This proposal seeks to get the conversation started regarding the future of the Multisig Support Services (MSS). In collaboration with the Arbitrum Foundation, input from MSS members, and based on conversations with key stakeholders and delegates, we are proposing to move forward by sunsetting the MSS. The multisig administration and payment processing responsibilities would be transferred to the Arbitrum Foundation, which is already deeply involved in the compliance and execution of nearly all MSS activity. MSS Signers will immediately begin the transition if this proposal passes Snapshot, and following the completion of this transition, receive final payments for their work.
If rejected, then Entropy will consider that delegates prefer to keep utilizing the MSS and will work to bring forward a proposal that restructures the MSS and a solution for the shortfall of funds.
When the MSS was proposed in April 2024, the DAO was managing six active multisig wallets. Entropy accurately predicted that the number and complexity of DAO-affiliated multisigs would grow significantly, and today the MSS is involved with eight active multisigs, including:
The original MSS proposal approved 600k ARB to cover the costs for R3gen’s monthly token reports and payments for the 3 chairs and 9 signers connected to the MSS. Despite an ample buffer at the time, market conditions over the last year have placed the MSS in a position where funds will run out before the end of its term, unless ARB suddenly starts performing extremely well.
As a reminder, the MSS was originally structured with 9 signers paid a fixed monthly fee of $1500 in ARB and 3 Chairs paid $2500 per month in ARB, both using the spot price at the time of payment. R3gen charges $6650 per month, paid upfront in ARB on the 1st of the month, also using USD/ARB spot price.
The MSS payroll multisig currently has 131,209.2 ARB (~$52,000, with ARB priced at ~$0.4) remaining, but with currently 2 active chairs and 8 signers, there is a total of $81,300 in commitments remaining. R3gen is owed two more payments for their June and July token reports, while the MSS members have 4 months of payment remaining (May-August) on their current term. At current prices, this would put the MSS on track to be short of funds following the July 1st payment to R3gen.
In April, Entropy, the Arbitrum Foundation, and MSS discussed potential solutions for the shortfall. Transferring the payment processing function to the Foundation was an option discussed and shared with the DAO by MSS chair @cattin. Following confirmation from the Foundation that they have operational bandwidth to take on such responsibilities, a partial transfer was considered by all parties, but it was deemed unfair to reduce MSS member pays due to the sustained level of risk MSS members take on by being signers. Even at $0.4, reducing the overall number of MSS members to 1 chair and 4 signers would still result in a shortfall. Another option is providing a top up of funds and beginning conversations on a restructured MSS; however, Entropy believes the best path forward is to formally wind down the MSS and recognize that the Arbitrum Foundation is better suited to take on payment responsibilities in the interim until OpCo is stood up, at which point the conversation shifts to moving the payment function to this entity.
Over the MSS’ tenure, operational improvements have happened and some of the recognized frictions could likely be further negated by restructuring the MSS to less signers, as the somewhat high threshold of 7/12 or 8/12 has proven to be inherently slow and inefficient. Regardless, given that the Foundation must be involved in every multisig anyway, the contributors of this proposal feel as though it’s sensible for the DAO to formally recognize this reality and consolidate multisig operations under the Foundation’s purview for the time being.
The primary rationale for consolidating the DAO’s multisigs and payment processing under the Arbitrum Foundation instead of approving additional funds or restructuring pertains to the required compliance process and coordination between signers and the Arbitrum Foundation. The compliance requirements create a system that requires the Foundation to approve and review the recipient of nearly every payment. Whether under OpCo or the AF, consolidating the payment function under one accountable entity with the capabilities to conduct KYC/KYB is the most effective long-term solution.
Additional benefits include not only a reduction in total OpEx spending by the DAO, but also with full-time employees trained in OpSec and internal legal capacities, we believe that the funds will be safest in the hands of the Arbitrum Foundation until OpCo possesses similar capabilities. Finally, by marking the clear owner of the payroll function as the AF, responsibility for successes and failures will fall on a single party, giving the DAO greater accountability beyond the committee structure.
After inquiry, delegates expressed a preference to honor the agreement with R3gen and have them finish out the planned monthly token reports. To ensure that the MSS Payroll multisig has sufficient ARB to pay out R3gen for the remaining 2 reports, Entropy is proposing that the MSS wind down begins by transitioning the following multisigs to the Arbitrum Foundation with a target completion date of June 15th:
Following the completion of this transfer, the Arbitrum Foundation will share the updated addresses for the seven initiatives being transferred in the MSS communication thread. The Arbitrum Foundation has confirmed that funds for these ongoing programs will be separated into unique wallets so that they can continue to be easily tracked. Going forward, the Arbitrum Foundation has also agreed to continue this practice for any new initiatives in order to ensure delegates and the DAO have transparency on the state and flow of funds. Additionally, the Foundation has committed to providing updates when necessary; however, delegates should expect these to be at an informal cadence.
The following multisigs will remain under the control of the MSS:
At the passing of this proposal (June 6th), the MSS will have discretion to pay R3gen upfront for their July token report if the price of ARB is high enough to secure the avoidance of a shortfall.
Once the above-mentioned multisigs have been transferred to the Arbitrum Foundation, the MSS will complete its tenure by sending a final payment to the MSS members for their work in June. With a target completion date of June 15th, MSS members will be paid one-half of their normal monthly compensation for June. If work for the MSS extends beyond June 15th, the members will be paid a pro-rata monthly rate up until June 30th. Following these final payments, the MSS will formally dissolve, returning any remaining ARB to the DAO’s treasury and being absolved of any future payment responsibilities and risk.
Similar to the upfront payment of R3gen’s work and if necessary due to extreme changes in market conditions, MSS members will have the discretion to send payments related to June work at an earlier date to avoid a shortfall.
Going forward, the payment vertical and its structure will be left up to the Arbitrum Foundation. In the event of resource constraints, Entropy recommends to the AF that they onboard a limited number of community members to assist with multisigs for smaller programs; however, this is something that will be up to the discretion of the Foundation. If the AF chooses to do so, they will have the mandate to structure the involvement of community contributions in the payroll function as they wish.
Once the OpCo has been operationalized and possesses similar payroll capabilities as the Arbitrum Foundation, we believe that responsibilities for the DAO’s multisigs should be transferred to that entity. When that time comes, Entropy recommends for the Arbitrum Foundation and future head of OpCo to update the DAO with a joint statement.
If this proposal is rejected, then delegates would be signalling a preference to keep utilizing the MSS until OpCo’s formation, at which point the conversation can be restarted on moving the payment function to that entity. If this is the prevailing decision, a top up would almost certainly be necessary to allow time for the full onchain proposal process & any possible follow-up procedures. In this scenario, Entropy will work to create a proposal that restructures the MSS, taking into account learnings and the opinions of relevant parties.
May 22nd: Forum Post May 29th - June 5th: Snapshot vote June 6th: If approved, transfer of the previous MSS multisigs to the Foundation will begin. June 15th: MSS' term comes to an end
This proposal seeks to get the conversation started regarding the future of the Multisig Support Services (MSS). In collaboration with the Arbitrum Foundation, input from MSS members, and based on conversations with key stakeholders and delegates, we are proposing to move forward by sunsetting the MSS. The multisig administration and payment processing responsibilities would be transferred to the Arbitrum Foundation, which is already deeply involved in the compliance and execution of nearly all MSS activity. MSS Signers will immediately begin the transition if this proposal passes Snapshot, and following the completion of this transition, receive final payments for their work.
If rejected, then Entropy will consider that delegates prefer to keep utilizing the MSS and will work to bring forward a proposal that restructures the MSS and a solution for the shortfall of funds.
When the MSS was proposed in April 2024, the DAO was managing six active multisig wallets. Entropy accurately predicted that the number and complexity of DAO-affiliated multisigs would grow significantly, and today the MSS is involved with eight active multisigs, including:
The original MSS proposal approved 600k ARB to cover the costs for R3gen’s monthly token reports and payments for the 3 chairs and 9 signers connected to the MSS. Despite an ample buffer at the time, market conditions over the last year have placed the MSS in a position where funds will run out before the end of its term, unless ARB suddenly starts performing extremely well.
As a reminder, the MSS was originally structured with 9 signers paid a fixed monthly fee of $1500 in ARB and 3 Chairs paid $2500 per month in ARB, both using the spot price at the time of payment. R3gen charges $6650 per month, paid upfront in ARB on the 1st of the month, also using USD/ARB spot price.
The MSS payroll multisig currently has 131,209.2 ARB (~$52,000, with ARB priced at ~$0.4) remaining, but with currently 2 active chairs and 8 signers, there is a total of $81,300 in commitments remaining. R3gen is owed two more payments for their June and July token reports, while the MSS members have 4 months of payment remaining (May-August) on their current term. At current prices, this would put the MSS on track to be short of funds following the July 1st payment to R3gen.
In April, Entropy, the Arbitrum Foundation, and MSS discussed potential solutions for the shortfall. Transferring the payment processing function to the Foundation was an option discussed and shared with the DAO by MSS chair @cattin. Following confirmation from the Foundation that they have operational bandwidth to take on such responsibilities, a partial transfer was considered by all parties, but it was deemed unfair to reduce MSS member pays due to the sustained level of risk MSS members take on by being signers. Even at $0.4, reducing the overall number of MSS members to 1 chair and 4 signers would still result in a shortfall. Another option is providing a top up of funds and beginning conversations on a restructured MSS; however, Entropy believes the best path forward is to formally wind down the MSS and recognize that the Arbitrum Foundation is better suited to take on payment responsibilities in the interim until OpCo is stood up, at which point the conversation shifts to moving the payment function to this entity.
Over the MSS’ tenure, operational improvements have happened and some of the recognized frictions could likely be further negated by restructuring the MSS to less signers, as the somewhat high threshold of 7/12 or 8/12 has proven to be inherently slow and inefficient. Regardless, given that the Foundation must be involved in every multisig anyway, the contributors of this proposal feel as though it’s sensible for the DAO to formally recognize this reality and consolidate multisig operations under the Foundation’s purview for the time being.
The primary rationale for consolidating the DAO’s multisigs and payment processing under the Arbitrum Foundation instead of approving additional funds or restructuring pertains to the required compliance process and coordination between signers and the Arbitrum Foundation. The compliance requirements create a system that requires the Foundation to approve and review the recipient of nearly every payment. Whether under OpCo or the AF, consolidating the payment function under one accountable entity with the capabilities to conduct KYC/KYB is the most effective long-term solution.
Additional benefits include not only a reduction in total OpEx spending by the DAO, but also with full-time employees trained in OpSec and internal legal capacities, we believe that the funds will be safest in the hands of the Arbitrum Foundation until OpCo possesses similar capabilities. Finally, by marking the clear owner of the payroll function as the AF, responsibility for successes and failures will fall on a single party, giving the DAO greater accountability beyond the committee structure.
After inquiry, delegates expressed a preference to honor the agreement with R3gen and have them finish out the planned monthly token reports. To ensure that the MSS Payroll multisig has sufficient ARB to pay out R3gen for the remaining 2 reports, Entropy is proposing that the MSS wind down begins by transitioning the following multisigs to the Arbitrum Foundation with a target completion date of June 15th:
Following the completion of this transfer, the Arbitrum Foundation will share the updated addresses for the seven initiatives being transferred in the MSS communication thread. The Arbitrum Foundation has confirmed that funds for these ongoing programs will be separated into unique wallets so that they can continue to be easily tracked. Going forward, the Arbitrum Foundation has also agreed to continue this practice for any new initiatives in order to ensure delegates and the DAO have transparency on the state and flow of funds. Additionally, the Foundation has committed to providing updates when necessary; however, delegates should expect these to be at an informal cadence.
The following multisigs will remain under the control of the MSS:
At the passing of this proposal (June 6th), the MSS will have discretion to pay R3gen upfront for their July token report if the price of ARB is high enough to secure the avoidance of a shortfall.
Once the above-mentioned multisigs have been transferred to the Arbitrum Foundation, the MSS will complete its tenure by sending a final payment to the MSS members for their work in June. With a target completion date of June 15th, MSS members will be paid one-half of their normal monthly compensation for June. If work for the MSS extends beyond June 15th, the members will be paid a pro-rata monthly rate up until June 30th. Following these final payments, the MSS will formally dissolve, returning any remaining ARB to the DAO’s treasury and being absolved of any future payment responsibilities and risk.
Similar to the upfront payment of R3gen’s work and if necessary due to extreme changes in market conditions, MSS members will have the discretion to send payments related to June work at an earlier date to avoid a shortfall.
Going forward, the payment vertical and its structure will be left up to the Arbitrum Foundation. In the event of resource constraints, Entropy recommends to the AF that they onboard a limited number of community members to assist with multisigs for smaller programs; however, this is something that will be up to the discretion of the Foundation. If the AF chooses to do so, they will have the mandate to structure the involvement of community contributions in the payroll function as they wish.
Once the OpCo has been operationalized and possesses similar payroll capabilities as the Arbitrum Foundation, we believe that responsibilities for the DAO’s multisigs should be transferred to that entity. When that time comes, Entropy recommends for the Arbitrum Foundation and future head of OpCo to update the DAO with a joint statement.
If this proposal is rejected, then delegates would be signalling a preference to keep utilizing the MSS until OpCo’s formation, at which point the conversation can be restarted on moving the payment function to that entity. If this is the prevailing decision, a top up would almost certainly be necessary to allow time for the full onchain proposal process & any possible follow-up procedures. In this scenario, Entropy will work to create a proposal that restructures the MSS, taking into account learnings and the opinions of relevant parties.
May 22nd: Forum Post May 29th - June 5th: Snapshot vote June 6th: If approved, transfer of the previous MSS multisigs to the Foundation will begin. June 15th: MSS' term comes to an end
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/49?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/47
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/44
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/49?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/47
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/44
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/46?u=0x_ultra
The Event Horizon Community voted FOR: WIND DOWN THE MSS on this proposal (ehARB-105): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-105
I am not in favour of centralising the control of payment transfer responsibilities. You should rather propose a better solution that will keep the accountability in check.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/41?u=mcfly
Operational efficiencies and less committees is a good thing. Hopefully the foundation can replicate the same services with less cost.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/40?u=maxlomu
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/19?u=tekr0x.eth
The Multisig Support Services should be dissolved for four reasons: Structural dysfunction -- coordinating between large number of signers makes timely payments difficult to impossible within 24h Operational impact -- Payment delays hurt DAO professionalism and operations Decentralization theater -- Foundation already controls transactions via mandatory compliance reviews Temporary solution -- OpCo will assume these duties soon, no point maintaining broken system Recommendation: Transfer payment responsibilities to Foundation as interim solution pending OpCo.
