The Quadratic Accelerator (q/acc) is the next evolution of web3 grant programs. Instead of distributing ARB to projects, often leading to immediate liquidation and subsequent repeated funding requests, q/acc creates a self-sustaining token economies for builders.
q/acc transforms how tokens enter the market with combined competitive application processes, ABCs, quadratic funding (QF), token lock-ups, and fair-launch mechanisms. This unique approach ensures alignment between protocols, projects, and communities in a manner that no other grant program has achieved before.
Arbitrum is the leader in defi among L2s, so it's fitting and inevitable that q/acc, a defi powered grant program, should be added to its orbit. We can predictably grow TVL, create demand for ARB and improve other onchain metrics for the ecosystem. For builders, we create revenue streams through mint and burn fees, give a subsidized path for tokenization and create DEEP liquidity. And for the Arbitrum community, we enable early access and ownership, fulfilling the dream of web3.
We have had great success working out the kinks of this novel program with Polygon, running our first season on zkEVM, then migrating to POS. We are finishing up the second season over the next few weeks, and expect to run many more seasons with them. The early results of the first season though are impressive already, especially considering it was done on zkEVM.
We are actively following SOS discussions and will ensure our cohorts focus on builders that directly support Arbitrum and advance the priorities established through that process. We could not be more excited to start this program with a clear direction established for the DAO.
Grant programs are essential to ecosystem growth, but many fail to create sustainable, lasting impact. Key issues include:
q/acc flips the script on grants with a mechanism-driven, on-chain approach that allows for investment into small and medium-sized enterprises while creating lasting alignment between Arbitrum DAO, projects, and the community. It can’t replace all grant programs, as many teams should not tokenize; however for the ones that want to, this is an incredible opportunity for them.
Here’s how it works:
q/acc fundamentally changes how projects can be funded. By subsidizing the launch of projects’ token economies, Arbitrum DAO and the supporting community get to share in the upside of the project’s success.
Our recent Season 1 cohort on Polygon has demonstrated the powerful impact of the q/acc model. Selected from over 200 applications (most having no prior plans to launch on Polygon), our first eight projects drove significant ecosystem value:
Official website: https://www.x23.ai/
X23 is automating the future of decentralized organizations by integrating AI tools to streamline the operation and governance of DAOs. Their platform brings together over 50,000 sources of data to provide a comprehensive overview of DAO activities, making governance more efficient and accessible.
Their AI Gov Assistant (available 24/7 via Telegram) has become a vital tool for DAO delegates, providing detailed and accurate answers to specific governance questions within seconds. By applying state-of-the-art machine learning and LLMs, x23 is solving critical information and decision-making challenges in the web3 space.
X23's participation in q/acc has accelerated their development and provided the tokenomic structure to align their service with the communities they serve. Their token economy now directly benefits from Polygon's growth.
Official website: https://prismo.technology/
Prismo is a layer-2 hybrid public-private blockchain platform already making significant real-world impact. Their solution addresses a critical need: allowing enterprises and governments to maintain data confidentiality while leveraging blockchain's transparency benefits.
Even before completing the q/acc program, Prismo had implemented a functioning MVP within the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) of the Philippines, where it's securing critical budget documents. This real government adoption demonstrates Prismo's product-market fit and utility.
In December 2024, they launched their gas token $PRSM through q/acc, with a testnet planned for early 2025 and mainnet launch expected by Q2 2025. Prismo exemplifies how q/acc can support projects that bring blockchain solutions to traditional institutions, creating substantial ecosystem value.
Official website: http://www.xade.finance/
Xade Finance, led by 18 yr old whiz kid Harshal Madnani, is building the AI-powered "Robinhood of DeFi" - a decentralized platform that makes sophisticated trading accessible through AI insights and tools. Their platform allows users to easily launch, interact with, and invest in no-code AI agents that can trade, tweet, and leverage over a thousand integrations.
Originally conceived as a "super decentralized bank" providing on-chain banking services through in-house DeFi protocols, Xade has evolved into a powerful gateway for AI-powered trading. Through q/acc, they've created a token for the first AI Agent on their platform, Alpha Chad. Holding the $ACHAD token gives you access to the AI trading tools they are developing..
Xade demonstrates how q/acc can help sophisticated DeFi protocols build token economies that drive adoption while creating lasting ecosystem value, while also demonstrating the AI Agent use case.
Official website: https://grandtimeline.org/
The Grand Timeline is creating the first comprehensive, interactive visualization of blockchain and Web3 history. This historical research project has been developed over three years and will result in collectible NFTs and wearables that document the evolution of our industry.
This project exemplifies how q/acc can support public goods that serve the broader ecosystem. By tokenizing this historical archive, The Grand Timeline can sustain ongoing research and documentation while offering collectors ownership in this valuable historical record.
The creator, a product designer named Igor, considers this work a public good born from his fascination with Web3 history. Through q/acc, this labor of love has become a sustainable initiative with its own token economy.
Official website: https://citizenwallet.xyz/
Citizen Wallet is bridging the gap between digital tokens and physical community engagement. Their mobile app and NFC wallet solution empowers communities and events to easily launch, use, and manage community tokens, bringing blockchain utility to everyday situations.
By focusing on accessible tools for real-world adoption, Citizen Wallet exemplifies how q/acc can support projects that extend blockchain's reach beyond crypto-native audiences. Their token economy now benefits from every new community and event that adopts their platform.
— And that’s just the beginning!
This next cohort is shaping up to be strong as well! We just launched Season 2 for To Da Moon, Web3 Packs, Gridlock & How To DAO. These 4 projects are launching their tokens on Polygon, because of our program, none of them have any requirements to launch on Polygon. If Arbitrum had q/acc, they could have launched here.
q/acc will launch with the following key deliverables:
Our selection process ensures we only support projects with real utility and potential—not speculative tokens:
The q/acc team are masters at driving narrative and mindshare. Our involvement in new ecosystems promotes broader interest and attention among token engineers, DAO operators, capital allocation designers, and crypto-native communities. This attention value is automatically included in new deployments. See:
We request $1.05M in ARB ($1.3M to protect from volatility) to launch q/acc on Arbitrum, allocated as follows:
| Expense Category | Amount | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Initialize Projects ABCs | $500k | Launch up to 10 projects, each getting $50,000 of ARB locked in their ABC (Released to team upon graduation) |
| ABC Bots | $50k | $5000 for each team to bridge liquidity to DEX from ABCs (Released to team upon graduation) |
| Matching Pool | $250k | Used to create protocol-locked liquidity pools (Held in perpetuity by the protocol) |
| Development & Deployment | $170k | Deployment, infrastructure, initial marketing, BD, and partnerships (Overhead, one-time cost) |
| Operations & Scaling | $80k | 10% of the grants given to teams, used to run and operate the q/acc program (Overhead, recurring cost) |
| Volatility Buffer | $250k | Ensures total USD amount is available in ARB when needed (To be returned to the DAO if not impacted by ARB depreciation during the period) |
To measure success, we will track:
📌 Onchain Growth – 10x – Market cap growth (in ARB) compared to ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will produce 10M ARB worth of market caps
📌 ARB Demand Ratio – 25% – Ratio of ARB in protocol vs ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will capture 1.25M worth of ARB in the protocol, creating 250k worth of ARB buying pressure.
📌 Sustained Value – 1 year – Long-term market cap growth (in ARB) of tokens. E.g The 10x growth will last for at least a year.
📌 First-time Arbitrum Users – 500 – Number of q/acc participants new to Arbitrum that buy more than $10 of tokens. E.g 500 users that pass our sybil filter will have never used Arbitrum before.
📌 On-Chain Activity – Varied – Trading volume, user participation, and liquidity metrics. This will be tracked but it is so gameable, it’s not worth creating an exact metric, but we will create a lot of onchain activity.
| Risk | Mitigation Strategy |
|---|---|
| Smart Contract Exploits | Conduct rigorous security audits. |
| User Friction | Create a UX similar to Polymarket |
| Market Volatility | Hold treasury in stables, rebuy ARB right before it is needed |
| Regulatory Uncertainty | Ensure compliance conforms with conservative norms (Geoblocking, low limits without KYC) |
The q/acc model has proven its ability to create sustainable token economies that drive lasting ecosystem value. By implementing q/acc on Arbitrum, we can attract quality projects, increase ARB demand, and position Arbitrum as the premier L2 for token launches.
Our focused 10-project first season allows us to demonstrate value while managing risk, and minimizing overhead due to deployment costs. We have clear metrics to evaluate performance and inform future scaling. We invite Arbitrum DAO to join us in pioneering this next evolution of ecosystem growth.
The Quadratic Accelerator (q/acc) is the next evolution of web3 grant programs. Instead of distributing ARB to projects, often leading to immediate liquidation and subsequent repeated funding requests, q/acc creates a self-sustaining token economies for builders.
q/acc transforms how tokens enter the market with combined competitive application processes, ABCs, quadratic funding (QF), token lock-ups, and fair-launch mechanisms. This unique approach ensures alignment between protocols, projects, and communities in a manner that no other grant program has achieved before.
Arbitrum is the leader in defi among L2s, so it's fitting and inevitable that q/acc, a defi powered grant program, should be added to its orbit. We can predictably grow TVL, create demand for ARB and improve other onchain metrics for the ecosystem. For builders, we create revenue streams through mint and burn fees, give a subsidized path for tokenization and create DEEP liquidity. And for the Arbitrum community, we enable early access and ownership, fulfilling the dream of web3.
We have had great success working out the kinks of this novel program with Polygon, running our first season on zkEVM, then migrating to POS. We are finishing up the second season over the next few weeks, and expect to run many more seasons with them. The early results of the first season though are impressive already, especially considering it was done on zkEVM.
We are actively following SOS discussions and will ensure our cohorts focus on builders that directly support Arbitrum and advance the priorities established through that process. We could not be more excited to start this program with a clear direction established for the DAO.
Grant programs are essential to ecosystem growth, but many fail to create sustainable, lasting impact. Key issues include:
q/acc flips the script on grants with a mechanism-driven, on-chain approach that allows for investment into small and medium-sized enterprises while creating lasting alignment between Arbitrum DAO, projects, and the community. It can’t replace all grant programs, as many teams should not tokenize; however for the ones that want to, this is an incredible opportunity for them.
Here’s how it works:
q/acc fundamentally changes how projects can be funded. By subsidizing the launch of projects’ token economies, Arbitrum DAO and the supporting community get to share in the upside of the project’s success.
Our recent Season 1 cohort on Polygon has demonstrated the powerful impact of the q/acc model. Selected from over 200 applications (most having no prior plans to launch on Polygon), our first eight projects drove significant ecosystem value:
Official website: https://www.x23.ai/
X23 is automating the future of decentralized organizations by integrating AI tools to streamline the operation and governance of DAOs. Their platform brings together over 50,000 sources of data to provide a comprehensive overview of DAO activities, making governance more efficient and accessible.
Their AI Gov Assistant (available 24/7 via Telegram) has become a vital tool for DAO delegates, providing detailed and accurate answers to specific governance questions within seconds. By applying state-of-the-art machine learning and LLMs, x23 is solving critical information and decision-making challenges in the web3 space.
X23's participation in q/acc has accelerated their development and provided the tokenomic structure to align their service with the communities they serve. Their token economy now directly benefits from Polygon's growth.
Official website: https://prismo.technology/
Prismo is a layer-2 hybrid public-private blockchain platform already making significant real-world impact. Their solution addresses a critical need: allowing enterprises and governments to maintain data confidentiality while leveraging blockchain's transparency benefits.
Even before completing the q/acc program, Prismo had implemented a functioning MVP within the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) of the Philippines, where it's securing critical budget documents. This real government adoption demonstrates Prismo's product-market fit and utility.
In December 2024, they launched their gas token $PRSM through q/acc, with a testnet planned for early 2025 and mainnet launch expected by Q2 2025. Prismo exemplifies how q/acc can support projects that bring blockchain solutions to traditional institutions, creating substantial ecosystem value.
Official website: http://www.xade.finance/
Xade Finance, led by 18 yr old whiz kid Harshal Madnani, is building the AI-powered "Robinhood of DeFi" - a decentralized platform that makes sophisticated trading accessible through AI insights and tools. Their platform allows users to easily launch, interact with, and invest in no-code AI agents that can trade, tweet, and leverage over a thousand integrations.
Originally conceived as a "super decentralized bank" providing on-chain banking services through in-house DeFi protocols, Xade has evolved into a powerful gateway for AI-powered trading. Through q/acc, they've created a token for the first AI Agent on their platform, Alpha Chad. Holding the $ACHAD token gives you access to the AI trading tools they are developing..
Xade demonstrates how q/acc can help sophisticated DeFi protocols build token economies that drive adoption while creating lasting ecosystem value, while also demonstrating the AI Agent use case.
Official website: https://grandtimeline.org/
The Grand Timeline is creating the first comprehensive, interactive visualization of blockchain and Web3 history. This historical research project has been developed over three years and will result in collectible NFTs and wearables that document the evolution of our industry.
This project exemplifies how q/acc can support public goods that serve the broader ecosystem. By tokenizing this historical archive, The Grand Timeline can sustain ongoing research and documentation while offering collectors ownership in this valuable historical record.
The creator, a product designer named Igor, considers this work a public good born from his fascination with Web3 history. Through q/acc, this labor of love has become a sustainable initiative with its own token economy.
Official website: https://citizenwallet.xyz/
Citizen Wallet is bridging the gap between digital tokens and physical community engagement. Their mobile app and NFC wallet solution empowers communities and events to easily launch, use, and manage community tokens, bringing blockchain utility to everyday situations.
By focusing on accessible tools for real-world adoption, Citizen Wallet exemplifies how q/acc can support projects that extend blockchain's reach beyond crypto-native audiences. Their token economy now benefits from every new community and event that adopts their platform.
— And that’s just the beginning!
This next cohort is shaping up to be strong as well! We just launched Season 2 for To Da Moon, Web3 Packs, Gridlock & How To DAO. These 4 projects are launching their tokens on Polygon, because of our program, none of them have any requirements to launch on Polygon. If Arbitrum had q/acc, they could have launched here.
q/acc will launch with the following key deliverables:
Our selection process ensures we only support projects with real utility and potential—not speculative tokens:
The q/acc team are masters at driving narrative and mindshare. Our involvement in new ecosystems promotes broader interest and attention among token engineers, DAO operators, capital allocation designers, and crypto-native communities. This attention value is automatically included in new deployments. See:
We request $1.05M in ARB ($1.3M to protect from volatility) to launch q/acc on Arbitrum, allocated as follows:
| Expense Category | Amount | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Initialize Projects ABCs | $500k | Launch up to 10 projects, each getting $50,000 of ARB locked in their ABC (Released to team upon graduation) |
| ABC Bots | $50k | $5000 for each team to bridge liquidity to DEX from ABCs (Released to team upon graduation) |
| Matching Pool | $250k | Used to create protocol-locked liquidity pools (Held in perpetuity by the protocol) |
| Development & Deployment | $170k | Deployment, infrastructure, initial marketing, BD, and partnerships (Overhead, one-time cost) |
| Operations & Scaling | $80k | 10% of the grants given to teams, used to run and operate the q/acc program (Overhead, recurring cost) |
| Volatility Buffer | $250k | Ensures total USD amount is available in ARB when needed (To be returned to the DAO if not impacted by ARB depreciation during the period) |
To measure success, we will track:
📌 Onchain Growth – 10x – Market cap growth (in ARB) compared to ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will produce 10M ARB worth of market caps
📌 ARB Demand Ratio – 25% – Ratio of ARB in protocol vs ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will capture 1.25M worth of ARB in the protocol, creating 250k worth of ARB buying pressure.
📌 Sustained Value – 1 year – Long-term market cap growth (in ARB) of tokens. E.g The 10x growth will last for at least a year.
📌 First-time Arbitrum Users – 500 – Number of q/acc participants new to Arbitrum that buy more than $10 of tokens. E.g 500 users that pass our sybil filter will have never used Arbitrum before.
📌 On-Chain Activity – Varied – Trading volume, user participation, and liquidity metrics. This will be tracked but it is so gameable, it’s not worth creating an exact metric, but we will create a lot of onchain activity.
| Risk | Mitigation Strategy |
|---|---|
| Smart Contract Exploits | Conduct rigorous security audits. |
| User Friction | Create a UX similar to Polymarket |
| Market Volatility | Hold treasury in stables, rebuy ARB right before it is needed |
| Regulatory Uncertainty | Ensure compliance conforms with conservative norms (Geoblocking, low limits without KYC) |
The q/acc model has proven its ability to create sustainable token economies that drive lasting ecosystem value. By implementing q/acc on Arbitrum, we can attract quality projects, increase ARB demand, and position Arbitrum as the premier L2 for token launches.
Our focused 10-project first season allows us to demonstrate value while managing risk, and minimizing overhead due to deployment costs. We have clear metrics to evaluate performance and inform future scaling. We invite Arbitrum DAO to join us in pioneering this next evolution of ecosystem growth.
Thanks Griff — the clarifications help. A couple of governance/risk items I’d still want tightened up:
1. Volatility buffer mechanics: if the plan is “stables needed, buy ARB at the last minute,” can you specify (a) who executes conversions (AAE/Foundation?), (b) the policy (timing bands / TWAP vs. market), and (c) what on-chain/operational controls prevent discretionary trading?
Thanks Griff — the clarifications help. A couple of governance/risk items I’d still want tightened up:
1. Volatility buffer mechanics: if the plan is “stables needed, buy ARB at the last minute,” can you specify (a) who executes conversions (AAE/Foundation?), (b) the policy (timing bands / TWAP vs. market), and (c) what on-chain/operational controls prevent discretionary trading?
2. Buffer outcome: if the buffer is unused, is it returned as ARB or stables (and where is that formally documented)?
3. “Not a grant” reality: since the 50k ARB is collateral in a bonding curve and teams get a subsidized token launch rather than free ARB, what are the success criteria you’ll publish (e.g., post-launch liquidity/volume, revenue, retention) and what’s the failure mode where we stop/exit?
4. Referral program transparency: are referral incentives disclosed publicly (even if amounts are small)? Hidden incentives have a habit of becoming “surprise incentives.”
If you can lock these into a simple policy + reporting cadence, the “low complexity” story becomes a lot easier to believe.
Thanks Griff — the clarifications help. A couple of governance/risk items I’d still want tightened up:
1. Volatility buffer mechanics: if the plan is “stables needed, buy ARB at the last minute,” can you specify (a) who executes conversions (AAE/Foundation?), (b) the policy (timing bands / TWAP vs. market), and (c) what on-chain/operational controls prevent discretionary trading?
Thanks Griff — the clarifications help. A couple of governance/risk items I’d still want tightened up:
1. Volatility buffer mechanics: if the plan is “stables needed, buy ARB at the last minute,” can you specify (a) who executes conversions (AAE/Foundation?), (b) the policy (timing bands / TWAP vs. market), and (c) what on-chain/operational controls prevent discretionary trading?
2. Buffer outcome: if the buffer is unused, is it returned as ARB or stables (and where is that formally documented)?
3. “Not a grant” reality: since the 50k ARB is collateral in a bonding curve and teams get a subsidized token launch rather than free ARB, what are the success criteria you’ll publish (e.g., post-launch liquidity/volume, revenue, retention) and what’s the failure mode where we stop/exit?
4. Referral program transparency: are referral incentives disclosed publicly (even if amounts are small)? Hidden incentives have a habit of becoming “surprise incentives.”
If you can lock these into a simple policy + reporting cadence, the “low complexity” story becomes a lot easier to believe.
Great to see x23.ai mentioned a few times here (I'm the founder) and happy that the q/acc program wants to extend to Arbitrum.
From a builder perspective, q/acc was great as they took care of the token side of things, helping us design and launch the token. It's true that it didn't help with runway, since we don't receive any direct funding from it. However it did help with growing our community, putting the token into the hands of early supporters, and ensured early backers will be rewarded.
Great to see x23.ai mentioned a few times here (I'm the founder) and happy that the q/acc program wants to extend to Arbitrum.
From a builder perspective, q/acc was great as they took care of the token side of things, helping us design and launch the token. It's true that it didn't help with runway, since we don't receive any direct funding from it. However it did help with growing our community, putting the token into the hands of early supporters, and ensured early backers will be rewarded.
Some of the comments seem to be overly analytical and academic towards builders and startups. The truth is startups are messy, constantly iterating, and moving towards (tighter) PMF. Outsized growth and results is by definition, an outlier. So trying to analyse so deeply the current results (after 2 seasons) is premature and better suited for business schools. Building something valuable in the real world takes time, and q/acc helps early teams achieve that goal.
FWIW I think this iteration of the q/acc program for Arbitrum is better designed than the first program :sweat_smile:
Really liking the direction here, especially the effort to move away from traditional grant farming and build something that rewards long-term builders. Just curious — since projects will be issuing tokenized grants, have you thought about how to handle potential risks in secondary markets? Like speculative trading or farming behavior after token issuance. Are there any built-in mechanisms to ensure tokens stay tied to actual product milestones, rather than becoming a short-term hype vehicle?
Great to see x23.ai mentioned a few times here (I'm the founder) and happy that the q/acc program wants to extend to Arbitrum.
From a builder perspective, q/acc was great as they took care of the token side of things, helping us design and launch the token. It's true that it didn't help with runway, since we don't receive any direct funding from it. However it did help with growing our community, putting the token into the hands of early supporters, and ensured early backers will be rewarded.
Great to see x23.ai mentioned a few times here (I'm the founder) and happy that the q/acc program wants to extend to Arbitrum.
From a builder perspective, q/acc was great as they took care of the token side of things, helping us design and launch the token. It's true that it didn't help with runway, since we don't receive any direct funding from it. However it did help with growing our community, putting the token into the hands of early supporters, and ensured early backers will be rewarded.
Some of the comments seem to be overly analytical and academic towards builders and startups. The truth is startups are messy, constantly iterating, and moving towards (tighter) PMF. Outsized growth and results is by definition, an outlier. So trying to analyse so deeply the current results (after 2 seasons) is premature and better suited for business schools. Building something valuable in the real world takes time, and q/acc helps early teams achieve that goal.
FWIW I think this iteration of the q/acc program for Arbitrum is better designed than the first program :sweat_smile:
Really liking the direction here, especially the effort to move away from traditional grant farming and build something that rewards long-term builders. Just curious — since projects will be issuing tokenized grants, have you thought about how to handle potential risks in secondary markets? Like speculative trading or farming behavior after token issuance. Are there any built-in mechanisms to ensure tokens stay tied to actual product milestones, rather than becoming a short-term hype vehicle?
Hi q/acc team,
Thank you again for the time and effort you put into the proposal and for sharing more about the q/acc program. We appreciate the innovative approach you're bringing to support early stage teams and token launch infrastructure.
Hi q/acc team,
Thank you again for the time and effort you put into the proposal and for sharing more about the q/acc program. We appreciate the innovative approach you're bringing to support early stage teams and token launch infrastructure.
The Arbitrum Foundation is currently focused on building out our builder journey, refining the top of funnel experience for teams, and aligning key internal stakeholders on a cohesive strategy to support early stage projects. At present, in relation to our builder journey work, we believe this proposal is too early and we are not in a position to support the proposal as an AAE focused on ecosystem growth. We’d recommend the DAO to pause on this effort for now.
As part of this, the Foundation is still evaluating how launchpad infrastructure fits into this picture, so while we see real value in q/acc, it's not the right moment to commit. We also want to share a few thoughts and concerns that informed our decision:
We’re currently working on a broader strategy for supporting early stage teams, including how best to handle this type of infrastructure and builder support. This will likely involve working with a few different launchpad models.
We found your proposed design mechanism to be novel and promising. However, based on our own experience to date, we do not believe there is not sufficient demand from teams in our funnel, who can take advantage of the program.
It is still a bit too early to draw conclusions from the existing information for the program on other networks. Additionally, there are an increasing number of competitive launchpad models, which should be evaluated alongside this offering. We want to avoid prescribing any specific launch infrastructure. Committing to a single launchpad model would create the expectation on teams to follow this particular path.
We’re excited to see how q/acc evolves and hope to revisit this conversation when we have defined our approach further.
Hi q/acc team,
Thank you again for the time and effort you put into the proposal and for sharing more about the q/acc program. We appreciate the innovative approach you're bringing to support early stage teams and token launch infrastructure.
Hi q/acc team,
Thank you again for the time and effort you put into the proposal and for sharing more about the q/acc program. We appreciate the innovative approach you're bringing to support early stage teams and token launch infrastructure.
The Arbitrum Foundation is currently focused on building out our builder journey, refining the top of funnel experience for teams, and aligning key internal stakeholders on a cohesive strategy to support early stage projects. At present, in relation to our builder journey work, we believe this proposal is too early and we are not in a position to support the proposal as an AAE focused on ecosystem growth. We’d recommend the DAO to pause on this effort for now.
As part of this, the Foundation is still evaluating how launchpad infrastructure fits into this picture, so while we see real value in q/acc, it's not the right moment to commit. We also want to share a few thoughts and concerns that informed our decision:
We’re currently working on a broader strategy for supporting early stage teams, including how best to handle this type of infrastructure and builder support. This will likely involve working with a few different launchpad models.
We found your proposed design mechanism to be novel and promising. However, based on our own experience to date, we do not believe there is not sufficient demand from teams in our funnel, who can take advantage of the program.
It is still a bit too early to draw conclusions from the existing information for the program on other networks. Additionally, there are an increasing number of competitive launchpad models, which should be evaluated alongside this offering. We want to avoid prescribing any specific launch infrastructure. Committing to a single launchpad model would create the expectation on teams to follow this particular path.
We’re excited to see how q/acc evolves and hope to revisit this conversation when we have defined our approach further.
q/acc transforms how tokens enter the market with combined competitive application processes, ABCs, quadratic funding (QF), token lock-ups, and fair-launch mechanisms. This unique approach ensures alignment between protocols, projects, and communities in a manner that no other grant program has achieved before.
q/acc transforms how tokens enter the market with combined competitive application processes, ABCs, quadratic funding (QF), token lock-ups, and fair-launch mechanisms. This unique approach ensures alignment between protocols, projects, and communities in a manner that no other grant program has achieved before.
Arbitrum is the leader in defi among L2s, so it’s fitting and inevitable that q/acc, a defi powered grant program, should be added to its orbit. We can predictably grow TVL, create demand for ARB and improve other onchain metrics for the ecosystem. For builders, we create revenue streams through mint and burn fees, give a subsidized path for tokenization and create DEEP liquidity. And for the Arbitrum community, we enable early access and ownership, fulfilling the dream of web3.
We have had great success working out the kinks of this novel program with Polygon, running our first season on zkEVM, then migrating to POS. We are finishing up the second season over the next few weeks, and expect to run many more seasons with them. The early results of the first season though are impressive already, especially considering it was done on zkEVM.
We are actively following SOS discussions and will ensure our cohorts focus on builders that directly support Arbitrum and advance the priorities established through that process. We could not be more excited to start this program with a clear direction established for the DAO.
Grant programs are essential to ecosystem growth, but many fail to create sustainable, lasting impact. Key issues include:
q/acc flips the script on grants with a mechanism-driven, on-chain approach that allows for investment into small and medium-sized enterprises while creating lasting alignment between Arbitrum DAO, projects, and the community. It can’t replace all grant programs, as many teams should not tokenize; however for the ones that want to, this is an incredible opportunity for them.
