. Kudos to yourself for taking the lead and for the retrospective support from the DAO.
Overview
To date, API3 DAO has deployed a range of oracle services that are accessible to the Arbitrum community. Specifically, we have:
Building on that last point, as of August 2023 decentralized data feeds called dAPIs were accessible to builders on Arbitrum One. dAPIs are data feeds powered by first-party oracles, which means that the API provider is running the required Oracle infrastructure without introducing additional third parties between the data producer and data consumer. Managed dAPIs see multiple first-party oracles aggregated on Arbitrum to provide a verifiably decentralized data feed that significantly enhances transparency within decentralized oracles. Since August we have seen dAPIs be utilized in a small number of DeFi dApps within the Arbitrum ecosystem with some updates to official TVS imminent.
What is the query?
Since the introduction of managed dAPIs, API3 has been utilizing the ARB grant from the Arbitrum DAO distribution to activate data feed required within the ecosystem. As of writing, we have utilized just over 1/3 of the initial 75k ARB to subsidize price feed operation for DeFi protocols on Arbitrum. With the introduction of this initiative, we have been considering how we can best support the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem through the provision of oracle infrastructure within this framework.
- Support Network Growth: Accelerate the distribution of incentives to Arbitrum dApps to drive network and ecosystem growth.
With the operation of API3 data feeds, we need to cover gas costs associated with oracle transactions. This means if we are to activate a feed on Arbitrum we would require a conversion from Arbitrum to Eth. With consideration of the below, we wanted to openly communicate this and understand if this is an acceptable scenario or whether we should consider alternate mechanisms to reach this end goal within a request. Or consider an alternate framework.
- Grantees are required to keep distributions in ARB without converting to other assets.
When considering this it is worth noting that API3 does not have margins built into our data feed pricing. Any funds provided for data feed operation exclusively cover gas overheads associated with maintaining price on-chain from multiple first-party oracles, with a small buffer to account for abnormal chain behaviors that may see these costs spike. This does not include operational overheads such as contributor grants or API access costs.
Many thanks Ben
Post the Short Term Incentive Program, what are the long-term plans for sustaining the growth and engagement within the Arbitrum ecosystem?
Hello! @tnorm
Looks like new projects aren't eligible to participate, is this intentional?
i respect the engagement and well written post but 'serving everyone and making everyone happy' was never really in the cards. there was always going to have to be discrimination and decision-making on the part of the delegates, and deciding which proposals deserve to be funded and which don't. nothing's changed in that respect.
it seems unlikely to me that the dao would approve more than 50 million worth of grants individually when it capped the aggregate to that amount, but in the event that happens then we'll just have to go through the governance process again to decide what to do. like you pointed out, a lot of the grants are not objectively reasonable and we should expect delegate voting to reflect that.
What are your thoughts on retaining the remaining amount for a future grant program or distributing it proportionally to approved projects based on their requested amounts, if the grant program receives requests for less than 50 million ARB, instead of returning the surplus to the treasury?
I will not make claims that this is specifically for the grants, but this is clear as day wash trading to artifically increase volume.
There are more than one protocols actively engaged in "wash trading" already. This is very clear to see when looking onchain, and I expect that the review process will allow the DAO and community to sufficiently filter out any malicious or deceiving proposals.
I will not make claims that this is specifically for the grants, but this is clear as day wash trading to artifically increase volume.
There are more than one protocols actively engaged in "wash trading" already. This is very clear to see when looking onchain, and I expect that the review process will allow the DAO and community to sufficiently filter out any malicious or deceiving proposals.
It is our duty as the DAO to ensure that protocols cannot lie or manipulate numbers - anyone caught doing this should face restrictions in the future.
we must confront the reality: strong opinions, including my own personal opinions, haven’t translated into actionable outcomes in Arbitrum governance.
@Griff just curious were you actively involved or engaged with any of the discussions so far? As far as I know, it was a public process that progressed over many months, allowing everyone an opportunity to voice concerns beforehand.
we must confront the reality: strong opinions, including my own personal opinions, haven’t translated into actionable outcomes in Arbitrum governance.
@Griff just curious were you actively involved or engaged with any of the discussions so far? As far as I know, it was a public process that progressed over many months, allowing everyone an opportunity to voice concerns beforehand.
The above quote would appear to summarise many of the large delegates who have strong opinions, yet their engagement and involvement seems to be lacking. Voicing your opinion unfortunately is not enough.
Ab wallet with transaction above a certain threshold should still qualify for incentives
Dear community members, we at Chronos Finance would like to also express our support for this proposal. We welcome a direct path for the DAO to support builders and believe that programmes like this will be essential to guarantee the long-term success of Arbitrum. We look forward to seeing how this will come together for the community and hope to contribute to improve the framework where possible. Finally, we’d like to thank the members from the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group who contributed to this proposal.
Absolutely, I couldn't agree more. It's not that established projects don't deserve support, but they likely already have a substantial user base and are generating profits from transaction fees. Do they really need additional incentives? In my opinion, their key need isn't financial backing but rather the space for innovation, something that the Arbitrum Foundation could certainly assist with.
If the primary KPI for these incentives is to boost user engagement with already established projects, I believe the initiative may miss its mark. These projects already have a large user base; further incentives would likely only drive transaction volumes and temporarily inflate TVL due to the 'incentive effect.'
Absolutely, I couldn't agree more. It's not that established projects don't deserve support, but they likely already have a substantial user base and are generating profits from transaction fees. Do they really need additional incentives? In my opinion, their key need isn't financial backing but rather the space for innovation, something that the Arbitrum Foundation could certainly assist with.
If the primary KPI for these incentives is to boost user engagement with already established projects, I believe the initiative may miss its mark. These projects already have a large user base; further incentives would likely only drive transaction volumes and temporarily inflate TVL due to the 'incentive effect.'
On the other hand, smaller projects with less than $1M TVL are the ones in dire need of such incentives. Creating a balanced ecosystem is crucial for the long-term health of any platform, and Arbitrum is no exception. If we only focus on bolstering the projects that have already achieved scale, we risk turning the ecosystem into a walled garden, monopolized by a few big names.
The consequences of this could be far-reaching: stifling innovation, discouraging new entrants, and ultimately leaving no room for disruptive ideas. The DeFi space is fueled by innovation, and if Arbitrum becomes a network where only the already successful can succeed, then we're going to lose that innovative edge.
So instead of concentrating resources on projects that have already established their place in the ecosystem, let's use these incentives to help smaller, promising initiatives rise to prominence. Otherwise, we risk turning the ecosystem into an exclusive club, with barriers too high for most to climb.
I find this exciting but would really like to know how to participate as a newbie
What are your thoughts on retaining the remaining amount for a future grant program or distributing it proportionally to approved projects based on their requested amounts, if the grant program receives requests for less than 50 million ARB, instead of returning the surplus to the treasury?
I will not make claims that this is specifically for the grants, but this is clear as day wash trading to artifically increase volume.
There are more than one protocols actively engaged in "wash trading" already. This is very clear to see when looking onchain, and I expect that the review process will allow the DAO and community to sufficiently filter out any malicious or deceiving proposals.
I will not make claims that this is specifically for the grants, but this is clear as day wash trading to artifically increase volume.
There are more than one protocols actively engaged in "wash trading" already. This is very clear to see when looking onchain, and I expect that the review process will allow the DAO and community to sufficiently filter out any malicious or deceiving proposals.
It is our duty as the DAO to ensure that protocols cannot lie or manipulate numbers - anyone caught doing this should face restrictions in the future.
we must confront the reality: strong opinions, including my own personal opinions, haven’t translated into actionable outcomes in Arbitrum governance.
@Griff just curious were you actively involved or engaged with any of the discussions so far? As far as I know, it was a public process that progressed over many months, allowing everyone an opportunity to voice concerns beforehand.
we must confront the reality: strong opinions, including my own personal opinions, haven’t translated into actionable outcomes in Arbitrum governance.
@Griff just curious were you actively involved or engaged with any of the discussions so far? As far as I know, it was a public process that progressed over many months, allowing everyone an opportunity to voice concerns beforehand.
The above quote would appear to summarise many of the large delegates who have strong opinions, yet their engagement and involvement seems to be lacking. Voicing your opinion unfortunately is not enough.
Ab wallet with transaction above a certain threshold should still qualify for incentives
Dear community members, we at Chronos Finance would like to also express our support for this proposal. We welcome a direct path for the DAO to support builders and believe that programmes like this will be essential to guarantee the long-term success of Arbitrum. We look forward to seeing how this will come together for the community and hope to contribute to improve the framework where possible. Finally, we’d like to thank the members from the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group who contributed to this proposal.
Absolutely, I couldn't agree more. It's not that established projects don't deserve support, but they likely already have a substantial user base and are generating profits from transaction fees. Do they really need additional incentives? In my opinion, their key need isn't financial backing but rather the space for innovation, something that the Arbitrum Foundation could certainly assist with.
If the primary KPI for these incentives is to boost user engagement with already established projects, I believe the initiative may miss its mark. These projects already have a large user base; further incentives would likely only drive transaction volumes and temporarily inflate TVL due to the 'incentive effect.'
Absolutely, I couldn't agree more. It's not that established projects don't deserve support, but they likely already have a substantial user base and are generating profits from transaction fees. Do they really need additional incentives? In my opinion, their key need isn't financial backing but rather the space for innovation, something that the Arbitrum Foundation could certainly assist with.
If the primary KPI for these incentives is to boost user engagement with already established projects, I believe the initiative may miss its mark. These projects already have a large user base; further incentives would likely only drive transaction volumes and temporarily inflate TVL due to the 'incentive effect.'
On the other hand, smaller projects with less than $1M TVL are the ones in dire need of such incentives. Creating a balanced ecosystem is crucial for the long-term health of any platform, and Arbitrum is no exception. If we only focus on bolstering the projects that have already achieved scale, we risk turning the ecosystem into a walled garden, monopolized by a few big names.
The consequences of this could be far-reaching: stifling innovation, discouraging new entrants, and ultimately leaving no room for disruptive ideas. The DeFi space is fueled by innovation, and if Arbitrum becomes a network where only the already successful can succeed, then we're going to lose that innovative edge.
So instead of concentrating resources on projects that have already established their place in the ecosystem, let's use these incentives to help smaller, promising initiatives rise to prominence. Otherwise, we risk turning the ecosystem into an exclusive club, with barriers too high for most to climb.
I find this exciting but would really like to know how to participate as a newbie
I think 75M ARB is too much fund and unnecessary incentive for 2 months time period. Since this is an experimental project, it can be started from a fund that will have less impact, such as 25M ARB. If this incentive makes a good impact the grant can be increased to 50M or 75M ARB.
Lovely idea and strong team. I will go for $50m, $25m, $75m.
Hi everyone, i'm Blue Clarity, the Head of Marketing and Growth at Trader Joe. I'm speaking both as a delegate and on behalf of the Trader Joe Community.
Trader Joe is excited to express full approval of and alignment with the short-term incentives program published by the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group. Given our past participation in similar programs, we foresee significant benefits for the Arbitrum ecosystem from this initiative.
Hi everyone, i'm Blue Clarity, the Head of Marketing and Growth at Trader Joe. I'm speaking both as a delegate and on behalf of the Trader Joe Community.
Trader Joe is excited to express full approval of and alignment with the short-term incentives program published by the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group. Given our past participation in similar programs, we foresee significant benefits for the Arbitrum ecosystem from this initiative.
The goals outlined in this program strongly resonate with our vision for both Trader Joe and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem. We think it is crucial for the Arbitrum DAO to mobilize and begin directly supporting builders with incentives, especially given the rapid changes occurring in the DeFi landscape in which we all participate. Although this program is designed for the short term, we see it as an excellent first step toward fostering long-term success for Arbitrum.
Alongside the Trader Joe Community, I am personally looking forward to engaging and shaping this program further to bring it to a successful fruition for Arbitrum.
n my humble opinion, I think the $75m is too big lol, but all the same I support the proposal. It’s good for the community
i'm confussed about KYC requirement. what's stand for?
Hi @tnorm I usually refrain from participating in these discussions, but the importance of this proposal prompted me to create an account just to weigh in.
While the proposal undoubtedly has its merits, especially for well-established projects, it seems to overlook a critical segment of the DeFi ecosystem: the underfunded innovators. I'm talking about the new players who are genuinely pushing the envelope but struggle for visibility and resources, often because they are self-funded and cautious with their limited marketing budgets.
Hi @tnorm I usually refrain from participating in these discussions, but the importance of this proposal prompted me to create an account just to weigh in.
While the proposal undoubtedly has its merits, especially for well-established projects, it seems to overlook a critical segment of the DeFi ecosystem: the underfunded innovators. I'm talking about the new players who are genuinely pushing the envelope but struggle for visibility and resources, often because they are self-funded and cautious with their limited marketing budgets.
Many of these are focused on automated strategies and vaults but are operating on a limited budget, with TVL often falling in the $50k-$200k range. The current criteria will inevitably exclude them, which is concerning.
My suggestion is to introduce a separate section within the existing Incentive Program that specifically targets these smaller, 'under-the-radar' projects that have a great track record and are brimming with technological innovations. We could call this an 'Innovation Grant' or 'Underdog Fund,' aiming to support projects that are pushing boundaries but are held back due to limited resources and visibility.
By backing these underdogs, the Arbitrum foundation and DeFi experts wouldn't just be giving them a lifeline; they would be enriching the entire DeFi ecosystem. Arbitrum could become a breeding ground for true innovation, ensuring the network’s long-term resilience and competitiveness.
Now, a question might arise: How do we make sure that these grants are used effectively? I propose that we borrow some of the scrutiny measures from the larger grant programs:
This way, the 'Innovation Grant' can still be held to high standards. The lower TVL and trading volume thresholds would allow these projects to qualify, while the additional scrutiny ensures that they are genuinely contributing to the space.
I hope these suggestions prompt a meaningful discussion on how we can make the Arbitrum network a more inclusive and nurturing environment for all kinds of innovations. It's crucial, especially in the ever-evolving DeFi landscape, where today's underdog could very well be tomorrow's leader.
I believe a more diversified grant program would make Arbitrum a truly comprehensive platform, encouraging innovation at all scales.
Hi @tnorm, trying to find out where the Incentive Grant Applications page is, would like to submit a proposal!
Is there any chance timelines for submissions will be changed? There's not a whole lot of time left to get applications together and it's not clear when submissions are actually opening - unless i've missed something going through all of this.
The proposal overall I think good, and only a small fraction of a very, very large war chest. The ARB provided is on estimate enough to fund at the very least some interesting campaigns and marketing/memetic ideas within the ecosystem that could be very beneficial.
Is there any chance timelines for submissions will be changed? There's not a whole lot of time left to get applications together and it's not clear when submissions are actually opening - unless i've missed something going through all of this.
The proposal overall I think good, and only a small fraction of a very, very large war chest. The ARB provided is on estimate enough to fund at the very least some interesting campaigns and marketing/memetic ideas within the ecosystem that could be very beneficial.
I do think TVL restrictions could be waived in the case of creative or novel DeFi use cases - there's a risk that have such restrictions hamstrings an ecosystems ability to reward ideas and teams that are innovating and building novel products on their own, or without explicit VC funding which is generally what contributes to TVL in outsized proportions relative to the community at large.
I was pleased to see the revisions that were made to enable the potential for NFT projects to be eligible in addition to Defi projects. However the recommended requirements of transaction volumes above $2M 30D cumulative volume is significantly more than any project on Arbitrum. Although this is the minimum recommended criteria for the Beacon Grant, the highest volume NFT collection on arbitrum has less than $100K 30D cumulative volume.
Can this be revised to provide some degree of inclusivity? Alternatively, adding an eligibility criteria that allows for the value of the assets held by an NFT collection's DAO would be worthwhile. This would still ensure that the grants are going to NFT collections with live products that have meaningful assets associated with its DAO to support growth on Arbitrum.
@tnorm Appreciate the comprehensive and well-thought out framework for the incentive program!
Are there any details on what are the exact KYC requirements for project teams?
@tnorm thanks for driving this initiative. I think this will be a welcome stimulus for the Arbitrum ecosystem and get more people involved in DAO operations which is a net positive.
Personally think your contribution of 20,000 $ARB is a bit excessive especially without breaking down the hours that went into this. I sure appreciate the time proposals and prior discussions around it take - but feel like half that amount would have seemed more appropriate and concerned this sets a bad precedent.
@tnorm thanks for driving this initiative. I think this will be a welcome stimulus for the Arbitrum ecosystem and get more people involved in DAO operations which is a net positive.
Personally think your contribution of 20,000 $ARB is a bit excessive especially without breaking down the hours that went into this. I sure appreciate the time proposals and prior discussions around it take - but feel like half that amount would have seemed more appropriate and concerned this sets a bad precedent.
But I realize I'm late to the discussion and this is already on Snapshot and I don't want to torpedo this whole proposal for some minor detail so i'll vote yes :slightly_smiling_face:
Around the application process and eligibility: would it make sense to make it a requirement that projects should have already used their $ARB allocation from the initial airdrop if they received any? Doesn't make sense to apply again if you don't even know how to allocate the first batch in my opinion.
And in terms of eligibility does it make sense to have a rigid TVL requirement when there are many non-financial project that don't necessarily fulfil the TVL criteria but are successful in other ways such as game projects such as Treasure, NFT marketplaces, bridge aggregators etc. ?
good and interesting propousal
I think 75M ARB is too much fund and unnecessary incentive for 2 months time period. Since this is an experimental project, it can be started from a fund that will have less impact, such as 25M ARB. If this incentive makes a good impact the grant can be increased to 50M or 75M ARB.
Lovely idea and strong team. I will go for $50m, $25m, $75m.
Hi everyone, i'm Blue Clarity, the Head of Marketing and Growth at Trader Joe. I'm speaking both as a delegate and on behalf of the Trader Joe Community.
Trader Joe is excited to express full approval of and alignment with the short-term incentives program published by the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group. Given our past participation in similar programs, we foresee significant benefits for the Arbitrum ecosystem from this initiative.
Hi everyone, i'm Blue Clarity, the Head of Marketing and Growth at Trader Joe. I'm speaking both as a delegate and on behalf of the Trader Joe Community.
Trader Joe is excited to express full approval of and alignment with the short-term incentives program published by the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group. Given our past participation in similar programs, we foresee significant benefits for the Arbitrum ecosystem from this initiative.
The goals outlined in this program strongly resonate with our vision for both Trader Joe and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem. We think it is crucial for the Arbitrum DAO to mobilize and begin directly supporting builders with incentives, especially given the rapid changes occurring in the DeFi landscape in which we all participate. Although this program is designed for the short term, we see it as an excellent first step toward fostering long-term success for Arbitrum.
Alongside the Trader Joe Community, I am personally looking forward to engaging and shaping this program further to bring it to a successful fruition for Arbitrum.
n my humble opinion, I think the $75m is too big lol, but all the same I support the proposal. It’s good for the community
i'm confussed about KYC requirement. what's stand for?
Hi @tnorm I usually refrain from participating in these discussions, but the importance of this proposal prompted me to create an account just to weigh in.
While the proposal undoubtedly has its merits, especially for well-established projects, it seems to overlook a critical segment of the DeFi ecosystem: the underfunded innovators. I'm talking about the new players who are genuinely pushing the envelope but struggle for visibility and resources, often because they are self-funded and cautious with their limited marketing budgets.
Hi @tnorm I usually refrain from participating in these discussions, but the importance of this proposal prompted me to create an account just to weigh in.
While the proposal undoubtedly has its merits, especially for well-established projects, it seems to overlook a critical segment of the DeFi ecosystem: the underfunded innovators. I'm talking about the new players who are genuinely pushing the envelope but struggle for visibility and resources, often because they are self-funded and cautious with their limited marketing budgets.
Many of these are focused on automated strategies and vaults but are operating on a limited budget, with TVL often falling in the $50k-$200k range. The current criteria will inevitably exclude them, which is concerning.
My suggestion is to introduce a separate section within the existing Incentive Program that specifically targets these smaller, 'under-the-radar' projects that have a great track record and are brimming with technological innovations. We could call this an 'Innovation Grant' or 'Underdog Fund,' aiming to support projects that are pushing boundaries but are held back due to limited resources and visibility.
By backing these underdogs, the Arbitrum foundation and DeFi experts wouldn't just be giving them a lifeline; they would be enriching the entire DeFi ecosystem. Arbitrum could become a breeding ground for true innovation, ensuring the network’s long-term resilience and competitiveness.
Now, a question might arise: How do we make sure that these grants are used effectively? I propose that we borrow some of the scrutiny measures from the larger grant programs:
This way, the 'Innovation Grant' can still be held to high standards. The lower TVL and trading volume thresholds would allow these projects to qualify, while the additional scrutiny ensures that they are genuinely contributing to the space.
I hope these suggestions prompt a meaningful discussion on how we can make the Arbitrum network a more inclusive and nurturing environment for all kinds of innovations. It's crucial, especially in the ever-evolving DeFi landscape, where today's underdog could very well be tomorrow's leader.
I believe a more diversified grant program would make Arbitrum a truly comprehensive platform, encouraging innovation at all scales.
Hi @tnorm, trying to find out where the Incentive Grant Applications page is, would like to submit a proposal!
Is there any chance timelines for submissions will be changed? There's not a whole lot of time left to get applications together and it's not clear when submissions are actually opening - unless i've missed something going through all of this.
The proposal overall I think good, and only a small fraction of a very, very large war chest. The ARB provided is on estimate enough to fund at the very least some interesting campaigns and marketing/memetic ideas within the ecosystem that could be very beneficial.
Is there any chance timelines for submissions will be changed? There's not a whole lot of time left to get applications together and it's not clear when submissions are actually opening - unless i've missed something going through all of this.
The proposal overall I think good, and only a small fraction of a very, very large war chest. The ARB provided is on estimate enough to fund at the very least some interesting campaigns and marketing/memetic ideas within the ecosystem that could be very beneficial.
I do think TVL restrictions could be waived in the case of creative or novel DeFi use cases - there's a risk that have such restrictions hamstrings an ecosystems ability to reward ideas and teams that are innovating and building novel products on their own, or without explicit VC funding which is generally what contributes to TVL in outsized proportions relative to the community at large.
I was pleased to see the revisions that were made to enable the potential for NFT projects to be eligible in addition to Defi projects. However the recommended requirements of transaction volumes above $2M 30D cumulative volume is significantly more than any project on Arbitrum. Although this is the minimum recommended criteria for the Beacon Grant, the highest volume NFT collection on arbitrum has less than $100K 30D cumulative volume.
Can this be revised to provide some degree of inclusivity? Alternatively, adding an eligibility criteria that allows for the value of the assets held by an NFT collection's DAO would be worthwhile. This would still ensure that the grants are going to NFT collections with live products that have meaningful assets associated with its DAO to support growth on Arbitrum.
@tnorm Appreciate the comprehensive and well-thought out framework for the incentive program!
Are there any details on what are the exact KYC requirements for project teams?
@tnorm thanks for driving this initiative. I think this will be a welcome stimulus for the Arbitrum ecosystem and get more people involved in DAO operations which is a net positive.
Personally think your contribution of 20,000 $ARB is a bit excessive especially without breaking down the hours that went into this. I sure appreciate the time proposals and prior discussions around it take - but feel like half that amount would have seemed more appropriate and concerned this sets a bad precedent.
@tnorm thanks for driving this initiative. I think this will be a welcome stimulus for the Arbitrum ecosystem and get more people involved in DAO operations which is a net positive.
Personally think your contribution of 20,000 $ARB is a bit excessive especially without breaking down the hours that went into this. I sure appreciate the time proposals and prior discussions around it take - but feel like half that amount would have seemed more appropriate and concerned this sets a bad precedent.
But I realize I'm late to the discussion and this is already on Snapshot and I don't want to torpedo this whole proposal for some minor detail so i'll vote yes :slightly_smiling_face:
Around the application process and eligibility: would it make sense to make it a requirement that projects should have already used their $ARB allocation from the initial airdrop if they received any? Doesn't make sense to apply again if you don't even know how to allocate the first batch in my opinion.
And in terms of eligibility does it make sense to have a rigid TVL requirement when there are many non-financial project that don't necessarily fulfil the TVL criteria but are successful in other ways such as game projects such as Treasure, NFT marketplaces, bridge aggregators etc. ?
good and interesting propousal
Thanks for the kind words about Treasure! This all makes sense to me and agree with this criterion about reporting flexibility being a good approach to accommodating the spectrum of projects.
We agree with this proposal for the most part. Dedicating ARB for this proposal, especially during the bear market, will make a huge difference in helping projects succeed and allow Arbitrum to remain competitive with other ecosystems' grant programs. However, we would like to note that the eligibility requirements here are written in such a way that caters to DeFi protocols (e.g. TVL metrics) over other sectors such as development tooling, gaming, web3 social, and other consumer applications that may have lower emphasis on staking capital.
Historically, user subsidies for DeFi protocols have not had lasting adoption unless the ecosystem is sticky enough to retain users for other reasons like NFTs or culture more broadly. User subsidies alone tend to attract mercenary farmers who hop between chains looking for the most attractive yield. While these kinds of incentives can be helpful in creating short-term boosts, Arbitrum DAO should be focused on supporting projects across the spectrum as well as developer tools that enable products with real market fit.
We agree with this proposal for the most part. Dedicating ARB for this proposal, especially during the bear market, will make a huge difference in helping projects succeed and allow Arbitrum to remain competitive with other ecosystems' grant programs. However, we would like to note that the eligibility requirements here are written in such a way that caters to DeFi protocols (e.g. TVL metrics) over other sectors such as development tooling, gaming, web3 social, and other consumer applications that may have lower emphasis on staking capital.
Historically, user subsidies for DeFi protocols have not had lasting adoption unless the ecosystem is sticky enough to retain users for other reasons like NFTs or culture more broadly. User subsidies alone tend to attract mercenary farmers who hop between chains looking for the most attractive yield. While these kinds of incentives can be helpful in creating short-term boosts, Arbitrum DAO should be focused on supporting projects across the spectrum as well as developer tools that enable products with real market fit.
We would argue that gaming and web3 social ecosystems are an ideal candidate for an incentive program, but since DeFi and NFTs have different metrics for success, non-DeFi protocols wouldn’t qualify. Without incentivizing projects across the spectrum, the 75M ARB here might be incentivizing short-term adoption with no lasting effect. Using incentives to bring in games specifically would increase adoption for Arbitrum due to the amount of effort it takes for these projects to migrate chains. The more that the Arbitrum community can embed itself as the premier hub for NFTs and gaming, the stronger the overall retention of users within the ecosystem.
Our main suggestion for this proposal would be to add alternative criteria or exemptions for non-DeFi protocols from considerations like TVL and daily volume. Historical volume would make more sense if the DAO decides to evaluate NFT trading by volume. We agree that length of time within the ecosystem is a good rubric of determining whether protocols should be considered here as well as a more informal evaluation of whether a project seems committed to Arbitrum in a meaningful way.
We would also suggest that the grant application period begin after the proposal is approved so that projects will know with certainty whether the incentive program will go into effect before putting together a proposal. It is not entirely clear from the suggested timeline here whether proposals should be submitted at the same time the DAO is voting on the incentive program.
I am very pleased with the changes. LFG
Well said. Tranches would help Protocols plan and establish realistic and achievable goals while counting on the long term sustainability and support these grants would offer them...something quite necessary as we head into a very complicated financial landscape in the coming quarters.
The response and solution was incredible, thank you so much for your answer. Kepler.homes Get ready. Thanks again @tnorm
I am very happy to see Arbitrum’s efforts and measures in community governance and incentives. This is also my first time to participate in community discussions. kepler.homes is a Web3 Game project starting in November 2021. After going through a relatively long development cycle, there is still a certain distance between this and delivering user testing. Before the game goes online for beta testing, we have plans to provide some full-chain gameplay to Arbitrum users.
This TVL evaluation rule is not applicable to the Web3 Game project, so my question is whether there are other evaluation standards? Thank you @tnorm for your hard work and dedication, and I look forward to getting answers.
@tnorm Thanks! Wish ya'll good luck.
So when does voting start?
According to the timeline, I think it started on September 8th, but I didn’t find any voting proposals on the Snapshot platform today.
As a member of the Arbitrum community, as well as Abracadabra DAO’s larger Arbitrum airdrop, I’ve been closely following the discussion of this short term incentive program. Drawing inspiration from the insightful feedback of members in this forum, I’d like to offer my perspective on the proposal.
Strengths:
As a member of the Arbitrum community, as well as Abracadabra DAO’s larger Arbitrum airdrop, I’ve been closely following the discussion of this short term incentive program. Drawing inspiration from the insightful feedback of members in this forum, I’d like to offer my perspective on the proposal.
Strengths:
Community Engagement: The proposal’s origin, coming from multiple community calls and workshops is commendable. This ensures a broad spectrum of voices and perspectives, fostering a sense of collective ownership. Granula Incentive Tiers: Tiered grant system is a thoughtful approach, catering to projects at different stages of maturity. Ensuring inclusivity and offering opportunities for both already established and nascent projects.
Areas for Consideration:
Grant Allocation and Milestones: Echoing @realdumbird ‘s concerns, the milestone-based funding tranches should be applied universally, irrespective of the grant size. This ensures accountability and encourages protocols to set realistic, achievable goals. A potential cap on the distribution percentage for each tranche could further enhance accountability.
Time Constraints: The application review periods do seem rushed. Given the significance of this program and the potential influx of applications, extending the periods could allow for a better vetting process.
Economic Implications: @mfer ‘s analogy of the proposal to traditional economic stimulus measures raises valid concerns. Incentives can drive short-term growth, but there's a risk of attracting mercenary capital that's transient. I’d like to shift the focus from merely inflating metrics to fostering genuine, sustainable growth. This could be achieved during the vetting process, by supporting innovative projects that offer real utility and address genuine user needs.
Transparency and Accountability: For a program of this magnitude there should be absolute clarity on the distribution of funds, the entities controlling them, and the checks and balances in place. We need to ensure that protocols have a clear understanding of the expectations and evaluation criteria.
I think this discussion and proposal is a step in the right direction, it’s essential to strike a balance between incentives growing the ecosystem and ensuring long term sustainability.
As one of the DAO contributors at Abracadabra, I am looking with interest to this proposal. Abracadabra DAO currently has 915.89K amount of ARB delegated towards it, which will vote depending on SPELL holders decisions.
Abracadabra has been the first CDP protocol to deploy successfully on Arbitrum and following discussions that happened even in the past in our community, we strongly believe that if done properly, an incentives program will be able to boost chain activity and help develop the Arbitrum Ecosystem further.
As one of the DAO contributors at Abracadabra, I am looking with interest to this proposal. Abracadabra DAO currently has 915.89K amount of ARB delegated towards it, which will vote depending on SPELL holders decisions.
Abracadabra has been the first CDP protocol to deploy successfully on Arbitrum and following discussions that happened even in the past in our community, we strongly believe that if done properly, an incentives program will be able to boost chain activity and help develop the Arbitrum Ecosystem further.
One thing that is particularly interesting in my eyes is the 4 class division of grants, that target specific metrics and require full reporting after the grant acquisition.
It will be interesting to see how many protocols will apply under such strict conditions and it will likely be already a first scrimmage of the possible participants.
As Abracadabra though, our whole community will look with interest at this proposal and is looking forward to seeing its further developments, especially about the total number of ARB proposed for distribution that will be pivotal to then decide upon smaller grants distributions.
thanks to the team who put this well thought out proposal together.
TVL growth, active user counts, developer engagement, and its impact on the landscape.
Thanks for the kind words about Treasure! This all makes sense to me and agree with this criterion about reporting flexibility being a good approach to accommodating the spectrum of projects.
We agree with this proposal for the most part. Dedicating ARB for this proposal, especially during the bear market, will make a huge difference in helping projects succeed and allow Arbitrum to remain competitive with other ecosystems' grant programs. However, we would like to note that the eligibility requirements here are written in such a way that caters to DeFi protocols (e.g. TVL metrics) over other sectors such as development tooling, gaming, web3 social, and other consumer applications that may have lower emphasis on staking capital.
Historically, user subsidies for DeFi protocols have not had lasting adoption unless the ecosystem is sticky enough to retain users for other reasons like NFTs or culture more broadly. User subsidies alone tend to attract mercenary farmers who hop between chains looking for the most attractive yield. While these kinds of incentives can be helpful in creating short-term boosts, Arbitrum DAO should be focused on supporting projects across the spectrum as well as developer tools that enable products with real market fit.
We agree with this proposal for the most part. Dedicating ARB for this proposal, especially during the bear market, will make a huge difference in helping projects succeed and allow Arbitrum to remain competitive with other ecosystems' grant programs. However, we would like to note that the eligibility requirements here are written in such a way that caters to DeFi protocols (e.g. TVL metrics) over other sectors such as development tooling, gaming, web3 social, and other consumer applications that may have lower emphasis on staking capital.
Historically, user subsidies for DeFi protocols have not had lasting adoption unless the ecosystem is sticky enough to retain users for other reasons like NFTs or culture more broadly. User subsidies alone tend to attract mercenary farmers who hop between chains looking for the most attractive yield. While these kinds of incentives can be helpful in creating short-term boosts, Arbitrum DAO should be focused on supporting projects across the spectrum as well as developer tools that enable products with real market fit.
We would argue that gaming and web3 social ecosystems are an ideal candidate for an incentive program, but since DeFi and NFTs have different metrics for success, non-DeFi protocols wouldn’t qualify. Without incentivizing projects across the spectrum, the 75M ARB here might be incentivizing short-term adoption with no lasting effect. Using incentives to bring in games specifically would increase adoption for Arbitrum due to the amount of effort it takes for these projects to migrate chains. The more that the Arbitrum community can embed itself as the premier hub for NFTs and gaming, the stronger the overall retention of users within the ecosystem.
Our main suggestion for this proposal would be to add alternative criteria or exemptions for non-DeFi protocols from considerations like TVL and daily volume. Historical volume would make more sense if the DAO decides to evaluate NFT trading by volume. We agree that length of time within the ecosystem is a good rubric of determining whether protocols should be considered here as well as a more informal evaluation of whether a project seems committed to Arbitrum in a meaningful way.
We would also suggest that the grant application period begin after the proposal is approved so that projects will know with certainty whether the incentive program will go into effect before putting together a proposal. It is not entirely clear from the suggested timeline here whether proposals should be submitted at the same time the DAO is voting on the incentive program.
I am very pleased with the changes. LFG
Well said. Tranches would help Protocols plan and establish realistic and achievable goals while counting on the long term sustainability and support these grants would offer them...something quite necessary as we head into a very complicated financial landscape in the coming quarters.
The response and solution was incredible, thank you so much for your answer. Kepler.homes Get ready. Thanks again @tnorm
I am very happy to see Arbitrum’s efforts and measures in community governance and incentives. This is also my first time to participate in community discussions. kepler.homes is a Web3 Game project starting in November 2021. After going through a relatively long development cycle, there is still a certain distance between this and delivering user testing. Before the game goes online for beta testing, we have plans to provide some full-chain gameplay to Arbitrum users.
This TVL evaluation rule is not applicable to the Web3 Game project, so my question is whether there are other evaluation standards? Thank you @tnorm for your hard work and dedication, and I look forward to getting answers.
@tnorm Thanks! Wish ya'll good luck.
So when does voting start?
According to the timeline, I think it started on September 8th, but I didn’t find any voting proposals on the Snapshot platform today.
As a member of the Arbitrum community, as well as Abracadabra DAO’s larger Arbitrum airdrop, I’ve been closely following the discussion of this short term incentive program. Drawing inspiration from the insightful feedback of members in this forum, I’d like to offer my perspective on the proposal.
Strengths:
As a member of the Arbitrum community, as well as Abracadabra DAO’s larger Arbitrum airdrop, I’ve been closely following the discussion of this short term incentive program. Drawing inspiration from the insightful feedback of members in this forum, I’d like to offer my perspective on the proposal.
Strengths:
Community Engagement: The proposal’s origin, coming from multiple community calls and workshops is commendable. This ensures a broad spectrum of voices and perspectives, fostering a sense of collective ownership. Granula Incentive Tiers: Tiered grant system is a thoughtful approach, catering to projects at different stages of maturity. Ensuring inclusivity and offering opportunities for both already established and nascent projects.
Areas for Consideration:
Grant Allocation and Milestones: Echoing @realdumbird ‘s concerns, the milestone-based funding tranches should be applied universally, irrespective of the grant size. This ensures accountability and encourages protocols to set realistic, achievable goals. A potential cap on the distribution percentage for each tranche could further enhance accountability.
Time Constraints: The application review periods do seem rushed. Given the significance of this program and the potential influx of applications, extending the periods could allow for a better vetting process.
Economic Implications: @mfer ‘s analogy of the proposal to traditional economic stimulus measures raises valid concerns. Incentives can drive short-term growth, but there's a risk of attracting mercenary capital that's transient. I’d like to shift the focus from merely inflating metrics to fostering genuine, sustainable growth. This could be achieved during the vetting process, by supporting innovative projects that offer real utility and address genuine user needs.
Transparency and Accountability: For a program of this magnitude there should be absolute clarity on the distribution of funds, the entities controlling them, and the checks and balances in place. We need to ensure that protocols have a clear understanding of the expectations and evaluation criteria.
I think this discussion and proposal is a step in the right direction, it’s essential to strike a balance between incentives growing the ecosystem and ensuring long term sustainability.
As one of the DAO contributors at Abracadabra, I am looking with interest to this proposal. Abracadabra DAO currently has 915.89K amount of ARB delegated towards it, which will vote depending on SPELL holders decisions.
Abracadabra has been the first CDP protocol to deploy successfully on Arbitrum and following discussions that happened even in the past in our community, we strongly believe that if done properly, an incentives program will be able to boost chain activity and help develop the Arbitrum Ecosystem further.
As one of the DAO contributors at Abracadabra, I am looking with interest to this proposal. Abracadabra DAO currently has 915.89K amount of ARB delegated towards it, which will vote depending on SPELL holders decisions.
Abracadabra has been the first CDP protocol to deploy successfully on Arbitrum and following discussions that happened even in the past in our community, we strongly believe that if done properly, an incentives program will be able to boost chain activity and help develop the Arbitrum Ecosystem further.
One thing that is particularly interesting in my eyes is the 4 class division of grants, that target specific metrics and require full reporting after the grant acquisition.
It will be interesting to see how many protocols will apply under such strict conditions and it will likely be already a first scrimmage of the possible participants.
As Abracadabra though, our whole community will look with interest at this proposal and is looking forward to seeing its further developments, especially about the total number of ARB proposed for distribution that will be pivotal to then decide upon smaller grants distributions.
thanks to the team who put this well thought out proposal together.
TVL growth, active user counts, developer engagement, and its impact on the landscape.
Having conducted an in-depth analysis of multiple government token-based incentive initiatives, it is apparent that the current program leaves much to be desired in terms of structure and impact. Arbitrum stands in a unique position to innovate by leveraging insights from previous successful programs, thereby offering a more intelligent, category-specific incentive structure.
Extensive data already exists on the characteristics that define a successful incentive program in various DeFi segments, such as Automated Market Makers (AMMs), Lending Markets, and Perpetual Decentralized Exchanges (Perp DEXes). Similarly, we have a wealth of information on approaches that have failed to yield positive outcomes.
Having conducted an in-depth analysis of multiple government token-based incentive initiatives, it is apparent that the current program leaves much to be desired in terms of structure and impact. Arbitrum stands in a unique position to innovate by leveraging insights from previous successful programs, thereby offering a more intelligent, category-specific incentive structure.
Extensive data already exists on the characteristics that define a successful incentive program in various DeFi segments, such as Automated Market Makers (AMMs), Lending Markets, and Perpetual Decentralized Exchanges (Perp DEXes). Similarly, we have a wealth of information on approaches that have failed to yield positive outcomes.
Focusing specifically on AMM liquidity mining, there are proven cases that illustrate its effectiveness in bootstrapping initial liquidity. Notable examples include the Avalanche Rush program, Fantom Foundation initiatives, and the nascent stages of Osmosis. However, it's imperative to acknowledge criticisms concerning the transitory nature of capital these programs attract. While liquidity tends to dissipate once the incentives decrease, well-executed liquidity mining programs have been shown to produce enduring, statistically significant enhancements in liquidity within the ecosystem.
According to research conducted by Gauntlet, a successful AMM liquidity mining program goes through the following process:
For it to work the following needs to be true.
SUGGESTION
Hey, this is Eugene from Galxe. Tally profile - galxe.eth
The proposal’s overall concept is quite promising as it aims to foster the growth of high-quality DApps within the ARB ecosystem. The allocation of a 75mm fund appears sufficient to attract substantial TVL projects that could make meaningful contributions to the ARB ecosystem. However, there is room for improvement in the project screening and review process to better demonstrate how these projects can positively impact the ARB ecosystem. Providing a more detailed explanation of how these initiatives can bring sustained benefits would be valuable. Moreover, it may be advantageous for projects to incorporate significant milestones into their application proposals. This approach would enable the operations team to allocate funds based on the progress and achievements of each project, potentially enhancing the performance of initiatives that align with the development goals of the ARB ecosystem.
I'm glad to see some intelligent and helpful suggestions in posts. My impression is that the main concern is about the proposed size of the incentive program. From my understanding, 75 million is the maximum possible allocation; in practice, only part of that will be distributed during the first 2 months. This proposed program surely isn't perfect - but it is needed, asap. It saddens me that I see criticism (and some valid, well-thought-out concerns) from the people with large voting power who didn't feel the need to take part in the calls and help in carving out this proposal. You are not sending the right message this way. Calls and consultations were open to everyone, and you should have attended and tried to help. After all, that is also the duty of a delegate, not only voting.
Hi, Vaultka here!
We're truly grateful for the fantastic work put in by the Arbitrum Incentive Group and the unwavering commitment of the Arbitrum community to drive further growth in the ecosystem. We fully support the launch of a grant program to help the ecosystem to help attract more users, given the intense competition in the L2 war.
Hi, Vaultka here!
We're truly grateful for the fantastic work put in by the Arbitrum Incentive Group and the unwavering commitment of the Arbitrum community to drive further growth in the ecosystem. We fully support the launch of a grant program to help the ecosystem to help attract more users, given the intense competition in the L2 war.
Vaultka has been an Arbitrum maxi since day one and will continue to be the no.1 Arbitrum Perp Dex supporter. Incentives are a fantastic way to lure new users into embracing fresh protocols. However, a one-time incentive might have a downside, potentially creating a temporary surge in selling pressure on the $ARB token, which isn't exactly the healthiest scenario for the ecosystem as a whole. Therefore, we suggest a more rigorous review framework to ensure that grant funds contribute to long-term development.
This proposal is a step in the right direction, and demonstrates the community's dedication to elevating Arbitrum. We're eagerly looking forward to seeing how this proposal propels Arbitrum to new heights! 🚀
Dears, how about new protocols?
Atomica.org has spent two years developing the NextGen Risk and Insurance Marketplace in stealth mode.
However, it seems that we do not even meet the initial requirements for Beacon Grants...
Finally, we are planning to launch this month (September) to support our partner - DeltaPrime.
Dears, how about new protocols?
Atomica.org has spent two years developing the NextGen Risk and Insurance Marketplace in stealth mode.
However, it seems that we do not even meet the initial requirements for Beacon Grants...
Finally, we are planning to launch this month (September) to support our partner - DeltaPrime.
Unlike others, we plan to use the Grant to create the Arbitrum Ecosystem Reinsurance Fund to provide Ecosystem Safety to protocols deployed on Arbitrum.
The more insurance liquidity there will be in the Arbitrum reinsurance pools, the cheaper insurance can be.
It simply means that if I can get 20% unprotected yield somewhere, my protected yield on the Arbitrum ecosystem will be 16-18%. I'll definitely choose the protected yield and increase my allocation on Arbitrum.
The results may be as follows:
Final thoughts:
Providing Ecosystem Safety can be a better long-term strategy:
We have more ideas on how to bootstrap the Ecosystem. Reach us if you are interested.
Atomica integration team: jaroslav.a_atomica.org telegram @shtir33
Wait for the bull market. In this current bear market, these tokens will ultimately be dumped by mercenaries reducing the current value of ARB. It's unfortunate, but at the moment this is the reality.
Hello there, we are a trustless non-custodial digital asset payment protocol with innovative tech breakthroughs that have already been deployed on Ethereum and Tron, and we are currently working on deploying it on Arbitrum right now. We would make a great contribution to Artibtrum by attracting more merchants to deploy their payment systems on Arbitrum and bring in more liquidity & active users to the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Even though we haven't deployed on Arbitrum right now, I am still wondering if there is any chance that we can participate in this short-term incentive program. It would be so helpful in accelerating our progress of bringing more value and vitality to the Arbitrum Ecosystem. If we could get in touch with the right person, we would love to discuss this further in detail!
In the current bear market landscape, blue chip token volatility and assets inflow are at a historical low. User activities are naturally low in this stage, as few new players enter the space, yet the remaining users primarily seek farming opportunities for quick yield. Based on this context, it still needs to be determined whether the grant can sustainably attract and maintain real users instead of mercenaries. The 75M ARB is SMALL to boost the entire crypto industry and attract inflow, yet too LARGE for one L2 to release in a 2-3 months campaign.
I totally understand the mindset of getting the ball rolling quickly. Still, the query for the risks surrounding the too-large 75M cap can't be simply addressed by using perspectives like "it's an experiment," "as long as things move forward, it's good enough," or "the cap is high, but what if we don't spend of it all." If the cap is set as 75M, people will aim to apply for all of them and spend them all; if each proposal drafting, reviewing and voting round is less than three weeks combined, the process will likely be rushed considering the number of applicants attracted by the 75M number. And if up to 75M ARB tokens are released to the secondary market in 2-3 months rapidly, considering the current market conditions, before we onboard more long-term LPs and users, we might witness holder confidence collapse first. If things turn south, this "experiment" will be very expensive in terms of cost and reputation.
In the current bear market landscape, blue chip token volatility and assets inflow are at a historical low. User activities are naturally low in this stage, as few new players enter the space, yet the remaining users primarily seek farming opportunities for quick yield. Based on this context, it still needs to be determined whether the grant can sustainably attract and maintain real users instead of mercenaries. The 75M ARB is SMALL to boost the entire crypto industry and attract inflow, yet too LARGE for one L2 to release in a 2-3 months campaign.
I totally understand the mindset of getting the ball rolling quickly. Still, the query for the risks surrounding the too-large 75M cap can't be simply addressed by using perspectives like "it's an experiment," "as long as things move forward, it's good enough," or "the cap is high, but what if we don't spend of it all." If the cap is set as 75M, people will aim to apply for all of them and spend them all; if each proposal drafting, reviewing and voting round is less than three weeks combined, the process will likely be rushed considering the number of applicants attracted by the 75M number. And if up to 75M ARB tokens are released to the secondary market in 2-3 months rapidly, considering the current market conditions, before we onboard more long-term LPs and users, we might witness holder confidence collapse first. If things turn south, this "experiment" will be very expensive in terms of cost and reputation.
After releasing this proposal, we have seen Twitter KOLs referencing it and using 75M ARB in the headlines; general audiences will ignore the fact that this is a cap, and they will assume a lot of ARB tokens will be dumped on the market in the short term. The attention that the eco gained from artificially boosted volume & APR might be countered by potentially scary price actions.
Representing one of the larger delegate in the ecosystem, I sincerely suggest making the following changes:
Hey guys, Waffle from Lodestar Finance here.
Fully in support of this proposal, 75M ARB could sound significant but it remains low for an ecosystem of our size in need for new traction and liquidity.
First of all, appreciate the work and it's generally a great initiative.
As the first season, this is an experiment. And if we take a look at what happened to OP season 1, we should start small, instead of such a huge number. We can expand based on the data and result of season and then expand in season 2.
First of all, appreciate the work and it's generally a great initiative.
As the first season, this is an experiment. And if we take a look at what happened to OP season 1, we should start small, instead of such a huge number. We can expand based on the data and result of season and then expand in season 2.
already saw some concerns raised around the large cap and tight schedule. Suggest to tweak the number and time frame.
@tnorm #GoodEntry Dex is the next bigger wave even than GMX with a trusted community.
WE CHOOSE #GOODENTRY
We fully appreciate the transparency of the application and review process and think such incentive program is very much needed at this stage as more newer L2s are attracting users and capital with airdrop speculation.
75M ARB does sound quite significant for a short term incentive program, but more importantly each application should be carefully evaluated on multiple fronts - incentives should not be casually designed to increase TVL and only benefit mercenary farmers, rather they should be efficiently used in more creative ways to foster user activities on Arbitrum, collaboration between existing protocols and new protocol integration.
We fully appreciate the transparency of the application and review process and think such incentive program is very much needed at this stage as more newer L2s are attracting users and capital with airdrop speculation.
75M ARB does sound quite significant for a short term incentive program, but more importantly each application should be carefully evaluated on multiple fronts - incentives should not be casually designed to increase TVL and only benefit mercenary farmers, rather they should be efficiently used in more creative ways to foster user activities on Arbitrum, collaboration between existing protocols and new protocol integration.
Kevin from WOOFi
Sounds good to me.
Might not be perfect, but Arbitrum needs to move fast and the proposal has been carefully drafted.
Onwards
Fully onboard, thank you for taking the time to put this together
Disclosure - I was part of the working group that helped draft this with @tnorm. TLDR - there was a lot of compromise made here, and I don't know that I Iove everything about it, but I think it works and captures the essence of what is needed. (This is how compromise works)
I think the main thing here is to enable Protocols to access DAO funds as quickly as possible and for the DAO to be able to judge how those funds were used. IMO it is unlikely $75m ARB is used in 2 months given the requirement for public voting.
Disclosure - I was part of the working group that helped draft this with @tnorm. TLDR - there was a lot of compromise made here, and I don't know that I Iove everything about it, but I think it works and captures the essence of what is needed. (This is how compromise works)
I think the main thing here is to enable Protocols to access DAO funds as quickly as possible and for the DAO to be able to judge how those funds were used. IMO it is unlikely $75m ARB is used in 2 months given the requirement for public voting.
More likely:
Things to watch for:
Given the bear market, and the peculiarities of network effect, the DAO will likely need to be bold to retain market position or risk losing out to others (optimism, Mantle etc.) Hopefully, this programme will be an opportunity for protocols to innovate and make requests for funding that demonstrate more thought than pure 'incentives' (i.e. outright unfettered giveaways). Vertex Protocol will be making an effort to do this - we would urge other protocols to do the same to avoid some of the mistakes people on the forum seem so concerned about.
75m ARB 'given away' seems foolish. 75m ARB as capital to fuel the ecosystem could be genius.
Masterbean from Good Entry here
Incentives are great. This will really help. Good Entry has fully committed to Arbitrum since our inception with no immediate plans for a multi chain strategy. A meaningful boost is necessary. Considering the large size of incentives its good to clarify what's the important objectives here.
Masterbean from Good Entry here
Incentives are great. This will really help. Good Entry has fully committed to Arbitrum since our inception with no immediate plans for a multi chain strategy. A meaningful boost is necessary. Considering the large size of incentives its good to clarify what's the important objectives here.
What is the team looking for? Activity? Awareness? Good Entry would suggest, the purpose of this incentive programme should be to search for the next GMX. A project that really defines the ecosystem.
Good Entry would propose that the foundation only provide grants to projects exclusive only to Arbitrum.
Another real north star for us builders is creating sticky activity. As we know incentives can bring mercenary capital that leaves once incentives end. One thing that can inform if a project deserves extension is if increased activity remains and grows for at least 3 months from the end date of the incentive programme.
Investing short term is necessary for long term. We want Arbitrum to win and these clearer goals can help us create sustainable programmes moving forward.
Having conducted an in-depth analysis of multiple government token-based incentive initiatives, it is apparent that the current program leaves much to be desired in terms of structure and impact. Arbitrum stands in a unique position to innovate by leveraging insights from previous successful programs, thereby offering a more intelligent, category-specific incentive structure.
Extensive data already exists on the characteristics that define a successful incentive program in various DeFi segments, such as Automated Market Makers (AMMs), Lending Markets, and Perpetual Decentralized Exchanges (Perp DEXes). Similarly, we have a wealth of information on approaches that have failed to yield positive outcomes.
Having conducted an in-depth analysis of multiple government token-based incentive initiatives, it is apparent that the current program leaves much to be desired in terms of structure and impact. Arbitrum stands in a unique position to innovate by leveraging insights from previous successful programs, thereby offering a more intelligent, category-specific incentive structure.
Extensive data already exists on the characteristics that define a successful incentive program in various DeFi segments, such as Automated Market Makers (AMMs), Lending Markets, and Perpetual Decentralized Exchanges (Perp DEXes). Similarly, we have a wealth of information on approaches that have failed to yield positive outcomes.
Focusing specifically on AMM liquidity mining, there are proven cases that illustrate its effectiveness in bootstrapping initial liquidity. Notable examples include the Avalanche Rush program, Fantom Foundation initiatives, and the nascent stages of Osmosis. However, it's imperative to acknowledge criticisms concerning the transitory nature of capital these programs attract. While liquidity tends to dissipate once the incentives decrease, well-executed liquidity mining programs have been shown to produce enduring, statistically significant enhancements in liquidity within the ecosystem.
According to research conducted by Gauntlet, a successful AMM liquidity mining program goes through the following process:
For it to work the following needs to be true.
SUGGESTION
Hey, this is Eugene from Galxe. Tally profile - galxe.eth
The proposal’s overall concept is quite promising as it aims to foster the growth of high-quality DApps within the ARB ecosystem. The allocation of a 75mm fund appears sufficient to attract substantial TVL projects that could make meaningful contributions to the ARB ecosystem. However, there is room for improvement in the project screening and review process to better demonstrate how these projects can positively impact the ARB ecosystem. Providing a more detailed explanation of how these initiatives can bring sustained benefits would be valuable. Moreover, it may be advantageous for projects to incorporate significant milestones into their application proposals. This approach would enable the operations team to allocate funds based on the progress and achievements of each project, potentially enhancing the performance of initiatives that align with the development goals of the ARB ecosystem.
I'm glad to see some intelligent and helpful suggestions in posts. My impression is that the main concern is about the proposed size of the incentive program. From my understanding, 75 million is the maximum possible allocation; in practice, only part of that will be distributed during the first 2 months. This proposed program surely isn't perfect - but it is needed, asap. It saddens me that I see criticism (and some valid, well-thought-out concerns) from the people with large voting power who didn't feel the need to take part in the calls and help in carving out this proposal. You are not sending the right message this way. Calls and consultations were open to everyone, and you should have attended and tried to help. After all, that is also the duty of a delegate, not only voting.
Hi, Vaultka here!
We're truly grateful for the fantastic work put in by the Arbitrum Incentive Group and the unwavering commitment of the Arbitrum community to drive further growth in the ecosystem. We fully support the launch of a grant program to help the ecosystem to help attract more users, given the intense competition in the L2 war.
Hi, Vaultka here!
We're truly grateful for the fantastic work put in by the Arbitrum Incentive Group and the unwavering commitment of the Arbitrum community to drive further growth in the ecosystem. We fully support the launch of a grant program to help the ecosystem to help attract more users, given the intense competition in the L2 war.
Vaultka has been an Arbitrum maxi since day one and will continue to be the no.1 Arbitrum Perp Dex supporter. Incentives are a fantastic way to lure new users into embracing fresh protocols. However, a one-time incentive might have a downside, potentially creating a temporary surge in selling pressure on the $ARB token, which isn't exactly the healthiest scenario for the ecosystem as a whole. Therefore, we suggest a more rigorous review framework to ensure that grant funds contribute to long-term development.
This proposal is a step in the right direction, and demonstrates the community's dedication to elevating Arbitrum. We're eagerly looking forward to seeing how this proposal propels Arbitrum to new heights! 🚀
Dears, how about new protocols?
Atomica.org has spent two years developing the NextGen Risk and Insurance Marketplace in stealth mode.
However, it seems that we do not even meet the initial requirements for Beacon Grants...
Finally, we are planning to launch this month (September) to support our partner - DeltaPrime.
Dears, how about new protocols?
Atomica.org has spent two years developing the NextGen Risk and Insurance Marketplace in stealth mode.
However, it seems that we do not even meet the initial requirements for Beacon Grants...
Finally, we are planning to launch this month (September) to support our partner - DeltaPrime.
Unlike others, we plan to use the Grant to create the Arbitrum Ecosystem Reinsurance Fund to provide Ecosystem Safety to protocols deployed on Arbitrum.
The more insurance liquidity there will be in the Arbitrum reinsurance pools, the cheaper insurance can be.
It simply means that if I can get 20% unprotected yield somewhere, my protected yield on the Arbitrum ecosystem will be 16-18%. I'll definitely choose the protected yield and increase my allocation on Arbitrum.
The results may be as follows:
Final thoughts:
Providing Ecosystem Safety can be a better long-term strategy:
We have more ideas on how to bootstrap the Ecosystem. Reach us if you are interested.
Atomica integration team: jaroslav.a_atomica.org telegram @shtir33
Wait for the bull market. In this current bear market, these tokens will ultimately be dumped by mercenaries reducing the current value of ARB. It's unfortunate, but at the moment this is the reality.
Hello there, we are a trustless non-custodial digital asset payment protocol with innovative tech breakthroughs that have already been deployed on Ethereum and Tron, and we are currently working on deploying it on Arbitrum right now. We would make a great contribution to Artibtrum by attracting more merchants to deploy their payment systems on Arbitrum and bring in more liquidity & active users to the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Even though we haven't deployed on Arbitrum right now, I am still wondering if there is any chance that we can participate in this short-term incentive program. It would be so helpful in accelerating our progress of bringing more value and vitality to the Arbitrum Ecosystem. If we could get in touch with the right person, we would love to discuss this further in detail!
In the current bear market landscape, blue chip token volatility and assets inflow are at a historical low. User activities are naturally low in this stage, as few new players enter the space, yet the remaining users primarily seek farming opportunities for quick yield. Based on this context, it still needs to be determined whether the grant can sustainably attract and maintain real users instead of mercenaries. The 75M ARB is SMALL to boost the entire crypto industry and attract inflow, yet too LARGE for one L2 to release in a 2-3 months campaign.
I totally understand the mindset of getting the ball rolling quickly. Still, the query for the risks surrounding the too-large 75M cap can't be simply addressed by using perspectives like "it's an experiment," "as long as things move forward, it's good enough," or "the cap is high, but what if we don't spend of it all." If the cap is set as 75M, people will aim to apply for all of them and spend them all; if each proposal drafting, reviewing and voting round is less than three weeks combined, the process will likely be rushed considering the number of applicants attracted by the 75M number. And if up to 75M ARB tokens are released to the secondary market in 2-3 months rapidly, considering the current market conditions, before we onboard more long-term LPs and users, we might witness holder confidence collapse first. If things turn south, this "experiment" will be very expensive in terms of cost and reputation.
In the current bear market landscape, blue chip token volatility and assets inflow are at a historical low. User activities are naturally low in this stage, as few new players enter the space, yet the remaining users primarily seek farming opportunities for quick yield. Based on this context, it still needs to be determined whether the grant can sustainably attract and maintain real users instead of mercenaries. The 75M ARB is SMALL to boost the entire crypto industry and attract inflow, yet too LARGE for one L2 to release in a 2-3 months campaign.
I totally understand the mindset of getting the ball rolling quickly. Still, the query for the risks surrounding the too-large 75M cap can't be simply addressed by using perspectives like "it's an experiment," "as long as things move forward, it's good enough," or "the cap is high, but what if we don't spend of it all." If the cap is set as 75M, people will aim to apply for all of them and spend them all; if each proposal drafting, reviewing and voting round is less than three weeks combined, the process will likely be rushed considering the number of applicants attracted by the 75M number. And if up to 75M ARB tokens are released to the secondary market in 2-3 months rapidly, considering the current market conditions, before we onboard more long-term LPs and users, we might witness holder confidence collapse first. If things turn south, this "experiment" will be very expensive in terms of cost and reputation.
After releasing this proposal, we have seen Twitter KOLs referencing it and using 75M ARB in the headlines; general audiences will ignore the fact that this is a cap, and they will assume a lot of ARB tokens will be dumped on the market in the short term. The attention that the eco gained from artificially boosted volume & APR might be countered by potentially scary price actions.
Representing one of the larger delegate in the ecosystem, I sincerely suggest making the following changes:
Hey guys, Waffle from Lodestar Finance here.
Fully in support of this proposal, 75M ARB could sound significant but it remains low for an ecosystem of our size in need for new traction and liquidity.
First of all, appreciate the work and it's generally a great initiative.
As the first season, this is an experiment. And if we take a look at what happened to OP season 1, we should start small, instead of such a huge number. We can expand based on the data and result of season and then expand in season 2.
First of all, appreciate the work and it's generally a great initiative.
As the first season, this is an experiment. And if we take a look at what happened to OP season 1, we should start small, instead of such a huge number. We can expand based on the data and result of season and then expand in season 2.
already saw some concerns raised around the large cap and tight schedule. Suggest to tweak the number and time frame.
@tnorm #GoodEntry Dex is the next bigger wave even than GMX with a trusted community.
WE CHOOSE #GOODENTRY
We fully appreciate the transparency of the application and review process and think such incentive program is very much needed at this stage as more newer L2s are attracting users and capital with airdrop speculation.
75M ARB does sound quite significant for a short term incentive program, but more importantly each application should be carefully evaluated on multiple fronts - incentives should not be casually designed to increase TVL and only benefit mercenary farmers, rather they should be efficiently used in more creative ways to foster user activities on Arbitrum, collaboration between existing protocols and new protocol integration.
We fully appreciate the transparency of the application and review process and think such incentive program is very much needed at this stage as more newer L2s are attracting users and capital with airdrop speculation.
75M ARB does sound quite significant for a short term incentive program, but more importantly each application should be carefully evaluated on multiple fronts - incentives should not be casually designed to increase TVL and only benefit mercenary farmers, rather they should be efficiently used in more creative ways to foster user activities on Arbitrum, collaboration between existing protocols and new protocol integration.
Kevin from WOOFi
Sounds good to me.
Might not be perfect, but Arbitrum needs to move fast and the proposal has been carefully drafted.
Onwards
Fully onboard, thank you for taking the time to put this together
Disclosure - I was part of the working group that helped draft this with @tnorm. TLDR - there was a lot of compromise made here, and I don't know that I Iove everything about it, but I think it works and captures the essence of what is needed. (This is how compromise works)
I think the main thing here is to enable Protocols to access DAO funds as quickly as possible and for the DAO to be able to judge how those funds were used. IMO it is unlikely $75m ARB is used in 2 months given the requirement for public voting.
Disclosure - I was part of the working group that helped draft this with @tnorm. TLDR - there was a lot of compromise made here, and I don't know that I Iove everything about it, but I think it works and captures the essence of what is needed. (This is how compromise works)
I think the main thing here is to enable Protocols to access DAO funds as quickly as possible and for the DAO to be able to judge how those funds were used. IMO it is unlikely $75m ARB is used in 2 months given the requirement for public voting.
More likely:
Things to watch for:
Given the bear market, and the peculiarities of network effect, the DAO will likely need to be bold to retain market position or risk losing out to others (optimism, Mantle etc.) Hopefully, this programme will be an opportunity for protocols to innovate and make requests for funding that demonstrate more thought than pure 'incentives' (i.e. outright unfettered giveaways). Vertex Protocol will be making an effort to do this - we would urge other protocols to do the same to avoid some of the mistakes people on the forum seem so concerned about.
75m ARB 'given away' seems foolish. 75m ARB as capital to fuel the ecosystem could be genius.
Masterbean from Good Entry here
Incentives are great. This will really help. Good Entry has fully committed to Arbitrum since our inception with no immediate plans for a multi chain strategy. A meaningful boost is necessary. Considering the large size of incentives its good to clarify what's the important objectives here.
Masterbean from Good Entry here
Incentives are great. This will really help. Good Entry has fully committed to Arbitrum since our inception with no immediate plans for a multi chain strategy. A meaningful boost is necessary. Considering the large size of incentives its good to clarify what's the important objectives here.
What is the team looking for? Activity? Awareness? Good Entry would suggest, the purpose of this incentive programme should be to search for the next GMX. A project that really defines the ecosystem.
Good Entry would propose that the foundation only provide grants to projects exclusive only to Arbitrum.
Another real north star for us builders is creating sticky activity. As we know incentives can bring mercenary capital that leaves once incentives end. One thing that can inform if a project deserves extension is if increased activity remains and grows for at least 3 months from the end date of the incentive programme.
Investing short term is necessary for long term. We want Arbitrum to win and these clearer goals can help us create sustainable programmes moving forward.
That is a >5% $ARB token dilution in just a couple of months. I like the proposal but 75m ARB incentivise for a couple of months is quite a lot.
FYI Arbitrum is meant to exist and be able to issue incentives/grants for the next 10-20 years. At this rate, the dao will be broke in what 3-5 years?
Hey hey everyone, dumbird from MUX here 👋 https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/delegates
First of all, fully support launching a grant program as it can potentially help the Arb eco gain users, liquidity, and exposure; the proposal is also thoughtfully drafted with collected insights from builders, community members, OP grant takeaways and more, thanks to @tnorm and everyone who joined the previous community calls.
Hey hey everyone, dumbird from MUX here 👋 https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/delegates
First of all, fully support launching a grant program as it can potentially help the Arb eco gain users, liquidity, and exposure; the proposal is also thoughtfully drafted with collected insights from builders, community members, OP grant takeaways and more, thanks to @tnorm and everyone who joined the previous community calls.
However, despite the good intentions and collected effort behind the proposed framework, I am writing to express several concerns and submit suggestions surrounding the grant cap, grant campaign duration, application discussion & voting period length, grant distribution, and the milestones setup.
Also, the 1-week review process could be rushed considering the total cap is 75M ARB (more than what other L2s have offered in multiple seasons combined), and it's reasonable to assume larger numbers of projects will apply because of the capacity.
I suggest extending the Application and Review periods to at least two weeks each.
Pushing this program into action faster is necessary, but we shouldn't sacrifice crucial periods like proposal drafting & review time. Ultimately, the higher the program quality, the better results Arb ecosystem will receive.
If the 75M $ARB grant is a hard cap and not intended to be spent all at once (ideally, it shouldn't, considering the large-cap & short-term combination), we might need to weaken general audiences' focus on this 75M number when preparing the following proposals and marketing materials. The concept of releasing 75M ARB tokens in the short term can shake community holders' confidence, considering the potential selling pressure caused by this campaign, which can lead to unforeseeable side effects that can negatively impact the Arbitrum ecosystem.
I also suggest adding more detailed requirements for preventing protocols from promoting campaigns that can initiate sybil attacks or wash-trading-type activities; campaigns should exclusively encourage more organic usage. Based on certain OP grant recipients' activities, we are witnessing protocols hitting abnormally high daily volume & tx while having less than 100 DAU (not everyone, but I just wanted to use this as an example). Such activities likely only benefit mercenaries who won't contribute long-term value to the ecosystem.
Keen to learn everyone's thoughts on this.
Gm Arb community, this is Roger with Radiant (also known as Mero on Telegram).
Great job by @tnorm and the working group on creating a proposal that provides a framework for protocols to move forward with grant requests.
Gm Arb community, this is Roger with Radiant (also known as Mero on Telegram).
Great job by @tnorm and the working group on creating a proposal that provides a framework for protocols to move forward with grant requests.
Arbitrum TVL is down 500 Million since mid-July, as other chains have attracted demand. It's critical to find efficient and creative ways to responsibly distribute incentives to protocols that can positively impact Arbitrum.
Even though 75M ARB is proposed, not all of it needs to be distributed.
It is up to the DAO to be critical of applications and ensure a proper balance between grant requests, impact, KPIs, and protocol strategies for redistributing granted ARB to ecosystem users.
This is the way.
I fully support, our arbitralum is not going through easy times ...
Seems to me that Arbitrum still doesn't clearly have a framework for a grant/incentives and just comes up with numbers based on their analysis each time.
75 million Arb is not much for incentives but for 2 months, it's quite a lot.
No forms of lockups of any sort, just distribution.
Seems to me that Arbitrum still doesn't clearly have a framework for a grant/incentives and just comes up with numbers based on their analysis each time.
75 million Arb is not much for incentives but for 2 months, it's quite a lot.
No forms of lockups of any sort, just distribution.
Also, only protocols requesting 1m Arb and above can provide milestone-based funding tranches in their application... I don't support this. Every protocol should be able to give specific milestones for grants they're requesting; this will mount for proper accountability, transparency, and dedication to the protocol building.
These are my thoughts so far, but overall, incentives to protocols are a great way to keep the ecosystem rolling.
Lastly, I'd like to know if a team that's looking to build something new on Arbitrum can also apply for this incentive program.
👋 Hi @tnorm, thanks for sharing this proposal. It's evident that a lot of effort has gone into crafting this program. Distributing 75,000,000 ARB to active Arbitrum protocols is indeed an exciting prospect for community growth.
🎯 The goals outlined, especially supporting network growth and experimenting with incentive grants, align with community interests. However, transparency and accountability should be at the core.
👋 Hi @tnorm, thanks for sharing this proposal. It's evident that a lot of effort has gone into crafting this program. Distributing 75,000,000 ARB to active Arbitrum protocols is indeed an exciting prospect for community growth.
🎯 The goals outlined, especially supporting network growth and experimenting with incentive grants, align with community interests. However, transparency and accountability should be at the core.
🤝 Community involvement in evaluating grant applications and monitoring fund usage is a positive step. But could you elaborate on how you plan to ensure compliance and prevent misbehavior?
📊 Metrics for evaluating grants are essential, but what measures are in place to adapt these metrics if needed, considering the evolving nature of the crypto space?
🔄 Lastly, the plan beyond this short-term program is intriguing. Could you provide more insight into how this initiative feeds into the development of a more robust, long-term program?
Looking forward to further discussions and clarifications. :blueberries:
I sincerely hope holders/delegates either vote YES or vote NO. Pick a side. Incels practice abstinence.
It is great to see some progession.
Whilst I am aligned with the need for incentives and that a framework is required, I do have several questions that I would like clarified before proceeding to support this specific proposal.
It is great to see some progession.
Whilst I am aligned with the need for incentives and that a framework is required, I do have several questions that I would like clarified before proceeding to support this specific proposal.
Compensation I have been following discussions, but due to time-zones and family commitments I have been unable to attend all the working group calls and chats. From what I understand, it was a collective effort from multiple people, delegates, and protocols, so it would be great @tnorm if you could detail how you came to the 20,000 ARB number for just yourself? Since the framework itself was the product of various group discussions, I assume the main thing you single-handedly worked on was writing it and some co-ordination around this? Whilst these efforts are great, I struggle to come to the same conclusion that it deserves 20,000 ARB for 3 weeks work, especially when it's only for you.
Multisig Please could you provide more clarity on the multisig? The only info provided is that plurality labs are being compensated for this. Does this mean they are the sole signers of $75m worth of ARB? This seems a slight conflict of interest, and I would expect significantly broader reassurances on a multisig for this size. Who is on it, what are their roles, are they publicly KYCed etc?
Success of the framework and what that means after the initial 4 month period I do not think that 75m is too big or too small, but I am simply unsure of how to understand it's size in the context of Arbitrum. Please could the working group or @tnorm detail how you came to this conclusion? Did you have any feedback from protocols on what size proposals they would be requesting?
Does this also mean that every proposal within the framework is only 4 months long?
How will the framework be measured in terms of being effective? What data is being laid out to do this?
Review process and KPIs This section appears quite vague and high-level. I understand that they are meant to be guides that protocols pick and choose rather than requirements, but it seems somewhat lacking for a framework of this size. The review process leaves me feeling the same, at what point does something not pass through the review stage? What if no delegates are involved here?
Is it possible to not get through the review stage? What is actually required here?
.
In conclusion, I am pleased to see a step in the right direction, but given that this is a vague framework that still ends in delegates voting for individual protocols, I would require further clarity on it's efficacy in order to support it. Especially regarding the review process, the compensation, the multisig, and finally how to measure the proposal as successful. I personally do not think it will pass in its current form.
How did the team come up with the number 75M?
Personally, 75M in 2 months feels a bit too aggressive.
Big supporter of this proposal and the criteria. The use of trading volume over 30 days is very good as opposed to just TVL which will ensure that these tokens are used to get activity moving on ARB, rather than just propping up low volume gov tokens. Camelot are the elephants in the room here and can of course expect a healthy distro, I would like to think that they are willing to vote in favor of other protocols receiving grants too, especially as it will mean competition for them! The use of recommended metrics for distribution is also genius and allows protocols to ‘sell their wares’ and promote what they are building for community discussion. BIG FAN.
Real utility is already there. If you don't support builders contributing to the ecosystem, they will just leave like anybody else. They are no different.
Note that this proposal is not to test the effectiveness of grants by handing out small amounts. Other initiatives are there to assist the goal.
Real utility is already there. If you don't support builders contributing to the ecosystem, they will just leave like anybody else. They are no different.
Note that this proposal is not to test the effectiveness of grants by handing out small amounts. Other initiatives are there to assist the goal.
Given the situation where the ARB is being caught up and slow in terms of distributing grants, disrupting the proposal under the idea of "amount is too much" would only hamper the growth.
Yes, the grants should be managed and distributed properly but ARB dao should not place thick walls on protocols wishing to expand and commit.
I think this is fantastic and should move forward as fast as is feasible.
A huge thanks to everyone who worked on this proposal and especially @tnorm for spearheading the initiative, putting all this together and getting it to this point.
That is a >5% $ARB token dilution in just a couple of months. I like the proposal but 75m ARB incentivise for a couple of months is quite a lot.
FYI Arbitrum is meant to exist and be able to issue incentives/grants for the next 10-20 years. At this rate, the dao will be broke in what 3-5 years?
Hey hey everyone, dumbird from MUX here 👋 https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/delegates
First of all, fully support launching a grant program as it can potentially help the Arb eco gain users, liquidity, and exposure; the proposal is also thoughtfully drafted with collected insights from builders, community members, OP grant takeaways and more, thanks to @tnorm and everyone who joined the previous community calls.
Hey hey everyone, dumbird from MUX here 👋 https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/delegates
First of all, fully support launching a grant program as it can potentially help the Arb eco gain users, liquidity, and exposure; the proposal is also thoughtfully drafted with collected insights from builders, community members, OP grant takeaways and more, thanks to @tnorm and everyone who joined the previous community calls.
However, despite the good intentions and collected effort behind the proposed framework, I am writing to express several concerns and submit suggestions surrounding the grant cap, grant campaign duration, application discussion & voting period length, grant distribution, and the milestones setup.
Also, the 1-week review process could be rushed considering the total cap is 75M ARB (more than what other L2s have offered in multiple seasons combined), and it's reasonable to assume larger numbers of projects will apply because of the capacity.
I suggest extending the Application and Review periods to at least two weeks each.
Pushing this program into action faster is necessary, but we shouldn't sacrifice crucial periods like proposal drafting & review time. Ultimately, the higher the program quality, the better results Arb ecosystem will receive.
If the 75M $ARB grant is a hard cap and not intended to be spent all at once (ideally, it shouldn't, considering the large-cap & short-term combination), we might need to weaken general audiences' focus on this 75M number when preparing the following proposals and marketing materials. The concept of releasing 75M ARB tokens in the short term can shake community holders' confidence, considering the potential selling pressure caused by this campaign, which can lead to unforeseeable side effects that can negatively impact the Arbitrum ecosystem.
I also suggest adding more detailed requirements for preventing protocols from promoting campaigns that can initiate sybil attacks or wash-trading-type activities; campaigns should exclusively encourage more organic usage. Based on certain OP grant recipients' activities, we are witnessing protocols hitting abnormally high daily volume & tx while having less than 100 DAU (not everyone, but I just wanted to use this as an example). Such activities likely only benefit mercenaries who won't contribute long-term value to the ecosystem.
Keen to learn everyone's thoughts on this.
Gm Arb community, this is Roger with Radiant (also known as Mero on Telegram).
Great job by @tnorm and the working group on creating a proposal that provides a framework for protocols to move forward with grant requests.
Gm Arb community, this is Roger with Radiant (also known as Mero on Telegram).
Great job by @tnorm and the working group on creating a proposal that provides a framework for protocols to move forward with grant requests.
Arbitrum TVL is down 500 Million since mid-July, as other chains have attracted demand. It's critical to find efficient and creative ways to responsibly distribute incentives to protocols that can positively impact Arbitrum.
Even though 75M ARB is proposed, not all of it needs to be distributed.
It is up to the DAO to be critical of applications and ensure a proper balance between grant requests, impact, KPIs, and protocol strategies for redistributing granted ARB to ecosystem users.
This is the way.
I fully support, our arbitralum is not going through easy times ...
Seems to me that Arbitrum still doesn't clearly have a framework for a grant/incentives and just comes up with numbers based on their analysis each time.
75 million Arb is not much for incentives but for 2 months, it's quite a lot.
No forms of lockups of any sort, just distribution.
Seems to me that Arbitrum still doesn't clearly have a framework for a grant/incentives and just comes up with numbers based on their analysis each time.
75 million Arb is not much for incentives but for 2 months, it's quite a lot.
No forms of lockups of any sort, just distribution.
Also, only protocols requesting 1m Arb and above can provide milestone-based funding tranches in their application... I don't support this. Every protocol should be able to give specific milestones for grants they're requesting; this will mount for proper accountability, transparency, and dedication to the protocol building.
These are my thoughts so far, but overall, incentives to protocols are a great way to keep the ecosystem rolling.
Lastly, I'd like to know if a team that's looking to build something new on Arbitrum can also apply for this incentive program.
👋 Hi @tnorm, thanks for sharing this proposal. It's evident that a lot of effort has gone into crafting this program. Distributing 75,000,000 ARB to active Arbitrum protocols is indeed an exciting prospect for community growth.
🎯 The goals outlined, especially supporting network growth and experimenting with incentive grants, align with community interests. However, transparency and accountability should be at the core.
👋 Hi @tnorm, thanks for sharing this proposal. It's evident that a lot of effort has gone into crafting this program. Distributing 75,000,000 ARB to active Arbitrum protocols is indeed an exciting prospect for community growth.
🎯 The goals outlined, especially supporting network growth and experimenting with incentive grants, align with community interests. However, transparency and accountability should be at the core.
🤝 Community involvement in evaluating grant applications and monitoring fund usage is a positive step. But could you elaborate on how you plan to ensure compliance and prevent misbehavior?
📊 Metrics for evaluating grants are essential, but what measures are in place to adapt these metrics if needed, considering the evolving nature of the crypto space?
🔄 Lastly, the plan beyond this short-term program is intriguing. Could you provide more insight into how this initiative feeds into the development of a more robust, long-term program?
Looking forward to further discussions and clarifications. :blueberries:
I sincerely hope holders/delegates either vote YES or vote NO. Pick a side. Incels practice abstinence.
It is great to see some progession.
Whilst I am aligned with the need for incentives and that a framework is required, I do have several questions that I would like clarified before proceeding to support this specific proposal.
It is great to see some progession.
Whilst I am aligned with the need for incentives and that a framework is required, I do have several questions that I would like clarified before proceeding to support this specific proposal.
Compensation I have been following discussions, but due to time-zones and family commitments I have been unable to attend all the working group calls and chats. From what I understand, it was a collective effort from multiple people, delegates, and protocols, so it would be great @tnorm if you could detail how you came to the 20,000 ARB number for just yourself? Since the framework itself was the product of various group discussions, I assume the main thing you single-handedly worked on was writing it and some co-ordination around this? Whilst these efforts are great, I struggle to come to the same conclusion that it deserves 20,000 ARB for 3 weeks work, especially when it's only for you.
Multisig Please could you provide more clarity on the multisig? The only info provided is that plurality labs are being compensated for this. Does this mean they are the sole signers of $75m worth of ARB? This seems a slight conflict of interest, and I would expect significantly broader reassurances on a multisig for this size. Who is on it, what are their roles, are they publicly KYCed etc?
Success of the framework and what that means after the initial 4 month period I do not think that 75m is too big or too small, but I am simply unsure of how to understand it's size in the context of Arbitrum. Please could the working group or @tnorm detail how you came to this conclusion? Did you have any feedback from protocols on what size proposals they would be requesting?
Does this also mean that every proposal within the framework is only 4 months long?
How will the framework be measured in terms of being effective? What data is being laid out to do this?
Review process and KPIs This section appears quite vague and high-level. I understand that they are meant to be guides that protocols pick and choose rather than requirements, but it seems somewhat lacking for a framework of this size. The review process leaves me feeling the same, at what point does something not pass through the review stage? What if no delegates are involved here?
Is it possible to not get through the review stage? What is actually required here?
.
In conclusion, I am pleased to see a step in the right direction, but given that this is a vague framework that still ends in delegates voting for individual protocols, I would require further clarity on it's efficacy in order to support it. Especially regarding the review process, the compensation, the multisig, and finally how to measure the proposal as successful. I personally do not think it will pass in its current form.
How did the team come up with the number 75M?
Personally, 75M in 2 months feels a bit too aggressive.
Big supporter of this proposal and the criteria. The use of trading volume over 30 days is very good as opposed to just TVL which will ensure that these tokens are used to get activity moving on ARB, rather than just propping up low volume gov tokens. Camelot are the elephants in the room here and can of course expect a healthy distro, I would like to think that they are willing to vote in favor of other protocols receiving grants too, especially as it will mean competition for them! The use of recommended metrics for distribution is also genius and allows protocols to ‘sell their wares’ and promote what they are building for community discussion. BIG FAN.
Real utility is already there. If you don't support builders contributing to the ecosystem, they will just leave like anybody else. They are no different.
Note that this proposal is not to test the effectiveness of grants by handing out small amounts. Other initiatives are there to assist the goal.
Real utility is already there. If you don't support builders contributing to the ecosystem, they will just leave like anybody else. They are no different.
Note that this proposal is not to test the effectiveness of grants by handing out small amounts. Other initiatives are there to assist the goal.
Given the situation where the ARB is being caught up and slow in terms of distributing grants, disrupting the proposal under the idea of "amount is too much" would only hamper the growth.
Yes, the grants should be managed and distributed properly but ARB dao should not place thick walls on protocols wishing to expand and commit.
I think this is fantastic and should move forward as fast as is feasible.
A huge thanks to everyone who worked on this proposal and especially @tnorm for spearheading the initiative, putting all this together and getting it to this point.
This sheet is good enough. No need to waste more money on that. Honestly. https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nQrcwTjsA4IXmZiSTodkjnfHRrO1MpdydJm4BO8bAn8/edit?_branch_match_id=1133666732149676081&_branch_referrer=H4sIAAAAAAAAAwXBURKAIAgFwBMh%2F90Gs1GmAgeeTsdvdwAzD%2BZH7S5qOa%2BvnM4SVRHrpR5iSNoOtU5NclSXaD%2BXGhM4NwAAAA%3D%3D#gid=0
Hi @Britt, the StableLab team is watching the status of the budget closely and will publish an update in the next 48 hours.
If meaningful budget remains, the one-week application period for Round 2 will take take place shortly after the end of Round 1.
This sheet is good enough. No need to waste more money on that. Honestly. https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nQrcwTjsA4IXmZiSTodkjnfHRrO1MpdydJm4BO8bAn8/edit?_branch_match_id=1133666732149676081&_branch_referrer=H4sIAAAAAAAAAwXBURKAIAgFwBMh%2F90Gs1GmAgeeTsdvdwAzD%2BZH7S5qOa%2BvnM4SVRHrpR5iSNoOtU5NclSXaD%2BXGhM4NwAAAA%3D%3D#gid=0
Hi @Britt, the StableLab team is watching the status of the budget closely and will publish an update in the next 48 hours.
If meaningful budget remains, the one-week application period for Round 2 will take take place shortly after the end of Round 1.
Hey @Mindao, yes that was also clarified here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/106?u=tnorm.
Out of Successful applications, STIP awards grants based first on the amount of votes FOR each proposal.
In the event there is a tie in the amount of votes FOR, the application that was first to publish their application will receive priority.
Let me know if that makes sense.
Clarification on Abstain Votes After multiple questions regarding the nature of Abstain votes, it's been decided to publicly and preemptively clarify the role of Abstain in the Voting Round.
To succeed, a proposal must receive greater than 50% of votes in favor of the proposal and a quorum greater than 71.51M ARB.
Voters can either vote FOR, AGAINST, or ABSTAIN.
Clarification on Abstain Votes After multiple questions regarding the nature of Abstain votes, it's been decided to publicly and preemptively clarify the role of Abstain in the Voting Round.
To succeed, a proposal must receive greater than 50% of votes in favor of the proposal and a quorum greater than 71.51M ARB.
Voters can either vote FOR, AGAINST, or ABSTAIN.
FOR: A vote in favor of the grant application. AGAINST: A vote against the grant application. ABSTAIN: Neither a vote FOR nor AGAINST the grant application, but a vote towards quorum.
As such, the success conditions of an application can be calculated as the following:
Percent in Favor = FOR / (FOR + AGAINST)
Quorum = FOR + AGAINST + ABSTAIN
Ok thanks, I get it now.
Let's trust delegates then. I hope they advocate for common sense over all. Fairness and inclusion should be prioritized imo in order to avoid/minimize any further anger and discomfort within the devs community.
Ok thanks, I get it now.
Let's trust delegates then. I hope they advocate for common sense over all. Fairness and inclusion should be prioritized imo in order to avoid/minimize any further anger and discomfort within the devs community.
Last thing we want is a general feeling of discrimination from the ones who meet the requirements and fully comply with the application guidelines. Otherwise could easily trigger an exodus leaving us with a least competitive space after the program than the one we had before it.
It's all in your hands delegates, be aware of your power/responsibility and don't disappoint please. I'm sure you won't.
Per this proposal, funds would be allocated to grants on a per-grant basis, meaning those with the most votes in favor of the proposal would be prioritized, with allocations continuing in descending order of the number of votes in favor of each proposal until the budget is exhausted.
This budget constraint was the primary point of the last Snapshot, and the DAO's decision was conclusive. To the point of not every grant being received, it's worth noting that grants =/ charity, and I'd expect delegates to act with their best discernment to reward those who request reasonable grants, with strong justification, and clear strategies in line with Arbitrum goals.
Per this proposal, funds would be allocated to grants on a per-grant basis, meaning those with the most votes in favor of the proposal would be prioritized, with allocations continuing in descending order of the number of votes in favor of each proposal until the budget is exhausted.
This budget constraint was the primary point of the last Snapshot, and the DAO's decision was conclusive. To the point of not every grant being received, it's worth noting that grants =/ charity, and I'd expect delegates to act with their best discernment to reward those who request reasonable grants, with strong justification, and clear strategies in line with Arbitrum goals.
A Snapshot vote (referenced by @Matt_StableLab and @axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth in previous comments) could presumably modify these parameters, as a ratification of operational guidance for the multisig to base their execution upon, but at this point that post would need to be made rather quickly.
There's also the possibility that the on-chain vote might not pass, essentially halting the program while the DAO considers other options. It's really in the hand of delegates now.
Barring any aforementioned changes or needed clarifications, I expect stakeholders will proceed per the guidance of the previous temperature check and current on-chain proposal.
The amount of applications submitted in the last 48h went crazy. I lost the count at 80. lol
50MM ARB / 80 applicants (at least) = 625K ARB each.
I've seen some asking for 3M, others 2M, others 1M and not so many asking for less than 625K. What does that mean? Well, I'm sorry to say but....
... Houston, we have a problem.
The amount of applications submitted in the last 48h went crazy. I lost the count at 80. lol
50MM ARB / 80 applicants (at least) = 625K ARB each.
I've seen some asking for 3M, others 2M, others 1M and not so many asking for less than 625K. What does that mean? Well, I'm sorry to say but....
... Houston, we have a problem.
I didn't do the math to see what is the exact total sum requested for, but I'm afraid we can't serve everyone and make everyone happy. I would't be surprised if we are exceeded by 20-30M. I wish someone with time and patience could provide accurate data about this numbers.
According to the program's guidelines:
We do not expect applications to exceed the funding budget of 50M ARB. However, if requested grants do exceed the allocated budget, funding will be allocated based on the amount of votes in favor of a proposal, and then on a first-come, first-serve basis dependent upon the time the proposal was submitted to the Arbitrum Forum. In the event that the budget is exceeded, the DAO may choose to unlock further funds for a third round, or backfund successful incentive proposals.
Now that this scenario is a reality, can you @tnorm elaborate or give some example to make it more clear?
I'm not sure if I get it right. Does that mean that every application that passes the vote will get paid only the same percentage of the total amount requested as the percentage of the votes received in favor? And then if the budget is still exceeded, the FCFS on application submission will apply to exclude the latest ones?
I wonder if given the unexpected outcome it could be a better option to apply new measures like: (just as examples)
1. Size of grants for each tier could be lowered by like 20%. 2. Pinnacle grants could be capped to 2.5M or 3M max.
Not only everyone asked for the max amount in their tier but also many asked for bigger amounts out of the range. I know the amounts so far are just suggestions, but maybe another measure could be:
3. Turn the amount suggestions into mandatory so everyone should stick within their tiers.
Let me give an example:
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/dodo-draft-stip-round-1/17225
This application requests for 1.8M ARB with a TVL of only $3M. They belong to the Beacon Grant tier with a recommendation of 200K ARB to be requested. 9x difference. However they are still allowed to go through vote since there's no limitations.
Knowing already at this point that there is no ARB enough to satisfy everyone, and knowing that many will have to be left out to allow others stay in, should this kind of greedy applications even being allowed to go through vote? In case it passes the vote, is it efficient and fair to other protocols with 10x more TVL and almost same grant? or to other protocols being left with 0 ARB?
Wouldn't make more sense to make them lower that amount by mandatory to one reasonable for their TVL and sensitive to the budget reach like the recommended one? Even more likely to pass the vote.
If everyone sticks to their tier recommendations it might be room for everyone.
I apologize to DODO for using them as an example. My intention isn't to point to anyone in specific. To begin with they are not doing anything illegal and mostly everyone is doing similar. It's just that I needed to use some real example to argument what I want to explain.
In summary:
We could make the application process more strict and selective to direct the applications to the voting process with a much more reasonable requests and more likely to pass.
This way our limited budget not only will reach more projects but also the distribution will be more fair, inclusive and reasonable in terms of grant size related to protocol size.
My pay for these responsibilities was removed from this proposal and given to StableLab due to their more competitive offer and for the aforementioned bandwidth reasons. It's all in the proposal above.
My pay for these responsibilities was removed from this proposal and given to StableLab due to their more competitive offer and for the aforementioned bandwidth reasons. It's all in the proposal above.
Hey @Mindao, yes that was also clarified here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/106?u=tnorm.
Out of Successful applications, STIP awards grants based first on the amount of votes FOR each proposal.
In the event there is a tie in the amount of votes FOR, the application that was first to publish their application will receive priority.
Let me know if that makes sense.
Clarification on Abstain Votes After multiple questions regarding the nature of Abstain votes, it's been decided to publicly and preemptively clarify the role of Abstain in the Voting Round.
To succeed, a proposal must receive greater than 50% of votes in favor of the proposal and a quorum greater than 71.51M ARB.
Voters can either vote FOR, AGAINST, or ABSTAIN.
Clarification on Abstain Votes After multiple questions regarding the nature of Abstain votes, it's been decided to publicly and preemptively clarify the role of Abstain in the Voting Round.
To succeed, a proposal must receive greater than 50% of votes in favor of the proposal and a quorum greater than 71.51M ARB.
Voters can either vote FOR, AGAINST, or ABSTAIN.
FOR: A vote in favor of the grant application. AGAINST: A vote against the grant application. ABSTAIN: Neither a vote FOR nor AGAINST the grant application, but a vote towards quorum.
As such, the success conditions of an application can be calculated as the following:
Percent in Favor = FOR / (FOR + AGAINST)
Quorum = FOR + AGAINST + ABSTAIN
Ok thanks, I get it now.
Let's trust delegates then. I hope they advocate for common sense over all. Fairness and inclusion should be prioritized imo in order to avoid/minimize any further anger and discomfort within the devs community.
Ok thanks, I get it now.
Let's trust delegates then. I hope they advocate for common sense over all. Fairness and inclusion should be prioritized imo in order to avoid/minimize any further anger and discomfort within the devs community.
Last thing we want is a general feeling of discrimination from the ones who meet the requirements and fully comply with the application guidelines. Otherwise could easily trigger an exodus leaving us with a least competitive space after the program than the one we had before it.
It's all in your hands delegates, be aware of your power/responsibility and don't disappoint please. I'm sure you won't.
Per this proposal, funds would be allocated to grants on a per-grant basis, meaning those with the most votes in favor of the proposal would be prioritized, with allocations continuing in descending order of the number of votes in favor of each proposal until the budget is exhausted.
This budget constraint was the primary point of the last Snapshot, and the DAO's decision was conclusive. To the point of not every grant being received, it's worth noting that grants =/ charity, and I'd expect delegates to act with their best discernment to reward those who request reasonable grants, with strong justification, and clear strategies in line with Arbitrum goals.
Per this proposal, funds would be allocated to grants on a per-grant basis, meaning those with the most votes in favor of the proposal would be prioritized, with allocations continuing in descending order of the number of votes in favor of each proposal until the budget is exhausted.
This budget constraint was the primary point of the last Snapshot, and the DAO's decision was conclusive. To the point of not every grant being received, it's worth noting that grants =/ charity, and I'd expect delegates to act with their best discernment to reward those who request reasonable grants, with strong justification, and clear strategies in line with Arbitrum goals.
A Snapshot vote (referenced by @Matt_StableLab and @axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth in previous comments) could presumably modify these parameters, as a ratification of operational guidance for the multisig to base their execution upon, but at this point that post would need to be made rather quickly.
There's also the possibility that the on-chain vote might not pass, essentially halting the program while the DAO considers other options. It's really in the hand of delegates now.
Barring any aforementioned changes or needed clarifications, I expect stakeholders will proceed per the guidance of the previous temperature check and current on-chain proposal.
The amount of applications submitted in the last 48h went crazy. I lost the count at 80. lol
50MM ARB / 80 applicants (at least) = 625K ARB each.
I've seen some asking for 3M, others 2M, others 1M and not so many asking for less than 625K. What does that mean? Well, I'm sorry to say but....
... Houston, we have a problem.
The amount of applications submitted in the last 48h went crazy. I lost the count at 80. lol
50MM ARB / 80 applicants (at least) = 625K ARB each.
I've seen some asking for 3M, others 2M, others 1M and not so many asking for less than 625K. What does that mean? Well, I'm sorry to say but....
... Houston, we have a problem.
I didn't do the math to see what is the exact total sum requested for, but I'm afraid we can't serve everyone and make everyone happy. I would't be surprised if we are exceeded by 20-30M. I wish someone with time and patience could provide accurate data about this numbers.
According to the program's guidelines:
We do not expect applications to exceed the funding budget of 50M ARB. However, if requested grants do exceed the allocated budget, funding will be allocated based on the amount of votes in favor of a proposal, and then on a first-come, first-serve basis dependent upon the time the proposal was submitted to the Arbitrum Forum. In the event that the budget is exceeded, the DAO may choose to unlock further funds for a third round, or backfund successful incentive proposals.
Now that this scenario is a reality, can you @tnorm elaborate or give some example to make it more clear?
I'm not sure if I get it right. Does that mean that every application that passes the vote will get paid only the same percentage of the total amount requested as the percentage of the votes received in favor? And then if the budget is still exceeded, the FCFS on application submission will apply to exclude the latest ones?
I wonder if given the unexpected outcome it could be a better option to apply new measures like: (just as examples)
1. Size of grants for each tier could be lowered by like 20%. 2. Pinnacle grants could be capped to 2.5M or 3M max.
Not only everyone asked for the max amount in their tier but also many asked for bigger amounts out of the range. I know the amounts so far are just suggestions, but maybe another measure could be:
3. Turn the amount suggestions into mandatory so everyone should stick within their tiers.
Let me give an example:
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/dodo-draft-stip-round-1/17225
This application requests for 1.8M ARB with a TVL of only $3M. They belong to the Beacon Grant tier with a recommendation of 200K ARB to be requested. 9x difference. However they are still allowed to go through vote since there's no limitations.
Knowing already at this point that there is no ARB enough to satisfy everyone, and knowing that many will have to be left out to allow others stay in, should this kind of greedy applications even being allowed to go through vote? In case it passes the vote, is it efficient and fair to other protocols with 10x more TVL and almost same grant? or to other protocols being left with 0 ARB?
Wouldn't make more sense to make them lower that amount by mandatory to one reasonable for their TVL and sensitive to the budget reach like the recommended one? Even more likely to pass the vote.
If everyone sticks to their tier recommendations it might be room for everyone.
I apologize to DODO for using them as an example. My intention isn't to point to anyone in specific. To begin with they are not doing anything illegal and mostly everyone is doing similar. It's just that I needed to use some real example to argument what I want to explain.
In summary:
We could make the application process more strict and selective to direct the applications to the voting process with a much more reasonable requests and more likely to pass.
This way our limited budget not only will reach more projects but also the distribution will be more fair, inclusive and reasonable in terms of grant size related to protocol size.
My pay for these responsibilities was removed from this proposal and given to StableLab due to their more competitive offer and for the aforementioned bandwidth reasons. It's all in the proposal above.
My pay for these responsibilities was removed from this proposal and given to StableLab due to their more competitive offer and for the aforementioned bandwidth reasons. It's all in the proposal above.
Clarified wording on quorum: "To succeed, eligible applications must receive a greater than 50% majority in favor of the proposal, and receive greater than 71.51 million ARB."
StableLab Engagement StableLab has offered to handle the management of the forum process starting September 22, 2023, and has agreed to accept back pay (from the proposal’s passing) via weekly streams forward through January 31, 2023. This arrangement was initiated due to their proactive outreach regarding a competitive rate and interest under unique time constraints and circumstances. If at any point the multisig feels StableLab has not upheld diligence in its responsibilities the multisig is empowered to halt the stream and appoint a new service provided by election.
Further, due to these last-minute circumstances, the DAO is entitled to elect competitive service providers during the first voting round by signaling a competitive offer in this proposal thread. If a counteroffer(s) is endorsed by a delegate with over 500,000 ARB VP the DAO will hold an election for the remainder of the contract length (endorsement to avoid spam).
StableLab Engagement StableLab has offered to handle the management of the forum process starting September 22, 2023, and has agreed to accept back pay (from the proposal’s passing) via weekly streams forward through January 31, 2023. This arrangement was initiated due to their proactive outreach regarding a competitive rate and interest under unique time constraints and circumstances. If at any point the multisig feels StableLab has not upheld diligence in its responsibilities the multisig is empowered to halt the stream and appoint a new service provided by election.
Further, due to these last-minute circumstances, the DAO is entitled to elect competitive service providers during the first voting round by signaling a competitive offer in this proposal thread. If a counteroffer(s) is endorsed by a delegate with over 500,000 ARB VP the DAO will hold an election for the remainder of the contract length (endorsement to avoid spam).
I will continue to stay involved in helping @Matt_StableLab and the StableLab team support the forum process, contributing toward the data and reporting side (working w/ PL-funded data provider). Given the magnitude of funds and the amount of applications, I hope the community can support this added help on short notice.
The changes on management expenses at the last moment (increment) is not what I call the best fair play. I've seen this tactic before and I don't like it. Obviously I can't prove that was intended/planned but I'm free to think bad. Just because of this I will vote 'no' this time. I voted for 25M on snapshot.
@tnorm you already asked for 20K ARB (~$16K) just for making the proposal. I don't know how many hours of work did take from you because you didn't even attach a breakdown detailing the tasks and amount of hour each, but since an incentive program is not even an original idea I assume it's not more than 50 hours.
The changes on management expenses at the last moment (increment) is not what I call the best fair play. I've seen this tactic before and I don't like it. Obviously I can't prove that was intended/planned but I'm free to think bad. Just because of this I will vote 'no' this time. I voted for 25M on snapshot.
@tnorm you already asked for 20K ARB (~$16K) just for making the proposal. I don't know how many hours of work did take from you because you didn't even attach a breakdown detailing the tasks and amount of hour each, but since an incentive program is not even an original idea I assume it's not more than 50 hours.
16000 / 50 = that's $320 per hour.
I don't know about other countries, maybe across the pond this is so different, but in the UK this ratio for an office job is waaaaay overpriced. It's just so arbitrary and in my opinion too greedy.
I rather support the libertarian economic principles from Adam Smith theory. I think we should let the competition take place when it comes to perform jobs for the DAO.
Now you ask for an extra of 30K ARB (~$24K) just for 10 hours a week of an accountancy work during the period of 3 months.
13 weeks x 10 hours = 130 hours. That's $185 per hour.
Can anyone here seriously explain me how is that not extremely overpriced? There are many professional accountants who use to do this job for less than $30 per hour.
If we were a private entity instead of a public one, I'm 99,99% sure this ask would be like 10x lower.
Same apply for signers. You just increased the bill by 3x and I still don't know how is that explained. Question: How many hours of work do you estimate they are going to put on this?
Don't you think if you allow people compete for price you will find dozens of them willing to do it for the original price of 2K ARB?
Are there signers involved in projects that are planning to apply for a grant?
Hi Everyone,
As we move the proposal to an on-chain vote, the first application period has started: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/how-to-apply-arbitrum-short-term-incentives-program/16545
Hi Everyone,
As we move the proposal to an on-chain vote, the first application period has started: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/how-to-apply-arbitrum-short-term-incentives-program/16545
Please be aware that while the application, review, and voting periods are underway, funding will only happen if the on-chain proposal passes. We'll update this thread with the on-chain proposal details once the vote goes live.
Final Updates (September 23, 2023)
BUDGET: Per Snapshot results, the maximum budget will be set at 50M ARB for granted funds expected to be distributed by the end of January 31, 2024.
STIP-ARB Multisig: A new 5/9 multisig has been created with the signers from the original PL-ARB multisig, under the name of the Arbitrum DAO, with the addition of to three community members:
Final Updates (September 23, 2023)
BUDGET: Per Snapshot results, the maximum budget will be set at 50M ARB for granted funds expected to be distributed by the end of January 31, 2024.
STIP-ARB Multisig: A new 5/9 multisig has been created with the signers from the original PL-ARB multisig, under the name of the Arbitrum DAO, with the addition of to three community members:
Clarification on Halting Funds: Further Clarification concerning Halting of Funds: Funds can be stopped by the STIP-ARB Multisig with a 5/9 consensus. Funds will be stopped in the event of negligent actions in violation of the previously defined grant requirements. If halted, the multisig must publish the justification of its decision on the Arbitrum Forum. The stream can restart either through a Snapshot Veto or if the multisig decides the grantee has corrected their actions and it's appropriate to continue.
Clarification on Exceeded Budget: If requested grants do exceed the allocated budget, funding will be allocated based on the amount of votes in favor of each grant proposal, and then on a first-come, first-serve basis dependent upon the time the proposal was submitted to the Arbitrum Forum.
Plurality Labs Grant Collaboration: Plurality Labs has expressed interest in backing a grant for Service Provider support, concentrating on data aggregation, collection, and analysis. This will add additional cost to the DAO, significant in nature, but funded by the pre-established Plurality Labs grant budget. Once selected in an independent RFP process, I will interface directly with this Service Provider to streamline reporting and accountability to help facilitate communications with the DAO and multisig.
Strengthening Admin Accountability & Costs: Addressing concerns (@olimpio, @Bobbay, others) about the current managerial framework, we're amplifying administrative capacities to ensure things run smoothly as possible. To be candid, the expectations of the community regarding the functioning of this framework exceed the admin capacity it was originally endowed (to be lean, quick, and risky). Consensus has been achieved, but in order to meet the expectations of delegates, I believe my role must expand to a paid admin position, overseeing the application process, reporting, and ensuring accountability. Further, the expansion of the Multisig and the expansion of signers responsibilities in setting up streaming, and enforcing accountability, justify an increased acknowledgment beyond the small 2,000 ARB gesture of the original proposal. The final proposal increases this acknowledgment to 6,000 ARB per signer.
For overseeing the application, review, and accountability of this program, from this date forth, I will propose a 30,000 ARB admin compensation (7,500 ARB streamed each month). This is a rate of ~$150/hour at current ARB prices, for an average of 10 hours per week over the programs duration. I think this is fair given the expressed demand for further involvement in the operations of the program and the expected hourly commitment. Admin Responsibilities will include:
Thank you for the active feedback and the engaging discussion. Currently, the DAO is on course to approve the Snapshot this Sunday. Delegates are also gearing up to launch the multisig and the onchain proposal by mid-next week. Once these steps are finalized, our intention is to concurrently kick off the first application phase.
For a deeper understanding of the application phase: the working group is in communication with the Foundation and plans to introduce a new forum category specifically for applications early next week. In this category, we will provide detailed information about the application process as described in the proposal. This structured process will assist both applicants and delegates, streamlining the review and signaling of applications through Snapshot for the multisig.
Thank you for the active feedback and the engaging discussion. Currently, the DAO is on course to approve the Snapshot this Sunday. Delegates are also gearing up to launch the multisig and the onchain proposal by mid-next week. Once these steps are finalized, our intention is to concurrently kick off the first application phase.
For a deeper understanding of the application phase: the working group is in communication with the Foundation and plans to introduce a new forum category specifically for applications early next week. In this category, we will provide detailed information about the application process as described in the proposal. This structured process will assist both applicants and delegates, streamlining the review and signaling of applications through Snapshot for the multisig.
Please stay tuned for an updated timeline once the steps mentioned above have been executed.
I played a role in leading a group of delegates and protocols to establish this basic framework. This was in response to the community's inability to do so, which led to an urgent situation. Had we not intervened, protocols would have applied directly to the DAO, and more than likely leading to outcomes in line with Camelot, or an unfair distribution of incentives to only proposals that got visibility.
I think most agree the lack of support for protocols is deterring builders, and users, driving them towards chains like Optimism, which has flipped Arbitrum in Market Cap, Transactions, and appears to be securing major partnerships and strategic deployments such as Base, Farcaster, and more.
Exactly as we should have expected it, the wash trading has started to get those sweet ARB tokens: https://twitter.com/cryptofishx/status/1702641093592973806 @tnorm What's your plan to deal with this? When projects hear grants, they hear free money. Many of the criterions you listed are gameable and they will be gamed. Overall, there seems to be no clear plan for your program, just throw money at protocols and hope it does something. Why such urgency? It would be useful, to determine how we want Arbitrum to evolve and how the grant tokens can help with this vision. So far there is nothing.
Hi @Griff,
Thanks for your feedback.
For context, in mere weeks this framework attempts to forgive and amend 8 months of failed governance. Without it, I know for a fact we'd be looking at several unstructured proposals flooding the forum, lacking budget context, data infrastructure, or greater ecosystem alignment (a la Camelot's proposal).
Hi @Griff,
Thanks for your feedback.
For context, in mere weeks this framework attempts to forgive and amend 8 months of failed governance. Without it, I know for a fact we'd be looking at several unstructured proposals flooding the forum, lacking budget context, data infrastructure, or greater ecosystem alignment (a la Camelot's proposal).
I share many of your critiques, but we must confront the reality: strong opinions, including my own personal opinions, haven't translated into actionable outcomes in Arbitrum governance.
As a short-term proposal, this program is really designed to try and minimize chaos as a catalyst to maximize future governance.
I'd urge you to join these discussions early on in the future. We held multiple sessions, and the overwhelming sentiment was a need for swift action and funding. Your insights, which I'm sure share the sentiments of many, would've been greatly valuable early on. With more voices like yours, there might have been a more persuasive case to delay the proposal and elect a suitable committee (or other structure).
Moving forward, I assure you the focus of incentive programs will aim to align much closer with what I think is a fair, and common critique.
He @olimpio, thanks so much for voting and sharing your feedback. I think you've pretty aptly described this proposals shortcomings, as well as summarized the general arguments for support. To touch on a few of the questions here:
He @olimpio, thanks so much for voting and sharing your feedback. I think you've pretty aptly described this proposals shortcomings, as well as summarized the general arguments for support. To touch on a few of the questions here:
It would have been ideal to set a maximum cap on how much ARB protocols can request. Maybe for the on-chain voting? In any case and since the DAO will be reviewing grant applications individually, I don’t view this as a major issue.
Might it be a good idea that yourself @tnorm take on the (of course - paid) responsibility of organizing and controlling the data reporting and execution, for the DAO to later process and read? Could this come out of the Operational Budget, or is this destined to something else?
I think the working group as it continues will aim to fund retrospectives and analysis on these projects accordingly, either as part of a future program(s) or as a separate proposal entirely.
I am echoing concerns by some delegates about this matter, and it will ultimately come down to the whole delegate community to revise and research to the best of their abilities. I am looking forward to seeing how this first attempt turns out, keeping in mind that adjusting/voting policies in real time is also acceptable.
I also agree with you here. I think to @GFXlabs point as well we understand this is a brute force path for proposals. This structure was chosen simply for velocity's sake, but I envision a more streamlined and professional application/review structure for future iterations.
While I'm not opposed to the idea of providing grants, it's imperative that there's a clear and purposeful strategy behind their allocation. There is no point in distributing millions of ARB to entities like traderjoe, camelot, ramses, etc., if all it does is to get some wash trading volume trading volume that disappears as soon as the program ends. This would accomplishes absolutely nothing but allow those protocols to dump their token at higher price for 3 months. Most of the protocols begging for grants are built on ponzinomics destined to allow them to maintain the token price high as long as possible (Hello veBlabla, locked Blabla, locked LP Blabla and so and so and so....), and that's exactly what they want your ARB token for.
There was a time where arbitrum looked like it was the only credible competitor of Ethereum mainnet to actually get a significant share of defi volume. If this happens, this will go through protocols that can retain users longer than a grant program distribution. Give people a reason to move from uniswap LP mainnet to Uniswap LP arbitrum , or Aave mainnet to Aave arb and then we might get something sustainable from our grant distribution. In fact it probably makes a lot of sense to build an incentive program around the arrival of Uniswap v4 which will probably reshape the defi landscape or at least bring some real innovation to the table. In any case, please dont squander those arbs on wash tradings for projects that add nothing to the table but another token to dump on retail.
Clarified wording on quorum: "To succeed, eligible applications must receive a greater than 50% majority in favor of the proposal, and receive greater than 71.51 million ARB."
StableLab Engagement StableLab has offered to handle the management of the forum process starting September 22, 2023, and has agreed to accept back pay (from the proposal’s passing) via weekly streams forward through January 31, 2023. This arrangement was initiated due to their proactive outreach regarding a competitive rate and interest under unique time constraints and circumstances. If at any point the multisig feels StableLab has not upheld diligence in its responsibilities the multisig is empowered to halt the stream and appoint a new service provided by election.
Further, due to these last-minute circumstances, the DAO is entitled to elect competitive service providers during the first voting round by signaling a competitive offer in this proposal thread. If a counteroffer(s) is endorsed by a delegate with over 500,000 ARB VP the DAO will hold an election for the remainder of the contract length (endorsement to avoid spam).
StableLab Engagement StableLab has offered to handle the management of the forum process starting September 22, 2023, and has agreed to accept back pay (from the proposal’s passing) via weekly streams forward through January 31, 2023. This arrangement was initiated due to their proactive outreach regarding a competitive rate and interest under unique time constraints and circumstances. If at any point the multisig feels StableLab has not upheld diligence in its responsibilities the multisig is empowered to halt the stream and appoint a new service provided by election.
Further, due to these last-minute circumstances, the DAO is entitled to elect competitive service providers during the first voting round by signaling a competitive offer in this proposal thread. If a counteroffer(s) is endorsed by a delegate with over 500,000 ARB VP the DAO will hold an election for the remainder of the contract length (endorsement to avoid spam).
I will continue to stay involved in helping @Matt_StableLab and the StableLab team support the forum process, contributing toward the data and reporting side (working w/ PL-funded data provider). Given the magnitude of funds and the amount of applications, I hope the community can support this added help on short notice.
The changes on management expenses at the last moment (increment) is not what I call the best fair play. I've seen this tactic before and I don't like it. Obviously I can't prove that was intended/planned but I'm free to think bad. Just because of this I will vote 'no' this time. I voted for 25M on snapshot.
@tnorm you already asked for 20K ARB (~$16K) just for making the proposal. I don't know how many hours of work did take from you because you didn't even attach a breakdown detailing the tasks and amount of hour each, but since an incentive program is not even an original idea I assume it's not more than 50 hours.
The changes on management expenses at the last moment (increment) is not what I call the best fair play. I've seen this tactic before and I don't like it. Obviously I can't prove that was intended/planned but I'm free to think bad. Just because of this I will vote 'no' this time. I voted for 25M on snapshot.
@tnorm you already asked for 20K ARB (~$16K) just for making the proposal. I don't know how many hours of work did take from you because you didn't even attach a breakdown detailing the tasks and amount of hour each, but since an incentive program is not even an original idea I assume it's not more than 50 hours.
16000 / 50 = that's $320 per hour.
I don't know about other countries, maybe across the pond this is so different, but in the UK this ratio for an office job is waaaaay overpriced. It's just so arbitrary and in my opinion too greedy.
I rather support the libertarian economic principles from Adam Smith theory. I think we should let the competition take place when it comes to perform jobs for the DAO.
Now you ask for an extra of 30K ARB (~$24K) just for 10 hours a week of an accountancy work during the period of 3 months.
13 weeks x 10 hours = 130 hours. That's $185 per hour.
Can anyone here seriously explain me how is that not extremely overpriced? There are many professional accountants who use to do this job for less than $30 per hour.
If we were a private entity instead of a public one, I'm 99,99% sure this ask would be like 10x lower.
Same apply for signers. You just increased the bill by 3x and I still don't know how is that explained. Question: How many hours of work do you estimate they are going to put on this?
Don't you think if you allow people compete for price you will find dozens of them willing to do it for the original price of 2K ARB?
Are there signers involved in projects that are planning to apply for a grant?
Hi Everyone,
As we move the proposal to an on-chain vote, the first application period has started: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/how-to-apply-arbitrum-short-term-incentives-program/16545
Hi Everyone,
As we move the proposal to an on-chain vote, the first application period has started: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/how-to-apply-arbitrum-short-term-incentives-program/16545
Please be aware that while the application, review, and voting periods are underway, funding will only happen if the on-chain proposal passes. We'll update this thread with the on-chain proposal details once the vote goes live.
Final Updates (September 23, 2023)
BUDGET: Per Snapshot results, the maximum budget will be set at 50M ARB for granted funds expected to be distributed by the end of January 31, 2024.
STIP-ARB Multisig: A new 5/9 multisig has been created with the signers from the original PL-ARB multisig, under the name of the Arbitrum DAO, with the addition of to three community members:
Final Updates (September 23, 2023)
BUDGET: Per Snapshot results, the maximum budget will be set at 50M ARB for granted funds expected to be distributed by the end of January 31, 2024.
STIP-ARB Multisig: A new 5/9 multisig has been created with the signers from the original PL-ARB multisig, under the name of the Arbitrum DAO, with the addition of to three community members:
Clarification on Halting Funds: Further Clarification concerning Halting of Funds: Funds can be stopped by the STIP-ARB Multisig with a 5/9 consensus. Funds will be stopped in the event of negligent actions in violation of the previously defined grant requirements. If halted, the multisig must publish the justification of its decision on the Arbitrum Forum. The stream can restart either through a Snapshot Veto or if the multisig decides the grantee has corrected their actions and it's appropriate to continue.
Clarification on Exceeded Budget: If requested grants do exceed the allocated budget, funding will be allocated based on the amount of votes in favor of each grant proposal, and then on a first-come, first-serve basis dependent upon the time the proposal was submitted to the Arbitrum Forum.
Plurality Labs Grant Collaboration: Plurality Labs has expressed interest in backing a grant for Service Provider support, concentrating on data aggregation, collection, and analysis. This will add additional cost to the DAO, significant in nature, but funded by the pre-established Plurality Labs grant budget. Once selected in an independent RFP process, I will interface directly with this Service Provider to streamline reporting and accountability to help facilitate communications with the DAO and multisig.
Strengthening Admin Accountability & Costs: Addressing concerns (@olimpio, @Bobbay, others) about the current managerial framework, we're amplifying administrative capacities to ensure things run smoothly as possible. To be candid, the expectations of the community regarding the functioning of this framework exceed the admin capacity it was originally endowed (to be lean, quick, and risky). Consensus has been achieved, but in order to meet the expectations of delegates, I believe my role must expand to a paid admin position, overseeing the application process, reporting, and ensuring accountability. Further, the expansion of the Multisig and the expansion of signers responsibilities in setting up streaming, and enforcing accountability, justify an increased acknowledgment beyond the small 2,000 ARB gesture of the original proposal. The final proposal increases this acknowledgment to 6,000 ARB per signer.
For overseeing the application, review, and accountability of this program, from this date forth, I will propose a 30,000 ARB admin compensation (7,500 ARB streamed each month). This is a rate of ~$150/hour at current ARB prices, for an average of 10 hours per week over the programs duration. I think this is fair given the expressed demand for further involvement in the operations of the program and the expected hourly commitment. Admin Responsibilities will include:
Thank you for the active feedback and the engaging discussion. Currently, the DAO is on course to approve the Snapshot this Sunday. Delegates are also gearing up to launch the multisig and the onchain proposal by mid-next week. Once these steps are finalized, our intention is to concurrently kick off the first application phase.
For a deeper understanding of the application phase: the working group is in communication with the Foundation and plans to introduce a new forum category specifically for applications early next week. In this category, we will provide detailed information about the application process as described in the proposal. This structured process will assist both applicants and delegates, streamlining the review and signaling of applications through Snapshot for the multisig.
Thank you for the active feedback and the engaging discussion. Currently, the DAO is on course to approve the Snapshot this Sunday. Delegates are also gearing up to launch the multisig and the onchain proposal by mid-next week. Once these steps are finalized, our intention is to concurrently kick off the first application phase.
For a deeper understanding of the application phase: the working group is in communication with the Foundation and plans to introduce a new forum category specifically for applications early next week. In this category, we will provide detailed information about the application process as described in the proposal. This structured process will assist both applicants and delegates, streamlining the review and signaling of applications through Snapshot for the multisig.
Please stay tuned for an updated timeline once the steps mentioned above have been executed.
I played a role in leading a group of delegates and protocols to establish this basic framework. This was in response to the community's inability to do so, which led to an urgent situation. Had we not intervened, protocols would have applied directly to the DAO, and more than likely leading to outcomes in line with Camelot, or an unfair distribution of incentives to only proposals that got visibility.
I think most agree the lack of support for protocols is deterring builders, and users, driving them towards chains like Optimism, which has flipped Arbitrum in Market Cap, Transactions, and appears to be securing major partnerships and strategic deployments such as Base, Farcaster, and more.
Exactly as we should have expected it, the wash trading has started to get those sweet ARB tokens: https://twitter.com/cryptofishx/status/1702641093592973806 @tnorm What's your plan to deal with this? When projects hear grants, they hear free money. Many of the criterions you listed are gameable and they will be gamed. Overall, there seems to be no clear plan for your program, just throw money at protocols and hope it does something. Why such urgency? It would be useful, to determine how we want Arbitrum to evolve and how the grant tokens can help with this vision. So far there is nothing.
Hi @Griff,
Thanks for your feedback.
For context, in mere weeks this framework attempts to forgive and amend 8 months of failed governance. Without it, I know for a fact we'd be looking at several unstructured proposals flooding the forum, lacking budget context, data infrastructure, or greater ecosystem alignment (a la Camelot's proposal).
Hi @Griff,
Thanks for your feedback.
For context, in mere weeks this framework attempts to forgive and amend 8 months of failed governance. Without it, I know for a fact we'd be looking at several unstructured proposals flooding the forum, lacking budget context, data infrastructure, or greater ecosystem alignment (a la Camelot's proposal).
I share many of your critiques, but we must confront the reality: strong opinions, including my own personal opinions, haven't translated into actionable outcomes in Arbitrum governance.
As a short-term proposal, this program is really designed to try and minimize chaos as a catalyst to maximize future governance.
I'd urge you to join these discussions early on in the future. We held multiple sessions, and the overwhelming sentiment was a need for swift action and funding. Your insights, which I'm sure share the sentiments of many, would've been greatly valuable early on. With more voices like yours, there might have been a more persuasive case to delay the proposal and elect a suitable committee (or other structure).
Moving forward, I assure you the focus of incentive programs will aim to align much closer with what I think is a fair, and common critique.
He @olimpio, thanks so much for voting and sharing your feedback. I think you've pretty aptly described this proposals shortcomings, as well as summarized the general arguments for support. To touch on a few of the questions here:
He @olimpio, thanks so much for voting and sharing your feedback. I think you've pretty aptly described this proposals shortcomings, as well as summarized the general arguments for support. To touch on a few of the questions here:
It would have been ideal to set a maximum cap on how much ARB protocols can request. Maybe for the on-chain voting? In any case and since the DAO will be reviewing grant applications individually, I don’t view this as a major issue.
Might it be a good idea that yourself @tnorm take on the (of course - paid) responsibility of organizing and controlling the data reporting and execution, for the DAO to later process and read? Could this come out of the Operational Budget, or is this destined to something else?
I think the working group as it continues will aim to fund retrospectives and analysis on these projects accordingly, either as part of a future program(s) or as a separate proposal entirely.
I am echoing concerns by some delegates about this matter, and it will ultimately come down to the whole delegate community to revise and research to the best of their abilities. I am looking forward to seeing how this first attempt turns out, keeping in mind that adjusting/voting policies in real time is also acceptable.
I also agree with you here. I think to @GFXlabs point as well we understand this is a brute force path for proposals. This structure was chosen simply for velocity's sake, but I envision a more streamlined and professional application/review structure for future iterations.
While I'm not opposed to the idea of providing grants, it's imperative that there's a clear and purposeful strategy behind their allocation. There is no point in distributing millions of ARB to entities like traderjoe, camelot, ramses, etc., if all it does is to get some wash trading volume trading volume that disappears as soon as the program ends. This would accomplishes absolutely nothing but allow those protocols to dump their token at higher price for 3 months. Most of the protocols begging for grants are built on ponzinomics destined to allow them to maintain the token price high as long as possible (Hello veBlabla, locked Blabla, locked LP Blabla and so and so and so....), and that's exactly what they want your ARB token for.
There was a time where arbitrum looked like it was the only credible competitor of Ethereum mainnet to actually get a significant share of defi volume. If this happens, this will go through protocols that can retain users longer than a grant program distribution. Give people a reason to move from uniswap LP mainnet to Uniswap LP arbitrum , or Aave mainnet to Aave arb and then we might get something sustainable from our grant distribution. In fact it probably makes a lot of sense to build an incentive program around the arrival of Uniswap v4 which will probably reshape the defi landscape or at least bring some real innovation to the table. In any case, please dont squander those arbs on wash tradings for projects that add nothing to the table but another token to dump on retail.
I played a role in leading a group of delegates and protocols to establish this basic framework. This was in response to the community's inability to do so, which led to an urgent situation. Had we not intervened, protocols would have applied directly to the DAO, and more than likely leading to outcomes in line with Camelot, or an unfair distribution of incentives to only proposals that got visibility.
I think most agree the lack of support for protocols is deterring builders, and users, driving them towards chains like Optimism, which has flipped Arbitrum in Market Cap, Transactions, and appears to be securing major partnerships and strategic deployments such as Base, Farcaster, and more.
This proposal is a blatant interim solution - an imperfect band-aid intended to provide the DAO some time to devise a more sustainable approach. I've acknowledged this format's faults, and I concede we will see some programs designed better than others. This proposal aims to mitigate that risk by empowering delegates to accept applications with a limited, pre-approved budget while being encouraged to review and judge proposals based on their discretion.
Furthermore, the proposal recommends a finite duration for the program to prevent prolonging any potential downsides. I urge you to voice any concerns about individual applications that may lead to problematic consequences.
Hello @jpatten,
Thank you for your thoughtful comments. Hopefully I can clarify a few points here:
Hello @jpatten,
Thank you for your thoughtful comments. Hopefully I can clarify a few points here:
As for whether games are eligible under this framework, the recommended metrics are designed to help delegates make informed decisions. Projects applying for incentives around edge-cases that may not stand in a certain TVL bracket, such as gaming, can still apply with their justification for a grant and delegates will ultimately make a decision on each application.
Data Reporting Flexibility: While grant requirements remain consistent, we did introduce more flexible language in the data reporting section to accommodate different dashboard needs.
Structure and Timeline: Projects who (understandably) would prefer confirmation of proposal success prior to applying may apply in the second application round. This design choice was made in the face of heavy demand and criticism to approve funds faster.
Lastly, we truly value the engagement of leaders like yourself and at Treasure DAO. While we've observed some of your team members joining calls, direct involvement aids in refining our proposals at earlier stages. This proactive involvement helps us measure and incorporate these considerations ahead of time.
I think we'd all greatly value your insights on gaming incentives and impactful program design and would love to collaborate on this moving forward!
Hey Matt, great question.
As for whether games are eligible under this framework, the recommended metrics are designed to help delegates make informed decisions. Projects applying for incentives around edge-cases that may not stand in a certain TVL bracket, such as gaming, can still apply with their justification for a grant and delegates will ultimately make a decision on each application.
Hey Matt, great question.
As for whether games are eligible under this framework, the recommended metrics are designed to help delegates make informed decisions. Projects applying for incentives around edge-cases that may not stand in a certain TVL bracket, such as gaming, can still apply with their justification for a grant and delegates will ultimately make a decision on each application.
That said, this program is designed for applications that are currently deployed on the Arbitrum network.
If your project has not deployed, I recommend exploring some of the other grants programs including Questbook's, which has a specific category for gaming itself:
We have identified the following domains based on our research and the feedback from the Arbitrum team and community. We invite delegates and community members to self nominate themselves.
| Domain | Credentials Needed | Why it is relevant |
|---|---|---|
| Gaming | Experience in game development or a deep understanding of Web3 gaming industry. | This will help Arbitrum encourage more developers to create innovative gaming experiences and thus onboard new users to its ecosystem |
Hope that clarifies...
Apologies, I meant to note that we delayed shortly just to accomodate any feedback on the aforementioned changes. The vote will be up this weekend.
TL;DR
Based on community feedback, we plan to update the proposal with these changes:
TL;DR
Based on community feedback, we plan to update the proposal with these changes:
A new multisig will be created with clawback capabilities and fund streaming (every two weeks) to ensure accountability.
Snapshot Temperature Check will include 3 budget options: 25M, 50M, 75M ARB through Jan 31, 2024.
Round 1: 1 week review period for ready protocols.
Round 2: 2 week review period for thorough review.
Updated V2
Thank you to everyone who engaged with this proposal. After reviewing the community feedback, we have aimed to address the following concerns:
As such, we plan to update the proposal prior to a temperature with implementation of the following changes:
Multisig Setup
A new multisig will be created with the signers from the original pl-ARB multisig, under the name of the Arbitrum DAO. The new multisig will include two features to ensure accountability of signers and grantees:
Fund Streams will be halted for the following reasons:
Budget and Timeline
There were differing views on the budget amount. The minimum length was extended until the end of January 2023 to account for more flexibility for grantees receiving funds in Round 2.
To gain consensus, we will put multiple options up for Snapshot Temperature Check:
Application Review Period
We’re suggesting the DAO keep the first review period at one week for those ready-to-go protocols, while extending the second review phase to two weeks for more thorough assessments. Protocols who are not accepted in the first round will be eligible to reapply.
We will also hold community calls for each review period for grantees to quickly present their case to delegates.
Coupled with the incentive period extension to January 31, 2024, we feel this strikes a compromise for all parties involved.
Hey @Eugene_Galxe! Thanks for chiming in and on a personal note I've super impressed with some of the data on your OP Quests, it's pretty amazing to see how paired with incentives similar programs can help boost engagement (depending on what you're optimizing for) beyond TVL. Would love to talk shop one of these days about what you've seen on your side and how we could implement similar strategies in a long-term program.
I encourage you to review the application as I think it touches on a few of your questions :)
That's a super interesting idea. Streams could be an interesting way to encourage stickiness of TVL or whatever metric you're using for a longer duration.
Answer’s below:
From what I understand, it was a collective effort from multiple people, delegates, and protocols, so it would be great @tnorm if you could detail how you came to the 20,000 ARB number for just yourself
Answer’s below:
From what I understand, it was a collective effort from multiple people, delegates, and protocols, so it would be great @tnorm if you could detail how you came to the 20,000 ARB number for just yourself
To clarify, I volunteered to lead this task without any promise of payment. Throughout the process, several stakeholders suggested I ensure I receive similar compensation. If the working group members feel this retroactive acknowledgment is excessive, I welcome that feedback in private or public. Accounting for ARB price, taxes, and the relative cost of this effort compared to the costs of other Arbitrum grants programs I do feel as though this amount is quite reasonable.
Your observation about the inconvenience of participating is accurate. To facilitate, I juggled time zones, family/life commitments, and long hours to recurrently coordinate across various stakeholders via community calls/telegram and individually. The tasks ranged from facilitating workshops, calls, group messages, and to drafting and refining the program through multiple iterations. All of which involved significant hourly commitments.
Multisig
Please could you provide more clarity on the multisig? The only info provided is that plurality labs are being compensated for this. Does this mean they are the sole signers of $75m worth of ARB? This seems a slight conflict of interest, and I would expect significantly broader reassurances on a multisig for this size. Who is on it, what are their roles, are they publicly KYCed etc?
On the multisig: The 2,000 ARB per signer is a gesture for the operational burden of coordinating between the Foundation and protocol teams.
The multisig details can be read here. It was selected as it is already set up and it was identified as the most expeditious path for funding. @DisruptionJoe can answer further Q’s on the multisig re: kyc, etc.
Neither of these acknowledgments were requested but added as a thank you for a thankless job. Given the expedited nature of the process, we kept the operations as lean as possible. If the community does not value these contributor efforts, the comp can be removed.
I do not think that 75m is too big or too small, but I am simply unsure of how to understand it’s size in the context of Arbitrum. Please could the working group or @tnorm detail how you came to this conclusion? Did you have any feedback from protocols on what size proposals they would be requesting?
@axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth pointed towards one great comparison we also observed and I addressed why we raised it to 75M exactly because of protocol feedback above here. Protocols were 100% involved in this recommendation as were delegates.
This section appears quite vague and high-level. I understand that they are meant to be guides that protocols pick and choose rather than requirements, but it seems somewhat lacking for a framework of this size. The review process leaves me feeling the same, at what point does something not pass through the review stage? What if no delegates are involved here?
Is it possible to not get through the review stage? What is actually required here?
You are correct, while the framework may seem vague, it's meant to be flexible. The review stage allows stakeholders to voice concerns, and provide feedback so applicants can adjust their proposal. Unless a proposal is ineligible, it moves to a snapshot vote.
In conclusion, I am pleased to see a step in the right direction, but given that this is a vague framework that still ends in delegates voting for individual protocols, I would require further clarity on it’s efficacy in order to support it. Especially regarding the review process, the compensation, the multisig, and finally how to measure the proposal as successful. I personally do not think it will pass in its current form.
It is undeniable that the robustness of the program suffers from the urgency of the DAO's appetite for incentives. This proposal reconciles ~7 months of lethargy and avoidance of the topic, lacking leadership or even attempted coordination from the DAO.
I think we all probably feel the proposal falls short in some way. I certainly do. But as anyone who participated in this process is aware, this proposal is a result of compromise.
Is there a maximum cap on the number of ARB tokens that can be applied for? I understand that the recommendations reduce the number of protocols that can apply for this type of grants. But I think that a maximum cap should be established as it has the rest of the categories.
Ultimately, delegates will decide whether an amount is excessive given the scope. Because there are two rounds, if a grant is rejected because of excessive cost, that team would have a chance to reapply.
I played a role in leading a group of delegates and protocols to establish this basic framework. This was in response to the community's inability to do so, which led to an urgent situation. Had we not intervened, protocols would have applied directly to the DAO, and more than likely leading to outcomes in line with Camelot, or an unfair distribution of incentives to only proposals that got visibility.
I think most agree the lack of support for protocols is deterring builders, and users, driving them towards chains like Optimism, which has flipped Arbitrum in Market Cap, Transactions, and appears to be securing major partnerships and strategic deployments such as Base, Farcaster, and more.
This proposal is a blatant interim solution - an imperfect band-aid intended to provide the DAO some time to devise a more sustainable approach. I've acknowledged this format's faults, and I concede we will see some programs designed better than others. This proposal aims to mitigate that risk by empowering delegates to accept applications with a limited, pre-approved budget while being encouraged to review and judge proposals based on their discretion.
Furthermore, the proposal recommends a finite duration for the program to prevent prolonging any potential downsides. I urge you to voice any concerns about individual applications that may lead to problematic consequences.
Hello @jpatten,
Thank you for your thoughtful comments. Hopefully I can clarify a few points here:
Hello @jpatten,
Thank you for your thoughtful comments. Hopefully I can clarify a few points here:
As for whether games are eligible under this framework, the recommended metrics are designed to help delegates make informed decisions. Projects applying for incentives around edge-cases that may not stand in a certain TVL bracket, such as gaming, can still apply with their justification for a grant and delegates will ultimately make a decision on each application.
Data Reporting Flexibility: While grant requirements remain consistent, we did introduce more flexible language in the data reporting section to accommodate different dashboard needs.
Structure and Timeline: Projects who (understandably) would prefer confirmation of proposal success prior to applying may apply in the second application round. This design choice was made in the face of heavy demand and criticism to approve funds faster.
Lastly, we truly value the engagement of leaders like yourself and at Treasure DAO. While we've observed some of your team members joining calls, direct involvement aids in refining our proposals at earlier stages. This proactive involvement helps us measure and incorporate these considerations ahead of time.
I think we'd all greatly value your insights on gaming incentives and impactful program design and would love to collaborate on this moving forward!
Hey Matt, great question.
As for whether games are eligible under this framework, the recommended metrics are designed to help delegates make informed decisions. Projects applying for incentives around edge-cases that may not stand in a certain TVL bracket, such as gaming, can still apply with their justification for a grant and delegates will ultimately make a decision on each application.
Hey Matt, great question.
As for whether games are eligible under this framework, the recommended metrics are designed to help delegates make informed decisions. Projects applying for incentives around edge-cases that may not stand in a certain TVL bracket, such as gaming, can still apply with their justification for a grant and delegates will ultimately make a decision on each application.
That said, this program is designed for applications that are currently deployed on the Arbitrum network.
If your project has not deployed, I recommend exploring some of the other grants programs including Questbook's, which has a specific category for gaming itself:
We have identified the following domains based on our research and the feedback from the Arbitrum team and community. We invite delegates and community members to self nominate themselves.
| Domain | Credentials Needed | Why it is relevant |
|---|---|---|
| Gaming | Experience in game development or a deep understanding of Web3 gaming industry. | This will help Arbitrum encourage more developers to create innovative gaming experiences and thus onboard new users to its ecosystem |
Hope that clarifies...
Apologies, I meant to note that we delayed shortly just to accomodate any feedback on the aforementioned changes. The vote will be up this weekend.
TL;DR
Based on community feedback, we plan to update the proposal with these changes:
TL;DR
Based on community feedback, we plan to update the proposal with these changes:
A new multisig will be created with clawback capabilities and fund streaming (every two weeks) to ensure accountability.
Snapshot Temperature Check will include 3 budget options: 25M, 50M, 75M ARB through Jan 31, 2024.
Round 1: 1 week review period for ready protocols.
Round 2: 2 week review period for thorough review.
Updated V2
Thank you to everyone who engaged with this proposal. After reviewing the community feedback, we have aimed to address the following concerns:
As such, we plan to update the proposal prior to a temperature with implementation of the following changes:
Multisig Setup
A new multisig will be created with the signers from the original pl-ARB multisig, under the name of the Arbitrum DAO. The new multisig will include two features to ensure accountability of signers and grantees:
Fund Streams will be halted for the following reasons:
Budget and Timeline
There were differing views on the budget amount. The minimum length was extended until the end of January 2023 to account for more flexibility for grantees receiving funds in Round 2.
To gain consensus, we will put multiple options up for Snapshot Temperature Check:
Application Review Period
We’re suggesting the DAO keep the first review period at one week for those ready-to-go protocols, while extending the second review phase to two weeks for more thorough assessments. Protocols who are not accepted in the first round will be eligible to reapply.
We will also hold community calls for each review period for grantees to quickly present their case to delegates.
Coupled with the incentive period extension to January 31, 2024, we feel this strikes a compromise for all parties involved.
Hey @Eugene_Galxe! Thanks for chiming in and on a personal note I've super impressed with some of the data on your OP Quests, it's pretty amazing to see how paired with incentives similar programs can help boost engagement (depending on what you're optimizing for) beyond TVL. Would love to talk shop one of these days about what you've seen on your side and how we could implement similar strategies in a long-term program.
I encourage you to review the application as I think it touches on a few of your questions :)
That's a super interesting idea. Streams could be an interesting way to encourage stickiness of TVL or whatever metric you're using for a longer duration.
Answer’s below:
From what I understand, it was a collective effort from multiple people, delegates, and protocols, so it would be great @tnorm if you could detail how you came to the 20,000 ARB number for just yourself
Answer’s below:
From what I understand, it was a collective effort from multiple people, delegates, and protocols, so it would be great @tnorm if you could detail how you came to the 20,000 ARB number for just yourself
To clarify, I volunteered to lead this task without any promise of payment. Throughout the process, several stakeholders suggested I ensure I receive similar compensation. If the working group members feel this retroactive acknowledgment is excessive, I welcome that feedback in private or public. Accounting for ARB price, taxes, and the relative cost of this effort compared to the costs of other Arbitrum grants programs I do feel as though this amount is quite reasonable.
Your observation about the inconvenience of participating is accurate. To facilitate, I juggled time zones, family/life commitments, and long hours to recurrently coordinate across various stakeholders via community calls/telegram and individually. The tasks ranged from facilitating workshops, calls, group messages, and to drafting and refining the program through multiple iterations. All of which involved significant hourly commitments.
Multisig
Please could you provide more clarity on the multisig? The only info provided is that plurality labs are being compensated for this. Does this mean they are the sole signers of $75m worth of ARB? This seems a slight conflict of interest, and I would expect significantly broader reassurances on a multisig for this size. Who is on it, what are their roles, are they publicly KYCed etc?
On the multisig: The 2,000 ARB per signer is a gesture for the operational burden of coordinating between the Foundation and protocol teams.
The multisig details can be read here. It was selected as it is already set up and it was identified as the most expeditious path for funding. @DisruptionJoe can answer further Q’s on the multisig re: kyc, etc.
Neither of these acknowledgments were requested but added as a thank you for a thankless job. Given the expedited nature of the process, we kept the operations as lean as possible. If the community does not value these contributor efforts, the comp can be removed.
I do not think that 75m is too big or too small, but I am simply unsure of how to understand it’s size in the context of Arbitrum. Please could the working group or @tnorm detail how you came to this conclusion? Did you have any feedback from protocols on what size proposals they would be requesting?
@axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth pointed towards one great comparison we also observed and I addressed why we raised it to 75M exactly because of protocol feedback above here. Protocols were 100% involved in this recommendation as were delegates.
This section appears quite vague and high-level. I understand that they are meant to be guides that protocols pick and choose rather than requirements, but it seems somewhat lacking for a framework of this size. The review process leaves me feeling the same, at what point does something not pass through the review stage? What if no delegates are involved here?
Is it possible to not get through the review stage? What is actually required here?
You are correct, while the framework may seem vague, it's meant to be flexible. The review stage allows stakeholders to voice concerns, and provide feedback so applicants can adjust their proposal. Unless a proposal is ineligible, it moves to a snapshot vote.
In conclusion, I am pleased to see a step in the right direction, but given that this is a vague framework that still ends in delegates voting for individual protocols, I would require further clarity on it’s efficacy in order to support it. Especially regarding the review process, the compensation, the multisig, and finally how to measure the proposal as successful. I personally do not think it will pass in its current form.
It is undeniable that the robustness of the program suffers from the urgency of the DAO's appetite for incentives. This proposal reconciles ~7 months of lethargy and avoidance of the topic, lacking leadership or even attempted coordination from the DAO.
I think we all probably feel the proposal falls short in some way. I certainly do. But as anyone who participated in this process is aware, this proposal is a result of compromise.
Is there a maximum cap on the number of ARB tokens that can be applied for? I understand that the recommendations reduce the number of protocols that can apply for this type of grants. But I think that a maximum cap should be established as it has the rest of the categories.
Ultimately, delegates will decide whether an amount is excessive given the scope. Because there are two rounds, if a grant is rejected because of excessive cost, that team would have a chance to reapply.
Hey @Eugene_Galxe! Thanks for chiming in and on a personal note I've super impressed with some of the data on your OP Quests, it's pretty amazing to see how paired with incentives similar programs can help boost engagement (depending on what you're optimizing for) beyond TVL. Would love to talk shop one of these days about what you've seen on your side and how we could implement similar strategies in a long-term program.
I encourage you to review the application as I think it touches on a few of your questions :)
I'll admit this was shortened to be more concise...but hopefully it asks enough relevant questions to allow the community to judge each proposal against the concerns you mention above.
Personally, 75M in 2 months feels a bit too aggressive
Personally, 75M in 2 months feels a bit too aggressive
The budget was raised to 75M ARB to accommodate larger protocols (Pinnacle Grants) without compromising smaller applications. The Working Group recognized that larger protocols might request funds external to the program if it was not large enough to accommodate their requests on similar timelines, so the change was also made to prevent confusion from overlapping large proposals.
It's important to note that this is just a budget; under this proposal, unused funds would be returned to the treasury. Delegates and voters will still individually vet each application, and decide whether a grant application for a given protocol is too aggressive.
The authors (grant recipient) of any DAO-endorsed grants will need to work with the Arbitrum Foundation on KYC/compliance. I always recommend to start that process sooner rather than later.
75MM ARB that's worth like $75MM. I personally think is way too much.
Most incentive proposals kinda remind me to the FED and trad economics... We all know the lesson: Printing money in mass and throw it into the markets to stimulate the economy is just a quick "fix" that always end up unleashing the monster of the INFLATION.
75MM ARB that's worth like $75MM. I personally think is way too much.
Most incentive proposals kinda remind me to the FED and trad economics... We all know the lesson: Printing money in mass and throw it into the markets to stimulate the economy is just a quick "fix" that always end up unleashing the monster of the INFLATION.
This kind of short term printing solutions use to become just a false make-up that make the chain look pretty but only while mercenaries keep getting paid. It artificial inflate the TVL and metrics but just temporarily.
This approach will only attract mercenary capital that will vanish as soon as the budget is gone. Then they will rotate to whichever new chain that launches.
The only goals I foresee to be achieved with this plan are:
The focus should be in my opinion onto support the projects committed to innovate and ship cutting-edge sustainable dapps and defi models on Arbitrum that are really NEEDED by the users. Useful, unique, problem solving and with great UX. Real UTILITY and real DEMAND is the only path to LONG TERM SUSTAINABILITY and success.
It's about gathering givers here, not more takers. We need/want real consumers, that's what we should aim to attract rather than only keep rewarding milkers.
The Foundation is already processing all the applications to assign and ship the grants to support projects. The DAO grants frameworks team is working to make possible more future support. Protocols will get support and will keep building. Respect the timings.
Genuine demand always turn up on bulla. Creating fake demand just to flex inflated metrics is cheating yourself. Be realistic with the current context please.
In my opinion you will never get an approval without splitting that crazy amount in tranches. Camelot's ask was a tiny amount compared to this one and couldn't pass. A more approval friendly ask would start small, give a try, assess results and escalate. $75MM shouldn't be transferred to any multisig at once, even with 20 signers KYCed. Anything that is not trustless has to be handled with extreme caution.
This proposal stems from the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group, whose updates can view here.
We believe it represents the initial task that the working group sought to achieve:
The primary goal of this working group is to facilitate communications between delegates, protocol teams, and network layer stakeholders to create a minimum viable framework to enable the approval of Arbitrum Incentive proposals in the next month.
This proposal stems from the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group, whose updates can view here.
We believe it represents the initial task that the working group sought to achieve:
The primary goal of this working group is to facilitate communications between delegates, protocol teams, and network layer stakeholders to create a minimum viable framework to enable the approval of Arbitrum Incentive proposals in the next month.
A minimum viable framework represents the quickest framework the DAO can create that meets the most possible demands and requirements across each major stakeholder group. The framework’s specific intent is to catalyze the creation, review, and judgment of protocol driven incentive proposals by bridging the gap between DAO and grantee concerns.
Pending the reception and success of this proposal, the working group will proceed to focus on it's second goal:
The working group’s second objective is to create a long-term Incentive Program framework. This will draw from broader incentive ecosystems to foster infrastructure that emphasizes program design, DAO-sponsored analytics, reporting, transparency, and decision-making processes for responsible grant disbursement and capital efficiency.
A huge thanks to everyone who contributed thus far, answered questions, and provided feedback including but not limited to @DisruptionJoe @coinflip @Matt_Gauntlet @krst @raho @lindsey @Myrddin @IronBoots @ameeradmi Darius, Mero, and the from the Foundation side: @stonecoldpat and Cliffton.
Hey @Eugene_Galxe! Thanks for chiming in and on a personal note I've super impressed with some of the data on your OP Quests, it's pretty amazing to see how paired with incentives similar programs can help boost engagement (depending on what you're optimizing for) beyond TVL. Would love to talk shop one of these days about what you've seen on your side and how we could implement similar strategies in a long-term program.
I encourage you to review the application as I think it touches on a few of your questions :)
I'll admit this was shortened to be more concise...but hopefully it asks enough relevant questions to allow the community to judge each proposal against the concerns you mention above.
Personally, 75M in 2 months feels a bit too aggressive
Personally, 75M in 2 months feels a bit too aggressive
The budget was raised to 75M ARB to accommodate larger protocols (Pinnacle Grants) without compromising smaller applications. The Working Group recognized that larger protocols might request funds external to the program if it was not large enough to accommodate their requests on similar timelines, so the change was also made to prevent confusion from overlapping large proposals.
It's important to note that this is just a budget; under this proposal, unused funds would be returned to the treasury. Delegates and voters will still individually vet each application, and decide whether a grant application for a given protocol is too aggressive.
The authors (grant recipient) of any DAO-endorsed grants will need to work with the Arbitrum Foundation on KYC/compliance. I always recommend to start that process sooner rather than later.
75MM ARB that's worth like $75MM. I personally think is way too much.
Most incentive proposals kinda remind me to the FED and trad economics... We all know the lesson: Printing money in mass and throw it into the markets to stimulate the economy is just a quick "fix" that always end up unleashing the monster of the INFLATION.
75MM ARB that's worth like $75MM. I personally think is way too much.
Most incentive proposals kinda remind me to the FED and trad economics... We all know the lesson: Printing money in mass and throw it into the markets to stimulate the economy is just a quick "fix" that always end up unleashing the monster of the INFLATION.
This kind of short term printing solutions use to become just a false make-up that make the chain look pretty but only while mercenaries keep getting paid. It artificial inflate the TVL and metrics but just temporarily.
This approach will only attract mercenary capital that will vanish as soon as the budget is gone. Then they will rotate to whichever new chain that launches.
The only goals I foresee to be achieved with this plan are:
The focus should be in my opinion onto support the projects committed to innovate and ship cutting-edge sustainable dapps and defi models on Arbitrum that are really NEEDED by the users. Useful, unique, problem solving and with great UX. Real UTILITY and real DEMAND is the only path to LONG TERM SUSTAINABILITY and success.
It's about gathering givers here, not more takers. We need/want real consumers, that's what we should aim to attract rather than only keep rewarding milkers.
The Foundation is already processing all the applications to assign and ship the grants to support projects. The DAO grants frameworks team is working to make possible more future support. Protocols will get support and will keep building. Respect the timings.
Genuine demand always turn up on bulla. Creating fake demand just to flex inflated metrics is cheating yourself. Be realistic with the current context please.
In my opinion you will never get an approval without splitting that crazy amount in tranches. Camelot's ask was a tiny amount compared to this one and couldn't pass. A more approval friendly ask would start small, give a try, assess results and escalate. $75MM shouldn't be transferred to any multisig at once, even with 20 signers KYCed. Anything that is not trustless has to be handled with extreme caution.
This proposal stems from the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group, whose updates can view here.
We believe it represents the initial task that the working group sought to achieve:
The primary goal of this working group is to facilitate communications between delegates, protocol teams, and network layer stakeholders to create a minimum viable framework to enable the approval of Arbitrum Incentive proposals in the next month.
This proposal stems from the Arbitrum Incentives Working Group, whose updates can view here.
We believe it represents the initial task that the working group sought to achieve:
The primary goal of this working group is to facilitate communications between delegates, protocol teams, and network layer stakeholders to create a minimum viable framework to enable the approval of Arbitrum Incentive proposals in the next month.
A minimum viable framework represents the quickest framework the DAO can create that meets the most possible demands and requirements across each major stakeholder group. The framework’s specific intent is to catalyze the creation, review, and judgment of protocol driven incentive proposals by bridging the gap between DAO and grantee concerns.
Pending the reception and success of this proposal, the working group will proceed to focus on it's second goal:
The working group’s second objective is to create a long-term Incentive Program framework. This will draw from broader incentive ecosystems to foster infrastructure that emphasizes program design, DAO-sponsored analytics, reporting, transparency, and decision-making processes for responsible grant disbursement and capital efficiency.
A huge thanks to everyone who contributed thus far, answered questions, and provided feedback including but not limited to @DisruptionJoe @coinflip @Matt_Gauntlet @krst @raho @lindsey @Myrddin @IronBoots @ameeradmi Darius, Mero, and the from the Foundation side: @stonecoldpat and Cliffton.
Plurality Labs will be funding a grant for monitoring and reporting on this program. For those interested in applying, check out https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfp-abitrum-short-term-incentive-program-stip-data-monitoring-and-reporting/18456
RFP Live - Oct 8
RFP Submissions Open: Oct, 08 to Oct 015, 2023.
RFP Interview and Submission Reviews: Oct 15 to Oct 22, 2023.
Plurality Labs will be funding a grant for monitoring and reporting on this program. For those interested in applying, check out https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfp-abitrum-short-term-incentive-program-stip-data-monitoring-and-reporting/18456
RFP Live - Oct 8
RFP Submissions Open: Oct, 08 to Oct 015, 2023.
RFP Interview and Submission Reviews: Oct 15 to Oct 22, 2023.
RFP Decision: Oct 22 - Oct 27 2023.
Grant awarded - Oct 27
Yes, all criteria are in the proposal. It requires reading it to be informed of the details.
Hey everyone, here is a link to my recent post about updates regarding the Round 1 Voting Period Update
Have you looked at the RFP? This sheet is great, but covers literally zero components of the reporting and monitoring asks. Am I missing something here?
Hey delegates!
Here is a simple checklist to help keep track of all the proposals
You can make a copy of this version and use it to organize all your votes and comments.
Thanks for the clarification
Thank you for the clarification.
What most are interested tho, is in the mechanism about distribution of funds since we are around a total request of 100M proposals. In the initial STIP framework, two rules were quoted: a vote-based distribution and a first-come-first-served.
Could you clarify, maybe with an example?
I have voted yes on Tally for this. I have some reservations about some of the decisions made for this, but I acknowledge that:
This has been the work of lots of contributors over an extended period of time. Decentralized governance (during a bear, no less!) is messy, and the solution was never going to be perfect given the circumstances.
We shouldn't let perfect be the enemy of good. Inertia works both ways, and I'd rather the ball start imperfectly rolling towards a comprehensive framework then away from it. As others have acknowledged, if this were to fail the grant requests will come rolling in regardless. At least we have some guiderails.
I have not been as active as I have wanted to during the last few months or so due to personal reasons, and in fairness to those who put in the hard work my concerns should of been voiced earlier. However, I see there has been a lot of thought that went into this and respected contributors are agreeing to it.
The size of grant requests is fairly large. Whether that is people looking for handouts or genuine success of the program is to be determined... but it does indicate there is a "market demand" for this in some manner. It will be a tall order, but hopefully delegates will do their due diligence when voting occurs. Although I fear the sheer volume may not allow for that.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
We voted in favour of the proposal during the temp-check with our option being to distribute up to 50M ARB through the program. We’re happy to see that the temp check resulted in that being the most popular option.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
We voted in favour of the proposal during the temp-check with our option being to distribute up to 50M ARB through the program. We’re happy to see that the temp check resulted in that being the most popular option.
We’ll also be voting in favor of the proposal at the on-chain vote.
As already noted by @cattin, the @seedlatam delegation has created this account in collaboration with several partners, with the objective of evaluating grant proposals related to Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives. Here are the evaluation criteria adopted:
Plurality Labs will be funding a grant for monitoring and reporting on this program. For those interested in applying, check out https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfp-abitrum-short-term-incentive-program-stip-data-monitoring-and-reporting/18456
RFP Live - Oct 8
RFP Submissions Open: Oct, 08 to Oct 015, 2023.
RFP Interview and Submission Reviews: Oct 15 to Oct 22, 2023.
Plurality Labs will be funding a grant for monitoring and reporting on this program. For those interested in applying, check out https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfp-abitrum-short-term-incentive-program-stip-data-monitoring-and-reporting/18456
RFP Live - Oct 8
RFP Submissions Open: Oct, 08 to Oct 015, 2023.
RFP Interview and Submission Reviews: Oct 15 to Oct 22, 2023.
RFP Decision: Oct 22 - Oct 27 2023.
Grant awarded - Oct 27
Yes, all criteria are in the proposal. It requires reading it to be informed of the details.
Hey everyone, here is a link to my recent post about updates regarding the Round 1 Voting Period Update
Have you looked at the RFP? This sheet is great, but covers literally zero components of the reporting and monitoring asks. Am I missing something here?
Hey delegates!
Here is a simple checklist to help keep track of all the proposals
You can make a copy of this version and use it to organize all your votes and comments.
Thanks for the clarification
Thank you for the clarification.
What most are interested tho, is in the mechanism about distribution of funds since we are around a total request of 100M proposals. In the initial STIP framework, two rules were quoted: a vote-based distribution and a first-come-first-served.
Could you clarify, maybe with an example?
I have voted yes on Tally for this. I have some reservations about some of the decisions made for this, but I acknowledge that:
This has been the work of lots of contributors over an extended period of time. Decentralized governance (during a bear, no less!) is messy, and the solution was never going to be perfect given the circumstances.
We shouldn't let perfect be the enemy of good. Inertia works both ways, and I'd rather the ball start imperfectly rolling towards a comprehensive framework then away from it. As others have acknowledged, if this were to fail the grant requests will come rolling in regardless. At least we have some guiderails.
I have not been as active as I have wanted to during the last few months or so due to personal reasons, and in fairness to those who put in the hard work my concerns should of been voiced earlier. However, I see there has been a lot of thought that went into this and respected contributors are agreeing to it.
The size of grant requests is fairly large. Whether that is people looking for handouts or genuine success of the program is to be determined... but it does indicate there is a "market demand" for this in some manner. It will be a tall order, but hopefully delegates will do their due diligence when voting occurs. Although I fear the sheer volume may not allow for that.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
We voted in favour of the proposal during the temp-check with our option being to distribute up to 50M ARB through the program. We’re happy to see that the temp check resulted in that being the most popular option.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
We voted in favour of the proposal during the temp-check with our option being to distribute up to 50M ARB through the program. We’re happy to see that the temp check resulted in that being the most popular option.
We’ll also be voting in favor of the proposal at the on-chain vote.
As already noted by @cattin, the @seedlatam delegation has created this account in collaboration with several partners, with the objective of evaluating grant proposals related to Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives. Here are the evaluation criteria adopted:
I have voted yes on Tally for this. I have some reservations about some of the decisions made for this, but I acknowledge that:
This has been the work of lots of contributors over an extended period of time. Decentralized governance (during a bear, no less!) is messy, and the solution was never going to be perfect given the circumstances.
We shouldn't let perfect be the enemy of good. Inertia works both ways, and I'd rather the ball start imperfectly rolling towards a comprehensive framework then away from it. As others have acknowledged, if this were to fail the grant requests will come rolling in regardless. At least we have some guiderails.
I have not been as active as I have wanted to during the last few months or so due to personal reasons, and in fairness to those who put in the hard work my concerns should of been voiced earlier. However, I see there has been a lot of thought that went into this and respected contributors are agreeing to it.
The size of grant requests is fairly large. Whether that is people looking for handouts or genuine success of the program is to be determined... but it does indicate there is a "market demand" for this in some manner. It will be a tall order, but hopefully delegates will do their due diligence when voting occurs. Although I fear the sheer volume may not allow for that.
Apologies if I missed it. I saw some discussion in the OP about KPIs for the program and determining the success. Has there been talk about what post-grant looks like? Who will use this info to keep the ball rolling into a more fleshed out, long term grants program?
As already noted by @cattin, the @seedlatam delegation has created this account in collaboration with several partners, with the objective of evaluating grant proposals related to Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives. Here are the evaluation criteria adopted:
Despite the large volume of proposals received, with more than 106 submissions in a short period, the team defined several essential criteria to determine which initiatives to support:
We leave a spreadsheets with our results
As usual, the vote of the @cattin delegation is made in consensus with the community. Although this voting process remains consistent with our standard practice, we have made some adjustments. Given the high number of proposals, and in a joint work with @cattin, we have conducted an initial assessment, selecting 32 proposals that amount to a total of 54,398,000 ARB. The community will have the opportunity to vote for the proposals they deem most relevant. The final determination will fall on those that receive the most votes, up to reaching the figure of 50M USD, as previously stipulated.
We remind you that the next governance call will take place on Tuesday the 10th at 19:45 UTC on our Discord server.
We wish to express our gratitude to all the protocols and community members who have reached out to us through various means. We regret not being able to respond to everyone due to the high workload this week.
Special recognition goes to @tnrom for his constant dedication and effort in this incentive program, and to @stablelabs for their management in the forum.
Additionally, we want to thank @BlockworksResearch, @jerame20, @archipelabro, among others who, with their contributions, facilitated the evaluation process. Their collaboration has been invaluable. Thank you all!
100% agree with this. Pinnacle grants being uncapped is just tipping the balance of power heavily towards larger projects once again. Many of these projects proposing 5m+ grants already received a very large DAO airdrop without showing any data on how their additional ARB proposals will do anything other than lock down their incumbent positions.
2.5m seems fair for the largest grant sizes.
100% agree with this. Pinnacle grants being uncapped is just tipping the balance of power heavily towards larger projects once again. Many of these projects proposing 5m+ grants already received a very large DAO airdrop without showing any data on how their additional ARB proposals will do anything other than lock down their incumbent positions.
2.5m seems fair for the largest grant sizes.
Remember - this is supposed to be a SHORT TERM incentive proposal. A stop-gap until more formality is put into place.
I was off for most of August and the first 1/2 of September and am just now getting back into the swing of things, and will be more involved.
There may be someone we would like to sponsor with a competing bid. What does that entail?
In the meantime, if StableLab is the intake filter for applications, this needs to be made known to all the applicants. No one knows they’re commenting on all these threads except as a delegate.
What exactly is "the forum process" and how much does it pay? Isn't that part of what your own pay is for under this proposal?
The original timeline intended to allow for delegates to expedite quality applications while pushing more questionable applications to the second round (either by voting no or not contributing to quorum). Given the numbers here though the burden on delegates to identify the quality applicants may be too high.
I can understand the sentiment to extend if delegates need more time given the sheer volume of apps. That said, this is perhaps best signaled by a snapshot vote to gain consensus from delegates if they wish to do so. If delegates feel a need, I’d suggest spinning up a quick amendment vote to adjust the review period to 2 weeks.
They have been thinking about extending the review time, in total there are 54 proposals and each of them needs to be analysed. I think it would be prudent to extend the review time, and there is still 1 day left to submit applications. We have to bear in mind that we are handing out millions of dollars.
I keep seeing repeating comments throughout this post but here is my attempt to make a tdlr.
Summary
I keep seeing repeating comments throughout this post but here is my attempt to make a tdlr.
Summary
There are a lot of shortcomings in this program and I have my own concerns, but for an initial program, it’s a start and will help the arb ecosystem. Nothing is ever perfect, but it’s better to get the ball rolling rather than continuously debating for the next few months.
Still, there will need to be further work in supporting applications and recording grant distributions which I explain below.
Program Considerations
As Olimpio mentioned, the DAO should also consider paying additional for these services assuming Tnorm is interested in reporting, facilitating forum ops. This would help cover some of the concerns in this program.
We are voting FOR this proposal with our preferred budget allocation being 25M, followed by 50M.
The Arbitrum Incentives Working Group has put in considerable effort and exceeded expectations for communicating with the community and addressing the concerns with this proposal.
We are voting FOR this proposal with our preferred budget allocation being 25M, followed by 50M.
The Arbitrum Incentives Working Group has put in considerable effort and exceeded expectations for communicating with the community and addressing the concerns with this proposal.
The amounts being requested are quite large considering the allocations made to previously approved Grant programs for Questbook and Pluralist Labs ($1M and 4M ARB, respectively). We understand the importance of getting funding into the network to reaccelerate Arbitrum's growth and get the ecosystem back on track after months of DAO delays. However, we also share concerns that this method of flooding the DAO forums with proposals and ushering out funds without proper mechanisms for due diligence or means of tracking and analyzing the success of the distributions has not been historically successful. Given this, we hope to provide this first iteration with a portion of the original requested budget to still jolt ecosystem growth and learn from the process as we continue to reiterate and develop an effective and sustainable funding program.
Thank you for the invite. I expect to get more involved in October. I run a burning man camp and basically took July pretty slow and August and September off to make it happen.
But now my schedule is clear and I hope to get involved more into Arbitrum Governance.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal with our preffered order of budget allocation being 50M, 25M, 75M.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal with our preffered order of budget allocation being 50M, 25M, 75M.
Having attended the workshops and consulted with other delegates, we have decided that we’ll be voting in favor of this proposal. We do believe there are kinks to work out and that the impact such a program will have won’t necessary be what we’d ideally want, but we realise that sitting on our hands will cause a greater harm to the DAO and the Arbitrum ecosystem as a whole.
While we think 25M might not be enough as a overall budget to achieve the overarching goal of attracting liquidity, we are also skeptical of allocating 75M ARB towards a short-term pilot program. With that in mind, we feel much comfortable voting in favour of distributing 50M ARB and we’ll be paying close attention both to the execution, but also to the impact the incentives will have.
I love the idea behind this proposal, but I am not a fan of it's execution. I am a stanch advocate against having the DAO has to vote on every single proposal.
I understand that this is a stop gap solution, and I am hopeful that the "more robust, sustainable program" designed soon avoids having a DAO vote to pass every proposal.
I love the idea behind this proposal, but I am not a fan of it's execution. I am a stanch advocate against having the DAO has to vote on every single proposal.
I understand that this is a stop gap solution, and I am hopeful that the "more robust, sustainable program" designed soon avoids having a DAO vote to pass every proposal.
As I have said before, I have a lot more faith in the DAO's ability to make a few high level decisions than lots of small one off decisions. If we want to distribute $25M-75M of ARB incentives, we would be better off hiring a high-caliber trustworthy people to manage the approval of these projects as a transparent un-bias committee, otherwise we will suffer from voter apathy, popularity contests, and governance capture.
As a DAO we can keep a few of these committees accountable, I don't have faith in our ability to keep 50-100 projects accountable.
Having sooooo many votes is not a healthy, successful way for DAOs to function, the limited bandwidth of busy delegates should be focused on high level decisions. Distributing this much money deserves a dedicated group of thoughtful decision makers, who's top priority is distributing the funds. The Optimism Grant Council really exemplifies this especially compared to the other processes they have tried. I hope we can follow that success and avoid spamming our DAO with countless proposals.
So I will be voting: Against, 25M, 50M, 75M. It is clear that this proposal will likely pass, and I will participate as a delegate in good faith, but I still believe it is important that I hold this dissenting voice.
I have voted yes on Tally for this. I have some reservations about some of the decisions made for this, but I acknowledge that:
This has been the work of lots of contributors over an extended period of time. Decentralized governance (during a bear, no less!) is messy, and the solution was never going to be perfect given the circumstances.
We shouldn't let perfect be the enemy of good. Inertia works both ways, and I'd rather the ball start imperfectly rolling towards a comprehensive framework then away from it. As others have acknowledged, if this were to fail the grant requests will come rolling in regardless. At least we have some guiderails.
I have not been as active as I have wanted to during the last few months or so due to personal reasons, and in fairness to those who put in the hard work my concerns should of been voiced earlier. However, I see there has been a lot of thought that went into this and respected contributors are agreeing to it.
The size of grant requests is fairly large. Whether that is people looking for handouts or genuine success of the program is to be determined... but it does indicate there is a "market demand" for this in some manner. It will be a tall order, but hopefully delegates will do their due diligence when voting occurs. Although I fear the sheer volume may not allow for that.
Apologies if I missed it. I saw some discussion in the OP about KPIs for the program and determining the success. Has there been talk about what post-grant looks like? Who will use this info to keep the ball rolling into a more fleshed out, long term grants program?
As already noted by @cattin, the @seedlatam delegation has created this account in collaboration with several partners, with the objective of evaluating grant proposals related to Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives. Here are the evaluation criteria adopted:
Despite the large volume of proposals received, with more than 106 submissions in a short period, the team defined several essential criteria to determine which initiatives to support:
We leave a spreadsheets with our results
As usual, the vote of the @cattin delegation is made in consensus with the community. Although this voting process remains consistent with our standard practice, we have made some adjustments. Given the high number of proposals, and in a joint work with @cattin, we have conducted an initial assessment, selecting 32 proposals that amount to a total of 54,398,000 ARB. The community will have the opportunity to vote for the proposals they deem most relevant. The final determination will fall on those that receive the most votes, up to reaching the figure of 50M USD, as previously stipulated.
We remind you that the next governance call will take place on Tuesday the 10th at 19:45 UTC on our Discord server.
We wish to express our gratitude to all the protocols and community members who have reached out to us through various means. We regret not being able to respond to everyone due to the high workload this week.
Special recognition goes to @tnrom for his constant dedication and effort in this incentive program, and to @stablelabs for their management in the forum.
Additionally, we want to thank @BlockworksResearch, @jerame20, @archipelabro, among others who, with their contributions, facilitated the evaluation process. Their collaboration has been invaluable. Thank you all!
100% agree with this. Pinnacle grants being uncapped is just tipping the balance of power heavily towards larger projects once again. Many of these projects proposing 5m+ grants already received a very large DAO airdrop without showing any data on how their additional ARB proposals will do anything other than lock down their incumbent positions.
2.5m seems fair for the largest grant sizes.
100% agree with this. Pinnacle grants being uncapped is just tipping the balance of power heavily towards larger projects once again. Many of these projects proposing 5m+ grants already received a very large DAO airdrop without showing any data on how their additional ARB proposals will do anything other than lock down their incumbent positions.
2.5m seems fair for the largest grant sizes.
Remember - this is supposed to be a SHORT TERM incentive proposal. A stop-gap until more formality is put into place.
I was off for most of August and the first 1/2 of September and am just now getting back into the swing of things, and will be more involved.
There may be someone we would like to sponsor with a competing bid. What does that entail?
In the meantime, if StableLab is the intake filter for applications, this needs to be made known to all the applicants. No one knows they’re commenting on all these threads except as a delegate.
What exactly is "the forum process" and how much does it pay? Isn't that part of what your own pay is for under this proposal?
The original timeline intended to allow for delegates to expedite quality applications while pushing more questionable applications to the second round (either by voting no or not contributing to quorum). Given the numbers here though the burden on delegates to identify the quality applicants may be too high.
I can understand the sentiment to extend if delegates need more time given the sheer volume of apps. That said, this is perhaps best signaled by a snapshot vote to gain consensus from delegates if they wish to do so. If delegates feel a need, I’d suggest spinning up a quick amendment vote to adjust the review period to 2 weeks.
They have been thinking about extending the review time, in total there are 54 proposals and each of them needs to be analysed. I think it would be prudent to extend the review time, and there is still 1 day left to submit applications. We have to bear in mind that we are handing out millions of dollars.
I keep seeing repeating comments throughout this post but here is my attempt to make a tdlr.
Summary
I keep seeing repeating comments throughout this post but here is my attempt to make a tdlr.
Summary
There are a lot of shortcomings in this program and I have my own concerns, but for an initial program, it’s a start and will help the arb ecosystem. Nothing is ever perfect, but it’s better to get the ball rolling rather than continuously debating for the next few months.
Still, there will need to be further work in supporting applications and recording grant distributions which I explain below.
Program Considerations
As Olimpio mentioned, the DAO should also consider paying additional for these services assuming Tnorm is interested in reporting, facilitating forum ops. This would help cover some of the concerns in this program.
We are voting FOR this proposal with our preferred budget allocation being 25M, followed by 50M.
The Arbitrum Incentives Working Group has put in considerable effort and exceeded expectations for communicating with the community and addressing the concerns with this proposal.
We are voting FOR this proposal with our preferred budget allocation being 25M, followed by 50M.
The Arbitrum Incentives Working Group has put in considerable effort and exceeded expectations for communicating with the community and addressing the concerns with this proposal.
The amounts being requested are quite large considering the allocations made to previously approved Grant programs for Questbook and Pluralist Labs ($1M and 4M ARB, respectively). We understand the importance of getting funding into the network to reaccelerate Arbitrum's growth and get the ecosystem back on track after months of DAO delays. However, we also share concerns that this method of flooding the DAO forums with proposals and ushering out funds without proper mechanisms for due diligence or means of tracking and analyzing the success of the distributions has not been historically successful. Given this, we hope to provide this first iteration with a portion of the original requested budget to still jolt ecosystem growth and learn from the process as we continue to reiterate and develop an effective and sustainable funding program.
Thank you for the invite. I expect to get more involved in October. I run a burning man camp and basically took July pretty slow and August and September off to make it happen.
But now my schedule is clear and I hope to get involved more into Arbitrum Governance.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal with our preffered order of budget allocation being 50M, 25M, 75M.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal with our preffered order of budget allocation being 50M, 25M, 75M.
Having attended the workshops and consulted with other delegates, we have decided that we’ll be voting in favor of this proposal. We do believe there are kinks to work out and that the impact such a program will have won’t necessary be what we’d ideally want, but we realise that sitting on our hands will cause a greater harm to the DAO and the Arbitrum ecosystem as a whole.
While we think 25M might not be enough as a overall budget to achieve the overarching goal of attracting liquidity, we are also skeptical of allocating 75M ARB towards a short-term pilot program. With that in mind, we feel much comfortable voting in favour of distributing 50M ARB and we’ll be paying close attention both to the execution, but also to the impact the incentives will have.
I love the idea behind this proposal, but I am not a fan of it's execution. I am a stanch advocate against having the DAO has to vote on every single proposal.
I understand that this is a stop gap solution, and I am hopeful that the "more robust, sustainable program" designed soon avoids having a DAO vote to pass every proposal.
I love the idea behind this proposal, but I am not a fan of it's execution. I am a stanch advocate against having the DAO has to vote on every single proposal.
I understand that this is a stop gap solution, and I am hopeful that the "more robust, sustainable program" designed soon avoids having a DAO vote to pass every proposal.
As I have said before, I have a lot more faith in the DAO's ability to make a few high level decisions than lots of small one off decisions. If we want to distribute $25M-75M of ARB incentives, we would be better off hiring a high-caliber trustworthy people to manage the approval of these projects as a transparent un-bias committee, otherwise we will suffer from voter apathy, popularity contests, and governance capture.
As a DAO we can keep a few of these committees accountable, I don't have faith in our ability to keep 50-100 projects accountable.
Having sooooo many votes is not a healthy, successful way for DAOs to function, the limited bandwidth of busy delegates should be focused on high level decisions. Distributing this much money deserves a dedicated group of thoughtful decision makers, who's top priority is distributing the funds. The Optimism Grant Council really exemplifies this especially compared to the other processes they have tried. I hope we can follow that success and avoid spamming our DAO with countless proposals.
So I will be voting: Against, 25M, 50M, 75M. It is clear that this proposal will likely pass, and I will participate as a delegate in good faith, but I still believe it is important that I hold this dissenting voice.
Agree. Established protocols that likely already received a large airdrop don't need the funds. Newer players and new projects trying to build the next frontier of defi should actually receive a larger allocation vs protocols that have an edge over the ecosystem already.
While established protocols on Arbitrum have the highest user / volume counts, what is going to keep Arbitrum ahead of the competition is having the strongest infrastructure and defi ecosystem around.
Agree. Established protocols that likely already received a large airdrop don't need the funds. Newer players and new projects trying to build the next frontier of defi should actually receive a larger allocation vs protocols that have an edge over the ecosystem already.
While established protocols on Arbitrum have the highest user / volume counts, what is going to keep Arbitrum ahead of the competition is having the strongest infrastructure and defi ecosystem around.
We see this case study in web2 again and again - once a platform /company reaches mass adoption, innovation slows to a crawl. In many cases, they will proactively stall innovation from competitors (which is very possible with ARB governance).
If the framework can figure out how to avoid overallocating grants to established protocols who are the least in need of extra incentives or funding while helping newer projects get a foothold, it would be much more favorable for the ecosystem.
This is a good initiative. Congratulations and thank you to the Incentives Working Group for the time invested to craft this, including organizing workshops, calls, and putting this forward.
I have voted in favour of incentives for this temperature check (order: 50M, 25M, 75M, A). I believe in the positive impact of incentives for the ecosystem and though the structure proposed can probably be enhanced, given the short-term objective and the points made to be getting things started I think this is a good compromise.
This is a good initiative. Congratulations and thank you to the Incentives Working Group for the time invested to craft this, including organizing workshops, calls, and putting this forward.
I have voted in favour of incentives for this temperature check (order: 50M, 25M, 75M, A). I believe in the positive impact of incentives for the ecosystem and though the structure proposed can probably be enhanced, given the short-term objective and the points made to be getting things started I think this is a good compromise.
Some feedback on previously discussed points:
The extension of the programme until Jan 31st is a positive change for potential new grantees to come to know about this and apply. It could be a good idea to leverage Arbitrum's official social media channels for discovery. Not sure if this is something the Foundation can help with, tagging Patrick just in case: @stonecoldpat.
Considering all possible Pinnacle bracket protocols (only 12 according to Defillama) which are the ones that could request the larger allocations, 50M in the proposed timespan until Jan 31st looks reasonable as a first iteration or until further initiatives come to place.
It would have been ideal to set a maximum cap on how much ARB protocols can request. Maybe for the on-chain voting? In any case and since the DAO will be reviewing grant applications individually, I don't view this as a major issue.
Reposting the document already shared by @axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth to another data input for the Optimism L2, on amounts and timeframes: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1eaHOlWB34ij1KGsXdaNyTQg4tt1Pu2JurJsElBb6a8k/edit
Streaming funds and tranches is a great idea.
Before the on-chain vote, how would the DAO feel about the suggestion that protocols that receive grants post a bi-weekly report with results and progress instead of just one Dune Dashboard at Dec 15?
Also, where will these be made available, a forum post? Is there a template? I saw Section 6 of the Application Template but it does not detail exactly how are protocols to move forward in this regard once a they receive a grant.
Might it be a good idea that yourself @tnorm take on the (of course - paid) responsibility of organizing and controlling the data reporting and execution, for the DAO to later process and read? Could this come out of the Operational Budget, or is this destined to something else?
The 20,000 ARB compensation for @tnorm looks fair to me. It's true that if we break it down to $/hour and compare it to similar demanding jobs it could or could not be overpriced, however for prices to go down there needs to be competition in the DAO services market offer. Until that happens, I am glad that there is people that do offer their services and time, as long as it's not an unreasonable ask.
I am echoing concerns by some delegates about this matter, and it will ultimately come down to the whole delegate community to revise and research to the best of their abilities. I am looking forward to seeing how this first attempt turns out, keeping in mind that adjusting/voting policies in real time is also acceptable.
In summary, I voted to support the funding of this grants programme. Hopefully we can keep improving the mechanics of this proposal before on-chain voting.
These are very large amounts of funding being proposed to be spent in a very short amount of time. Historically, bringing many grant proposals to a delegate-wide vote has not resulted in prudent spending (Optimism’s early grants are an excellent example of how this very model does not perform well). Realistically, most will receive de minimis review and likely be approved.
It would be good if there was some kind of structured review process or curation process beyond simply finding a delegate to sponsor a proposal. A maximum cap on what a project can request is also recommended. The lower tiers with caps allow grantees to request amounts ~15% of their TVL - which seems both very high and very arbitrary.
These are very large amounts of funding being proposed to be spent in a very short amount of time. Historically, bringing many grant proposals to a delegate-wide vote has not resulted in prudent spending (Optimism’s early grants are an excellent example of how this very model does not perform well). Realistically, most will receive de minimis review and likely be approved.
It would be good if there was some kind of structured review process or curation process beyond simply finding a delegate to sponsor a proposal. A maximum cap on what a project can request is also recommended. The lower tiers with caps allow grantees to request amounts ~15% of their TVL - which seems both very high and very arbitrary.
We applaud the concept, but it is a struggle to understand why solicitation of direct-to-governance-vote grant applications is the process chosen here.
There are not a lot of examples of that performing well. It's also just very hard to spend even 25,000,000 ARB in the next 3 months without just giving money to the lowest effort grantees.
What is it about this proposal that makes people think 20-30 grant proposals flooding the forum will receive proper diligence (to avoid ghost projects, unlaunched projects, technically infeasible plans, etc) without someone explicitly charged with providing either a recommendation or a neutral summary of each one?
There is no doubt that Arbitrum's long-term health requires the right incentives. It’s not merely about competing but about creating a thriving ecosystem where all participants are motivated, especially in these early stages as we attempt to cross the chasm in onboarding the next generation of users.
The proposal outlines comprehensive eligibility requirements and evaluation criteria, which suggest careful consideration and planning. This foundation is crucial to ensuring the program's success and fairness. We commend the Incentives Working Group for their efforts.
There is no doubt that Arbitrum's long-term health requires the right incentives. It’s not merely about competing but about creating a thriving ecosystem where all participants are motivated, especially in these early stages as we attempt to cross the chasm in onboarding the next generation of users.
The proposal outlines comprehensive eligibility requirements and evaluation criteria, which suggest careful consideration and planning. This foundation is crucial to ensuring the program's success and fairness. We commend the Incentives Working Group for their efforts.
While 75 million ARB might sound immense for a 2-month program, context is everything. With a 4.2 billion ARB treasury, this is merely a drop in the ocean. It's not about recklessly spending but strategically investing to foster growth and innovation.
Governance processes, while necessary, can be lengthy. The proposed timetable does take its time, but given Arbitrum's competitive landscape, it's essential to hit the ground running. Delays might lead to missed opportunities, and this is a chance to expedite the process.
This proposal, while thorough, is notably short-term. It's imperative that this isn't the sole “quick fix” but serves as a precursor to more consistent, long-term programs. As tokens start flowing, governance will be tested, and having a clear vision will be paramount.
Past decisions, like the Camelot opportunity, serve as lessons. It’s essential not just to move forward but to ensure previous oversights aren't repeated. Although the advancement of ecosystem grants was delayed due to the proposal’s result, we believe this has galvanized ecosystem participants to take more of an interest in Arbitrum and its governance. As a DAO, we must make this a crucial lesson learned in order to push Arbitrum forward.
This proposal is more than an opportunity—it's a chance to correct course and set Arbitrum on a path of sustainable growth.
Coming from a DeFi project, I think the requirements are unforgiving to other projects that are not trading-related. Something also to monitor is that most developers will be traveling during the period you want to collect applications. I would push the application process 4-6 weeks out. The sweet spot would probably be between mid-October and mid-November (when Dev Connect starts). Also, it's probably best to keep the first round to 25mm or less; you will learn a lot from the first round you can use for future rounds. 75mm in a quarter is a ton of responsibility, and some of that is probably better for the DAO to try to procure exclusivity deals with projects outside the perps or dex project types, which it seems this proposal is focused on.
Personally, I would like to see grants awarded to auditors, research, infrastructure, tooling, inter-project collaboration, shared resourcing, etc - things that developers actually need right now rather than juiced yields. Happy to jump on a call to discuss this or chat at any upcoming conferences we think about these incentive structures and the relationships between projects building on layer-2s every day.
Maybe it already ended
It's good that there is progress and glad to see discussions around the short-term plan, but I still don't see much of a framework to answer the 'why' and endgoal behind this proposal.
Is the why to give the Arbitrum builders temporary relief while a more meaningful framework is built?
Also - what are the goals / metrics that will determine success?
It's good that there is progress and glad to see discussions around the short-term plan, but I still don't see much of a framework to answer the 'why' and endgoal behind this proposal.
Is the why to give the Arbitrum builders temporary relief while a more meaningful framework is built?
Also - what are the goals / metrics that will determine success?
Are we trying to ensure that new protocols get a chance to compete in the ecosystem against the established players? Is it so existing players don't take their liquidity elsewhere?
Any of the above should have some data we are tracking. Data should also be reinforcing the proposed ARB amount.
The biggest single problem I see right now is that the existing ecosystem players have all the incentive to promote their own proposals and 0 incentive to help competitors break into the market. Any suggestions how we address the above issue?
Again, great job getting the conversation started, but I see lots of solid concerns and feedback that we should resolve before continuing forward.
Dan Vela Exchange
Another consideration is how we send grants and what recourse the DAO has.
For example, we could say that all grants use Hedgey Token Grant streaming which is revokable by the multisig. We could even say that the multisig can be overridden by the DAO with only a snapshot vote.
This type of revokable stream would not be used for performance per se, but more importantly to stop bad actors like this:
I love the idea of half the grant being offered on a stream, then the other half being awarded 3 months later for having sticky commitments. This would have to be baselined though...
I do not think that 75m is too big or too small, but I am simply unsure of how to understand it’s size in the context of Arbitrum.
Grantees must agree to KYC with the Arbitrum Foundation in order to receive funds.
I estimate that this has already been agreed with the foundation. In Optimism there were several problems with the KyC. I understand that funds will only be sent to those who have successfully passed the KyC?
Agree. Established protocols that likely already received a large airdrop don't need the funds. Newer players and new projects trying to build the next frontier of defi should actually receive a larger allocation vs protocols that have an edge over the ecosystem already.
While established protocols on Arbitrum have the highest user / volume counts, what is going to keep Arbitrum ahead of the competition is having the strongest infrastructure and defi ecosystem around.
Agree. Established protocols that likely already received a large airdrop don't need the funds. Newer players and new projects trying to build the next frontier of defi should actually receive a larger allocation vs protocols that have an edge over the ecosystem already.
While established protocols on Arbitrum have the highest user / volume counts, what is going to keep Arbitrum ahead of the competition is having the strongest infrastructure and defi ecosystem around.
We see this case study in web2 again and again - once a platform /company reaches mass adoption, innovation slows to a crawl. In many cases, they will proactively stall innovation from competitors (which is very possible with ARB governance).
If the framework can figure out how to avoid overallocating grants to established protocols who are the least in need of extra incentives or funding while helping newer projects get a foothold, it would be much more favorable for the ecosystem.
This is a good initiative. Congratulations and thank you to the Incentives Working Group for the time invested to craft this, including organizing workshops, calls, and putting this forward.
I have voted in favour of incentives for this temperature check (order: 50M, 25M, 75M, A). I believe in the positive impact of incentives for the ecosystem and though the structure proposed can probably be enhanced, given the short-term objective and the points made to be getting things started I think this is a good compromise.
This is a good initiative. Congratulations and thank you to the Incentives Working Group for the time invested to craft this, including organizing workshops, calls, and putting this forward.
I have voted in favour of incentives for this temperature check (order: 50M, 25M, 75M, A). I believe in the positive impact of incentives for the ecosystem and though the structure proposed can probably be enhanced, given the short-term objective and the points made to be getting things started I think this is a good compromise.
Some feedback on previously discussed points:
The extension of the programme until Jan 31st is a positive change for potential new grantees to come to know about this and apply. It could be a good idea to leverage Arbitrum's official social media channels for discovery. Not sure if this is something the Foundation can help with, tagging Patrick just in case: @stonecoldpat.
Considering all possible Pinnacle bracket protocols (only 12 according to Defillama) which are the ones that could request the larger allocations, 50M in the proposed timespan until Jan 31st looks reasonable as a first iteration or until further initiatives come to place.
It would have been ideal to set a maximum cap on how much ARB protocols can request. Maybe for the on-chain voting? In any case and since the DAO will be reviewing grant applications individually, I don't view this as a major issue.
Reposting the document already shared by @axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth to another data input for the Optimism L2, on amounts and timeframes: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1eaHOlWB34ij1KGsXdaNyTQg4tt1Pu2JurJsElBb6a8k/edit
Streaming funds and tranches is a great idea.
Before the on-chain vote, how would the DAO feel about the suggestion that protocols that receive grants post a bi-weekly report with results and progress instead of just one Dune Dashboard at Dec 15?
Also, where will these be made available, a forum post? Is there a template? I saw Section 6 of the Application Template but it does not detail exactly how are protocols to move forward in this regard once a they receive a grant.
Might it be a good idea that yourself @tnorm take on the (of course - paid) responsibility of organizing and controlling the data reporting and execution, for the DAO to later process and read? Could this come out of the Operational Budget, or is this destined to something else?
The 20,000 ARB compensation for @tnorm looks fair to me. It's true that if we break it down to $/hour and compare it to similar demanding jobs it could or could not be overpriced, however for prices to go down there needs to be competition in the DAO services market offer. Until that happens, I am glad that there is people that do offer their services and time, as long as it's not an unreasonable ask.
I am echoing concerns by some delegates about this matter, and it will ultimately come down to the whole delegate community to revise and research to the best of their abilities. I am looking forward to seeing how this first attempt turns out, keeping in mind that adjusting/voting policies in real time is also acceptable.
In summary, I voted to support the funding of this grants programme. Hopefully we can keep improving the mechanics of this proposal before on-chain voting.
These are very large amounts of funding being proposed to be spent in a very short amount of time. Historically, bringing many grant proposals to a delegate-wide vote has not resulted in prudent spending (Optimism’s early grants are an excellent example of how this very model does not perform well). Realistically, most will receive de minimis review and likely be approved.
It would be good if there was some kind of structured review process or curation process beyond simply finding a delegate to sponsor a proposal. A maximum cap on what a project can request is also recommended. The lower tiers with caps allow grantees to request amounts ~15% of their TVL - which seems both very high and very arbitrary.
These are very large amounts of funding being proposed to be spent in a very short amount of time. Historically, bringing many grant proposals to a delegate-wide vote has not resulted in prudent spending (Optimism’s early grants are an excellent example of how this very model does not perform well). Realistically, most will receive de minimis review and likely be approved.
It would be good if there was some kind of structured review process or curation process beyond simply finding a delegate to sponsor a proposal. A maximum cap on what a project can request is also recommended. The lower tiers with caps allow grantees to request amounts ~15% of their TVL - which seems both very high and very arbitrary.
We applaud the concept, but it is a struggle to understand why solicitation of direct-to-governance-vote grant applications is the process chosen here.
There are not a lot of examples of that performing well. It's also just very hard to spend even 25,000,000 ARB in the next 3 months without just giving money to the lowest effort grantees.
What is it about this proposal that makes people think 20-30 grant proposals flooding the forum will receive proper diligence (to avoid ghost projects, unlaunched projects, technically infeasible plans, etc) without someone explicitly charged with providing either a recommendation or a neutral summary of each one?
There is no doubt that Arbitrum's long-term health requires the right incentives. It’s not merely about competing but about creating a thriving ecosystem where all participants are motivated, especially in these early stages as we attempt to cross the chasm in onboarding the next generation of users.
The proposal outlines comprehensive eligibility requirements and evaluation criteria, which suggest careful consideration and planning. This foundation is crucial to ensuring the program's success and fairness. We commend the Incentives Working Group for their efforts.
There is no doubt that Arbitrum's long-term health requires the right incentives. It’s not merely about competing but about creating a thriving ecosystem where all participants are motivated, especially in these early stages as we attempt to cross the chasm in onboarding the next generation of users.
The proposal outlines comprehensive eligibility requirements and evaluation criteria, which suggest careful consideration and planning. This foundation is crucial to ensuring the program's success and fairness. We commend the Incentives Working Group for their efforts.
While 75 million ARB might sound immense for a 2-month program, context is everything. With a 4.2 billion ARB treasury, this is merely a drop in the ocean. It's not about recklessly spending but strategically investing to foster growth and innovation.
Governance processes, while necessary, can be lengthy. The proposed timetable does take its time, but given Arbitrum's competitive landscape, it's essential to hit the ground running. Delays might lead to missed opportunities, and this is a chance to expedite the process.
This proposal, while thorough, is notably short-term. It's imperative that this isn't the sole “quick fix” but serves as a precursor to more consistent, long-term programs. As tokens start flowing, governance will be tested, and having a clear vision will be paramount.
Past decisions, like the Camelot opportunity, serve as lessons. It’s essential not just to move forward but to ensure previous oversights aren't repeated. Although the advancement of ecosystem grants was delayed due to the proposal’s result, we believe this has galvanized ecosystem participants to take more of an interest in Arbitrum and its governance. As a DAO, we must make this a crucial lesson learned in order to push Arbitrum forward.
This proposal is more than an opportunity—it's a chance to correct course and set Arbitrum on a path of sustainable growth.
Coming from a DeFi project, I think the requirements are unforgiving to other projects that are not trading-related. Something also to monitor is that most developers will be traveling during the period you want to collect applications. I would push the application process 4-6 weeks out. The sweet spot would probably be between mid-October and mid-November (when Dev Connect starts). Also, it's probably best to keep the first round to 25mm or less; you will learn a lot from the first round you can use for future rounds. 75mm in a quarter is a ton of responsibility, and some of that is probably better for the DAO to try to procure exclusivity deals with projects outside the perps or dex project types, which it seems this proposal is focused on.
Personally, I would like to see grants awarded to auditors, research, infrastructure, tooling, inter-project collaboration, shared resourcing, etc - things that developers actually need right now rather than juiced yields. Happy to jump on a call to discuss this or chat at any upcoming conferences we think about these incentive structures and the relationships between projects building on layer-2s every day.
Maybe it already ended
It's good that there is progress and glad to see discussions around the short-term plan, but I still don't see much of a framework to answer the 'why' and endgoal behind this proposal.
Is the why to give the Arbitrum builders temporary relief while a more meaningful framework is built?
Also - what are the goals / metrics that will determine success?
It's good that there is progress and glad to see discussions around the short-term plan, but I still don't see much of a framework to answer the 'why' and endgoal behind this proposal.
Is the why to give the Arbitrum builders temporary relief while a more meaningful framework is built?
Also - what are the goals / metrics that will determine success?
Are we trying to ensure that new protocols get a chance to compete in the ecosystem against the established players? Is it so existing players don't take their liquidity elsewhere?
Any of the above should have some data we are tracking. Data should also be reinforcing the proposed ARB amount.
The biggest single problem I see right now is that the existing ecosystem players have all the incentive to promote their own proposals and 0 incentive to help competitors break into the market. Any suggestions how we address the above issue?
Again, great job getting the conversation started, but I see lots of solid concerns and feedback that we should resolve before continuing forward.
Dan Vela Exchange
Another consideration is how we send grants and what recourse the DAO has.
For example, we could say that all grants use Hedgey Token Grant streaming which is revokable by the multisig. We could even say that the multisig can be overridden by the DAO with only a snapshot vote.
This type of revokable stream would not be used for performance per se, but more importantly to stop bad actors like this:
I love the idea of half the grant being offered on a stream, then the other half being awarded 3 months later for having sticky commitments. This would have to be baselined though...
I do not think that 75m is too big or too small, but I am simply unsure of how to understand it’s size in the context of Arbitrum.
Grantees must agree to KYC with the Arbitrum Foundation in order to receive funds.
I estimate that this has already been agreed with the foundation. In Optimism there were several problems with the KyC. I understand that funds will only be sent to those who have successfully passed the KyC?
Another consideration is how we send grants and what recourse the DAO has.
For example, we could say that all grants use Hedgey Token Grant streaming which is revokable by the multisig. We could even say that the multisig can be overridden by the DAO with only a snapshot vote.
This type of revokable stream would not be used for performance per se, but more importantly to stop bad actors like this:
https://twitter.com/AtlasIsMe/status/1698742193916100727?s=20
*Grants greater than $1M ARB will be asked to include milestone-based funding tranches in their application.
One could reasonably use the date of publication for this proposal to inform these metrics.
Is there a maximum cap on the number of ARB tokens that can be applied for? I understand that the recommendations reduce the number of protocols that can apply for this type of grants. But I think that a maximum cap should be established as it has the rest of the categories.
I do not think that 75m is too big or too small, but I am simply unsure of how to understand it’s size in the context of Arbitrum.
I think if we compare it against Optimism's funding rounds, the 75M makes sense. I give the example of Optimism because in my opinion it is a good point of comparison.
Considering that Arbitrum outperforms and doubles Optimism in terms of TVL and number of protocols, I think it is a good number. I would like to clarify that a deeper analysis should be done but given the context I think it's ok,
In addition we must take into account that this working group was created to get out of the way while working on a more general framework.
I am not part of the working group and I did not participate in the calls due to work and time zone issues. But I think this is a good place to start working with DAO.
5,000 ARB Delegate Contributions [A delegate (@krst?) will need to sponsor the application migration from the forum → snapshot for voting rounds 1 and 2]
5K ARB for posting proposals in snapshots? Why not make it open and share the reward among those who submit the proposal?
Personally, I am in favor of putting a reward for this type of actions.
In my humble opinion, I think the $75m is too big lol, but all the same I support the proposal. It’s good for the community
Another consideration is how we send grants and what recourse the DAO has.
For example, we could say that all grants use Hedgey Token Grant streaming which is revokable by the multisig. We could even say that the multisig can be overridden by the DAO with only a snapshot vote.
This type of revokable stream would not be used for performance per se, but more importantly to stop bad actors like this:
https://twitter.com/AtlasIsMe/status/1698742193916100727?s=20
*Grants greater than $1M ARB will be asked to include milestone-based funding tranches in their application.
One could reasonably use the date of publication for this proposal to inform these metrics.
Is there a maximum cap on the number of ARB tokens that can be applied for? I understand that the recommendations reduce the number of protocols that can apply for this type of grants. But I think that a maximum cap should be established as it has the rest of the categories.
I do not think that 75m is too big or too small, but I am simply unsure of how to understand it’s size in the context of Arbitrum.
I think if we compare it against Optimism's funding rounds, the 75M makes sense. I give the example of Optimism because in my opinion it is a good point of comparison.
Considering that Arbitrum outperforms and doubles Optimism in terms of TVL and number of protocols, I think it is a good number. I would like to clarify that a deeper analysis should be done but given the context I think it's ok,
In addition we must take into account that this working group was created to get out of the way while working on a more general framework.
I am not part of the working group and I did not participate in the calls due to work and time zone issues. But I think this is a good place to start working with DAO.
5,000 ARB Delegate Contributions [A delegate (@krst?) will need to sponsor the application migration from the forum → snapshot for voting rounds 1 and 2]
5K ARB for posting proposals in snapshots? Why not make it open and share the reward among those who submit the proposal?
Personally, I am in favor of putting a reward for this type of actions.
In my humble opinion, I think the $75m is too big lol, but all the same I support the proposal. It’s good for the community