Continue with the MS-13
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/39?u=hawheik
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/38?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/37?u=danielm
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/29
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/34
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/33?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/32
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/31?u=0xalex
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/30?u=zeptimus
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/25?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/21?u=ezr3al
the DAO should retain the control over releasing funds, not the Arbitrum Foundation. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/18?u=paulofonseca
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/46?u=0x_ultra
The Event Horizon Community voted FOR: WIND DOWN THE MSS on this proposal (ehARB-105): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-105
I am not in favour of centralising the control of payment transfer responsibilities. You should rather propose a better solution that will keep the accountability in check.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/41?u=mcfly
Operational efficiencies and less committees is a good thing. Hopefully the foundation can replicate the same services with less cost.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/40?u=maxlomu
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/19?u=tekr0x.eth
The Multisig Support Services should be dissolved for four reasons: Structural dysfunction -- coordinating between large number of signers makes timely payments difficult to impossible within 24h Operational impact -- Payment delays hurt DAO professionalism and operations Decentralization theater -- Foundation already controls transactions via mandatory compliance reviews Temporary solution -- OpCo will assume these duties soon, no point maintaining broken system Recommendation: Transfer payment responsibilities to Foundation as interim solution pending OpCo.
Continue with the MS-13
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/39?u=hawheik
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/38?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/37?u=danielm
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/29
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/34
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/33?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/32
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/31?u=0xalex
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/30?u=zeptimus
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/25?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/21?u=ezr3al
the DAO should retain the control over releasing funds, not the Arbitrum Foundation. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/wind-down-the-mss-transfer-payment-responsibilities-to-the-arbitrum-foundation/29279/18?u=paulofonseca
We are voting FOR this proposal.
As not to be redundant, our voting justification mirrors that mentioned by Zeptimus. We also want to thank JoJo for illuminating some of the current functioning of MSS.
We do believe that decentralization is worth prioritizing, but do not see a pragmatic temporary stopgap, until OpCo is up and running, as the proposal to make it a priority.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
As not to be redundant, our voting justification mirrors that mentioned by Zeptimus. We also want to thank JoJo for illuminating some of the current functioning of MSS.
We do believe that decentralization is worth prioritizing, but do not see a pragmatic temporary stopgap, until OpCo is up and running, as the proposal to make it a priority.
In my experience at Event Horizon the Foundation is heavily involved with essentially every interaction we have with the MSS so this feels like a formalization of the processes already in place, but with the added benefit of reducing costs and overhead at the DAO.
I will echo a growing concern expressed elsewhere that the Foundation is taking on increasing responsibilities at the DAO. It's unclear what the end state will be but the direction towards centralization is clear. This initiative, which I do support, will not the be straw that breaks the camel's back, but it does slightly raise concerns about the overall direction that the DAO is headed.
In my experience at Event Horizon the Foundation is heavily involved with essentially every interaction we have with the MSS so this feels like a formalization of the processes already in place, but with the added benefit of reducing costs and overhead at the DAO.
I will echo a growing concern expressed elsewhere that the Foundation is taking on increasing responsibilities at the DAO. It's unclear what the end state will be but the direction towards centralization is clear. This initiative, which I do support, will not the be straw that breaks the camel's back, but it does slightly raise concerns about the overall direction that the DAO is headed.
you mean, if approved with a participation bigger than the non-constitutional 3% quorum, correct?
you mean, if approved with a participation bigger than the non-constitutional 3% quorum, correct?
I'm not sure if this will be the case, but the number of Snapshot votes requiring quorum has already become significant enough to warrant requesting the platform to enable quorum requirements to be set on a per-vote basis, rather than applying a general setting across the entire space. If this isn’t possible, we may need to consider switching to another platform.
you mean, if approved with a participation bigger than the non-constitutional 3% quorum, correct?
you mean, if approved with a participation bigger than the non-constitutional 3% quorum, correct?
I'm not sure if this will be the case, but the number of Snapshot votes requiring quorum has already become significant enough to warrant requesting the platform to enable quorum requirements to be set on a per-vote basis, rather than applying a general setting across the entire space. If this isn’t possible, we may need to consider switching to another platform.
When the MSS was proposed in April 2024, the DAO was managing six active multisig wallets. Entropy accurately predicted that the number and complexity of DAO-affiliated multisigs would grow significantly, and today the MSS is involved with eight active multisigs, including:
The original MSS proposal approved 600k ARB to cover the costs for R3gen’s monthly token reports and payments for the 3 chairs and 9 signers connected to the MSS. Despite an ample buffer at the time, market conditions over the last year have placed the MSS in a position where funds will run out before the end of its term, unless ARB suddenly starts performing extremely well.
As a reminder, the MSS was originally structured with 9 signers paid a fixed monthly fee of $1500 in ARB and 3 Chairs paid $2500 per month in ARB, both using the spot price at the time of payment. R3gen charges $6650 per month, paid upfront in ARB on the 1st of the month, also using USD/ARB spot price.
The MSS payroll multisig currently has 131,209.2 ARB (~$52,000, with ARB priced at ~$0.4) remaining, but with currently 2 active chairs and 8 signers, there is a total of $81,300 in commitments remaining. R3gen is owed two more payments for their June and July token reports, while the MSS members have 4 months of payment remaining (May-August) on their current term. At current prices, this would put the MSS on track to be short of funds following the July 1st payment to R3gen.
In April, Entropy, the Arbitrum Foundation, and MSS discussed potential solutions for the shortfall. Transferring the payment processing function to the Foundation was an option discussed and shared with the DAO by MSS chair @cattin. Following confirmation from the Foundation that they have operational bandwidth to take on such responsibilities, a partial transfer was considered by all parties, but it was deemed unfair to reduce MSS member pays due to the sustained level of risk MSS members take on by being signers. Even at $0.4, reducing the overall number of MSS members to 1 chair and 4 signers would still result in a shortfall. Another option is an early renewal and restructuring of the MSS; however, Entropy believes the best path forward is to formally wind down the MSS and recognize that the Arbitrum Foundation is better suited to take on payment responsibilities.
The primary rationale for consolidating the DAO’s multisigs and payment processing under the Arbitrum Foundation instead of approving additional funds or restructuring pertains to the required compliance process and coordination between signers and the Arbitrum Foundation. The compliance requirements create a system that requires the Foundation to approve and review the recipient of nearly every payment.
Over the MSS’ tenure, operational improvements have happened and some of the recognized frictions could likely be further negated by restructuring the MSS to less signers, as the somewhat high threshold of 7/12 or 8/12 has proven to be inherently slow and inefficient. Regardless, given that the Foundation must be involved in every multisig anyway, the contributors of this proposal feel as though it’s sensible for the DAO to formally recognize this reality and consolidate multisig operations under the Foundation’s purview. Additional benefits include not only a reduction in total OpEx spending by the DAO, but also with full-time employees trained in OpSec and internal legal capacities, we believe that the funds will be safest in the hands of the AF. Finally, by marking the clear owner of the payroll function as the AF, responsibility for successes and failures will fall on a single party, giving the DAO greater accountability beyond the committee structure.
After inquiry, delegates expressed a preference to honor the agreement with R3gen and have them finish out the planned monthly token reports. To ensure that the MSS Payroll multisig has sufficient ARB to pay out R3gen for the remaining 2 reports, Entropy is proposing that the MSS wind down begins by transitioning the following multisigs to the Arbitrum Foundation with a target completion date of June 15th:
Following the completion of this transfer, the Arbitrum Foundation will share the updated addresses for the seven initiatives being transferred in the MSS communication thread. The Arbitrum Foundation has confirmed that funds for these ongoing programs will be separated into unique wallets so that they can continue to be easily tracked. Going forward, the Arbitrum Foundation has also agreed to continue this practice for any new initiatives in order to ensure delegates and the DAO have transparency on the state and flow of funds. Additionally, the Foundation has committed to providing updates when necessary; however, delegates should expect these to be at an informal cadence.
The following multisigs will remain under the control of the MSS:
At the passing of this proposal (June 6th), the MSS will have discretion to pay R3gen upfront for their July token report if the price of ARB is high enough to secure the avoidance of a shortfall.
Once the above-mentioned multisigs have been transferred to the Arbitrum Foundation, the MSS will complete its tenure by sending a final payment to the MSS members for their work in June. With a target completion date of June 15th, MSS members will be paid one-half of their normal monthly compensation for June. If work for the MSS extends beyond June 15th, the members will be paid a pro-rata monthly rate up until June 30th. Following these final payments, the MSS will formally dissolve, returning any remaining ARB to the DAO’s treasury and being absolved of any future payment responsibilities and risk.
Similar to the upfront payment of R3gen’s work and if necessary due to extreme changes in market conditions, MSS members will have the discretion to send payments related to June work at an earlier date to avoid a shortfall.
Going forward, the payment vertical and its structure will be left up to the Arbitrum Foundation. In the event of resource constraints, Entropy recommends to the AF that they onboard a limited number of community members to assist with multisigs for smaller programs; however, this is something that will be up to the discretion of the Foundation. If the AF chooses to do so, they will have the mandate to structure the involvement of community contributions in the payroll function as they wish.
Once the OpCo has been operationalized and possesses similar payroll capabilities as the Arbitrum Foundation, we believe that responsibilities for the DAO’s multisigs should be transferred to that entity. When that time comes, Entropy recommends for the Arbitrum Foundation and future head of OpCo to update the DAO with a joint statement.
May 22nd: Forum Post May 29th - June 5th: Snapshot vote June 6th: If approved, transfer of the previous MSS multisigs to the Foundation will begin. June 15th: MSS’ term comes to an end
Basic voting with FOR, AGAINST, ABSTAIN choices.
FOR: In support of winding down the MSS and transferring ownership of the payment vertical to the Arbitrum Foundation
AGAINST: Entropy will work with the MSS to bring a revised proposal that addresses the shortfall and future structure of the payment vertical
ABSTAIN
A thoughtful and well-structured proposa.
Big props to everyone involved. Consolidating MSS functions under the Arbitrum Foundation seems like a natural evolution, especially given their existing oversight role and compliance infrastructure. Curious to hear from others: does this shift strengthen operational efficiency, or do we risk losing decentralized touchpoints in the DAO’s payment process?
We want to drop our thoughts on the MSS issue including in relation to this post: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/mss-for-arbitrum-communication-thread-arbitrum-multisig-support-service/26508/28?u=arbitrum
We believe the multisig service operations will be absorbed into OpCo's mandate and OpCo will eventually take over this service. The question facing the DAO is what to do in regards to managing the treasury for proposals passed by the DAO until the OpCo is ready to take on this role.
We want to drop our thoughts on the MSS issue including in relation to this post: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/mss-for-arbitrum-communication-thread-arbitrum-multisig-support-service/26508/28?u=arbitrum
We believe the multisig service operations will be absorbed into OpCo's mandate and OpCo will eventually take over this service. The question facing the DAO is what to do in regards to managing the treasury for proposals passed by the DAO until the OpCo is ready to take on this role.
There are two outcomes:
In order for the DAO to continue with the MSS, a new funding proposal would be required to pay the signers until the OpCo is ready to take over. To help with this decision, the DAO should evaluate the overall cost of funding the MSS relative to the funds under their custody and the quantity of transactions signed per month. If MSS continues, we'd strongly recommend keeping the 9/12 setup and avoid reducing the number of signers. This is to help combat the increasing rise of digital and real-world threats that signers may face. Additionally, the DAO needs to decide whether a new set of elections should take place as the original proposal mentions that elections should occur every 12 months.
MSS is paid $234k per year and $19.5k per month. They are holding approximately 24,545,271 ARB and $3,290,031 across multiple multisigs as outlined in Entropy's post. Note, the current payment is slightly less at $17k per month, as Alex L stood down as Chair and Frisson is no longer taking payment.
The Arbitrum Foundation is already involved in the MSS. We perform compliance (KYC/KYB) on the recipient and inform all signers when compliance is completed. We provide each signer with the name of the recipient alongside the wallet address for each project. It is then up to the MSS chair to coordinate the payment with the signers, communicate with the recipient, and keep the DAO abreast on updates in regards to the MSS.
We are happy to take on the additional role until the OpCo is ready to take it on. If we do take it on, our strong preference will be to set up our own multisigs and rely on our existing processes for handling the payments. This is to avoid any additional complexities that can lead to delays or other issues.
We see any change as temporary solutions until the OpCo is set up. We are willing to help to support that transition, but ultimately, it will be up to the DAO to decide on what to do.
When the MSS was proposed in April 2024, the DAO was managing six active multisig wallets. Entropy accurately predicted that the number and complexity of DAO-affiliated multisigs would grow significantly, and today the MSS is involved with eight active multisigs, including:
The original MSS proposal approved 600k ARB to cover the costs for R3gen’s monthly token reports and payments for the 3 chairs and 9 signers connected to the MSS. Despite an ample buffer at the time, market conditions over the last year have placed the MSS in a position where funds will run out before the end of its term, unless ARB suddenly starts performing extremely well.
As a reminder, the MSS was originally structured with 9 signers paid a fixed monthly fee of $1500 in ARB and 3 Chairs paid $2500 per month in ARB, both using the spot price at the time of payment. R3gen charges $6650 per month, paid upfront in ARB on the 1st of the month, also using USD/ARB spot price.
The MSS payroll multisig currently has 131,209.2 ARB (~$52,000, with ARB priced at ~$0.4) remaining, but with currently 2 active chairs and 8 signers, there is a total of $81,300 in commitments remaining. R3gen is owed two more payments for their June and July token reports, while the MSS members have 4 months of payment remaining (May-August) on their current term. At current prices, this would put the MSS on track to be short of funds following the July 1st payment to R3gen.
In April, Entropy, the Arbitrum Foundation, and MSS discussed potential solutions for the shortfall. Transferring the payment processing function to the Foundation was an option discussed and shared with the DAO by MSS chair @cattin. Following confirmation from the Foundation that they have operational bandwidth to take on such responsibilities, a partial transfer was considered by all parties, but it was deemed unfair to reduce MSS member pays due to the sustained level of risk MSS members take on by being signers. Even at $0.4, reducing the overall number of MSS members to 1 chair and 4 signers would still result in a shortfall. Another option is an early renewal and restructuring of the MSS; however, Entropy believes the best path forward is to formally wind down the MSS and recognize that the Arbitrum Foundation is better suited to take on payment responsibilities.