Here’s how it works:
q/acc fundamentally changes how projects can be funded. By subsidizing the launch of projects’ token economies, Arbitrum DAO and the supporting community get to share in the upside of the project’s success.
Our recent Season 1 cohort on Polygon has demonstrated the powerful impact of the q/acc model. Selected from over 200 applications (most having no prior plans to launch on Polygon), our first eight projects drove significant ecosystem value:
Official website: https://www.x23.ai/
X23 is automating the future of decentralized organizations by integrating AI tools to streamline the operation and governance of DAOs. Their platform brings together over 50,000 sources of data to provide a comprehensive overview of DAO activities, making governance more efficient and accessible.
Their AI Gov Assistant (available 24/7 via Telegram) has become a vital tool for DAO delegates, providing detailed and accurate answers to specific governance questions within seconds. By applying state-of-the-art machine learning and LLMs, x23 is solving critical information and decision-making challenges in the web3 space.
X23’s participation in q/acc has accelerated their development and provided the tokenomic structure to align their service with the communities they serve. Their token economy now directly benefits from Polygon’s growth.
Official website: https://prismo.technology/
Prismo is a layer-2 hybrid public-private blockchain platform already making significant real-world impact. Their solution addresses a critical need: allowing enterprises and governments to maintain data confidentiality while leveraging blockchain’s transparency benefits.
Even before completing the q/acc program, Prismo had implemented a functioning MVP within the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) of the Philippines, where it’s securing critical budget documents. This real government adoption demonstrates Prismo’s product-market fit and utility.
In December 2024, they launched their gas token $PRSM through q/acc, with a testnet planned for early 2025 and mainnet launch expected by Q2 2025. Prismo exemplifies how q/acc can support projects that bring blockchain solutions to traditional institutions, creating substantial ecosystem value.
Official website: http://www.xade.finance/
Xade Finance, led by 18 yr old whiz kid Harshal Madnani, is building the AI-powered “Robinhood of DeFi” - a decentralized platform that makes sophisticated trading accessible through AI insights and tools. Their platform allows users to easily launch, interact with, and invest in no-code AI agents that can trade, tweet, and leverage over a thousand integrations.
Originally conceived as a “super decentralized bank” providing on-chain banking services through in-house DeFi protocols, Xade has evolved into a powerful gateway for AI-powered trading. Through q/acc, they’ve created a token for the first AI Agent on their platform, Alpha Chad. Holding the $ACHAD token gives you access to the AI trading tools they are developing..
Xade demonstrates how q/acc can help sophisticated DeFi protocols build token economies that drive adoption while creating lasting ecosystem value, while also demonstrating the AI Agent use case.
Official website: https://grandtimeline.org/
The Grand Timeline is creating the first comprehensive, interactive visualization of blockchain and Web3 history. This historical research project has been developed over three years and will result in collectible NFTs and wearables that document the evolution of our industry.
This project exemplifies how q/acc can support public goods that serve the broader ecosystem. By tokenizing this historical archive, The Grand Timeline can sustain ongoing research and documentation while offering collectors ownership in this valuable historical record.
The creator, a product designer named Igor, considers this work a public good born from his fascination with Web3 history. Through q/acc, this labor of love has become a sustainable initiative with its own token economy.
Official website: https://citizenwallet.xyz/
Citizen Wallet is bridging the gap between digital tokens and physical community engagement. Their mobile app and NFC wallet solution empowers communities and events to easily launch, use, and manage community tokens, bringing blockchain utility to everyday situations.
By focusing on accessible tools for real-world adoption, Citizen Wallet exemplifies how q/acc can support projects that extend blockchain’s reach beyond crypto-native audiences. Their token economy now benefits from every new community and event that adopts their platform.
— And that’s just the beginning!
This next cohort is shaping up to be strong as well! We just launched Season 2 for To Da Moon, Web3 Packs, Gridlock & How To DAO. These 4 projects are launching their tokens on Polygon, because of our program, none of them have any requirements to launch on Polygon. If Arbitrum had q/acc, they could have launched here.
q/acc will launch with the following key deliverables:
Our selection process ensures we only support projects with real utility and potential—not speculative tokens:
The q/acc team are masters at driving narrative and mindshare. Our involvement in new ecosystems promotes broader interest and attention among token engineers, DAO operators, capital allocation designers, and crypto-native communities. This attention value is automatically included in new deployments. See:
We request $1.05M in ARB ($1.3M to protect from volatility) to launch q/acc on Arbitrum, allocated as follows:
| Expense Category | Amount | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Initialize Projects ABCs | $500k | Launch up to 10 projects, each getting $50,000 of ARB locked in their ABC (Released to team upon graduation) |
| ABC Bots | $50k | $5000 for each team to bridge liquidity to DEX from ABCs (Released to team upon graduation) |
| Matching Pool | $250k | Used to create protocol-locked liquidity pools (Held in perpetuity by the protocol) |
| Development & Deployment | $170k | Deployment, infrastructure, initial marketing, BD, and partnerships (Overhead, one-time cost) |
| Operations & Scaling | $80k | 10% of the grants given to teams, used to run and operate the q/acc program (Overhead, recurring cost) |
| Volatility Buffer | $250k | Ensures total USD amount is available in ARB when needed (To be returned to the DAO if not impacted by ARB depreciation during the period) |
To measure success, we will track:
:pushpin: Onchain Growth – 10x – Market cap growth (in ARB) compared to ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will produce 10M ARB worth of market caps
:pushpin: ARB Demand Ratio – 25% – Ratio of ARB in protocol vs ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will capture 1.25M worth of ARB in the protocol, creating 250k worth of ARB buying pressure.
:pushpin: Sustained Value – 1 year – Long-term market cap growth (in ARB) of tokens. E.g The 10x growth will last for at least a year.
:pushpin: First-time Arbitrum Users – 500 – Number of q/acc participants new to Arbitrum that buy more than $10 of tokens. E.g 500 users that pass our sybil filter will have never used Arbitrum before.
:pushpin: On-Chain Activity – Varied – Trading volume, user participation, and liquidity metrics. This will be tracked but it is so gameable, it’s not worth creating an exact metric, but we will create a lot of onchain activity.
| Risk | Mitigation Strategy |
|---|---|
| Smart Contract Exploits | Conduct rigorous security audits. |
| User Friction | Create a UX similar to Polymarket |
| Market Volatility | Hold treasury in stables, rebuy ARB right before it is needed |
| Regulatory Uncertainty | Ensure compliance conforms with conservative norms (Geoblocking, low limits without KYC) |
The q/acc model has proven its ability to create sustainable token economies that drive lasting ecosystem value. By implementing q/acc on Arbitrum, we can attract quality projects, increase ARB demand, and position Arbitrum as the premier L2 for token launches.
Our focused 10-project first season allows us to demonstrate value while managing risk, and minimizing overhead due to deployment costs. We have clear metrics to evaluate performance and inform future scaling. We invite Arbitrum DAO to join us in pioneering this next evolution of ecosystem growth.
This is the kind of mechanism Web3 desperately needs. q/acc doesn’t just hand out grants — it engineers aligned incentives , sustainable token economies, and real builder momentum. You’ve taken the flaws of traditional funding models and turned them into a flywheel for innovation, demand, and community ownership.
q/acc transforms how tokens enter the market with combined competitive application processes, ABCs, quadratic funding (QF), token lock-ups, and fair-launch mechanisms. This unique approach ensures alignment between protocols, projects, and communities in a manner that no other grant program has achieved before.
q/acc transforms how tokens enter the market with combined competitive application processes, ABCs, quadratic funding (QF), token lock-ups, and fair-launch mechanisms. This unique approach ensures alignment between protocols, projects, and communities in a manner that no other grant program has achieved before.
Arbitrum is the leader in defi among L2s, so it’s fitting and inevitable that q/acc, a defi powered grant program, should be added to its orbit. We can predictably grow TVL, create demand for ARB and improve other onchain metrics for the ecosystem. For builders, we create revenue streams through mint and burn fees, give a subsidized path for tokenization and create DEEP liquidity. And for the Arbitrum community, we enable early access and ownership, fulfilling the dream of web3.
We have had great success working out the kinks of this novel program with Polygon, running our first season on zkEVM, then migrating to POS. We are finishing up the second season over the next few weeks, and expect to run many more seasons with them. The early results of the first season though are impressive already, especially considering it was done on zkEVM.
We are actively following SOS discussions and will ensure our cohorts focus on builders that directly support Arbitrum and advance the priorities established through that process. We could not be more excited to start this program with a clear direction established for the DAO.
Grant programs are essential to ecosystem growth, but many fail to create sustainable, lasting impact. Key issues include:
q/acc flips the script on grants with a mechanism-driven, on-chain approach that allows for investment into small and medium-sized enterprises while creating lasting alignment between Arbitrum DAO, projects, and the community. It can’t replace all grant programs, as many teams should not tokenize; however for the ones that want to, this is an incredible opportunity for them.
Here’s how it works:
q/acc fundamentally changes how projects can be funded. By subsidizing the launch of projects’ token economies, Arbitrum DAO and the supporting community get to share in the upside of the project’s success.
Our recent Season 1 cohort on Polygon has demonstrated the powerful impact of the q/acc model. Selected from over 200 applications (most having no prior plans to launch on Polygon), our first eight projects drove significant ecosystem value:
Official website: https://www.x23.ai/
X23 is automating the future of decentralized organizations by integrating AI tools to streamline the operation and governance of DAOs. Their platform brings together over 50,000 sources of data to provide a comprehensive overview of DAO activities, making governance more efficient and accessible.
Their AI Gov Assistant (available 24/7 via Telegram) has become a vital tool for DAO delegates, providing detailed and accurate answers to specific governance questions within seconds. By applying state-of-the-art machine learning and LLMs, x23 is solving critical information and decision-making challenges in the web3 space.
X23’s participation in q/acc has accelerated their development and provided the tokenomic structure to align their service with the communities they serve. Their token economy now directly benefits from Polygon’s growth.
Official website: https://prismo.technology/
Prismo is a layer-2 hybrid public-private blockchain platform already making significant real-world impact. Their solution addresses a critical need: allowing enterprises and governments to maintain data confidentiality while leveraging blockchain’s transparency benefits.
Even before completing the q/acc program, Prismo had implemented a functioning MVP within the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) of the Philippines, where it’s securing critical budget documents. This real government adoption demonstrates Prismo’s product-market fit and utility.
In December 2024, they launched their gas token $PRSM through q/acc, with a testnet planned for early 2025 and mainnet launch expected by Q2 2025. Prismo exemplifies how q/acc can support projects that bring blockchain solutions to traditional institutions, creating substantial ecosystem value.
Official website: http://www.xade.finance/
Xade Finance, led by 18 yr old whiz kid Harshal Madnani, is building the AI-powered “Robinhood of DeFi” - a decentralized platform that makes sophisticated trading accessible through AI insights and tools. Their platform allows users to easily launch, interact with, and invest in no-code AI agents that can trade, tweet, and leverage over a thousand integrations.
Originally conceived as a “super decentralized bank” providing on-chain banking services through in-house DeFi protocols, Xade has evolved into a powerful gateway for AI-powered trading. Through q/acc, they’ve created a token for the first AI Agent on their platform, Alpha Chad. Holding the $ACHAD token gives you access to the AI trading tools they are developing..
Xade demonstrates how q/acc can help sophisticated DeFi protocols build token economies that drive adoption while creating lasting ecosystem value, while also demonstrating the AI Agent use case.
Official website: https://grandtimeline.org/
The Grand Timeline is creating the first comprehensive, interactive visualization of blockchain and Web3 history. This historical research project has been developed over three years and will result in collectible NFTs and wearables that document the evolution of our industry.
This project exemplifies how q/acc can support public goods that serve the broader ecosystem. By tokenizing this historical archive, The Grand Timeline can sustain ongoing research and documentation while offering collectors ownership in this valuable historical record.
The creator, a product designer named Igor, considers this work a public good born from his fascination with Web3 history. Through q/acc, this labor of love has become a sustainable initiative with its own token economy.
Official website: https://citizenwallet.xyz/
Citizen Wallet is bridging the gap between digital tokens and physical community engagement. Their mobile app and NFC wallet solution empowers communities and events to easily launch, use, and manage community tokens, bringing blockchain utility to everyday situations.
By focusing on accessible tools for real-world adoption, Citizen Wallet exemplifies how q/acc can support projects that extend blockchain’s reach beyond crypto-native audiences. Their token economy now benefits from every new community and event that adopts their platform.
— And that’s just the beginning!
This next cohort is shaping up to be strong as well! We just launched Season 2 for To Da Moon, Web3 Packs, Gridlock & How To DAO. These 4 projects are launching their tokens on Polygon, because of our program, none of them have any requirements to launch on Polygon. If Arbitrum had q/acc, they could have launched here.
q/acc will launch with the following key deliverables:
Our selection process ensures we only support projects with real utility and potential—not speculative tokens:
The q/acc team are masters at driving narrative and mindshare. Our involvement in new ecosystems promotes broader interest and attention among token engineers, DAO operators, capital allocation designers, and crypto-native communities. This attention value is automatically included in new deployments. See:
We request $1.05M in ARB ($1.3M to protect from volatility) to launch q/acc on Arbitrum, allocated as follows:
| Expense Category | Amount | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Initialize Projects ABCs | $500k | Launch up to 10 projects, each getting $50,000 of ARB locked in their ABC (Released to team upon graduation) |
| ABC Bots | $50k | $5000 for each team to bridge liquidity to DEX from ABCs (Released to team upon graduation) |
| Matching Pool | $250k | Used to create protocol-locked liquidity pools (Held in perpetuity by the protocol) |
| Development & Deployment | $170k | Deployment, infrastructure, initial marketing, BD, and partnerships (Overhead, one-time cost) |
| Operations & Scaling | $80k | 10% of the grants given to teams, used to run and operate the q/acc program (Overhead, recurring cost) |
| Volatility Buffer | $250k | Ensures total USD amount is available in ARB when needed (To be returned to the DAO if not impacted by ARB depreciation during the period) |
To measure success, we will track:
:pushpin: Onchain Growth – 10x – Market cap growth (in ARB) compared to ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will produce 10M ARB worth of market caps
:pushpin: ARB Demand Ratio – 25% – Ratio of ARB in protocol vs ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will capture 1.25M worth of ARB in the protocol, creating 250k worth of ARB buying pressure.
:pushpin: Sustained Value – 1 year – Long-term market cap growth (in ARB) of tokens. E.g The 10x growth will last for at least a year.
:pushpin: First-time Arbitrum Users – 500 – Number of q/acc participants new to Arbitrum that buy more than $10 of tokens. E.g 500 users that pass our sybil filter will have never used Arbitrum before.
:pushpin: On-Chain Activity – Varied – Trading volume, user participation, and liquidity metrics. This will be tracked but it is so gameable, it’s not worth creating an exact metric, but we will create a lot of onchain activity.
| Risk | Mitigation Strategy |
|---|---|
| Smart Contract Exploits | Conduct rigorous security audits. |
| User Friction | Create a UX similar to Polymarket |
| Market Volatility | Hold treasury in stables, rebuy ARB right before it is needed |
| Regulatory Uncertainty | Ensure compliance conforms with conservative norms (Geoblocking, low limits without KYC) |
The q/acc model has proven its ability to create sustainable token economies that drive lasting ecosystem value. By implementing q/acc on Arbitrum, we can attract quality projects, increase ARB demand, and position Arbitrum as the premier L2 for token launches.
Our focused 10-project first season allows us to demonstrate value while managing risk, and minimizing overhead due to deployment costs. We have clear metrics to evaluate performance and inform future scaling. We invite Arbitrum DAO to join us in pioneering this next evolution of ecosystem growth.
This is the kind of mechanism Web3 desperately needs. q/acc doesn’t just hand out grants — it engineers aligned incentives , sustainable token economies, and real builder momentum. You’ve taken the flaws of traditional funding models and turned them into a flywheel for innovation, demand, and community ownership.
This is not too bad IMO. Maybe just "Launchpad for Utility Tokens" or token launchpad informally. I'm just trying to avoid builders having to use a dictionary to engage with Arbitrum. And having long names leads people to use acronyms so something short "launchpad" is great.
A serious builder pipeline officially supported by the DAO should never suggest launching a token before an MVP exists.
I agree with this point, proposing to the DAO shouldn't force a vendor to disclose all their internal IP. What I'm trying to clarify is not the itemisation but more what the marketing support offered. Basically, is there a comprehensive marketing coaching program? Given the 80k cost to do everything, I imagine the answer is "no", and that's ok by me. I'm just trying to understand the scope of support: how much is this a token launchpad with an announcement vs an incubation program with significant support. I understand the answer is the former, right?
I think both paths are ok, just trying to understand so we (ArbitrumDAO) know what to expect and can learn from the pilot.
Thanks @griff for the response! We appreciate your transparency around the DAO’s potential token management strategies, especially the suggestion of mirroring the team’s moves of selling or holding. It would be great to clearly document this strategy in the proposal itself before it goes to the Snapshot vote. Doing so will help avoid confusion later on.
we will have to make the graduation have some subjectivity componant, because these onchain metrics are just so gameable.
Thanks @griff for the response! We appreciate your transparency around the DAO’s potential token management strategies, especially the suggestion of mirroring the team’s moves of selling or holding. It would be great to clearly document this strategy in the proposal itself before it goes to the Snapshot vote. Doing so will help avoid confusion later on.
we will have to make the graduation have some subjectivity componant, because these onchain metrics are just so gameable.
As we've previously mentioned, relying solely on financial metrics such as market cap and circulating supply can lead to manipulation, adding more metrics related to liquidity quality, such as monitoring trade slippage, differentiating between organic liquidity and incentivized liquidity, and detecting wash trading, would provide a better picture of genuine project health.
Also, we’re glad to hear about the existing Dune dashboards. Some of the metrics from these dashboards that we can use as an inspiration for our dashboards -
Some of these dashboards offer nice examples of how to display detailed token metrics, including liquidity, token velocity, and user retention.
Thanks for explanations
On finances: A. Why pay projects that have not lost the value of their tokens for the withdrawal of funds to DEX due to the Arbitration?
Thanks for explanations
On finances: A. Why pay projects that have not lost the value of their tokens for the withdrawal of funds to DEX due to the Arbitration?
Sorry for my bad wording, below you already have answered to the question I had in mind
Find someone who will provide a full service token launch solution like we provide for 8k per token
nverter’s Smart Contract system is an incredibly powerful piece of modular infrastructure
It would be great if the team could elaborate on the scope of their work. As far as I understand, you plan to use their product, i.e. you can't understand their labor costs that deeply
We agree with @0xDonPepe’s reflection that this is one of the first proposals to treat sell pressure and grant-farming not as inevitabilities, but as design challenges. That’s a key strength of q/acc, it doesn’t just fund projects, it attempts to create structured alignment between builders, token holders, and the ecosystem at large. The combination of bonding curves, fair-launch rounds, and locked token economies makes this a unique approach to ecosystem funding.
We agree with @0xDonPepe’s reflection that this is one of the first proposals to treat sell pressure and grant-farming not as inevitabilities, but as design challenges. That’s a key strength of q/acc, it doesn’t just fund projects, it attempts to create structured alignment between builders, token holders, and the ecosystem at large. The combination of bonding curves, fair-launch rounds, and locked token economies makes this a unique approach to ecosystem funding.
Thank you! I've been in the web3 grant game as long as anyone and have seen the horrors... we want to do something different.
While it’s good to see the DAO included in the token distribution, we think the proposal would benefit from greater clarity around how the DAO’s token share will be managed. Will it be held passively in a multisig? Will it be delegated, staked, or used to participate in the governance of the supported protocols? A simple policy framework, even if non-binding, could help prevent downstream uncertainty and establish best practices for DAO involvement beyond being a passive recipient of tokens.
Behind the scenes, there is an Arbitrum Treasury Management proposal brewing, we hope to just send the tokens there and let that group make the calls.
My recommendation would be to mirror the team's moves. If they sell, we sell, if they hold we hold. We have the same lock up schedule as they do, so it makes sense and I'm sure an automation could be easily vibecoded by the time the 1 year unlock begins.
That said, market cap and supply metrics can be gameable in short windows, especially with hype-driven liquidity. We’d recommend that we also consider metrics around liquidity quality, such as slippage on mid-size trades, source of LP volume (organic vs incentives), or wash trading detection.
Additionally, introducing softer KPIs around ecosystem contribution, integrations, governance activity, and retention of first-time users could move graduation from just a financial milestone to a broader signal of long-term ecosystem fit.
I think these are nice to have's but IMO most projects shouldn't have to care about our high level goals.They should just focus on making their project a success. The incentive alignment is set such that their success is tied to our success because of the token design bakes it in.
They will care greatly about the ARB price as their token is effectively pegged to it. This bias can't be stronger.
We appreciate the thoughtful structure this proposal brings and the experimentation it enables within Arbitrum’s grant landscape. q/acc stands out by proposing a mechanism-first model that directly addresses recurring inefficiencies in ecosystem funding.
We’re looking forward to seeing this cohort go live and looking at the results as outcomes unfold.
Yes absolutely. We have Dune dashboards for every team and a global dune dashboard for our current deployment viewable here: https://dune.com/discover/content/relevant?q=author:qaccteam&resource-type=dashboards
It covers some of those metrics, but I would LOVE to add the metrics that are missing... do you have any dune dashboards you especially love, that we can review to include even more better metrics?
Guys I’m not saying a token launchpad is a bad idea. We’ve seen plenty of successful projects that began as memecoins or NFTs and evolved into real products post-public sale. Even with the current hype around Virtuals, some innovation might emerge.
Arbitrum needs great launchpads.
Guys I’m not saying a token launchpad is a bad idea. We’ve seen plenty of successful projects that began as memecoins or NFTs and evolved into real products post-public sale. Even with the current hype around Virtuals, some innovation might emerge.
Arbitrum needs great launchpads.
What I am saying: let’s not misrepresent this as a substitute for grant programs or seed funding. Those exist to help teams reach MVP before raising further funds (publicly or privately).
It’s true that it didn’t help with runway, since we don’t receive any direct funding from it. However it did help with growing our community, putting the token into the hands of early supporters, and ensured early backers will be rewarded.
If we’re backing a new launchpad, great. But we should be clear: this is not a magical solution for early-stage builders.
A serious builder pipeline officially supported by the DAO should never suggest launching a token before an MVP exists.
Note: I'm talking about an MVP not product market fit (which is utopic for an early stage crypto project :wink:).
Not every project will benefit from launching a token before PMF, it depends on the project
Saying “anyone who launches a token loses focus” is just not accurate. A clear counterexample is Ethereum. Are you seriously claiming Vitalik’s team lost focus or wasted time navigating regulatory minefields?
I think that’s an anachronistic take—Ethereum launched 12 years ago, in a completely different landscape. And it’s likely not even accurate:
As stated above, we have been talking directly with the AF and they came to the conclusion that its not the right time to pursue this opportunity.
Especially given the changes in the DAO structure with AAEs taking a larger role, we believe it would be prudent to ensure that we are working closely with the AF so we can become part of a cohesive, overarching grant strategy.
As stated above, we have been talking directly with the AF and they came to the conclusion that its not the right time to pursue this opportunity.
Especially given the changes in the DAO structure with AAEs taking a larger role, we believe it would be prudent to ensure that we are working closely with the AF so we can become part of a cohesive, overarching grant strategy.
So we made the tough decision to pause this proposal for now. Once the AF stands up their builder funnel, we see q/acc as a strong second funnel to attract builders that want to launch utility tokens, and bring them to Arbitrum.
Also, over the weekend we finalized the Season 2 Impact report.
The numbers don't lie, q/acc is an incredible mechanism. It's only a matter of time before I can bring her home to Arbitrum :blue_heart:
https://mirror.xyz/qacc.eth/1SXFKQM2Ea81s8BqDy6C4qSk2P-rf2qzdIkmoZbCLyQ
Personally I'm really excited to see q/acc on Arbitrum( I think I've been bringing that up with @Griff multiple times in the past), it's a totally new mechanism and Arbitrum is the right ecosystem to expand it due to it's DEFI principal focus.
Speaking from experience, I've participated in the first and second iterations on Polygon and I enjoyed it, the only general concern I have for this is that certain projects rush to create tokenomic models that are tailored made to be eligible to participated in the program, not based on real economics, not that I'm an expert myself.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Thanks @griff for putting together this well-thought-out proposal. We’re a bit late to the party, as we see, but would still like to add our two cents to the discussion. Apologies in advance if any of the points below echo previous comments from other delegates.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Thanks @griff for putting together this well-thought-out proposal. We’re a bit late to the party, as we see, but would still like to add our two cents to the discussion. Apologies in advance if any of the points below echo previous comments from other delegates.
We agree with @0xDonPepe’s reflection that this is one of the first proposals to treat sell pressure and grant-farming not as inevitabilities, but as design challenges. That’s a key strength of q/acc, it doesn’t just fund projects, it attempts to create structured alignment between builders, token holders, and the ecosystem at large. The combination of bonding curves, fair-launch rounds, and locked token economies makes this a unique approach to ecosystem funding.
90% of the tokens generated, while Arbitrum DAO and q/acc split the other 10% equally. All tokens are locked.
While it’s good to see the DAO included in the token distribution, we think the proposal would benefit from greater clarity around how the DAO’s token share will be managed. Will it be held passively in a multisig? Will it be delegated, staked, or used to participate in the governance of the supported protocols? A simple policy framework, even if non-binding, could help prevent downstream uncertainty and establish best practices for DAO involvement beyond being a passive recipient of tokens.
Selected from over 200 applications (most having no prior plans to launch on Polygon)
On the residency side, we noted that many Polygon participants had no original intent to launch there, which shows the pull of the model. But for Arbitrum, this can be a concern, like, are we becoming a launchpad or a long-term home?
A possible improvement, just thinking off the top of my head, could be to tie some post-graduation benefits, like the release of DAO-held tokens or access to follow-on support, to light ecosystem residency criteria. This could include keeping liquidity or governance active on Arbitrum, integrating with core infrastructure, or maintaining user engagement on the chain. These don’t need to be strict mandates, but they would help ensure the ecosystem gets lasting benefit from its investment.
While going through the comments, we also reviewed the graduation KPIs provided in the response, that a minimum 50% token circulation, $15M market cap, and liquidity thresholds that are clear and valuable.
That said, market cap and supply metrics can be gameable in short windows, especially with hype-driven liquidity. We’d recommend that we also consider metrics around liquidity quality, such as slippage on mid-size trades, source of LP volume (organic vs incentives), or wash trading detection. Additionally, introducing softer KPIs around ecosystem contribution, integrations, governance activity, and retention of first-time users could move graduation from just a financial milestone to a broader signal of long-term ecosystem fit.
On the reporting side, while you’ve mentioned:
If possible, along with the monthly reporting, we can add a public-facing dashboard with live metrics such as ARB demand ratio, liquidity distribution, user conversions, token velocity, etc. This would increase transparency, enable better cross-program coordination, and let everyone monitor progress in real time.
