Constitutional proposal
Updated 10 November 2025: This proposal has been amended to include an increase in the L2 min base fee from 0.01 gwei to 0.02 gwei. This change is proposed to be executed by an ArbOwner precompile call to the setMinimumL2BaseFee function and will solely be a parameter/configuration change.
This AIP proposes to reduce the severity, frequency, and duration of high L2 gas prices during periods when demand exceeds the gas target by introducing a new set of gas targets and new, accompanying adjustment windows for Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova. The starting effective (lowest) gas target of the chain is proposed to be 10 Mgas/s with an adjustment period of 86,400 seconds (1 day). These changes are intended to replace the current 7 Mgas/s gas target, which is used to adjust the L2 gas price using an EIP-1559-inspired algorithm relative to the current 102-second adjustment window.
The AIP requests that the ArbitrumDAO grant Offchain Labs the right (for 2-years, measured from this proposal’s mainnet activation) to add up to 10 gas targets and adjustment windows, and to modify them over time—up to 100 Mgas/s and 86,400s, respectively. These changes will be introduced gradually to protect network stability while addressing high gas price volatility. The rollout begins with 6 new gas targets, each paired with its own adjustment window.
Lastly, this AIP is accompanied by an increase in the minimum L2 base fee from 0.01 gwei/gas to 0.02 gwei/gas to help reduce spam and offset any potential decline in the portion of L2 surplus fee-derived transaction fees (during periods of peak demand) to the ArbitrumDAO.
These updates and delegated rights are proposed by Offchain Labs in its role as an Arbitrum Aligned Entity (AAE), as described in A Vision for the Future of Arbitrum. Offchain Labs serves as an AAE for engineering, product, business development, and technical research.
All changes will be gated through smart contracts and DAO votes. Activation will require an on-chain vote, a security audit, and deployment of a new Resource Constraint Manager contract to manage permissions. If approved, only Offchain Labs will be authorized to adjust the parameters within the approved limits.
The proposal also outlines the rationale, risks, tradeoffs, and supporting data behind these changes. It applies solely to ArbitrumDAO-owned chains—Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova.
How gas costs are priced today
Arbitrum chains determine transaction gas fees using two components:
L1 gas costs – the expense of posting data to the parent chain.
L2 gas costs – the resources consumed on the child chain (computation and storage).
L1 gas costs depend on the price of calldata or blobs on the parent chain, while L2 gas costs depend on network demand. Today, when demand on Arbitrum One exceeds 7 MGas/s, the L2 base fee increases exponentially — using a mechanism similar to Ethereum’s EIP-1559 — until demand falls back toward the gas target over a 102-second adjustment window. Learn more about Arbitrum’s gas model here.
Negative impacts of elevated demand
During periods of high activity, L2 gas prices can rise sharply, which significantly increases transaction costs for users and developers. For example, on Oct. 10, 2025, Arbitrum One’s L2 gas price peaked at an average of 41 gwei/gas, resulting in roughly $9.49 in L2 gas costs to transfer an ERC-20 token (source, and assumes 60,000 gas and a price of $3,855 per Ether).
These high L2 gas price spikes are the motivation behind this AIP: to mitigate the frequency and severity of congestion-driven cost increases. Notably, introducing multiple gas targets with overlapping adjustment windows has a greater combined effect on stabilizing prices than raising a single gas target or changing a single adjustment window alone.
Illustrative example
To illustrate this, we analyzed how the L2 gas price would have changed during the demand surge on Oct. 10, 2025 and on Sept 22, 2025, under different gas targets and adjustment windows. The adjustment window is a time-based damping parameter that controls how slowly the L2 gas price responds to changes in demand on the network above the gas target. A larger adjustment window results in slower price adjustments relative to the gas target, while a smaller adjustment window results in faster price adjustments.
Figure 1: L2 gas prices calculated different pricing algorithms during a period of high congestion on Sept 22, 2025
Figure 2: L2 gas prices from different pricing algorithms during a period of high congestion on Oct 10, 2025
Below is a brief description of the colored lines and what they represent in each of the two figures above, while holding the minimum L2 base fee constant
Red lines: Actual L2 gas price using today’s parameters (effective gas target of 7 MGas/s over a 102-second adjustment window), peaking near 4 gwei on Sept 22 (Figure 1) and 42 gwei on Oct 10 (Figure 2).
Blue lines: L2 prices using the new set of proposed gas targets and adjustment windows, with an effective 7 MGas/s target and 86,400-second window.
Green lines: L2 prices using the new set of proposed gas targets and adjustment windows, with an effective 10 MGas/s target and 86,400-second window.
Looking specifically at Figure 2 during the period of peak demand on October 10, 2025, notice how both the green and the blue lines produce a much lower L2 gas price of ~9 gwei during the same demand peak, representing a ~33 gwei difference when compared to the peak of the red line (which uses today’s single 7 Mgas/s gas target and 102-second adjustment window). The difference between the peaks is almost ~33 gwei (129% difference) despite the effective gas targets being very close. Both the green and blue lines show substantially lower peak prices — around 9 gwei — a 33 gwei (≈129%) reduction compared to the current configuration, despite similar effective gas targets.
Summary and the increase in the minimum L2 base fee
This retrospective analysis shows that applying the proposed gas targets and adjustment windows would have significantly reduced L2 gas prices during the periods of peak demand on Sept 22, 2025 and Oct. 10, 2025. While this simulation does not predict future outcomes, it demonstrates that longer and overlapping adjustment windows can meaningfully dampen gas price volatility during periods of high demand.
Naturally, this change will mean that during periods of peak demand, the portion of L2 surplus fee-derived transaction fees collected by the ArbitrumDAO will be lower going forward, compared to before. To offset this potential decline, this proposal is to be accompanied by a slight increase in the minimum L2 base fee from 0.01 gwei/gas to 0.02 gwei/gas. This slight increase in the minimum L2 base fee can also positively contribute to reducing spam on the network as well, since the base fee for all transactions will be slightly larger than before this change.
New gas targets and adjustment windows
This proposal replaces the current, singular gas target (7 Mgas/s over a 102-second adjustment window) with multiple gas targets across overlapping adjustment windows, as tabulated in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Proposed gas targets & accompanying adjustment windows
| Gas Target (Mgas/s) | Adjustment window (seconds) |
|---|---|
| 60 | 9 |
| 41 | 52 |
| 29 | 329 |
| 20 | 2,105 |
| 14 | 13,485 |
| 10 | 86,400 |
These values were calculated using this model here, with inputs from internal benchmarking on a server hosted by a cloud provider. This model assumes that a node on the reference hardware can sustainably sync at 80 MGas/s and that the chain can tolerate a 20% increase in L2 gas price per second during periods of high demand. Reference hardware used for these tests was: 64 GB RAM, 8 CPUs (x86 architecture), and a locally attached NVMe drive (for AWS, i4i.2xlarge). Note that the lowest gas target of the 6 being introduced is 10 Mgas/s, which will be measured over the longest adjustment window (86,400s). We refer to this proposed 10 Mgas/s gas target as the “long-term gas target” or “effective gas target” of the chain..
Special permissions to gradually adjust gas targets and adjustment windows, over time
Separately, this proposal requests the ArbitrumDAO grant Offchain Labs permission, for 2 years from the mainnet activation of this proposal, to adjust the gas targets and adjustment windows in Table 1, in addition to the right to add up to 10 more gas targets and adjustment values. These rights will allow Offchain Labs to adjust these values over time and help the chain’s stability in a way that security is not negatively impacted as additional capacity is added. The rollout of these changes will be paired with continuous monitoring of how the user behavior, node operators, and the network itself respond to them. Summarized below in Table 1 are the values and ranges that this proposal grants Offchain Labs the right to adjust.
Table 2: Proposed gas targets and adjustment window ranges that can be adjusted over time by Offchain Labs, should the permission be granted by the ArbitrumDAO
| Parameter | Range | Status quo value |
|---|---|---|
| Number of gas targets | 1 to 10, inclusive | 1 |
| Gas targets | 7 Mgas/s to 100 Mgas/s, inclusive | 7 Mgas/s |
| Adjustment windows | 5 seconds to 86,400 seconds, inclusive | 102 seconds |
Resource Constraint Manager Contract
Lastly, if approved, there will be a new contract deployed called the ResourceConstraintManager that will give Offchain Labs the appropriate permissions to adjust the above values within the specified ranges in Table 2 over time, should this proposal pass. This new contract will be audited by an independent third party entity (Trail of Bits). A full audit report will be published alongside this proposal when it gets proposed in the eventual on-chain vote.
This new contract will contain an access list. We propose that the ArbitrumDAO use this access to designate Offchain Labs the right to invoke specific functions on the ArbOwner precompile to adjust the above values in Table 2, within certain ArbitrumDAO-approved bounds. Normally, ArbOwner parameter changes and function calls require an ArbitrumDAO vote. Implementing this ResourceConstraintManager contract will allow Offchain Labs to adjust these parameters in Table 2, within the proposed bounds, without the need for additional votes - should the ArbitrumDAO pass this proposal.
Changing the minimum L2 base fee
A change to the minimum L2 base fee is also included in this proposal and will be executed via a call to the ArbOwner setMinimumL2BaseFee function. This will be a one-time adjustment from the current 0.01 gwei value to a new 0.02 gwei value.
Risks & Tradeoffs
The addition of new, higher gas targets to a chain is not without tradeoffs. Below are some of the potential tradeoffs that the ArbitrumDAO and ecosystem should consider in their assessment of this proposal.
A gas target increase translates to an increase to the demand threshold at which EIP-1559-style congestion pricing kicks in, which will invite more demand to the network. After profiling the type of gas used on Arbitrum One over a period of about 3 weeks, the gas rate associated with state growth was observed to remain relatively stable over time. It is believed that if the capacity of the chain increases, then the rate of storage growth is expected to also increase.
While this issue presents a challenge regarding the size of the state database and the costs to maintain it over the long run (e.g., archive node operators), after careful consideration, we believe the below are sufficient justifications that support the current proposed course of action.
In September 2025, the Erigon team announced the alpha release of their archive node support for Arbitrum Sepolia. Their team was able to reduce the Arbitrum Sepolia archive node size from 12 TB to 0.732 TB, a 94% reduction. The Erigon team is expected to deliver Arbitrum One mainnet support by Q1 2026. This achievement will mean that node operators can opt to run archive nodes using Erigon, significantly reducing the cost associated with maintaining a larger and faster-growing state database size (when compared to today’s Geth-based Nitro nodes).
The majority of professional node operators surveyed run Arbitrum One nodes on bare-metal providers and in RAID0 configurations. This special type of setup grants node operators the flexibility and optionality to expand storage at more predictable (and sometimes lower) costs and in a horizontal fashion. Based on this information, we expect professional node operators to be able to adequately provision and scale up in their disk sizes over time.
In September 2025, AWS announced that it raised the limit on EBS GP3 volumes to 64 TB, up from 16 TB. Given that some instance families (e.g., i8g) have an upper bound of 32 EBS volumes, then the theoretical maximum that a node operator could provision on AWS would be 32 x 64 TB = 2048 TB. For NVMe drives, which we recommend for performance and latency today already, some instances offered by AWS go as high as 120 TB (i8g) and 45 TB (i7ie). We expect that cost reductions and other advancements to technology will continue to improve across all cloud providers, making access to these larger drives more affordable as time goes on (i.e., Moore’s Law).
The combination of the above 3 trends leads us to conclude that the risk of accelerated state growth, as a result of increased demand, can be reasonably managed in both the short and long term.
As noted in Table 1, the proposed starting gas targets and adjustment windows were computed using test results observed from syncing an Arbitrum node on reference hardware. The reference hardware used in these tests was 64 GB RAM, 8 CPUs (x86), and a locally attached NVMe drive formatted with ext4 (for AWS, i4i.2xlarge). Therefore, this proposal will accompany an increase in the minimum hardware requirements for node operators from the current specification. These requirements will be used as the foundation for future increases to the tech stack’s scaling capabilities.
Table 3: Comparison of current and new minimum hardware requirements for Arbitrum Nitro full nodes, given the new gas targets being proposed
| Arbitrum Nitro full node hardware requirements | Current (source) minimum | Proposed new minimum |
|---|---|---|
| Total RAM (GB) | 16 | 64 |
| Number of CPUs | 4 | 8 |
| Disk type | Local NVMe drive | Local NVMe drive |
Despite the cost increases that come with higher hardware minimums, we believe that this increase is justified because:
Surveys conducted with at-home node operators found that the majority of teams are already running Arbitrum Nitro full nodes on servers that have 12+ CPU cores, 64GB+ RAM, and NVMe drives. As such, we believe this change will bring the requirements in line with setups that teams use today.
The current minimum CPU and RAM requirements for running an Arbitrum Nitro node were defined over 3 years ago. As technology has improved and costs have decreased, we believe it makes sense to update this requirement to align with what the market can offer today at a similar price.
Future chain capacity increases will benefit from better hardware, and so this update will establish a new baseline for how we scale Arbitrum technology in the future
Over the coming weeks, we will perform similar benchmarking tests on various other types of hardware using different workloads to understand the limitations of the Nitro node software. The results of these upcoming tests will help us further improve Arbitrum technology.
As mentioned above, a gas target increase translates to an increase to the demand threshold at which L2 congestion pricing kicks in. Doing this naturally invites more demand to the network and could, therefore, result in more spam relative to organic traffic and today’s level of spam, since there would be more capacity to transact on the chain. While spam can be monitored, it is difficult to predict exactly how much more spam could take place on the network as a result of this change, relative to organic traffic.
To counteract the potential increase in spam, Entropy Advisors, an Arbitrum Aligned Entity (AAE), has suggested this proposal be accompanied with a change in the minimum L2 base fee from 0.01 gwei to 0.02 gwei. This change is based on the assumption that inorganic demand (generated from bots or spam) are more price sensitive compared to organic demand.
Careful monitoring and subsequent changes to the gas targets and their adjustment windows will be considered over time to better manage spam. We acknowledge that there is no single, one-size-fits-all solution to eliminating or reducing spam, and so this area remains a topic of ongoing research at Offchain Labs.
An increase in the minimum L2 base fee will result in, overall, higher transaction costs for all users during all periods, assuming usage remains the same. However, we believe this change (from 0.01 gwei/gas to 0.02 gwei/gas) is small enough that regular users and applications will largely be unaffected. To illustrate this, a simple ETH transfer consumes 21,000 gas. At $3500 USD per ETH, this increase in the minimum L2 base fee would result in a ~ $0.000735 increase in cost for an end user (0.01 gwei/gas * 21,000 gas * 1e-9 gwei/ETH * $3500 ETH = ~$0.000735).
If approved, these changes will be deployed with the values in Table 1, accompanied by continuous monitoring of the network and its response to the changes. With permission from the ArbitrumDAO, Offchain Labs may adjust these values over time to help maintain the stability and security of the network as the chain’s capacity increases.
Below are the approximate next steps and timelines for this proposal:
Formal submission to the ArbitrumDAO for consideration and assessment (this post)
Discussion and productive iteration together with the community (1 week)
Development and audit, by Trail of Bits, of the required changes to add multiple gas targets and adjustment windows, alongside the actual proposed starting parameter values (now through mid-November 2025)
Temperature check vote on Snapshot (mid-November 2025)
Arbitrum Sepolia upgrade to ArbOS 50, should the temperature check vote pass successfully (mid- to late-November 2025)
Submission for inclusion in the ArbOS 50 on-chain vote (carried out on Tally) (early December 2025), should the temperature check vote pass successfully, alongside the publication of the audit report from Trail of Bits.
All engineering and research conducted for this proposal was done so by Offchain Labs at no explicit or additional costs to the ArbitrumDAO
Constitutional proposal
Updated 10 November 2025: This proposal has been amended to include an increase in the L2 min base fee from 0.01 gwei to 0.02 gwei. This change is proposed to be executed by an ArbOwner precompile call to the setMinimumL2BaseFee function and will solely be a parameter/configuration change.
This AIP proposes to reduce the severity, frequency, and duration of high L2 gas prices during periods when demand exceeds the gas target by introducing a new set of gas targets and new, accompanying adjustment windows for Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova. The starting effective (lowest) gas target of the chain is proposed to be 10 Mgas/s with an adjustment period of 86,400 seconds (1 day). These changes are intended to replace the current 7 Mgas/s gas target, which is used to adjust the L2 gas price using an EIP-1559-inspired algorithm relative to the current 102-second adjustment window.
The AIP requests that the ArbitrumDAO grant Offchain Labs the right (for 2-years, measured from this proposal’s mainnet activation) to add up to 10 gas targets and adjustment windows, and to modify them over time—up to 100 Mgas/s and 86,400s, respectively. These changes will be introduced gradually to protect network stability while addressing high gas price volatility. The rollout begins with 6 new gas targets, each paired with its own adjustment window.
Lastly, this AIP is accompanied by an increase in the minimum L2 base fee from 0.01 gwei/gas to 0.02 gwei/gas to help reduce spam and offset any potential decline in the portion of L2 surplus fee-derived transaction fees (during periods of peak demand) to the ArbitrumDAO.
These updates and delegated rights are proposed by Offchain Labs in its role as an Arbitrum Aligned Entity (AAE), as described in A Vision for the Future of Arbitrum. Offchain Labs serves as an AAE for engineering, product, business development, and technical research.
All changes will be gated through smart contracts and DAO votes. Activation will require an on-chain vote, a security audit, and deployment of a new Resource Constraint Manager contract to manage permissions. If approved, only Offchain Labs will be authorized to adjust the parameters within the approved limits.
The proposal also outlines the rationale, risks, tradeoffs, and supporting data behind these changes. It applies solely to ArbitrumDAO-owned chains—Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova.
How gas costs are priced today
Arbitrum chains determine transaction gas fees using two components:
L1 gas costs – the expense of posting data to the parent chain.
L2 gas costs – the resources consumed on the child chain (computation and storage).
L1 gas costs depend on the price of calldata or blobs on the parent chain, while L2 gas costs depend on network demand. Today, when demand on Arbitrum One exceeds 7 MGas/s, the L2 base fee increases exponentially — using a mechanism similar to Ethereum’s EIP-1559 — until demand falls back toward the gas target over a 102-second adjustment window. Learn more about Arbitrum’s gas model here.
Negative impacts of elevated demand
During periods of high activity, L2 gas prices can rise sharply, which significantly increases transaction costs for users and developers. For example, on Oct. 10, 2025, Arbitrum One’s L2 gas price peaked at an average of 41 gwei/gas, resulting in roughly $9.49 in L2 gas costs to transfer an ERC-20 token (source, and assumes 60,000 gas and a price of $3,855 per Ether).
These high L2 gas price spikes are the motivation behind this AIP: to mitigate the frequency and severity of congestion-driven cost increases. Notably, introducing multiple gas targets with overlapping adjustment windows has a greater combined effect on stabilizing prices than raising a single gas target or changing a single adjustment window alone.
Illustrative example
To illustrate this, we analyzed how the L2 gas price would have changed during the demand surge on Oct. 10, 2025 and on Sept 22, 2025, under different gas targets and adjustment windows. The adjustment window is a time-based damping parameter that controls how slowly the L2 gas price responds to changes in demand on the network above the gas target. A larger adjustment window results in slower price adjustments relative to the gas target, while a smaller adjustment window results in faster price adjustments.
Figure 1: L2 gas prices calculated different pricing algorithms during a period of high congestion on Sept 22, 2025
Figure 2: L2 gas prices from different pricing algorithms during a period of high congestion on Oct 10, 2025
Below is a brief description of the colored lines and what they represent in each of the two figures above, while holding the minimum L2 base fee constant
Red lines: Actual L2 gas price using today’s parameters (effective gas target of 7 MGas/s over a 102-second adjustment window), peaking near 4 gwei on Sept 22 (Figure 1) and 42 gwei on Oct 10 (Figure 2).
Blue lines: L2 prices using the new set of proposed gas targets and adjustment windows, with an effective 7 MGas/s target and 86,400-second window.
Green lines: L2 prices using the new set of proposed gas targets and adjustment windows, with an effective 10 MGas/s target and 86,400-second window.
Looking specifically at Figure 2 during the period of peak demand on October 10, 2025, notice how both the green and the blue lines produce a much lower L2 gas price of ~9 gwei during the same demand peak, representing a ~33 gwei difference when compared to the peak of the red line (which uses today’s single 7 Mgas/s gas target and 102-second adjustment window). The difference between the peaks is almost ~33 gwei (129% difference) despite the effective gas targets being very close. Both the green and blue lines show substantially lower peak prices — around 9 gwei — a 33 gwei (≈129%) reduction compared to the current configuration, despite similar effective gas targets.
Summary and the increase in the minimum L2 base fee
This retrospective analysis shows that applying the proposed gas targets and adjustment windows would have significantly reduced L2 gas prices during the periods of peak demand on Sept 22, 2025 and Oct. 10, 2025. While this simulation does not predict future outcomes, it demonstrates that longer and overlapping adjustment windows can meaningfully dampen gas price volatility during periods of high demand.
Naturally, this change will mean that during periods of peak demand, the portion of L2 surplus fee-derived transaction fees collected by the ArbitrumDAO will be lower going forward, compared to before. To offset this potential decline, this proposal is to be accompanied by a slight increase in the minimum L2 base fee from 0.01 gwei/gas to 0.02 gwei/gas. This slight increase in the minimum L2 base fee can also positively contribute to reducing spam on the network as well, since the base fee for all transactions will be slightly larger than before this change.
New gas targets and adjustment windows
This proposal replaces the current, singular gas target (7 Mgas/s over a 102-second adjustment window) with multiple gas targets across overlapping adjustment windows, as tabulated in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Proposed gas targets & accompanying adjustment windows
| Gas Target (Mgas/s) | Adjustment window (seconds) |
|---|---|
| 60 | 9 |
| 41 | 52 |
| 29 | 329 |
| 20 | 2,105 |
| 14 | 13,485 |
| 10 | 86,400 |
These values were calculated using this model here, with inputs from internal benchmarking on a server hosted by a cloud provider. This model assumes that a node on the reference hardware can sustainably sync at 80 MGas/s and that the chain can tolerate a 20% increase in L2 gas price per second during periods of high demand. Reference hardware used for these tests was: 64 GB RAM, 8 CPUs (x86 architecture), and a locally attached NVMe drive (for AWS, i4i.2xlarge). Note that the lowest gas target of the 6 being introduced is 10 Mgas/s, which will be measured over the longest adjustment window (86,400s). We refer to this proposed 10 Mgas/s gas target as the “long-term gas target” or “effective gas target” of the chain..
Special permissions to gradually adjust gas targets and adjustment windows, over time
Separately, this proposal requests the ArbitrumDAO grant Offchain Labs permission, for 2 years from the mainnet activation of this proposal, to adjust the gas targets and adjustment windows in Table 1, in addition to the right to add up to 10 more gas targets and adjustment values. These rights will allow Offchain Labs to adjust these values over time and help the chain’s stability in a way that security is not negatively impacted as additional capacity is added. The rollout of these changes will be paired with continuous monitoring of how the user behavior, node operators, and the network itself respond to them. Summarized below in Table 1 are the values and ranges that this proposal grants Offchain Labs the right to adjust.
Table 2: Proposed gas targets and adjustment window ranges that can be adjusted over time by Offchain Labs, should the permission be granted by the ArbitrumDAO
| Parameter | Range | Status quo value |
|---|---|---|
| Number of gas targets | 1 to 10, inclusive | 1 |
| Gas targets | 7 Mgas/s to 100 Mgas/s, inclusive | 7 Mgas/s |
| Adjustment windows | 5 seconds to 86,400 seconds, inclusive | 102 seconds |
Resource Constraint Manager Contract
Lastly, if approved, there will be a new contract deployed called the ResourceConstraintManager that will give Offchain Labs the appropriate permissions to adjust the above values within the specified ranges in Table 2 over time, should this proposal pass. This new contract will be audited by an independent third party entity (Trail of Bits). A full audit report will be published alongside this proposal when it gets proposed in the eventual on-chain vote.
This new contract will contain an access list. We propose that the ArbitrumDAO use this access to designate Offchain Labs the right to invoke specific functions on the ArbOwner precompile to adjust the above values in Table 2, within certain ArbitrumDAO-approved bounds. Normally, ArbOwner parameter changes and function calls require an ArbitrumDAO vote. Implementing this ResourceConstraintManager contract will allow Offchain Labs to adjust these parameters in Table 2, within the proposed bounds, without the need for additional votes - should the ArbitrumDAO pass this proposal.
Changing the minimum L2 base fee
A change to the minimum L2 base fee is also included in this proposal and will be executed via a call to the ArbOwner setMinimumL2BaseFee function. This will be a one-time adjustment from the current 0.01 gwei value to a new 0.02 gwei value.
Risks & Tradeoffs
The addition of new, higher gas targets to a chain is not without tradeoffs. Below are some of the potential tradeoffs that the ArbitrumDAO and ecosystem should consider in their assessment of this proposal.
A gas target increase translates to an increase to the demand threshold at which EIP-1559-style congestion pricing kicks in, which will invite more demand to the network. After profiling the type of gas used on Arbitrum One over a period of about 3 weeks, the gas rate associated with state growth was observed to remain relatively stable over time. It is believed that if the capacity of the chain increases, then the rate of storage growth is expected to also increase.
While this issue presents a challenge regarding the size of the state database and the costs to maintain it over the long run (e.g., archive node operators), after careful consideration, we believe the below are sufficient justifications that support the current proposed course of action.
In September 2025, the Erigon team announced the alpha release of their archive node support for Arbitrum Sepolia. Their team was able to reduce the Arbitrum Sepolia archive node size from 12 TB to 0.732 TB, a 94% reduction. The Erigon team is expected to deliver Arbitrum One mainnet support by Q1 2026. This achievement will mean that node operators can opt to run archive nodes using Erigon, significantly reducing the cost associated with maintaining a larger and faster-growing state database size (when compared to today’s Geth-based Nitro nodes).
The majority of professional node operators surveyed run Arbitrum One nodes on bare-metal providers and in RAID0 configurations. This special type of setup grants node operators the flexibility and optionality to expand storage at more predictable (and sometimes lower) costs and in a horizontal fashion. Based on this information, we expect professional node operators to be able to adequately provision and scale up in their disk sizes over time.
In September 2025, AWS announced that it raised the limit on EBS GP3 volumes to 64 TB, up from 16 TB. Given that some instance families (e.g., i8g) have an upper bound of 32 EBS volumes, then the theoretical maximum that a node operator could provision on AWS would be 32 x 64 TB = 2048 TB. For NVMe drives, which we recommend for performance and latency today already, some instances offered by AWS go as high as 120 TB (i8g) and 45 TB (i7ie). We expect that cost reductions and other advancements to technology will continue to improve across all cloud providers, making access to these larger drives more affordable as time goes on (i.e., Moore’s Law).
The combination of the above 3 trends leads us to conclude that the risk of accelerated state growth, as a result of increased demand, can be reasonably managed in both the short and long term.
As noted in Table 1, the proposed starting gas targets and adjustment windows were computed using test results observed from syncing an Arbitrum node on reference hardware. The reference hardware used in these tests was 64 GB RAM, 8 CPUs (x86), and a locally attached NVMe drive formatted with ext4 (for AWS, i4i.2xlarge). Therefore, this proposal will accompany an increase in the minimum hardware requirements for node operators from the current specification. These requirements will be used as the foundation for future increases to the tech stack’s scaling capabilities.
Table 3: Comparison of current and new minimum hardware requirements for Arbitrum Nitro full nodes, given the new gas targets being proposed
| Arbitrum Nitro full node hardware requirements | Current (source) minimum | Proposed new minimum |
|---|---|---|
| Total RAM (GB) | 16 | 64 |
| Number of CPUs | 4 | 8 |
| Disk type | Local NVMe drive | Local NVMe drive |
Despite the cost increases that come with higher hardware minimums, we believe that this increase is justified because:
Surveys conducted with at-home node operators found that the majority of teams are already running Arbitrum Nitro full nodes on servers that have 12+ CPU cores, 64GB+ RAM, and NVMe drives. As such, we believe this change will bring the requirements in line with setups that teams use today.
The current minimum CPU and RAM requirements for running an Arbitrum Nitro node were defined over 3 years ago. As technology has improved and costs have decreased, we believe it makes sense to update this requirement to align with what the market can offer today at a similar price.
Future chain capacity increases will benefit from better hardware, and so this update will establish a new baseline for how we scale Arbitrum technology in the future
Over the coming weeks, we will perform similar benchmarking tests on various other types of hardware using different workloads to understand the limitations of the Nitro node software. The results of these upcoming tests will help us further improve Arbitrum technology.
As mentioned above, a gas target increase translates to an increase to the demand threshold at which L2 congestion pricing kicks in. Doing this naturally invites more demand to the network and could, therefore, result in more spam relative to organic traffic and today’s level of spam, since there would be more capacity to transact on the chain. While spam can be monitored, it is difficult to predict exactly how much more spam could take place on the network as a result of this change, relative to organic traffic.
To counteract the potential increase in spam, Entropy Advisors, an Arbitrum Aligned Entity (AAE), has suggested this proposal be accompanied with a change in the minimum L2 base fee from 0.01 gwei to 0.02 gwei. This change is based on the assumption that inorganic demand (generated from bots or spam) are more price sensitive compared to organic demand.
Careful monitoring and subsequent changes to the gas targets and their adjustment windows will be considered over time to better manage spam. We acknowledge that there is no single, one-size-fits-all solution to eliminating or reducing spam, and so this area remains a topic of ongoing research at Offchain Labs.
An increase in the minimum L2 base fee will result in, overall, higher transaction costs for all users during all periods, assuming usage remains the same. However, we believe this change (from 0.01 gwei/gas to 0.02 gwei/gas) is small enough that regular users and applications will largely be unaffected. To illustrate this, a simple ETH transfer consumes 21,000 gas. At $3500 USD per ETH, this increase in the minimum L2 base fee would result in a ~ $0.000735 increase in cost for an end user (0.01 gwei/gas * 21,000 gas * 1e-9 gwei/ETH * $3500 ETH = ~$0.000735).
If approved, these changes will be deployed with the values in Table 1, accompanied by continuous monitoring of the network and its response to the changes. With permission from the ArbitrumDAO, Offchain Labs may adjust these values over time to help maintain the stability and security of the network as the chain’s capacity increases.
Below are the approximate next steps and timelines for this proposal:
Formal submission to the ArbitrumDAO for consideration and assessment (this post)
Discussion and productive iteration together with the community (1 week)
Development and audit, by Trail of Bits, of the required changes to add multiple gas targets and adjustment windows, alongside the actual proposed starting parameter values (now through mid-November 2025)
Temperature check vote on Snapshot (mid-November 2025)
Arbitrum Sepolia upgrade to ArbOS 50, should the temperature check vote pass successfully (mid- to late-November 2025)
Submission for inclusion in the ArbOS 50 on-chain vote (carried out on Tally) (early December 2025), should the temperature check vote pass successfully, alongside the publication of the audit report from Trail of Bits.
All engineering and research conducted for this proposal was done so by Offchain Labs at no explicit or additional costs to the ArbitrumDAO
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-139): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-139
The Event Horizon Community voted FOR on this proposal (ehARB-139): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-139
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-raise-the-gas-target-min-l2-base-fee-implement-improvements-to-the-pricing-algorithm/30182/21
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-raise-the-gas-target-min-l2-base-fee-implement-improvements-to-the-pricing-algorithm/30182/12?u=arbitrumgaming
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-raise-the-gas-target-min-l2-base-fee-implement-improvements-to-the-pricing-algorithm/30182/18?u=maxlomu
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/24
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-raise-the-gas-target-min-l2-base-fee-implement-improvements-to-the-pricing-algorithm/30182/17?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-raise-the-gas-target-min-l2-base-fee-implement-improvements-to-the-pricing-algorithm/30182/15?u=griff
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-139): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-139
The Event Horizon Community voted FOR on this proposal (ehARB-139): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-139
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-raise-the-gas-target-min-l2-base-fee-implement-improvements-to-the-pricing-algorithm/30182/21
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-raise-the-gas-target-min-l2-base-fee-implement-improvements-to-the-pricing-algorithm/30182/12?u=arbitrumgaming
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-raise-the-gas-target-min-l2-base-fee-implement-improvements-to-the-pricing-algorithm/30182/18?u=maxlomu
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/24
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-raise-the-gas-target-min-l2-base-fee-implement-improvements-to-the-pricing-algorithm/30182/17?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-raise-the-gas-target-min-l2-base-fee-implement-improvements-to-the-pricing-algorithm/30182/15?u=griff
Sherlock appreciates the depth of the proposal and agrees that reducing gas price volatility and enabling more flexible throughput tuning is directionally beneficial. At the same time, Sherlock would like to offer its security-focused perspective, since higher capacity and expanded parameter authority introduce meaningful security and decentralization considerations that the DAO should address alongside the technical rollout. The proposal mentions that higher throughput will increase hardware and storage demands, with Offchain Labs recommending a new baseline of 8 CPUs, 64 GB RAM, and NVMe storage for Arbitrum One and Nova nodes.
This is reasonable for scaling, but it’s important to ensure accessibility for smaller operators over time.
Sherlock appreciates the depth of the proposal and agrees that reducing gas price volatility and enabling more flexible throughput tuning is directionally beneficial. At the same time, Sherlock would like to offer its security-focused perspective, since higher capacity and expanded parameter authority introduce meaningful security and decentralization considerations that the DAO should address alongside the technical rollout. The proposal mentions that higher throughput will increase hardware and storage demands, with Offchain Labs recommending a new baseline of 8 CPUs, 64 GB RAM, and NVMe storage for Arbitrum One and Nova nodes.
This is reasonable for scaling, but it’s important to ensure accessibility for smaller operators over time.
Maintain and publicly update baseline and recommended specs with a notice period before any future increase.
Provide monthly telemetry reports with state growth data (GB per day, keys per day) and resource usage percentiles so the DAO can monitor impact under real conditions.
Define rollback or pause criteria, for example, if resource use exceeds thresholds or if there is a sustained 15% decline in active nodes over four weeks instead of short week-to-week noise.
Delegating limited authority for two years can accelerate technical iteration, but it increases reliance on a single actor unless paired with strong transparency and clear oversight.
Maintain a public change log documenting every parameter update (what changed, why, before and after metrics).
Provide a monthly telemetry dashboard covering base fee percentiles, throughput, failed transaction rate, state growth, L1 data cost share, sequencer revenue, and other key indicators.
Apply rate limits on parameter changes (for example, maximum N per week with bounded step sizes).
Schedule 6- and 12-month DAO reviews to renew, narrow, or revoke delegated authority based on measured outcomes.
Open-source the pricing algorithm implementation so the community can audit and test changes independently.
Prepare a backup plan in case the Erigon integration or other client dependencies are delayed.
On the other hand, Arbitrum does not use traditional validator economics since it operates a sequencer model managed by Offchain Labs. The “node operators” mostly run full nodes for RPC access and data availability, and they do not directly receive transaction fees. The real concern is DAO treasury sustainability, network health, and bot economics.
Publish weekly breakdowns of base fee revenue versus L1 data costs and throughput metrics before and after deployment.
Monitor independent node counts and liveness to ensure decentralization and resilience remain strong.
Commit to parameter or fee floor adjustments if decentralization metrics or DAO revenue sustainability deteriorate beyond defined thresholds.
Fewer independent nodes could weaken decentralization and censorship resistance, visibility here is key.
very excited to dive into this proposal during the discussion call next week.
Is this to better support enterprise level clients? without naming them directly
Sherlock appreciates the depth of the proposal and agrees that reducing gas price volatility and enabling more flexible throughput tuning is directionally beneficial. At the same time, Sherlock would like to offer its security-focused perspective, since higher capacity and expanded parameter authority introduce meaningful security and decentralization considerations that the DAO should address alongside the technical rollout. The proposal mentions that higher throughput will increase hardware and storage demands, with Offchain Labs recommending a new baseline of 8 CPUs, 64 GB RAM, and NVMe storage for Arbitrum One and Nova nodes.
This is reasonable for scaling, but it’s important to ensure accessibility for smaller operators over time.
Sherlock appreciates the depth of the proposal and agrees that reducing gas price volatility and enabling more flexible throughput tuning is directionally beneficial. At the same time, Sherlock would like to offer its security-focused perspective, since higher capacity and expanded parameter authority introduce meaningful security and decentralization considerations that the DAO should address alongside the technical rollout. The proposal mentions that higher throughput will increase hardware and storage demands, with Offchain Labs recommending a new baseline of 8 CPUs, 64 GB RAM, and NVMe storage for Arbitrum One and Nova nodes.
This is reasonable for scaling, but it’s important to ensure accessibility for smaller operators over time.
Maintain and publicly update baseline and recommended specs with a notice period before any future increase.
Provide monthly telemetry reports with state growth data (GB per day, keys per day) and resource usage percentiles so the DAO can monitor impact under real conditions.
Define rollback or pause criteria, for example, if resource use exceeds thresholds or if there is a sustained 15% decline in active nodes over four weeks instead of short week-to-week noise.
Delegating limited authority for two years can accelerate technical iteration, but it increases reliance on a single actor unless paired with strong transparency and clear oversight.
Maintain a public change log documenting every parameter update (what changed, why, before and after metrics).
Provide a monthly telemetry dashboard covering base fee percentiles, throughput, failed transaction rate, state growth, L1 data cost share, sequencer revenue, and other key indicators.
Apply rate limits on parameter changes (for example, maximum N per week with bounded step sizes).
Schedule 6- and 12-month DAO reviews to renew, narrow, or revoke delegated authority based on measured outcomes.
Open-source the pricing algorithm implementation so the community can audit and test changes independently.
Prepare a backup plan in case the Erigon integration or other client dependencies are delayed.
On the other hand, Arbitrum does not use traditional validator economics since it operates a sequencer model managed by Offchain Labs. The “node operators” mostly run full nodes for RPC access and data availability, and they do not directly receive transaction fees. The real concern is DAO treasury sustainability, network health, and bot economics.
Publish weekly breakdowns of base fee revenue versus L1 data costs and throughput metrics before and after deployment.
Monitor independent node counts and liveness to ensure decentralization and resilience remain strong.
Commit to parameter or fee floor adjustments if decentralization metrics or DAO revenue sustainability deteriorate beyond defined thresholds.
Fewer independent nodes could weaken decentralization and censorship resistance, visibility here is key.
very excited to dive into this proposal during the discussion call next week.
Is this to better support enterprise level clients? without naming them directly
Thanks for the thoughtful questions and perspectives @Camelot @gi0rgos @Jonezee @shogun
It’s difficult to produce precise projections for how a 2x increase to the minimum base fee may influence arbitrage, market-making, and user flows, holistically - these behaviors adapt to many variables. However we can lean on historical usage - the minimum base fee was previously 10x higher (0.1 gwei) before the Arbitrum Security Council was requested to take a non-emergency action to reduce it to 0.01 gwei in March 2024; activity across DeFi protocols (including DEXs and perps) remained healthy before that reduction.
Thanks for the thoughtful questions and perspectives @Camelot @gi0rgos @Jonezee @shogun
It’s difficult to produce precise projections for how a 2x increase to the minimum base fee may influence arbitrage, market-making, and user flows, holistically - these behaviors adapt to many variables. However we can lean on historical usage - the minimum base fee was previously 10x higher (0.1 gwei) before the Arbitrum Security Council was requested to take a non-emergency action to reduce it to 0.01 gwei in March 2024; activity across DeFi protocols (including DEXs and perps) remained healthy before that reduction.
The intent behind the proposed fee curve changes is to smooth out the user experience of fees during high-activity events, while the intent behind the related proposed 0.02 gwei minimum is to not meaningfully impact typical user experience but to balance and stabilize DAO revenue as the smoother fee curve reduces surplus fees. At the same time, the adjustment in the base fee helps make spam-style bot activity more expensive, which causes unpredictable fees for organic users. The adjustment remains well within historically permissible parameters for the ecosystem.
For a deeper explanation of the rationale, we encourage reading this response from @Entropy
Entropy Advisors is strongly in favor of this proposal. As always, thank you to the Offchain Labs team for putting this together.
However, we are in favor of modifying this proposal to also include a 2x of the minimum base fee from .01 gwei to .02 gwei. We wrote extensively about this topic and our rationale behind our view point here.
To quickly summarize, we estimate that roughly 80-90% of daily transactions conducted on Arbitrum One are bot-driven in nature. While increasing the minimum base fee has a minimal effect on “average” users that engage with applications in an organic manner, it will increase the costs of transacting for bot operators. We view this as positive, as it could help prevent spam-motivated bots that congest the network for ordinary users, and could even push arbitrage bots to engage with Timeboost and make the product a more competitive marketplace.
Screenshot 2025-11-05 at 12.36.31 PM721×406 49.5 KB
As a side benefit, a slight increase to the L2 min base fee will also ensure the DAO does not experience a decrease in revenue, while also improving the revenue predictability and thus financial forecasting/budgeting capabilities of the DAO. As can be seen in the image below, L2 Surplus Fees generate a lot of revenue for the DAO but are more sporadic in nature. This leads to a less than ideal UX for organic users on Arbitrum One during times of congestion, which is why we are in support of this proposal from OCL. It is simply not worth the added revenue that accrues to the DAO.
Screenshot 2025-11-05 at 12.49.56 PM721×406 21.7 KB
In contrast to L2 surplus fees, the L2 base fee provides a much more stable source of DAO revenue (image below) and does not come at the expense of organic users’ experience. The L2 min base fee on Arbitrum One was previously set to 0.1 gwei prior to the ArbOS Atlas upgrade, so we already know that this is a safe change to make.
Screenshot 2025-11-05 at 12.52.22 PM721×404 23.5 KB
Over the past 90 days, the DAO has generated ~$6.7M of revenue from transaction fees, of which only $1.8M was derived from the L2 base fees and the remainder coming from L2 surplus fees. With this proposal, the L2 surplus fees are set to be drastically reduced. However, if we increase L2 min base fee from .01 gwei to .02 gwei, paired with the increased gas target per second and subsequent increase in daily transaction count from bots, the min base fee increase should help offset the revenue decline in L2 surplus fees.
To sum it up - we are in favor of this proposal as is, but believe it is made stronger by incorporating a slight increase to the L2 min base fee. This has the potential to increase Timeboost participation, make spam activity more expensive to conduct (thus providing more, cheaper block space for organic users), and offset the decline in L2 surplus fee-derived revenue by increasing L2 min base fee-derived revenue which is more predictable in nature.
Hey dzack23, great question. The reason is so that future changes may involve the introduction of a gas target for a very short window of 5 seconds (almost half of the current shortest adjustment window of 9s). A gas target measured over a 5 second adjustment window would be used to allow the chain to handle extreme demand shocks for a brief, short period of time. For example, a gas target of 75Mgas/s over 5 seconds may be accompanied by gas targets measured over longer periods of time (than the ones already proposed).
I realize that raising the baseline gas fee seems like a sensible add-on to this proposal, and I can imagine that for most Arbitrum dApps, this is not a change that will be significantly felt by users.
However, speaking for GMX and it’s ~5000 weekly users, allow me to disagree: the increase will definitely be noticable by users. And will definitely push some smaller users away. We already get many comments on the regular from users about how not having to pay gas fees is a crucial reason for them to consider alternative, non-Arbitrum-based trading platforms.
I realize that raising the baseline gas fee seems like a sensible add-on to this proposal, and I can imagine that for most Arbitrum dApps, this is not a change that will be significantly felt by users.
However, speaking for GMX and it’s ~5000 weekly users, allow me to disagree: the increase will definitely be noticable by users. And will definitely push some smaller users away. We already get many comments on the regular from users about how not having to pay gas fees is a crucial reason for them to consider alternative, non-Arbitrum-based trading platforms.
For added context: complex smart contracts like GMX’s are gas-intensive. In quiet times, users pay about 7 cents, but that can easily go up to 20 cents. And that’s for a simple onchain transaction, of which the average trader faces many every day. For a complex transaction, like setting a limit order with a Take Profit and a Stop Loss included, these fees increase exponentially…
So please don’t underestimate the impact of such a change.
Thanks for the thoughtful questions and perspectives @Camelot @gi0rgos @Jonezee @shogun
It’s difficult to produce precise projections for how a 2x increase to the minimum base fee may influence arbitrage, market-making, and user flows, holistically - these behaviors adapt to many variables. However we can lean on historical usage - the minimum base fee was previously 10x higher (0.1 gwei) before the Arbitrum Security Council was requested to take a non-emergency action to reduce it to 0.01 gwei in March 2024; activity across DeFi protocols (including DEXs and perps) remained healthy before that reduction.
Thanks for the thoughtful questions and perspectives @Camelot @gi0rgos @Jonezee @shogun
It’s difficult to produce precise projections for how a 2x increase to the minimum base fee may influence arbitrage, market-making, and user flows, holistically - these behaviors adapt to many variables. However we can lean on historical usage - the minimum base fee was previously 10x higher (0.1 gwei) before the Arbitrum Security Council was requested to take a non-emergency action to reduce it to 0.01 gwei in March 2024; activity across DeFi protocols (including DEXs and perps) remained healthy before that reduction.
The intent behind the proposed fee curve changes is to smooth out the user experience of fees during high-activity events, while the intent behind the related proposed 0.02 gwei minimum is to not meaningfully impact typical user experience but to balance and stabilize DAO revenue as the smoother fee curve reduces surplus fees. At the same time, the adjustment in the base fee helps make spam-style bot activity more expensive, which causes unpredictable fees for organic users. The adjustment remains well within historically permissible parameters for the ecosystem.
For a deeper explanation of the rationale, we encourage reading this response from @Entropy
Entropy Advisors is strongly in favor of this proposal. As always, thank you to the Offchain Labs team for putting this together.
However, we are in favor of modifying this proposal to also include a 2x of the minimum base fee from .01 gwei to .02 gwei. We wrote extensively about this topic and our rationale behind our view point here.
To quickly summarize, we estimate that roughly 80-90% of daily transactions conducted on Arbitrum One are bot-driven in nature. While increasing the minimum base fee has a minimal effect on “average” users that engage with applications in an organic manner, it will increase the costs of transacting for bot operators. We view this as positive, as it could help prevent spam-motivated bots that congest the network for ordinary users, and could even push arbitrage bots to engage with Timeboost and make the product a more competitive marketplace.
Screenshot 2025-11-05 at 12.36.31 PM721×406 49.5 KB
As a side benefit, a slight increase to the L2 min base fee will also ensure the DAO does not experience a decrease in revenue, while also improving the revenue predictability and thus financial forecasting/budgeting capabilities of the DAO. As can be seen in the image below, L2 Surplus Fees generate a lot of revenue for the DAO but are more sporadic in nature. This leads to a less than ideal UX for organic users on Arbitrum One during times of congestion, which is why we are in support of this proposal from OCL. It is simply not worth the added revenue that accrues to the DAO.
Screenshot 2025-11-05 at 12.49.56 PM721×406 21.7 KB
In contrast to L2 surplus fees, the L2 base fee provides a much more stable source of DAO revenue (image below) and does not come at the expense of organic users’ experience. The L2 min base fee on Arbitrum One was previously set to 0.1 gwei prior to the ArbOS Atlas upgrade, so we already know that this is a safe change to make.
Screenshot 2025-11-05 at 12.52.22 PM721×404 23.5 KB
Over the past 90 days, the DAO has generated ~$6.7M of revenue from transaction fees, of which only $1.8M was derived from the L2 base fees and the remainder coming from L2 surplus fees. With this proposal, the L2 surplus fees are set to be drastically reduced. However, if we increase L2 min base fee from .01 gwei to .02 gwei, paired with the increased gas target per second and subsequent increase in daily transaction count from bots, the min base fee increase should help offset the revenue decline in L2 surplus fees.
To sum it up - we are in favor of this proposal as is, but believe it is made stronger by incorporating a slight increase to the L2 min base fee. This has the potential to increase Timeboost participation, make spam activity more expensive to conduct (thus providing more, cheaper block space for organic users), and offset the decline in L2 surplus fee-derived revenue by increasing L2 min base fee-derived revenue which is more predictable in nature.
Hey dzack23, great question. The reason is so that future changes may involve the introduction of a gas target for a very short window of 5 seconds (almost half of the current shortest adjustment window of 9s). A gas target measured over a 5 second adjustment window would be used to allow the chain to handle extreme demand shocks for a brief, short period of time. For example, a gas target of 75Mgas/s over 5 seconds may be accompanied by gas targets measured over longer periods of time (than the ones already proposed).
I realize that raising the baseline gas fee seems like a sensible add-on to this proposal, and I can imagine that for most Arbitrum dApps, this is not a change that will be significantly felt by users.
However, speaking for GMX and it’s ~5000 weekly users, allow me to disagree: the increase will definitely be noticable by users. And will definitely push some smaller users away. We already get many comments on the regular from users about how not having to pay gas fees is a crucial reason for them to consider alternative, non-Arbitrum-based trading platforms.
I realize that raising the baseline gas fee seems like a sensible add-on to this proposal, and I can imagine that for most Arbitrum dApps, this is not a change that will be significantly felt by users.
However, speaking for GMX and it’s ~5000 weekly users, allow me to disagree: the increase will definitely be noticable by users. And will definitely push some smaller users away. We already get many comments on the regular from users about how not having to pay gas fees is a crucial reason for them to consider alternative, non-Arbitrum-based trading platforms.
For added context: complex smart contracts like GMX’s are gas-intensive. In quiet times, users pay about 7 cents, but that can easily go up to 20 cents. And that’s for a simple onchain transaction, of which the average trader faces many every day. For a complex transaction, like setting a limit order with a Take Profit and a Stop Loss included, these fees increase exponentially…
So please don’t underestimate the impact of such a change.
As an Arbitrum user from the very day the chain went live – and on behalf of GMX, one of the most gas-intensive, revenue-generating dapps on the chain – I can say that I look forward to this change tremendously.
Being one of the few Perp DEX trading platforms dedicated to building on decentralized public blockchains, chain congestion events and Arbitrum’s severe gas spikes are among the biggest remaining UX issues we have to deal with. Our 5000+ weekly users have huge amounts of funds on the line in active trades, and there is no worse feeling than not being able to get a transaction through at those moments when you most need to.
As an Arbitrum user from the very day the chain went live – and on behalf of GMX, one of the most gas-intensive, revenue-generating dapps on the chain – I can say that I look forward to this change tremendously.
Being one of the few Perp DEX trading platforms dedicated to building on decentralized public blockchains, chain congestion events and Arbitrum’s severe gas spikes are among the biggest remaining UX issues we have to deal with. Our 5000+ weekly users have huge amounts of funds on the line in active trades, and there is no worse feeling than not being able to get a transaction through at those moments when you most need to.
Being able to better deal with demand shocks is a crucial issue for us. It will meaningfully boost the GMX experience and will have a vast, direct impact on user satisfaction and retention.
During a call today, some one suggested that the fire starter pilot should focus on revenue ideas.
I would suggest a study / analysis of the minimum base fee for a transaction. The minimum rate has been doubled in this proposal. But my understanding is that even doubling the rate is immaterial to most. So why couldn t it be 10 times or 20 times? As long as it feels immaterial, it should not affect transaction volume.
Thank you @frisson for your support of our proposal. Your feedback has been noted and we have edited the proposal to include Entropy Advisor’s suggestions, alongside a special call out at the top to highlight this edit.
Thank you @EntropyAdvisors for your support of our proposal. We at Offchain Labs remain an Arbitrum Aligned Entity (AAE) for the functions of "Engineering, Product, Business Development and Technical Research, Contracted Service Provider to Foundation" as it relates to Arbitrum technology. As a result, we will refrain from commenting on the topics relating to ArbitrumDAO revenue or finances. We will, however, comment on the technical aspects of this change. Your proposed change is a parameter change using a pre-established function in the ArbOwner contract. We believe that this change poses little to no additional security risks and can easily be included in the proposal payload that will be executed following a successful on-chain vote. We have edited the proposal to include this change and have made a special call out at the top to highlight this edit.
This proposal has been amended to include an increase in the L2 min base fee from 0.01 gwei to 0.02 gwei. This change is proposed to be executed by an ArbOwner precompile call to the setMinimumL2BaseFee function and will solely be a parameter/configuration change.
Supporting enterprise-level clients with Arbitrum technology has always been a goal for Offchain Labs. This particular AIP is not, however, aimed solely at enterprise-level clients but rather to optimize Arbitrum technology and the pricing algorithm used to price resource usage and demand on the chain. We view these types of optimizations as being net-beneficial to any user of Arbitrum technology: enterprise-level users and regular users alike.
As an Arbitrum user from the very day the chain went live – and on behalf of GMX, one of the most gas-intensive, revenue-generating dapps on the chain – I can say that I look forward to this change tremendously.
Being one of the few Perp DEX trading platforms dedicated to building on decentralized public blockchains, chain congestion events and Arbitrum’s severe gas spikes are among the biggest remaining UX issues we have to deal with. Our 5000+ weekly users have huge amounts of funds on the line in active trades, and there is no worse feeling than not being able to get a transaction through at those moments when you most need to.
As an Arbitrum user from the very day the chain went live – and on behalf of GMX, one of the most gas-intensive, revenue-generating dapps on the chain – I can say that I look forward to this change tremendously.
Being one of the few Perp DEX trading platforms dedicated to building on decentralized public blockchains, chain congestion events and Arbitrum’s severe gas spikes are among the biggest remaining UX issues we have to deal with. Our 5000+ weekly users have huge amounts of funds on the line in active trades, and there is no worse feeling than not being able to get a transaction through at those moments when you most need to.
Being able to better deal with demand shocks is a crucial issue for us. It will meaningfully boost the GMX experience and will have a vast, direct impact on user satisfaction and retention.
During a call today, some one suggested that the fire starter pilot should focus on revenue ideas.
I would suggest a study / analysis of the minimum base fee for a transaction. The minimum rate has been doubled in this proposal. But my understanding is that even doubling the rate is immaterial to most. So why couldn t it be 10 times or 20 times? As long as it feels immaterial, it should not affect transaction volume.
Thank you @frisson for your support of our proposal. Your feedback has been noted and we have edited the proposal to include Entropy Advisor’s suggestions, alongside a special call out at the top to highlight this edit.
Thank you @EntropyAdvisors for your support of our proposal. We at Offchain Labs remain an Arbitrum Aligned Entity (AAE) for the functions of "Engineering, Product, Business Development and Technical Research, Contracted Service Provider to Foundation" as it relates to Arbitrum technology. As a result, we will refrain from commenting on the topics relating to ArbitrumDAO revenue or finances. We will, however, comment on the technical aspects of this change. Your proposed change is a parameter change using a pre-established function in the ArbOwner contract. We believe that this change poses little to no additional security risks and can easily be included in the proposal payload that will be executed following a successful on-chain vote. We have edited the proposal to include this change and have made a special call out at the top to highlight this edit.
This proposal has been amended to include an increase in the L2 min base fee from 0.01 gwei to 0.02 gwei. This change is proposed to be executed by an ArbOwner precompile call to the setMinimumL2BaseFee function and will solely be a parameter/configuration change.
Supporting enterprise-level clients with Arbitrum technology has always been a goal for Offchain Labs. This particular AIP is not, however, aimed solely at enterprise-level clients but rather to optimize Arbitrum technology and the pricing algorithm used to price resource usage and demand on the chain. We view these types of optimizations as being net-beneficial to any user of Arbitrum technology: enterprise-level users and regular users alike.
gm, voted FOR as previously justified.
gm, voted FOR as previously justified.
voting as referenced here
voting For on this offchain vote because this will improve the network
Voting For on Tally
Having more predictable fees makes sense in all scenarios. Even as a regular user, knowing roughly what you'll pay is valuable. But it's especially important for the protocol because predictable pricing is what allows developers to build sustainable business models on top of Arbitrum.
Voting For on Tally
Having more predictable fees makes sense in all scenarios. Even as a regular user, knowing roughly what you'll pay is valuable. But it's especially important for the protocol because predictable pricing is what allows developers to build sustainable business models on top of Arbitrum.
Raising the minimum L2 base fee to is a small and low risk change. Fees on L2s are already very low, so general users won't even notice .
As for node operators, I don't think this change will actually reduce the number of people running nodes. Operators who have economic or strategic reasons to run nodes will adapt. The impact on network participation should be limited.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR
Our research team reviewed the bundle and found no blockers; the changes appear to do what they claim. This vote centers on ArbOS 51 and rolls out the gas-pricing tweaks we already approved at temp check: more (and longer) targets to smooth peak-time spikes, plus a slight increase in the min L2 base fee (0.01 → 0.02 gwei) to help discourage spam.
The native mint/burn code is included but stays off on Arbitrum One and Nova, and on-chain limits constrain any tuning. Trail of Bits has audited the release, and activation follows the published timeline.
In quiet times, users pay about 7 cents, but that can easily go up to 20 cents.
Hey @Jonezee thanks for bringing up your/ GMX's perspective. I believe the purpose of this proposal is exactly to reduce those spikes in times of high congestions.
Thank you for the comment.
I had studied the Entropy position in detail before posting my rationale, and I agree with you that it provides a solid rationale for the adjustment.
However, what I did not know, and is another strong argument, is that in the past, the minimum fee level was 10 times higher, and yet no harm to protocol activity was observed. This is even more reassuring.
Camelot supports this proposal as we see value in having a smoother fee curve during periods of network congestion. We have observed what happens during turmoil periods, and we believe the proposed changes would benefit user experience by reducing the volatility in gas pricing, especially in DeFi protocols that do see increase of usage like DEXes and Perps. However, we are somewhat dubious about increasing the base fee. While there is certainly merit in both increasing base revenue for the DAO and eliminating spam transactions, we wonder how this would affect arbitrageurs and market makers. We are particularly interested in understanding if there are any projections on how this increase might change activity that is key for specific DeFi protocols, namely DEXs and perpetual protocols.
We are overall supportive of the direction, but before moving to Tally we would like the question above answered. We acknowledge there is a scenario in which market maker data is simply not public, not even for Offchain Labs, and so conducting projections might be complex. If such data constraints exist, we would appreciate transparency around that limitation and any alternative analysis that could be provided to assess the potential impact on arbitrage and market-making activities.
Your minimum fee level point was a good one, I didn’t even think of that. Definitely in favor of the proposal.
Multiple cascading gas targets seems like a very good idea — likely voting “for.”
I am curious why the lower bound of value the ResourceConstraintManager can set the adjustment window is lower than the current status quo (5 seconds vs. 102 seconds). In what scenarios would the ResourceConstraintManager want to set it to such a low value?
Voting For I believe raising the base fee to 0.02 makes a lot of sense. Fees on L2s are already extremely low, and in most cases users won't even notice the difference. Arbitrum's monthly revenue is currently way behind Base, and I love to see us experiment with new, low risk, ways to compete. If the change doesn't work out the way we hope, we can always roll it back.
Revenue comparison from Grow the Pie
Entropy posted this proposal on behalf of OCL to Snapshot yesterday. It is now live for voting and concludes at 4:55 pm UTC on Thursday, November 20th.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We are generally in accordance with the increased minimum L2 base fee, its important to note that the aforementioned spike in October 10th 2025 and September 22nd 2025 in gas expense, and more recently 4th November 2025, was related to a series of perps orders being triggered. Perps and derivatives users on Arbitrum, will unambiguously feel this expense, what we hope is that this doesn’t deliver an undesirable result for traders to move away in high demand usage.
Reminder that Base makes more money because they do 7x the monthly transactions of Arbitrum. We shouldn’t looking at increasing cost to increase our revenues, we should look at ways to attract more apps and more users.
Thank you for the proposal! This is an important topic, as changes in gas fees can affect different types of users in different ways, especially with this climax structure.
I understand the change proposed by @Entropy and also the concerns raised by @Jonezee regarding the potential impact on everyday and smaller users. I have spent some time trying to analyze the real effects, since losing users from the ecosystem would be a serious issue. Based on what I have found so far, while there may be some impact for certain use cases, I believe that the overall benefits outweigh the drawbacks. Therefore, at this stage, I intend to vote FOR.
gm, I voted FOR. All changes are reasonable, including the base fee increase to avoid spam increase.
Thank you for putting out a technical proposal in a very clear and understandable format.
gm, I voted FOR. All changes are reasonable, including the base fee increase to avoid spam increase.
Thank you for putting out a technical proposal in a very clear and understandable format.
Arbitrum’s monthly revenue is currently way behind Base, and I love to see us experiment with new, low risk, ways to compete.
Reminder that Base makes more money because they do 7x the monthly transactions of Arbitrum. We shouldn't be looking at increasing cost to increase our revenues, we should look at ways to attract more apps and more users.
Tx count per growthepie - Base (dark blue) vs Arbitrum
voting as referenced here
voting For on this offchain vote because this will improve the network
Voting For on Tally
Having more predictable fees makes sense in all scenarios. Even as a regular user, knowing roughly what you'll pay is valuable. But it's especially important for the protocol because predictable pricing is what allows developers to build sustainable business models on top of Arbitrum.
Voting For on Tally
Having more predictable fees makes sense in all scenarios. Even as a regular user, knowing roughly what you'll pay is valuable. But it's especially important for the protocol because predictable pricing is what allows developers to build sustainable business models on top of Arbitrum.
Raising the minimum L2 base fee to is a small and low risk change. Fees on L2s are already very low, so general users won't even notice .
As for node operators, I don't think this change will actually reduce the number of people running nodes. Operators who have economic or strategic reasons to run nodes will adapt. The impact on network participation should be limited.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR
Our research team reviewed the bundle and found no blockers; the changes appear to do what they claim. This vote centers on ArbOS 51 and rolls out the gas-pricing tweaks we already approved at temp check: more (and longer) targets to smooth peak-time spikes, plus a slight increase in the min L2 base fee (0.01 → 0.02 gwei) to help discourage spam.
The native mint/burn code is included but stays off on Arbitrum One and Nova, and on-chain limits constrain any tuning. Trail of Bits has audited the release, and activation follows the published timeline.
In quiet times, users pay about 7 cents, but that can easily go up to 20 cents.
Hey @Jonezee thanks for bringing up your/ GMX's perspective. I believe the purpose of this proposal is exactly to reduce those spikes in times of high congestions.
Thank you for the comment.
I had studied the Entropy position in detail before posting my rationale, and I agree with you that it provides a solid rationale for the adjustment.
However, what I did not know, and is another strong argument, is that in the past, the minimum fee level was 10 times higher, and yet no harm to protocol activity was observed. This is even more reassuring.
Camelot supports this proposal as we see value in having a smoother fee curve during periods of network congestion. We have observed what happens during turmoil periods, and we believe the proposed changes would benefit user experience by reducing the volatility in gas pricing, especially in DeFi protocols that do see increase of usage like DEXes and Perps. However, we are somewhat dubious about increasing the base fee. While there is certainly merit in both increasing base revenue for the DAO and eliminating spam transactions, we wonder how this would affect arbitrageurs and market makers. We are particularly interested in understanding if there are any projections on how this increase might change activity that is key for specific DeFi protocols, namely DEXs and perpetual protocols.
We are overall supportive of the direction, but before moving to Tally we would like the question above answered. We acknowledge there is a scenario in which market maker data is simply not public, not even for Offchain Labs, and so conducting projections might be complex. If such data constraints exist, we would appreciate transparency around that limitation and any alternative analysis that could be provided to assess the potential impact on arbitrage and market-making activities.
Your minimum fee level point was a good one, I didn’t even think of that. Definitely in favor of the proposal.
Multiple cascading gas targets seems like a very good idea — likely voting “for.”
I am curious why the lower bound of value the ResourceConstraintManager can set the adjustment window is lower than the current status quo (5 seconds vs. 102 seconds). In what scenarios would the ResourceConstraintManager want to set it to such a low value?
Voting For I believe raising the base fee to 0.02 makes a lot of sense. Fees on L2s are already extremely low, and in most cases users won't even notice the difference. Arbitrum's monthly revenue is currently way behind Base, and I love to see us experiment with new, low risk, ways to compete. If the change doesn't work out the way we hope, we can always roll it back.
Revenue comparison from Grow the Pie
Entropy posted this proposal on behalf of OCL to Snapshot yesterday. It is now live for voting and concludes at 4:55 pm UTC on Thursday, November 20th.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We are generally in accordance with the increased minimum L2 base fee, its important to note that the aforementioned spike in October 10th 2025 and September 22nd 2025 in gas expense, and more recently 4th November 2025, was related to a series of perps orders being triggered. Perps and derivatives users on Arbitrum, will unambiguously feel this expense, what we hope is that this doesn’t deliver an undesirable result for traders to move away in high demand usage.
Reminder that Base makes more money because they do 7x the monthly transactions of Arbitrum. We shouldn’t looking at increasing cost to increase our revenues, we should look at ways to attract more apps and more users.
Thank you for the proposal! This is an important topic, as changes in gas fees can affect different types of users in different ways, especially with this climax structure.
I understand the change proposed by @Entropy and also the concerns raised by @Jonezee regarding the potential impact on everyday and smaller users. I have spent some time trying to analyze the real effects, since losing users from the ecosystem would be a serious issue. Based on what I have found so far, while there may be some impact for certain use cases, I believe that the overall benefits outweigh the drawbacks. Therefore, at this stage, I intend to vote FOR.
gm, I voted FOR. All changes are reasonable, including the base fee increase to avoid spam increase.
Thank you for putting out a technical proposal in a very clear and understandable format.
gm, I voted FOR. All changes are reasonable, including the base fee increase to avoid spam increase.
Thank you for putting out a technical proposal in a very clear and understandable format.
Arbitrum’s monthly revenue is currently way behind Base, and I love to see us experiment with new, low risk, ways to compete.
Reminder that Base makes more money because they do 7x the monthly transactions of Arbitrum. We shouldn't be looking at increasing cost to increase our revenues, we should look at ways to attract more apps and more users.
Tx count per growthepie - Base (dark blue) vs Arbitrum
Thank you for the comment.
I had studied the Entropy position in detail before posting my rationale, and I agree with you that it provides a solid rationale for the adjustment.
However, what I did not know, and is another strong argument, is that in the past, the minimum fee level was 10 times higher, and yet no harm to protocol activity was observed. This is even more reassuring.
Thank you for offering this perspective on information I was not aware of. It helps me form an even clearer view on the matter.
Voting For I believe raising the base fee to 0.02 makes a lot of sense. Fees on L2s are already extremely low, and in most cases users won't even notice the difference. Arbitrum's monthly revenue is currently way behind Base, and I love to see us experiment with new, low risk, ways to compete. If the change doesn't work out the way we hope, we can always roll it back.
Revenue comparison from Grow the Pie
I think the 2 year special permissions are reasonable to add flexibility for playing with those parameters and find the best solution for users and mostly developers for the spikes experienced. For the node operators, it's true that increasing the hardware requirement could make it a bit harder for running nodes. But in reality, how many people are running nodes? I don't think this adjustment will have a significant impact on reducing the number of node runners in any practical sense.... The people who are incentivized to run nodes for their own purposes, will make it work IMO.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We are generally in accordance with the increased minimum L2 base fee, its important to note that the aforementioned spike in October 10th 2025 and September 22nd 2025 in gas expense, and more recently 4th November 2025, was related to a series of perps orders being triggered. Perps and derivatives users on Arbitrum, will unambiguously feel this expense, what we hope is that this doesn’t deliver an undesirable result for traders to move away in high demand usage.
Nonetheless, we’re excited for the technical upgrades for node operators and the Erigon team’s deliverable to the Sepolia network and soon to Arbitrum One for these operators in reducing storage and costs.
We have APPROVED this proposal, but hope there’s a recognition for trader behaviour.
Reminder that Base makes more money because they do 7x the monthly transactions of Arbitrum. We shouldn’t looking at increasing cost to increase our revenues, we should look at ways to attract more apps and more users.
Agreed, we should absolutely be looking to bring in more dapps and more users, however, I still think that the price of txs on Arbitrum is too cheap and raising the baseline fee will probably >1.5x the revenue without pushing users away.
I want to see Arbitrum have the highest revenue of all L2's, this is probably the most important metric to compete on, and has a huge impact on the implied value of $ARB. BD efforts are the most important piece of the puzzle, but not the only piece. Base fees are an important knob to consider adjusting as well.
Despite our revenue numbers being OUTSTANDING on their own, second place is the first loser in the crypto space.... but maybe I'm saying the quiet part out loud.
Thank you for the proposal! This is an important topic, as changes in gas fees can affect different types of users in different ways, especially with this climax structure.
I understand the change proposed by @Entropy and also the concerns raised by @Jonezee regarding the potential impact on everyday and smaller users. I have spent some time trying to analyze the real effects, since losing users from the ecosystem would be a serious issue. Based on what I have found so far, while there may be some impact for certain use cases, I believe that the overall benefits outweigh the drawbacks. Therefore, at this stage, I intend to vote FOR.
Of course, if anyone has concrete data showing that a minimum of 0.02 gwei would harm users and, in conclusion, the ecosystem, please share it with the community so we can evaluate it before the on-chain vote.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
This AIP proposes to reduce the severity, frequency, and duration of high L2 gas prices during periods when demand exceeds the gas target by introducing a new set of gas targets and new, accompanying adjustment windows for Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova.
We support this direction. Frequent gas spikes have been one of the few remaining pain points for both users and developers on Arbitrum. The introduction of multiple gas targets and longer adjustment windows feels like a well-reasoned and data-backed step to make network fees more predictable without compromising stability.
this AIP is accompanied by an increase in the minimum L2 base fee from 0.01 gwei/gas to 0.02 gwei/gas to help reduce spam and offset any potential decline in the portion of L2 surplus fee-derived transaction fees (during periods of peak demand) to the ArbitrumDAO.
We agree with this adjustment. The increase is minimal for users but meaningful in reducing spam-driven transactions and balancing the DAO’s revenue model. It shifts the fee dynamics slightly toward a more stable and predictable income stream, which is healthy for long-term sustainability.
this proposal requests the ArbitrumDAO grant Offchain Labs permission, for 2 years from the mainnet activation of this proposal, to adjust the gas targets and adjustment windows in Table 1, in addition to the right to add up to 10 more gas targets and adjustment values.
We find this reasonable. OCL has the technical competence, and granting limited, transparent flexibility for parameter adjustments allows the network to evolve dynamically. Still, we expect visibility into every change; public logs, clear reasoning, and metrics showing network impact, to maintain accountability during this delegated period.
We also acknowledge the updated node hardware requirements. They are realistic for today’s operators, but maintaining transparency around decentralization metrics will remain important as throughput increases.
Overall, this proposal aligns with DAO’s long-term goals: improving user experience, keeping the system scalable, and preserving stability. It is a technically sound and forward-looking change, and we are confident in its positive impact on both the ecosystem and DAO revenue health.
I want to +1 Entropy's perspective here.
I'm strongly in favor of reducing gas spikes. I've felt the pain as both a user and an application developer building on Arbitrum. With that said, I feel equally strongly that we shouldn't intentionally decrease revenue at this time (or ever tbh). I like the idea of pairing this improvement with an increase in the base fee.
Entropy Advisors is strongly in favor of this proposal. As always, thank you to the Offchain Labs team for putting this together.
However, we are in favor of modifying this proposal to also include a 2x of the minimum base fee from .01 gwei to .02 gwei. We wrote extensively about this topic and our rationale behind our view point here.
Entropy Advisors is strongly in favor of this proposal. As always, thank you to the Offchain Labs team for putting this together.
However, we are in favor of modifying this proposal to also include a 2x of the minimum base fee from .01 gwei to .02 gwei. We wrote extensively about this topic and our rationale behind our view point here.
To quickly summarize, we estimate that roughly 80-90% of daily transactions conducted on Arbitrum One are bot-driven in nature. While increasing the minimum base fee has a minimal effect on “average” users that engage with applications in an organic manner, it will increase the costs of transacting for bot operators. We view this as positive, as it could help prevent spam-motivated bots that congest the network for ordinary users, and could even push arbitrage bots to engage with Timeboost and make the product a more competitive marketplace.
As a side benefit, a slight increase to the L2 min base fee will also ensure the DAO does not experience a decrease in revenue, while also improving the revenue predictability and thus financial forecasting/budgeting capabilities of the DAO. As can be seen in the image below, L2 Surplus Fees generate a lot of revenue for the DAO but are more sporadic in nature. This leads to a less than ideal UX for organic users on Arbitrum One during times of congestion, which is why we are in support of this proposal from OCL. It is simply not worth the added revenue that accrues to the DAO.
In contrast to L2 surplus fees, the L2 base fee provides a much more stable source of DAO revenue (image below) and does not come at the expense of organic users’ experience. The L2 min base fee on Arbitrum One was previously set to 0.1 gwei prior to the ArbOS Atlas upgrade, so we already know that this is a safe change to make.
Over the past 90 days, the DAO has generated ~$6.7M of revenue from transaction fees, of which only $1.8M was derived from the L2 base fees and the remainder coming from L2 surplus fees. With this proposal, the L2 surplus fees are set to be drastically reduced. However, if we increase L2 min base fee from .01 gwei to .02 gwei, paired with the increased gas target per second and subsequent increase in daily transaction count from bots, the min base fee increase should help offset the revenue decline in L2 surplus fees.
To sum it up - we are in favor of this proposal as is, but believe it is made stronger by incorporating a slight increase to the L2 min base fee. This has the potential to increase Timeboost participation, make spam activity more expensive to conduct (thus providing more, cheaper block space for organic users), and offset the decline in L2 surplus fee-derived revenue by increasing L2 min base fee-derived revenue which is more predictable in nature.
Castle is in favour of this proposal, and appreciates all the OCL efforts who went into this.
We align in increasing the L2 minimum base fees from 0.01 to 0.02 gwei to minimize the impact of this proposal on spam. As a result, this will increase the costs for bot operators, reduce spam in the network, and also provide revenue for the DAO from L2 surplus fees that will occur with this increase.
We support the proposed changes.
Based on our understanding of Entropy's analysis, raising the L2 minimum base fee is a worthwhile experiment to better understand the elasticity of bots to fees and their likelihood of engaging with Timeboost in a higher base fee environment.
Thank you for the comment.
I had studied the Entropy position in detail before posting my rationale, and I agree with you that it provides a solid rationale for the adjustment.
However, what I did not know, and is another strong argument, is that in the past, the minimum fee level was 10 times higher, and yet no harm to protocol activity was observed. This is even more reassuring.
Thank you for offering this perspective on information I was not aware of. It helps me form an even clearer view on the matter.
Voting For I believe raising the base fee to 0.02 makes a lot of sense. Fees on L2s are already extremely low, and in most cases users won't even notice the difference. Arbitrum's monthly revenue is currently way behind Base, and I love to see us experiment with new, low risk, ways to compete. If the change doesn't work out the way we hope, we can always roll it back.
Revenue comparison from Grow the Pie
I think the 2 year special permissions are reasonable to add flexibility for playing with those parameters and find the best solution for users and mostly developers for the spikes experienced. For the node operators, it's true that increasing the hardware requirement could make it a bit harder for running nodes. But in reality, how many people are running nodes? I don't think this adjustment will have a significant impact on reducing the number of node runners in any practical sense.... The people who are incentivized to run nodes for their own purposes, will make it work IMO.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We are generally in accordance with the increased minimum L2 base fee, its important to note that the aforementioned spike in October 10th 2025 and September 22nd 2025 in gas expense, and more recently 4th November 2025, was related to a series of perps orders being triggered. Perps and derivatives users on Arbitrum, will unambiguously feel this expense, what we hope is that this doesn’t deliver an undesirable result for traders to move away in high demand usage.
Nonetheless, we’re excited for the technical upgrades for node operators and the Erigon team’s deliverable to the Sepolia network and soon to Arbitrum One for these operators in reducing storage and costs.
We have APPROVED this proposal, but hope there’s a recognition for trader behaviour.
Reminder that Base makes more money because they do 7x the monthly transactions of Arbitrum. We shouldn’t looking at increasing cost to increase our revenues, we should look at ways to attract more apps and more users.
Agreed, we should absolutely be looking to bring in more dapps and more users, however, I still think that the price of txs on Arbitrum is too cheap and raising the baseline fee will probably >1.5x the revenue without pushing users away.
I want to see Arbitrum have the highest revenue of all L2's, this is probably the most important metric to compete on, and has a huge impact on the implied value of $ARB. BD efforts are the most important piece of the puzzle, but not the only piece. Base fees are an important knob to consider adjusting as well.
Despite our revenue numbers being OUTSTANDING on their own, second place is the first loser in the crypto space.... but maybe I'm saying the quiet part out loud.
Thank you for the proposal! This is an important topic, as changes in gas fees can affect different types of users in different ways, especially with this climax structure.
I understand the change proposed by @Entropy and also the concerns raised by @Jonezee regarding the potential impact on everyday and smaller users. I have spent some time trying to analyze the real effects, since losing users from the ecosystem would be a serious issue. Based on what I have found so far, while there may be some impact for certain use cases, I believe that the overall benefits outweigh the drawbacks. Therefore, at this stage, I intend to vote FOR.
Of course, if anyone has concrete data showing that a minimum of 0.02 gwei would harm users and, in conclusion, the ecosystem, please share it with the community so we can evaluate it before the on-chain vote.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
This AIP proposes to reduce the severity, frequency, and duration of high L2 gas prices during periods when demand exceeds the gas target by introducing a new set of gas targets and new, accompanying adjustment windows for Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova.
We support this direction. Frequent gas spikes have been one of the few remaining pain points for both users and developers on Arbitrum. The introduction of multiple gas targets and longer adjustment windows feels like a well-reasoned and data-backed step to make network fees more predictable without compromising stability.
this AIP is accompanied by an increase in the minimum L2 base fee from 0.01 gwei/gas to 0.02 gwei/gas to help reduce spam and offset any potential decline in the portion of L2 surplus fee-derived transaction fees (during periods of peak demand) to the ArbitrumDAO.
We agree with this adjustment. The increase is minimal for users but meaningful in reducing spam-driven transactions and balancing the DAO’s revenue model. It shifts the fee dynamics slightly toward a more stable and predictable income stream, which is healthy for long-term sustainability.
this proposal requests the ArbitrumDAO grant Offchain Labs permission, for 2 years from the mainnet activation of this proposal, to adjust the gas targets and adjustment windows in Table 1, in addition to the right to add up to 10 more gas targets and adjustment values.
We find this reasonable. OCL has the technical competence, and granting limited, transparent flexibility for parameter adjustments allows the network to evolve dynamically. Still, we expect visibility into every change; public logs, clear reasoning, and metrics showing network impact, to maintain accountability during this delegated period.
We also acknowledge the updated node hardware requirements. They are realistic for today’s operators, but maintaining transparency around decentralization metrics will remain important as throughput increases.
Overall, this proposal aligns with DAO’s long-term goals: improving user experience, keeping the system scalable, and preserving stability. It is a technically sound and forward-looking change, and we are confident in its positive impact on both the ecosystem and DAO revenue health.
I want to +1 Entropy's perspective here.
I'm strongly in favor of reducing gas spikes. I've felt the pain as both a user and an application developer building on Arbitrum. With that said, I feel equally strongly that we shouldn't intentionally decrease revenue at this time (or ever tbh). I like the idea of pairing this improvement with an increase in the base fee.
Entropy Advisors is strongly in favor of this proposal. As always, thank you to the Offchain Labs team for putting this together.
However, we are in favor of modifying this proposal to also include a 2x of the minimum base fee from .01 gwei to .02 gwei. We wrote extensively about this topic and our rationale behind our view point here.
Entropy Advisors is strongly in favor of this proposal. As always, thank you to the Offchain Labs team for putting this together.
However, we are in favor of modifying this proposal to also include a 2x of the minimum base fee from .01 gwei to .02 gwei. We wrote extensively about this topic and our rationale behind our view point here.
To quickly summarize, we estimate that roughly 80-90% of daily transactions conducted on Arbitrum One are bot-driven in nature. While increasing the minimum base fee has a minimal effect on “average” users that engage with applications in an organic manner, it will increase the costs of transacting for bot operators. We view this as positive, as it could help prevent spam-motivated bots that congest the network for ordinary users, and could even push arbitrage bots to engage with Timeboost and make the product a more competitive marketplace.
As a side benefit, a slight increase to the L2 min base fee will also ensure the DAO does not experience a decrease in revenue, while also improving the revenue predictability and thus financial forecasting/budgeting capabilities of the DAO. As can be seen in the image below, L2 Surplus Fees generate a lot of revenue for the DAO but are more sporadic in nature. This leads to a less than ideal UX for organic users on Arbitrum One during times of congestion, which is why we are in support of this proposal from OCL. It is simply not worth the added revenue that accrues to the DAO.
In contrast to L2 surplus fees, the L2 base fee provides a much more stable source of DAO revenue (image below) and does not come at the expense of organic users’ experience. The L2 min base fee on Arbitrum One was previously set to 0.1 gwei prior to the ArbOS Atlas upgrade, so we already know that this is a safe change to make.
Over the past 90 days, the DAO has generated ~$6.7M of revenue from transaction fees, of which only $1.8M was derived from the L2 base fees and the remainder coming from L2 surplus fees. With this proposal, the L2 surplus fees are set to be drastically reduced. However, if we increase L2 min base fee from .01 gwei to .02 gwei, paired with the increased gas target per second and subsequent increase in daily transaction count from bots, the min base fee increase should help offset the revenue decline in L2 surplus fees.
To sum it up - we are in favor of this proposal as is, but believe it is made stronger by incorporating a slight increase to the L2 min base fee. This has the potential to increase Timeboost participation, make spam activity more expensive to conduct (thus providing more, cheaper block space for organic users), and offset the decline in L2 surplus fee-derived revenue by increasing L2 min base fee-derived revenue which is more predictable in nature.
Castle is in favour of this proposal, and appreciates all the OCL efforts who went into this.
We align in increasing the L2 minimum base fees from 0.01 to 0.02 gwei to minimize the impact of this proposal on spam. As a result, this will increase the costs for bot operators, reduce spam in the network, and also provide revenue for the DAO from L2 surplus fees that will occur with this increase.
We support the proposed changes.
Based on our understanding of Entropy's analysis, raising the L2 minimum base fee is a worthwhile experiment to better understand the elasticity of bots to fees and their likelihood of engaging with Timeboost in a higher base fee environment.