The primary rationale for consolidating the DAO’s multisigs and payment processing under the Arbitrum Foundation instead of approving additional funds or restructuring pertains to the required compliance process and coordination between signers and the Arbitrum Foundation. The compliance requirements create a system that requires the Foundation to approve and review the recipient of nearly every payment.
Over the MSS’ tenure, operational improvements have happened and some of the recognized frictions could likely be further negated by restructuring the MSS to less signers, as the somewhat high threshold of 7/12 or 8/12 has proven to be inherently slow and inefficient. Regardless, given that the Foundation must be involved in every multisig anyway, the contributors of this proposal feel as though it’s sensible for the DAO to formally recognize this reality and consolidate multisig operations under the Foundation’s purview. Additional benefits include not only a reduction in total OpEx spending by the DAO, but also with full-time employees trained in OpSec and internal legal capacities, we believe that the funds will be safest in the hands of the AF. Finally, by marking the clear owner of the payroll function as the AF, responsibility for successes and failures will fall on a single party, giving the DAO greater accountability beyond the committee structure.
After inquiry, delegates expressed a preference to honor the agreement with R3gen and have them finish out the planned monthly token reports. To ensure that the MSS Payroll multisig has sufficient ARB to pay out R3gen for the remaining 2 reports, Entropy is proposing that the MSS wind down begins by transitioning the following multisigs to the Arbitrum Foundation with a target completion date of June 15th:
Following the completion of this transfer, the Arbitrum Foundation will share the updated addresses for the seven initiatives being transferred in the MSS communication thread. The Arbitrum Foundation has confirmed that funds for these ongoing programs will be separated into unique wallets so that they can continue to be easily tracked. Going forward, the Arbitrum Foundation has also agreed to continue this practice for any new initiatives in order to ensure delegates and the DAO have transparency on the state and flow of funds. Additionally, the Foundation has committed to providing updates when necessary; however, delegates should expect these to be at an informal cadence.
The following multisigs will remain under the control of the MSS:
At the passing of this proposal (June 6th), the MSS will have discretion to pay R3gen upfront for their July token report if the price of ARB is high enough to secure the avoidance of a shortfall.
Once the above-mentioned multisigs have been transferred to the Arbitrum Foundation, the MSS will complete its tenure by sending a final payment to the MSS members for their work in June. With a target completion date of June 15th, MSS members will be paid one-half of their normal monthly compensation for June. If work for the MSS extends beyond June 15th, the members will be paid a pro-rata monthly rate up until June 30th. Following these final payments, the MSS will formally dissolve, returning any remaining ARB to the DAO’s treasury and being absolved of any future payment responsibilities and risk.
Similar to the upfront payment of R3gen’s work and if necessary due to extreme changes in market conditions, MSS members will have the discretion to send payments related to June work at an earlier date to avoid a shortfall.
Going forward, the payment vertical and its structure will be left up to the Arbitrum Foundation. In the event of resource constraints, Entropy recommends to the AF that they onboard a limited number of community members to assist with multisigs for smaller programs; however, this is something that will be up to the discretion of the Foundation. If the AF chooses to do so, they will have the mandate to structure the involvement of community contributions in the payroll function as they wish.
Once the OpCo has been operationalized and possesses similar payroll capabilities as the Arbitrum Foundation, we believe that responsibilities for the DAO’s multisigs should be transferred to that entity. When that time comes, Entropy recommends for the Arbitrum Foundation and future head of OpCo to update the DAO with a joint statement.
May 22nd: Forum Post May 29th - June 5th: Snapshot vote June 6th: If approved, transfer of the previous MSS multisigs to the Foundation will begin. June 15th: MSS’ term comes to an end
Basic voting with FOR, AGAINST, ABSTAIN choices.
FOR: In support of winding down the MSS and transferring ownership of the payment vertical to the Arbitrum Foundation
AGAINST: Entropy will work with the MSS to bring a revised proposal that addresses the shortfall and future structure of the payment vertical
ABSTAIN
A thoughtful and well-structured proposa.
Big props to everyone involved. Consolidating MSS functions under the Arbitrum Foundation seems like a natural evolution, especially given their existing oversight role and compliance infrastructure. Curious to hear from others: does this shift strengthen operational efficiency, or do we risk losing decentralized touchpoints in the DAO’s payment process?
We want to drop our thoughts on the MSS issue including in relation to this post: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/mss-for-arbitrum-communication-thread-arbitrum-multisig-support-service/26508/28?u=arbitrum
We believe the multisig service operations will be absorbed into OpCo's mandate and OpCo will eventually take over this service. The question facing the DAO is what to do in regards to managing the treasury for proposals passed by the DAO until the OpCo is ready to take on this role.
We want to drop our thoughts on the MSS issue including in relation to this post: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/mss-for-arbitrum-communication-thread-arbitrum-multisig-support-service/26508/28?u=arbitrum
We believe the multisig service operations will be absorbed into OpCo's mandate and OpCo will eventually take over this service. The question facing the DAO is what to do in regards to managing the treasury for proposals passed by the DAO until the OpCo is ready to take on this role.
There are two outcomes:
In order for the DAO to continue with the MSS, a new funding proposal would be required to pay the signers until the OpCo is ready to take over. To help with this decision, the DAO should evaluate the overall cost of funding the MSS relative to the funds under their custody and the quantity of transactions signed per month. If MSS continues, we'd strongly recommend keeping the 9/12 setup and avoid reducing the number of signers. This is to help combat the increasing rise of digital and real-world threats that signers may face. Additionally, the DAO needs to decide whether a new set of elections should take place as the original proposal mentions that elections should occur every 12 months.
MSS is paid $234k per year and $19.5k per month. They are holding approximately 24,545,271 ARB and $3,290,031 across multiple multisigs as outlined in Entropy's post. Note, the current payment is slightly less at $17k per month, as Alex L stood down as Chair and Frisson is no longer taking payment.
The Arbitrum Foundation is already involved in the MSS. We perform compliance (KYC/KYB) on the recipient and inform all signers when compliance is completed. We provide each signer with the name of the recipient alongside the wallet address for each project. It is then up to the MSS chair to coordinate the payment with the signers, communicate with the recipient, and keep the DAO abreast on updates in regards to the MSS.
We are happy to take on the additional role until the OpCo is ready to take it on. If we do take it on, our strong preference will be to set up our own multisigs and rely on our existing processes for handling the payments. This is to avoid any additional complexities that can lead to delays or other issues.
We see any change as temporary solutions until the OpCo is set up. We are willing to help to support that transition, but ultimately, it will be up to the DAO to decide on what to do.
I have voted in favour of this proposal. I have not experienced it first hand, but from comments and participation I gathered that its structure has proven inefficient, with too many signers causing delays and uneven participation, while the chair role became overloaded and undercompensated.
Even though reform might be possible, imo it makes more sense to align with current DAO operations by consolidating payment responsibilities under the Arbitrum Foundation temporarily (already the compliance bottleneck, as explained by Griff) and later transitioning to OpCo. Voted FOR
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR (Wind Down the MSS) on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR (Wind Down the MSS) on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Given the current circumstances—including the economic shortfall and increased involvement from the Arbitrum Foundation—we find this transition to be reasonable. We expect that responsibility will return to the DAO once the OpCo is fully operational, as originally intended. As DIP Program Managers, we can confirm that the handover process was coordinated jointly with the Arbitrum Foundation. We appreciate being included in the program’s payment workflows and thank AF for its collaboration during this period.
As in @web3citizenxyz representation, voting for winding down the MSS. Below the rationale:
I understand — and have often expressed support for — reducing unnecessary costs in the DAO.
On the other hand, the MSS has provided operational value that might not have existed otherwise. Without it, we may have seen delays or — under different conditions, which are not currently present — even security risks.
I understand — and have often expressed support for — reducing unnecessary costs in the DAO.
On the other hand, the MSS has provided operational value that might not have existed otherwise. Without it, we may have seen delays or — under different conditions, which are not currently present — even security risks.
Between the two perspectives, I believe concerns over risk currently carry far less weight than the benefit of cost reduction. So, I would vote FOR in this proposal.
As a final note, I want to emphasize that we must not allow payment transparency or accountability to deteriorate. If at any point the situation worsens, it is our collective responsibility as DAO members to contribute to a solution not only through criticism, but through action, like suggesting or contributing in any alternative structure that ensures trust and clarity in the process.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
After reviewing all alternative solutions to the current funding shortfall that the MSS faces, the most straightforward option is to wind it down and temporarily transfer this function to the Arbitrum Foundation.
It’s essential to note that we view this as an interim measure, and we believe the OpCo should ultimately assume control of the funds for DAO initiatives once it’s operationally ready to do so. In the meantime, it might be beneficial for the DAO to discuss how the setup should look like once the OpCo is in control, and whether it’d make sense to include external parties in a setup similar to the MSS.
Lastly, we’d like to request that the Arbitrum Foundation transparently manage the funds on behalf of the DAO, either by having different wallets that delegates can refer to when checking for the balance of different initiatives, or by having a public spreadsheet that tracks said balance.
Cross-posting the recent MSS update from @Sinkas, which encapsulates the next steps following the passing of this proposal on Snapshot.
With the proposal to wind down the MSS successfully passing Snapshot, the MSS is coordinating with the Arbitrum Foundation to transfer control of the funds for each initiative smoothly. Once the Foundation is ready to receive funds, they’ll share the list of addresses in the forum for confirmation, and then the MSS will begin transferring the balances. The target date for that transition is June 15th.
I'm voting in favor of this proposal. The MSS was created at a time when there were many proposals and each was setting up its own multisig, which resulted in high costs for the DAO. I believe the MSS system has been very useful and served an important purpose during that period. However, it makes sense to evolve as the DAO matures. Transitioning these responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation aligns with the broader restructuring efforts and gives the Foundation more authority to streamline operations and improve efficiency. I fully support this direction.
I’m concerned that the conversation has focused almost entirely on efficiency and structure, without addressing a key factor for medium-term success: retaining and transferring the operational knowledge accumulated by the MSS.
Throughout its tenure, the MSS has managed complex payments, compliance workflows, and coordination across multiple stakeholders. That hands-on experience is incredibly valuable, and likely undocumented.
I’m concerned that the conversation has focused almost entirely on efficiency and structure, without addressing a key factor for medium-term success: retaining and transferring the operational knowledge accumulated by the MSS.
Throughout its tenure, the MSS has managed complex payments, compliance workflows, and coordination across multiple stakeholders. That hands-on experience is incredibly valuable, and likely undocumented.
If this transition to the Foundation, and later to OpCo, is to be effective, we urgently need a structured process for operational knowledge transfer, including:
Without this institutional memory, we risk repeating past mistakes or losing small but meaningful improvements that kept things running.
This kind of transition work is often overlooked, but it’s critical to ensure that whoever takes over doesn’t have to start from scratch.
I will be voting to Wind down the MSS. I appreciate the cost savings and independence that this brought, but it's clear to me from responses within this thread of those on the MSS that this is no longer needed. Both logistically, but also that the AF is effectively involved with this indirectly anyway making it more of an appearance thing than anything.
First, we’d like to thank Entropy for bringing forward this proposal.
We are voting AGAINST the proposal to sunset the MSS and transfer its responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation. We share the centralization concerns raised by GFX Labs [here] and believe that approving this change could set an unhealthy precedent: if operational challenges justify bypassing decentralized structures now, similar shortcuts may be taken when issues arise within OpCo in the future.
I have voted in favour of this proposal. I have not experienced it first hand, but from comments and participation I gathered that its structure has proven inefficient, with too many signers causing delays and uneven participation, while the chair role became overloaded and undercompensated.
Even though reform might be possible, imo it makes more sense to align with current DAO operations by consolidating payment responsibilities under the Arbitrum Foundation temporarily (already the compliance bottleneck, as explained by Griff) and later transitioning to OpCo. Voted FORAfter consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR (Wind Down the MSS) on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR (Wind Down the MSS) on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Given the current circumstances—including the economic shortfall and increased involvement from the Arbitrum Foundation—we find this transition to be reasonable. We expect that responsibility will return to the DAO once the OpCo is fully operational, as originally intended. As DIP Program Managers, we can confirm that the handover process was coordinated jointly with the Arbitrum Foundation. We appreciate being included in the program’s payment workflows and thank AF for its collaboration during this period.
As in @web3citizenxyz representation, voting for winding down the MSS. Below the rationale:
I understand — and have often expressed support for — reducing unnecessary costs in the DAO.
On the other hand, the MSS has provided operational value that might not have existed otherwise. Without it, we may have seen delays or — under different conditions, which are not currently present — even security risks.
I understand — and have often expressed support for — reducing unnecessary costs in the DAO.
On the other hand, the MSS has provided operational value that might not have existed otherwise. Without it, we may have seen delays or — under different conditions, which are not currently present — even security risks.
Between the two perspectives, I believe concerns over risk currently carry far less weight than the benefit of cost reduction. So, I would vote FOR in this proposal.
As a final note, I want to emphasize that we must not allow payment transparency or accountability to deteriorate. If at any point the situation worsens, it is our collective responsibility as DAO members to contribute to a solution not only through criticism, but through action, like suggesting or contributing in any alternative structure that ensures trust and clarity in the process.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
After reviewing all alternative solutions to the current funding shortfall that the MSS faces, the most straightforward option is to wind it down and temporarily transfer this function to the Arbitrum Foundation.
It’s essential to note that we view this as an interim measure, and we believe the OpCo should ultimately assume control of the funds for DAO initiatives once it’s operationally ready to do so. In the meantime, it might be beneficial for the DAO to discuss how the setup should look like once the OpCo is in control, and whether it’d make sense to include external parties in a setup similar to the MSS.
Lastly, we’d like to request that the Arbitrum Foundation transparently manage the funds on behalf of the DAO, either by having different wallets that delegates can refer to when checking for the balance of different initiatives, or by having a public spreadsheet that tracks said balance.
Cross-posting the recent MSS update from @Sinkas, which encapsulates the next steps following the passing of this proposal on Snapshot.
With the proposal to wind down the MSS successfully passing Snapshot, the MSS is coordinating with the Arbitrum Foundation to transfer control of the funds for each initiative smoothly. Once the Foundation is ready to receive funds, they’ll share the list of addresses in the forum for confirmation, and then the MSS will begin transferring the balances. The target date for that transition is June 15th.