We appreciate the thoughtful structure this proposal brings and the experimentation it enables within Arbitrum’s grant landscape. q/acc stands out by proposing a mechanism-first model that directly addresses recurring inefficiencies in ecosystem funding.
We’re looking forward to seeing this cohort go live and looking at the results as outcomes unfold.
We support this proposal because q/acc directly fixes the misalignment that plagues traditional grant programs: instead of handing builders liquid ARB they can instantly sell, the accelerator locks ARB into bonding-curve liquidity and releases it only when pre-defined KPIs are met. This keeps ARB working on-chain rather than hitting the market and gives the DAO a 5 % stake in every cohort project—so the treasury benefits alongside builders as each token’s market cap grows. The model has already proved its value: on Polygon zkEVM, q/acc’s first season lifted project market caps by roughly 10× compared with the support provided and attracted many first-time users, demonstrating both capital efficiency and ecosystem growth. Those results give us confidence the same structure can match or exceed that success on Arbitrum’s larger network and liquidity.
What is not accurate is your question to chatgpt, the ico itselt its launching a token before the product.
Ill leave it there i dont want to explain what i belive someone is trying to do/build.
This is not too bad IMO. Maybe just "Launchpad for Utility Tokens" or token launchpad informally. I'm just trying to avoid builders having to use a dictionary to engage with Arbitrum. And having long names leads people to use acronyms so something short "launchpad" is great.
A serious builder pipeline officially supported by the DAO should never suggest launching a token before an MVP exists.
I agree with this point, proposing to the DAO shouldn't force a vendor to disclose all their internal IP. What I'm trying to clarify is not the itemisation but more what the marketing support offered. Basically, is there a comprehensive marketing coaching program? Given the 80k cost to do everything, I imagine the answer is "no", and that's ok by me. I'm just trying to understand the scope of support: how much is this a token launchpad with an announcement vs an incubation program with significant support. I understand the answer is the former, right?
I think both paths are ok, just trying to understand so we (ArbitrumDAO) know what to expect and can learn from the pilot.
Thanks @griff for the response! We appreciate your transparency around the DAO’s potential token management strategies, especially the suggestion of mirroring the team’s moves of selling or holding. It would be great to clearly document this strategy in the proposal itself before it goes to the Snapshot vote. Doing so will help avoid confusion later on.
we will have to make the graduation have some subjectivity componant, because these onchain metrics are just so gameable.
Thanks @griff for the response! We appreciate your transparency around the DAO’s potential token management strategies, especially the suggestion of mirroring the team’s moves of selling or holding. It would be great to clearly document this strategy in the proposal itself before it goes to the Snapshot vote. Doing so will help avoid confusion later on.
we will have to make the graduation have some subjectivity componant, because these onchain metrics are just so gameable.
As we've previously mentioned, relying solely on financial metrics such as market cap and circulating supply can lead to manipulation, adding more metrics related to liquidity quality, such as monitoring trade slippage, differentiating between organic liquidity and incentivized liquidity, and detecting wash trading, would provide a better picture of genuine project health.
Also, we’re glad to hear about the existing Dune dashboards. Some of the metrics from these dashboards that we can use as an inspiration for our dashboards -
Some of these dashboards offer nice examples of how to display detailed token metrics, including liquidity, token velocity, and user retention.
Thanks for explanations
On finances: A. Why pay projects that have not lost the value of their tokens for the withdrawal of funds to DEX due to the Arbitration?
Thanks for explanations
On finances: A. Why pay projects that have not lost the value of their tokens for the withdrawal of funds to DEX due to the Arbitration?
Sorry for my bad wording, below you already have answered to the question I had in mind
Find someone who will provide a full service token launch solution like we provide for 8k per token
nverter’s Smart Contract system is an incredibly powerful piece of modular infrastructure
It would be great if the team could elaborate on the scope of their work. As far as I understand, you plan to use their product, i.e. you can't understand their labor costs that deeply
We agree with @0xDonPepe’s reflection that this is one of the first proposals to treat sell pressure and grant-farming not as inevitabilities, but as design challenges. That’s a key strength of q/acc, it doesn’t just fund projects, it attempts to create structured alignment between builders, token holders, and the ecosystem at large. The combination of bonding curves, fair-launch rounds, and locked token economies makes this a unique approach to ecosystem funding.
We agree with @0xDonPepe’s reflection that this is one of the first proposals to treat sell pressure and grant-farming not as inevitabilities, but as design challenges. That’s a key strength of q/acc, it doesn’t just fund projects, it attempts to create structured alignment between builders, token holders, and the ecosystem at large. The combination of bonding curves, fair-launch rounds, and locked token economies makes this a unique approach to ecosystem funding.
Thank you! I've been in the web3 grant game as long as anyone and have seen the horrors... we want to do something different.
While it’s good to see the DAO included in the token distribution, we think the proposal would benefit from greater clarity around how the DAO’s token share will be managed. Will it be held passively in a multisig? Will it be delegated, staked, or used to participate in the governance of the supported protocols? A simple policy framework, even if non-binding, could help prevent downstream uncertainty and establish best practices for DAO involvement beyond being a passive recipient of tokens.
Behind the scenes, there is an Arbitrum Treasury Management proposal brewing, we hope to just send the tokens there and let that group make the calls.
My recommendation would be to mirror the team's moves. If they sell, we sell, if they hold we hold. We have the same lock up schedule as they do, so it makes sense and I'm sure an automation could be easily vibecoded by the time the 1 year unlock begins.
That said, market cap and supply metrics can be gameable in short windows, especially with hype-driven liquidity. We’d recommend that we also consider metrics around liquidity quality, such as slippage on mid-size trades, source of LP volume (organic vs incentives), or wash trading detection.
Additionally, introducing softer KPIs around ecosystem contribution, integrations, governance activity, and retention of first-time users could move graduation from just a financial milestone to a broader signal of long-term ecosystem fit.
I think these are nice to have's but IMO most projects shouldn't have to care about our high level goals.They should just focus on making their project a success. The incentive alignment is set such that their success is tied to our success because of the token design bakes it in.
They will care greatly about the ARB price as their token is effectively pegged to it. This bias can't be stronger.
We appreciate the thoughtful structure this proposal brings and the experimentation it enables within Arbitrum’s grant landscape. q/acc stands out by proposing a mechanism-first model that directly addresses recurring inefficiencies in ecosystem funding.
We’re looking forward to seeing this cohort go live and looking at the results as outcomes unfold.
Yes absolutely. We have Dune dashboards for every team and a global dune dashboard for our current deployment viewable here: https://dune.com/discover/content/relevant?q=author:qaccteam&resource-type=dashboards
It covers some of those metrics, but I would LOVE to add the metrics that are missing... do you have any dune dashboards you especially love, that we can review to include even more better metrics?
Guys I’m not saying a token launchpad is a bad idea. We’ve seen plenty of successful projects that began as memecoins or NFTs and evolved into real products post-public sale. Even with the current hype around Virtuals, some innovation might emerge.
Arbitrum needs great launchpads.
Guys I’m not saying a token launchpad is a bad idea. We’ve seen plenty of successful projects that began as memecoins or NFTs and evolved into real products post-public sale. Even with the current hype around Virtuals, some innovation might emerge.
Arbitrum needs great launchpads.
What I am saying: let’s not misrepresent this as a substitute for grant programs or seed funding. Those exist to help teams reach MVP before raising further funds (publicly or privately).
It’s true that it didn’t help with runway, since we don’t receive any direct funding from it. However it did help with growing our community, putting the token into the hands of early supporters, and ensured early backers will be rewarded.
If we’re backing a new launchpad, great. But we should be clear: this is not a magical solution for early-stage builders.
A serious builder pipeline officially supported by the DAO should never suggest launching a token before an MVP exists.
Note: I'm talking about an MVP not product market fit (which is utopic for an early stage crypto project :wink:).
Not every project will benefit from launching a token before PMF, it depends on the project
Saying “anyone who launches a token loses focus” is just not accurate. A clear counterexample is Ethereum. Are you seriously claiming Vitalik’s team lost focus or wasted time navigating regulatory minefields?
I think that’s an anachronistic take—Ethereum launched 12 years ago, in a completely different landscape. And it’s likely not even accurate:
As stated above, we have been talking directly with the AF and they came to the conclusion that its not the right time to pursue this opportunity.
Especially given the changes in the DAO structure with AAEs taking a larger role, we believe it would be prudent to ensure that we are working closely with the AF so we can become part of a cohesive, overarching grant strategy.
As stated above, we have been talking directly with the AF and they came to the conclusion that its not the right time to pursue this opportunity.
Especially given the changes in the DAO structure with AAEs taking a larger role, we believe it would be prudent to ensure that we are working closely with the AF so we can become part of a cohesive, overarching grant strategy.
So we made the tough decision to pause this proposal for now. Once the AF stands up their builder funnel, we see q/acc as a strong second funnel to attract builders that want to launch utility tokens, and bring them to Arbitrum.
Also, over the weekend we finalized the Season 2 Impact report.
The numbers don't lie, q/acc is an incredible mechanism. It's only a matter of time before I can bring her home to Arbitrum :blue_heart:
https://mirror.xyz/qacc.eth/1SXFKQM2Ea81s8BqDy6C4qSk2P-rf2qzdIkmoZbCLyQ
Personally I'm really excited to see q/acc on Arbitrum( I think I've been bringing that up with @Griff multiple times in the past), it's a totally new mechanism and Arbitrum is the right ecosystem to expand it due to it's DEFI principal focus.
Speaking from experience, I've participated in the first and second iterations on Polygon and I enjoyed it, the only general concern I have for this is that certain projects rush to create tokenomic models that are tailored made to be eligible to participated in the program, not based on real economics, not that I'm an expert myself.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Thanks @griff for putting together this well-thought-out proposal. We’re a bit late to the party, as we see, but would still like to add our two cents to the discussion. Apologies in advance if any of the points below echo previous comments from other delegates.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Thanks @griff for putting together this well-thought-out proposal. We’re a bit late to the party, as we see, but would still like to add our two cents to the discussion. Apologies in advance if any of the points below echo previous comments from other delegates.
We agree with @0xDonPepe’s reflection that this is one of the first proposals to treat sell pressure and grant-farming not as inevitabilities, but as design challenges. That’s a key strength of q/acc, it doesn’t just fund projects, it attempts to create structured alignment between builders, token holders, and the ecosystem at large. The combination of bonding curves, fair-launch rounds, and locked token economies makes this a unique approach to ecosystem funding.
90% of the tokens generated, while Arbitrum DAO and q/acc split the other 10% equally. All tokens are locked.
While it’s good to see the DAO included in the token distribution, we think the proposal would benefit from greater clarity around how the DAO’s token share will be managed. Will it be held passively in a multisig? Will it be delegated, staked, or used to participate in the governance of the supported protocols? A simple policy framework, even if non-binding, could help prevent downstream uncertainty and establish best practices for DAO involvement beyond being a passive recipient of tokens.
Selected from over 200 applications (most having no prior plans to launch on Polygon)
On the residency side, we noted that many Polygon participants had no original intent to launch there, which shows the pull of the model. But for Arbitrum, this can be a concern, like, are we becoming a launchpad or a long-term home?
A possible improvement, just thinking off the top of my head, could be to tie some post-graduation benefits, like the release of DAO-held tokens or access to follow-on support, to light ecosystem residency criteria. This could include keeping liquidity or governance active on Arbitrum, integrating with core infrastructure, or maintaining user engagement on the chain. These don’t need to be strict mandates, but they would help ensure the ecosystem gets lasting benefit from its investment.
While going through the comments, we also reviewed the graduation KPIs provided in the response, that a minimum 50% token circulation, $15M market cap, and liquidity thresholds that are clear and valuable.
That said, market cap and supply metrics can be gameable in short windows, especially with hype-driven liquidity. We’d recommend that we also consider metrics around liquidity quality, such as slippage on mid-size trades, source of LP volume (organic vs incentives), or wash trading detection. Additionally, introducing softer KPIs around ecosystem contribution, integrations, governance activity, and retention of first-time users could move graduation from just a financial milestone to a broader signal of long-term ecosystem fit.
On the reporting side, while you’ve mentioned:
If possible, along with the monthly reporting, we can add a public-facing dashboard with live metrics such as ARB demand ratio, liquidity distribution, user conversions, token velocity, etc. This would increase transparency, enable better cross-program coordination, and let everyone monitor progress in real time.
We appreciate the thoughtful structure this proposal brings and the experimentation it enables within Arbitrum’s grant landscape. q/acc stands out by proposing a mechanism-first model that directly addresses recurring inefficiencies in ecosystem funding.
We’re looking forward to seeing this cohort go live and looking at the results as outcomes unfold.
We support this proposal because q/acc directly fixes the misalignment that plagues traditional grant programs: instead of handing builders liquid ARB they can instantly sell, the accelerator locks ARB into bonding-curve liquidity and releases it only when pre-defined KPIs are met. This keeps ARB working on-chain rather than hitting the market and gives the DAO a 5 % stake in every cohort project—so the treasury benefits alongside builders as each token’s market cap grows. The model has already proved its value: on Polygon zkEVM, q/acc’s first season lifted project market caps by roughly 10× compared with the support provided and attracted many first-time users, demonstrating both capital efficiency and ecosystem growth. Those results give us confidence the same structure can match or exceed that success on Arbitrum’s larger network and liquidity.
What is not accurate is your question to chatgpt, the ico itselt its launching a token before the product.
Ill leave it there i dont want to explain what i belive someone is trying to do/build.
Personally I'm really excited to see q/acc on Arbitrum( I think I've been bringing that up with @Griff multiple times in the past), it's a totally new mechanism and Arbitrum is the right ecosystem to expand it due to it's DEFI principal focus.
Speaking from experience, I've participated in the first and second iterations on Polygon and I enjoyed it, the only general concern I have for this is that certain projects rush to create tokenomic models that are tailored made to be eligible to participated in the program, not based on real economics, not that I'm an expert myself.
Concerns:
-lack of Arbitrum lead marketing/awareness for the program - it should be coupled with a mini marketing campaign led by the foundation to ensure that the program really penetrates the ecosystem. -quality of applications, speaking from personal experience, in any short time frame grant program there is a hidden incentive for the managers to allow certain projects in just to HIT the KPIs and to kickstart the programs - would recommend an adaptable approach here to override this problem.
Avantages:
-it's a novel mechanism that transforms donors and supporters into investors and based on my experience in the ecosystem and the previous QF rounds that were on Arbitrum, I think people will enjoy the investor experience it delivers - which is unique
-it can help flip this metric provided by @Entropy here **~32% of the DAO proposals were **
grants related, let's get more investments in Arb!
-it's a fair launch coupled with QF which is a big deal because it aligns the interests of the projects and the Arbitrum community better than traditional grant programs. The ideal end result is a healthier, more sustainable ecosystem where token distribution is transparent, fair, and encourages long-term participation.
-due to the q/acc teams marketing know-how and connections it can bring new users/teams to Arbitrum.
I would be voting FOR the proposal because I believe the benefits of the experimental Builders Ignite program outweigh the benefits. Hopefully the Q/ACC can become a long term program so it can reiterate based on the learnings and feedback from the delegate/teams after each cycle. A good metric for success imo would be if we would score over Polygons Season 1.
Full disclosure: I have not read any other delegate comments because it's a topic I'm passionate about, apologize if some of the feedback has already been provided.
Now imagine doing that before you’ve even built the product, and for only a small amount. It’s a recipe for disaster.
This setup suits memecoins and hype cycles. Arbitrum should aim higher.
This is just too general of a statement. Not every project will benefit from launching a token before PMF, it depends on the project. There are a lot of instances where the token is integral to the project (e.g. the gas token for an Orbit chain, but also many other instances) and needs to be launched for the product to work, or there is a strategic benefit to building incentivized community early, or several other circumstances.
Those are the projects we accept into the program, they must have clear token utility, and for those projects, we have a perfect fit, because they can focus on the product, and we help them with the token launch. Once their token is launched people can buy in with great liquidity despite the low market cap, and there is reduced volatility due to the bonding curve.
Jump to 2:19 in this video and hear what one of our builders has to say about working with us: https://x.com/Nofuturephoto/status/1918297827425271885
Also, check out her project, it's really cool! https://todamoon.live/
We will absolutely coordinate with Lino and AVI. The scope though is very different. This is more of a narrowly scoped support program that helps builders tokenize on Arbitrum. The upside in the projects is less of a focus. I don't think the AVI is actively investing right now in anything.
Advantages:
LBP and MISO are launch tools projects can use in isolation. q/acc is an Arbitrum-native accelerator that makes it a community event and creates a cohort of builders that can share learnings with each other.
The big trade off for teams, is that they have to peg their token price to ARB, but they are willing to do this for the sponsored token launch.
We are more of a full-service token launch support program for builders... not just a tool.
And of course the token design we have is based on bonding curves, not LPs, which creates a much safer environment for retail... the token cannot go to zero. And with our standardized lock up schedule, the community has 2 types of fair launches to participate in:
3. For how long will such a pool be created, and will there be a limit for the project initial release on other projects?
I might not fully grok this question, but I think you are asking: How long will the project's ABC and LPs be on the platform.
Their liquidity is controlled by the protocol, but will be released to them when their token hits market cap, circulating supply and liquidity KPIs which make the ranged liquidity we provide for bootstrapping not useful for their token economy.
B. Why are we spending 17% of funding on Development & Deployment. This is too much expense. In addition, if this principle has already been implemented for several projects, then the code base has already been developed, what will this money be spent on - $ 170,000?
C. What are the overhead costs? What is needed for as much as 80,000 odllars?
D. Why were the amounts of $ 50,000 chosen for the project. What should the project be assessed at, that it only needs $ 50,000 for liquidity?
A. I don't understand this question.
B. Inverter's Smart Contract system is an incredibly powerful piece of modular infrastructure. They spent years building it and the Audits were not cheap! This is how the upfront cost get's recouped. They charge to have it deployed to chains. Also, they made a custom set up for us on top of it all, and this is part of the deal. We can nickel and dime it down, but this a common business model for building smart contract infra.
C. We will help 10 teams launch 10 tokens... Find someone who will provide a full service token launch solution like we provide for 8k per token. That's an incredible deal. And it's set at 10% of the capital allocated, which is very reasonable for grant programs.
D. We are using a 12.5% Reserve Ratio which is a little low, but not unreasonable from a token engineering point of view, and at 50k, this sets the teams starting token market cap at $400,000. This is attractive enough to the community of buyers, low but not too low for the builders and $50k locked up in ARB is only about twice the average questbook grant... and this grant creates ARB demand instead of ARB inflation so we think it's reasonable for Arbitrum. So $50k just hits that sweet spot.
Now imagine doing that before you’ve even built the product, and for only a small amount. It’s a recipe for disaster.
Saying “anyone who launches a token loses focus” is just not accurate. A clear counterexample is Ethereum. Are you seriously claiming Vitalik's team lost focus or wasted time navigating regulatory minefields?
There are many successful projects that launched tokens early and are clear winners today. You should really do some research before making such broad, misleading claims. Let's stay rational and base our arguments on evidence.
Don’t let your thinking be guided by failure stories, better to be inspired by successful ones. Then be analytical: what made them work? How do we apply that here to ensure Arbitrum success?
That’s the mindset we need.
We support this proposal because q/acc directly fixes the misalignment that plagues traditional grant programs: instead of handing builders liquid ARB they can instantly sell, the accelerator locks ARB into bonding-curve liquidity and releases it only when pre-defined KPIs are met. This keeps ARB working on-chain rather than hitting the market and gives the DAO a 5 % stake in every cohort project—so the treasury benefits alongside builders as each token’s market cap grows. The model has already proved its value: on Polygon zkEVM, q/acc’s first season lifted project market caps by roughly 10× compared with the support provided and attracted many first-time users, demonstrating both capital efficiency and ecosystem growth. Those results give us confidence the same structure can match or exceed that success on Arbitrum’s larger network and liquidity.
We support this proposal because q/acc directly fixes the misalignment that plagues traditional grant programs: instead of handing builders liquid ARB they can instantly sell, the accelerator locks ARB into bonding-curve liquidity and releases it only when pre-defined KPIs are met. This keeps ARB working on-chain rather than hitting the market and gives the DAO a 5 % stake in every cohort project—so the treasury benefits alongside builders as each token’s market cap grows. The model has already proved its value: on Polygon zkEVM, q/acc’s first season lifted project market caps by roughly 10× compared with the support provided and attracted many first-time users, demonstrating both capital efficiency and ecosystem growth. Those results give us confidence the same structure can match or exceed that success on Arbitrum’s larger network and liquidity.
Thank you for the support!
Thank you for putting this up, @Griff.
We’ve reviewed the proposal and appreciate the intention and vision behind it. The early outcomes from Season 1 at Polygon look promising, and the featured projects reflect thoughtful curation.
Thank you for putting this up, @Griff.
We’ve reviewed the proposal and appreciate the intention and vision behind it. The early outcomes from Season 1 at Polygon look promising, and the featured projects reflect thoughtful curation.
That said, as we consider bringing this initiative to Arbitrum, there are several key concerns we’d like to highlight, particularly around operational structure and the timeline.
Assign a DAO-experienced Program Manager (PM) with greater involvement and oversight of DA processes
We strongly agree with the ARDC’s recommendation for DAO grant programs to include a dedicated, DAO-appointed Program Manager. The q/acc team is designed as an accelerator, but this role is currently missing from the structure.
This gap becomes especially relevant given how Polygon-centric the current q/acc material is, particularly the Protocol Knowledge Hub, where Polygon and its builder ecosystem are mentioned severally. For a program stewarded by the Arbitrum DAO, we must ensure:
Continuous alignment with Arbitrum’s unique ecosystem and builder base.
Robust feedback loops between the DAO, the program team, and participating projects.
Transparent communication that extends beyond the SOS objectives.
Community participation via quadratic funding is valuable, but it's not sufficient as a substitute for proper DAO oversight and stewardship.
Multisig DAO Oversight – q/acc operations will be managed transparently via an AAE, likely the foundation.
Involving the Foundation in a multisig is a good step, but if they would eventually serve as the dedicated Program Manager, this needs to be clearly stated and their scope of responsibilities must be fully fleshed out.
Without this, the current oversight structure appears too passive for a program of this magnitude, particularly given its ambitions and funding request.
The Detox proposal happened because the DAO spent a lot of money, saw little ROI, and thus needed some time to properly analyze all of these efforts to come up with a better structure for grants.
From the timing of the S1 impact report release, we can say the cohort likely wrapped up around late March or early April. Six weeks is not ample time for analysis of the results, especially after stating this as a KPI:
:pushpin: Sustained Value – 1 year – Long-term market cap growth (in ARB) of tokens. E.g The 10x growth will last for at least a year.
What happens after the one year?
There’s no clear plan for what happens after the one-year mark or how teams are expected to continue delivering after vesting ends.
We recommend this proposal be pushed back by at least six months (September 2025), to:
Allow for proper analysis of the Season 1 cohort’s outcomes and sustainability.
Ensure alignment with the final outcomes of SOS.
Give room to design a more robust oversight structure with DAO-integrated governance roles.
This time buffer would enable more informed decision-making and better community alignment.
Thanks again for putting forward this proposal. We see the potential here, but believe a slightly more cautious and structured approach will yield significantly better results for the Arbitrum DAO.
Apologies, I wasn’t clear on my perspective.
Did the Ethereum Foundation lose time and resources due to legal issues? Yes. Did it limit how they could act and communicate publicly? Yes. Were they smart enough to raise some funds before going public? Yes. Did they succeed anyway? Yes.
Apologies, I wasn’t clear on my perspective.
Did the Ethereum Foundation lose time and resources due to legal issues? Yes. Did it limit how they could act and communicate publicly? Yes. Were they smart enough to raise some funds before going public? Yes. Did they succeed anyway? Yes.
So: Should a team delay launching a token as much as possible? Yes. Should they explore every other funding route first, especially if they’re pre-product? Absolutely.
That said, we're clearly in a different regulatory landscape. if a team chooses to launch a token and doesn't need to raise funds directly, then yes, this becomes a valid option worth considering and I am happy it's launching also on Arbitrum.
I also care about this funding point Sorry, but I still don't see that kind of cost in development. Let's say we have a team of programmers, where the lead high-level gets $10k and 3 regular programmers get $3k. Are they really going to implement this in 9 months? It's very expensive and time-consuming
Wow! Thanks for the kind words @GozmanGonzalez !
I don’t understand the operations & Sacaling, is that given to the projects “given to teams” or is that basically the program manager’s fee (including overhead)?
I don’t understand the operations & Sacaling, is that given to the projects “given to teams” or is that basically the program manager’s fee (including overhead)?
Basically, i would suggest redoing the budget before a vote and include:
We have several external contractors that we work with, most notably Inverter Network, and out of professional curtesy, we can't itemize every cost publicly. So we broke it down along the lines of what is a one-time, setup cost, and what is an on going recurring cost for the program. We intend on running this program for multiple seasons, and have a 10% overhead on the program, but the set up is not free. I can go deeper into what those different bucket include, but because of external agreements, I can't itemize them to the detail you are asking, and I think it makes more sense to itemize it based off what is a one time setup cost and what will be the cost that is repeated every season
$800k goes to creating liquidity for the teams in various ways, as outlined in the three buckets: Initialize Projects ABCs, ABC Bots & Matching Pool.
$170k is a one-time setup cost. The bulk of the setup cost is deploying the Inverter Network infra to Arbitrum which is a powerful piece of infra that can be used by projects in the ecosystem besides q/acc. It has a lot of cool modules, to allow for very complex token design, and no-code economic management. It's similar to Aragon. The rest of the cost in this bucket is just the general work to initiate the project on Arbitrum from a program perspective. We are going to build a completely new front-end, so it looks less like Giveth and more like an exchange where you buy small-cap tokens. We will also need to do Arbitrum specific partnerships and BD/Marketing work to kick start the program here.
$80k is the program execution cost. This will be a recurring cost every season. It is just 10% of what is given to the teams, and it covers collecting and reviewing applications to choose the teams; the 8-week program to get the teams prepared for their token launch, supporting the teams in marketing their token launch; the deployment of each team's token, and development improvements and maintenance of the software. Deploying 10 tokens for 10 different teams for $80k is an audaciously good deal, that is made possible by the Inverter infra and setup costs. The more seasons we have the better this deal gets.
$250k is just extra ARB to make sure that everything can be converted to stables so we get the right amounts of funds for everything to work. We really can't manage the volitility risk appropriately without this... I am hopeful the DAO has a solution in place before my proposal passes so that we never have to hold this extra ARB and we just get all our funds in Stables... which we will use to buy ARB at the right moment :-D
I am talking about this with the AF a this week, I think a more global solution is in the works.
3. Final point, I’d appreciate some mapping of the next step of the journey after q/acc based on the amounts these projects have raised. Will they go to raise a seed round and then list in CEXs? Will they…? at least some rough idea of what makes sense as next steps.
This is an impossible question to answer, as each team is totally different. The only similarity that all of the teams have is to grow their user base.
Some teams that we launched with had already had a seed round, so they set their team lockups for their investors once it is minted and locked. Other teams can go and sell equity and their token lock ups, later. Some teams aren't looking for investment and are looking to be crowdfunded, then they will build revenue/utility into their product and hope to get big enough to get to graduation, where the ARB in the bonding curve is released and they can use that to fund their operations.
It really depends on the team, we just help them tokenize, they have the freedom to do what it takes to make their start up a success.
4. the name is horrible. Can we call it “Arbitrum Token Launchpad pilot”? or something that’s not more self-referntial web3 mental mast…? We really need to move into more user friendly language :slight_smile:
HAHAHAHA You mean q/acc? We will absolutely make the new platform we are building extremely accessible for a variety of token buyers, and you are absolutely right we need to do a better job at saying how all this works w/o the web3 jargon.
But q/acc (Quadratic Accelerator) is the name of the game. We can name the Arbitrum program something basic though if we want, for listing out Arbitrum opportunities, like Launchpad for Liquid Utility Tokens... I slept on it and nothing better came up... will keep thinking about it.
Thx for the vote of confidence!!
Thx for the vote of confidence!!
In general we tend to focus on the token KPIs. They are easier and more fair to measure.
Are there any legal challenges to this? If yes how do you plan to address these?
Are there any legal challenges to this? If yes how do you plan to address these?
Launching tokens is legally challenging of course. From our side, we have 2 legal entities one that accepts the grant from Arbitrum and distributes the grants to the teams, and then one that supports the team and their token economy. In our terms and smart contracts, the project launches their own token and supporting contracts. We advise them to use a one time-use EOA to do this and load it with ETH from a mixer to avoid anyone having weird personal liability.
We are mitigating the legal issues for the teams as much as possible, first by selecting teams that are legit & have a clear utility for their token, and also we give their token utility right away with a token gated chat. We have a partnership with MIDAO to set teams up with a legal solution for their token if they don't have one.
Prismo has a partnership with (DBM) of the Philippines and just has a working MVP how to do you deem this as pmf? The project is supposed to launch it’s mainnet in Q2.
True, I am probably overstating the PMF. They have validated market demand from governments... but that is different.
The success of these project also depends on how they plan to utilise the 90% tokenomics if they won’t utilise it efficiently it is most likely going to fail.
We are not a silver bullet for a project of course, but our set up gives builders a great chance to succeed and gives the community ample opportunities to get in to their token early and safely.
We are not designed to be a gambling machine like pump fun, so we miss out on a lot of the gambling volume, and we aren't running bots to fake anything.
Our suggestion would be make this program more suitable for Arbitrum Native Projects since we have wider ecosystem than Polygon. Preference for Arbitrum native or Arbitrum aligned projects those from STIP, LTIPP, or other DAO efforts.
100% agree.
We strongly agree with the ARDC’s recommendation for DAO grant programs to include a dedicated, DAO-appointed Program Manager. The q/acc team is designed as an accelerator, but this role is currently missing from the structure.
We strongly agree with the ARDC’s recommendation for DAO grant programs to include a dedicated, DAO-appointed Program Manager. The q/acc team is designed as an accelerator, but this role is currently missing from the structure.
We can definitely do this if we win the bid. We can ensure we have a dedicated program manager focusing on Arbitrum, and no other chains.
A lot of things are shifting in Arbitrum DAO's structure right now, I am following along as a delegate and we will ensure an AAE has proper oversight over our program. But exactly how that all plays out is ambiguous because the rules are still be written... not by us, but by the DAO. This is a timing issue. A lot of things will become more clear, such as Arbitrum treasury management and oversight, and by the time this proposal goes to snapshot, it will clear these things up.
There’s no clear plan for what happens after the one-year mark or how teams are expected to continue delivering after vesting ends.
Teams will deliver value in a variety of ways, after one year they will have built their project on Arbitrum, brought their community there, and effectively pegged their token to ARB. Those things don't change after the 1 year mark.
The biggest difference between this model and other grant systems is we don't have to have a plan and over engineer things to get teams to continue to deliver value. We have aligned incentives. Their stream starts to unlock after 1 year, but its streams over another year. It's not likes they can just dump at the 1 year mark. They still need to drive value to their token.
The teams have major upside in their own success, and their upside is aligned with Arbitrum's success, as the token's price rise mechanically locks up ARB (and the DAO owns a lot of the token).
It won't make sense for them to jump from chain to chain, they are locked into Arbitrum from every angle, the incentives are clearly there for them to commit fully to our ecosystem from the start, and lock-in for the long haul.
Thank you for the offer, I like the principle of the ABC model itself, but there are many questions:
This, this, and this.
At present, q/acc reads more like a launchpad with some added support layers. To maximize its impact, we suggest exploring stronger collaboration with other grant domains (e.g., Domain Allocator Offering) to ensure that technical and pre-token projects also receive the resources they need. This could create a more holistic pipeline from early R&D through to tokenization while keeping Arbitrum attractive to a broader range of builders.
Michigan Blockchain believes that the Quadratic Accelerator shows tremendous promise in growing Arbitrum and creating self-sustaining token economies built on the chain. DeFi is all about finding innovative ways to reimagine finance, and the traditional method of picking projects and allocating capital proves to be difficult when currencies are subject to price volatility. The q/acc addresses this problem by locking up ARB, minting tokens in accordance with supply and demand.
We are curious as to how the DAO will standardize success criteria across different projects? Will success criteria be based on tokenomics (price stability, trading volume, supply, etc.) or project-specific KPIs (user adoption, growth, cross-chain compatibility, etc.)? And will these benchmarks be determined per project, vertical, or uniform across all projects?
I’m not convinced that strong teams would choose to launch tokens through q/acc.
The twelve teams that have launched on q/acc so far can be found here: https://q-acc.giveth.io/projects
Appreciate the energy and thinking behind this proposal. I like how you try to tackle genuine issues with traditional grant programs – especially around mitigating token sell pressure and providing the DAO with direct upside.
However, I’m not convinced that strong teams would choose to launch tokens through q/acc. Giving up 10% of total token supply in exchange for ~$50k in ARB (which is locked and not immediately usable) seems like a poor trade. This setup doesn't offer a meaningful runway, pushing teams to prioritize token hype over genuine product development – a distraction from achieving PMF. And at that point, teams might as well use permissionless launchpads or other, less dilutive options instead.
Appreciate the energy and thinking behind this proposal. I like how you try to tackle genuine issues with traditional grant programs – especially around mitigating token sell pressure and providing the DAO with direct upside.
However, I’m not convinced that strong teams would choose to launch tokens through q/acc. Giving up 10% of total token supply in exchange for ~$50k in ARB (which is locked and not immediately usable) seems like a poor trade. This setup doesn't offer a meaningful runway, pushing teams to prioritize token hype over genuine product development – a distraction from achieving PMF. And at that point, teams might as well use permissionless launchpads or other, less dilutive options instead.
It’d be helpful to clarify exactly what kind of teams q/acc is targeting. Later-stage projects with established PMF likely won’t accept the dilution and complexity, while high-quality early-stage projects will typically prefer to delay token launches until after achieving PMF. In my experience as an investor, most token launches are successful only after clear PMF is achieved, making the proposition here difficult for both builders and investors to justify.
While some q/acc projects (like those from Polygon Season-1) might see short-term activity, I’m skeptical they'll sustain meaningful long-term value, which makes me think that there are better ways to spend the treasury’s ARB. I'd be more supportive of pursuing a more traditional venture investing approach (similar to what the GCP is currently doing) than adapting token launch mechanics into a grants framework.
Below is a comprehensive analysis of the proposal and the community’s reasoning, along with a simulated expert debate, recommendations for improvements, and novel enhancements suggested by the agent swarm.
Below is a v1 pre-vote feedback report from the Event Horizon community and agents (note: these perspectives are subject to change with the inclusion of continued forum discussion):
Below is a comprehensive analysis of the proposal and the community’s reasoning, along with a simulated expert debate, recommendations for improvements, and novel enhancements suggested by the swarm.
I'm generally supportive of this proposal as mentioned in a 1-1 conversation
It provides an interesting next step in the builder support pipeline after the sort of programs that we're running with RnDAO.
4 requests for improvement of the proposal
Personally I'm really excited to see q/acc on Arbitrum( I think I've been bringing that up with @Griff multiple times in the past), it's a totally new mechanism and Arbitrum is the right ecosystem to expand it due to it's DEFI principal focus.
Speaking from experience, I've participated in the first and second iterations on Polygon and I enjoyed it, the only general concern I have for this is that certain projects rush to create tokenomic models that are tailored made to be eligible to participated in the program, not based on real economics, not that I'm an expert myself.
Concerns:
-lack of Arbitrum lead marketing/awareness for the program - it should be coupled with a mini marketing campaign led by the foundation to ensure that the program really penetrates the ecosystem. -quality of applications, speaking from personal experience, in any short time frame grant program there is a hidden incentive for the managers to allow certain projects in just to HIT the KPIs and to kickstart the programs - would recommend an adaptable approach here to override this problem.
Avantages:
-it's a novel mechanism that transforms donors and supporters into investors and based on my experience in the ecosystem and the previous QF rounds that were on Arbitrum, I think people will enjoy the investor experience it delivers - which is unique
-it can help flip this metric provided by @Entropy here **~32% of the DAO proposals were **
grants related, let's get more investments in Arb!
-it's a fair launch coupled with QF which is a big deal because it aligns the interests of the projects and the Arbitrum community better than traditional grant programs. The ideal end result is a healthier, more sustainable ecosystem where token distribution is transparent, fair, and encourages long-term participation.
-due to the q/acc teams marketing know-how and connections it can bring new users/teams to Arbitrum.
I would be voting FOR the proposal because I believe the benefits of the experimental Builders Ignite program outweigh the benefits. Hopefully the Q/ACC can become a long term program so it can reiterate based on the learnings and feedback from the delegate/teams after each cycle. A good metric for success imo would be if we would score over Polygons Season 1.
Full disclosure: I have not read any other delegate comments because it's a topic I'm passionate about, apologize if some of the feedback has already been provided.
Now imagine doing that before you’ve even built the product, and for only a small amount. It’s a recipe for disaster.
This setup suits memecoins and hype cycles. Arbitrum should aim higher.
This is just too general of a statement. Not every project will benefit from launching a token before PMF, it depends on the project. There are a lot of instances where the token is integral to the project (e.g. the gas token for an Orbit chain, but also many other instances) and needs to be launched for the product to work, or there is a strategic benefit to building incentivized community early, or several other circumstances.
Those are the projects we accept into the program, they must have clear token utility, and for those projects, we have a perfect fit, because they can focus on the product, and we help them with the token launch. Once their token is launched people can buy in with great liquidity despite the low market cap, and there is reduced volatility due to the bonding curve.
Jump to 2:19 in this video and hear what one of our builders has to say about working with us: https://x.com/Nofuturephoto/status/1918297827425271885
Also, check out her project, it's really cool! https://todamoon.live/
We will absolutely coordinate with Lino and AVI. The scope though is very different. This is more of a narrowly scoped support program that helps builders tokenize on Arbitrum. The upside in the projects is less of a focus. I don't think the AVI is actively investing right now in anything.
Advantages:
LBP and MISO are launch tools projects can use in isolation. q/acc is an Arbitrum-native accelerator that makes it a community event and creates a cohort of builders that can share learnings with each other.
The big trade off for teams, is that they have to peg their token price to ARB, but they are willing to do this for the sponsored token launch.
We are more of a full-service token launch support program for builders... not just a tool.
And of course the token design we have is based on bonding curves, not LPs, which creates a much safer environment for retail... the token cannot go to zero. And with our standardized lock up schedule, the community has 2 types of fair launches to participate in:
3. For how long will such a pool be created, and will there be a limit for the project initial release on other projects?
I might not fully grok this question, but I think you are asking: How long will the project's ABC and LPs be on the platform.
Their liquidity is controlled by the protocol, but will be released to them when their token hits market cap, circulating supply and liquidity KPIs which make the ranged liquidity we provide for bootstrapping not useful for their token economy.
B. Why are we spending 17% of funding on Development & Deployment. This is too much expense. In addition, if this principle has already been implemented for several projects, then the code base has already been developed, what will this money be spent on - $ 170,000?
C. What are the overhead costs? What is needed for as much as 80,000 odllars?
D. Why were the amounts of $ 50,000 chosen for the project. What should the project be assessed at, that it only needs $ 50,000 for liquidity?
A. I don't understand this question.
B. Inverter's Smart Contract system is an incredibly powerful piece of modular infrastructure. They spent years building it and the Audits were not cheap! This is how the upfront cost get's recouped. They charge to have it deployed to chains. Also, they made a custom set up for us on top of it all, and this is part of the deal. We can nickel and dime it down, but this a common business model for building smart contract infra.
C. We will help 10 teams launch 10 tokens... Find someone who will provide a full service token launch solution like we provide for 8k per token. That's an incredible deal. And it's set at 10% of the capital allocated, which is very reasonable for grant programs.
D. We are using a 12.5% Reserve Ratio which is a little low, but not unreasonable from a token engineering point of view, and at 50k, this sets the teams starting token market cap at $400,000. This is attractive enough to the community of buyers, low but not too low for the builders and $50k locked up in ARB is only about twice the average questbook grant... and this grant creates ARB demand instead of ARB inflation so we think it's reasonable for Arbitrum. So $50k just hits that sweet spot.
Now imagine doing that before you’ve even built the product, and for only a small amount. It’s a recipe for disaster.
Saying “anyone who launches a token loses focus” is just not accurate. A clear counterexample is Ethereum. Are you seriously claiming Vitalik's team lost focus or wasted time navigating regulatory minefields?
There are many successful projects that launched tokens early and are clear winners today. You should really do some research before making such broad, misleading claims. Let's stay rational and base our arguments on evidence.
Don’t let your thinking be guided by failure stories, better to be inspired by successful ones. Then be analytical: what made them work? How do we apply that here to ensure Arbitrum success?
That’s the mindset we need.
We support this proposal because q/acc directly fixes the misalignment that plagues traditional grant programs: instead of handing builders liquid ARB they can instantly sell, the accelerator locks ARB into bonding-curve liquidity and releases it only when pre-defined KPIs are met. This keeps ARB working on-chain rather than hitting the market and gives the DAO a 5 % stake in every cohort project—so the treasury benefits alongside builders as each token’s market cap grows. The model has already proved its value: on Polygon zkEVM, q/acc’s first season lifted project market caps by roughly 10× compared with the support provided and attracted many first-time users, demonstrating both capital efficiency and ecosystem growth. Those results give us confidence the same structure can match or exceed that success on Arbitrum’s larger network and liquidity.
We support this proposal because q/acc directly fixes the misalignment that plagues traditional grant programs: instead of handing builders liquid ARB they can instantly sell, the accelerator locks ARB into bonding-curve liquidity and releases it only when pre-defined KPIs are met. This keeps ARB working on-chain rather than hitting the market and gives the DAO a 5 % stake in every cohort project—so the treasury benefits alongside builders as each token’s market cap grows. The model has already proved its value: on Polygon zkEVM, q/acc’s first season lifted project market caps by roughly 10× compared with the support provided and attracted many first-time users, demonstrating both capital efficiency and ecosystem growth. Those results give us confidence the same structure can match or exceed that success on Arbitrum’s larger network and liquidity.
Thank you for the support!
Thank you for putting this up, @Griff.
We’ve reviewed the proposal and appreciate the intention and vision behind it. The early outcomes from Season 1 at Polygon look promising, and the featured projects reflect thoughtful curation.
Thank you for putting this up, @Griff.
We’ve reviewed the proposal and appreciate the intention and vision behind it. The early outcomes from Season 1 at Polygon look promising, and the featured projects reflect thoughtful curation.
That said, as we consider bringing this initiative to Arbitrum, there are several key concerns we’d like to highlight, particularly around operational structure and the timeline.
Assign a DAO-experienced Program Manager (PM) with greater involvement and oversight of DA processes
We strongly agree with the ARDC’s recommendation for DAO grant programs to include a dedicated, DAO-appointed Program Manager. The q/acc team is designed as an accelerator, but this role is currently missing from the structure.
This gap becomes especially relevant given how Polygon-centric the current q/acc material is, particularly the Protocol Knowledge Hub, where Polygon and its builder ecosystem are mentioned severally. For a program stewarded by the Arbitrum DAO, we must ensure:
Continuous alignment with Arbitrum’s unique ecosystem and builder base.
Robust feedback loops between the DAO, the program team, and participating projects.
Transparent communication that extends beyond the SOS objectives.
Community participation via quadratic funding is valuable, but it's not sufficient as a substitute for proper DAO oversight and stewardship.
Multisig DAO Oversight – q/acc operations will be managed transparently via an AAE, likely the foundation.
Involving the Foundation in a multisig is a good step, but if they would eventually serve as the dedicated Program Manager, this needs to be clearly stated and their scope of responsibilities must be fully fleshed out.
Without this, the current oversight structure appears too passive for a program of this magnitude, particularly given its ambitions and funding request.
The Detox proposal happened because the DAO spent a lot of money, saw little ROI, and thus needed some time to properly analyze all of these efforts to come up with a better structure for grants.
From the timing of the S1 impact report release, we can say the cohort likely wrapped up around late March or early April. Six weeks is not ample time for analysis of the results, especially after stating this as a KPI:
:pushpin: Sustained Value – 1 year – Long-term market cap growth (in ARB) of tokens. E.g The 10x growth will last for at least a year.
What happens after the one year?
There’s no clear plan for what happens after the one-year mark or how teams are expected to continue delivering after vesting ends.
We recommend this proposal be pushed back by at least six months (September 2025), to:
Allow for proper analysis of the Season 1 cohort’s outcomes and sustainability.
Ensure alignment with the final outcomes of SOS.
Give room to design a more robust oversight structure with DAO-integrated governance roles.
This time buffer would enable more informed decision-making and better community alignment.
Thanks again for putting forward this proposal. We see the potential here, but believe a slightly more cautious and structured approach will yield significantly better results for the Arbitrum DAO.
Apologies, I wasn’t clear on my perspective.
Did the Ethereum Foundation lose time and resources due to legal issues? Yes. Did it limit how they could act and communicate publicly? Yes. Were they smart enough to raise some funds before going public? Yes. Did they succeed anyway? Yes.
Apologies, I wasn’t clear on my perspective.
Did the Ethereum Foundation lose time and resources due to legal issues? Yes. Did it limit how they could act and communicate publicly? Yes. Were they smart enough to raise some funds before going public? Yes. Did they succeed anyway? Yes.
So: Should a team delay launching a token as much as possible? Yes. Should they explore every other funding route first, especially if they’re pre-product? Absolutely.
That said, we're clearly in a different regulatory landscape. if a team chooses to launch a token and doesn't need to raise funds directly, then yes, this becomes a valid option worth considering and I am happy it's launching also on Arbitrum.
I also care about this funding point Sorry, but I still don't see that kind of cost in development. Let's say we have a team of programmers, where the lead high-level gets $10k and 3 regular programmers get $3k. Are they really going to implement this in 9 months? It's very expensive and time-consuming
Wow! Thanks for the kind words @GozmanGonzalez !
I don’t understand the operations & Sacaling, is that given to the projects “given to teams” or is that basically the program manager’s fee (including overhead)?
I don’t understand the operations & Sacaling, is that given to the projects “given to teams” or is that basically the program manager’s fee (including overhead)?
Basically, i would suggest redoing the budget before a vote and include:
We have several external contractors that we work with, most notably Inverter Network, and out of professional curtesy, we can't itemize every cost publicly. So we broke it down along the lines of what is a one-time, setup cost, and what is an on going recurring cost for the program. We intend on running this program for multiple seasons, and have a 10% overhead on the program, but the set up is not free. I can go deeper into what those different bucket include, but because of external agreements, I can't itemize them to the detail you are asking, and I think it makes more sense to itemize it based off what is a one time setup cost and what will be the cost that is repeated every season
$800k goes to creating liquidity for the teams in various ways, as outlined in the three buckets: Initialize Projects ABCs, ABC Bots & Matching Pool.
$170k is a one-time setup cost. The bulk of the setup cost is deploying the Inverter Network infra to Arbitrum which is a powerful piece of infra that can be used by projects in the ecosystem besides q/acc. It has a lot of cool modules, to allow for very complex token design, and no-code economic management. It's similar to Aragon. The rest of the cost in this bucket is just the general work to initiate the project on Arbitrum from a program perspective. We are going to build a completely new front-end, so it looks less like Giveth and more like an exchange where you buy small-cap tokens. We will also need to do Arbitrum specific partnerships and BD/Marketing work to kick start the program here.
$80k is the program execution cost. This will be a recurring cost every season. It is just 10% of what is given to the teams, and it covers collecting and reviewing applications to choose the teams; the 8-week program to get the teams prepared for their token launch, supporting the teams in marketing their token launch; the deployment of each team's token, and development improvements and maintenance of the software. Deploying 10 tokens for 10 different teams for $80k is an audaciously good deal, that is made possible by the Inverter infra and setup costs. The more seasons we have the better this deal gets.
$250k is just extra ARB to make sure that everything can be converted to stables so we get the right amounts of funds for everything to work. We really can't manage the volitility risk appropriately without this... I am hopeful the DAO has a solution in place before my proposal passes so that we never have to hold this extra ARB and we just get all our funds in Stables... which we will use to buy ARB at the right moment :-D
I am talking about this with the AF a this week, I think a more global solution is in the works.
3. Final point, I’d appreciate some mapping of the next step of the journey after q/acc based on the amounts these projects have raised. Will they go to raise a seed round and then list in CEXs? Will they…? at least some rough idea of what makes sense as next steps.
This is an impossible question to answer, as each team is totally different. The only similarity that all of the teams have is to grow their user base.
Some teams that we launched with had already had a seed round, so they set their team lockups for their investors once it is minted and locked. Other teams can go and sell equity and their token lock ups, later. Some teams aren't looking for investment and are looking to be crowdfunded, then they will build revenue/utility into their product and hope to get big enough to get to graduation, where the ARB in the bonding curve is released and they can use that to fund their operations.
It really depends on the team, we just help them tokenize, they have the freedom to do what it takes to make their start up a success.
4. the name is horrible. Can we call it “Arbitrum Token Launchpad pilot”? or something that’s not more self-referntial web3 mental mast…? We really need to move into more user friendly language :slight_smile:
HAHAHAHA You mean q/acc? We will absolutely make the new platform we are building extremely accessible for a variety of token buyers, and you are absolutely right we need to do a better job at saying how all this works w/o the web3 jargon.
But q/acc (Quadratic Accelerator) is the name of the game. We can name the Arbitrum program something basic though if we want, for listing out Arbitrum opportunities, like Launchpad for Liquid Utility Tokens... I slept on it and nothing better came up... will keep thinking about it.
Thx for the vote of confidence!!
Thx for the vote of confidence!!
In general we tend to focus on the token KPIs. They are easier and more fair to measure.
Are there any legal challenges to this? If yes how do you plan to address these?
Are there any legal challenges to this? If yes how do you plan to address these?
Launching tokens is legally challenging of course. From our side, we have 2 legal entities one that accepts the grant from Arbitrum and distributes the grants to the teams, and then one that supports the team and their token economy. In our terms and smart contracts, the project launches their own token and supporting contracts. We advise them to use a one time-use EOA to do this and load it with ETH from a mixer to avoid anyone having weird personal liability.
We are mitigating the legal issues for the teams as much as possible, first by selecting teams that are legit & have a clear utility for their token, and also we give their token utility right away with a token gated chat. We have a partnership with MIDAO to set teams up with a legal solution for their token if they don't have one.
Prismo has a partnership with (DBM) of the Philippines and just has a working MVP how to do you deem this as pmf? The project is supposed to launch it’s mainnet in Q2.
True, I am probably overstating the PMF. They have validated market demand from governments... but that is different.
The success of these project also depends on how they plan to utilise the 90% tokenomics if they won’t utilise it efficiently it is most likely going to fail.
We are not a silver bullet for a project of course, but our set up gives builders a great chance to succeed and gives the community ample opportunities to get in to their token early and safely.
We are not designed to be a gambling machine like pump fun, so we miss out on a lot of the gambling volume, and we aren't running bots to fake anything.
Our suggestion would be make this program more suitable for Arbitrum Native Projects since we have wider ecosystem than Polygon. Preference for Arbitrum native or Arbitrum aligned projects those from STIP, LTIPP, or other DAO efforts.
100% agree.
We strongly agree with the ARDC’s recommendation for DAO grant programs to include a dedicated, DAO-appointed Program Manager. The q/acc team is designed as an accelerator, but this role is currently missing from the structure.
We strongly agree with the ARDC’s recommendation for DAO grant programs to include a dedicated, DAO-appointed Program Manager. The q/acc team is designed as an accelerator, but this role is currently missing from the structure.
We can definitely do this if we win the bid. We can ensure we have a dedicated program manager focusing on Arbitrum, and no other chains.
A lot of things are shifting in Arbitrum DAO's structure right now, I am following along as a delegate and we will ensure an AAE has proper oversight over our program. But exactly how that all plays out is ambiguous because the rules are still be written... not by us, but by the DAO. This is a timing issue. A lot of things will become more clear, such as Arbitrum treasury management and oversight, and by the time this proposal goes to snapshot, it will clear these things up.
There’s no clear plan for what happens after the one-year mark or how teams are expected to continue delivering after vesting ends.
Teams will deliver value in a variety of ways, after one year they will have built their project on Arbitrum, brought their community there, and effectively pegged their token to ARB. Those things don't change after the 1 year mark.
The biggest difference between this model and other grant systems is we don't have to have a plan and over engineer things to get teams to continue to deliver value. We have aligned incentives. Their stream starts to unlock after 1 year, but its streams over another year. It's not likes they can just dump at the 1 year mark. They still need to drive value to their token.
The teams have major upside in their own success, and their upside is aligned with Arbitrum's success, as the token's price rise mechanically locks up ARB (and the DAO owns a lot of the token).
It won't make sense for them to jump from chain to chain, they are locked into Arbitrum from every angle, the incentives are clearly there for them to commit fully to our ecosystem from the start, and lock-in for the long haul.
Thank you for the offer, I like the principle of the ABC model itself, but there are many questions:
This, this, and this.
At present, q/acc reads more like a launchpad with some added support layers. To maximize its impact, we suggest exploring stronger collaboration with other grant domains (e.g., Domain Allocator Offering) to ensure that technical and pre-token projects also receive the resources they need. This could create a more holistic pipeline from early R&D through to tokenization while keeping Arbitrum attractive to a broader range of builders.
Michigan Blockchain believes that the Quadratic Accelerator shows tremendous promise in growing Arbitrum and creating self-sustaining token economies built on the chain. DeFi is all about finding innovative ways to reimagine finance, and the traditional method of picking projects and allocating capital proves to be difficult when currencies are subject to price volatility. The q/acc addresses this problem by locking up ARB, minting tokens in accordance with supply and demand.
We are curious as to how the DAO will standardize success criteria across different projects? Will success criteria be based on tokenomics (price stability, trading volume, supply, etc.) or project-specific KPIs (user adoption, growth, cross-chain compatibility, etc.)? And will these benchmarks be determined per project, vertical, or uniform across all projects?
I’m not convinced that strong teams would choose to launch tokens through q/acc.
The twelve teams that have launched on q/acc so far can be found here: https://q-acc.giveth.io/projects
Appreciate the energy and thinking behind this proposal. I like how you try to tackle genuine issues with traditional grant programs – especially around mitigating token sell pressure and providing the DAO with direct upside.
However, I’m not convinced that strong teams would choose to launch tokens through q/acc. Giving up 10% of total token supply in exchange for ~$50k in ARB (which is locked and not immediately usable) seems like a poor trade. This setup doesn't offer a meaningful runway, pushing teams to prioritize token hype over genuine product development – a distraction from achieving PMF. And at that point, teams might as well use permissionless launchpads or other, less dilutive options instead.
Appreciate the energy and thinking behind this proposal. I like how you try to tackle genuine issues with traditional grant programs – especially around mitigating token sell pressure and providing the DAO with direct upside.
However, I’m not convinced that strong teams would choose to launch tokens through q/acc. Giving up 10% of total token supply in exchange for ~$50k in ARB (which is locked and not immediately usable) seems like a poor trade. This setup doesn't offer a meaningful runway, pushing teams to prioritize token hype over genuine product development – a distraction from achieving PMF. And at that point, teams might as well use permissionless launchpads or other, less dilutive options instead.
It’d be helpful to clarify exactly what kind of teams q/acc is targeting. Later-stage projects with established PMF likely won’t accept the dilution and complexity, while high-quality early-stage projects will typically prefer to delay token launches until after achieving PMF. In my experience as an investor, most token launches are successful only after clear PMF is achieved, making the proposition here difficult for both builders and investors to justify.
While some q/acc projects (like those from Polygon Season-1) might see short-term activity, I’m skeptical they'll sustain meaningful long-term value, which makes me think that there are better ways to spend the treasury’s ARB. I'd be more supportive of pursuing a more traditional venture investing approach (similar to what the GCP is currently doing) than adapting token launch mechanics into a grants framework.
Below is a comprehensive analysis of the proposal and the community’s reasoning, along with a simulated expert debate, recommendations for improvements, and novel enhancements suggested by the agent swarm.
Below is a v1 pre-vote feedback report from the Event Horizon community and agents (note: these perspectives are subject to change with the inclusion of continued forum discussion):
Below is a comprehensive analysis of the proposal and the community’s reasoning, along with a simulated expert debate, recommendations for improvements, and novel enhancements suggested by the swarm.
I'm generally supportive of this proposal as mentioned in a 1-1 conversation
It provides an interesting next step in the builder support pipeline after the sort of programs that we're running with RnDAO.
4 requests for improvement of the proposal
Thank you for the offer, I like the principle of the ABC model itself, but there are many questions:
This, this, and this.
It’d be helpful to clarify exactly what kind of teams q/acc is targeting. Later-stage projects with established PMF likely won’t accept the dilution and complexity, while high-quality early-stage projects will typically prefer to delay token launches until after achieving PMF. In my experience as an investor, most token launches are successful only after clear PMF is achieved, making the proposition here difficult for both builders and investors to justify.
I don't believe this structure does not fit early stage projects looking for bootstrapping grants: it could actually set them up for failure.
They are forced to launch a token and collect no direct funding from it.
And anyone who’s launched a token backing a serious product knows what follows:
Now imagine doing that before you’ve even built the product, and for only a small amount.
It's a misaligned, high-friction path.
This is not what real builders need at this stage.
Yes, we need better ways to deploy capital. Yes, we need fewer frictions for top teams to get funding.
But forcing a premature token launch is not the right way:
This setup suits memecoins and hype cycles - which they do have of course a fit in crypto. But our builders' pipeline should do better.
Federico is right: strong teams with real products will raise at the right time, and if they want to go public with a token, they’ll have no shortage of options. Let’s not drive them away with the wrong ones.
Thanks
At present, q/acc reads more like a launchpad with some added support layers. To maximize its impact, we suggest exploring stronger collaboration with other grant domains (e.g., Domain Allocator Offering) to ensure that technical and pre-token projects also receive the resources they need. This could create a more holistic pipeline from early R&D through to tokenization while keeping Arbitrum attractive to a broader range of builders.
100% aligned on this. Already talked to @danielo about making q/acc part of his pipeline for the Hackahton Continuation Program and will absolutely connect with Questbook, AF, OCL and other programs to ensure they know to recommend builders our way.
We created a referral program last round which brought in one of our teams, and gave the program that recommended the team 0.2% of the initial token supply. We expect to do something similar.
Michigan Blockchain believes that the Quadratic Accelerator shows tremendous promise in growing Arbitrum and creating self-sustaining token economies built on the chain. DeFi is all about finding innovative ways to reimagine finance, and the traditional method of picking projects and allocating capital proves to be difficult when currencies are subject to price volatility. The q/acc addresses this problem by locking up ARB, minting tokens in accordance with supply and demand.
We are curious as to how the DAO will standardize success criteria across different projects? Will success criteria be based on tokenomics (price stability, trading volume, supply, etc.) or project-specific KPIs (user adoption, growth, cross-chain compatibility, etc.)? And will these benchmarks be determined per project, vertical, or uniform across all projects?
Thank you @Griff for the proposal, we are super excited to see how this will improve Arbitrum!
Michigan Blockchain; Jack Verrill; TG @JackVerrill
I’m not convinced that strong teams would choose to launch tokens through q/acc.
The twelve teams that have launched on q/acc so far can be found here: https://q-acc.giveth.io/projects
They are pretty great projects. These 12 teams wanted to launch a token, but they were short on capital. We offer them a fair launch platform, and a deep liquid low cap token. Many of these projects see ways where a token can enhance their product, or is core to their product, but the complexity of executing on a token launch is a lot of work, we streamline that process for them and they really appreciate it.
Jump to 2:19 and hear what one of our builders has to say about the experience: https://x.com/Nofuturephoto/status/1918297827425271885
It’d be helpful to clarify exactly what kind of teams q/acc is targeting. Later-stage projects with established PMF likely won’t accept the dilution and complexity, while high-quality early-stage projects will typically prefer to delay token launches until after achieving PMF. In my experience as an investor, most token launches are successful only after clear PMF is achieved, making the proposition here difficult for both builders and investors to justify.
We are definitely targeting the high-quality early-stage projects. The reason they need to delay their token launch is because they don't have q/acc to handle it for them! The q/acc launch helps them build an early committed community and unlike most token launch strategies, they have an external team doing it for them and deep liquidity & a price floor once they hit dexes. They can launch and then have effectively 6 months before the tokens from the fair launch unlock, so they have 6 months to get PMF.
Not every project will benefit from launching a token before PMF, it depends on the project. But there are a lot of instances where the token is integral to the project (e.g. the gas token for an Orbit chain, but also many other instances) where a token is a core part of the product and needs to be launched, or there is a strategic benefit to building incentivized community early, or several other circumstances.
Given q/acc’s track record on Polygon and cross-chain operability, we’d like to see stronger mechanisms that ensure enduring alignment with Arbitrum. While this deployment may initially target Arbitrum-native teams, there’s a risk that some projects might migrate or operate cross-chain post-launch, diluting the value created for the Arbitrum ecosystem.
We suggest exploring:
I love these suggestions... one important thing that maybe I didn't make clear in the proposal is that each team is absolutely locked into the Arbitrum ecosystem and the success of ARB because their token's price is directly pegged to the ARB price.
The Augmented Bonding Curve's (ABC) collateral will be ARB and the LPs on Camelot will be ARB pairs so if ARB goes up 5%, the builder's token goes up 5%, if ARB goes down 3%, the builder's token goes down 3%. There is a direct economic connection between each team's token and $ARB. Even if they nridge their token to other chains... their liquidity is here and denominated in ARB. I can't think of another program that offers stronger aligned incentives.
Also, we are absolutely excited about doubling down on our successful launch of Prismo's L2 gas token, and would love to repeat that same success with Orbit chains.
Reducing the per-project ARB allocation to $25–30K for initial cohorts, scaling upward based on community traction or usage milestones.
We can't really do this, we are using bancor-style bonding curves with a 12.5% reserve ratio, this means that if we only put $25k in the bonding curve their fair launch would start at a market cap of $200k. This is too low in my opinion for most teams we are talking to. We could do funny things... like launch the ABC with less collateral than it is supposed to have, but that is very bad practice.
We are looking at a solution that could work like this, where we would put KPI vesting on the team's tokens. This was in the original ABC design. The main KPIs we would look at are related to secondary market liquidity, circulating supply and market cap.
If we can implement KPI vesting then we could have a clawback mechanism.
Below is a comprehensive analysis of the proposal and the community’s reasoning, along with a simulated expert debate, recommendations for improvements, and novel enhancements suggested by the agent swarm.
Votes in favor of the proposal: 226 out of 230.
WOW! Thats amazing! I love that you guys added an AI Agent swarm to your offering! This is super cool!
Below is a v1 pre-vote feedback report from the Event Horizon community and agents (note: these perspectives are subject to change with the inclusion of continued forum discussion):
Below is a comprehensive analysis of the proposal and the community’s reasoning, along with a simulated expert debate, recommendations for improvements, and novel enhancements suggested by the swarm.
Votes in favor of the proposal: 226 out of 230.
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-- Innovative: Most voters favor the Quadratic Accelerator (q/acc) because it offers an innovative, mechanism‐driven alternative to traditional grant programs that have long suffered from issues such as immediate token sell pressure, misaligned incentives, and unsustainable funding. The proposal’s design – using quadratic funding, token lock‐ups, ABC bonding curves, and fair‐launch mechanisms – is seen as an effective way to create self‐sustaining token economies that align the interests of projects, the Arbitrum DAO, and the community.
-- Track Record: Voters are reassured by q/acc’s proven track record on Polygon’s zkEVM, where very rigorous project selection (acceptance rates <4%), clear KPIs, and strong onchain growth (10× market cap multiplier, new user adoption, etc.) demonstrated tangible impact.
-- Assurances Robust risk-mitigation strategies (smart contract audits, treasury volatility buffers, regulatory safeguards, and multisig DAO oversight) further instill confidence in the proposal’s long‐term value creation and ecosystem alignment.
Overall, the model is seen as a way to drive significant ARB demand, improve key onchain metrics, and transform the funding process by letting the community capture the upside of a project’s success.
– Complexity & Overhead: Some worry that the multi‐layered mechanisms (bonding curves, lock‐ups, fair launches) might create user friction or become too complex for new entrants.
– Replication Risk: Although successful on Polygon, market dynamics on Arbitrum may differ. Skeptics question whether similar growth and token demand can be replicated on Arbitrum and whether the program might expose the ecosystem to unforeseen risks.
– Regulatory & Technical Uncertainty: Despite risk mitigations, the complexity of token economies and evolving regulatory norms could pose challenges that are not fully addressed.
• Simplify Mechanisms Where Possible—Streamline the number of moving parts to reduce user confusion while maintaining core benefits.
• Strengthen Regulatory Buffers—Consider additional geoblocking measures and a tiered approval process for larger grant allocations.
• Monitor and Adapt—Establish a clear feedback cycle after Season 1 on Arbitrum to fine-tune the model based on real-world performance data.
Representative A (Proponent): q/acc addresses longstanding funding inefficiencies. It locks capital into growth cycles, deters short-term dumping, and encourages community alignment. The 4% acceptance rate on Polygon signals rigor, not inflation.
Representative B (Skeptic): Mechanically, it's promising. But the operational complexity might deter use, and its replicability on Arbitrum isn’t guaranteed. Ecosystem dynamics are non-transferable. What mechanisms will enforce long-term accountability?
Representative A: Three: First, tie fund disbursements to real usage metrics—retention, DAU, onchain actions. Second, create incentives for ecosystem-level contributions—tools, integrations, open standards. Third, allow projects to opt-in to ARB buyback pledges post-launch. These create structure, interdependence, and voluntary alignment.
Representative B: Retention-based milestones are critical. Public goods incentives are good—but underrepresented. The buyback concept is rare in grant ecosystems and could shift norms. What ensures the DAO learns from failed projects?
Representative A: Every project should submit post-program reporting: metrics, learnings, failures. These should be published, curated, and used to shape cohort design. Transparency compounds governance intelligence.
Representative B: With those extensions—tiered funding, cross-product rewards, ARB buybacks, and structured postmortems—I’d consider the proposal not just viable, but a new baseline. Provided UX and compliance hurdles are addressed, this becomes a scalable model.
Strength of Conviction and Voter Sway Analysis Before the Debate:
-- Proponents’ Conviction: ~90/100 -- Skeptics’ Conviction: ~40/100
After the Debate:
-- Proponents remain strongly convinced at ~85/100—confidence softens slightly due to recognition of execution complexity but remains high given the track record and built-in mitigations.
-- Skeptics shift to ~50–60/100 with integration of specific improvements:
Estimated Voter Sway: ~15–20% of voters previously on the fence likely to support the proposal if these enhancements are committed to, while hardened opposition remains minimal (<5%).
1. Cross-Product Rewards: Create bonus incentives for projects that build shared infrastructure, tooling, or integrations used by other q/acc participants. This promotes collaboration and ecosystem cohesion.
2. ARB Buyback Commitments: Allow projects to voluntarily commit a portion of future revenue toward ARB buybacks or returning value to the DAO treasury. It’s an opt-in model that aligns successful projects with long-term ARB demand.
3. Post-Program Reporting: Require all funded projects to submit a standardized post-mortem (successes, failures, metrics, and lessons learned). This builds institutional knowledge and strengthens DAO decision-making in future cohorts.
The Quadratic Accelerator proposal is widely supported for its innovative approach that addresses longstanding issues in traditional grant programs. A strong case is made through its clear tokenomics, proven success on Polygon, and comprehensive risk management. The simulated debate highlights that while there are execution and complexity concerns, these can be mitigated through additional UX improvements, further audits, and strengthened community engagement. The proposed novel enhancements—from tiered funding to post-program reporting—add even more robustness and long-term alignment to the initiative. Overall, the proposal is seen as a transformative opportunity that, with further refinements, should significantly enhance the Arbitrum ecosystem’s sustainability and growth.
I'm generally supportive of this proposal as mentioned in a 1-1 conversation
It provides an interesting next step in the builder support pipeline after the sort of programs that we're running with RnDAO.
4 requests for improvement of the proposal
I'd appreciate further clarity on the Development and Deployment costs. A breakdown separating what's actually Dev costs and marketing is super important IMO.
I don't understand the operations & Sacaling, is that given to the projects "given to teams" or is that basically the program manager's fee (including overhead)?
Basically, i would suggest redoing the budget before a vote and include:
Additionally, a fund management approach is missing (and we had a lot of issues with the Hackahton Continuation Program because of this...) See here:
Fund management process: The funds are transferred from the DAO treasury directly to the AF and the AF is instructed to swap ASAP (they can normally execute within a week). Assuming a 30% volatility buffer, the AF can most likely swap successfully and return the excess to the DAO. After the AF Swaps, stables are transferred to the MSS. After the investees complete KYC and contract signing with the AF, the program manager schedules transactions in the MSS. So it’s the MSS signers who approve but the program manager (e.g. RnDAO) who schedules the transaction. This way the funds remain under the control of the AF (the counterparty for the investment) until transferred to the investee. The program manager serves simply as an advisor/service provider for selecting the projects, suggesting the disbursement(s), and delivering some support services. Note that one of the strengths of the HCP is having a small amount of funds disbursed each month as opposed to a lump sum upfront, so we can track progress and stop the disbursement if the projects are not executing well. Hence, the program manager serves as a scheduler for the monthly/milestone transactions.
Final point, I'd appreciate some mapping of the next step of the journey after q/acc based on the amounts these projects have raised. Will they go to raise a seed round and then list in CEXs? Will they...? at least some rough idea of what makes sense as next steps.
the name is horrible. Can we call it "Arbitrum Token Launchpad pilot"? or something that's not more self-referntial web3 mental mast...? We really need to move into more user friendly language :slight_smile:
Thank you for presenting such an ambitious and thoughtfully constructed proposal. We appreciate the innovative approach q/acc brings to the table, especially its focus on sustainable token economies, on-chain capital formation, and reducing the inefficiencies seen in traditional grant programs. The use of bonding curves, quadratic funding, and protocol-aligned token launches aligns well with Arbitrum’s ethos of experimentation and community-driven development.
That said, before moving forward to an onchain vote, we’d like to share two key areas we believe could be improved to enhance the proposal’s impact and sustainability:
Thank you for presenting such an ambitious and thoughtfully constructed proposal. We appreciate the innovative approach q/acc brings to the table, especially its focus on sustainable token economies, on-chain capital formation, and reducing the inefficiencies seen in traditional grant programs. The use of bonding curves, quadratic funding, and protocol-aligned token launches aligns well with Arbitrum’s ethos of experimentation and community-driven development.
That said, before moving forward to an onchain vote, we’d like to share two key areas we believe could be improved to enhance the proposal’s impact and sustainability:
Given q/acc’s track record on Polygon and cross-chain operability, we’d like to see stronger mechanisms that ensure enduring alignment with Arbitrum. While this deployment may initially target Arbitrum-native teams, there’s a risk that some projects might migrate or operate cross-chain post-launch, diluting the value created for the Arbitrum ecosystem.
We suggest exploring:
Anchoring q/acc participants more tightly to Arbitrum will ensure the DAO captures more lasting upside from its initial investment.
The proposal requests $500K in ARB for project bonding curve collateral, roughly 50% of the total ask. While we understand the mechanism is structured to be non-dilutive and potentially recoupable, it still represents significant upfront capital risk.
We believe the DAO could benefit from a more modular and performance-based allocation model, particularly for early-stage cohorts.
Suggestions include:
This would allow the DAO to experiment with the q/acc model while containing downside exposure, especially in the program’s initial season.
q/acc offers a novel approach to ecosystem development that feels well suited to Arbitrum’s DeFi leadership and innovation-focused community. If appropriately structured and aligned with Arbitrum’s long-term strategy, this program has the potential to complement traditional grant structures with a more self-sustaining alternative.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
In the current DDA program season three the grantees are paid in USDC. It was a similar case in season 2.
We like the new approach taken instead of traditional grant approaches. The approach is promising aligning incentives through q/acc, bonding curves, and fair launches it also resembles more like a token launchpad ( Fjord Foundry). The price of the token is very substantial and depends on the market.
Are there any legal challenges to this? If yes how do you plan to address these?
Prismo has a partnership with (DBM) of the Philippines and just has a working MVP how to do you deem this as pmf? The project is supposed to launch it’s mainnet in Q2.
While the projects might have liquidity, but there is little to no trading volumes which raises our concern on the demand for these tokens.
The success of these project also depends on how they plan to utilise the 90% tokenomics if they won’t utilise it efficiently it is most likely going to fail.
Our suggestion would be make this program more suitable for Arbitrum Native Projects since we have wider ecosystem than Polygon. Preference for Arbitrum native or Arbitrum aligned projects those from STIP, LTIPP, or other DAO efforts.
Thank you, @Griff, for bringing this compelling proposal to the Forum. We, who are also members of the Gitcoin Governance Council, have been supportive of quadratic funding and other innovative grant distribution models that align clear community signaling with meaningful incentive structures. This proposal is exciting as it introduces novel mechanisms by combining ABC bonding curves and quadratic funding, explicitly designed to address persistent issues like sell pressure on ARB and incentive misalignment that often plague traditional grants.
However, precisely because we understand both the promise and the practical challenges inherent in such mechanisms, we have identified several strategic points we believe warrant further clarity before proceeding to a formal vote.
Thank you, @Griff, for bringing this compelling proposal to the Forum. We, who are also members of the Gitcoin Governance Council, have been supportive of quadratic funding and other innovative grant distribution models that align clear community signaling with meaningful incentive structures. This proposal is exciting as it introduces novel mechanisms by combining ABC bonding curves and quadratic funding, explicitly designed to address persistent issues like sell pressure on ARB and incentive misalignment that often plague traditional grants.
However, precisely because we understand both the promise and the practical challenges inherent in such mechanisms, we have identified several strategic points we believe warrant further clarity before proceeding to a formal vote.
Early-stage projects typically indicate that their primary constraint is operational capital rather than secondary market liquidity. While ABC bonding curves lock 50k ARB per project, complemented by matching pools, we are concerned about the actual effectiveness of this liquidity provision.
Examining the Polygon pilot, particularly the top-funded cohort such as x23.ai, the current liquidity is under $120k against a fully diluted valuation (FDV) of approximately $800k (link). Considering the scale of investment, such limited liquidity may neither significantly extend project runway nor improve token price discovery. In practice, it could inadvertently amplify token launch risks rather than alleviating funding pressures.
We ask you to explicitly evaluate the liquidity provision mechanism's empirical effectiveness in meeting builders’ core financial needs to see if this is better than simply giving funds to them.
Actually, low market caps are our sweet spot :-D. Even though the market caps are low, the market caps for the Season 1 teams during their q/acc round were even LOWER!
100%, some projects don’t need a token or aren’t ready for a token. This program is NOT for them. It is not a one size fits all solution, it is only for projects that can benefit from launching a low cap utility token with deep liquidity, and they want to do a fair launch (not a pump and dump). However, you would be surprised at how many teams there are like this.
You already provided some perspectives on this by clarifying detailed targeting of this funding, but we'd appreciate further clarity on if this is actually helping projects based on some actual data.
Requiring every recipient to spin up a live token adds a layer of operational drag that many seed-stage teams are ill-equipped to handle. Beyond smart contract deployment, founders must craft vesting schedules, mediate community expectations, often before product-market fit.
On the legal side, we partnered with MIDAO to give our builders a legal structure in the Marshal Islands that works with our token design, some of the projects took that route and others already had a legal structure that worked that they set up before being accepted into our program.
Although it seems there is some legal support provided, that's not the entirety of this complexity. How do you think this complexity/cost can be overcome or mitigated?
We recognize the ABC mechanism significantly reduces immediate sell pressure on ARB tokens by locking them within liquidity pools. However, this approach effectively immobilizes capital in very low-turnover micro-pools (in certain amount of cases), functionally resembling a token burn. Or, is there any way the DAO can reclaim ARB provided at some point?
Although receiving 5% of each project's token issuance is attractive, governance tokens from small-cap projects are notoriously illiquid and may impose significant portfolio-management overhead relative to the potential return. If we are to focus on this aspect, employing a dedicated investment vehicle, similar to the GCP, might offer a more strategically sound approach to capturing economic upside from supported projects. We'd love to understand the rationale of gaining tokens of projects that this type of funding mechanism targets actually benefits Arbitrum DAO financially after some operational overhead.
Everytime a token is launched, 5% of the initially minted supply (320k tokens) would be locked for a year in the Payment Processor contract and then streamed for a year, claimable by an address that an AAE would control (I assume a multisig).
Gitcoin’s recent transition from broad quadratic funding (QF) rounds to the more focused DDA framework underscores some needs toward precision capital deployment. Likewise, Arbitrum’s own DDA pilot programs have demonstrated the operational advantages of DDA-based funding.
In that regard, it would be beneficial to outline explicitly how q/acc's structure specifically outperforms DDA on key dimensions such as project targeting accuracy, evaluation overhead or so.
Or, it is also beneficial to demonstrate strong post-launch KPI performance (revenue, user retention, and actual product-market fit) clearly linked to the ABC and quadratic funding structures. Transparent and detailed reporting of these outcomes will ensure this design could potentially outperform the existing funding scheme.
At this point, we are reluctant to endorse the proposal. Our hesitation stems from several points noted above: certain aspects remain insufficiently clear, and we are not yet convinced that the mechanisms outlined would potentially provide an effective solution for the Arbitrum DAO or its broader ecosystem. Thus, we still think it would be more straightforward to do a simple quadratic funding rather than this mechanism if we are to do something different from the existing one.
If there are existing data, empirical findings, or even well-reasoned hypotheses that could bolster the current design and address the uncertainties we have raised, we would greatly appreciate it if you could share them. Such evidence would go a long way toward strengthening the proposal and facilitating an informed decision.
To reiterate, we do recognize the value and importance of innovative experiments of this kind, and in principle we are eager to lend our support. Our goal is simply to ensure that any initiative we back is both robust and beneficial to the community, at least hypothetically.
First and foremost, Griff, I want to applaud you for establishing such a net-positive model. Often grant programs are large gambles for the ecosystem. But, the alignment here has managed to assuage the vast majority of economic risk while also preserving, and in some ways expanding, benefits to the recipients.
I echo a lot of the positive feedback as well as some of the points of consideration (namely, token necessity) which have been stated, and you largely addressed.
First and foremost, Griff, I want to applaud you for establishing such a net-positive model. Often grant programs are large gambles for the ecosystem. But, the alignment here has managed to assuage the vast majority of economic risk while also preserving, and in some ways expanding, benefits to the recipients.
I echo a lot of the positive feedback as well as some of the points of consideration (namely, token necessity) which have been stated, and you largely addressed.
A couple of new points of consideration which I'd love your thoughts on are around administrative considerations for the DAO. If we assume this becomes a readily adopted and seasonal model utilized by the DAO, the treasury, in a sense, becomes a venture portfolio with micro allocations of dozens of q/acc funded project tokens. I by no means think this is a blocker, but I do believe this opens a couple of avenues warranting greater consideration:
Interested to hear your thoughts and past experiences on these points ^
Interested to hear your thoughts and past experiences on these points ^
Everytime a token is launched, 5% of the initially minted supply (320k tokens) would be locked for a year in the Payment Processor contract and then streamed for a year, claimable by an address that an AAE would control (I assume a multisig).
We would need guidance from an AAE on this IMO.
I assume one of the AAE's can take this on for the DAO. Given the diagram below it fals under either the AF or Entropy.
Looks like overall program KPIs are presented, but could we get some more clarity on the KPIs required for the unlock to happen as a project graduates? Are these projects specific or generalized? How public will they be/is there a place to view milestones till graduation?
Looks like overall program KPIs are presented, but could we get some more clarity on the KPIs required for the unlock to happen as a project graduates? Are these projects specific or generalized? How public will they be/is there a place to view milestones till graduation?
They are not project specific, they are mostly economic, and the data is very public
The default graduation KPIs consider several factors:
However, we are early in experimenting with this mechanism and have gotten feedback that this is too strict so we are currently working on an accelerated graduation plan that can allow teams to change from time based vesting for their token unlock to a KPI based unlock for the Team's token. This is still early in it's design though, and no promises it will validated enough to make it into the first season.
What’s the long-term vision behind dealing with the tokens that Arbitrum receives, and who will manage this portfolio of small caps? Should DAO-held tokens be used for treasury diversification, sold for cash, burned, used in retroactive reward programs, etc? This doesn’t have to be fully answered right now, but a vision is helpful.
Another great question! I would personally advise to hodl and count it as treasury diversification, but we will need to get advice on this from some AAEs about the ideal address to set in the protocol for Arbitrum's hodlings. I would imagine the AF will hold the funds and it would be managed by some treasury committee... but the initial tokens are locked for a year and then streamed for a year... so there is a lot of time to figure out the management.
If the majority of early buyers participate expecting a pump, due to a “price floor” and low float, it may actually create sharp price crashes once lockups fully expire. This could make the Arbitrum DAO allocation worth a lot less. A good way to mitigate long-term issues around token price is to effectively diligence projects. Tokens that actually have some sort of usecase or financial backing demonstrate less downside volatility. The counterargument is that this is following a more venture-esque approach with a few expected home runs. But when the portfolio of projects is limited to 10, the instance of a home run can also be limited since there’s always a luck component to venture investing, even if the initial vetting process has a stated ~4% acceptance rate.
Wow! You really get it! Thank you for diving in so deep to this, it's pretty complicated but you really seem to understand the mechanism.
Yes, not every team is going to be a winner... some projects will fail and the tokens won't be worth much... but as you said that is standard for small cap investments (and grant programs). The projects have 6 months to prove token demand before the buyers in the q/acc round have their tokens start to unlock, and a year before the larger team allocations start to unlock.
The best thing to do is to look at the quality of our projects and decide if you think they are worth betting on.
From a market-oriented standpoint, the Quadratic Accelerator hits all the right notes. It transforms ecosystem funding into an organic experiment and I love it!.
Really aligned with this direction. qacc is the kind of experiment we need more of — market-driven, lean, and focused on real outcomes without relying on artificial support, it's really interesting how the clear winner of season 1 was x23ai a product that probably all delegates are using.
From a market-oriented standpoint, the Quadratic Accelerator hits all the right notes. It transforms ecosystem funding into an organic experiment and I love it!.
Really aligned with this direction. qacc is the kind of experiment we need more of — market-driven, lean, and focused on real outcomes without relying on artificial support, it's really interesting how the clear winner of season 1 was x23ai a product that probably all delegates are using.
In most ecosystems, public goods funding ends up rewarding participation or presence, not results. qacc flips that script — it ties funding to actual demand, and that's the right approach. If no one cares about your project, it doesn’t get resources. Simple.
I also like that this isn’t trying to become a permanent bureaucracy. It’s scoped, targeted, and has clear bounds. Run it, measure it, and decide based on outcomes. That’s exactly how governance experiments should be done — small, measurable, and easy to shut off if it doesn’t work.
From a tokenomics angle, it’s a smart structure. Instead of flooding the market with ARB that gets dumped, it locks it up and releases it only when there's traction. That protects token value while still incentivizing builders.
Fully support trying this out. (💙,💎)
Thanks for the kind words @Tane! I'll jump straight to answering your Q's
Thanks for the kind words @Tane! I'll jump straight to answering your Q's
We ask you to explicitly evaluate the liquidity provision mechanism’s empirical effectiveness in meeting builders’ core financial needs to see if this is better than simply giving funds to them.
The $120k liquidity is just the Liquidity in the DEX, but their Augmented Bonding Curve (ABC) also has over $100k in it, it just doesn't show on gecko terminal. Here is a screen shot of the dashboard we use for internal tracking, which shows the collateral for each ABC in the protocol:
As far as empirical effectiveness, if you go to your link and click Show X23/WPOL Price Chart in WPOL
You will see that EVERY token has beaten the price of POL, which is pretty incredible considering that the market was tanking to unexpected lows during the short 2 months that these tokens have been liquid. For a 6-figure market cap token to have such a strong resistance to downward market pressure is impressive to say the least.
You can also simply try to buy and sell the token on quickswap to see the experienced liquidity: https://dapp.quickswap.exchange/swap/best/0x3c499c542cEF5E3811e1192ce70d8cC03d5c3359/0xc530B75465Ce3c6286e718110A7B2e2B64Bdc860
And
The token is paired with POL so it has great routing so any token can be used to buy it and $3000 moves the price 1% either direction.
As far as "meeting builders’ core financial needs." Arbitrum has a lot of programs to do that. Questbook, AF & OCL are throwing money at builders left and right, and I am excited for their programs to recommend great builders to us.
We help them launch their token on Arbitrum, lock them into the Arbitrum ecosystem, and create demand for ARB in the process. This is not for every project, but for many projects, it is a perfect fit.
Requiring every recipient to spin up a live token adds a layer of operational drag that many seed-stage teams are ill-equipped to handle. Beyond smart contract deployment, founders must craft vesting schedules, mediate community expectations, often before product-market fit.
Although it seems there is some legal support provided, that’s not the entirety of this complexity. How do you think this complexity/cost can be overcome or mitigated?
You are absolutely right, most seed stage teams are not ready for a token, even though MANY want it. The key feature to mitigate this issue is the screening process, we had less than a 4% acceptance rate for projects in the first cohort. We choose teams that are ready to integrate a token into their product and have figured out where the demand will come from.
Also, as far as vesting schedules and all the other token design related issues. We have that all set for the team, they just need to say the addresses for their vested tokens and its done, and the rest of their token launch process from the technical side, is covered.
From the social side, absolutely they now have a second product to sell... their token! But we try to choose builders that have a token design that supports the needs of their core product., like the gas token for an L2 (Prismo) or creative ideas like what To Da Moon is doing.
We recognize the ABC mechanism significantly reduces immediate sell pressure on ARB tokens by locking them within liquidity pools. However, this approach effectively immobilizes capital in very low-turnover micro-pools (in certain amount of cases), functionally resembling a token burn. Or, is there any way the DAO can reclaim ARB provided at some point?
We aren't just "mitigating sell pressure" the ARB is acting like a magnet, attracting more ARB! As tokens get sold via q/acc, ARB gets sucked into the ABC. We created over 400k POL demand with our program in season 1 on zkEVM, we can create even more demand for ARB given the lessons we've learned so far.
We don't currently have a mechanism for the ARB to be clawed back, other than token sales.
Although receiving 5% of each project’s token issuance is attractive, governance tokens from small-cap projects are notoriously illiquid and may impose significant portfolio-management overhead relative to the potential return. If we are to focus on this aspect, employing a dedicated investment vehicle, similar to the GCP, might offer a more strategically sound approach to capturing economic upside from supported projects. We’d love to understand the rationale of gaining tokens of projects that this type of funding mechanism targets actually benefits Arbitrum DAO financially after some operational overhead.
These tokens are very liquid by design, but I would keep the operational overhead light and just make a simple rule, like sell 1/2 tokens if they are over 20M market cap, another 1/4 at 50M, move the rest into treasury or something like that. There is no reason to bloat this proposal with bureaucratic overhead... We can let an AAE handle the treasury management.
Gitcoin’s recent transition from broad quadratic funding (QF) rounds to the more focused DDA framework underscores some needs toward precision capital deployment. Likewise, Arbitrum’s own DDA pilot programs have demonstrated the operational advantages of DDA-based funding.
In that regard, it would be beneficial to outline explicitly how q/acc’s structure specifically outperforms DDA on key dimensions such as project targeting accuracy, evaluation overhead or so.
Or, it is also beneficial to demonstrate strong post-launch KPI performance (revenue, user retention, and actual product-market fit) clearly linked to the ABC and quadratic funding structures. Transparent and detailed reporting of these outcomes will ensure this design could potentially outperform the existing funding scheme.
I would consider q/acc to be a specific domain itself: Small startups that want to tokenize. This is the domain we want to support. I think its important to not be overly exposed to one narrative, AI, NFTs, DeFi, Wallets, Gaming, DAOs, Music, L2s; we have helped teams from all of these verticals launch tokens. If we were only oing AI tokens, and the AI narative dies, we are in trouble.
Instead we are going more horizontal, supporting small teams that want to launch a token for their product, and we will make it easy for them to launch their token here on Arbitrum.
I don't see us needing to out perform DDA programs on these metrics, we work along side these programs to support the builders that go through them to help them launch their token (if they need one) and create demand for ARB while we do it!
Most of the KPIs we hope to be judged on are not even on the table for DDA grant programs, they don't generate ARB demand and they don't launch tokens.
:pushpin: Onchain Growth – 10x – Market cap growth (in ARB) compared to ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will produce 10M ARB worth of market caps
:pushpin: ARB Demand Ratio – 25% – Ratio of ARB in protocol vs ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will capture 1.25M worth of ARB in the protocol, creating 250k worth of ARB buying pressure.
:pushpin: Sustained Value – 1 year – Long-term market cap growth (in ARB) of tokens. E.g The 10x growth will last for at least a year.
:pushpin: First-time Arbitrum Users – 500 – Number of q/acc participants new to Arbitrum that buy more than $10 of tokens. E.g 500 users that pass our sybil filter will have never used Arbitrum before.
:pushpin: On-Chain Activity – Varied – Trading volume, user participation, and liquidity metrics. This will be tracked but it is so gameable, it’s not worth creating an exact metric, but we will create a lot of onchain activity.
100% we have a referral program behind the scenes, which will give upside to Questbook and other allies in the Arbitrum Ecosystem in the teams they recommend to us if they make it into the round.
100% we have a referral program behind the scenes, which will give upside to Questbook and other allies in the Arbitrum Ecosystem in the teams they recommend to us if they make it into the round.
I don't think it's worth the complexity... The goal would be to not sell the ARB and just return it to the DAO if it is unused... in the end, we need stables, which we will convert to ARB at the last minute, so the volatility buffer is there for that, and i't probably better to just sell less ARB. However, it could be worth the complexity... IF we are just converting it all to stables and then sending the excess stables to STEP to do with it what they will. In the end, I imagine it would all be handled by the AAE that manages us (probably the foundation).
We are discussing some potential changes to the system that rhymes with this, but in the current design, that $50k ARB is all locked in a bonding curve, not given to the team. So they don't have it, it is collateralizing the initially minted locked tokens (Including Arbitrum DAO's token allocation). While technically possible to mint the tokens without collateral... I would consider it bad practice.
These teams do not get free ARB, they get a liquid token economy that gives them revenue as they sell tokens, and a subsidized token launch. So the teams this works best for aren't always the same ones that would apply for a questbook grant, they are likely to be looking for investment, something where maybe they have a good business model, and clear token utility, but they don't have an obvious path to becoming billion dollar unicorns so VC's are not really interested.
This is great feed back though! Thanks @0xDonPepe!
Really liking the direction here, especially the effort to move away from traditional grant farming and build something that rewards long-term builders. Just curious — since projects will be issuing tokenized grants, have you thought about how to handle potential risks in secondary markets? Like speculative trading or farming behavior after token issuance. Are there any built-in mechanisms to ensure tokens stay tied to actual product milestones, rather than becoming a short-term hype vehicle?
Really liking the direction here, especially the effort to move away from traditional grant farming and build something that rewards long-term builders. Just curious — since projects will be issuing tokenized grants, have you thought about how to handle potential risks in secondary markets? Like speculative trading or farming behavior after token issuance. Are there any built-in mechanisms to ensure tokens stay tied to actual product milestones, rather than becoming a short-term hype vehicle?
Yes! Bonding curves actually dampen volatility, as the price goes up, more tokens are minted, as the price goes down, tokens are burned. This desing naturally combats the a short-term hype cycles.
Tying token prices to product results however is just impossible sadly... I wish the free market worked that way :frowning: Each project that goes through our program must have a plan for ACTUAL token utility. So there will be some correlation of course.... but in my experience, tokens go up and down based on anything but product advancement.
Hi @Griff,
Thanks for this interesting and innovative proposal. I’d love to better understand your broader operating model so we can set expectations clearly.
Hi @Griff,
Thanks for this interesting and innovative proposal. I’d love to better understand your broader operating model so we can set expectations clearly.
From what I gather, q/acc is positioned as a multi-chain protocol that you’re deploying across different ecosystems (e.g., Polygon, now potentially Arbitrum), rather than something exclusive to one chain. That makes sense! Especially if the goal is to standardize more sustainable token launches across Web3.
That said, I’d appreciate clarification on a few points to better understand how this fits within Arbitrum’s strategy:
How do you prioritize chain-specific alignment when running q/acc across multiple ecosystems? For example, are you planning to tailor cohorts to each chain’s priorities, or do you envision more generalized deployment?
Could you share more on your governance and funding model? For instance, do DAOs fund each cohort separately, or is there shared infrastructure (dev, ops, tooling) across chains?
Would Arbitrum have any ongoing role e.g. representatives, visibility, or feedback loops in guiding cohort selection, KPIs, or narrative direction if this pilot is funded?
Finally, are you planning to run a cohort with another ecosystem at the same time as the proposed Arbitrum cohort, or would this be a dedicated focus?
q/acc seems like a cool model. I’m simply looking to understand more clearly how it would operate with Arbitrum, especially given your cross-chain strategy.
Thank you
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
Thanks @Griff for this proposal. It’s nice to see creative alternatives to customary grant programs like this.
There are a handful of aspects that we like about the q/acc setup, as it—
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
Thanks @Griff for this proposal. It’s nice to see creative alternatives to customary grant programs like this.
There are a handful of aspects that we like about the q/acc setup, as it—
We strongly believe that one of the criteria for selecting candidates is whether or not the project issuing a token is warranted. The majority of token launches are a form of raising capital as opposed to some sort of utility or actual ownership over a business/subject to yield. The latter is of course more difficult due to regulations, and we’ve seen smaller projects simply issue traditional equity to investors as opposed to offering a token—these projects also apply for grants solely for funding without explicit association to a token. If projects don’t have a concrete vision for their token, it may be best for the q/acc team to divert them to alternative grant programs. One other aspect would be to work with other grant teams, having them funnel promising projects that may be ready to issue a token. We more easily conceive the q/acc setup as a later-stage funding mechanism, kind of like a follow-on investment. Many grant programs suffer from not doubling down on their winners, so there’s merit to this approach. This may also make your due diligence process easier where builders can take an initial survey, and if they indicate no desire for a token now—or are too early in development/traction—they can be routed elsewhere.
Looks like overall program KPIs are presented, but could we get some more clarity on the KPIs required for the unlock to happen as a project graduates? Are these projects specific or generalized? How public will they be/is there a place to view milestones till graduation?
What’s the long-term vision behind dealing with the tokens that Arbitrum receives, and who will manage this portfolio of small caps? Should DAO-held tokens be used for treasury diversification, sold for cash, burned, used in retroactive reward programs, etc? This doesn’t have to be fully answered right now, but a vision is helpful.
We would heed caution on starting this program until after the results of the Polygon initiative are clear. The small cap tokens from the initial funding round are still partly locked for the stated Polygon projects. If the majority of early buyers participate expecting a pump, due to a “price floor” and low float, it may actually create sharp price crashes once lockups fully expire. This could make the Arbitrum DAO allocation worth a lot less. A good way to mitigate long-term issues around token price is to effectively diligence projects. Tokens that actually have some sort of usecase or financial backing demonstrate less downside volatility. The counterargument is that this is following a more venture-esque approach with a few expected home runs. But when the portfolio of projects is limited to 10, the instance of a home run can also be limited since there’s always a luck component to venture investing, even if the initial vetting process has a stated ~4% acceptance rate.
We’re supportive of the direction q/acc is taking, particularly its use of DeFi-native mechanisms to align incentives, reduce ARB sell pressure, and offer a more sustainable approach to token-based funding. It’s clear that the program is designed to help teams launch tokens with improved structure and community alignment, and early results from Polygon show promise.
That said, the proposal leans heavily toward projects that are already looking to launch a token. While that’s a valid subset of builders, many high-potential teams on Arbitrum are still in earlier phases focused on technical development, infrastructure, or product validation before a token is even on the table.
In my opinion, both the current D.A.O. program and q/acc will be competing for the same group of builders. That’s totally fine, builders should be able to choose, but it could get a bit messy for the people running the programs. I can imagine a scenario where the same project gets accepted by both, and then timelines clash or even double funding happens. In the final proposal, I’d love to see something on how this will be handled. What would coordination between different grant programs look like?
We request $1.05M in ARB ($1.3M to protect from volatility) to launch q/acc on Arbitrum, allocated as follows:
I've been following q/acc since your first season with Polygon. There's definitely something interesting in this fresh approach to supporting builders. I love it. Also, it's clear builders like it (looking at how many applied for Season 1 and Season 2). I like the program because it brings together builders, investors, and chains in an active way. It also creates a competitive environment from the start, which is a good thing. Builders with strong marketing skills usually do much better in the long run.
I’d like to open up a few discussions around the following three points:
Hey Griff, thanks for putting this together. q/acc feels like the first grant design I’ve seen in a while that treats “sell pressure” and “grant‑farmers” as problems to engineer around, not just accept. I’m leaning in favor of this proposal, but before we go into Snapshot I have few questions / recommendations.
First, kudos for anchoring the proposal in Arbitrum’s context, aligning project selection with the new SOS proposals and tapping native infra like Camelot is exactly the kind of home‑field advantage we should be playing.
Given the results that were reportedly achieved on Polygon with a smaller budget (which seem impressive), I think ArbitrumDAO might be happy to see similar outcomes without pushing the budget too far.
Thank you for the offer, I like the principle of the ABC model itself, but there are many questions:
This, this, and this.
It’d be helpful to clarify exactly what kind of teams q/acc is targeting. Later-stage projects with established PMF likely won’t accept the dilution and complexity, while high-quality early-stage projects will typically prefer to delay token launches until after achieving PMF. In my experience as an investor, most token launches are successful only after clear PMF is achieved, making the proposition here difficult for both builders and investors to justify.
I don't believe this structure does not fit early stage projects looking for bootstrapping grants: it could actually set them up for failure.
They are forced to launch a token and collect no direct funding from it.
And anyone who’s launched a token backing a serious product knows what follows:
Now imagine doing that before you’ve even built the product, and for only a small amount.
It's a misaligned, high-friction path.
This is not what real builders need at this stage.
Yes, we need better ways to deploy capital. Yes, we need fewer frictions for top teams to get funding.
But forcing a premature token launch is not the right way:
This setup suits memecoins and hype cycles - which they do have of course a fit in crypto. But our builders' pipeline should do better.
Federico is right: strong teams with real products will raise at the right time, and if they want to go public with a token, they’ll have no shortage of options. Let’s not drive them away with the wrong ones.
Thanks
At present, q/acc reads more like a launchpad with some added support layers. To maximize its impact, we suggest exploring stronger collaboration with other grant domains (e.g., Domain Allocator Offering) to ensure that technical and pre-token projects also receive the resources they need. This could create a more holistic pipeline from early R&D through to tokenization while keeping Arbitrum attractive to a broader range of builders.
100% aligned on this. Already talked to @danielo about making q/acc part of his pipeline for the Hackahton Continuation Program and will absolutely connect with Questbook, AF, OCL and other programs to ensure they know to recommend builders our way.
We created a referral program last round which brought in one of our teams, and gave the program that recommended the team 0.2% of the initial token supply. We expect to do something similar.
Michigan Blockchain believes that the Quadratic Accelerator shows tremendous promise in growing Arbitrum and creating self-sustaining token economies built on the chain. DeFi is all about finding innovative ways to reimagine finance, and the traditional method of picking projects and allocating capital proves to be difficult when currencies are subject to price volatility. The q/acc addresses this problem by locking up ARB, minting tokens in accordance with supply and demand.
We are curious as to how the DAO will standardize success criteria across different projects? Will success criteria be based on tokenomics (price stability, trading volume, supply, etc.) or project-specific KPIs (user adoption, growth, cross-chain compatibility, etc.)? And will these benchmarks be determined per project, vertical, or uniform across all projects?
Thank you @Griff for the proposal, we are super excited to see how this will improve Arbitrum!
Michigan Blockchain; Jack Verrill; TG @JackVerrill
I’m not convinced that strong teams would choose to launch tokens through q/acc.
The twelve teams that have launched on q/acc so far can be found here: https://q-acc.giveth.io/projects
They are pretty great projects. These 12 teams wanted to launch a token, but they were short on capital. We offer them a fair launch platform, and a deep liquid low cap token. Many of these projects see ways where a token can enhance their product, or is core to their product, but the complexity of executing on a token launch is a lot of work, we streamline that process for them and they really appreciate it.
Jump to 2:19 and hear what one of our builders has to say about the experience: https://x.com/Nofuturephoto/status/1918297827425271885
It’d be helpful to clarify exactly what kind of teams q/acc is targeting. Later-stage projects with established PMF likely won’t accept the dilution and complexity, while high-quality early-stage projects will typically prefer to delay token launches until after achieving PMF. In my experience as an investor, most token launches are successful only after clear PMF is achieved, making the proposition here difficult for both builders and investors to justify.
We are definitely targeting the high-quality early-stage projects. The reason they need to delay their token launch is because they don't have q/acc to handle it for them! The q/acc launch helps them build an early committed community and unlike most token launch strategies, they have an external team doing it for them and deep liquidity & a price floor once they hit dexes. They can launch and then have effectively 6 months before the tokens from the fair launch unlock, so they have 6 months to get PMF.
Not every project will benefit from launching a token before PMF, it depends on the project. But there are a lot of instances where the token is integral to the project (e.g. the gas token for an Orbit chain, but also many other instances) where a token is a core part of the product and needs to be launched, or there is a strategic benefit to building incentivized community early, or several other circumstances.
Given q/acc’s track record on Polygon and cross-chain operability, we’d like to see stronger mechanisms that ensure enduring alignment with Arbitrum. While this deployment may initially target Arbitrum-native teams, there’s a risk that some projects might migrate or operate cross-chain post-launch, diluting the value created for the Arbitrum ecosystem.
We suggest exploring:
I love these suggestions... one important thing that maybe I didn't make clear in the proposal is that each team is absolutely locked into the Arbitrum ecosystem and the success of ARB because their token's price is directly pegged to the ARB price.
The Augmented Bonding Curve's (ABC) collateral will be ARB and the LPs on Camelot will be ARB pairs so if ARB goes up 5%, the builder's token goes up 5%, if ARB goes down 3%, the builder's token goes down 3%. There is a direct economic connection between each team's token and $ARB. Even if they nridge their token to other chains... their liquidity is here and denominated in ARB. I can't think of another program that offers stronger aligned incentives.
Also, we are absolutely excited about doubling down on our successful launch of Prismo's L2 gas token, and would love to repeat that same success with Orbit chains.
Reducing the per-project ARB allocation to $25–30K for initial cohorts, scaling upward based on community traction or usage milestones.
We can't really do this, we are using bancor-style bonding curves with a 12.5% reserve ratio, this means that if we only put $25k in the bonding curve their fair launch would start at a market cap of $200k. This is too low in my opinion for most teams we are talking to. We could do funny things... like launch the ABC with less collateral than it is supposed to have, but that is very bad practice.
We are looking at a solution that could work like this, where we would put KPI vesting on the team's tokens. This was in the original ABC design. The main KPIs we would look at are related to secondary market liquidity, circulating supply and market cap.
If we can implement KPI vesting then we could have a clawback mechanism.
Below is a comprehensive analysis of the proposal and the community’s reasoning, along with a simulated expert debate, recommendations for improvements, and novel enhancements suggested by the agent swarm.
Votes in favor of the proposal: 226 out of 230.
WOW! Thats amazing! I love that you guys added an AI Agent swarm to your offering! This is super cool!
Below is a v1 pre-vote feedback report from the Event Horizon community and agents (note: these perspectives are subject to change with the inclusion of continued forum discussion):
Below is a comprehensive analysis of the proposal and the community’s reasoning, along with a simulated expert debate, recommendations for improvements, and novel enhancements suggested by the swarm.
Votes in favor of the proposal: 226 out of 230.
─────────────────────────────
-- Innovative: Most voters favor the Quadratic Accelerator (q/acc) because it offers an innovative, mechanism‐driven alternative to traditional grant programs that have long suffered from issues such as immediate token sell pressure, misaligned incentives, and unsustainable funding. The proposal’s design – using quadratic funding, token lock‐ups, ABC bonding curves, and fair‐launch mechanisms – is seen as an effective way to create self‐sustaining token economies that align the interests of projects, the Arbitrum DAO, and the community.
-- Track Record: Voters are reassured by q/acc’s proven track record on Polygon’s zkEVM, where very rigorous project selection (acceptance rates <4%), clear KPIs, and strong onchain growth (10× market cap multiplier, new user adoption, etc.) demonstrated tangible impact.
-- Assurances Robust risk-mitigation strategies (smart contract audits, treasury volatility buffers, regulatory safeguards, and multisig DAO oversight) further instill confidence in the proposal’s long‐term value creation and ecosystem alignment.
Overall, the model is seen as a way to drive significant ARB demand, improve key onchain metrics, and transform the funding process by letting the community capture the upside of a project’s success.
– Complexity & Overhead: Some worry that the multi‐layered mechanisms (bonding curves, lock‐ups, fair launches) might create user friction or become too complex for new entrants.
– Replication Risk: Although successful on Polygon, market dynamics on Arbitrum may differ. Skeptics question whether similar growth and token demand can be replicated on Arbitrum and whether the program might expose the ecosystem to unforeseen risks.
– Regulatory & Technical Uncertainty: Despite risk mitigations, the complexity of token economies and evolving regulatory norms could pose challenges that are not fully addressed.
• Simplify Mechanisms Where Possible—Streamline the number of moving parts to reduce user confusion while maintaining core benefits.
• Strengthen Regulatory Buffers—Consider additional geoblocking measures and a tiered approval process for larger grant allocations.
• Monitor and Adapt—Establish a clear feedback cycle after Season 1 on Arbitrum to fine-tune the model based on real-world performance data.
Representative A (Proponent): q/acc addresses longstanding funding inefficiencies. It locks capital into growth cycles, deters short-term dumping, and encourages community alignment. The 4% acceptance rate on Polygon signals rigor, not inflation.
Representative B (Skeptic): Mechanically, it's promising. But the operational complexity might deter use, and its replicability on Arbitrum isn’t guaranteed. Ecosystem dynamics are non-transferable. What mechanisms will enforce long-term accountability?
Representative A: Three: First, tie fund disbursements to real usage metrics—retention, DAU, onchain actions. Second, create incentives for ecosystem-level contributions—tools, integrations, open standards. Third, allow projects to opt-in to ARB buyback pledges post-launch. These create structure, interdependence, and voluntary alignment.
Representative B: Retention-based milestones are critical. Public goods incentives are good—but underrepresented. The buyback concept is rare in grant ecosystems and could shift norms. What ensures the DAO learns from failed projects?
Representative A: Every project should submit post-program reporting: metrics, learnings, failures. These should be published, curated, and used to shape cohort design. Transparency compounds governance intelligence.
Representative B: With those extensions—tiered funding, cross-product rewards, ARB buybacks, and structured postmortems—I’d consider the proposal not just viable, but a new baseline. Provided UX and compliance hurdles are addressed, this becomes a scalable model.
Strength of Conviction and Voter Sway Analysis Before the Debate:
-- Proponents’ Conviction: ~90/100 -- Skeptics’ Conviction: ~40/100
After the Debate:
-- Proponents remain strongly convinced at ~85/100—confidence softens slightly due to recognition of execution complexity but remains high given the track record and built-in mitigations.
-- Skeptics shift to ~50–60/100 with integration of specific improvements:
Estimated Voter Sway: ~15–20% of voters previously on the fence likely to support the proposal if these enhancements are committed to, while hardened opposition remains minimal (<5%).
1. Cross-Product Rewards: Create bonus incentives for projects that build shared infrastructure, tooling, or integrations used by other q/acc participants. This promotes collaboration and ecosystem cohesion.
2. ARB Buyback Commitments: Allow projects to voluntarily commit a portion of future revenue toward ARB buybacks or returning value to the DAO treasury. It’s an opt-in model that aligns successful projects with long-term ARB demand.
3. Post-Program Reporting: Require all funded projects to submit a standardized post-mortem (successes, failures, metrics, and lessons learned). This builds institutional knowledge and strengthens DAO decision-making in future cohorts.
The Quadratic Accelerator proposal is widely supported for its innovative approach that addresses longstanding issues in traditional grant programs. A strong case is made through its clear tokenomics, proven success on Polygon, and comprehensive risk management. The simulated debate highlights that while there are execution and complexity concerns, these can be mitigated through additional UX improvements, further audits, and strengthened community engagement. The proposed novel enhancements—from tiered funding to post-program reporting—add even more robustness and long-term alignment to the initiative. Overall, the proposal is seen as a transformative opportunity that, with further refinements, should significantly enhance the Arbitrum ecosystem’s sustainability and growth.
I'm generally supportive of this proposal as mentioned in a 1-1 conversation
It provides an interesting next step in the builder support pipeline after the sort of programs that we're running with RnDAO.
4 requests for improvement of the proposal
I'd appreciate further clarity on the Development and Deployment costs. A breakdown separating what's actually Dev costs and marketing is super important IMO.
I don't understand the operations & Sacaling, is that given to the projects "given to teams" or is that basically the program manager's fee (including overhead)?
Basically, i would suggest redoing the budget before a vote and include:
Additionally, a fund management approach is missing (and we had a lot of issues with the Hackahton Continuation Program because of this...) See here:
Fund management process: The funds are transferred from the DAO treasury directly to the AF and the AF is instructed to swap ASAP (they can normally execute within a week). Assuming a 30% volatility buffer, the AF can most likely swap successfully and return the excess to the DAO. After the AF Swaps, stables are transferred to the MSS. After the investees complete KYC and contract signing with the AF, the program manager schedules transactions in the MSS. So it’s the MSS signers who approve but the program manager (e.g. RnDAO) who schedules the transaction. This way the funds remain under the control of the AF (the counterparty for the investment) until transferred to the investee. The program manager serves simply as an advisor/service provider for selecting the projects, suggesting the disbursement(s), and delivering some support services. Note that one of the strengths of the HCP is having a small amount of funds disbursed each month as opposed to a lump sum upfront, so we can track progress and stop the disbursement if the projects are not executing well. Hence, the program manager serves as a scheduler for the monthly/milestone transactions.
Final point, I'd appreciate some mapping of the next step of the journey after q/acc based on the amounts these projects have raised. Will they go to raise a seed round and then list in CEXs? Will they...? at least some rough idea of what makes sense as next steps.
the name is horrible. Can we call it "Arbitrum Token Launchpad pilot"? or something that's not more self-referntial web3 mental mast...? We really need to move into more user friendly language :slight_smile:
Thank you for presenting such an ambitious and thoughtfully constructed proposal. We appreciate the innovative approach q/acc brings to the table, especially its focus on sustainable token economies, on-chain capital formation, and reducing the inefficiencies seen in traditional grant programs. The use of bonding curves, quadratic funding, and protocol-aligned token launches aligns well with Arbitrum’s ethos of experimentation and community-driven development.
That said, before moving forward to an onchain vote, we’d like to share two key areas we believe could be improved to enhance the proposal’s impact and sustainability:
Thank you for presenting such an ambitious and thoughtfully constructed proposal. We appreciate the innovative approach q/acc brings to the table, especially its focus on sustainable token economies, on-chain capital formation, and reducing the inefficiencies seen in traditional grant programs. The use of bonding curves, quadratic funding, and protocol-aligned token launches aligns well with Arbitrum’s ethos of experimentation and community-driven development.
That said, before moving forward to an onchain vote, we’d like to share two key areas we believe could be improved to enhance the proposal’s impact and sustainability:
Given q/acc’s track record on Polygon and cross-chain operability, we’d like to see stronger mechanisms that ensure enduring alignment with Arbitrum. While this deployment may initially target Arbitrum-native teams, there’s a risk that some projects might migrate or operate cross-chain post-launch, diluting the value created for the Arbitrum ecosystem.
We suggest exploring:
Anchoring q/acc participants more tightly to Arbitrum will ensure the DAO captures more lasting upside from its initial investment.
The proposal requests $500K in ARB for project bonding curve collateral, roughly 50% of the total ask. While we understand the mechanism is structured to be non-dilutive and potentially recoupable, it still represents significant upfront capital risk.
We believe the DAO could benefit from a more modular and performance-based allocation model, particularly for early-stage cohorts.
Suggestions include:
This would allow the DAO to experiment with the q/acc model while containing downside exposure, especially in the program’s initial season.
q/acc offers a novel approach to ecosystem development that feels well suited to Arbitrum’s DeFi leadership and innovation-focused community. If appropriately structured and aligned with Arbitrum’s long-term strategy, this program has the potential to complement traditional grant structures with a more self-sustaining alternative.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
In the current DDA program season three the grantees are paid in USDC. It was a similar case in season 2.
We like the new approach taken instead of traditional grant approaches. The approach is promising aligning incentives through q/acc, bonding curves, and fair launches it also resembles more like a token launchpad ( Fjord Foundry). The price of the token is very substantial and depends on the market.
Are there any legal challenges to this? If yes how do you plan to address these?
Prismo has a partnership with (DBM) of the Philippines and just has a working MVP how to do you deem this as pmf? The project is supposed to launch it’s mainnet in Q2.
While the projects might have liquidity, but there is little to no trading volumes which raises our concern on the demand for these tokens.
The success of these project also depends on how they plan to utilise the 90% tokenomics if they won’t utilise it efficiently it is most likely going to fail.
Our suggestion would be make this program more suitable for Arbitrum Native Projects since we have wider ecosystem than Polygon. Preference for Arbitrum native or Arbitrum aligned projects those from STIP, LTIPP, or other DAO efforts.
Thank you, @Griff, for bringing this compelling proposal to the Forum. We, who are also members of the Gitcoin Governance Council, have been supportive of quadratic funding and other innovative grant distribution models that align clear community signaling with meaningful incentive structures. This proposal is exciting as it introduces novel mechanisms by combining ABC bonding curves and quadratic funding, explicitly designed to address persistent issues like sell pressure on ARB and incentive misalignment that often plague traditional grants.
However, precisely because we understand both the promise and the practical challenges inherent in such mechanisms, we have identified several strategic points we believe warrant further clarity before proceeding to a formal vote.
Thank you, @Griff, for bringing this compelling proposal to the Forum. We, who are also members of the Gitcoin Governance Council, have been supportive of quadratic funding and other innovative grant distribution models that align clear community signaling with meaningful incentive structures. This proposal is exciting as it introduces novel mechanisms by combining ABC bonding curves and quadratic funding, explicitly designed to address persistent issues like sell pressure on ARB and incentive misalignment that often plague traditional grants.
However, precisely because we understand both the promise and the practical challenges inherent in such mechanisms, we have identified several strategic points we believe warrant further clarity before proceeding to a formal vote.
Early-stage projects typically indicate that their primary constraint is operational capital rather than secondary market liquidity. While ABC bonding curves lock 50k ARB per project, complemented by matching pools, we are concerned about the actual effectiveness of this liquidity provision.
Examining the Polygon pilot, particularly the top-funded cohort such as x23.ai, the current liquidity is under $120k against a fully diluted valuation (FDV) of approximately $800k (link). Considering the scale of investment, such limited liquidity may neither significantly extend project runway nor improve token price discovery. In practice, it could inadvertently amplify token launch risks rather than alleviating funding pressures.
We ask you to explicitly evaluate the liquidity provision mechanism's empirical effectiveness in meeting builders’ core financial needs to see if this is better than simply giving funds to them.
Actually, low market caps are our sweet spot :-D. Even though the market caps are low, the market caps for the Season 1 teams during their q/acc round were even LOWER!
100%, some projects don’t need a token or aren’t ready for a token. This program is NOT for them. It is not a one size fits all solution, it is only for projects that can benefit from launching a low cap utility token with deep liquidity, and they want to do a fair launch (not a pump and dump). However, you would be surprised at how many teams there are like this.
You already provided some perspectives on this by clarifying detailed targeting of this funding, but we'd appreciate further clarity on if this is actually helping projects based on some actual data.
Requiring every recipient to spin up a live token adds a layer of operational drag that many seed-stage teams are ill-equipped to handle. Beyond smart contract deployment, founders must craft vesting schedules, mediate community expectations, often before product-market fit.
On the legal side, we partnered with MIDAO to give our builders a legal structure in the Marshal Islands that works with our token design, some of the projects took that route and others already had a legal structure that worked that they set up before being accepted into our program.
Although it seems there is some legal support provided, that's not the entirety of this complexity. How do you think this complexity/cost can be overcome or mitigated?
We recognize the ABC mechanism significantly reduces immediate sell pressure on ARB tokens by locking them within liquidity pools. However, this approach effectively immobilizes capital in very low-turnover micro-pools (in certain amount of cases), functionally resembling a token burn. Or, is there any way the DAO can reclaim ARB provided at some point?
Although receiving 5% of each project's token issuance is attractive, governance tokens from small-cap projects are notoriously illiquid and may impose significant portfolio-management overhead relative to the potential return. If we are to focus on this aspect, employing a dedicated investment vehicle, similar to the GCP, might offer a more strategically sound approach to capturing economic upside from supported projects. We'd love to understand the rationale of gaining tokens of projects that this type of funding mechanism targets actually benefits Arbitrum DAO financially after some operational overhead.
Everytime a token is launched, 5% of the initially minted supply (320k tokens) would be locked for a year in the Payment Processor contract and then streamed for a year, claimable by an address that an AAE would control (I assume a multisig).
Gitcoin’s recent transition from broad quadratic funding (QF) rounds to the more focused DDA framework underscores some needs toward precision capital deployment. Likewise, Arbitrum’s own DDA pilot programs have demonstrated the operational advantages of DDA-based funding.
In that regard, it would be beneficial to outline explicitly how q/acc's structure specifically outperforms DDA on key dimensions such as project targeting accuracy, evaluation overhead or so.
Or, it is also beneficial to demonstrate strong post-launch KPI performance (revenue, user retention, and actual product-market fit) clearly linked to the ABC and quadratic funding structures. Transparent and detailed reporting of these outcomes will ensure this design could potentially outperform the existing funding scheme.
At this point, we are reluctant to endorse the proposal. Our hesitation stems from several points noted above: certain aspects remain insufficiently clear, and we are not yet convinced that the mechanisms outlined would potentially provide an effective solution for the Arbitrum DAO or its broader ecosystem. Thus, we still think it would be more straightforward to do a simple quadratic funding rather than this mechanism if we are to do something different from the existing one.
If there are existing data, empirical findings, or even well-reasoned hypotheses that could bolster the current design and address the uncertainties we have raised, we would greatly appreciate it if you could share them. Such evidence would go a long way toward strengthening the proposal and facilitating an informed decision.
To reiterate, we do recognize the value and importance of innovative experiments of this kind, and in principle we are eager to lend our support. Our goal is simply to ensure that any initiative we back is both robust and beneficial to the community, at least hypothetically.
First and foremost, Griff, I want to applaud you for establishing such a net-positive model. Often grant programs are large gambles for the ecosystem. But, the alignment here has managed to assuage the vast majority of economic risk while also preserving, and in some ways expanding, benefits to the recipients.
I echo a lot of the positive feedback as well as some of the points of consideration (namely, token necessity) which have been stated, and you largely addressed.
First and foremost, Griff, I want to applaud you for establishing such a net-positive model. Often grant programs are large gambles for the ecosystem. But, the alignment here has managed to assuage the vast majority of economic risk while also preserving, and in some ways expanding, benefits to the recipients.
I echo a lot of the positive feedback as well as some of the points of consideration (namely, token necessity) which have been stated, and you largely addressed.
A couple of new points of consideration which I'd love your thoughts on are around administrative considerations for the DAO. If we assume this becomes a readily adopted and seasonal model utilized by the DAO, the treasury, in a sense, becomes a venture portfolio with micro allocations of dozens of q/acc funded project tokens. I by no means think this is a blocker, but I do believe this opens a couple of avenues warranting greater consideration:
Interested to hear your thoughts and past experiences on these points ^
Interested to hear your thoughts and past experiences on these points ^
Everytime a token is launched, 5% of the initially minted supply (320k tokens) would be locked for a year in the Payment Processor contract and then streamed for a year, claimable by an address that an AAE would control (I assume a multisig).
We would need guidance from an AAE on this IMO.
I assume one of the AAE's can take this on for the DAO. Given the diagram below it fals under either the AF or Entropy.
Looks like overall program KPIs are presented, but could we get some more clarity on the KPIs required for the unlock to happen as a project graduates? Are these projects specific or generalized? How public will they be/is there a place to view milestones till graduation?
Looks like overall program KPIs are presented, but could we get some more clarity on the KPIs required for the unlock to happen as a project graduates? Are these projects specific or generalized? How public will they be/is there a place to view milestones till graduation?
They are not project specific, they are mostly economic, and the data is very public
The default graduation KPIs consider several factors:
However, we are early in experimenting with this mechanism and have gotten feedback that this is too strict so we are currently working on an accelerated graduation plan that can allow teams to change from time based vesting for their token unlock to a KPI based unlock for the Team's token. This is still early in it's design though, and no promises it will validated enough to make it into the first season.
What’s the long-term vision behind dealing with the tokens that Arbitrum receives, and who will manage this portfolio of small caps? Should DAO-held tokens be used for treasury diversification, sold for cash, burned, used in retroactive reward programs, etc? This doesn’t have to be fully answered right now, but a vision is helpful.
Another great question! I would personally advise to hodl and count it as treasury diversification, but we will need to get advice on this from some AAEs about the ideal address to set in the protocol for Arbitrum's hodlings. I would imagine the AF will hold the funds and it would be managed by some treasury committee... but the initial tokens are locked for a year and then streamed for a year... so there is a lot of time to figure out the management.
If the majority of early buyers participate expecting a pump, due to a “price floor” and low float, it may actually create sharp price crashes once lockups fully expire. This could make the Arbitrum DAO allocation worth a lot less. A good way to mitigate long-term issues around token price is to effectively diligence projects. Tokens that actually have some sort of usecase or financial backing demonstrate less downside volatility. The counterargument is that this is following a more venture-esque approach with a few expected home runs. But when the portfolio of projects is limited to 10, the instance of a home run can also be limited since there’s always a luck component to venture investing, even if the initial vetting process has a stated ~4% acceptance rate.
Wow! You really get it! Thank you for diving in so deep to this, it's pretty complicated but you really seem to understand the mechanism.
Yes, not every team is going to be a winner... some projects will fail and the tokens won't be worth much... but as you said that is standard for small cap investments (and grant programs). The projects have 6 months to prove token demand before the buyers in the q/acc round have their tokens start to unlock, and a year before the larger team allocations start to unlock.
The best thing to do is to look at the quality of our projects and decide if you think they are worth betting on.
From a market-oriented standpoint, the Quadratic Accelerator hits all the right notes. It transforms ecosystem funding into an organic experiment and I love it!.
Really aligned with this direction. qacc is the kind of experiment we need more of — market-driven, lean, and focused on real outcomes without relying on artificial support, it's really interesting how the clear winner of season 1 was x23ai a product that probably all delegates are using.
From a market-oriented standpoint, the Quadratic Accelerator hits all the right notes. It transforms ecosystem funding into an organic experiment and I love it!.
Really aligned with this direction. qacc is the kind of experiment we need more of — market-driven, lean, and focused on real outcomes without relying on artificial support, it's really interesting how the clear winner of season 1 was x23ai a product that probably all delegates are using.
In most ecosystems, public goods funding ends up rewarding participation or presence, not results. qacc flips that script — it ties funding to actual demand, and that's the right approach. If no one cares about your project, it doesn’t get resources. Simple.
I also like that this isn’t trying to become a permanent bureaucracy. It’s scoped, targeted, and has clear bounds. Run it, measure it, and decide based on outcomes. That’s exactly how governance experiments should be done — small, measurable, and easy to shut off if it doesn’t work.
From a tokenomics angle, it’s a smart structure. Instead of flooding the market with ARB that gets dumped, it locks it up and releases it only when there's traction. That protects token value while still incentivizing builders.
Fully support trying this out. (💙,💎)
Thanks for the kind words @Tane! I'll jump straight to answering your Q's
Thanks for the kind words @Tane! I'll jump straight to answering your Q's
We ask you to explicitly evaluate the liquidity provision mechanism’s empirical effectiveness in meeting builders’ core financial needs to see if this is better than simply giving funds to them.
The $120k liquidity is just the Liquidity in the DEX, but their Augmented Bonding Curve (ABC) also has over $100k in it, it just doesn't show on gecko terminal. Here is a screen shot of the dashboard we use for internal tracking, which shows the collateral for each ABC in the protocol:
As far as empirical effectiveness, if you go to your link and click Show X23/WPOL Price Chart in WPOL
You will see that EVERY token has beaten the price of POL, which is pretty incredible considering that the market was tanking to unexpected lows during the short 2 months that these tokens have been liquid. For a 6-figure market cap token to have such a strong resistance to downward market pressure is impressive to say the least.
You can also simply try to buy and sell the token on quickswap to see the experienced liquidity: https://dapp.quickswap.exchange/swap/best/0x3c499c542cEF5E3811e1192ce70d8cC03d5c3359/0xc530B75465Ce3c6286e718110A7B2e2B64Bdc860
And
The token is paired with POL so it has great routing so any token can be used to buy it and $3000 moves the price 1% either direction.
As far as "meeting builders’ core financial needs." Arbitrum has a lot of programs to do that. Questbook, AF & OCL are throwing money at builders left and right, and I am excited for their programs to recommend great builders to us.
We help them launch their token on Arbitrum, lock them into the Arbitrum ecosystem, and create demand for ARB in the process. This is not for every project, but for many projects, it is a perfect fit.
Requiring every recipient to spin up a live token adds a layer of operational drag that many seed-stage teams are ill-equipped to handle. Beyond smart contract deployment, founders must craft vesting schedules, mediate community expectations, often before product-market fit.
Although it seems there is some legal support provided, that’s not the entirety of this complexity. How do you think this complexity/cost can be overcome or mitigated?
You are absolutely right, most seed stage teams are not ready for a token, even though MANY want it. The key feature to mitigate this issue is the screening process, we had less than a 4% acceptance rate for projects in the first cohort. We choose teams that are ready to integrate a token into their product and have figured out where the demand will come from.
Also, as far as vesting schedules and all the other token design related issues. We have that all set for the team, they just need to say the addresses for their vested tokens and its done, and the rest of their token launch process from the technical side, is covered.
From the social side, absolutely they now have a second product to sell... their token! But we try to choose builders that have a token design that supports the needs of their core product., like the gas token for an L2 (Prismo) or creative ideas like what To Da Moon is doing.
We recognize the ABC mechanism significantly reduces immediate sell pressure on ARB tokens by locking them within liquidity pools. However, this approach effectively immobilizes capital in very low-turnover micro-pools (in certain amount of cases), functionally resembling a token burn. Or, is there any way the DAO can reclaim ARB provided at some point?
We aren't just "mitigating sell pressure" the ARB is acting like a magnet, attracting more ARB! As tokens get sold via q/acc, ARB gets sucked into the ABC. We created over 400k POL demand with our program in season 1 on zkEVM, we can create even more demand for ARB given the lessons we've learned so far.
We don't currently have a mechanism for the ARB to be clawed back, other than token sales.
Although receiving 5% of each project’s token issuance is attractive, governance tokens from small-cap projects are notoriously illiquid and may impose significant portfolio-management overhead relative to the potential return. If we are to focus on this aspect, employing a dedicated investment vehicle, similar to the GCP, might offer a more strategically sound approach to capturing economic upside from supported projects. We’d love to understand the rationale of gaining tokens of projects that this type of funding mechanism targets actually benefits Arbitrum DAO financially after some operational overhead.
These tokens are very liquid by design, but I would keep the operational overhead light and just make a simple rule, like sell 1/2 tokens if they are over 20M market cap, another 1/4 at 50M, move the rest into treasury or something like that. There is no reason to bloat this proposal with bureaucratic overhead... We can let an AAE handle the treasury management.
Gitcoin’s recent transition from broad quadratic funding (QF) rounds to the more focused DDA framework underscores some needs toward precision capital deployment. Likewise, Arbitrum’s own DDA pilot programs have demonstrated the operational advantages of DDA-based funding.
In that regard, it would be beneficial to outline explicitly how q/acc’s structure specifically outperforms DDA on key dimensions such as project targeting accuracy, evaluation overhead or so.
Or, it is also beneficial to demonstrate strong post-launch KPI performance (revenue, user retention, and actual product-market fit) clearly linked to the ABC and quadratic funding structures. Transparent and detailed reporting of these outcomes will ensure this design could potentially outperform the existing funding scheme.
I would consider q/acc to be a specific domain itself: Small startups that want to tokenize. This is the domain we want to support. I think its important to not be overly exposed to one narrative, AI, NFTs, DeFi, Wallets, Gaming, DAOs, Music, L2s; we have helped teams from all of these verticals launch tokens. If we were only oing AI tokens, and the AI narative dies, we are in trouble.
Instead we are going more horizontal, supporting small teams that want to launch a token for their product, and we will make it easy for them to launch their token here on Arbitrum.
I don't see us needing to out perform DDA programs on these metrics, we work along side these programs to support the builders that go through them to help them launch their token (if they need one) and create demand for ARB while we do it!
Most of the KPIs we hope to be judged on are not even on the table for DDA grant programs, they don't generate ARB demand and they don't launch tokens.
:pushpin: Onchain Growth – 10x – Market cap growth (in ARB) compared to ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will produce 10M ARB worth of market caps
:pushpin: ARB Demand Ratio – 25% – Ratio of ARB in protocol vs ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will capture 1.25M worth of ARB in the protocol, creating 250k worth of ARB buying pressure.
:pushpin: Sustained Value – 1 year – Long-term market cap growth (in ARB) of tokens. E.g The 10x growth will last for at least a year.
:pushpin: First-time Arbitrum Users – 500 – Number of q/acc participants new to Arbitrum that buy more than $10 of tokens. E.g 500 users that pass our sybil filter will have never used Arbitrum before.
:pushpin: On-Chain Activity – Varied – Trading volume, user participation, and liquidity metrics. This will be tracked but it is so gameable, it’s not worth creating an exact metric, but we will create a lot of onchain activity.
100% we have a referral program behind the scenes, which will give upside to Questbook and other allies in the Arbitrum Ecosystem in the teams they recommend to us if they make it into the round.
100% we have a referral program behind the scenes, which will give upside to Questbook and other allies in the Arbitrum Ecosystem in the teams they recommend to us if they make it into the round.
I don't think it's worth the complexity... The goal would be to not sell the ARB and just return it to the DAO if it is unused... in the end, we need stables, which we will convert to ARB at the last minute, so the volatility buffer is there for that, and i't probably better to just sell less ARB. However, it could be worth the complexity... IF we are just converting it all to stables and then sending the excess stables to STEP to do with it what they will. In the end, I imagine it would all be handled by the AAE that manages us (probably the foundation).
We are discussing some potential changes to the system that rhymes with this, but in the current design, that $50k ARB is all locked in a bonding curve, not given to the team. So they don't have it, it is collateralizing the initially minted locked tokens (Including Arbitrum DAO's token allocation). While technically possible to mint the tokens without collateral... I would consider it bad practice.
These teams do not get free ARB, they get a liquid token economy that gives them revenue as they sell tokens, and a subsidized token launch. So the teams this works best for aren't always the same ones that would apply for a questbook grant, they are likely to be looking for investment, something where maybe they have a good business model, and clear token utility, but they don't have an obvious path to becoming billion dollar unicorns so VC's are not really interested.
This is great feed back though! Thanks @0xDonPepe!
Really liking the direction here, especially the effort to move away from traditional grant farming and build something that rewards long-term builders. Just curious — since projects will be issuing tokenized grants, have you thought about how to handle potential risks in secondary markets? Like speculative trading or farming behavior after token issuance. Are there any built-in mechanisms to ensure tokens stay tied to actual product milestones, rather than becoming a short-term hype vehicle?
Really liking the direction here, especially the effort to move away from traditional grant farming and build something that rewards long-term builders. Just curious — since projects will be issuing tokenized grants, have you thought about how to handle potential risks in secondary markets? Like speculative trading or farming behavior after token issuance. Are there any built-in mechanisms to ensure tokens stay tied to actual product milestones, rather than becoming a short-term hype vehicle?
Yes! Bonding curves actually dampen volatility, as the price goes up, more tokens are minted, as the price goes down, tokens are burned. This desing naturally combats the a short-term hype cycles.
Tying token prices to product results however is just impossible sadly... I wish the free market worked that way :frowning: Each project that goes through our program must have a plan for ACTUAL token utility. So there will be some correlation of course.... but in my experience, tokens go up and down based on anything but product advancement.
Hi @Griff,
Thanks for this interesting and innovative proposal. I’d love to better understand your broader operating model so we can set expectations clearly.
Hi @Griff,
Thanks for this interesting and innovative proposal. I’d love to better understand your broader operating model so we can set expectations clearly.
From what I gather, q/acc is positioned as a multi-chain protocol that you’re deploying across different ecosystems (e.g., Polygon, now potentially Arbitrum), rather than something exclusive to one chain. That makes sense! Especially if the goal is to standardize more sustainable token launches across Web3.
That said, I’d appreciate clarification on a few points to better understand how this fits within Arbitrum’s strategy:
How do you prioritize chain-specific alignment when running q/acc across multiple ecosystems? For example, are you planning to tailor cohorts to each chain’s priorities, or do you envision more generalized deployment?
Could you share more on your governance and funding model? For instance, do DAOs fund each cohort separately, or is there shared infrastructure (dev, ops, tooling) across chains?
Would Arbitrum have any ongoing role e.g. representatives, visibility, or feedback loops in guiding cohort selection, KPIs, or narrative direction if this pilot is funded?
Finally, are you planning to run a cohort with another ecosystem at the same time as the proposed Arbitrum cohort, or would this be a dedicated focus?
q/acc seems like a cool model. I’m simply looking to understand more clearly how it would operate with Arbitrum, especially given your cross-chain strategy.
Thank you
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
Thanks @Griff for this proposal. It’s nice to see creative alternatives to customary grant programs like this.
There are a handful of aspects that we like about the q/acc setup, as it—
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
Thanks @Griff for this proposal. It’s nice to see creative alternatives to customary grant programs like this.
There are a handful of aspects that we like about the q/acc setup, as it—
We strongly believe that one of the criteria for selecting candidates is whether or not the project issuing a token is warranted. The majority of token launches are a form of raising capital as opposed to some sort of utility or actual ownership over a business/subject to yield. The latter is of course more difficult due to regulations, and we’ve seen smaller projects simply issue traditional equity to investors as opposed to offering a token—these projects also apply for grants solely for funding without explicit association to a token. If projects don’t have a concrete vision for their token, it may be best for the q/acc team to divert them to alternative grant programs. One other aspect would be to work with other grant teams, having them funnel promising projects that may be ready to issue a token. We more easily conceive the q/acc setup as a later-stage funding mechanism, kind of like a follow-on investment. Many grant programs suffer from not doubling down on their winners, so there’s merit to this approach. This may also make your due diligence process easier where builders can take an initial survey, and if they indicate no desire for a token now—or are too early in development/traction—they can be routed elsewhere.
Looks like overall program KPIs are presented, but could we get some more clarity on the KPIs required for the unlock to happen as a project graduates? Are these projects specific or generalized? How public will they be/is there a place to view milestones till graduation?
What’s the long-term vision behind dealing with the tokens that Arbitrum receives, and who will manage this portfolio of small caps? Should DAO-held tokens be used for treasury diversification, sold for cash, burned, used in retroactive reward programs, etc? This doesn’t have to be fully answered right now, but a vision is helpful.
We would heed caution on starting this program until after the results of the Polygon initiative are clear. The small cap tokens from the initial funding round are still partly locked for the stated Polygon projects. If the majority of early buyers participate expecting a pump, due to a “price floor” and low float, it may actually create sharp price crashes once lockups fully expire. This could make the Arbitrum DAO allocation worth a lot less. A good way to mitigate long-term issues around token price is to effectively diligence projects. Tokens that actually have some sort of usecase or financial backing demonstrate less downside volatility. The counterargument is that this is following a more venture-esque approach with a few expected home runs. But when the portfolio of projects is limited to 10, the instance of a home run can also be limited since there’s always a luck component to venture investing, even if the initial vetting process has a stated ~4% acceptance rate.
We’re supportive of the direction q/acc is taking, particularly its use of DeFi-native mechanisms to align incentives, reduce ARB sell pressure, and offer a more sustainable approach to token-based funding. It’s clear that the program is designed to help teams launch tokens with improved structure and community alignment, and early results from Polygon show promise.
That said, the proposal leans heavily toward projects that are already looking to launch a token. While that’s a valid subset of builders, many high-potential teams on Arbitrum are still in earlier phases focused on technical development, infrastructure, or product validation before a token is even on the table.
In my opinion, both the current D.A.O. program and q/acc will be competing for the same group of builders. That’s totally fine, builders should be able to choose, but it could get a bit messy for the people running the programs. I can imagine a scenario where the same project gets accepted by both, and then timelines clash or even double funding happens. In the final proposal, I’d love to see something on how this will be handled. What would coordination between different grant programs look like?
We request $1.05M in ARB ($1.3M to protect from volatility) to launch q/acc on Arbitrum, allocated as follows:
I've been following q/acc since your first season with Polygon. There's definitely something interesting in this fresh approach to supporting builders. I love it. Also, it's clear builders like it (looking at how many applied for Season 1 and Season 2). I like the program because it brings together builders, investors, and chains in an active way. It also creates a competitive environment from the start, which is a good thing. Builders with strong marketing skills usually do much better in the long run.
I’d like to open up a few discussions around the following three points:
Hey Griff, thanks for putting this together. q/acc feels like the first grant design I’ve seen in a while that treats “sell pressure” and “grant‑farmers” as problems to engineer around, not just accept. I’m leaning in favor of this proposal, but before we go into Snapshot I have few questions / recommendations.
First, kudos for anchoring the proposal in Arbitrum’s context, aligning project selection with the new SOS proposals and tapping native infra like Camelot is exactly the kind of home‑field advantage we should be playing.
Given the results that were reportedly achieved on Polygon with a smaller budget (which seem impressive), I think ArbitrumDAO might be happy to see similar outcomes without pushing the budget too far.
We’re supportive of the direction q/acc is taking, particularly its use of DeFi-native mechanisms to align incentives, reduce ARB sell pressure, and offer a more sustainable approach to token-based funding. It’s clear that the program is designed to help teams launch tokens with improved structure and community alignment, and early results from Polygon show promise.
That said, the proposal leans heavily toward projects that are already looking to launch a token. While that’s a valid subset of builders, many high-potential teams on Arbitrum are still in earlier phases focused on technical development, infrastructure, or product validation before a token is even on the table.
At present, q/acc reads more like a launchpad with some added support layers. To maximize its impact, we suggest exploring stronger collaboration with other grant domains (e.g., Domain Allocator Offering) to ensure that technical and pre-token projects also receive the resources they need. This could create a more holistic pipeline from early R&D through to tokenization while keeping Arbitrum attractive to a broader range of builders.
In my opinion, both the current D.A.O. program and q/acc will be competing for the same group of builders. That’s totally fine, builders should be able to choose, but it could get a bit messy for the people running the programs. I can imagine a scenario where the same project gets accepted by both, and then timelines clash or even double funding happens. In the final proposal, I’d love to see something on how this will be handled. What would coordination between different grant programs look like?
We absolutely will work with other grant programs, and we have a referral program for them to bring us good teams. But the crossover will probably be more with OCL and the AF more than questbook. I would love to see us launch some Orbit Chains' Gas Tokens on q/acc, like we did for Prismo in season 1. We compliment existing grant programs well, because we don't impose product deadlines or milestones, it is pure incentive alignment. If projects do well and the market buys a lot of tokens, they collect revenue and have clear upside in their own success (they have over 50% of the Max Supply). If they don't well then they don't collect revenue and market pushes their token price down.
Looking at the outcomes from Season 1 and 2 with Polygon, it seems like investors (donors) didn’t really get much return. Builders benefited the most, which is fine, but the tokens investors got ended up with very low market caps and little activity. For example, the top-funded project from Season 1 was x23, and its current market cap is around $800K. For this program to be sustainable long-term, I feel like this needs to be addressed. Investors should have a solid reason to take part. How are you thinking about solving this?
Actually, low market caps are our sweet spot :-D. Even though the market caps are low, the market caps for the Season 1 teams during their q/acc round were even LOWER!
Every single person who bought in during the first q/acc round got a very good deal on the token, and relative to POL, the price people paid is up at worst 6% and in the case of Prismo, supporters are up 34%. There was a horrible market down turn in Q1 so in dollars people are down in some of the projects... but it would be worse if they were just holding the POL they put in, and much worse if they were holding low cap alts in the same market cap range.
Here is the list of prices people paid and the current market price for Season 1 projects:
| Price for q/acc buyers (in POL) | Price on May 15 (in POL) | % Increase since q/acc 1 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prismo Technology | 0.2602 | 0.3492 | 34.23% |
| Xade Finance | 0.2636 | 0.3271 | 24.09% |
| Citizen Wallet | 0.3028 | 0.371 | 22.52% |
| x23.ai | 0.4035 | 0.4903 | 21.51% |
| The Grand Timeline | 0.2521 | 0.281 | 11.46% |
| Akarun | 0.2272 | 0.2457 | 8.14% |
| Ancient Beast | 0.2229 | 0.2389 | 7.18% |
| Melodex by DjookyX | 0.2233 | 0.2377 | 6.45% |
We launch at low market caps and provide deep liquidity for legit utility tokens. This round ended right before Trump came to office and the market TANKED... yet the tokens are still alive, they didn't crash like the other small caps. There is reduced risk, so there is also reduced upside... It is not really built like other launchpads which are really just a complicated form of gambling... Investors can make small steady gains (relative to ARB) while supporting builders.
That said, tokens bought during the first q/acc round unlock in June, and stream for 6 months, so the gains made so far are not locked in. The teams still need to do well for investors to make money. There is no magic money making tokenomics here... Teams have to produce for their supporters to make a profit.
Not every project needs (or is ready for) a token. One of my main concerns with this program is that it might be too complicated for serious web3 startups to join. For small projects, a token might work, but for bigger teams with bigger team, and maybe existing investors, launching a token isn’t easy. They need legal structure, proper distribution plans, etc. Is there a way for these kinds of projects to also be included in the program? I’d love to see this part addressed in the proposal, too.
100%, some projects don't need a token or aren't ready for a token. This program is NOT for them. It is not a one size fits all solution, it is only for projects that can benefit from launching a low cap utility token with deep liquidity, and they want to do a fair launch (not a pump and dump). However, you would be surprised at how many teams there are like this.
On the legal side, we partnered with MIDAO to give our builders a legal structure in the Marshal Islands that works with our token design, some of the projects took that route and others already had a legal structure that worked that they set up before being accepted into our program.
We request $1.05M in ARB ($1.3M to protect from volatility) to launch q/acc on Arbitrum, allocated as follows:
Hey @Griff, thanks for this proposal. It's very well written. We're still taking time to review it and will provide more comprehensive feedback on all points.
As an initial reaction - it would be helpful if you could share more insight into why you've requested $1.05M from ArbitrumDAO, rather than an amount closer to what you received to launch the pilot on Polygon (1.76M POL, which I assume was around $400–500k).
Given the results that were reportedly achieved on Polygon with a smaller budget (which seem impressive), I think ArbitrumDAO might be happy to see similar outcomes without pushing the budget too far.
I've been following q/acc since your first season with Polygon. There's definitely something interesting in this fresh approach to supporting builders. I love it. Also, it's clear builders like it (looking at how many applied for Season 1 and Season 2). I like the program because it brings together builders, investors, and chains in an active way. It also creates a competitive environment from the start, which is a good thing. Builders with strong marketing skills usually do much better in the long run.
I’d like to open up a few discussions around the following three points:
1. Competition with DAO programs and other grants (e.g., Foundation)
In my opinion, both the current D.A.O. program and q/acc will be competing for the same group of builders. That’s totally fine, builders should be able to choose, but it could get a bit messy for the people running the programs. I can imagine a scenario where the same project gets accepted by both, and then timelines clash or even double funding happens. In the final proposal, I’d love to see something on how this will be handled. What would coordination between different grant programs look like?
2. Low market cap concerns
Looking at the outcomes from Season 1 and 2 with Polygon, it seems like investors (donors) didn’t really get much return. Builders benefited the most, which is fine, but the tokens investors got ended up with very low market caps and little activity. For example, the top-funded project from Season 1 was x23, and its current market cap is around $800K. For this program to be sustainable long-term, I feel like this needs to be addressed. Investors should have a solid reason to take part. How are you thinking about solving this?
DexScreener (x23 token): https://dexscreener.com/polygon/0x0de6da16d5181a9fe2543ce1eeb4bfd268d68838
3. Token launch push
Not every project needs (or is ready for) a token. One of my main concerns with this program is that it might be too complicated for serious web3 startups to join. For small projects, a token might work, but for bigger teams with bigger team, and maybe existing investors, launching a token isn’t easy. They need legal structure, proper distribution plans, etc. Is there a way for these kinds of projects to also be included in the program? I’d love to see this part addressed in the proposal, too.
Hey Griff, thanks for putting this together. q/acc feels like the first grant design I’ve seen in a while that treats “sell pressure” and “grant‑farmers” as problems to engineer around, not just accept. I’m leaning in favor of this proposal, but before we go into Snapshot I have few questions / recommendations.
First, kudos for anchoring the proposal in Arbitrum’s context, aligning project selection with the new SOS proposals and tapping native infra like Camelot is exactly the kind of home‑field advantage we should be playing.
My first recommendation would be to try and formalize a partnership with Questbook’s “New Ideas” and/or “Dev Tooling” tracks; graduates who meet preset KPIs could receive a fast‑track slot in the next q/acc cohort, turning isolated grants into a seamless pipeline from prototype to tokenized product.
Secondly, regarding the 250 k ARB volatility buffer, instead of letting it sit idle, we could convert a portion to a stable‑denominated, low‑risk yield strategy, say, parking half in an ARB‑stable vault on Aave or even a covered‑call product, so it earns while remaining instantly withdrawable; do you think this extra yield is worth the added complexity, or should we just keep the buffer in straight stables?
Thirdly, I was thinking we could split the seed capital instead of handing over the full 50 k ARB on day one (release 25 k at deployment and the remaining 25 k only after the project demonstrates real traction, say 200 unique addresses that pass the Sybil filter) so incentives stay live without adding much overhead; do you think this would be wise, or would it slow grantees down?
Overall, I believe this is a promising proposal and I’m excited to see it rolled out on Arbitrum.
Given the results that were reportedly achieved on Polygon with a smaller budget (which seem impressive), I think ArbitrumDAO might be happy to see similar outcomes without pushing the budget too far.
The 1.76M POL is the amount of POL given to the teams (not including the overhead cost). Which is about the same design for this proposal, the only difference is 10 teams instead of 8, the Polygon season 1 round had the same $250k Matching Pool and $50k to launch each bonding curve, and $5k for each Arb Bot.
There are 2 main reasons we chose 10 teams for this round. #1 to keep the overhead low, the overhead is 24% here. Our first draft of this proposal was for 2 seasons and 30 teams which had the overhead at 18%, but the initial feedback from Raam and others that we discussed with was to reduce the budget. So we thought 10 was a happy medium.
#2 The more teams in the q/acc round, the more network effects. I have run a dozen QF rounds and there is a clear correlation between the number of teams participating and the overall activity of the round. Imagine, each team brings an average of 30 supporters... and then each supporter buys tokens on an average of 3 teams... and you can see how exponential the math is. More teams = better!
That said, we can reduce the number of teams more, but it will definitely increase the overhead as a % of the grant, as the deployment costs are hard to reduce.
We absolutely are excited to tailor cohorts to each chain's priorities, at least from our side. I am excited to see the finalization of SOS to do so. Also of course, if we have programs running on Arbitrum and Polygon, they will have 2 different applications and the teams will sort themselves. In general, many teams will have a preference for what chain they will want to launch on, and they really get the final choice.
2. Could you share more on your governance and funding model? For instance, do DAOs fund each cohort separately, or is there shared infrastructure (dev, ops, tooling) across chains?
DAOs will fund each cohort separately. As far as funding model, we have an initial deployment fee, a 10% capital allocation fee, trading fees from DEXs and we get some of each tokens that are launched.
We are currently building a new UI that can handle multiple chains and will be shared with Arbitrum and Polygon to amplify network effects, IMO the people buying tokens care more about the project than necessarily what chain they are on, so we want to make the experience as easy as possible.
And of course, we are a small team and will be managing both chains with the same team.
3. Would Arbitrum have any ongoing role e.g. representatives, visibility, or feedback loops in guiding cohort selection, KPIs, or narrative direction if this pilot is funded?
I would imagine we would work with an AAE, probably the foundation... as that seems to be the direction the DAO is moving.
For KPIs I have them here:
To measure success, we will track:
:pushpin: Onchain Growth – 10x – Market cap growth (in ARB) compared to ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will produce 10M ARB worth of market caps
:pushpin: ARB Demand Ratio – 25% – Ratio of ARB in protocol vs ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will capture 1.25M worth of ARB in the protocol, creating 250k worth of ARB buying pressure.
:pushpin: Sustained Value – 1 year – Long-term market cap growth (in ARB) of tokens. E.g The 10x growth will last for at least a year.
:pushpin: First-time Arbitrum Users – 500 – Number of q/acc participants new to Arbitrum that buy more than $10 of tokens. E.g 500 users that pass our sybil filter will have never used Arbitrum before.
:pushpin: On-Chain Activity – Varied – Trading volume, user participation, and liquidity metrics. This will be tracked but it is so gameable, it’s not worth creating an exact metric, but we will create a lot of onchain activity.
4. Finally, are you planning to run a cohort with another ecosystem at the same time as the proposed Arbitrum cohort, or would this be a dedicated focus?
We aren't planning to run them at the same time, but I'll be honest, we can't always control these things. There are a lot of timelines and resources to manage with lots of different teams so we will just do what we think is best given the situation. There might be some network effects to running them at the same time though! So we'll think about it :thinking:
We’re supportive of the direction q/acc is taking, particularly its use of DeFi-native mechanisms to align incentives, reduce ARB sell pressure, and offer a more sustainable approach to token-based funding. It’s clear that the program is designed to help teams launch tokens with improved structure and community alignment, and early results from Polygon show promise.
That said, the proposal leans heavily toward projects that are already looking to launch a token. While that’s a valid subset of builders, many high-potential teams on Arbitrum are still in earlier phases focused on technical development, infrastructure, or product validation before a token is even on the table.
At present, q/acc reads more like a launchpad with some added support layers. To maximize its impact, we suggest exploring stronger collaboration with other grant domains (e.g., Domain Allocator Offering) to ensure that technical and pre-token projects also receive the resources they need. This could create a more holistic pipeline from early R&D through to tokenization while keeping Arbitrum attractive to a broader range of builders.
In my opinion, both the current D.A.O. program and q/acc will be competing for the same group of builders. That’s totally fine, builders should be able to choose, but it could get a bit messy for the people running the programs. I can imagine a scenario where the same project gets accepted by both, and then timelines clash or even double funding happens. In the final proposal, I’d love to see something on how this will be handled. What would coordination between different grant programs look like?
We absolutely will work with other grant programs, and we have a referral program for them to bring us good teams. But the crossover will probably be more with OCL and the AF more than questbook. I would love to see us launch some Orbit Chains' Gas Tokens on q/acc, like we did for Prismo in season 1. We compliment existing grant programs well, because we don't impose product deadlines or milestones, it is pure incentive alignment. If projects do well and the market buys a lot of tokens, they collect revenue and have clear upside in their own success (they have over 50% of the Max Supply). If they don't well then they don't collect revenue and market pushes their token price down.
Looking at the outcomes from Season 1 and 2 with Polygon, it seems like investors (donors) didn’t really get much return. Builders benefited the most, which is fine, but the tokens investors got ended up with very low market caps and little activity. For example, the top-funded project from Season 1 was x23, and its current market cap is around $800K. For this program to be sustainable long-term, I feel like this needs to be addressed. Investors should have a solid reason to take part. How are you thinking about solving this?
Actually, low market caps are our sweet spot :-D. Even though the market caps are low, the market caps for the Season 1 teams during their q/acc round were even LOWER!
Every single person who bought in during the first q/acc round got a very good deal on the token, and relative to POL, the price people paid is up at worst 6% and in the case of Prismo, supporters are up 34%. There was a horrible market down turn in Q1 so in dollars people are down in some of the projects... but it would be worse if they were just holding the POL they put in, and much worse if they were holding low cap alts in the same market cap range.
Here is the list of prices people paid and the current market price for Season 1 projects:
| Price for q/acc buyers (in POL) | Price on May 15 (in POL) | % Increase since q/acc 1 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prismo Technology | 0.2602 | 0.3492 | 34.23% |
| Xade Finance | 0.2636 | 0.3271 | 24.09% |
| Citizen Wallet | 0.3028 | 0.371 | 22.52% |
| x23.ai | 0.4035 | 0.4903 | 21.51% |
| The Grand Timeline | 0.2521 | 0.281 | 11.46% |
| Akarun | 0.2272 | 0.2457 | 8.14% |
| Ancient Beast | 0.2229 | 0.2389 | 7.18% |
| Melodex by DjookyX | 0.2233 | 0.2377 | 6.45% |
We launch at low market caps and provide deep liquidity for legit utility tokens. This round ended right before Trump came to office and the market TANKED... yet the tokens are still alive, they didn't crash like the other small caps. There is reduced risk, so there is also reduced upside... It is not really built like other launchpads which are really just a complicated form of gambling... Investors can make small steady gains (relative to ARB) while supporting builders.
That said, tokens bought during the first q/acc round unlock in June, and stream for 6 months, so the gains made so far are not locked in. The teams still need to do well for investors to make money. There is no magic money making tokenomics here... Teams have to produce for their supporters to make a profit.
Not every project needs (or is ready for) a token. One of my main concerns with this program is that it might be too complicated for serious web3 startups to join. For small projects, a token might work, but for bigger teams with bigger team, and maybe existing investors, launching a token isn’t easy. They need legal structure, proper distribution plans, etc. Is there a way for these kinds of projects to also be included in the program? I’d love to see this part addressed in the proposal, too.
100%, some projects don't need a token or aren't ready for a token. This program is NOT for them. It is not a one size fits all solution, it is only for projects that can benefit from launching a low cap utility token with deep liquidity, and they want to do a fair launch (not a pump and dump). However, you would be surprised at how many teams there are like this.
On the legal side, we partnered with MIDAO to give our builders a legal structure in the Marshal Islands that works with our token design, some of the projects took that route and others already had a legal structure that worked that they set up before being accepted into our program.
We request $1.05M in ARB ($1.3M to protect from volatility) to launch q/acc on Arbitrum, allocated as follows:
Hey @Griff, thanks for this proposal. It's very well written. We're still taking time to review it and will provide more comprehensive feedback on all points.
As an initial reaction - it would be helpful if you could share more insight into why you've requested $1.05M from ArbitrumDAO, rather than an amount closer to what you received to launch the pilot on Polygon (1.76M POL, which I assume was around $400–500k).
Given the results that were reportedly achieved on Polygon with a smaller budget (which seem impressive), I think ArbitrumDAO might be happy to see similar outcomes without pushing the budget too far.
I've been following q/acc since your first season with Polygon. There's definitely something interesting in this fresh approach to supporting builders. I love it. Also, it's clear builders like it (looking at how many applied for Season 1 and Season 2). I like the program because it brings together builders, investors, and chains in an active way. It also creates a competitive environment from the start, which is a good thing. Builders with strong marketing skills usually do much better in the long run.
I’d like to open up a few discussions around the following three points:
1. Competition with DAO programs and other grants (e.g., Foundation)
In my opinion, both the current D.A.O. program and q/acc will be competing for the same group of builders. That’s totally fine, builders should be able to choose, but it could get a bit messy for the people running the programs. I can imagine a scenario where the same project gets accepted by both, and then timelines clash or even double funding happens. In the final proposal, I’d love to see something on how this will be handled. What would coordination between different grant programs look like?
2. Low market cap concerns
Looking at the outcomes from Season 1 and 2 with Polygon, it seems like investors (donors) didn’t really get much return. Builders benefited the most, which is fine, but the tokens investors got ended up with very low market caps and little activity. For example, the top-funded project from Season 1 was x23, and its current market cap is around $800K. For this program to be sustainable long-term, I feel like this needs to be addressed. Investors should have a solid reason to take part. How are you thinking about solving this?
DexScreener (x23 token): https://dexscreener.com/polygon/0x0de6da16d5181a9fe2543ce1eeb4bfd268d68838
3. Token launch push
Not every project needs (or is ready for) a token. One of my main concerns with this program is that it might be too complicated for serious web3 startups to join. For small projects, a token might work, but for bigger teams with bigger team, and maybe existing investors, launching a token isn’t easy. They need legal structure, proper distribution plans, etc. Is there a way for these kinds of projects to also be included in the program? I’d love to see this part addressed in the proposal, too.
Hey Griff, thanks for putting this together. q/acc feels like the first grant design I’ve seen in a while that treats “sell pressure” and “grant‑farmers” as problems to engineer around, not just accept. I’m leaning in favor of this proposal, but before we go into Snapshot I have few questions / recommendations.
First, kudos for anchoring the proposal in Arbitrum’s context, aligning project selection with the new SOS proposals and tapping native infra like Camelot is exactly the kind of home‑field advantage we should be playing.
My first recommendation would be to try and formalize a partnership with Questbook’s “New Ideas” and/or “Dev Tooling” tracks; graduates who meet preset KPIs could receive a fast‑track slot in the next q/acc cohort, turning isolated grants into a seamless pipeline from prototype to tokenized product.
Secondly, regarding the 250 k ARB volatility buffer, instead of letting it sit idle, we could convert a portion to a stable‑denominated, low‑risk yield strategy, say, parking half in an ARB‑stable vault on Aave or even a covered‑call product, so it earns while remaining instantly withdrawable; do you think this extra yield is worth the added complexity, or should we just keep the buffer in straight stables?
Thirdly, I was thinking we could split the seed capital instead of handing over the full 50 k ARB on day one (release 25 k at deployment and the remaining 25 k only after the project demonstrates real traction, say 200 unique addresses that pass the Sybil filter) so incentives stay live without adding much overhead; do you think this would be wise, or would it slow grantees down?
Overall, I believe this is a promising proposal and I’m excited to see it rolled out on Arbitrum.
Given the results that were reportedly achieved on Polygon with a smaller budget (which seem impressive), I think ArbitrumDAO might be happy to see similar outcomes without pushing the budget too far.
The 1.76M POL is the amount of POL given to the teams (not including the overhead cost). Which is about the same design for this proposal, the only difference is 10 teams instead of 8, the Polygon season 1 round had the same $250k Matching Pool and $50k to launch each bonding curve, and $5k for each Arb Bot.
There are 2 main reasons we chose 10 teams for this round. #1 to keep the overhead low, the overhead is 24% here. Our first draft of this proposal was for 2 seasons and 30 teams which had the overhead at 18%, but the initial feedback from Raam and others that we discussed with was to reduce the budget. So we thought 10 was a happy medium.
#2 The more teams in the q/acc round, the more network effects. I have run a dozen QF rounds and there is a clear correlation between the number of teams participating and the overall activity of the round. Imagine, each team brings an average of 30 supporters... and then each supporter buys tokens on an average of 3 teams... and you can see how exponential the math is. More teams = better!
That said, we can reduce the number of teams more, but it will definitely increase the overhead as a % of the grant, as the deployment costs are hard to reduce.
We absolutely are excited to tailor cohorts to each chain's priorities, at least from our side. I am excited to see the finalization of SOS to do so. Also of course, if we have programs running on Arbitrum and Polygon, they will have 2 different applications and the teams will sort themselves. In general, many teams will have a preference for what chain they will want to launch on, and they really get the final choice.
2. Could you share more on your governance and funding model? For instance, do DAOs fund each cohort separately, or is there shared infrastructure (dev, ops, tooling) across chains?
DAOs will fund each cohort separately. As far as funding model, we have an initial deployment fee, a 10% capital allocation fee, trading fees from DEXs and we get some of each tokens that are launched.
We are currently building a new UI that can handle multiple chains and will be shared with Arbitrum and Polygon to amplify network effects, IMO the people buying tokens care more about the project than necessarily what chain they are on, so we want to make the experience as easy as possible.
And of course, we are a small team and will be managing both chains with the same team.
3. Would Arbitrum have any ongoing role e.g. representatives, visibility, or feedback loops in guiding cohort selection, KPIs, or narrative direction if this pilot is funded?
I would imagine we would work with an AAE, probably the foundation... as that seems to be the direction the DAO is moving.
For KPIs I have them here:
To measure success, we will track:
:pushpin: Onchain Growth – 10x – Market cap growth (in ARB) compared to ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will produce 10M ARB worth of market caps
:pushpin: ARB Demand Ratio – 25% – Ratio of ARB in protocol vs ARB granted to teams. E.g If we give the teams a total of 1M ARB, we will capture 1.25M worth of ARB in the protocol, creating 250k worth of ARB buying pressure.
:pushpin: Sustained Value – 1 year – Long-term market cap growth (in ARB) of tokens. E.g The 10x growth will last for at least a year.
:pushpin: First-time Arbitrum Users – 500 – Number of q/acc participants new to Arbitrum that buy more than $10 of tokens. E.g 500 users that pass our sybil filter will have never used Arbitrum before.
:pushpin: On-Chain Activity – Varied – Trading volume, user participation, and liquidity metrics. This will be tracked but it is so gameable, it’s not worth creating an exact metric, but we will create a lot of onchain activity.
4. Finally, are you planning to run a cohort with another ecosystem at the same time as the proposed Arbitrum cohort, or would this be a dedicated focus?
We aren't planning to run them at the same time, but I'll be honest, we can't always control these things. There are a lot of timelines and resources to manage with lots of different teams so we will just do what we think is best given the situation. There might be some network effects to running them at the same time though! So we'll think about it :thinking:
