Authors: @jojo, @jameskbh
This proposal asks the Arbitrum DAO to authorize a temporary extension of the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) v1.7 for four months, covering the period 1 November 2025 – 28 February 2026, with retroactive coverage for November 2025.
The goal is not to redesign or revisit the underlying incentive model, but to maintain continuity while the Arbitrum Foundation and DAO stakeholders work on a successor framework (e.g., DIP 2.0). This follows two failed Snapshot attempts (more context here and here) in the prior months and avoids a governance incentive gap during a period of limited bandwidth (holidays, Devconnect, and broader ecosystem activity).
The DAO will choose between:
Reinstating DIP v1.7 fully,
Reinstating only Tier X from DIP v1.7, or
Doing nothing (ending incentives).
The extension will automatically deprecate earlier if a new incentive program is approved and activated before the end of February 2026. No compensation is requested for the proposers.
Under the currently approved parameters, DIP v1.7 has run his course covering until October 2025. In practice this means that, as of November 2025, the DAO lacks any active delegate incentive framework despite:
Without a temporary extension, there is a material risk that the momentum around governance participation — particularly among delegates reactivated or newly onboarded via DIP v1.7 and Tier X — will decay, and that several months of effort and coordination will be lost.
Over the coming months the DAO will face:
Given this context, it is unlikely that the AAEs and the DAO can:
before February 2026 in a way that feels legitimate and sustainable.
We also want to be mindful about a general concern of simply “extending things forever.” There is value in stopping programs that we collectively think don’t work; there is also value in having periods of “detox”, like we did in between LTIPP/STIP.b and DRIP, for broader reassessment, discussion, and analysis of what happens to the ecosystem without certain programs. However, there are also strong arguments for continuity in core operational ones once the DAO has already invested in them:
The proposal is aimed to avoid losing previously dormant and not active delegates, allow for older ones that don’t have enough bandwidth to keep being engaged with the DAO, and above all minimize governance churn with a short, explicit extension that keeps the program alive while the DAO and the Foundation continue to work toward a re-scoped, widely supported successor program.
This proposal does not modify the internal mechanics of DIP v1.7. Instead, it offers two mutually exclusive implementation paths, to be selected via Snapshot:
Option 1 – “Reinstate DIP 1.7 fully”
Option 2 – “Reinstate only Tier X from DIP 1.7”
In both cases, this proposal is strictly a temporary extension and does not prejudge or constrain the design of any future program (e.g. DIP 2.0 or alternative frameworks).
We do think that the foundation should be able to survey delegates, gather feedback and propose a new program that is operationalised by end of January; to avoid further issues, we are adding February to the scope of the extension.
The existing Program Manager for the DIP (SEEDGov) continues in the role for the duration of the bridge period. Karma will also continue to provide data, dashboards, and operational support as in DIP v1.7.
Due to the nature of the proposal, Program Manager and data provider are expected to start preparing again from early December 2025 so that, if the proposal passes, they can reconstruct November and December evaluations in a practical, best-effort manner.
Operational costs will also remain the same, with the Program Manager and data provider compensation as defined in DIP v1.7.
If Option 2 (Tier X only) passes, the scope of rules, rewards, caps, ranges and requirements will only be related to Tier X as defined in DIP v1.7. Operational costs for the extension period will be the following:
No compensation is requested for the proposers of this extension (jojo, jameskbh).
If approved at Snapshot, this proposal:
If no successor program is ready by the end of February 2026, and there is the will to further extend DIP 1.7, a separate proposal and vote would be required: this vote does not pre-authorize further optimistically extensions.
Proposed timeline
This timeline aims to:
On Snapshot, we propose the following options:
For the proposal to be considered successful, in addition to achieving the 3% quorum through the sum of Option 1 (Reinstate DIP 1.7), Option 2 (Reinstate only Tier X) and Option 3 (Abstain), the combined votes for Option 1 + Option 2 must be greater than the votes for Option 4 (Against).
If this condition is met, the extension passes, and the DAO implements whichever option receives more votes between Option 1 and Option 2.
If the condition is not met, the proposal is rejected, and no extension is enacted.
Authors: @jojo, @jameskbh
This proposal asks the Arbitrum DAO to authorize a temporary extension of the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) v1.7 for four months, covering the period 1 November 2025 – 28 February 2026, with retroactive coverage for November 2025.
The goal is not to redesign or revisit the underlying incentive model, but to maintain continuity while the Arbitrum Foundation and DAO stakeholders work on a successor framework (e.g., DIP 2.0). This follows two failed Snapshot attempts (more context here and here) in the prior months and avoids a governance incentive gap during a period of limited bandwidth (holidays, Devconnect, and broader ecosystem activity).
The DAO will choose between:
Reinstating DIP v1.7 fully,
Reinstating only Tier X from DIP v1.7, or
Doing nothing (ending incentives).
The extension will automatically deprecate earlier if a new incentive program is approved and activated before the end of February 2026. No compensation is requested for the proposers.
Under the currently approved parameters, DIP v1.7 has run his course covering until October 2025. In practice this means that, as of November 2025, the DAO lacks any active delegate incentive framework despite:
Without a temporary extension, there is a material risk that the momentum around governance participation — particularly among delegates reactivated or newly onboarded via DIP v1.7 and Tier X — will decay, and that several months of effort and coordination will be lost.
Over the coming months the DAO will face:
Given this context, it is unlikely that the AAEs and the DAO can:
before February 2026 in a way that feels legitimate and sustainable.
We also want to be mindful about a general concern of simply “extending things forever.” There is value in stopping programs that we collectively think don’t work; there is also value in having periods of “detox”, like we did in between LTIPP/STIP.b and DRIP, for broader reassessment, discussion, and analysis of what happens to the ecosystem without certain programs. However, there are also strong arguments for continuity in core operational ones once the DAO has already invested in them:
The proposal is aimed to avoid losing previously dormant and not active delegates, allow for older ones that don’t have enough bandwidth to keep being engaged with the DAO, and above all minimize governance churn with a short, explicit extension that keeps the program alive while the DAO and the Foundation continue to work toward a re-scoped, widely supported successor program.
This proposal does not modify the internal mechanics of DIP v1.7. Instead, it offers two mutually exclusive implementation paths, to be selected via Snapshot:
Option 1 – “Reinstate DIP 1.7 fully”
Option 2 – “Reinstate only Tier X from DIP 1.7”
In both cases, this proposal is strictly a temporary extension and does not prejudge or constrain the design of any future program (e.g. DIP 2.0 or alternative frameworks).
We do think that the foundation should be able to survey delegates, gather feedback and propose a new program that is operationalised by end of January; to avoid further issues, we are adding February to the scope of the extension.
The existing Program Manager for the DIP (SEEDGov) continues in the role for the duration of the bridge period. Karma will also continue to provide data, dashboards, and operational support as in DIP v1.7.
Due to the nature of the proposal, Program Manager and data provider are expected to start preparing again from early December 2025 so that, if the proposal passes, they can reconstruct November and December evaluations in a practical, best-effort manner.
Operational costs will also remain the same, with the Program Manager and data provider compensation as defined in DIP v1.7.
If Option 2 (Tier X only) passes, the scope of rules, rewards, caps, ranges and requirements will only be related to Tier X as defined in DIP v1.7. Operational costs for the extension period will be the following:
No compensation is requested for the proposers of this extension (jojo, jameskbh).
If approved at Snapshot, this proposal:
If no successor program is ready by the end of February 2026, and there is the will to further extend DIP 1.7, a separate proposal and vote would be required: this vote does not pre-authorize further optimistically extensions.
Proposed timeline
This timeline aims to:
On Snapshot, we propose the following options:
For the proposal to be considered successful, in addition to achieving the 3% quorum through the sum of Option 1 (Reinstate DIP 1.7), Option 2 (Reinstate only Tier X) and Option 3 (Abstain), the combined votes for Option 1 + Option 2 must be greater than the votes for Option 4 (Against).
If this condition is met, the extension passes, and the DAO implements whichever option receives more votes between Option 1 and Option 2.
If the condition is not met, the proposal is rejected, and no extension is enacted.
We are skeptical about this part, so we believe our point stands. What if the DAO has only a few (or the worst, zero) proposals in these months? We also wonder what happens to the voting activities if there is no incentive for delegates with big voting powers. We would like the DAO to consider this as an experimental period.
We are skeptical about this part, so we believe our point stands. What if the DAO has only a few (or the worst, zero) proposals in these months? We also wonder what happens to the voting activities if there is no incentive for delegates with big voting powers. We would like the DAO to consider this as an experimental period.
No compensation is requested for the proposers of this extension (jojo, jameskbh)
Thanks for this disclaimer, though we think it's better to indicate that two of you would be beneficiaries for the DIP extension if you keep your voting power during the period.
Posting from the RAD proposal from the Arbitrum Foundation as update on this extension.
though we think it’s better to indicate that two of you would be beneficiaries for the DIP extension
actually, all 3 of the quoted authors/contributors would be beneficiaries of an extension, @TodayInDeFi included.
errr... you... didn't answer my question @JoJo.
...if the Option 2 is the one that gets approved on the vote, why should the PM get $10k USD a month? to do what exactly?
also, there will be no onchain proposals that finish in the month of November, so under the current rules, for delegates to qualify for Tier X rewards, they would have to be awarded the full 25 points of score for onchain vote participation, like it happened on the month of August where there were no valid Snapshot proposals:
For this reasons and in exceptionality terms, we’ve decided to give every participant the totality of Snapshot points for the month of August.
We are skeptical about this part, so we believe our point stands. What if the DAO has only a few (or the worst, zero) proposals in these months? We also wonder what happens to the voting activities if there is no incentive for delegates with big voting powers. We would like the DAO to consider this as an experimental period.
We are skeptical about this part, so we believe our point stands. What if the DAO has only a few (or the worst, zero) proposals in these months? We also wonder what happens to the voting activities if there is no incentive for delegates with big voting powers. We would like the DAO to consider this as an experimental period.
No compensation is requested for the proposers of this extension (jojo, jameskbh)
Thanks for this disclaimer, though we think it's better to indicate that two of you would be beneficiaries for the DIP extension if you keep your voting power during the period.
Posting from the RAD proposal from the Arbitrum Foundation as update on this extension.
though we think it’s better to indicate that two of you would be beneficiaries for the DIP extension
actually, all 3 of the quoted authors/contributors would be beneficiaries of an extension, @TodayInDeFi included.
errr... you... didn't answer my question @JoJo.
...if the Option 2 is the one that gets approved on the vote, why should the PM get $10k USD a month? to do what exactly?
also, there will be no onchain proposals that finish in the month of November, so under the current rules, for delegates to qualify for Tier X rewards, they would have to be awarded the full 25 points of score for onchain vote participation, like it happened on the month of August where there were no valid Snapshot proposals:
For this reasons and in exceptionality terms, we’ve decided to give every participant the totality of Snapshot points for the month of August.
Posting from the RAD proposal from the Arbitrum Foundation as update on this extension.
My invite, for the foundation, is to put out any other detail regarding simulations, history, decisions that were changed, or any other piece of info related to this final version that can put all the delegates on the same page for a favourable vote if they deem the program good enough.
As I see it now, extention would go on vote in the following scenarios:
That said, there is no interest in having concurrent proposals here. Goal is not for advocating for different frameworks and scenario, but to have something good enough in place, where good enough means
though we think it’s better to indicate that two of you would be beneficiaries for the DIP extension
actually, all 3 of the quoted authors/contributors would be beneficiaries of an extension, @TodayInDeFi included.
I would also be a beneficiary, but I would vote against an Option 1 extension because the DIP 1.7 has already proved many times that it's not working to achieve their own self-imposed goals, and maybe I would also vote against an Option 2 extension because Tier X is not correctly calibrated as I explained above, specially in a scenario where the @Arbitrum Foundation Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program would reward delegates retroactively whenever it gets approved, starting from November 1st.
Hi @Tane, thanks for your question.
We are not aware of the voting schedule for the next few months, but this is not the point of this proposal. It is to proactively put the incentives in place in case they are needed, and to ensure the current level of support is sustained while the DAO figures out the next iteration of its program.
Small update here. Since the RAD proposal recently passed the snapshot vote and the DAO expressed the intention to move forward with that program, the extension discussed here as previously stated won't got to vote since there is no necessity to fill a DIP gap.
i think we don’t need a PM for option 2. so first we should specify, in this proposal, why we need a PM for option 2, what would they do, and then we can figure out how much they should be paid, and if those $10k USD a month make sense or not.
also, if there’s an actual need for a PM, I think it would be so small, that the OpCo could just take on the little work that would be needed to manage this program with just a Tier X.
Program Manager: 10,000 USD-equivalent in ARB per month
$10k USD a month to do what exactly? If the option that wins is Option 2 (Tier X only), we don't need a program manager at all. So we should spend precisely $0 USD a month on that.
$10k USD a month to do what exactly? If the option that wins is Option 2 (Tier X only), we don't need a program manager at all. So we should spend precisely $0 USD a month on that.
If anything, the PM should only be rewarded if they attract more active voting power into the program, and the compensation for that BD effort should be awarded in a way that is tied to performance on that KPI only.
Otherwise, I don't see why we should spend $10k a month on a PM that is not needed, for sure not at the tune of $10k a month and with no KPIs attached to that payment, in this Tier X only version of the DIP.
Also, it should be said, just like I mentioned in the telegram chat, that the Tier X parameters are not correctly calibrated right now. Delegates with 500k ARB in voting power get $1000 USD equivalent a month, and delegates with +4M ARB in voting power get $1500 USD a month. That is not a fair or proportional payment in regard to voting power, and it's also not material enough to either maintain or attract new voters into the program, so if this proposal passes with Option 2, it won't achieve the stated goals.
I recommend a change to this proposal, to increase the higher limit of Tier X compensation from $1500 USD to $3000 USD (x2) or even $4500 USD (x3) a month, so that payment is more proportional to the voting power that delegates cast and their respective contribution to achieving quorum.
What if the proposal instead says that OpCo will negotiate the Program Manager's compensation if Option 2 is selected? That way, we don't get stuck on this number.
One of OpCo's responsibilities is to negotiate service providers compensations anyway.
Would like to also acknowledge @TodayInDeFi for the internal discussion, contribution and feedback. We actually moved in parallel on the very same topic after the convo we had in the delegates' chat last week about the DIP and worked simultaneously on the same proposal during the weekend (albeit in an independent way). They gracefully decided to not publish their own proposal, with a very similar scope, in favour of what you see live here, to avoid public confusion.
Hi @JoJo (and @jameskbh) for the DIP extension proposal.
We have one question: are there any critical and controversial proposals to be voted on in three months? The recent proposal has overwhelming support and its onchain proposal will likely pass. If there are no other controversial proposals (except for the new DIP proposal), the budget will be used only for a few voting activities, especially if the option of only Tier X being rewarded is chosen.
I understand the general will about improving the previous program.
In my opinion, and in the opinion of the delegates that contacted me, there is little to no space for changes.
I understand the general will about improving the previous program.
In my opinion, and in the opinion of the delegates that contacted me, there is little to no space for changes.
The mission of this extension is just, as the name suggest, to extend the previous program in the two ways that are already proved and tested, and nothing more; any discussion on changes should probably be directed toward new programs the Foundation, or any other third party, will present. If the DIP, as we have known it so far, is deemed not good enough for the DAO for the next 4 months, the delegates should vote either abstain or against in this specific instance and put effort, energy and time into new iterations instead of trying to change the previous program.
Again the goal here is not really to discuss a new program, just to extend the old one for continuity and give any willing and brave enough stakeholder the time and peace of mind to work toward the best outcome possible, without the pressure of having to go live "just" for the sake of having delegates' incentives.
Posting from the RAD proposal from the Arbitrum Foundation as update on this extension.
My invite, for the foundation, is to put out any other detail regarding simulations, history, decisions that were changed, or any other piece of info related to this final version that can put all the delegates on the same page for a favourable vote if they deem the program good enough.
As I see it now, extention would go on vote in the following scenarios:
That said, there is no interest in having concurrent proposals here. Goal is not for advocating for different frameworks and scenario, but to have something good enough in place, where good enough means
though we think it’s better to indicate that two of you would be beneficiaries for the DIP extension
actually, all 3 of the quoted authors/contributors would be beneficiaries of an extension, @TodayInDeFi included.
I would also be a beneficiary, but I would vote against an Option 1 extension because the DIP 1.7 has already proved many times that it's not working to achieve their own self-imposed goals, and maybe I would also vote against an Option 2 extension because Tier X is not correctly calibrated as I explained above, specially in a scenario where the @Arbitrum Foundation Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) Program would reward delegates retroactively whenever it gets approved, starting from November 1st.
Hi @Tane, thanks for your question.
We are not aware of the voting schedule for the next few months, but this is not the point of this proposal. It is to proactively put the incentives in place in case they are needed, and to ensure the current level of support is sustained while the DAO figures out the next iteration of its program.
Small update here. Since the RAD proposal recently passed the snapshot vote and the DAO expressed the intention to move forward with that program, the extension discussed here as previously stated won't got to vote since there is no necessity to fill a DIP gap.
i think we don’t need a PM for option 2. so first we should specify, in this proposal, why we need a PM for option 2, what would they do, and then we can figure out how much they should be paid, and if those $10k USD a month make sense or not.
also, if there’s an actual need for a PM, I think it would be so small, that the OpCo could just take on the little work that would be needed to manage this program with just a Tier X.
Program Manager: 10,000 USD-equivalent in ARB per month
$10k USD a month to do what exactly? If the option that wins is Option 2 (Tier X only), we don't need a program manager at all. So we should spend precisely $0 USD a month on that.
$10k USD a month to do what exactly? If the option that wins is Option 2 (Tier X only), we don't need a program manager at all. So we should spend precisely $0 USD a month on that.
If anything, the PM should only be rewarded if they attract more active voting power into the program, and the compensation for that BD effort should be awarded in a way that is tied to performance on that KPI only.
Otherwise, I don't see why we should spend $10k a month on a PM that is not needed, for sure not at the tune of $10k a month and with no KPIs attached to that payment, in this Tier X only version of the DIP.
Also, it should be said, just like I mentioned in the telegram chat, that the Tier X parameters are not correctly calibrated right now. Delegates with 500k ARB in voting power get $1000 USD equivalent a month, and delegates with +4M ARB in voting power get $1500 USD a month. That is not a fair or proportional payment in regard to voting power, and it's also not material enough to either maintain or attract new voters into the program, so if this proposal passes with Option 2, it won't achieve the stated goals.
I recommend a change to this proposal, to increase the higher limit of Tier X compensation from $1500 USD to $3000 USD (x2) or even $4500 USD (x3) a month, so that payment is more proportional to the voting power that delegates cast and their respective contribution to achieving quorum.
What if the proposal instead says that OpCo will negotiate the Program Manager's compensation if Option 2 is selected? That way, we don't get stuck on this number.
One of OpCo's responsibilities is to negotiate service providers compensations anyway.
Would like to also acknowledge @TodayInDeFi for the internal discussion, contribution and feedback. We actually moved in parallel on the very same topic after the convo we had in the delegates' chat last week about the DIP and worked simultaneously on the same proposal during the weekend (albeit in an independent way). They gracefully decided to not publish their own proposal, with a very similar scope, in favour of what you see live here, to avoid public confusion.
Hi @JoJo (and @jameskbh) for the DIP extension proposal.
We have one question: are there any critical and controversial proposals to be voted on in three months? The recent proposal has overwhelming support and its onchain proposal will likely pass. If there are no other controversial proposals (except for the new DIP proposal), the budget will be used only for a few voting activities, especially if the option of only Tier X being rewarded is chosen.
I understand the general will about improving the previous program.
In my opinion, and in the opinion of the delegates that contacted me, there is little to no space for changes.
I understand the general will about improving the previous program.
In my opinion, and in the opinion of the delegates that contacted me, there is little to no space for changes.
The mission of this extension is just, as the name suggest, to extend the previous program in the two ways that are already proved and tested, and nothing more; any discussion on changes should probably be directed toward new programs the Foundation, or any other third party, will present. If the DIP, as we have known it so far, is deemed not good enough for the DAO for the next 4 months, the delegates should vote either abstain or against in this specific instance and put effort, energy and time into new iterations instead of trying to change the previous program.
Again the goal here is not really to discuss a new program, just to extend the old one for continuity and give any willing and brave enough stakeholder the time and peace of mind to work toward the best outcome possible, without the pressure of having to go live "just" for the sake of having delegates' incentives.