I'm voting in favor of this proposal. The MSS was created at a time when there were many proposals and each was setting up its own multisig, which resulted in high costs for the DAO. I believe the MSS system has been very useful and served an important purpose during that period. However, it makes sense to evolve as the DAO matures. Transitioning these responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation aligns with the broader restructuring efforts and gives the Foundation more authority to streamline operations and improve efficiency. I fully support this direction.
I’m concerned that the conversation has focused almost entirely on efficiency and structure, without addressing a key factor for medium-term success: retaining and transferring the operational knowledge accumulated by the MSS.
Throughout its tenure, the MSS has managed complex payments, compliance workflows, and coordination across multiple stakeholders. That hands-on experience is incredibly valuable, and likely undocumented.
I’m concerned that the conversation has focused almost entirely on efficiency and structure, without addressing a key factor for medium-term success: retaining and transferring the operational knowledge accumulated by the MSS.
Throughout its tenure, the MSS has managed complex payments, compliance workflows, and coordination across multiple stakeholders. That hands-on experience is incredibly valuable, and likely undocumented.
If this transition to the Foundation, and later to OpCo, is to be effective, we urgently need a structured process for operational knowledge transfer, including:
Without this institutional memory, we risk repeating past mistakes or losing small but meaningful improvements that kept things running.
This kind of transition work is often overlooked, but it’s critical to ensure that whoever takes over doesn’t have to start from scratch.
I will be voting to Wind down the MSS. I appreciate the cost savings and independence that this brought, but it's clear to me from responses within this thread of those on the MSS that this is no longer needed. Both logistically, but also that the AF is effectively involved with this indirectly anyway making it more of an appearance thing than anything.
First, we’d like to thank Entropy for bringing forward this proposal.
We are voting AGAINST the proposal to sunset the MSS and transfer its responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation. We share the centralization concerns raised by GFX Labs [here] and believe that approving this change could set an unhealthy precedent: if operational challenges justify bypassing decentralized structures now, similar shortcuts may be taken when issues arise within OpCo in the future.
Cross-posting the recent MSS update from @Sinkas, which encapsulates the next steps following the passing of this proposal on Snapshot.
With the proposal to wind down the MSS successfully passing Snapshot, the MSS is coordinating with the Arbitrum Foundation to transfer control of the funds for each initiative smoothly. Once the Foundation is ready to receive funds, they’ll share the list of addresses in the forum for confirmation, and then the MSS will begin transferring the balances. The target date for that transition is June 15th.
The MSS has also confirmed that they will put together a post-mortem report as suggested by @Oni
Lastly, with market conditions slightly worsening since this proposal was written, the MSS has decided to initiate the payments for R3gen's July report and member payments for half of June ahead of schedule in order to avoid any further shortfalls.
First, we’d like to thank Entropy for bringing forward this proposal.
We are voting AGAINST the proposal to sunset the MSS and transfer its responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation. We share the centralization concerns raised by GFX Labs [here] and believe that approving this change could set an unhealthy precedent: if operational challenges justify bypassing decentralized structures now, similar shortcuts may be taken when issues arise within OpCo in the future.
In our view, the strongest version of this proposal would have introduced a restructured MSS, with reduced compensation, improved treasury risk management (e.g. stablecoin conversion), and a clearly defined transition path to OpCo. We are also interested in seeing suggested Plan B [here], as @Cattin mentioned. which may offer a more balanced approach.
While we recognize the tension between decentralization and operational efficiency, we believe the value at risk here does not justify compromising decentralization. Until OpCo is fully operational and accountable to the DAO, we view MSS—even with its limitations—as the more transparent and decentralized option.
We encourage the proposers to return with an amended version that retains the MSS structure while addressing funding constraints through leaner operations and clearer safeguards.
Voted FOR.
As discussed in length here https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/mss-for-arbitrum-communication-thread-arbitrum-multisig-support-service/26508/9?u=tamara I saw first hand how the MSS underperformed in terms of accountability and actually lost the DAO money.
Voted FOR.
As discussed in length here https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/mss-for-arbitrum-communication-thread-arbitrum-multisig-support-service/26508/9?u=tamara I saw first hand how the MSS underperformed in terms of accountability and actually lost the DAO money.
Hence I am very in favor of a new approach with more ownership and accountability. This being said, I would like to see more details on the following phases
Payment Responsibilities are sitting with the AF
Payment Responsibilities moving to OpCo
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We support the proposal to wind down the Multisig Support Services (MSS) and transfer payment responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation. This transition addresses the current funding shortfall and operational inefficiencies within the MSS.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We support the proposal to wind down the Multisig Support Services (MSS) and transfer payment responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation. This transition addresses the current funding shortfall and operational inefficiencies within the MSS.
We align with the perspectives shared by JoJo and Castle Capital, acknowledging that while the MSS has played a crucial role in managing DAO-affiliated multisigs, the evolving needs of the DAO necessitate a more streamlined and efficient approach. The Foundation's existing involvement in compliance and execution positions it well to assume these responsibilities temporarily until the establishment of OpCo.
Recognizing concerns about centralization and transparency, we recommend the following measures to maintain accountability:
We view this transition as an interim solution, with the understanding that OpCo will eventually take over these functions. We encourage the DAO to use this period to develop a comprehensive framework for OpCo's operations, ensuring a smooth and transparent handover in the future.
We appreciate the efforts of all MSS members and chairs for their contributions to the DAO's operations and look forward to continued collaboration as we evolve our governance structures.
gm, voting For shutting down the MSS. We still stand with the original rationale posted earlier here
gm, voting FOR.
AF first, then OpCo once they’re ready and trained - a major advantage over using the MSS, as emphasized in the proposal:
full-time employees trained in OpSec and internal legal capacities
gm, voting FOR.
AF first, then OpCo once they’re ready and trained - a major advantage over using the MSS, as emphasized in the proposal:
full-time employees trained in OpSec and internal legal capacities
we should have a passed proposal for how this task is to ultimately be performed by the OpCo, along with clear assent form the OpCo that they believe the terms set forth in that proposal are realistic and acceptable.
Come on, it's a multisig. It starts in one AAE that can hold it indefinitely if needed, and eventually transitions to another. Why do we always have to overcomplicate things for the sake of bureaucracy?
We agree that winding down the MSS and temporarily handing over responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation is the right move, especially given the operational overlap and the compliance demands already requiring Foundation involvement.
Quoted from ArbitrumWe are happy to take on the additional role until the OpCo is ready to take it on. If we do take it on, our strong preference will be to set up our own multisigs and rely on our existing processes for handling the payments. This is to avoid any additional complexities that can lead to delays or other issues.
We agree that winding down the MSS and temporarily handing over responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation is the right move, especially given the operational overlap and the compliance demands already requiring Foundation involvement.
Quoted from ArbitrumWe are happy to take on the additional role until the OpCo is ready to take it on. If we do take it on, our strong preference will be to set up our own multisigs and rely on our existing processes for handling the payments. This is to avoid any additional complexities that can lead to delays or other issues.
That said, have the next steps after the MSS wind-down been thought through in more detail?
Specifically:
We’re aligned on the transition, but believe it’s important to begin shaping the path beyond the Foundation’s interim role to avoid ambiguity later.
I'm voting for wind down the MSS cause it makes sense to let the Arbitrum Foundation handle payments since they already do most of the work. It'll save money and make things simpler for the DAO. Plus, the Foundation’s got the skills to keep our funds safe.
I am voting yes on this proposal. I believe this is a timely and necessary step to avoid any more unnecessary waste.
Also, since the Foundation has already been involved in most of the checks and verifications (KYC, wallet info, recipient confirmation…), this proposal just formalizes what they have been doing. It’s not about giving more power to the AF.
I am voting yes on this proposal. I believe this is a timely and necessary step to avoid any more unnecessary waste.
Also, since the Foundation has already been involved in most of the checks and verifications (KYC, wallet info, recipient confirmation…), this proposal just formalizes what they have been doing. It’s not about giving more power to the AF.
But I would still advocate that it doesn’t necessarily make sense, also in the new setup put forward with AAE and OpCo operationalizing the DAO, having the initiative not falling under AF or OpCo itself.
Agree, and the current MSS process is quite heavy and with signers in different timezones, signing transactions within 24 hours is almost impossible and not practical.
OpCo will soon take over managing the approvals, and they will have their own handover process. I think this proposal is just making that transition smoother and earlier.
AF has clear internal processes, experienced staff, and professional operations, so payments, handling errors, and communication will be faster and more efficient than with a scattered multisig group.
Voting in favour of winding down the MSS
As a related note, I have concerns with the lack of transparency in the foundation, and believe in addition to this proposal we should demand significantly higher transparency in the foundation's reporting.
Voting AGAINST.
We should not focus on saving money at the cost of decentralisation.
In this DAO we should be always asking ourselves when should we not make things more efficient because they would compromise another quality of the system?
The DAO via MSS (and then OpCo) should control decision making and execution over dispersing funds, and use the Foundation for compliance.
I have voted "Against: Continue with the MSS", because I feel the path forward suggested here as far too ambiguous.
I see the issues raised by the MSS as valid and I don't doubt that AF and later the OpCo could perform this task well..but before we decide to terminate the MSS we should have a passed proposal for how this task is to ultimately be performed by the OpCo, along with clear assent form the OpCo that they believe the terms set forth in that proposal are realistic and acceptable.
I have voted "Against: Continue with the MSS", because I feel the path forward suggested here as far too ambiguous.
I see the issues raised by the MSS as valid and I don't doubt that AF and later the OpCo could perform this task well..but before we decide to terminate the MSS we should have a passed proposal for how this task is to ultimately be performed by the OpCo, along with clear assent form the OpCo that they believe the terms set forth in that proposal are realistic and acceptable.
Right now it seems we are committing to having the AF and later OpCo perform this role, with no actual control or plan for exactly how those parties will perform it. Will it require additional OpCo funding? What security measures will the OpCo have to undertake? What risks are associated with this switch-over? Without answers to at least most of those questions I don't think I can vote for this proposal.
Vote: FOR
This one's pretty clear tbh. ARB tanked and now MSS is running out of money, but here's the thing, the Foundation already has to approve every single transaction anyway because of compliance stuff. So we're basically paying 12 people to click approve on things that are already pre-approved.
Vote: FOR
This one's pretty clear tbh. ARB tanked and now MSS is running out of money, but here's the thing, the Foundation already has to approve every single transaction anyway because of compliance stuff. So we're basically paying 12 people to click approve on things that are already pre-approved.
The Arbitrum Foundation is already handling the heavy lifting on legal and compliance, so it makes sense to let them take care of things for now until OpCo, which we agreed will take over, is ready. There’s no point in spending extra funds if the Foundation can manage temporarily. It might look like centralization, but it’s only temporary, and there’s strong agreement that OpCo will step in soon.
We will vote against this proposal because moving all multisig authority to the Foundation concentrates decision‐making power in one place and removes the transparent, community‐driven cost structure that MSS signers provided, making it harder for delegates to verify administrative expenses and adds unnecessary complexity, risks payment delays, and requires extra governance approvals instead of allowing OpCo to assume these duties seamlessly from the start.
I fully support winding down the service. I see the MSS from the inside as a signer and the math is simple. We're facing a funding shortfall, and rather than asking for a top-up, this is the more efficient path forward.
I fully support winding down the service. I see the MSS from the inside as a signer and the math is simple. We're facing a funding shortfall, and rather than asking for a top-up, this is the more efficient path forward.
To everyone that says “but now it’s not decentralized” Every payment requires Foundation approval due to compliance. They send out an email to all the the multisig holders (myself included) saying “This address can receive money from you.” and we are supposed to ensure we don;t send money to anyone without getting that email, they already are the gate keepers. They should just make the payments.
The MSS served its purpose, saving the DAO lots of money, and making payments way more efficient… but just having the AF do it is better, I wonder honestly if they should even give it over to OpCo given the fact that they will probably still do the compliance check… but that’s a different discussion for another thread.
Thanks to the MSS team for the work we've done together, and thank you to Arbitrum DAO for entrusting me with this responsibility.
I am voting Against: Continue with the MSS for this proposal for the same reasons mentionned by @jameskbh. In my view, the most efficient approach is to continue with the MSS until the OpCo is live to assume this responsibility.
IMO, there is a “soft consensus” that this function should be taken by the OpCo, as it would be the “Operational Arm” of the DAO. Following this line of thought, it does not makes sense to transfer the responsabilities to the AF and then back to the OpCo: this will only increase the friction in the process. While this seems to be a cheaper “short term” solution, I don’t see it as the best one in the long term.
We vote for this proposal.
This effectively addresses the critical issue of the MSS funding shortfall by transitioning multisig responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation, leveraging its existing compliance and execution capabilities. Consolidating these functions under a single entity not only reduces operational expenses but also mitigates the complexities of coordination between separate entities. We recognize the concerns around centralization but view this transfer as an essential interim solution until OpCo can fully assume multisig management. The Foundation’s commitment to transparency, through separate wallets and periodic updates, offers sufficient accountability to mitigate risks in the transition.
I am voting in favor of disbanding the MSS.
I am one of the signer and have been serving the MSS since the beginning of the term.
The initiative, while well intended, has always clashed with the reality of multisig management that I personally tried to suggest at the time and boils down to the following points:
I am voting in favor of disbanding the MSS.
I am one of the signer and have been serving the MSS since the beginning of the term.
The initiative, while well intended, has always clashed with the reality of multisig management that I personally tried to suggest at the time and boils down to the following points:
Is there a way to restructure all of this, keep the initiative in the DAO and make it efficient? Potentially, yes. 5 or 7 signer, a PM (not a chair) that assigns ownership of initiatives, a schedule for unavailability, rules like no transactions being submitted on a friday unless is super urgent, periodic performance audit with rules to replace signers.
But I would still advocate that it doesn't necessarily make sense, also in the new setup put forward with AAE and OpCo operationalizing the DAO, having the initiative not falling under AF or OpCo itself. AF is needed, in every initiative, and almost in every transaction. As a signer, we always have to wait for the greenlight of AF from a compliance standpoint; this has also meant back and forth via email with them. Just this point really reduces performances, which to me are paramount here: we have to pay people in a timely fashion to become a professionalized DAO, full stop. Foundation will always be a middle layer, so it makes sense to move the whole function to this middle layer. OpCo will likely be able to have more agile communication with AF as well in future.
I voted against it.
