Non-Constitutional
The Arbitrum Foundation is seeking 5,134 ETH, which is a combination of:
This proposal is contingent on the proposal “AIP to upgrade the DAO-governed chains to use BoLD” being approved by the ArbitrumDAO. If the AIP to upgrade the DAO-governed chains to use BoLD does not pass - then the Arbitrum Foundation will return the funds, in its entirety, to the ArbitrumDAO within 30 days of the BOLD proposal being hypothetically rejected.
The AIP to upgrade the DAO-governed chains to use BoLD is scoped to only propose the technical upgrade and intentionally does not yet include the introduction of an economic incentive mechanism. In the absence of an economic incentive, the ArbitrumDAO holds the risk that no entity will fulfill the role of being the first honest party to secure Arbitrum One. By adopting this proposal, the ArbitrumDAO is appointing the Arbitrum Foundation to be the first active proposer for Arbitrum One.
This section focuses on the budget request from the ArbitrumDAO treasury alongside the motivation for why the funding is required.
We are requesting 4,234 ETH from the ArbitrumDAO treasury to cover the bonds required to establish a single honest proposer with the capability to defend the system.
The requested ETH is a combination of:
The Arbitrum Foundation will deposit these funds in the RollupCore.sol contracts on L1 Ethereum for the validator. If the BoLD AIP passes, then the Arbitrum Foundation’s staked validator will be enabled to immediately act as a proposer for Arbitrum One
Note: the Arbitrum Foundation is proposing to be the first active validator, not the ONLY validator. BOLD removes the reliance on a permissioned set of validators, and any interested parties and/or teams can permissionlessly run nodes and validators for Arbitrum chains upon a successful upgrade of the dispute protocol.
All blockchain systems, including Arbitrum, should reward participants who actively work to advance the system.
In the case of Arbitrum, the DAO will pay a service fee to an active proposer who is helping to advance the system by posting assertions. If approved, the service fee will correlate to the same annualized income earned by a validator on Ethereum mainnet. At the time of writing, the estimated annual income is approximately 3% to 4% of the staked ETH, according to the Composite Ether Staking Rate benchmark by CoinDesk Indices.
We must highlight that this payment is a fee and not a reward. In BoLD, a new assertion can be posted every round (1 hour) and only a single fee is paid per round. There can be multiple agents who deposit the required assertion bond and run a proposer, but the fee will only be paid to the proposer whose assertion is the first to be accepted on L1. The proposer whose assertion is accepted by L1 and paid the service fee is called the active proposer for this round. Subsequent assertions posted by the same address will simply move the already-supplied bond to their latest proposed assertion. Meanwhile, if an entity, say Bob, has posted a successor assertion to one previously made by another entity, Alice, then Bob would be considered by the protocol to be the current active proposer. Alice would no longer be considered by the protocol as the active proposer and once Alice’s assertion is confirmed, then Alice gets her assertion bond refunded.
We estimate the following service fee per year:
The Foundation is therefore requesting 500 ETH to support service fee payments for up to 3 years (with a buffer of 68 ETH in case the average Ethereum validator income increases) in the event that an active proposer, who is not the Arbitrum Foundation, steps up to advance the chain. Moving forward, the DAO may consider allocating a portion of ETH from the ArbitrumDAO governed chains’ sequencer fees to fund the ongoing service fees for active proposers.
To learn more, please read the section on Service Fees in the BOLD AIP.
Note: The Arbitrum Foundation will NOT be entitled to receive the service fee.
We are requesting 400 ETH to reimburse the on-chain gas costs for active (and honest) proposers who are helping advance and defend the Arbitrum chain. It is estimated that 400 ETH will be sufficient to cover ~3 years of operational costs.
There are two on-chain gas costs:
Note: we only propose to reimburse L1 gas costs since that is publicly verifiable and computable by all. The off-chain costs to run a proposer will not be reimbursed and it is expected the service fee will be sufficient to help cover the operational cost for it.
This section focuses on the estimated costs to reimburse the L1 gas costs for proposers who are actively posting assertions and participating in the challenge process.
The on-chain gas costs for posting assertions are available from the BoLD testnet deployed on Arbitrum Sepolia:
Assertions are expected to be posted every hour and under normal operations:
If we assume 50 gwei/gas on L1 Ethereum, then the estimated total gas costs will be 71.44 ETH/year. This equates to 214.32 ETH for a 3-year period.
A challenge should only occur if a dishonest proposer posts an assertion that is not valid. Given the financial cost to a dishonest proposer, we are not expecting many challenges to occur. Even so, we should always be prepared for the worst-case scenario and be ready to defend against it.
According to the BoLD whitepaper and theoretical calculations conducted by the Offchain Labs team, honest moves to defend a full challenge will cost honest parties roughly 62,632,000 gas (not including the top-level assertion).
Per challenge, the L1 gas costs will depend on the gas price at the time of the challenge:
At a 50 gwei/gas price, this equals 3.1316 ETH in L1 gas costs
At a 100 gwei/gas price, this equals 6.2632 ETH in L1 gas costs
At a 500 gwei/gas price, this equals 31.316 ETH in L1 gas costs
Assuming one challenge per year for 3 years in the worse case scenario on gas prices, we estimate 93.93 ETH will be required.
Assuming a nominal gas price of 50 gwei/gas during normal operations (i.e. no challenges) and assuming an elevated 500 gwei/gas price during a challenge (i.e. worst-case scenario), to fully reimburse an honest party’s gas costs incurred for posting assertions and for performing honest moves to defend Arbitrum in the event of one challenge per year, the Arbitrum Foundation is requesting 400 ETH for 3 years.
This includes ~308 ETH to cover the above costs and a ~92 ETH buffer in the event of higher gas prices during normal operations, during a challenge, and/or in the event that there is more than one challenge per year.
Publication of an AIP to the ArbitrumDAO forums for engaged discussion and debate [this post].
Two separate temperature checks on Snapshot (1 week).
a. Bond sentiment. Test whether the ArbitrumDAO may approve the Arbitrum Foundation’s request for 4234 ETH to run the first BOLD validator. b. Operational cost sentiment. Test whether the ArbitrumDAO may approve the additional service fee for active proposers (excluding the Arbitrum Foundation) and the reimbursement of L1 gas costs for running an active proposer. Total request is 900 ETH to cover a 3-year period.
Depending on the temperature check result:
a. Continue to Tally. If there is strong consensus on both temperature checks, then the AIP will be published as one on-chain AIP on Tally for an on-chain vote.
b. Re-iterate on numbers. If either temperature check is rejected by the DAO, then it will be iterated on and re-submitted for a temperature check again, until the DAO has consensus of what an appropriate ask from the DAO treasury is.
Assuming a successful vote on-chain, the funds will be transferred to a multi-sig wallet controlled by the Arbitrum Foundation.
The Arbitrum Foundation will then deposit the funds in a validator that will be used to secure Arbitrum One, if the AIP to upgrade the DAO-governed chains to use BoLD is passed.
The Arbitrum Foundation is requesting 5,134 ETH from the ArbitrumDAO to cover the following costs:
Notable points:
All requested funds will be sent to a multi-sig controlled by the Arbitrum Foundation and the funds will be returned if the BoLD proposal is not approved by the ArbitrumDAO. Additionally, after 3 years, any unspent funds from the service fee or gas reimbursements will be returned to the ArbitrumDAO and a subsequent proposal will be posted to help cover the future operational costs of Arbitrum.
The ArbitrumDAO reserves the right to revoke the Arbitrum Foundation’s proposer at any time and return the bonds back to the treasury. This will be implemented and enforced via the BoLD smart contracts:
Put another way, the ArbitrumDAO will have the authority to single-handedly return the funds back to the ArbitrumDAO treasury. This model can be used for future proposals if other entities want to run a proposer on behalf of the ArbitrumDAO.
Non-Constitutional
The Arbitrum Foundation is seeking 5,134 ETH, which is a combination of:
This proposal is contingent on the proposal “AIP to upgrade the DAO-governed chains to use BoLD” being approved by the ArbitrumDAO. If the AIP to upgrade the DAO-governed chains to use BoLD does not pass - then the Arbitrum Foundation will return the funds, in its entirety, to the ArbitrumDAO within 30 days of the BOLD proposal being hypothetically rejected.
The AIP to upgrade the DAO-governed chains to use BoLD is scoped to only propose the technical upgrade and intentionally does not yet include the introduction of an economic incentive mechanism. In the absence of an economic incentive, the ArbitrumDAO holds the risk that no entity will fulfill the role of being the first honest party to secure Arbitrum One. By adopting this proposal, the ArbitrumDAO is appointing the Arbitrum Foundation to be the first active proposer for Arbitrum One.
This section focuses on the budget request from the ArbitrumDAO treasury alongside the motivation for why the funding is required.
We are requesting 4,234 ETH from the ArbitrumDAO treasury to cover the bonds required to establish a single honest proposer with the capability to defend the system.
The requested ETH is a combination of:
The Arbitrum Foundation will deposit these funds in the RollupCore.sol contracts on L1 Ethereum for the validator. If the BoLD AIP passes, then the Arbitrum Foundation’s staked validator will be enabled to immediately act as a proposer for Arbitrum One
Note: the Arbitrum Foundation is proposing to be the first active validator, not the ONLY validator. BOLD removes the reliance on a permissioned set of validators, and any interested parties and/or teams can permissionlessly run nodes and validators for Arbitrum chains upon a successful upgrade of the dispute protocol.
All blockchain systems, including Arbitrum, should reward participants who actively work to advance the system.
In the case of Arbitrum, the DAO will pay a service fee to an active proposer who is helping to advance the system by posting assertions. If approved, the service fee will correlate to the same annualized income earned by a validator on Ethereum mainnet. At the time of writing, the estimated annual income is approximately 3% to 4% of the staked ETH, according to the Composite Ether Staking Rate benchmark by CoinDesk Indices.
We must highlight that this payment is a fee and not a reward. In BoLD, a new assertion can be posted every round (1 hour) and only a single fee is paid per round. There can be multiple agents who deposit the required assertion bond and run a proposer, but the fee will only be paid to the proposer whose assertion is the first to be accepted on L1. The proposer whose assertion is accepted by L1 and paid the service fee is called the active proposer for this round. Subsequent assertions posted by the same address will simply move the already-supplied bond to their latest proposed assertion. Meanwhile, if an entity, say Bob, has posted a successor assertion to one previously made by another entity, Alice, then Bob would be considered by the protocol to be the current active proposer. Alice would no longer be considered by the protocol as the active proposer and once Alice’s assertion is confirmed, then Alice gets her assertion bond refunded.
We estimate the following service fee per year:
The Foundation is therefore requesting 500 ETH to support service fee payments for up to 3 years (with a buffer of 68 ETH in case the average Ethereum validator income increases) in the event that an active proposer, who is not the Arbitrum Foundation, steps up to advance the chain. Moving forward, the DAO may consider allocating a portion of ETH from the ArbitrumDAO governed chains’ sequencer fees to fund the ongoing service fees for active proposers.
To learn more, please read the section on Service Fees in the BOLD AIP.
Note: The Arbitrum Foundation will NOT be entitled to receive the service fee.
We are requesting 400 ETH to reimburse the on-chain gas costs for active (and honest) proposers who are helping advance and defend the Arbitrum chain. It is estimated that 400 ETH will be sufficient to cover ~3 years of operational costs.
There are two on-chain gas costs:
Note: we only propose to reimburse L1 gas costs since that is publicly verifiable and computable by all. The off-chain costs to run a proposer will not be reimbursed and it is expected the service fee will be sufficient to help cover the operational cost for it.
This section focuses on the estimated costs to reimburse the L1 gas costs for proposers who are actively posting assertions and participating in the challenge process.
The on-chain gas costs for posting assertions are available from the BoLD testnet deployed on Arbitrum Sepolia:
Assertions are expected to be posted every hour and under normal operations:
If we assume 50 gwei/gas on L1 Ethereum, then the estimated total gas costs will be 71.44 ETH/year. This equates to 214.32 ETH for a 3-year period.
A challenge should only occur if a dishonest proposer posts an assertion that is not valid. Given the financial cost to a dishonest proposer, we are not expecting many challenges to occur. Even so, we should always be prepared for the worst-case scenario and be ready to defend against it.
According to the BoLD whitepaper and theoretical calculations conducted by the Offchain Labs team, honest moves to defend a full challenge will cost honest parties roughly 62,632,000 gas (not including the top-level assertion).
Per challenge, the L1 gas costs will depend on the gas price at the time of the challenge:
At a 50 gwei/gas price, this equals 3.1316 ETH in L1 gas costs
At a 100 gwei/gas price, this equals 6.2632 ETH in L1 gas costs
At a 500 gwei/gas price, this equals 31.316 ETH in L1 gas costs
Assuming one challenge per year for 3 years in the worse case scenario on gas prices, we estimate 93.93 ETH will be required.
Assuming a nominal gas price of 50 gwei/gas during normal operations (i.e. no challenges) and assuming an elevated 500 gwei/gas price during a challenge (i.e. worst-case scenario), to fully reimburse an honest party’s gas costs incurred for posting assertions and for performing honest moves to defend Arbitrum in the event of one challenge per year, the Arbitrum Foundation is requesting 400 ETH for 3 years.
This includes ~308 ETH to cover the above costs and a ~92 ETH buffer in the event of higher gas prices during normal operations, during a challenge, and/or in the event that there is more than one challenge per year.
Publication of an AIP to the ArbitrumDAO forums for engaged discussion and debate [this post].
Two separate temperature checks on Snapshot (1 week).
a. Bond sentiment. Test whether the ArbitrumDAO may approve the Arbitrum Foundation’s request for 4234 ETH to run the first BOLD validator. b. Operational cost sentiment. Test whether the ArbitrumDAO may approve the additional service fee for active proposers (excluding the Arbitrum Foundation) and the reimbursement of L1 gas costs for running an active proposer. Total request is 900 ETH to cover a 3-year period.
Depending on the temperature check result:
a. Continue to Tally. If there is strong consensus on both temperature checks, then the AIP will be published as one on-chain AIP on Tally for an on-chain vote.
b. Re-iterate on numbers. If either temperature check is rejected by the DAO, then it will be iterated on and re-submitted for a temperature check again, until the DAO has consensus of what an appropriate ask from the DAO treasury is.
Assuming a successful vote on-chain, the funds will be transferred to a multi-sig wallet controlled by the Arbitrum Foundation.
The Arbitrum Foundation will then deposit the funds in a validator that will be used to secure Arbitrum One, if the AIP to upgrade the DAO-governed chains to use BoLD is passed.
The Arbitrum Foundation is requesting 5,134 ETH from the ArbitrumDAO to cover the following costs:
Notable points:
All requested funds will be sent to a multi-sig controlled by the Arbitrum Foundation and the funds will be returned if the BoLD proposal is not approved by the ArbitrumDAO. Additionally, after 3 years, any unspent funds from the service fee or gas reimbursements will be returned to the ArbitrumDAO and a subsequent proposal will be posted to help cover the future operational costs of Arbitrum.
The ArbitrumDAO reserves the right to revoke the Arbitrum Foundation’s proposer at any time and return the bonds back to the treasury. This will be implemented and enforced via the BoLD smart contracts:
Put another way, the ArbitrumDAO will have the authority to single-handedly return the funds back to the ArbitrumDAO treasury. This model can be used for future proposals if other entities want to run a proposer on behalf of the ArbitrumDAO.
We would prefer to see the Foundation use its own funds to provide this bond. But that apparently is not an offered option, so we will support the use of governance funds.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/75?u=castlecapital
As an Arbitrum holder, I believe this proposal deserves our support for several compelling reasons. First, it's crucial for ensuring the security and proper functioning of the Arbitrum network as we transition to the BoLD (Bonded Liquidity Dispute) system. By providing the Arbitrum Foundation with the necessary ETH for assertion and challenge bonds, we're enabling them to act as the first honest and active proposer, which is essential for the network's integrity. The proposal also demonstrates financial prudence. It includes funds for service fees to incentivize active proposers and reimburse L1 gas costs, which are vital for maintaining network operations. The 3-year budget shows foresight and planning, giving us stability as we move forward with this significant upgrade. I appreciate the transparency and accountability measures built into the proposal. The Arbitrum Foundation won't be entitled to collect service fees themselves, and any unspent funds will be returned to the ArbitrumDAO after three years. Moreover, we retain the right to revoke the Foundation's proposer status and reclaim the funds if necessary, which protects our interests as token holders. The contingency on the BoLD upgrade proposal passing also shows a responsible approach. If that doesn't pass, all funds will be returned, ensuring we're not committing resources unnecessarily. Lastly, this proposal is a crucial step in decentralizing Arbitrum's infrastructure. By moving away from a permissioned set of validators and allowing anyone to run nodes and validators, we're strengthening the network's resilience and openness. In summary, this proposal represents a well-thought-out, financially responsible, and strategically important move for Arbitrum's future. It balances the need for network security with accountability to token holders, making it a proposal I'm inclined to support.
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
We would prefer to see the Foundation use its own funds to provide this bond. But that apparently is not an offered option, so we will support the use of governance funds.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/75?u=castlecapital
As an Arbitrum holder, I believe this proposal deserves our support for several compelling reasons. First, it's crucial for ensuring the security and proper functioning of the Arbitrum network as we transition to the BoLD (Bonded Liquidity Dispute) system. By providing the Arbitrum Foundation with the necessary ETH for assertion and challenge bonds, we're enabling them to act as the first honest and active proposer, which is essential for the network's integrity. The proposal also demonstrates financial prudence. It includes funds for service fees to incentivize active proposers and reimburse L1 gas costs, which are vital for maintaining network operations. The 3-year budget shows foresight and planning, giving us stability as we move forward with this significant upgrade. I appreciate the transparency and accountability measures built into the proposal. The Arbitrum Foundation won't be entitled to collect service fees themselves, and any unspent funds will be returned to the ArbitrumDAO after three years. Moreover, we retain the right to revoke the Foundation's proposer status and reclaim the funds if necessary, which protects our interests as token holders. The contingency on the BoLD upgrade proposal passing also shows a responsible approach. If that doesn't pass, all funds will be returned, ensuring we're not committing resources unnecessarily. Lastly, this proposal is a crucial step in decentralizing Arbitrum's infrastructure. By moving away from a permissioned set of validators and allowing anyone to run nodes and validators, we're strengthening the network's resilience and openness. In summary, this proposal represents a well-thought-out, financially responsible, and strategically important move for Arbitrum's future. It balances the need for network security with accountability to token holders, making it a proposal I'm inclined to support.
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/42?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/40?u=tane
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-18: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-18
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/39
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/56
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/seed-latam-delegate-communication-thread/13895/44?u=seedgov
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/28?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/36?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/72?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/33?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/59?u=ezr3al
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/71?u=maxlomu
ARB is currently the strongest L2, active development to allow more adoption is good for the long term, arb dao is also the best in terms of governance.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/32?u=0xdonpepe
I support this proposal as it ensures the integrity and liveness of the Arbitrum One chain by appointing the Arbitrum Foundation as the first active proposer. Allocating funds for bonds, service fees, and gas costs is essential for maintaining a secure and efficient network.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/31?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/64?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/64?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/58?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/58?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/56
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/56
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/20?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/20?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/55?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/55?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/51?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/51?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/50?u=jameskbh
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/50?u=jameskbh
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/47
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/47
we are comfortable with sending out this amount of ETH for the service fee and L1 gas reimbursement
we are in favor of handing out the stated ETH to the Foundation
Voting for but would like to see more details on the control system & authority structure within the foundation on managing this validator
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/46?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/46?u=ocandocrypto
I've voted FOR! It's important for the Arbitrum ecosystem to keep thriving!
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/35?u=jojo
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/35?u=jojo
"To pay for establishing a single honest proposer with the ability to defend the system, expecting their performance."
I support this proposal as it provides essential funds to ensure the Arbitrum Foundation can run a BoLD validator effectively.
I fully support this proposal. It provides essential incentives for active participation and ensures the security and advancement of Arb.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/42?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/40?u=tane
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-18: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-18
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/39
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/56
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/seed-latam-delegate-communication-thread/13895/44?u=seedgov
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/28?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/36?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/72?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/33?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/59?u=ezr3al
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/71?u=maxlomu
ARB is currently the strongest L2, active development to allow more adoption is good for the long term, arb dao is also the best in terms of governance.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/32?u=0xdonpepe
I support this proposal as it ensures the integrity and liveness of the Arbitrum One chain by appointing the Arbitrum Foundation as the first active proposer. Allocating funds for bonds, service fees, and gas costs is essential for maintaining a secure and efficient network.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/31?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/64?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/64?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/58?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/58?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/56
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/56
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/20?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-funds-to-bootstrap-the-first-bold-validator/24506/20?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/55?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/55?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/51?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/51?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/50?u=jameskbh
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/50?u=jameskbh
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/47
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/47
we are comfortable with sending out this amount of ETH for the service fee and L1 gas reimbursement
we are in favor of handing out the stated ETH to the Foundation
Voting for but would like to see more details on the control system & authority structure within the foundation on managing this validator
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/46?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/46?u=ocandocrypto
I've voted FOR! It's important for the Arbitrum ecosystem to keep thriving!
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/35?u=jojo
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232/35?u=jojo
"To pay for establishing a single honest proposer with the ability to defend the system, expecting their performance."
I support this proposal as it provides essential funds to ensure the Arbitrum Foundation can run a BoLD validator effectively.
I fully support this proposal. It provides essential incentives for active participation and ensures the security and advancement of Arb.
Treasure ARC voted in favor of bootstrapping the first BoLD Validator agreeing with other comments on the importance of having a trusted, honest validator in play early. Also agree on the involvement of the foundation managing and running the node. We look forward to further discussion around incentivizing other operators.
Treasure ARC voted in favor of bootstrapping the first BoLD Validator agreeing with other comments on the importance of having a trusted, honest validator in play early. Also agree on the involvement of the foundation managing and running the node. We look forward to further discussion around incentivizing other operators.
The Foundation will be working closely with Offchain Labs initially to set up and maintain the validator. Additionally, the Foundation is in the process of building internal capacity to host the Validator without any assistance.
The Foundation will be working closely with Offchain Labs initially to set up and maintain the validator. Additionally, the Foundation is in the process of building internal capacity to host the Validator without any assistance.
The results are in for the Funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator on-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1043
The results are in for the Funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator on-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1043
Hi everyone, we have posted a non-consitutional onchain AIP to officially request funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator.
We officially confirm that the 2 multi-sig addresses listed as recipients of the proposal are under the control of the Arbitrum Foundation.
Hi everyone, we have posted a non-consitutional onchain AIP to officially request funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator.
We officially confirm that the 2 multi-sig addresses listed as recipients of the proposal are under the control of the Arbitrum Foundation.
Multi-Sig A - Proposing to receive 4,234 ETH
Multi-Sig B - Proposing to receive 900 ETH
Yes - anyone can propose a change to the current model via an AIP. It should be noted that the Arbitrum Foundation is volunteering to be the first active proposer for Arbitrum One and will forfeit all of the service fees. Additionally, in the current design, each assertion can only be posted by one proposer so there is an upper limit on service fees paid to active proposers. This also means that if the Arbitrum Foundation is the active proposer and no other proposers are actively participating, then the service fee won’t get paid out and will be returned to the ArbitrumDAO at the end of the 3 years (as mentioned in the AIP). The topic of multiple, active proposers is one of active research and development. Offchain Labs team will share updates on this capability when they have details to share.
As mentioned in other comments, there are many reasons why ETH is proposed to be the bonding token for BoLD’s initial rollout on Arbitrum One. Both Question 6 and Question 7 in the BoLD FAQ dive into this topic further - be sure to check that out!
This is valid feedback - thank you! The 3-year duration was selected for the following reasons: a) to account for having enough runway in the medium term, until there is an on-chain reimbursement solution. If and when an on-chain system is deployed, remaining funds will be sent back to the DAO or deposited into the on-chain solution; b) to avoid the friction of having to go through the entire governance process again, to request more funds to run the network in the near future.
Hi everyone, we have posted a non-consitutional onchain AIP to officially request funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator.
We officially confirm that the 2 multi-sig addresses listed as recipients of the proposal are under the control of the Arbitrum Foundation.
Hi everyone, we have posted a non-consitutional onchain AIP to officially request funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator.
We officially confirm that the 2 multi-sig addresses listed as recipients of the proposal are under the control of the Arbitrum Foundation.
Multi-Sig A - Proposing to receive 4,234 ETH
Multi-Sig B - Proposing to receive 900 ETH
Yes - anyone can propose a change to the current model via an AIP. It should be noted that the Arbitrum Foundation is volunteering to be the first active proposer for Arbitrum One and will forfeit all of the service fees. Additionally, in the current design, each assertion can only be posted by one proposer so there is an upper limit on service fees paid to active proposers. This also means that if the Arbitrum Foundation is the active proposer and no other proposers are actively participating, then the service fee won’t get paid out and will be returned to the ArbitrumDAO at the end of the 3 years (as mentioned in the AIP). The topic of multiple, active proposers is one of active research and development. Offchain Labs team will share updates on this capability when they have details to share.
As mentioned in other comments, there are many reasons why ETH is proposed to be the bonding token for BoLD’s initial rollout on Arbitrum One. Both Question 6 and Question 7 in the BoLD FAQ dive into this topic further - be sure to check that out!
This is valid feedback - thank you! The 3-year duration was selected for the following reasons: a) to account for having enough runway in the medium term, until there is an on-chain reimbursement solution. If and when an on-chain system is deployed, remaining funds will be sent back to the DAO or deposited into the on-chain solution; b) to avoid the friction of having to go through the entire governance process again, to request more funds to run the network in the near future.
A recording of this call can be viewed here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1I7Qsb0vscjtYTDnq4n7p1VucFXAEI1qt/view
A recording of this call can be viewed here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1I7Qsb0vscjtYTDnq4n7p1VucFXAEI1qt/view
Firstly, the proposer role is already decentralized in a sense since both proposing and challenging L2 state roots are permissionless with BoLD (i.e. anyone is allowed to fulfill the role). Secondly, trustless bonding pools will be available for individuals to use to pool funds together to fulfill this role with no minimum bond requirement. Lastly, as mentioned in the BoLD AIP, the documentation about BoLD, and the BoLD whitepaper, there is no technical need for more than 1 active, honest party advancing a BoLD-enabled chain at any given point in time. Since what the proposer does is fully deterministic so that there's no real advantage to being the proposer in terms of power over the system, what's the concern that you're interested in resolving via decentralizing the proposer?
The Foundation will be working closely with Offchain Labs initially to set up and maintain the validator. Additionally, the Foundation is in the process of building internal capacity to host the Validator without any assistance.
Arbitrum One and Nova, as well as the implementation of the proposed BoLD upgrade, rely on Ethereum for security. Using ETH for service fees aligns the incentives for actors who both secure and use Arbitrum One and Nova since those same actors are implicitly also relying on the censorship-resistant and decentralized properties of Ethereum. Furthermore, ETH has greater liquidity than $ARB. In the event of an attack on Arbitrum One, access and ease of pooling funds may become crucial. As always, the DAO has full autonomy over how to diversify its revenue sources & how best to deploy said revenue.
There will be an 'Office Hours: BoLD AIP Temperature Checks' governance call later today (as listed in the governance calendar), to cover the 3 on-going BOLD-related temperature checks. See details below:
Office Hours: BoLD AIP Temperature Checks Monday, June 10 · 3:00 – 3:45pm Time zone: UTC Video call link: https://meet.google.com/ktv-dqwg-nne
This proposal has now been raised to Snapshot for a Temperature Check in 2 parts:
Thank you for your questions!
Firstly, the proposer role is already decentralized in a sense since both proposing and challenging L2 state roots are permissionless with BoLD (i.e. anyone is allowed to fulfill the role). Secondly, trustless bonding pools will be available for individuals to use to pool funds together to fulfill this role with no minimum bond requirement. Lastly, as mentioned in the BoLD AIP, the documentation about BoLD, and the BoLD whitepaper, there is no technical need for more than 1 active, honest party advancing a BoLD-enabled chain at any given point in time. Since what the proposer does is fully deterministic so that there's no real advantage to being the proposer in terms of power over the system, what's the concern that you're interested in resolving via decentralizing the proposer?
The Foundation will be working closely with Offchain Labs initially to set up and maintain the validator. Additionally, the Foundation is in the process of building internal capacity to host the Validator without any assistance.
Arbitrum One and Nova, as well as the implementation of the proposed BoLD upgrade, rely on Ethereum for security. Using ETH for service fees aligns the incentives for actors who both secure and use Arbitrum One and Nova since those same actors are implicitly also relying on the censorship-resistant and decentralized properties of Ethereum. Furthermore, ETH has greater liquidity than $ARB. In the event of an attack on Arbitrum One, access and ease of pooling funds may become crucial. As always, the DAO has full autonomy over how to diversify its revenue sources & how best to deploy said revenue.
There will be an 'Office Hours: BoLD AIP Temperature Checks' governance call later today (as listed in the governance calendar), to cover the 3 on-going BOLD-related temperature checks. See details below:
Office Hours: BoLD AIP Temperature Checks Monday, June 10 · 3:00 – 3:45pm Time zone: UTC Video call link: https://meet.google.com/ktv-dqwg-nne
This proposal has now been raised to Snapshot for a Temperature Check in 2 parts:
Thank you for your questions!
DAOplomats voted in favor of this proposal on Tally.
We maintained our support for this proposal during the onchain vote.
Vote: FOR Type: Tally Proposal link: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/30828395120264250515588826110157291466999820796280987022346439005676672544691?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4
COMMENTING RATIONALE: Voted in For this proposal on Tally and on Snapshot.
Vote: FOR Type: Tally Proposal link: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/30828395120264250515588826110157291466999820796280987022346439005676672544691?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4
COMMENTING RATIONALE: Voted in For this proposal on Tally and on Snapshot.
Glad that the first BoLD validator is a trusted party like the ARB FND especially one that is working early. We are setting the stage for things to move forward.
Looking forward I'd like to see how a program to support getting more validators involved and from diverse geographies.
Voted in favour of this proposal on Tally, after supporting proposals in Snapshot as well. Having the first BoLD validator be a known honest party like the ARB FND, and by backing this proposal, we’re fostering a healthier ecosystem that promotes trust and reliability.
I voted FOR this proposal, following the reasoning in the Snapshot phase.
I’m voting FOR this proposal.
Having a ‘first honest proposer’ available is crucial for minimizing the risk of malicious actors.
Honestly, it’s difficult not to consider the risk of centralization, but ensuring reliable actors run this infrastructure is essential for the ecosystem’s long-term health.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
We’re voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
Our team doesn't have much experience with the technical aspects mentioned in the proposal. We're learning and trying to understand them better.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
We’re voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
Our team doesn't have much experience with the technical aspects mentioned in the proposal. We're learning and trying to understand them better.
However, after hearing the proposal on the governance call and reading through the comments on this post, we believe it makes sense to have the first BoLD validator.
We vote For the proposal on Tally.
We maintain the support described in the Snapshot phase and look forward to the proposal to enable the BoLD soon.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
We supported the proposal to upgrade Arbitrum One and Nove to use BoLD during temp-check while committing to a deep-dive before casting our vote when the proposal goes onchain. This Tally proposal is only about the ETH needed to bootstrap the first BoLD validator, given that the onchain proposal to enable BoLD passes - or funds will be returned to the DAO in the event it doesn’t.
Therefore, we’re voting in its favor, and looking forward to seeing the finalized proposal to upgrade Arbitrum One and Nova to use BoLD. As a reminder, the ARDC has conducted a security analysis of the BoLD proposal.
I voted FOR these proposals (both the bond and the operational cost) at the temp check stage because I think it’s important to bootstrap BOLD with an aligned validator. With that said, I would like to explore additional incentive mechanisms in the future to ensure that a broad set of parties participate in BOLD.
The FranklinDAO/PennBlockchain team voted FOR this proposal on Tally. We support the Arbitrum Foundation running the first BoLD validator should it be approved on chain. We fully support the move to permissionless proposer and challenger roles and it's an important step toward for Arbitrum to become a Stage 2 Rollup. Although the proposed bond requirements are high, we see the value in preventing spam transactions/challenges. We are waiting on the Tally vote for the BoLD implementation and will be voting FOR that proposal as well.
We're voting FOR this proposal. The reimbursement structure for L1 gas costs could serve as a blueprint for sustainable validator economics across L2 networks. By shouldering these costs initially, we're lowering barriers to entry for future validators, potentially accelerating decentralization. This approach might also pressure competing L2s to adopt similar models.
I voted for in favor of the proposal because, after considering the details and community feedback, I believe that having a BoLD validator is crucial for the security and long-term objectives of the Arbitrum network.
I appreciate the responses. Your comments regarding the on-chain solution in response to @ITUblockchain really helped to clarify the thought behind the 3-year proposal. We fully align with ETH being the asset for bonding, but in a similar fashion to Eigen Layer’s incorporation of EIGEN, we think it may be interesting to explore ARB’s potential utility as a secondary bonding. We recognize this becomes relevant only with the topic of multiple, active proposers, and we look forward to learning and discussion updates as they come.
DAOplomats voted in favor of this proposal on Tally.
We maintained our support for this proposal during the onchain vote.
Vote: FOR Type: Tally Proposal link: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/30828395120264250515588826110157291466999820796280987022346439005676672544691?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4
COMMENTING RATIONALE: Voted in For this proposal on Tally and on Snapshot.
Vote: FOR Type: Tally Proposal link: https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/30828395120264250515588826110157291466999820796280987022346439005676672544691?govId=eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4
COMMENTING RATIONALE: Voted in For this proposal on Tally and on Snapshot.
Glad that the first BoLD validator is a trusted party like the ARB FND especially one that is working early. We are setting the stage for things to move forward.
Looking forward I'd like to see how a program to support getting more validators involved and from diverse geographies.
Voted in favour of this proposal on Tally, after supporting proposals in Snapshot as well. Having the first BoLD validator be a known honest party like the ARB FND, and by backing this proposal, we’re fostering a healthier ecosystem that promotes trust and reliability.
I voted FOR this proposal, following the reasoning in the Snapshot phase.
I’m voting FOR this proposal.
Having a ‘first honest proposer’ available is crucial for minimizing the risk of malicious actors.
Honestly, it’s difficult not to consider the risk of centralization, but ensuring reliable actors run this infrastructure is essential for the ecosystem’s long-term health.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
We’re voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
Our team doesn't have much experience with the technical aspects mentioned in the proposal. We're learning and trying to understand them better.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
We’re voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
Our team doesn't have much experience with the technical aspects mentioned in the proposal. We're learning and trying to understand them better.
However, after hearing the proposal on the governance call and reading through the comments on this post, we believe it makes sense to have the first BoLD validator.
We vote For the proposal on Tally.
We maintain the support described in the Snapshot phase and look forward to the proposal to enable the BoLD soon.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
We supported the proposal to upgrade Arbitrum One and Nove to use BoLD during temp-check while committing to a deep-dive before casting our vote when the proposal goes onchain. This Tally proposal is only about the ETH needed to bootstrap the first BoLD validator, given that the onchain proposal to enable BoLD passes - or funds will be returned to the DAO in the event it doesn’t.
Therefore, we’re voting in its favor, and looking forward to seeing the finalized proposal to upgrade Arbitrum One and Nova to use BoLD. As a reminder, the ARDC has conducted a security analysis of the BoLD proposal.
I voted FOR these proposals (both the bond and the operational cost) at the temp check stage because I think it’s important to bootstrap BOLD with an aligned validator. With that said, I would like to explore additional incentive mechanisms in the future to ensure that a broad set of parties participate in BOLD.
The FranklinDAO/PennBlockchain team voted FOR this proposal on Tally. We support the Arbitrum Foundation running the first BoLD validator should it be approved on chain. We fully support the move to permissionless proposer and challenger roles and it's an important step toward for Arbitrum to become a Stage 2 Rollup. Although the proposed bond requirements are high, we see the value in preventing spam transactions/challenges. We are waiting on the Tally vote for the BoLD implementation and will be voting FOR that proposal as well.
We're voting FOR this proposal. The reimbursement structure for L1 gas costs could serve as a blueprint for sustainable validator economics across L2 networks. By shouldering these costs initially, we're lowering barriers to entry for future validators, potentially accelerating decentralization. This approach might also pressure competing L2s to adopt similar models.
I voted for in favor of the proposal because, after considering the details and community feedback, I believe that having a BoLD validator is crucial for the security and long-term objectives of the Arbitrum network.
I appreciate the responses. Your comments regarding the on-chain solution in response to @ITUblockchain really helped to clarify the thought behind the 3-year proposal. We fully align with ETH being the asset for bonding, but in a similar fashion to Eigen Layer’s incorporation of EIGEN, we think it may be interesting to explore ARB’s potential utility as a secondary bonding. We recognize this becomes relevant only with the topic of multiple, active proposers, and we look forward to learning and discussion updates as they come.
We vote For the proposal on Tally.
We maintain the support described in the Snapshot phase and look forward to the proposal to enable the BoLD soon.
Regarding bond funding, it makes sense to support the Foundation to bootstrap the first BoLD validator as the trusted and honest party. It’s also great to confirm that the Foundation will equip themselves with a team of operators running a node with help from Offchain Labs.
Regarding operational cost subsidizing, it makes sense to subsidize the first operator running the BoLD validator and cover the operation costs by the DAO. Although the DAO will need a more sustainable model to attract operators running BoLD, we support the fund as it stands.
I voted FOR these proposals (both the bond and the operational cost) at the temp check stage because I think it’s important to bootstrap BOLD with an aligned validator. With that said, I would like to explore additional incentive mechanisms in the future to ensure that a broad set of parties participate in BOLD.
I voted FOR this onchain proposal on Tally for the reasons outlined above.
I voted FOR: After reviewing the proposal and comments I believe a BoLD validator in terms of security and long-term goals for the Arbitrum network is necessary. I also like the collaboration between Arbitrum DAO on Arbitrum Foundation on this matter.
I voted "For" after hearing the proposal in the call, it makes sense to have the first BoLD validator being a known honest party.
This develepment should not be stoped or delayed at this stage because of costs so i also agree with the requested funds.
Blockworks Research will be voting FOR funding the first BoLD validator on Tally.
This step is a logical development for an optimistic rollup, while the capital costs are high, they are justified to keep the cost of an attack (by either parties involved) low. However, we have one outstanding question. The whitepaper for BoLD states that there will eventually be a trustless pool for people to stake their capital in order to bootstrap more validators. What exactly is the timeline for this?
I just voted in favor of funding the first BoLD validator. My main reason is security: having a 'first honest proposer' always available is crucial for reducing the risk of malicious actors, as the BoLD protocol only requires one honest participant to maintain its integrity.
Initially, I had concerns about potential centralization. However, after reading more about the BoLD protocol + the trustless bonding pools, I'm convinced these mechanisms provide strong incentives for diverse participation in both proposing and challenging, which helps to maintain a decentralized network.
We vote For the proposal on Tally.
We maintain the support described in the Snapshot phase and look forward to the proposal to enable the BoLD soon.
Regarding bond funding, it makes sense to support the Foundation to bootstrap the first BoLD validator as the trusted and honest party. It’s also great to confirm that the Foundation will equip themselves with a team of operators running a node with help from Offchain Labs.
Regarding operational cost subsidizing, it makes sense to subsidize the first operator running the BoLD validator and cover the operation costs by the DAO. Although the DAO will need a more sustainable model to attract operators running BoLD, we support the fund as it stands.
I voted FOR these proposals (both the bond and the operational cost) at the temp check stage because I think it’s important to bootstrap BOLD with an aligned validator. With that said, I would like to explore additional incentive mechanisms in the future to ensure that a broad set of parties participate in BOLD.
I voted FOR this onchain proposal on Tally for the reasons outlined above.
I voted FOR: After reviewing the proposal and comments I believe a BoLD validator in terms of security and long-term goals for the Arbitrum network is necessary. I also like the collaboration between Arbitrum DAO on Arbitrum Foundation on this matter.
I voted "For" after hearing the proposal in the call, it makes sense to have the first BoLD validator being a known honest party.
This develepment should not be stoped or delayed at this stage because of costs so i also agree with the requested funds.
Blockworks Research will be voting FOR funding the first BoLD validator on Tally.
This step is a logical development for an optimistic rollup, while the capital costs are high, they are justified to keep the cost of an attack (by either parties involved) low. However, we have one outstanding question. The whitepaper for BoLD states that there will eventually be a trustless pool for people to stake their capital in order to bootstrap more validators. What exactly is the timeline for this?
I just voted in favor of funding the first BoLD validator. My main reason is security: having a 'first honest proposer' always available is crucial for reducing the risk of malicious actors, as the BoLD protocol only requires one honest participant to maintain its integrity.
Initially, I had concerns about potential centralization. However, after reading more about the BoLD protocol + the trustless bonding pools, I'm convinced these mechanisms provide strong incentives for diverse participation in both proposing and challenging, which helps to maintain a decentralized network.
The Princeton Blockchain Club voted FOR funding the first BoLD validator's assertion and challenge bonds, and operational costs.
After voting on introducing BoLD, bootstrapping the first BoLD validator (and having it run by a party aligned with the DAO) is the next logical step for the DAO to take.
The Princeton Blockchain Club voted FOR funding the first BoLD validator's assertion and challenge bonds, and operational costs.
After voting on introducing BoLD, bootstrapping the first BoLD validator (and having it run by a party aligned with the DAO) is the next logical step for the DAO to take.
The additional 900 ETH to compensate (non-Foundation) proposers and reimburse their L1 fees is talked about in the original BoLD proposal (which we voted in favor of), so we're also supporting it here.
Hoping to see more organizations/pools run validators in the future! (though we're still not entirely sure if the economics of that are significantly attractive)
I've voted for both proposals as they're aligned with the DAOs goal of having the best tech around. Glad to see that the Foundation is also taking some technical initiatives in its own hands, I'd love to see community members involved in the process as well - or simply the ARDC!
We vote FOR the two proposals related to funding the first BoLD validator on Snapshot.
Regarding bond funding, it makes sense to support the Foundation to bootstrap the first BoLD validator as the trusted and honest party. It’s also great to confirm that the Foundation will equip themselves with a team of operators running a node with help from Offchain Labs.
We vote FOR the two proposals related to funding the first BoLD validator on Snapshot.
Regarding bond funding, it makes sense to support the Foundation to bootstrap the first BoLD validator as the trusted and honest party. It’s also great to confirm that the Foundation will equip themselves with a team of operators running a node with help from Offchain Labs.
Regarding operational cost subsidizing, it makes sense to subsidize the first operator running the BoLD validator and cover the operation costs by the DAO. Although the DAO will need a more sustainable model to attract operators running BoLD, we support the fund as it stands.
We fully support the Arbitrum Foundation's establishment of the first BoLD validator and the DAO treasury's provision of funds to bootstrap the bond for this endeavor and have voted for this first proposal on Snapshot. We do, however, have some concerns regarding the DAO funding of the Service Fee and have decided to Abstain from that Snapshot vote.
BoLD introduces permissionless validation, ushering in a new era for Ethereum rollups and the decentralization of the Arbitrum protocol. The foundation's request of 4234 ETH enables the Arbitrum Foundation to run the first BoLD validator by supplying the 3600 for the assertion bond and funds for a challenge bond in case it is needed. This will enable the validator to instantly serve as a proposer for Arbitrum One. One aspect of this framework we would like to explore going forward is the utilization of ARB in the assertion bond as well as ETH. The ARB token is yet to grow beyond the utilization for governance and the integration with a proposer bond would enable it to contribute to the decentralization of the protocol, something which the Arbitrum DAO should be more than willing to support. The DAO is also more capable of supporting efforts outside of the Foundation, given the DAO treasury is made up nearly entirely of ARB rather than ETH.
I voted FOR these proposals (both the bond and the operational cost) at the temp check stage because I think it's important to bootstrap BOLD with an aligned validator. With that said, I would like to explore additional incentive mechanisms in the future to ensure that a broad set of parties participate in BOLD.
Voted "For" so we can move on with BoLD :+1:
The Princeton Blockchain Club voted FOR funding the first BoLD validator's assertion and challenge bonds, and operational costs.
After voting on introducing BoLD, bootstrapping the first BoLD validator (and having it run by a party aligned with the DAO) is the next logical step for the DAO to take.
The Princeton Blockchain Club voted FOR funding the first BoLD validator's assertion and challenge bonds, and operational costs.
After voting on introducing BoLD, bootstrapping the first BoLD validator (and having it run by a party aligned with the DAO) is the next logical step for the DAO to take.
The additional 900 ETH to compensate (non-Foundation) proposers and reimburse their L1 fees is talked about in the original BoLD proposal (which we voted in favor of), so we're also supporting it here.
Hoping to see more organizations/pools run validators in the future! (though we're still not entirely sure if the economics of that are significantly attractive)
I've voted for both proposals as they're aligned with the DAOs goal of having the best tech around. Glad to see that the Foundation is also taking some technical initiatives in its own hands, I'd love to see community members involved in the process as well - or simply the ARDC!
We vote FOR the two proposals related to funding the first BoLD validator on Snapshot.
Regarding bond funding, it makes sense to support the Foundation to bootstrap the first BoLD validator as the trusted and honest party. It’s also great to confirm that the Foundation will equip themselves with a team of operators running a node with help from Offchain Labs.
We vote FOR the two proposals related to funding the first BoLD validator on Snapshot.
Regarding bond funding, it makes sense to support the Foundation to bootstrap the first BoLD validator as the trusted and honest party. It’s also great to confirm that the Foundation will equip themselves with a team of operators running a node with help from Offchain Labs.
Regarding operational cost subsidizing, it makes sense to subsidize the first operator running the BoLD validator and cover the operation costs by the DAO. Although the DAO will need a more sustainable model to attract operators running BoLD, we support the fund as it stands.
We fully support the Arbitrum Foundation's establishment of the first BoLD validator and the DAO treasury's provision of funds to bootstrap the bond for this endeavor and have voted for this first proposal on Snapshot. We do, however, have some concerns regarding the DAO funding of the Service Fee and have decided to Abstain from that Snapshot vote.
BoLD introduces permissionless validation, ushering in a new era for Ethereum rollups and the decentralization of the Arbitrum protocol. The foundation's request of 4234 ETH enables the Arbitrum Foundation to run the first BoLD validator by supplying the 3600 for the assertion bond and funds for a challenge bond in case it is needed. This will enable the validator to instantly serve as a proposer for Arbitrum One. One aspect of this framework we would like to explore going forward is the utilization of ARB in the assertion bond as well as ETH. The ARB token is yet to grow beyond the utilization for governance and the integration with a proposer bond would enable it to contribute to the decentralization of the protocol, something which the Arbitrum DAO should be more than willing to support. The DAO is also more capable of supporting efforts outside of the Foundation, given the DAO treasury is made up nearly entirely of ARB rather than ETH.
I voted FOR these proposals (both the bond and the operational cost) at the temp check stage because I think it's important to bootstrap BOLD with an aligned validator. With that said, I would like to explore additional incentive mechanisms in the future to ensure that a broad set of parties participate in BOLD.
Voted "For" so we can move on with BoLD :+1:
We fully support the Arbitrum Foundation's establishment of the first BoLD validator and the DAO treasury's provision of funds to bootstrap the bond for this endeavor and have voted for this first proposal on Snapshot. We do, however, have some concerns regarding the DAO funding of the Service Fee and have decided to Abstain from that Snapshot vote.
BoLD introduces permissionless validation, ushering in a new era for Ethereum rollups and the decentralization of the Arbitrum protocol. The foundation's request of 4234 ETH enables the Arbitrum Foundation to run the first BoLD validator by supplying the 3600 for the assertion bond and funds for a challenge bond in case it is needed. This will enable the validator to instantly serve as a proposer for Arbitrum One. One aspect of this framework we would like to explore going forward is the utilization of ARB in the assertion bond as well as ETH. The ARB token is yet to grow beyond the utilization for governance and the integration with a proposer bond would enable it to contribute to the decentralization of the protocol, something which the Arbitrum DAO should be more than willing to support. The DAO is also more capable of supporting efforts outside of the Foundation, given the DAO treasury is made up nearly entirely of ARB rather than ETH.
The second proposal is regarding the additional 900 ETH allocated to the proposer Service Fee and the refund of L1 gas costs. This amount is to be allocated over 3 years. We abstained on this proposal due to sharing similar concerns as @swmartin and further highlighted by the @Entropy team in this Gas Fee & Revenue Breakdown. While an allocation to cover L1 fees and counter the opportunity cost of staking is reasonable, putting off this issue for three years may not be the best approach for the DAO or the Arbitrum protocol. This is an aspect of sustainability with the BoLD implementation and the DAO revenue model that should be further explored. Are there ways to make the incentives offered to proposers more attractive than the yield offered by staking? Staking is a good benchmark to start, but committing to three years of providing staking yield felt like something to reconsider, and we are open to investigating alternative solutions.
We look forward to working with the Arbitrum Foundation and our fellow members of the Arbitrum DAO to create a sustainable process for persmissionless validation of the Arbitrum Protocol.
For bond sentiment: Arbitrum Foundation has put forward a well-planned initiative. BoLD plays a vital role in the ecosystem, and we are confident that it can handle validator effectively. For BoLD to operate smoothly in its early stages, taking on the initial role as an active proposer is essential. This initiative will prove the system's functionality and encourage wider participation as the ecosystem develops. Therefore, we are voting "for".
For operational cost sentiment: We appreciate the initiative, but we find the proposed three-year funding plan excessive. A one-year period should suffice for testing and user acclimatization, allowing time to gather insights and adjust the system before committing to longer-term funding. We suggest revising the proposal for a one-year funding period to ensure a more agile and efficient approach. As ITU Blockchain, we look forward to supporting a revised proposal that aligns with these considerations. Therefore, we are voting “against” this proposal.
I am very much in favor of this spend. Bringing permissionless validation to an Ethereum L2 is not just big for our DAO, but marks a huge step forward for the industry as a whole. Not surprised to see Arbitrum leading here :-)
I do have long-term concerns with paying proposers ETH in order to compensate them for their opportunity cost on their bond, however.
I am very much in favor of this spend. Bringing permissionless validation to an Ethereum L2 is not just big for our DAO, but marks a huge step forward for the industry as a whole. Not surprised to see Arbitrum leading here :-)
I do have long-term concerns with paying proposers ETH in order to compensate them for their opportunity cost on their bond, however.
I do not want to draw attention away from the fact that I believe this is definitely something the DAO should approve in its current state, so I will link to this concern here for those curious. A working group should likely be formed over the coming months to continue iterating on BoLD's implementation. This is something I would love to take part in!
Thanks for the proposal @Arbitrum While I support this initial setup cost, it would be great to get some insights on the current thinking on how this proposer role would be decentralized over time.
This is a reasonable ask from the Foundation and to be honest, I don't think I see any alternative for the DAO if we want this initiative to move forward. It also improves the overall security and stability of the network, so I'm all for it!
Hi, I have some questions:
This proposal ensures the Arbitrum network's security and functionality by funding the first BoLD validator. It leverages the Arbitrum Foundation's resources to kickstart the process, minimizing risk and setting a precedent for other validators. The DAO retains control over the funds, ensuring transparency and accountability. This foundational step fosters network stability and encourages further participation.
We echo the positive sentiments from other delegates and truly believe the direction that Arbitrum is taking is clearly the best way for the end-game L2 structure.
We have a couple of question: is the Arbitrum Foundation capable of running a BoLD validator by their own? The Foundation is going to hire a group of engineers to manage the validator going forward? Would it make sense for the DAO to consider having a set of "approved" validators in the future?
We fully support the Arbitrum Foundation's establishment of the first BoLD validator and the DAO treasury's provision of funds to bootstrap the bond for this endeavor and have voted for this first proposal on Snapshot. We do, however, have some concerns regarding the DAO funding of the Service Fee and have decided to Abstain from that Snapshot vote.
BoLD introduces permissionless validation, ushering in a new era for Ethereum rollups and the decentralization of the Arbitrum protocol. The foundation's request of 4234 ETH enables the Arbitrum Foundation to run the first BoLD validator by supplying the 3600 for the assertion bond and funds for a challenge bond in case it is needed. This will enable the validator to instantly serve as a proposer for Arbitrum One. One aspect of this framework we would like to explore going forward is the utilization of ARB in the assertion bond as well as ETH. The ARB token is yet to grow beyond the utilization for governance and the integration with a proposer bond would enable it to contribute to the decentralization of the protocol, something which the Arbitrum DAO should be more than willing to support. The DAO is also more capable of supporting efforts outside of the Foundation, given the DAO treasury is made up nearly entirely of ARB rather than ETH.
The second proposal is regarding the additional 900 ETH allocated to the proposer Service Fee and the refund of L1 gas costs. This amount is to be allocated over 3 years. We abstained on this proposal due to sharing similar concerns as @swmartin and further highlighted by the @Entropy team in this Gas Fee & Revenue Breakdown. While an allocation to cover L1 fees and counter the opportunity cost of staking is reasonable, putting off this issue for three years may not be the best approach for the DAO or the Arbitrum protocol. This is an aspect of sustainability with the BoLD implementation and the DAO revenue model that should be further explored. Are there ways to make the incentives offered to proposers more attractive than the yield offered by staking? Staking is a good benchmark to start, but committing to three years of providing staking yield felt like something to reconsider, and we are open to investigating alternative solutions.
We look forward to working with the Arbitrum Foundation and our fellow members of the Arbitrum DAO to create a sustainable process for persmissionless validation of the Arbitrum Protocol.
For bond sentiment: Arbitrum Foundation has put forward a well-planned initiative. BoLD plays a vital role in the ecosystem, and we are confident that it can handle validator effectively. For BoLD to operate smoothly in its early stages, taking on the initial role as an active proposer is essential. This initiative will prove the system's functionality and encourage wider participation as the ecosystem develops. Therefore, we are voting "for".
For operational cost sentiment: We appreciate the initiative, but we find the proposed three-year funding plan excessive. A one-year period should suffice for testing and user acclimatization, allowing time to gather insights and adjust the system before committing to longer-term funding. We suggest revising the proposal for a one-year funding period to ensure a more agile and efficient approach. As ITU Blockchain, we look forward to supporting a revised proposal that aligns with these considerations. Therefore, we are voting “against” this proposal.
I am very much in favor of this spend. Bringing permissionless validation to an Ethereum L2 is not just big for our DAO, but marks a huge step forward for the industry as a whole. Not surprised to see Arbitrum leading here :-)
I do have long-term concerns with paying proposers ETH in order to compensate them for their opportunity cost on their bond, however.
I am very much in favor of this spend. Bringing permissionless validation to an Ethereum L2 is not just big for our DAO, but marks a huge step forward for the industry as a whole. Not surprised to see Arbitrum leading here :-)
I do have long-term concerns with paying proposers ETH in order to compensate them for their opportunity cost on their bond, however.
I do not want to draw attention away from the fact that I believe this is definitely something the DAO should approve in its current state, so I will link to this concern here for those curious. A working group should likely be formed over the coming months to continue iterating on BoLD's implementation. This is something I would love to take part in!
Thanks for the proposal @Arbitrum While I support this initial setup cost, it would be great to get some insights on the current thinking on how this proposer role would be decentralized over time.
This is a reasonable ask from the Foundation and to be honest, I don't think I see any alternative for the DAO if we want this initiative to move forward. It also improves the overall security and stability of the network, so I'm all for it!
Hi, I have some questions:
This proposal ensures the Arbitrum network's security and functionality by funding the first BoLD validator. It leverages the Arbitrum Foundation's resources to kickstart the process, minimizing risk and setting a precedent for other validators. The DAO retains control over the funds, ensuring transparency and accountability. This foundational step fosters network stability and encourages further participation.
We echo the positive sentiments from other delegates and truly believe the direction that Arbitrum is taking is clearly the best way for the end-game L2 structure.
We have a couple of question: is the Arbitrum Foundation capable of running a BoLD validator by their own? The Foundation is going to hire a group of engineers to manage the validator going forward? Would it make sense for the DAO to consider having a set of "approved" validators in the future?
We echo the positive sentiments from other delegates and truly believe the direction that Arbitrum is taking is clearly the best way for the end-game L2 structure.
We have a couple of question: is the Arbitrum Foundation capable of running a BoLD validator by their own? The Foundation is going to hire a group of engineers to manage the validator going forward? Would it make sense for the DAO to consider having a set of "approved" validators in the future?
A working group should likely be formed over the coming months to continue iterating on BoLD’s implementation.
We would love to get involved as we are experienced in running and managing node operations in the various blockchains as well.
We echo the positive sentiments from other delegates and truly believe the direction that Arbitrum is taking is clearly the best way for the end-game L2 structure.
We have a couple of question: is the Arbitrum Foundation capable of running a BoLD validator by their own? The Foundation is going to hire a group of engineers to manage the validator going forward? Would it make sense for the DAO to consider having a set of "approved" validators in the future?
A working group should likely be formed over the coming months to continue iterating on BoLD’s implementation.
We would love to get involved as we are experienced in running and managing node operations in the various blockchains as well.