IMO, there is a "soft consensus" that this function should be taken by the OpCo, as it would be the "Operational Arm" of the DAO. Following this line of thought, it does not makes sense to transfer the responsabilities to the AF and then back to the OpCo: this will only increase the friction in the process. While this seems to be a cheaper "short term" solution, I don't see it as the best one in the long term.
Cross-posting the recent MSS update from @Sinkas, which encapsulates the next steps following the passing of this proposal on Snapshot.
With the proposal to wind down the MSS successfully passing Snapshot, the MSS is coordinating with the Arbitrum Foundation to transfer control of the funds for each initiative smoothly. Once the Foundation is ready to receive funds, they’ll share the list of addresses in the forum for confirmation, and then the MSS will begin transferring the balances. The target date for that transition is June 15th.
The MSS has also confirmed that they will put together a post-mortem report as suggested by @Oni
Lastly, with market conditions slightly worsening since this proposal was written, the MSS has decided to initiate the payments for R3gen's July report and member payments for half of June ahead of schedule in order to avoid any further shortfalls.
First, we’d like to thank Entropy for bringing forward this proposal.
We are voting AGAINST the proposal to sunset the MSS and transfer its responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation. We share the centralization concerns raised by GFX Labs [here] and believe that approving this change could set an unhealthy precedent: if operational challenges justify bypassing decentralized structures now, similar shortcuts may be taken when issues arise within OpCo in the future.
In our view, the strongest version of this proposal would have introduced a restructured MSS, with reduced compensation, improved treasury risk management (e.g. stablecoin conversion), and a clearly defined transition path to OpCo. We are also interested in seeing suggested Plan B [here], as @Cattin mentioned. which may offer a more balanced approach.
While we recognize the tension between decentralization and operational efficiency, we believe the value at risk here does not justify compromising decentralization. Until OpCo is fully operational and accountable to the DAO, we view MSS—even with its limitations—as the more transparent and decentralized option.
We encourage the proposers to return with an amended version that retains the MSS structure while addressing funding constraints through leaner operations and clearer safeguards.
Voted FOR.
As discussed in length here https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/mss-for-arbitrum-communication-thread-arbitrum-multisig-support-service/26508/9?u=tamara I saw first hand how the MSS underperformed in terms of accountability and actually lost the DAO money.
Voted FOR.
As discussed in length here https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/mss-for-arbitrum-communication-thread-arbitrum-multisig-support-service/26508/9?u=tamara I saw first hand how the MSS underperformed in terms of accountability and actually lost the DAO money.
Hence I am very in favor of a new approach with more ownership and accountability. This being said, I would like to see more details on the following phases
Payment Responsibilities are sitting with the AF
Payment Responsibilities moving to OpCo
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We support the proposal to wind down the Multisig Support Services (MSS) and transfer payment responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation. This transition addresses the current funding shortfall and operational inefficiencies within the MSS.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We support the proposal to wind down the Multisig Support Services (MSS) and transfer payment responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation. This transition addresses the current funding shortfall and operational inefficiencies within the MSS.
We align with the perspectives shared by JoJo and Castle Capital, acknowledging that while the MSS has played a crucial role in managing DAO-affiliated multisigs, the evolving needs of the DAO necessitate a more streamlined and efficient approach. The Foundation's existing involvement in compliance and execution positions it well to assume these responsibilities temporarily until the establishment of OpCo.
Recognizing concerns about centralization and transparency, we recommend the following measures to maintain accountability:
We view this transition as an interim solution, with the understanding that OpCo will eventually take over these functions. We encourage the DAO to use this period to develop a comprehensive framework for OpCo's operations, ensuring a smooth and transparent handover in the future.
We appreciate the efforts of all MSS members and chairs for their contributions to the DAO's operations and look forward to continued collaboration as we evolve our governance structures.
gm, voting For shutting down the MSS. We still stand with the original rationale posted earlier here
gm, voting FOR.
AF first, then OpCo once they’re ready and trained - a major advantage over using the MSS, as emphasized in the proposal:
full-time employees trained in OpSec and internal legal capacities
gm, voting FOR.
AF first, then OpCo once they’re ready and trained - a major advantage over using the MSS, as emphasized in the proposal:
full-time employees trained in OpSec and internal legal capacities
we should have a passed proposal for how this task is to ultimately be performed by the OpCo, along with clear assent form the OpCo that they believe the terms set forth in that proposal are realistic and acceptable.
Come on, it's a multisig. It starts in one AAE that can hold it indefinitely if needed, and eventually transitions to another. Why do we always have to overcomplicate things for the sake of bureaucracy?
We agree that winding down the MSS and temporarily handing over responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation is the right move, especially given the operational overlap and the compliance demands already requiring Foundation involvement.
Quoted from ArbitrumWe are happy to take on the additional role until the OpCo is ready to take it on. If we do take it on, our strong preference will be to set up our own multisigs and rely on our existing processes for handling the payments. This is to avoid any additional complexities that can lead to delays or other issues.
We agree that winding down the MSS and temporarily handing over responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation is the right move, especially given the operational overlap and the compliance demands already requiring Foundation involvement.
Quoted from ArbitrumWe are happy to take on the additional role until the OpCo is ready to take it on. If we do take it on, our strong preference will be to set up our own multisigs and rely on our existing processes for handling the payments. This is to avoid any additional complexities that can lead to delays or other issues.
That said, have the next steps after the MSS wind-down been thought through in more detail?
Specifically:
We’re aligned on the transition, but believe it’s important to begin shaping the path beyond the Foundation’s interim role to avoid ambiguity later.
I'm voting for wind down the MSS cause it makes sense to let the Arbitrum Foundation handle payments since they already do most of the work. It'll save money and make things simpler for the DAO. Plus, the Foundation’s got the skills to keep our funds safe.
I am voting yes on this proposal. I believe this is a timely and necessary step to avoid any more unnecessary waste.
Also, since the Foundation has already been involved in most of the checks and verifications (KYC, wallet info, recipient confirmation…), this proposal just formalizes what they have been doing. It’s not about giving more power to the AF.
I am voting yes on this proposal. I believe this is a timely and necessary step to avoid any more unnecessary waste.
Also, since the Foundation has already been involved in most of the checks and verifications (KYC, wallet info, recipient confirmation…), this proposal just formalizes what they have been doing. It’s not about giving more power to the AF.
But I would still advocate that it doesn’t necessarily make sense, also in the new setup put forward with AAE and OpCo operationalizing the DAO, having the initiative not falling under AF or OpCo itself.
Agree, and the current MSS process is quite heavy and with signers in different timezones, signing transactions within 24 hours is almost impossible and not practical.
OpCo will soon take over managing the approvals, and they will have their own handover process. I think this proposal is just making that transition smoother and earlier.
AF has clear internal processes, experienced staff, and professional operations, so payments, handling errors, and communication will be faster and more efficient than with a scattered multisig group.
Voting in favour of winding down the MSS
As a related note, I have concerns with the lack of transparency in the foundation, and believe in addition to this proposal we should demand significantly higher transparency in the foundation's reporting.
Voting AGAINST.
We should not focus on saving money at the cost of decentralisation.
In this DAO we should be always asking ourselves when should we not make things more efficient because they would compromise another quality of the system?
The DAO via MSS (and then OpCo) should control decision making and execution over dispersing funds, and use the Foundation for compliance.
I have voted "Against: Continue with the MSS", because I feel the path forward suggested here as far too ambiguous.
I see the issues raised by the MSS as valid and I don't doubt that AF and later the OpCo could perform this task well..but before we decide to terminate the MSS we should have a passed proposal for how this task is to ultimately be performed by the OpCo, along with clear assent form the OpCo that they believe the terms set forth in that proposal are realistic and acceptable.
I have voted "Against: Continue with the MSS", because I feel the path forward suggested here as far too ambiguous.
I see the issues raised by the MSS as valid and I don't doubt that AF and later the OpCo could perform this task well..but before we decide to terminate the MSS we should have a passed proposal for how this task is to ultimately be performed by the OpCo, along with clear assent form the OpCo that they believe the terms set forth in that proposal are realistic and acceptable.
Right now it seems we are committing to having the AF and later OpCo perform this role, with no actual control or plan for exactly how those parties will perform it. Will it require additional OpCo funding? What security measures will the OpCo have to undertake? What risks are associated with this switch-over? Without answers to at least most of those questions I don't think I can vote for this proposal.
Vote: FOR
This one's pretty clear tbh. ARB tanked and now MSS is running out of money, but here's the thing, the Foundation already has to approve every single transaction anyway because of compliance stuff. So we're basically paying 12 people to click approve on things that are already pre-approved.
Vote: FOR
This one's pretty clear tbh. ARB tanked and now MSS is running out of money, but here's the thing, the Foundation already has to approve every single transaction anyway because of compliance stuff. So we're basically paying 12 people to click approve on things that are already pre-approved.
The Arbitrum Foundation is already handling the heavy lifting on legal and compliance, so it makes sense to let them take care of things for now until OpCo, which we agreed will take over, is ready. There’s no point in spending extra funds if the Foundation can manage temporarily. It might look like centralization, but it’s only temporary, and there’s strong agreement that OpCo will step in soon.
We will vote against this proposal because moving all multisig authority to the Foundation concentrates decision‐making power in one place and removes the transparent, community‐driven cost structure that MSS signers provided, making it harder for delegates to verify administrative expenses and adds unnecessary complexity, risks payment delays, and requires extra governance approvals instead of allowing OpCo to assume these duties seamlessly from the start.
I fully support winding down the service. I see the MSS from the inside as a signer and the math is simple. We're facing a funding shortfall, and rather than asking for a top-up, this is the more efficient path forward.
I fully support winding down the service. I see the MSS from the inside as a signer and the math is simple. We're facing a funding shortfall, and rather than asking for a top-up, this is the more efficient path forward.
To everyone that says “but now it’s not decentralized” Every payment requires Foundation approval due to compliance. They send out an email to all the the multisig holders (myself included) saying “This address can receive money from you.” and we are supposed to ensure we don;t send money to anyone without getting that email, they already are the gate keepers. They should just make the payments.
The MSS served its purpose, saving the DAO lots of money, and making payments way more efficient… but just having the AF do it is better, I wonder honestly if they should even give it over to OpCo given the fact that they will probably still do the compliance check… but that’s a different discussion for another thread.
Thanks to the MSS team for the work we've done together, and thank you to Arbitrum DAO for entrusting me with this responsibility.
I am voting Against: Continue with the MSS for this proposal for the same reasons mentionned by @jameskbh. In my view, the most efficient approach is to continue with the MSS until the OpCo is live to assume this responsibility.
IMO, there is a “soft consensus” that this function should be taken by the OpCo, as it would be the “Operational Arm” of the DAO. Following this line of thought, it does not makes sense to transfer the responsabilities to the AF and then back to the OpCo: this will only increase the friction in the process. While this seems to be a cheaper “short term” solution, I don’t see it as the best one in the long term.
We vote for this proposal.
This effectively addresses the critical issue of the MSS funding shortfall by transitioning multisig responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation, leveraging its existing compliance and execution capabilities. Consolidating these functions under a single entity not only reduces operational expenses but also mitigates the complexities of coordination between separate entities. We recognize the concerns around centralization but view this transfer as an essential interim solution until OpCo can fully assume multisig management. The Foundation’s commitment to transparency, through separate wallets and periodic updates, offers sufficient accountability to mitigate risks in the transition.
I am voting in favor of disbanding the MSS.
I am one of the signer and have been serving the MSS since the beginning of the term.
The initiative, while well intended, has always clashed with the reality of multisig management that I personally tried to suggest at the time and boils down to the following points:
I am voting in favor of disbanding the MSS.
I am one of the signer and have been serving the MSS since the beginning of the term.
The initiative, while well intended, has always clashed with the reality of multisig management that I personally tried to suggest at the time and boils down to the following points:
Is there a way to restructure all of this, keep the initiative in the DAO and make it efficient? Potentially, yes. 5 or 7 signer, a PM (not a chair) that assigns ownership of initiatives, a schedule for unavailability, rules like no transactions being submitted on a friday unless is super urgent, periodic performance audit with rules to replace signers.
But I would still advocate that it doesn't necessarily make sense, also in the new setup put forward with AAE and OpCo operationalizing the DAO, having the initiative not falling under AF or OpCo itself. AF is needed, in every initiative, and almost in every transaction. As a signer, we always have to wait for the greenlight of AF from a compliance standpoint; this has also meant back and forth via email with them. Just this point really reduces performances, which to me are paramount here: we have to pay people in a timely fashion to become a professionalized DAO, full stop. Foundation will always be a middle layer, so it makes sense to move the whole function to this middle layer. OpCo will likely be able to have more agile communication with AF as well in future.
I voted against it.
IMO, there is a "soft consensus" that this function should be taken by the OpCo, as it would be the "Operational Arm" of the DAO. Following this line of thought, it does not makes sense to transfer the responsabilities to the AF and then back to the OpCo: this will only increase the friction in the process. While this seems to be a cheaper "short term" solution, I don't see it as the best one in the long term.
Voting AGAINST.
We should not focus on saving money at the cost of decentralisation.
In this DAO we should be always asking ourselves when should we not make things more efficient because they would compromise another quality of the system?
The DAO via MSS (and then OpCo) should control decision making and execution over dispersing funds, and use the Foundation for compliance.
The Foundation is a necessary step in the process (compliance) in any way we configure this, it does not follow therefore that we should group the AF also as making payments.
I am voting Against: Continue with the MSS for this proposal for the same reasons mentionned by @jameskbh. In my view, the most efficient approach is to continue with the MSS until the OpCo is live to assume this responsibility.
IMO, there is a “soft consensus” that this function should be taken by the OpCo, as it would be the “Operational Arm” of the DAO. Following this line of thought, it does not makes sense to transfer the responsabilities to the AF and then back to the OpCo: this will only increase the friction in the process. While this seems to be a cheaper “short term” solution, I don’t see it as the best one in the long term.
I align with your point, duplicating compliance and legal functions across both OpCo and the Foundation may not be the most efficient use of resources, especially when the Foundation already has well-established systems in place.
While OpCo’s approved budget does include funding for legal setup and access to outsourced legal and auditing services, it would likely be more efficient if one entity takes primary responsibility for compliance. Splitting this across multiple entities could create confusion or operational friction, particularly in high-stakes or time-sensitive processes.
Whether or not OpCo should eventually become capable of independently executing from 0 to 1 is still open for discussion. Still, I agree that any move in that direction should be weighed carefully against the need for clarity, cost-efficiency, and smooth coordination.
Appreciate your perspective as always, it grounds the conversation in what’s practical now, while we plan for a more efficient future.
While this reflects the current reality, we hope that as OpCo takes shape, such dependencies on the Foundation can be reduced through better tooling and more autonomous operational structures. Until then, centralizing the responsibility with AF appears to be the most stable option, and we expect transparent communication from AF about the same.
While this reflects the current reality, we hope that as OpCo takes shape, such dependencies on the Foundation can be reduced through better tooling and more autonomous operational structures. Until then, centralizing the responsibility with AF appears to be the most stable option, and we expect transparent communication from AF about the same.
my guess is as good as yours here but since we are talking about compliance, here we have to possibilities:
While if I recall opco has a legal budget, and I see them potentially having a dedicated legal person, I am not necessarily sure that duplicating some of the functions of the foundation would be the most efficient way of using opco resources. Would only be viable if we want opco to be able to execute initiatives from 0 to 1 without any action needed on the foundation's side. Unsure if this is going to happen knowing the very strict relationship all the AAEs are building.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting For: Wind Down the MSS in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting For: Wind Down the MSS in the Snapshot voting.
We sincerely appreciate the work of all MSS chairs and signers who have contributed their time and efforts to operate the program. Despite some recent operational challenges, the MSS played a crucial role in supporting multisig coordination during a key period of DAO growth.
As shared in our earlier comment, we believe that in the current environment, the most effective short-term path is to transfer MSS responsibilities to the AF, which has both the resources and compliance infrastructure to manage this transition until the OpCo becomes fully functional.
We also acknowledge the operational friction highlighted by @JoJo:
AF is needed, in every initiative, and almost in every transaction. As a signer, we always have to wait for the greenlight of AF from a compliance standpoint; this has also meant back and forth via email with them.
While this reflects the current reality, we hope that as OpCo takes shape, such dependencies on the Foundation can be reduced through better tooling and more autonomous operational structures. Until then, centralizing the responsibility with AF appears to be the most stable option, and we expect transparent communication from AF about the same.
Camelot supports this proposal to transfer multisig operations to the Arbitrum Foundation and, later if deemed necessary, to OpCo when it becomes operationalized. While there is value in involving the DAO in various functions, multisig management represents the typical task where efficiency and security are the most important features. For this reason, placing these responsibilities in the hands of Arbitrum-aligned entities makes considerable sense: the Foundation’s, having the role of compliance member and having full-time employees that are better trained in OpSec compared to DAO members, and the internal legal capacities, makes them the most suitable interim custodian of these functions.
We also have a general preference for the transactions related to the DAO programs being timely executed. For whoever operated multisigs, is easy to recognize how the current 7/12 or 8/12 threshold is slow and inefficient; but we also can’t realistically go below this threshold in DAO operated multisigs. We realistically see as the only path forward consolidating the functions under Foundation first, and OpCo later.
LobbyFi’s rationale on the price and making the voting power available for sale for this proposal:
This proposal is rather of an operational nature, and we cannot identify any individual beneficiaries—so the auction will be made available.
The price will be set at 0.1% of our VP’s worth in ETH terms—2.5 ETH.
I voted AGAINST this proposal
The MSS simplified and saved DAO funds by organizing multisigs — now all signings are performed by the MSS, not by separate groups in each initiative, while remaining transparent to the DAO
Now, due to the fall in the value of the ARB token, the Arbitrum Foundation (AF) will take over signing functions to itself, and we believe that this is a bad decision:
I voted AGAINST this proposal
The MSS simplified and saved DAO funds by organizing multisigs — now all signings are performed by the MSS, not by separate groups in each initiative, while remaining transparent to the DAO
Now, due to the fall in the value of the ARB token, the Arbitrum Foundation (AF) will take over signing functions to itself, and we believe that this is a bad decision:
1. Centralization of powers, which has been a trend lately This reduces community participation, which increases the risk of a decrease in active voting, as we have already seen in the recently adopted initiative to reduce the quorum. The centralization increases risk by creating a single point of failure and reducing operational redundancy
2. The AF is less transparent and will not report to the DAO on the costs of the MSS. It is unknown how much higher the AF’s costs will be compared to supporting the current model. If you have seen the annual reports of the AF, you understand that all administrative costs are aggregated into a single line item, making it difficult to assess efficiency or control expenditures
3. Instead of solving the budgeting problem, which has already manifested itself in many initiatives, it is simply suggested to spend money from another source and without the control of the DAO. Without addressing this systemic issue, this merely postpones the problem and reduces accountability
What can be done? There are several solutions, each with its pros and cons: --- Sell ARB immediately for the entire duration of the initiative, ensuring that there are always sufficient funds for all expenses --- Hedge ARB to mitigate risks associated with market volatility --- Analyze the market and dynamically manage the treasury — selling or buying back ARB depending on the situation
None of these options are currently being implemented
Before distributing further funds to initiatives, this problem must be resolved
With the current change within the DAO I do support the Wind down of the MSS. Execution, costs and efficiency should become better making the DAO also move faster.
We’re for shutting down the MSS and handing payments to the Arbitrum Foundation, and down the road to the OpCo. It cuts out extra steps, save money for everyone, and keeps funds safe and clear with the Foundation’s team taking full responsibility, leveraging its existing operational bandwidth and compliance processes. However, the proposal lacks a clear fallback plan if ARB’s price drops significantly (e.g., below $0.3), which could exacerbate the shortfall beyond what the proposed measures can handle.
Thank you for raising this issue and suggesting steps forward.
The MSS served a great job as a decentralized operational and execution body and the DAO should be proud of this initiative. As the general future view for payment execution is that the OpCo, as a DAO operational intiative, will overlap functions with MSS, we agree the most sensible decision is the OpCo to take over MSS tasks and learn from all the challenges and optimizations that the MSS has faced.
Thank you for raising this issue and suggesting steps forward.
The MSS served a great job as a decentralized operational and execution body and the DAO should be proud of this initiative. As the general future view for payment execution is that the OpCo, as a DAO operational intiative, will overlap functions with MSS, we agree the most sensible decision is the OpCo to take over MSS tasks and learn from all the challenges and optimizations that the MSS has faced.
Regarding shortfall of funds and wallet top up, we think that, as the general sentiment is OpCo will take over MSS, the most effective short-term solution is to transfer the functions to the Arbitrum Foundation as an intermediate operational body until the OpCo finishes its formation. Topping up the MSS again for just a few months of activity would be a waste of delegate effort and mindshare in our opinion.
It is worth exploring, however, how can the DAO prevent these shortfalls of program funds in situations of market downturns. Particularly, we would be supportive of keeping idle program funds subject to limit sell orders, set at a price that always guarantee honouring the program's dollar value. Therefore, if Arb price falls sharply during the duration of the program, the limit order will trigger and the DAO saves Arb-denominated funds as replenishments are never necessary, while still preserving the upside potential of Arb price increasing.
voting Against: Continue with the MSS on the current offchain vote because the DAO should retain the control over releasing funds, not the Arbitrum Foundation.
Entropy appreciates the feedback and comments from delegates thus far. We will respond to a few comments before moving this proposal forward to Snapshot shortly due to the time sensitive nature of the situation.
A few delegates have suggested alternative options. As stated in the rationale of the proposal, other options such as reducing MSS member pay or reducing the number of signers were already discussed with the relevant parties and were deemed unsuitable solutions due to safety concerns or signer unwillingness to perform the task with reduced pay.
Entropy appreciates the feedback and comments from delegates thus far. We will respond to a few comments before moving this proposal forward to Snapshot shortly due to the time sensitive nature of the situation.
A few delegates have suggested alternative options. As stated in the rationale of the proposal, other options such as reducing MSS member pay or reducing the number of signers were already discussed with the relevant parties and were deemed unsuitable solutions due to safety concerns or signer unwillingness to perform the task with reduced pay.
a partial transfer was considered by all parties, but it was deemed unfair to reduce MSS member pays due to the sustained level of risk MSS members take on by being signers. Even at $0.4, reducing the overall number of MSS members to 1 chair and 4 signers would still result in a shortfall.
Overall, our team’s stance is perhaps more succinctly captured by @jose_stablelab statement:
the most effective short-term solution is to transfer the functions to the Arbitrum Foundation as an intermediate operational body until the OpCo finishes its formation.
However, we are in agreement with the Arbitrum Foundation in that the delegates should consider the following two paths available:
The question facing the DAO is what to do in regards to managing the treasury for proposals passed by the DAO until the OpCo is ready to take on this role.
There are two outcomes:
If this proposal is rejected, then it’s clear that the DAO wants to keep utilizing the MSS until it's time to have the discussion about whether or not to move the function to OpCo. If this is the prevailing decision, a top up would almost certainly be necessary to allow time for the full onchain proposal process & any possible follow-up procedures. In this scenario, Entropy will work to create a proposal that restructures the MSS, taking into account learnings and the opinions of relevant parties.
The voting options and proposal language have been updated to better reflect the two paths.
In regards to delegates concerned about the framework/structure for how this transfer will be handled, the Arbitrum Foundation has affirmed their commitment to keep the program’s funds in separate multisigs to ensure transparency. This aligns with their existing payment processes.
Additionally, a valid concern raised by @mcfly:
However, the proposal lacks a clear fallback plan if ARB’s price drops significantly (e.g., below $0.3), which could exacerbate the shortfall beyond what the proposed measures can handle.
Entropy shares this concern and it was the motivator for targeting a June 15th turnover if this proposal passes. Now that we are a bit closer to June 1st, if R3gen and MSS members’ payments are sent at roughly the current price, the risk of an additional shortfall following this proposal becomes much lower. If those payments are sent out at ~$0.4, the breakeven price would then be roughly $0.21 for the MSS work for half of June & R3gen’s July payment. If markets begin turning for the worse, the proposal states that the MSS would be granted the discretion to make the payments early to avoid a shortfall.
At the passing of this proposal (June 6th), the MSS will have discretion to pay R3gen upfront for their July token report if the price of ARB is high enough to secure the avoidance of a shortfall.
Again we thank delegates for their engagement and thoughts. Entropy looks forward to moving this to a Snapshot vote to obtain clarity on next steps.
We support getting rid of the MSS and acknowledge that it caused major inefficiencies because it added extra steps—such as dual approvals and manual coordination between the DAO, the MSS, and the Foundation—but this change also shifts power away from decentralization toward greater control by the Arbitrum Foundation. Decentralization is a trade-off with efficiency; however, this move gives the Foundation too much control over DAO operations, as it will now oversee all spending.
Question: Why isn’t this role given to OpCo instead of the AF?
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We appreciate the efforts of MSS to date and would like to acknowledge that, despite some challenges with execution and communications, the program was operated efficiently.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We appreciate the efforts of MSS to date and would like to acknowledge that, despite some challenges with execution and communications, the program was operated efficiently.
Given the current transition plan, we support the temporary transfer of MSS responsibilities to the AF, especially since the OpCo is still in its early stages and the AF has confirmed the resources and capacity to manage this in the interim.
That said, we believe there are two areas worth reflecting on for future improvement:
While we support the direction, we agree with the observation by @cp0x that the proposal could have provided alternatives or options, such as additional funding, AF takeover, or revised program structures. This would have allowed delegates to actively participate in shaping the outcome, rather than only responding to a pre-decided path of winding down the MSS.
Looking ahead, we also recommend applying ARB-denominated caps for each role in DAO-funded programs, similar to how the DIP uses caps in tier-based compensation. This can help avoid budget shortfalls during market downturns and ensure spending remains predictable and aligned with treasury conditions.
Thanks for identifying the problem and voicing it, however I have many doubts
Lately, Entropy has been advocating for trading decentralization for efficiency. Of course, direct control is always more efficient than decentralized processes — but I see several major downsides to this proposal:
Thanks for identifying the problem and voicing it, however I have many doubts
Lately, Entropy has been advocating for trading decentralization for efficiency. Of course, direct control is always more efficient than decentralized processes — but I see several major downsides to this proposal:
It represents a shift away from decentralization and DAO governance toward centralization under the Arbitrum Foundation If we continue down this path in every case, we’ll eventually reduce the DAO to a symbolic role — picking Twitter banner images while the real decisions are made elsewhere
Ending a program prematurely, despite it functioning well and fulfilling its responsibilities, sets a bad precedent It suggests the Foundation is an unreliable partner — willing to cancel initiatives arbitrarily. The financial issues cited here aren’t related to the MCC itself, but rather to the decision to convert funds to USDS right before payments were due — a decision made by the Foundation, which now seems unwilling to take responsibility for the consequences.
The proposal offers no real alternatives If this is the path you want to take, fine — but don’t present it as the only option. There’s a real issue here that needs solving, so present multiple solutions. Some obvious alternatives — which weren’t discussed — include:
In case of receiving AGAINST the proposal it will lead to the fact that we will spend more time than we could have spent if we had different alternative solutions
We appreciate the start to the discussion and would like to cross-post our reply to the MSS communication thread.
This is Brook @rooktc from TiD Research. We appreciate Entropy’s effort to address the MSS’s challenges, but I believe framing this as a binary yes/no choice somewhat oversimplifies a multifaceted issue.
The DAO needs more information and options to make an informed decision, and I urge the community to consider the following points that lead to the problem here to ensure a balanced approach.
This is Brook @rooktc from TiD Research. We appreciate Entropy’s effort to address the MSS’s challenges, but I believe framing this as a binary yes/no choice somewhat oversimplifies a multifaceted issue.
The DAO needs more information and options to make an informed decision, and I urge the community to consider the following points that lead to the problem here to ensure a balanced approach.
Entropy highlights inefficiencies due to the overlap between the Arbitrum Foundation’s compliance role (KYC/KYB, ARB-to-stablecoin conversion) and MSS’s multisig execution. However, the MSS communication thread suggests delays were primarily due to underperforming signers, not structural overlap.
The focus should be on improving MSS internal management—such as stricter performance expectations or more transparent reporting—rather than winding down the program.
The ~$29,300 shortfall, driven by ARB’s price drop to ~$0.4, reflects a broader challenge of managing token-based budgets in volatile markets. This issue, also discussed in the Top-up for Hackathon Continuation Program and TMC - Stablecoin Withdrawal Process threads, isn’t unique to MSS.
Sunsetting MSS solely due to this shortfall risks setting a precedent that fails to address the underlying problem, which could recur in other projects.
We propose revisiting our suggestion for all live projects to report monthly budget statuses to the TMC, DAO, and Foundation, providing visibility into potential shortfalls and enabling proactive solutions like additional funding or stablecoin adjustments.
Positioning the Foundation as a temporary solution until OpCo assumes multisig duties raises concerns about the timeline and OpCo’s readiness for compliance and payment execution.
Without a defined plan, we risk a governance vacuum or over-reliance on the Foundation, with limited transparency into how KYC/KYB and ARB-to-stablecoin conversions are handled, which is also not disclosed in MSS update thread.
The DAO needs a clear schedule and a well-defined process for transferring these functions to OpCo, along with a commitment from OpCo to continue disclosing detailed information on these processes to maintain transparency and accountability.
Given the underlying issues, in addition to having Entropy & AF's support to provide more information, I believe we should also have at least the below option available for the DAO to make better decision.
MSS Budget Top-Up
Allocate extra ARB + buffer to sustain MSS through its current term (August 2025).
Implement stricter signer performance standards (e.g., 24-hour response times) and weekly performance reports to address delays, retaining the 9/12 signer structure for security, as the Foundation recommends.
Use the remaining term to develop a transition plan to OpCo, with the Foundation and MSS proposing a schedule, and OpCo committing to monthly transparency reports on multisig activities.
I believe the DAO can address MSS challenges without shutting it down by focusing on better signer accountability, regular budget updates across projects, and a transparent plan for transitioning to OpCo. A budget top-up paired with stricter standards and a clear timeline would fix inefficiencies, stabilize funding, and uphold governance integrity, giving the DAO the tools to decide thoughtfully.
We support the winding down of the MSS and the sunset of the current governing council. Having engaged with both directly, we found the communications with the entity inifficient, primarily due to the lack of accountability and clear elected leaders for the councils, perhaps not as much a reflection of the individuals' composition.
We'd like to see some delegated authority to OpCo here to oversee these. We believe there is a clear path for OpCo to oversee the appointment and operational management of the multisig while still allowing the AF to provide a financial/legal wrapper for KYB/KYC purposes.
June 6th: If approved
you mean, if approved with a participation bigger than the non-constitutional 3% quorum, correct?
Voting AGAINST.
We should not focus on saving money at the cost of decentralisation.
In this DAO we should be always asking ourselves when should we not make things more efficient because they would compromise another quality of the system?
The DAO via MSS (and then OpCo) should control decision making and execution over dispersing funds, and use the Foundation for compliance.
The Foundation is a necessary step in the process (compliance) in any way we configure this, it does not follow therefore that we should group the AF also as making payments.
I am voting Against: Continue with the MSS for this proposal for the same reasons mentionned by @jameskbh. In my view, the most efficient approach is to continue with the MSS until the OpCo is live to assume this responsibility.
IMO, there is a “soft consensus” that this function should be taken by the OpCo, as it would be the “Operational Arm” of the DAO. Following this line of thought, it does not makes sense to transfer the responsabilities to the AF and then back to the OpCo: this will only increase the friction in the process. While this seems to be a cheaper “short term” solution, I don’t see it as the best one in the long term.
I align with your point, duplicating compliance and legal functions across both OpCo and the Foundation may not be the most efficient use of resources, especially when the Foundation already has well-established systems in place.
While OpCo’s approved budget does include funding for legal setup and access to outsourced legal and auditing services, it would likely be more efficient if one entity takes primary responsibility for compliance. Splitting this across multiple entities could create confusion or operational friction, particularly in high-stakes or time-sensitive processes.
Whether or not OpCo should eventually become capable of independently executing from 0 to 1 is still open for discussion. Still, I agree that any move in that direction should be weighed carefully against the need for clarity, cost-efficiency, and smooth coordination.
Appreciate your perspective as always, it grounds the conversation in what’s practical now, while we plan for a more efficient future.
While this reflects the current reality, we hope that as OpCo takes shape, such dependencies on the Foundation can be reduced through better tooling and more autonomous operational structures. Until then, centralizing the responsibility with AF appears to be the most stable option, and we expect transparent communication from AF about the same.
While this reflects the current reality, we hope that as OpCo takes shape, such dependencies on the Foundation can be reduced through better tooling and more autonomous operational structures. Until then, centralizing the responsibility with AF appears to be the most stable option, and we expect transparent communication from AF about the same.
my guess is as good as yours here but since we are talking about compliance, here we have to possibilities:
While if I recall opco has a legal budget, and I see them potentially having a dedicated legal person, I am not necessarily sure that duplicating some of the functions of the foundation would be the most efficient way of using opco resources. Would only be viable if we want opco to be able to execute initiatives from 0 to 1 without any action needed on the foundation's side. Unsure if this is going to happen knowing the very strict relationship all the AAEs are building.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting For: Wind Down the MSS in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting For: Wind Down the MSS in the Snapshot voting.
We sincerely appreciate the work of all MSS chairs and signers who have contributed their time and efforts to operate the program. Despite some recent operational challenges, the MSS played a crucial role in supporting multisig coordination during a key period of DAO growth.
As shared in our earlier comment, we believe that in the current environment, the most effective short-term path is to transfer MSS responsibilities to the AF, which has both the resources and compliance infrastructure to manage this transition until the OpCo becomes fully functional.
We also acknowledge the operational friction highlighted by @JoJo:
AF is needed, in every initiative, and almost in every transaction. As a signer, we always have to wait for the greenlight of AF from a compliance standpoint; this has also meant back and forth via email with them.
While this reflects the current reality, we hope that as OpCo takes shape, such dependencies on the Foundation can be reduced through better tooling and more autonomous operational structures. Until then, centralizing the responsibility with AF appears to be the most stable option, and we expect transparent communication from AF about the same.
Camelot supports this proposal to transfer multisig operations to the Arbitrum Foundation and, later if deemed necessary, to OpCo when it becomes operationalized. While there is value in involving the DAO in various functions, multisig management represents the typical task where efficiency and security are the most important features. For this reason, placing these responsibilities in the hands of Arbitrum-aligned entities makes considerable sense: the Foundation’s, having the role of compliance member and having full-time employees that are better trained in OpSec compared to DAO members, and the internal legal capacities, makes them the most suitable interim custodian of these functions.
We also have a general preference for the transactions related to the DAO programs being timely executed. For whoever operated multisigs, is easy to recognize how the current 7/12 or 8/12 threshold is slow and inefficient; but we also can’t realistically go below this threshold in DAO operated multisigs. We realistically see as the only path forward consolidating the functions under Foundation first, and OpCo later.
LobbyFi’s rationale on the price and making the voting power available for sale for this proposal:
This proposal is rather of an operational nature, and we cannot identify any individual beneficiaries—so the auction will be made available.
The price will be set at 0.1% of our VP’s worth in ETH terms—2.5 ETH.
I voted AGAINST this proposal
The MSS simplified and saved DAO funds by organizing multisigs — now all signings are performed by the MSS, not by separate groups in each initiative, while remaining transparent to the DAO
Now, due to the fall in the value of the ARB token, the Arbitrum Foundation (AF) will take over signing functions to itself, and we believe that this is a bad decision:
I voted AGAINST this proposal
The MSS simplified and saved DAO funds by organizing multisigs — now all signings are performed by the MSS, not by separate groups in each initiative, while remaining transparent to the DAO
Now, due to the fall in the value of the ARB token, the Arbitrum Foundation (AF) will take over signing functions to itself, and we believe that this is a bad decision:
1. Centralization of powers, which has been a trend lately This reduces community participation, which increases the risk of a decrease in active voting, as we have already seen in the recently adopted initiative to reduce the quorum. The centralization increases risk by creating a single point of failure and reducing operational redundancy
2. The AF is less transparent and will not report to the DAO on the costs of the MSS. It is unknown how much higher the AF’s costs will be compared to supporting the current model. If you have seen the annual reports of the AF, you understand that all administrative costs are aggregated into a single line item, making it difficult to assess efficiency or control expenditures
3. Instead of solving the budgeting problem, which has already manifested itself in many initiatives, it is simply suggested to spend money from another source and without the control of the DAO. Without addressing this systemic issue, this merely postpones the problem and reduces accountability
What can be done? There are several solutions, each with its pros and cons: --- Sell ARB immediately for the entire duration of the initiative, ensuring that there are always sufficient funds for all expenses --- Hedge ARB to mitigate risks associated with market volatility --- Analyze the market and dynamically manage the treasury — selling or buying back ARB depending on the situation
None of these options are currently being implemented
Before distributing further funds to initiatives, this problem must be resolved
With the current change within the DAO I do support the Wind down of the MSS. Execution, costs and efficiency should become better making the DAO also move faster.
We’re for shutting down the MSS and handing payments to the Arbitrum Foundation, and down the road to the OpCo. It cuts out extra steps, save money for everyone, and keeps funds safe and clear with the Foundation’s team taking full responsibility, leveraging its existing operational bandwidth and compliance processes. However, the proposal lacks a clear fallback plan if ARB’s price drops significantly (e.g., below $0.3), which could exacerbate the shortfall beyond what the proposed measures can handle.
Thank you for raising this issue and suggesting steps forward.
The MSS served a great job as a decentralized operational and execution body and the DAO should be proud of this initiative. As the general future view for payment execution is that the OpCo, as a DAO operational intiative, will overlap functions with MSS, we agree the most sensible decision is the OpCo to take over MSS tasks and learn from all the challenges and optimizations that the MSS has faced.
Thank you for raising this issue and suggesting steps forward.
The MSS served a great job as a decentralized operational and execution body and the DAO should be proud of this initiative. As the general future view for payment execution is that the OpCo, as a DAO operational intiative, will overlap functions with MSS, we agree the most sensible decision is the OpCo to take over MSS tasks and learn from all the challenges and optimizations that the MSS has faced.
Regarding shortfall of funds and wallet top up, we think that, as the general sentiment is OpCo will take over MSS, the most effective short-term solution is to transfer the functions to the Arbitrum Foundation as an intermediate operational body until the OpCo finishes its formation. Topping up the MSS again for just a few months of activity would be a waste of delegate effort and mindshare in our opinion.
It is worth exploring, however, how can the DAO prevent these shortfalls of program funds in situations of market downturns. Particularly, we would be supportive of keeping idle program funds subject to limit sell orders, set at a price that always guarantee honouring the program's dollar value. Therefore, if Arb price falls sharply during the duration of the program, the limit order will trigger and the DAO saves Arb-denominated funds as replenishments are never necessary, while still preserving the upside potential of Arb price increasing.
voting Against: Continue with the MSS on the current offchain vote because the DAO should retain the control over releasing funds, not the Arbitrum Foundation.
Entropy appreciates the feedback and comments from delegates thus far. We will respond to a few comments before moving this proposal forward to Snapshot shortly due to the time sensitive nature of the situation.
A few delegates have suggested alternative options. As stated in the rationale of the proposal, other options such as reducing MSS member pay or reducing the number of signers were already discussed with the relevant parties and were deemed unsuitable solutions due to safety concerns or signer unwillingness to perform the task with reduced pay.
Entropy appreciates the feedback and comments from delegates thus far. We will respond to a few comments before moving this proposal forward to Snapshot shortly due to the time sensitive nature of the situation.
A few delegates have suggested alternative options. As stated in the rationale of the proposal, other options such as reducing MSS member pay or reducing the number of signers were already discussed with the relevant parties and were deemed unsuitable solutions due to safety concerns or signer unwillingness to perform the task with reduced pay.
a partial transfer was considered by all parties, but it was deemed unfair to reduce MSS member pays due to the sustained level of risk MSS members take on by being signers. Even at $0.4, reducing the overall number of MSS members to 1 chair and 4 signers would still result in a shortfall.
Overall, our team’s stance is perhaps more succinctly captured by @jose_stablelab statement:
the most effective short-term solution is to transfer the functions to the Arbitrum Foundation as an intermediate operational body until the OpCo finishes its formation.
However, we are in agreement with the Arbitrum Foundation in that the delegates should consider the following two paths available:
The question facing the DAO is what to do in regards to managing the treasury for proposals passed by the DAO until the OpCo is ready to take on this role.
There are two outcomes:
If this proposal is rejected, then it’s clear that the DAO wants to keep utilizing the MSS until it's time to have the discussion about whether or not to move the function to OpCo. If this is the prevailing decision, a top up would almost certainly be necessary to allow time for the full onchain proposal process & any possible follow-up procedures. In this scenario, Entropy will work to create a proposal that restructures the MSS, taking into account learnings and the opinions of relevant parties.
The voting options and proposal language have been updated to better reflect the two paths.
In regards to delegates concerned about the framework/structure for how this transfer will be handled, the Arbitrum Foundation has affirmed their commitment to keep the program’s funds in separate multisigs to ensure transparency. This aligns with their existing payment processes.
Additionally, a valid concern raised by @mcfly:
However, the proposal lacks a clear fallback plan if ARB’s price drops significantly (e.g., below $0.3), which could exacerbate the shortfall beyond what the proposed measures can handle.
Entropy shares this concern and it was the motivator for targeting a June 15th turnover if this proposal passes. Now that we are a bit closer to June 1st, if R3gen and MSS members’ payments are sent at roughly the current price, the risk of an additional shortfall following this proposal becomes much lower. If those payments are sent out at ~$0.4, the breakeven price would then be roughly $0.21 for the MSS work for half of June & R3gen’s July payment. If markets begin turning for the worse, the proposal states that the MSS would be granted the discretion to make the payments early to avoid a shortfall.
At the passing of this proposal (June 6th), the MSS will have discretion to pay R3gen upfront for their July token report if the price of ARB is high enough to secure the avoidance of a shortfall.
Again we thank delegates for their engagement and thoughts. Entropy looks forward to moving this to a Snapshot vote to obtain clarity on next steps.
We support getting rid of the MSS and acknowledge that it caused major inefficiencies because it added extra steps—such as dual approvals and manual coordination between the DAO, the MSS, and the Foundation—but this change also shifts power away from decentralization toward greater control by the Arbitrum Foundation. Decentralization is a trade-off with efficiency; however, this move gives the Foundation too much control over DAO operations, as it will now oversee all spending.
Question: Why isn’t this role given to OpCo instead of the AF?
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We appreciate the efforts of MSS to date and would like to acknowledge that, despite some challenges with execution and communications, the program was operated efficiently.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We appreciate the efforts of MSS to date and would like to acknowledge that, despite some challenges with execution and communications, the program was operated efficiently.
Given the current transition plan, we support the temporary transfer of MSS responsibilities to the AF, especially since the OpCo is still in its early stages and the AF has confirmed the resources and capacity to manage this in the interim.
That said, we believe there are two areas worth reflecting on for future improvement:
While we support the direction, we agree with the observation by @cp0x that the proposal could have provided alternatives or options, such as additional funding, AF takeover, or revised program structures. This would have allowed delegates to actively participate in shaping the outcome, rather than only responding to a pre-decided path of winding down the MSS.
Looking ahead, we also recommend applying ARB-denominated caps for each role in DAO-funded programs, similar to how the DIP uses caps in tier-based compensation. This can help avoid budget shortfalls during market downturns and ensure spending remains predictable and aligned with treasury conditions.
Thanks for identifying the problem and voicing it, however I have many doubts
Lately, Entropy has been advocating for trading decentralization for efficiency. Of course, direct control is always more efficient than decentralized processes — but I see several major downsides to this proposal:
Thanks for identifying the problem and voicing it, however I have many doubts
Lately, Entropy has been advocating for trading decentralization for efficiency. Of course, direct control is always more efficient than decentralized processes — but I see several major downsides to this proposal:
It represents a shift away from decentralization and DAO governance toward centralization under the Arbitrum Foundation If we continue down this path in every case, we’ll eventually reduce the DAO to a symbolic role — picking Twitter banner images while the real decisions are made elsewhere
Ending a program prematurely, despite it functioning well and fulfilling its responsibilities, sets a bad precedent It suggests the Foundation is an unreliable partner — willing to cancel initiatives arbitrarily. The financial issues cited here aren’t related to the MCC itself, but rather to the decision to convert funds to USDS right before payments were due — a decision made by the Foundation, which now seems unwilling to take responsibility for the consequences.
The proposal offers no real alternatives If this is the path you want to take, fine — but don’t present it as the only option. There’s a real issue here that needs solving, so present multiple solutions. Some obvious alternatives — which weren’t discussed — include:
In case of receiving AGAINST the proposal it will lead to the fact that we will spend more time than we could have spent if we had different alternative solutions
We appreciate the start to the discussion and would like to cross-post our reply to the MSS communication thread.
This is Brook @rooktc from TiD Research. We appreciate Entropy’s effort to address the MSS’s challenges, but I believe framing this as a binary yes/no choice somewhat oversimplifies a multifaceted issue.
The DAO needs more information and options to make an informed decision, and I urge the community to consider the following points that lead to the problem here to ensure a balanced approach.
This is Brook @rooktc from TiD Research. We appreciate Entropy’s effort to address the MSS’s challenges, but I believe framing this as a binary yes/no choice somewhat oversimplifies a multifaceted issue.
The DAO needs more information and options to make an informed decision, and I urge the community to consider the following points that lead to the problem here to ensure a balanced approach.
Entropy highlights inefficiencies due to the overlap between the Arbitrum Foundation’s compliance role (KYC/KYB, ARB-to-stablecoin conversion) and MSS’s multisig execution. However, the MSS communication thread suggests delays were primarily due to underperforming signers, not structural overlap.
The focus should be on improving MSS internal management—such as stricter performance expectations or more transparent reporting—rather than winding down the program.
The ~$29,300 shortfall, driven by ARB’s price drop to ~$0.4, reflects a broader challenge of managing token-based budgets in volatile markets. This issue, also discussed in the Top-up for Hackathon Continuation Program and TMC - Stablecoin Withdrawal Process threads, isn’t unique to MSS.
Sunsetting MSS solely due to this shortfall risks setting a precedent that fails to address the underlying problem, which could recur in other projects.
We propose revisiting our suggestion for all live projects to report monthly budget statuses to the TMC, DAO, and Foundation, providing visibility into potential shortfalls and enabling proactive solutions like additional funding or stablecoin adjustments.
Positioning the Foundation as a temporary solution until OpCo assumes multisig duties raises concerns about the timeline and OpCo’s readiness for compliance and payment execution.
Without a defined plan, we risk a governance vacuum or over-reliance on the Foundation, with limited transparency into how KYC/KYB and ARB-to-stablecoin conversions are handled, which is also not disclosed in MSS update thread.
The DAO needs a clear schedule and a well-defined process for transferring these functions to OpCo, along with a commitment from OpCo to continue disclosing detailed information on these processes to maintain transparency and accountability.
Given the underlying issues, in addition to having Entropy & AF's support to provide more information, I believe we should also have at least the below option available for the DAO to make better decision.
MSS Budget Top-Up
Allocate extra ARB + buffer to sustain MSS through its current term (August 2025).
Implement stricter signer performance standards (e.g., 24-hour response times) and weekly performance reports to address delays, retaining the 9/12 signer structure for security, as the Foundation recommends.
Use the remaining term to develop a transition plan to OpCo, with the Foundation and MSS proposing a schedule, and OpCo committing to monthly transparency reports on multisig activities.
I believe the DAO can address MSS challenges without shutting it down by focusing on better signer accountability, regular budget updates across projects, and a transparent plan for transitioning to OpCo. A budget top-up paired with stricter standards and a clear timeline would fix inefficiencies, stabilize funding, and uphold governance integrity, giving the DAO the tools to decide thoughtfully.
We support the winding down of the MSS and the sunset of the current governing council. Having engaged with both directly, we found the communications with the entity inifficient, primarily due to the lack of accountability and clear elected leaders for the councils, perhaps not as much a reflection of the individuals' composition.
We'd like to see some delegated authority to OpCo here to oversee these. We believe there is a clear path for OpCo to oversee the appointment and operational management of the multisig while still allowing the AF to provide a financial/legal wrapper for KYB/KYC purposes.
June 6th: If approved
you mean, if approved with a participation bigger than the non-constitutional 3% quorum, correct?
We support getting rid of the MSS and acknowledge that it caused major inefficiencies because it added extra steps—such as dual approvals and manual coordination between the DAO, the MSS, and the Foundation—but this change also shifts power away from decentralization toward greater control by the Arbitrum Foundation. Decentralization is a trade-off with efficiency; however, this move gives the Foundation too much control over DAO operations, as it will now oversee all spending.
Question: Why isn’t this role given to OpCo instead of the AF?
Overall, we are in favor of the proposal for the added efficiency, but the centralization risk must be carefully considered.
We appreciate the start to the discussion and would like to cross-post our reply to the MSS communication thread.
Importantly, this is not a binary decision. Two principles should guide us:
As Sinkas noted, any future direction for the MSS must ultimately be approved by the DAO through a formal vote. While we appreciate Entropy’s role in helping stand up the MSS, it’s important to clarify that the initiative has operated independently since inception—run by elected signers and chairs, with the Foundation assisting with KYC and ARB to stablecoin conversion.
One path under consideration is winding down the MSS and transferring its responsibilities to the Foundation. However, an equally viable—and arguably more consistent—option is to top up the MSS to allow it to complete the remaining four months of its current term. This would provide the necessary runway for the MSS team to propose a longer-term solution that includes new elections, an updated budget, and clearly defined performance expectations for signers.
Past concerns about payment delays are valid. From our perspective, much of the early friction was driven by a small number of underperforming signers who delayed transaction approvals—an issue compounded by discrepancies between the chair mandates outlined in the original proposal and how roles were executed in practice. These challenges have already prompted internal adjustments and serve as a valuable foundation for improving the MSS structure moving forward.
As execution responsibilities increasingly shift toward Arbitrum-Aligned Entities (AAEs), some may view transferring the MSS to the Foundation as a logical next step. But doing so would shift a core function of decentralized treasury management into more centralized hands. That raises important questions about the DAO’s long-term governance trajectory.
The MSS represents one of the few active initiatives through which the DAO exercises direct control over treasury operations. While not perfect, it reflects the DAO’s capacity to self-govern and execute. That autonomy is worth preserving and improving rather than handing off prematurely.
Winding down the MSS early in the name of operational efficiency may seem pragmatic. But decentralization often demands tradeoffs. Not every initiative should be judged strictly by cost or convenience. Some functions, like decentralized execution, are worth investing in even when they’re harder to manage.
you mean, if approved with a participation bigger than the non-constitutional 3% quorum, correct?
also, since the original MSS was approved with both an offchain and an onchain non-constitutional vote, I think we should, as a good governance practice, have the requirements to cancel an initiative, be the same as the ones that were needed to approve it in the first place.
So in this case, I think we should do an offchain vote to determine what is the sentiment of the community regarding this, even with the several options outlined in the proposal, and then a non-constitutional onchain vote to ratify the decision that came out of the offchain vote.
This feels like a relatively straightforward function to insource — especially since multisig is not a strategic task but rather operational/executional.
It should also be fairly easy to transition, as the Arbitrum Foundation is already involved in the compliance and execution of DAO payments. Consolidating this under one accountable entity makes sense. MSS helped fill a gap at the time, but now the added complexity and cost of outsourcing seem unnecessary.
This feels like a relatively straightforward function to insource — especially since multisig is not a strategic task but rather operational/executional.
It should also be fairly easy to transition, as the Arbitrum Foundation is already involved in the compliance and execution of DAO payments. Consolidating this under one accountable entity makes sense. MSS helped fill a gap at the time, but now the added complexity and cost of outsourcing seem unnecessary.
I’m supporting this proposal.
I agree with this proposal as the separation between the MSS and AF caused further delays for us with the Hackathon Continuation Program (HCP).
However, I think is key that the AF provides a framework for how this will be handled. We need to ensure they count with the setup/resources to execute efficiently.
I agree with this proposal as the separation between the MSS and AF caused further delays for us with the Hackathon Continuation Program (HCP).
However, I think is key that the AF provides a framework for how this will be handled. We need to ensure they count with the setup/resources to execute efficiently.
Then, for discussion purposes: Why shouldn't this be transferred to OpCo? I can see a reason for efficiency in the compliance-payments liaison (the issue we had with HCP was because of this). But then I'm curious how this plays out for other initiatives. If OpCo can't oversee compliance/payments for DAO initiatives... doesn't that handicaps OpCo? I see that AF suggests this could move to OpCo eventually, but then we need OpCo to do compliance for the DAO (KYC/KYB)? :upside_down_face:
We support getting rid of the MSS and acknowledge that it caused major inefficiencies because it added extra steps—such as dual approvals and manual coordination between the DAO, the MSS, and the Foundation—but this change also shifts power away from decentralization toward greater control by the Arbitrum Foundation. Decentralization is a trade-off with efficiency; however, this move gives the Foundation too much control over DAO operations, as it will now oversee all spending.
Question: Why isn’t this role given to OpCo instead of the AF?
Overall, we are in favor of the proposal for the added efficiency, but the centralization risk must be carefully considered.
We appreciate the start to the discussion and would like to cross-post our reply to the MSS communication thread.
Importantly, this is not a binary decision. Two principles should guide us:
As Sinkas noted, any future direction for the MSS must ultimately be approved by the DAO through a formal vote. While we appreciate Entropy’s role in helping stand up the MSS, it’s important to clarify that the initiative has operated independently since inception—run by elected signers and chairs, with the Foundation assisting with KYC and ARB to stablecoin conversion.
One path under consideration is winding down the MSS and transferring its responsibilities to the Foundation. However, an equally viable—and arguably more consistent—option is to top up the MSS to allow it to complete the remaining four months of its current term. This would provide the necessary runway for the MSS team to propose a longer-term solution that includes new elections, an updated budget, and clearly defined performance expectations for signers.
Past concerns about payment delays are valid. From our perspective, much of the early friction was driven by a small number of underperforming signers who delayed transaction approvals—an issue compounded by discrepancies between the chair mandates outlined in the original proposal and how roles were executed in practice. These challenges have already prompted internal adjustments and serve as a valuable foundation for improving the MSS structure moving forward.
As execution responsibilities increasingly shift toward Arbitrum-Aligned Entities (AAEs), some may view transferring the MSS to the Foundation as a logical next step. But doing so would shift a core function of decentralized treasury management into more centralized hands. That raises important questions about the DAO’s long-term governance trajectory.
The MSS represents one of the few active initiatives through which the DAO exercises direct control over treasury operations. While not perfect, it reflects the DAO’s capacity to self-govern and execute. That autonomy is worth preserving and improving rather than handing off prematurely.
Winding down the MSS early in the name of operational efficiency may seem pragmatic. But decentralization often demands tradeoffs. Not every initiative should be judged strictly by cost or convenience. Some functions, like decentralized execution, are worth investing in even when they’re harder to manage.
you mean, if approved with a participation bigger than the non-constitutional 3% quorum, correct?
also, since the original MSS was approved with both an offchain and an onchain non-constitutional vote, I think we should, as a good governance practice, have the requirements to cancel an initiative, be the same as the ones that were needed to approve it in the first place.
So in this case, I think we should do an offchain vote to determine what is the sentiment of the community regarding this, even with the several options outlined in the proposal, and then a non-constitutional onchain vote to ratify the decision that came out of the offchain vote.
This feels like a relatively straightforward function to insource — especially since multisig is not a strategic task but rather operational/executional.
It should also be fairly easy to transition, as the Arbitrum Foundation is already involved in the compliance and execution of DAO payments. Consolidating this under one accountable entity makes sense. MSS helped fill a gap at the time, but now the added complexity and cost of outsourcing seem unnecessary.
This feels like a relatively straightforward function to insource — especially since multisig is not a strategic task but rather operational/executional.
It should also be fairly easy to transition, as the Arbitrum Foundation is already involved in the compliance and execution of DAO payments. Consolidating this under one accountable entity makes sense. MSS helped fill a gap at the time, but now the added complexity and cost of outsourcing seem unnecessary.
I’m supporting this proposal.
I agree with this proposal as the separation between the MSS and AF caused further delays for us with the Hackathon Continuation Program (HCP).
However, I think is key that the AF provides a framework for how this will be handled. We need to ensure they count with the setup/resources to execute efficiently.
I agree with this proposal as the separation between the MSS and AF caused further delays for us with the Hackathon Continuation Program (HCP).
However, I think is key that the AF provides a framework for how this will be handled. We need to ensure they count with the setup/resources to execute efficiently.
Then, for discussion purposes: Why shouldn't this be transferred to OpCo? I can see a reason for efficiency in the compliance-payments liaison (the issue we had with HCP was because of this). But then I'm curious how this plays out for other initiatives. If OpCo can't oversee compliance/payments for DAO initiatives... doesn't that handicaps OpCo? I see that AF suggests this could move to OpCo eventually, but then we need OpCo to do compliance for the DAO (KYC/KYB)? :upside_down_face:
