
Non-constitutional AIP By Alex Lumley and Disruption Joe
This proposal seeks funding for Alex Lumley and Disruption Joe to work full-time for up to one year, focusing on two critical areas:
This work will create a foundation for long-term governance and operational success while immediately pushing critical work forward. Governance operations work pushes a flywheel that develops insights through counterparty interactions, synthesizes feedback, and continually optimizes and aligns processes & stakeholders.
This proposal includes executing governance operations while Entropy designs long-term systems driven through an OpCo, in preparation for a handoff - recognizing that doing the work cannot wait for an entity to be established. By immediately addressing key operational gaps and establishing governance processes, this proposal ensures Arbitrum begins executing important work without delay, while building scalable systems for long-term effectiveness. Governance operations includes a set of responsibilities that connect the strategic to the tactical, and each “level” connected to the system as a whole.
| DAO Level | Workstream | Initiative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic Design | Entropy | AJ | Initiative Lead |
| Governance Operations | AJ now, OpCo later? | AJ now, OpCo Later? | AJ supporting initiative |
| Tactical Execution | AJ now, OpCo later? | AJ now, Workstream Steward | Initiative |
The DAO is currently struggling to execute its most impactful initiatives, resulting in a lack of confidence from key stakeholders.
Delegates, builders, and contributors face similar problems:
Without streamlined systems, the DAO's potential is being stifled, delaying progress and eroding trust among participants.
Alex Lumley and Disruption Joe are uniquely positioned to resolve these issues, given their deep experience with the Arbitrum DAO and DAO governance more broadly. They possess the knowledge and skills required to design operational processes and execute strategies with alignment from all key stakeholder entities.
Their work will activate a positive feedback loop by:
Why Alex and Joe? Both are high-context contributors with proven governance and operational expertise:
Their extensive backgrounds in strategy, governance, and execution make them ideal candidates to lead this initiative, ensuring the DAO delivers on its key priorities.
Agreement: Alex and Joe will commit to working full-time with Arbitrum, leading governance operations and developing strategic workstreams. They will participate in work groups, facilitate meetings, and act as points of contact for general DAO inquiries.
The first step is to formalize governance operations and build a foundation for transparency and accountability. This includes:
The next step is to secure the necessary funding to implement the workstream strategy and begin executing work immediately. Building a trusted workstream governance framework has some components that must happen before passing the budget. A governance framework for workstreams must be designed to empower strategic decision-making and enable the delegation of authority.
After several months of execution, the focus will shift to optimization and refinement:
As the proposal approaches its conclusion (and potentially before), preparations will be made for a smooth handoff to the OpCo or a future DAO governance structure:
For this proposal to be possible, we will also need to pass the workstream budget proposal. Here is the current draft. We are working on recruiting the council already. If passed, this workstream could fund and support Max’s Embracing Chain Abstraction proposal. We are currently recruiting expert council members.
The compensation for this proposal will be structured to balance immediate needs with long-term incentives. We are considering a vesting model to align our success with the success of the DAO. Our approach to compensation, expenses, and clawback will follow the model used in Entropy’s approved proposal, ensuring transparency and alignment with DAO standards.

Non-constitutional AIP By Alex Lumley and Disruption Joe
This proposal seeks funding for Alex Lumley and Disruption Joe to work full-time for up to one year, focusing on two critical areas:
This work will create a foundation for long-term governance and operational success while immediately pushing critical work forward. Governance operations work pushes a flywheel that develops insights through counterparty interactions, synthesizes feedback, and continually optimizes and aligns processes & stakeholders.
This proposal includes executing governance operations while Entropy designs long-term systems driven through an OpCo, in preparation for a handoff - recognizing that doing the work cannot wait for an entity to be established. By immediately addressing key operational gaps and establishing governance processes, this proposal ensures Arbitrum begins executing important work without delay, while building scalable systems for long-term effectiveness. Governance operations includes a set of responsibilities that connect the strategic to the tactical, and each “level” connected to the system as a whole.
| DAO Level | Workstream | Initiative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic Design | Entropy | AJ | Initiative Lead |
| Governance Operations | AJ now, OpCo later? | AJ now, OpCo Later? | AJ supporting initiative |
| Tactical Execution | AJ now, OpCo later? | AJ now, Workstream Steward | Initiative |
The DAO is currently struggling to execute its most impactful initiatives, resulting in a lack of confidence from key stakeholders.
Delegates, builders, and contributors face similar problems:
Without streamlined systems, the DAO's potential is being stifled, delaying progress and eroding trust among participants.
Alex Lumley and Disruption Joe are uniquely positioned to resolve these issues, given their deep experience with the Arbitrum DAO and DAO governance more broadly. They possess the knowledge and skills required to design operational processes and execute strategies with alignment from all key stakeholder entities.
Their work will activate a positive feedback loop by:
Why Alex and Joe? Both are high-context contributors with proven governance and operational expertise:
Their extensive backgrounds in strategy, governance, and execution make them ideal candidates to lead this initiative, ensuring the DAO delivers on its key priorities.
Agreement: Alex and Joe will commit to working full-time with Arbitrum, leading governance operations and developing strategic workstreams. They will participate in work groups, facilitate meetings, and act as points of contact for general DAO inquiries.
The first step is to formalize governance operations and build a foundation for transparency and accountability. This includes:
The next step is to secure the necessary funding to implement the workstream strategy and begin executing work immediately. Building a trusted workstream governance framework has some components that must happen before passing the budget. A governance framework for workstreams must be designed to empower strategic decision-making and enable the delegation of authority.
After several months of execution, the focus will shift to optimization and refinement:
As the proposal approaches its conclusion (and potentially before), preparations will be made for a smooth handoff to the OpCo or a future DAO governance structure:
For this proposal to be possible, we will also need to pass the workstream budget proposal. Here is the current draft. We are working on recruiting the council already. If passed, this workstream could fund and support Max’s Embracing Chain Abstraction proposal. We are currently recruiting expert council members.
The compensation for this proposal will be structured to balance immediate needs with long-term incentives. We are considering a vesting model to align our success with the success of the DAO. Our approach to compensation, expenses, and clawback will follow the model used in Entropy’s approved proposal, ensuring transparency and alignment with DAO standards.
Just look at Treasure DAO who clearly sighted lack of the DAO being able to progress at reasonable speeds
Just look at Treasure DAO who clearly sighted lack of the DAO being able to progress at reasonable speeds
This is a lousy example, the DAO literally approved them a 250M ARB program and they had a seat on the GCP, if they did not move forward quickly having the funds in the multisig is no longer the DAO's fault, it is the fault of those involved in the execution of the program. In the end, they left because someone offered them money somewhat faster, which speaks more about Treasure than Arbitrum DAO.
Not speaking for Alex, but for me - I need to make at minimum what I’ve made in the past. There is no reason for me to take a role without benefits, travel expenses, bonus, commission, equity or tokens AND do it for less than my salary the last 4 years. While I’d like to stay working with Arbitrum, that is a hard constraint for me - I’m willing to not negotiate to match my opportunity cost, but I can’t take a role that is a huge backward step financially. (Which I’ve done before with early team roles at startups - because we negotiated for higher equity.)
So in this case I would recommend that you open the process to candidates who are willing to do it for a reasonable salary based on the task at hand. Your argument is like the CEO of Apple applying for a job as a manager at a McDonalds branch and pretending to earn the same salary as his previous job.
On the other hand, I am surprised by the absence of any mention of Alex's failure at Savvy (also a waste of DAO’s funds through STIP/STIP-B) or the multiple complaints (as example this one) about Plurality Labs and their management of the DAO-funded program. It is even more incredible that these cases of failure are presented as a “positive” aspect of Alex and Joe's background. In the case of PL, they couldn't even deliver a framework for grants as promised.
The next step is to secure the necessary funding to implement the workstream strategy and begin executing work immediately. Building a trusted workstream governance framework has some components that must happen before passing the budget. A governance framework for workstreams must be designed to empower strategic decision-making and enable the delegation of authority.
Recruit Expert Council: Identify and onboard a diverse council of domain experts to support governance decisions and provide strategic guidance on funded initiatives.
Establish Outcomes: Establish a clear set of goals and measurable outcomes for the workstream. These objectives will guide the allocation of budgets and the approval of initiatives.
Create Checks and Balances: Develop mechanisms to provide oversight and ensure accountability for workstream stewards, including veto powers and regular performance reviews.
Draft & Pass Proposal: Submit and pass a workstream budget proposal to fund initiatives. This proposal will be used as a test case for the workstream governance processes.
Launch Strategic Initiatives: Once funding is secured, begin executing the initiatives under the workstream, ensuring that each is aligned with the established governance processes and goals.
In my opinion, this collides with the work being done by Entropy, who are trying to first establish the Mission, Vision, and Purpose of the DAO and then come up with a proposal with more specific objectives for the next 12-24 months. And to be honest, if PL/Joe couldn't deliver a framework for grants, I don’t think that you can solve a huge problem for the DAO such as outlining objectives and setting budgets for different verticals.
This is quite the interesting post from a first time poster on this forum. Would you be willing to take the anon front off and share your concerns with skin in the game? Either way - Welcome!
Your reaction to criticism (both now and when you canceled a Snapshot vote because you didn't get the result you wanted) could be one of the reasons why people choose to create an anonymous profile to tell you things. In any case, this is web3, if someone chooses to be anonymous it shouldn't matter.
Then we workshop it and get something strategic and deserving of our salaries to pass or risk being fired by the DAO. What would have happened if Entropy didn’t pass the Stylus fund?
The comparison with Entropy is misplaced because Stylus is not the only initiative they are working on. It was only given as an example in a series of initiatives.
Steward a minimum of 10 DAO programs free of ad hoc charges. Examples include the MSS, a stylus sprint proposal we are working on that requires active reviewers, etc.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Thank you for the proposal. We had a few questions regarding it:
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Thank you for the proposal. We had a few questions regarding it:
Develop Governance Wiki: Begin documenting key processes, roles, and governance structures in a publicly accessible wiki to improve clarity for all DAO participants.
Kick-off Governance Reporting Calls (GRC): Start monthly calls with key stakeholders, including delegates, builders, and contributors. Use these calls to communicate the progress of initiatives and gather feedback for continuous improvement.
I’d like to raise concerns about this proposal.
Additionally, the execution of such initiatives outlined demands a deep understanding of the nitro stack, interoperability, cross chain communication, governance at scale, and a proven track record of driving strategic outcomes. From what is presented, it’s unclear how previous work—such as governance reporting calls or passing a few proposals—equips them to address the intricate challenges currently facing Orbit and the DAO. Looking at the contributors' resume such as STIP Backfund or Plurality Labs, the work does not demonstrate the depth of expertise required to lead a working group focused on such an important and technical concept.
Just look at Treasure DAO who clearly sighted lack of the DAO being able to progress at reasonable speeds
Just look at Treasure DAO who clearly sighted lack of the DAO being able to progress at reasonable speeds
This is a lousy example, the DAO literally approved them a 250M ARB program and they had a seat on the GCP, if they did not move forward quickly having the funds in the multisig is no longer the DAO's fault, it is the fault of those involved in the execution of the program. In the end, they left because someone offered them money somewhat faster, which speaks more about Treasure than Arbitrum DAO.
Not speaking for Alex, but for me - I need to make at minimum what I’ve made in the past. There is no reason for me to take a role without benefits, travel expenses, bonus, commission, equity or tokens AND do it for less than my salary the last 4 years. While I’d like to stay working with Arbitrum, that is a hard constraint for me - I’m willing to not negotiate to match my opportunity cost, but I can’t take a role that is a huge backward step financially. (Which I’ve done before with early team roles at startups - because we negotiated for higher equity.)
So in this case I would recommend that you open the process to candidates who are willing to do it for a reasonable salary based on the task at hand. Your argument is like the CEO of Apple applying for a job as a manager at a McDonalds branch and pretending to earn the same salary as his previous job.
On the other hand, I am surprised by the absence of any mention of Alex's failure at Savvy (also a waste of DAO’s funds through STIP/STIP-B) or the multiple complaints (as example this one) about Plurality Labs and their management of the DAO-funded program. It is even more incredible that these cases of failure are presented as a “positive” aspect of Alex and Joe's background. In the case of PL, they couldn't even deliver a framework for grants as promised.
The next step is to secure the necessary funding to implement the workstream strategy and begin executing work immediately. Building a trusted workstream governance framework has some components that must happen before passing the budget. A governance framework for workstreams must be designed to empower strategic decision-making and enable the delegation of authority.
Recruit Expert Council: Identify and onboard a diverse council of domain experts to support governance decisions and provide strategic guidance on funded initiatives.
Establish Outcomes: Establish a clear set of goals and measurable outcomes for the workstream. These objectives will guide the allocation of budgets and the approval of initiatives.
Create Checks and Balances: Develop mechanisms to provide oversight and ensure accountability for workstream stewards, including veto powers and regular performance reviews.
Draft & Pass Proposal: Submit and pass a workstream budget proposal to fund initiatives. This proposal will be used as a test case for the workstream governance processes.
Launch Strategic Initiatives: Once funding is secured, begin executing the initiatives under the workstream, ensuring that each is aligned with the established governance processes and goals.
In my opinion, this collides with the work being done by Entropy, who are trying to first establish the Mission, Vision, and Purpose of the DAO and then come up with a proposal with more specific objectives for the next 12-24 months. And to be honest, if PL/Joe couldn't deliver a framework for grants, I don’t think that you can solve a huge problem for the DAO such as outlining objectives and setting budgets for different verticals.
This is quite the interesting post from a first time poster on this forum. Would you be willing to take the anon front off and share your concerns with skin in the game? Either way - Welcome!
Your reaction to criticism (both now and when you canceled a Snapshot vote because you didn't get the result you wanted) could be one of the reasons why people choose to create an anonymous profile to tell you things. In any case, this is web3, if someone chooses to be anonymous it shouldn't matter.
Then we workshop it and get something strategic and deserving of our salaries to pass or risk being fired by the DAO. What would have happened if Entropy didn’t pass the Stylus fund?
The comparison with Entropy is misplaced because Stylus is not the only initiative they are working on. It was only given as an example in a series of initiatives.
Steward a minimum of 10 DAO programs free of ad hoc charges. Examples include the MSS, a stylus sprint proposal we are working on that requires active reviewers, etc.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Thank you for the proposal. We had a few questions regarding it:
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
Thank you for the proposal. We had a few questions regarding it:
Develop Governance Wiki: Begin documenting key processes, roles, and governance structures in a publicly accessible wiki to improve clarity for all DAO participants.
Kick-off Governance Reporting Calls (GRC): Start monthly calls with key stakeholders, including delegates, builders, and contributors. Use these calls to communicate the progress of initiatives and gather feedback for continuous improvement.
I’d like to raise concerns about this proposal.
Additionally, the execution of such initiatives outlined demands a deep understanding of the nitro stack, interoperability, cross chain communication, governance at scale, and a proven track record of driving strategic outcomes. From what is presented, it’s unclear how previous work—such as governance reporting calls or passing a few proposals—equips them to address the intricate challenges currently facing Orbit and the DAO. Looking at the contributors' resume such as STIP Backfund or Plurality Labs, the work does not demonstrate the depth of expertise required to lead a working group focused on such an important and technical concept.
I’d like to raise concerns about this proposal.
Additionally, the execution of such initiatives outlined demands a deep understanding of the nitro stack, interoperability, cross chain communication, governance at scale, and a proven track record of driving strategic outcomes. From what is presented, it’s unclear how previous work—such as governance reporting calls or passing a few proposals—equips them to address the intricate challenges currently facing Orbit and the DAO. Looking at the contributors' resume such as STIP Backfund or Plurality Labs, the work does not demonstrate the depth of expertise required to lead a working group focused on such an important and technical concept.
Existing DAO service providers such as the ADPC or Entropy Advisors could likely take on the work of driving this in a more effective manner. Preemptively assigning full-time roles without clearer evidence of relevant competencies or measurable achievements risks misallocating resources and perpetuating inefficiencies. It would be more strategic for the DAO to first approve the 10M ARB unified orbit proposal and then engage individuals with proven capabilities to manage this critical initiative.
I’d like to raise concerns about this proposal.
Additionally, the execution of such initiatives outlined demands a deep understanding of the nitro stack, interoperability, cross chain communication, governance at scale, and a proven track record of driving strategic outcomes. From what is presented, it’s unclear how previous work—such as governance reporting calls or passing a few proposals—equips them to address the intricate challenges currently facing Orbit and the DAO. Looking at the contributors' resume such as STIP Backfund or Plurality Labs, the work does not demonstrate the depth of expertise required to lead a working group focused on such an important and technical concept.
Existing DAO service providers such as the ADPC or Entropy Advisors could likely take on the work of driving this in a more effective manner. Preemptively assigning full-time roles without clearer evidence of relevant competencies or measurable achievements risks misallocating resources and perpetuating inefficiencies. It would be more strategic for the DAO to first approve the 10M ARB unified orbit proposal and then engage individuals with proven capabilities to manage this critical initiative.
I think the roles and functions outlined in this proposal are a fantastic idea to bring some much-needed order and keep tabs on what's happening in the DAO. From my experience over the past five months, I've seen how Joe and Alex are both very active participants, and they seem professional enough to handle these responsibilities.
However, regarding some of the comments made in this proposal, I believe there should be a more detailed justification for their compensation. Providing a clear breakdown of how their compensation is determined would help with transparency and ensure it aligns with industry standards. Maybe even considering performance-based incentives could align their interests more closely with the DAO's success. Transparency in this area would put everyone's mind at ease.
I think the roles and functions outlined in this proposal are a fantastic idea to bring some much-needed order and keep tabs on what's happening in the DAO. From my experience over the past five months, I've seen how Joe and Alex are both very active participants, and they seem professional enough to handle these responsibilities.
However, regarding some of the comments made in this proposal, I believe there should be a more detailed justification for their compensation. Providing a clear breakdown of how their compensation is determined would help with transparency and ensure it aligns with industry standards. Maybe even considering performance-based incentives could align their interests more closely with the DAO's success. Transparency in this area would put everyone's mind at ease.
I also think it would be fairer to propose several candidates for these roles and have the community vote on them. This would encourage inclusivity and ensure that those in leadership positions have support from all of us. I propose an open nomination process.
Establishing clear accountability and oversight mechanisms would be beneficial too. With regular reports and evaluations on how things are going, we could monitor progress and ensure everything is in order. I do understand Joe’s comment
But a temperature check on main projects and clear follow-up to their development would be very useful for everyone.
Overall, I like this initiative and I think it has a lot of potential to improve the DAO's operations.
We've been asked to chime in here several times, so we're providing general feedback in addition to giving our opinion on where we see the proposed scope overlapping with our current work and mandate.
Overall, having read the proposal several times and hopped on calls with the two initiative leaders (@AlexLumley and @DisruptionJoe), it's still somewhat unclear to us—and based on the above comments, to others—what all of the exact deliverables would be, with some information potentially having been lost in translation. This seems to stem from the fact that additional complexity keeps getting added through widening the scope, some ad hoc deliverables are being talked about in the comments, and two proposals are now entangled (i.e., the one above and the one-click" U/X Package draft).
We've been asked to chime in here several times, so we're providing general feedback in addition to giving our opinion on where we see the proposed scope overlapping with our current work and mandate.
Overall, having read the proposal several times and hopped on calls with the two initiative leaders (@AlexLumley and @DisruptionJoe), it's still somewhat unclear to us—and based on the above comments, to others—what all of the exact deliverables would be, with some information potentially having been lost in translation. This seems to stem from the fact that additional complexity keeps getting added through widening the scope, some ad hoc deliverables are being talked about in the comments, and two proposals are now entangled (i.e., the one above and the one-click" U/X Package draft).
We want to begin by making it thoroughly clear that we don't want to act as a bottleneck for other actors to become contributors or continue their work in the ecosystem. With that out of the way, we’ll only address the high-level deliverables to avoid adding more convolution and an overly lengthy response:
To simplify, we understand this deliverable as oversight of initiatives across the DAO and designing related processes and frameworks. On a high level, this deliverable doesn’t overlap with our scope of work as we aren’t acting as an oversight-related body. A few things we’d like to highlight, however:
In our opinion, this is akin to inserting a new operational model into the DAO. When it comes to the framework itself, we see this as a direct overlap with the work we’ve been facilitating with respect to OpCo. The first workstream, “One-Click” U/X Package to Orbit Chain Builders, would fall within the ecosystem support category, which is one of the focus areas OpCo would be mandated to help facilitate if approved. We see a few likely outcomes as a result of this:
Diving deeper into the actual execution of the framework, we have some apprehension regarding the initiative leaders’ suitability to spearhead the “One-Click” U/X Package to Orbit Chain Builders and manage 10M ARB worth of capital. To be absolutely clear, we recognize the leaders’ impressive backgrounds and skill sets but think they may not be optimally suited for facilitating an extremely specialized and technical initiative. As an example, Uniswap carried out a cross-chain bridge assessment process to empower the Uniswap community’s decision-making around the use of cross-chain bridges in governance. The assessment was managed and produced by a committee comprising 9 industry-leading members with backgrounds in engineering, research, security, bridges, risk, etc. Simply put, we feel as though the contributors could bring more value to the ecosystem by leveraging their capacity in other areas of the DAO.
The third high-level deliverable seems to be ad hoc, operational tasks related to scaling and refining the workstream model, which is basically identical to one of Entropy’s mandates but applied to the workstreams instead of the overall DAO. We strongly agree with the proposal authors in that Entropy shouldn’t be the only facilitator in this area. Having said that, one of our focus areas is to decrease/limit the DAO’s OpEx. As such, we feel obligated to point out that we are already equipped to perform the aforementioned ad hoc work and could scale our capabilities further if the DAO were to decide to move forward with the operational model proposed by the authors. At the end of the day, the decision is up to delegates, and we’re more than happy to collaborate with the authors within this area if the DAO wants multiple entities working full-time on such deliverables.
We’d also point out that the compensation model (note that we're addressing the structure rather than focusing on specific numbers); $120K yearly base for gov ops work with a bonus structure based on workstream deliverables which could bring the total comp up to ~$300K (apologies if this is outdated as information is somewhat scattered), might incentivize the proposal authors to overlook some of the gov ops deliverables and put most of their efforts into workstream-related tasks. Continuing on the salary topic, would the proposal authors forego the compensation they are currently receiving from other DAO initiatives, such as the MSS and the DIP, if they were to be hired as full-time contributors? While it’s fair to argue that this work should still be compensated considering that it’s separate from this proposal, receiving full-time compensation in addition to separate payments creates a weird structure in our opinion.
Due to the dual-proposal structure, there is a risk that a majority of the deliverables laid out in this proposal would not be possible in the case that the other proposal isn’t passed. We’ve noticed that the proposal authors have compared this situation to, e.g., “What would have happened if Entropy didn’t pass the Stylus fund?”. We feel as though this comparison is misleading since our main deliverables weren’t/aren’t conditional on passing one single proposal in addition to the one that funded us.
Putting this all together, we agree with Pedro’s comment but don’t see a high risk of overlap on this front:
I believe the actions included in “Governance Operations” are valuable and necessary for the DAO. I would focus the proposal on that, ideally working together with Entropy to avoid overlap.
We believe this to be the most effective way forward, but would additionally like to see an exact, step-by-step plan on how the proposal authors intend to implement the Governance Operations initiative in order to ensure that 1) oversight doesn’t turn into something that prevents contributors from performing at their best; 2) micromanagement doesn’t arise; 3) the proposal authors don’t become the de facto persons who decide whether success was reached or not.
While we understand that the proposal authors have included additional deliverables on top of the gov ops initiative to justify a higher compensation, we feel as though the workstream deliverable and its related ad hoc tasks aren’t the most beneficial route for the DAO to take as they are currently proposed (we may have a biased perspective here due to the overlap with OpCo). Nevertheless, again, we don’t want to act as a blocker for other actors to join the ecosystem or continue their work but will once more highlight that if delegates want to go in the workstream operating model direction, Entropy has the resources to provide assistance in this area.
Hello @DisruptionJoe and @AlexLumley,
Firstly, we would like to mention that several questions we asked in the previous post were left unanswered, and we believe they remain relevant in this new proposal, especially those concerning compensation.
This is an extremely well crafted response. I really appreciate the time and thoughtfulness put into it.
Unfortunately, I am not finding a clear path to an opportunity that is:
Recently, proposals for OpCo are also under discussion. I would like to ask about the specific transition mechanism between OpCo and the DAO. How will a smooth transition of governance to OpCo be ensured? Will it be through training or joint management?
The report mentions remuneration and vesting but does not clarify their structure and timeline. It would be helpful to provide more details, such as whether the vesting period is tied to achieving specific goals.
I think the roles and functions outlined in this proposal are a fantastic idea to bring some much-needed order and keep tabs on what's happening in the DAO. From my experience over the past five months, I've seen how Joe and Alex are both very active participants, and they seem professional enough to handle these responsibilities.
However, regarding some of the comments made in this proposal, I believe there should be a more detailed justification for their compensation. Providing a clear breakdown of how their compensation is determined would help with transparency and ensure it aligns with industry standards. Maybe even considering performance-based incentives could align their interests more closely with the DAO's success. Transparency in this area would put everyone's mind at ease.
I think the roles and functions outlined in this proposal are a fantastic idea to bring some much-needed order and keep tabs on what's happening in the DAO. From my experience over the past five months, I've seen how Joe and Alex are both very active participants, and they seem professional enough to handle these responsibilities.
However, regarding some of the comments made in this proposal, I believe there should be a more detailed justification for their compensation. Providing a clear breakdown of how their compensation is determined would help with transparency and ensure it aligns with industry standards. Maybe even considering performance-based incentives could align their interests more closely with the DAO's success. Transparency in this area would put everyone's mind at ease.
I also think it would be fairer to propose several candidates for these roles and have the community vote on them. This would encourage inclusivity and ensure that those in leadership positions have support from all of us. I propose an open nomination process.
Establishing clear accountability and oversight mechanisms would be beneficial too. With regular reports and evaluations on how things are going, we could monitor progress and ensure everything is in order. I do understand Joe’s comment
But a temperature check on main projects and clear follow-up to their development would be very useful for everyone.
Overall, I like this initiative and I think it has a lot of potential to improve the DAO's operations.
We've been asked to chime in here several times, so we're providing general feedback in addition to giving our opinion on where we see the proposed scope overlapping with our current work and mandate.
Overall, having read the proposal several times and hopped on calls with the two initiative leaders (@AlexLumley and @DisruptionJoe), it's still somewhat unclear to us—and based on the above comments, to others—what all of the exact deliverables would be, with some information potentially having been lost in translation. This seems to stem from the fact that additional complexity keeps getting added through widening the scope, some ad hoc deliverables are being talked about in the comments, and two proposals are now entangled (i.e., the one above and the one-click" U/X Package draft).
We've been asked to chime in here several times, so we're providing general feedback in addition to giving our opinion on where we see the proposed scope overlapping with our current work and mandate.
Overall, having read the proposal several times and hopped on calls with the two initiative leaders (@AlexLumley and @DisruptionJoe), it's still somewhat unclear to us—and based on the above comments, to others—what all of the exact deliverables would be, with some information potentially having been lost in translation. This seems to stem from the fact that additional complexity keeps getting added through widening the scope, some ad hoc deliverables are being talked about in the comments, and two proposals are now entangled (i.e., the one above and the one-click" U/X Package draft).
We want to begin by making it thoroughly clear that we don't want to act as a bottleneck for other actors to become contributors or continue their work in the ecosystem. With that out of the way, we’ll only address the high-level deliverables to avoid adding more convolution and an overly lengthy response:
To simplify, we understand this deliverable as oversight of initiatives across the DAO and designing related processes and frameworks. On a high level, this deliverable doesn’t overlap with our scope of work as we aren’t acting as an oversight-related body. A few things we’d like to highlight, however:
In our opinion, this is akin to inserting a new operational model into the DAO. When it comes to the framework itself, we see this as a direct overlap with the work we’ve been facilitating with respect to OpCo. The first workstream, “One-Click” U/X Package to Orbit Chain Builders, would fall within the ecosystem support category, which is one of the focus areas OpCo would be mandated to help facilitate if approved. We see a few likely outcomes as a result of this:
Diving deeper into the actual execution of the framework, we have some apprehension regarding the initiative leaders’ suitability to spearhead the “One-Click” U/X Package to Orbit Chain Builders and manage 10M ARB worth of capital. To be absolutely clear, we recognize the leaders’ impressive backgrounds and skill sets but think they may not be optimally suited for facilitating an extremely specialized and technical initiative. As an example, Uniswap carried out a cross-chain bridge assessment process to empower the Uniswap community’s decision-making around the use of cross-chain bridges in governance. The assessment was managed and produced by a committee comprising 9 industry-leading members with backgrounds in engineering, research, security, bridges, risk, etc. Simply put, we feel as though the contributors could bring more value to the ecosystem by leveraging their capacity in other areas of the DAO.
The third high-level deliverable seems to be ad hoc, operational tasks related to scaling and refining the workstream model, which is basically identical to one of Entropy’s mandates but applied to the workstreams instead of the overall DAO. We strongly agree with the proposal authors in that Entropy shouldn’t be the only facilitator in this area. Having said that, one of our focus areas is to decrease/limit the DAO’s OpEx. As such, we feel obligated to point out that we are already equipped to perform the aforementioned ad hoc work and could scale our capabilities further if the DAO were to decide to move forward with the operational model proposed by the authors. At the end of the day, the decision is up to delegates, and we’re more than happy to collaborate with the authors within this area if the DAO wants multiple entities working full-time on such deliverables.
We’d also point out that the compensation model (note that we're addressing the structure rather than focusing on specific numbers); $120K yearly base for gov ops work with a bonus structure based on workstream deliverables which could bring the total comp up to ~$300K (apologies if this is outdated as information is somewhat scattered), might incentivize the proposal authors to overlook some of the gov ops deliverables and put most of their efforts into workstream-related tasks. Continuing on the salary topic, would the proposal authors forego the compensation they are currently receiving from other DAO initiatives, such as the MSS and the DIP, if they were to be hired as full-time contributors? While it’s fair to argue that this work should still be compensated considering that it’s separate from this proposal, receiving full-time compensation in addition to separate payments creates a weird structure in our opinion.
Due to the dual-proposal structure, there is a risk that a majority of the deliverables laid out in this proposal would not be possible in the case that the other proposal isn’t passed. We’ve noticed that the proposal authors have compared this situation to, e.g., “What would have happened if Entropy didn’t pass the Stylus fund?”. We feel as though this comparison is misleading since our main deliverables weren’t/aren’t conditional on passing one single proposal in addition to the one that funded us.
Putting this all together, we agree with Pedro’s comment but don’t see a high risk of overlap on this front:
I believe the actions included in “Governance Operations” are valuable and necessary for the DAO. I would focus the proposal on that, ideally working together with Entropy to avoid overlap.
We believe this to be the most effective way forward, but would additionally like to see an exact, step-by-step plan on how the proposal authors intend to implement the Governance Operations initiative in order to ensure that 1) oversight doesn’t turn into something that prevents contributors from performing at their best; 2) micromanagement doesn’t arise; 3) the proposal authors don’t become the de facto persons who decide whether success was reached or not.
While we understand that the proposal authors have included additional deliverables on top of the gov ops initiative to justify a higher compensation, we feel as though the workstream deliverable and its related ad hoc tasks aren’t the most beneficial route for the DAO to take as they are currently proposed (we may have a biased perspective here due to the overlap with OpCo). Nevertheless, again, we don’t want to act as a blocker for other actors to join the ecosystem or continue their work but will once more highlight that if delegates want to go in the workstream operating model direction, Entropy has the resources to provide assistance in this area.
Hello @DisruptionJoe and @AlexLumley,
Firstly, we would like to mention that several questions we asked in the previous post were left unanswered, and we believe they remain relevant in this new proposal, especially those concerning compensation.
This is an extremely well crafted response. I really appreciate the time and thoughtfulness put into it.
Unfortunately, I am not finding a clear path to an opportunity that is:
Recently, proposals for OpCo are also under discussion. I would like to ask about the specific transition mechanism between OpCo and the DAO. How will a smooth transition of governance to OpCo be ensured? Will it be through training or joint management?
The report mentions remuneration and vesting but does not clarify their structure and timeline. It would be helpful to provide more details, such as whether the vesting period is tied to achieving specific goals.
Hello @DisruptionJoe and @AlexLumley,
Firstly, we would like to mention that several questions we asked in the previous post were left unanswered, and we believe they remain relevant in this new proposal, especially those concerning compensation.
The proposal mentions designing workstreams, creating a council to oversee DAO-funded proposals, participating in WGs, providing support to several initiatives, and setting goals for the workstreams to guide funding allocation and initiative approvals (this last point sounds quite similar to defining the DAO’s mission, vision, and purpose). Except for the GRC, the initiatives DB, and the Wiki, the rest seem to be tasks for which the DAO has already hired an SP (Entropy) with enough budget for 10 people. This begs the question: do we need 2 more people to cover these items? If the answer is yes, then why not expand the Entropy structure instead of creating an isolated one?
Objective: Design and implement governance processes that empower delegated authorities to manage strategic budgets.
Actions:
Define objectives and outcomes for workstreams.
Oversee budget management and collaboration across funded initiatives.
Select and guide an expert council for governance oversight.
Establish checks and balances for budget management and initiative execution.
Additionally, considering that the proposal positions your function as a “preliminary step to the OpCo,” how does the release of the RFC OpCo – A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution affect this initiative? We ask this because, assuming the OpCo is approved, it could start its setup work in about 60 days, and we see potential duplication of effort in creating structures. It is also difficult for us to envision a frictionless handoff of any outcomes to the OpCo, as it will be a structure built entirely independently of this initiative, with its objectives and employees.
I’ve actually never been paid from it - I don’t believe so anyway. I always put my rational on snapshot or tally, but don’t have a thread. I’m such a small delegate anyway that I almost felt embarassed collecting because I was earning from Plurality Labs/Thrive. I’ll admit it was a little frustrating this last month since I see tons of delegates putting short sweet answers in their thread while I spend a lot of time actively participating!
Firstly, the delegate thread is not a requirement; it’s a suggestion. Secondly, you received a payment from the program in July. However, our main concern is that we haven’t seen your participation in key discussions on the forum. While you have contributed to some discussions in the Telegram group, we would have liked to understand your stance on various topics more deeply to assess your suitability for this role. For instance, out of the last 31 votes, you only engaged in 5 discussions.
This is an extremely well crafted response. I really appreciate the time and thoughtfulness put into it.
Unfortunately, I am not finding a clear path to an opportunity that is:
I do intend to carry on my duties on MSS and as a delegate, but I’m stepping back from full-time working on Arbitrum. My plan is to take a wider view of the web 3 ecosystem to examine other opportunities which have been presented. I still have some valuable ideas that I’ll need to write down and at DevCon I’ll be cohosting the Orbit Builders night. I intend to still do my best to make connections and help whip support for great proposals as a delegate.
I’m encouraging @AlexLumley to continue forward with the part of the proposal that is gaining broad acceptance and will support through that process.
@raam We can consider this proposal closed. Thank you.
Recently, proposals for OpCo are also under discussion. I would like to ask about the specific transition mechanism between OpCo and the DAO. How will a smooth transition of governance to OpCo be ensured? Will it be through training or joint management?
The report mentions remuneration and vesting but does not clarify their structure and timeline. It would be helpful to provide more details, such as whether the vesting period is tied to achieving specific goals.
Additionally, regarding governance training, I think that beyond the incentive program for governance guidance, a dedicated governance training plan for community members could be introduced. A budget could be allocated to appoint a dedicated trainer to guide this process, enhancing the governance capabilities of more participants and contributing to long-term sustainability.
Here are a few answers to more questions that have come up. Thanks for the engagement and helping to keep us connected to things brought up on the other post.
Here are a few answers to more questions that have come up. Thanks for the engagement and helping to keep us connected to things brought up on the other post.
As for Thrive, I guess the crux of me bringing that up is asking however if you two think this is something you could have prevented. It sounds like no based on the response?
For the specific problem reference, I don't think it was preventable in the first season of doing this. During the second season it was solved. The reason I think it wasn't a "foreseeable" issue is that we had other programs running, that had paid out and didn't have this issue. Due to the experimental nature of each round having different mechanisms, it wasn't unforeseeable, but it likely wasn't a simple oversight error.
Apologies if that wasn’t clear, but the goal of the question was more of a “if you were in this role at the time, what would you have done” more so then a “what happened here” summary. For example - would you have proactively contacted Thrive in April so they understood how KYC / grant allocation has to be done to avoid delays like this? Would you have made the DAO aware this was going on, if so at what point?
I was in the role at that time leading the Thrive/Plurality Labs Arbitrum deployment. The problem was in too many cooks in the kitchen as we had Fractal.ID, the Arbitrum Foundation, and our team along with the program manager. If you look at the responses, anytime Thrive was alerted to the issue, we responded quickly, but we didn't have the power to just override authority and make payments. Seeing that this was one program with only 15 of 40 grants affected (out of 400+ delivered by Thrive in the last year), I really do believe that our learning and adjustments to make season M1B flawless in that regard was the best we could do. It even cost Thrive a lot of money (not recouped) to do the right thing and make it work better for season M1B.
Would you be objectively fact checking the proposal made in the restitution post that is going to vote? Is this a discussion you’d bring to the DAO for problem resolution in the future?
Personally, I'm mixed on supporting the proposal. Everything was denominated in ARB and the risks were clear, if unexpected. I do want to support it, but I worry that there are many others in the DAO who have had ARB price go down from the Tally or grant date. These grants were also community based voting contest grants without milestones and clear outcomes as a requirement. That was part of the nature of the test. For this reason, I think we should move forward and learn from it - which I believe we have.
I do think that if Alex and I were in the proposed roles, we would have been bringing the issue to the attention of the DAO and delegates earlier and could have pushed for a better result when it was happening.
This is a great example. Yes, we would have clarified the objective for that tranche of funding along the way and worked with the initiative leads to communicate earlier giving the DAO more time to utilize the funds as intended.
The DAO. The problem with all initiatives is this. In a centralized entity, when strategy is set and secures a budget, the executive is naturally responsible for making sure this translates to outcomes from the tactical functions. In a decentralized system, the strategy and budget are set by the collective - which leaves a gaping hole for accountability. This is what "governance operations" is. Forgive the rudimentary slide image, but maybe this helps

For us, we would be accountable to our council - think of the governance operations as a workstream itself. We will also be accountable to delegates and the DAO. Its not perfect, but if we need to trust some people to bring it to existance, hopefully you can trust us enough to get started.
We would be serving and assisting councils for workstreams. We had an deep convo with delegate advisors about going wide or deep in our strategic function and we've landed on the "width" strategy in the slide below.

Would you consider that role operations or also BD for Orbit chains?
No, but we will be doing a lot of that by nature of supporting the workstream success.
Maybe even considering performance-based incentives could align their interests more closely with the DAO’s success. Transparency in this area would put everyone’s mind at ease.
This is how the structure we've finally come to will work. We will be adjusting the post today.
I also think it would be fairer to propose several candidates for these roles and have the community vote on them. This would encourage inclusivity and ensure that those in leadership positions have support from all of us. I propose an open nomination process.
It's hard to do this for roles that don't currently exist. If we pass this proposal, it is based on a long time talking directly with delegates, builders, and contributors about the issues in the DAO. We have very high context that doesn't come from an election process.
Except for the GRC, the initiatives DB, and the Wiki, the rest seem to be tasks for which the DAO has already hired an SP (Entropy) with enough budget for 10 people. This begs the question: do we need 2 more people to cover these items?
First, you can refer to this answer almost exclusively dedicated to answering about the overlap between our proposed roles and Entropy. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/dedicated-dao-contributors-enhancing-live-initiatives-and-driving-key-workstream/27296/25?u=disruptionjoe
Second, do we need 2 more people to cover these items? I think it is health to have more entities than Entropy doing work in the DAO. They aren't currently doing the things you mentioned, and in reading our reply I think we fairly showcase how we are not duplicating work.
If the answer is yes, then why not expand the Entropy structure instead of creating an isolated one?
I really appreciate Entropy, but I don't believe they should be forced to hire us! We believe it is good to create some balance and have others in the DAO funded directly by the DAO.
If we do these jobs well, we will be drafting a role description which could be handed off to the OpCo. They could hire someone for less to maintain the position as opposed to our creating of the position. If we get to work, we are willing to bet that we can create enough value that we will be able to shift roles if that handoff happens sooner than later. And perhaps OpCo would want to hire us... though we aren't pushing for that either.
We believe that "governance operations" is critical in connecting the strategic functions to tactical functions - and that this happens not only from the DAO to workstream layer, but from workstreams to initiatives.
Entropy is focusing (based on their posts) on the DAO level purpose, vision mission and strategy functions in how it defines high level objectives. We are talking about governance operations which connects the strategic to the tactical and does so at multiple layers. We are also talking about repeatable and scalable processes for quickly setting up workstreams - which is a prerequisite to them setting WORKSTREAM obectives for how they deliver their part which is working towards the DAO level objectives.

Personally, I'd like to see OpCo move forward. I don't think it will be up and running in 60 days. I'd make a bet that it isn't doing work other than hiring until Feb 2025 at the earliest. Yes, the happy path for OpCo would be to be setup in about 75 days, but we all know that in a DAO the happy path is rarely what happens!
Do we feel that Arbitrum is in a spot where it can wait for an undefined period of time to begin the work we are suggesting?
While I completely support hiring both Alex and Joe to the DAO, and I genuinely struggle to imagine any scenario where this is not a clear win for the DAO to have these two onboard, I think a couple clarifications are needed as to the future incentives of people hired directly by the DAO.
Who would you work for? Would you be overseeing councils or rather assisting them? Would you consider that role operations or also BD for Orbit chains?
While I completely support hiring both Alex and Joe to the DAO, and I genuinely struggle to imagine any scenario where this is not a clear win for the DAO to have these two onboard, I think a couple clarifications are needed as to the future incentives of people hired directly by the DAO.
Who would you work for? Would you be overseeing councils or rather assisting them? Would you consider that role operations or also BD for Orbit chains?
Excited for this, and I think that one year is a worthwhile trial period. It's not a major cost to the DAO and I think the upside is good enough to experiment with that. On a per worker basis, this is probably one of the cheapest options available to hire high context people.
Just wanted to note thanks for the clarification on the call. That makes sense and I'm for it, I originally was concerned as I thought that this would be in addition to the monthly one. I see the value in it.
Tagging @cliffton.eth and/or @AlexLumley --- can we add a discussion thread for the monthly one in the same manner as the Bi-Weekly's Latest Governance/Biweekly Proposals Discussions Call topics - Arbitrum. It probably can just go there (unless this is already happening elsewhere in the forum, and I missed it)
Just wanted to note thanks for the clarification on the call. That makes sense and I'm for it, I originally was concerned as I thought that this would be in addition to the monthly one. I see the value in it.
Tagging @cliffton.eth and/or @AlexLumley --- can we add a discussion thread for the monthly one in the same manner as the Bi-Weekly's Latest Governance/Biweekly Proposals Discussions Call topics - Arbitrum. It probably can just go there (unless this is already happening elsewhere in the forum, and I missed it)
As for Thrive, I guess the crux of me bringing that up is asking however if you two think this is something you could have prevented. It sounds like no based on the response? Is that out of scope issue of the project, or some other reason? I say that fully understanding the limitations around KYC items, but as noted with the Delegate / Builder / Contributor problem I think this situation is one of the issues that leads to that. As far as I know, many delegates weren't aware this was happening and we had builders in this scenario who seem to be (rightfully or wrongly) upset with the experience. I bring up this specifically as it was sort of the example that was actively being discussed and relevant at the time of my post. I have seen other examples of this too so I bring it up not as just a one-off issue.
Apologies if that wasn't clear, but the goal of the question was more of a "if you were in this role at the time, what would you have done" more so then a "what happened here" summary. For example - would you have proactively contacted Thrive in April so they understood how KYC / grant allocation has to be done to avoid delays like this? Would you have made the DAO aware this was going on, if so at what point? Would the Wikipedia address this type of thing? Would you be objectively fact checking the proposal made in the restitution post that is going to vote? Is this a discussion you'd bring to the DAO for problem resolution in the future? Things like that, if that makes sense.
Edit: I'll bring up another example, if you'd rather address the same question above but on a different topic since you were involved with the Thrive project. LTIPP Retroactive Grants - https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/ltipp-retroactive-community-funding/26903/55?u=bob-rossi. My thoughts are there, but relevant to this post I think this is another clear example of where the Delegate / Builder / Contributor triangle all left that process 'frustrated/losing faith/disengaged'. As IMO no retroactive grants were funded not due to quality of work but administrative issues. IF this was active what would you / Alex have done to avoid this?
I still plan to go ahead with the GRC tracking and reporting proposal. Will update and post soon.
Entropy has already contributed significantly by launching initiatives like the Multi-sig Support Service (MSS) (where both Alex and Joe serve as elected members) the Stylus sprint , the DAO Events Budget (where Joe is involved in). Entropy is also working on a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalizing DAO Ops proposal and a Unifying Mission, Vision, and Purpose for the DAO. Furthermore, Entropy has also already synced with high-impact DAO initiatives such as the Treasury Management Working Group and the ARDC to enhance alignment and request additional reporting.
Thank you for taking the time to update the proposal based on feedback from the other thread. I don't think my two questions in the original thread were ever addressed before it was locked, so copy + pasting here (https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/boosting-dao-efficiency-by-10x-aligning-accountability-increasing-throughput/27051/23).
- Pretty much everything you listed as problem areas I agree with. I’ve either experienced them myself or have had discussions with builders who echo similar sentiment. It’s unfortunate these issues still exist, as I know it’s been discussed for a while and different attempts have been made to resolve them. I’ve historically been supportive of any initiative that tries to resolve this, as I’ve gotten to the point of ‘throw enough crap to see what sticks’.
- You mentioned a monthly governance call… what extra value would this add beyond the bi-weekly calls & monthly call already in place with the DAO?
- As a though exercise, what would you have done to prevent this from happening had you been in this role earlier this year (Proposal for Financial Restitution For ArbitrumDAO Grant Winners )? This is just one example, but in my experience some of the roadblocks were seeing aren’t anything the DAO can necessarily control.
This proposal is very very interesting and I believe it is crucial to Arbitrum DAO short term (and potentially long term) success, especially with the current state of the market and landscape as well.
I'm glad you have reposted here as I didn't get to answer on the other thread in time. I'm pretty sure others have similar questions too.
Pretty much everything you listed as problem areas I agree with. I’ve either experienced them myself or have had discussions with builders who echo similar sentiment. It’s unfortunate these issues still exist, as I know it’s been discussed for a while and different attempts have been made to resolve them. I’ve historically been supportive of any initiative that tries to resolve this, as I’ve gotten to the point of ‘throw enough crap to see what sticks’.
Thank you Alex and Joe for sharing this proposal. We agree that Arbitrum should continue improving its governance processes. However, we see several significant issues with this proposal. First, it significantly overlaps with Entropy’s role. Second, it risks creating an environment of micro-management for existing and new workstreams. Lastly, it lacks quantifiable KPIs to ensure accountability.
Addressing each point individually:
Good day! Thanks for clarification. I think it's very necessary to hire an admin support.
Thank you for your response! 😊
Thank you @DisruptionJoe and @AlexLumley for this proposal! As a new delegate of Arbitrum, I find there are a lot of ressources about the DAO that can be difficult to find as they are spread in different places. So I would certainly value tools like a database for all current initiatives, meeting minutes, dedicated calls, "confidence in the DAO" score and others if they are well organized under a specific hub.
Regarding operational efficiency, I wonder if you have a concrete example from the past where a lack of coordination and operational follow-up was costly in terms of time, money, and alignment for the DAO. How could these issues have been resolved if you, as DAO contributors, had been elected at that time?
Our intention is not for implicit approval, but rather explicit approval. We've been working on forming the expert council roles this last week and hope to have the workstream proposal on Snapshot by the time this proposal hits Tally.
Alex and Joe's backgrounds and experience make them well suited to designing governance processes and driving strategy execution. Their addition to the team will help DAO establish clear accountability mechanisms, improve efficiency, and increase the confidence of key stakeholders in anticipation of improved governance effectiveness and advancement of key strategies. Questions: 1. Specific effectiveness measures: while the proposal lists overall goals, are there more specific KPIs or milestones to assess improvements in governance efficiency? For example, proposal success rate, improvement in governance process response time, etc. Recommendations: 1. Enhance Transparency: It is recommended that progress reports on governance and workflow improvements be issued regularly and that relevant data be made publicly available, which would allow the community to better track effectiveness and boost confidence in the proposal.
Hello @DisruptionJoe and @AlexLumley,
Firstly, we would like to mention that several questions we asked in the previous post were left unanswered, and we believe they remain relevant in this new proposal, especially those concerning compensation.
The proposal mentions designing workstreams, creating a council to oversee DAO-funded proposals, participating in WGs, providing support to several initiatives, and setting goals for the workstreams to guide funding allocation and initiative approvals (this last point sounds quite similar to defining the DAO’s mission, vision, and purpose). Except for the GRC, the initiatives DB, and the Wiki, the rest seem to be tasks for which the DAO has already hired an SP (Entropy) with enough budget for 10 people. This begs the question: do we need 2 more people to cover these items? If the answer is yes, then why not expand the Entropy structure instead of creating an isolated one?
Objective: Design and implement governance processes that empower delegated authorities to manage strategic budgets.
Actions:
Define objectives and outcomes for workstreams.
Oversee budget management and collaboration across funded initiatives.
Select and guide an expert council for governance oversight.
Establish checks and balances for budget management and initiative execution.
Additionally, considering that the proposal positions your function as a “preliminary step to the OpCo,” how does the release of the RFC OpCo – A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution affect this initiative? We ask this because, assuming the OpCo is approved, it could start its setup work in about 60 days, and we see potential duplication of effort in creating structures. It is also difficult for us to envision a frictionless handoff of any outcomes to the OpCo, as it will be a structure built entirely independently of this initiative, with its objectives and employees.
I’ve actually never been paid from it - I don’t believe so anyway. I always put my rational on snapshot or tally, but don’t have a thread. I’m such a small delegate anyway that I almost felt embarassed collecting because I was earning from Plurality Labs/Thrive. I’ll admit it was a little frustrating this last month since I see tons of delegates putting short sweet answers in their thread while I spend a lot of time actively participating!
Firstly, the delegate thread is not a requirement; it’s a suggestion. Secondly, you received a payment from the program in July. However, our main concern is that we haven’t seen your participation in key discussions on the forum. While you have contributed to some discussions in the Telegram group, we would have liked to understand your stance on various topics more deeply to assess your suitability for this role. For instance, out of the last 31 votes, you only engaged in 5 discussions.
This is an extremely well crafted response. I really appreciate the time and thoughtfulness put into it.
Unfortunately, I am not finding a clear path to an opportunity that is:
I do intend to carry on my duties on MSS and as a delegate, but I’m stepping back from full-time working on Arbitrum. My plan is to take a wider view of the web 3 ecosystem to examine other opportunities which have been presented. I still have some valuable ideas that I’ll need to write down and at DevCon I’ll be cohosting the Orbit Builders night. I intend to still do my best to make connections and help whip support for great proposals as a delegate.
I’m encouraging @AlexLumley to continue forward with the part of the proposal that is gaining broad acceptance and will support through that process.
@raam We can consider this proposal closed. Thank you.
Recently, proposals for OpCo are also under discussion. I would like to ask about the specific transition mechanism between OpCo and the DAO. How will a smooth transition of governance to OpCo be ensured? Will it be through training or joint management?
The report mentions remuneration and vesting but does not clarify their structure and timeline. It would be helpful to provide more details, such as whether the vesting period is tied to achieving specific goals.
Additionally, regarding governance training, I think that beyond the incentive program for governance guidance, a dedicated governance training plan for community members could be introduced. A budget could be allocated to appoint a dedicated trainer to guide this process, enhancing the governance capabilities of more participants and contributing to long-term sustainability.
Here are a few answers to more questions that have come up. Thanks for the engagement and helping to keep us connected to things brought up on the other post.
Here are a few answers to more questions that have come up. Thanks for the engagement and helping to keep us connected to things brought up on the other post.
As for Thrive, I guess the crux of me bringing that up is asking however if you two think this is something you could have prevented. It sounds like no based on the response?
For the specific problem reference, I don't think it was preventable in the first season of doing this. During the second season it was solved. The reason I think it wasn't a "foreseeable" issue is that we had other programs running, that had paid out and didn't have this issue. Due to the experimental nature of each round having different mechanisms, it wasn't unforeseeable, but it likely wasn't a simple oversight error.
Apologies if that wasn’t clear, but the goal of the question was more of a “if you were in this role at the time, what would you have done” more so then a “what happened here” summary. For example - would you have proactively contacted Thrive in April so they understood how KYC / grant allocation has to be done to avoid delays like this? Would you have made the DAO aware this was going on, if so at what point?
I was in the role at that time leading the Thrive/Plurality Labs Arbitrum deployment. The problem was in too many cooks in the kitchen as we had Fractal.ID, the Arbitrum Foundation, and our team along with the program manager. If you look at the responses, anytime Thrive was alerted to the issue, we responded quickly, but we didn't have the power to just override authority and make payments. Seeing that this was one program with only 15 of 40 grants affected (out of 400+ delivered by Thrive in the last year), I really do believe that our learning and adjustments to make season M1B flawless in that regard was the best we could do. It even cost Thrive a lot of money (not recouped) to do the right thing and make it work better for season M1B.
Would you be objectively fact checking the proposal made in the restitution post that is going to vote? Is this a discussion you’d bring to the DAO for problem resolution in the future?
Personally, I'm mixed on supporting the proposal. Everything was denominated in ARB and the risks were clear, if unexpected. I do want to support it, but I worry that there are many others in the DAO who have had ARB price go down from the Tally or grant date. These grants were also community based voting contest grants without milestones and clear outcomes as a requirement. That was part of the nature of the test. For this reason, I think we should move forward and learn from it - which I believe we have.
I do think that if Alex and I were in the proposed roles, we would have been bringing the issue to the attention of the DAO and delegates earlier and could have pushed for a better result when it was happening.
This is a great example. Yes, we would have clarified the objective for that tranche of funding along the way and worked with the initiative leads to communicate earlier giving the DAO more time to utilize the funds as intended.
The DAO. The problem with all initiatives is this. In a centralized entity, when strategy is set and secures a budget, the executive is naturally responsible for making sure this translates to outcomes from the tactical functions. In a decentralized system, the strategy and budget are set by the collective - which leaves a gaping hole for accountability. This is what "governance operations" is. Forgive the rudimentary slide image, but maybe this helps

For us, we would be accountable to our council - think of the governance operations as a workstream itself. We will also be accountable to delegates and the DAO. Its not perfect, but if we need to trust some people to bring it to existance, hopefully you can trust us enough to get started.
We would be serving and assisting councils for workstreams. We had an deep convo with delegate advisors about going wide or deep in our strategic function and we've landed on the "width" strategy in the slide below.

Would you consider that role operations or also BD for Orbit chains?
No, but we will be doing a lot of that by nature of supporting the workstream success.
Maybe even considering performance-based incentives could align their interests more closely with the DAO’s success. Transparency in this area would put everyone’s mind at ease.
This is how the structure we've finally come to will work. We will be adjusting the post today.
I also think it would be fairer to propose several candidates for these roles and have the community vote on them. This would encourage inclusivity and ensure that those in leadership positions have support from all of us. I propose an open nomination process.
It's hard to do this for roles that don't currently exist. If we pass this proposal, it is based on a long time talking directly with delegates, builders, and contributors about the issues in the DAO. We have very high context that doesn't come from an election process.
Except for the GRC, the initiatives DB, and the Wiki, the rest seem to be tasks for which the DAO has already hired an SP (Entropy) with enough budget for 10 people. This begs the question: do we need 2 more people to cover these items?
First, you can refer to this answer almost exclusively dedicated to answering about the overlap between our proposed roles and Entropy. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/dedicated-dao-contributors-enhancing-live-initiatives-and-driving-key-workstream/27296/25?u=disruptionjoe
Second, do we need 2 more people to cover these items? I think it is health to have more entities than Entropy doing work in the DAO. They aren't currently doing the things you mentioned, and in reading our reply I think we fairly showcase how we are not duplicating work.
If the answer is yes, then why not expand the Entropy structure instead of creating an isolated one?
I really appreciate Entropy, but I don't believe they should be forced to hire us! We believe it is good to create some balance and have others in the DAO funded directly by the DAO.
If we do these jobs well, we will be drafting a role description which could be handed off to the OpCo. They could hire someone for less to maintain the position as opposed to our creating of the position. If we get to work, we are willing to bet that we can create enough value that we will be able to shift roles if that handoff happens sooner than later. And perhaps OpCo would want to hire us... though we aren't pushing for that either.
We believe that "governance operations" is critical in connecting the strategic functions to tactical functions - and that this happens not only from the DAO to workstream layer, but from workstreams to initiatives.
Entropy is focusing (based on their posts) on the DAO level purpose, vision mission and strategy functions in how it defines high level objectives. We are talking about governance operations which connects the strategic to the tactical and does so at multiple layers. We are also talking about repeatable and scalable processes for quickly setting up workstreams - which is a prerequisite to them setting WORKSTREAM obectives for how they deliver their part which is working towards the DAO level objectives.

Personally, I'd like to see OpCo move forward. I don't think it will be up and running in 60 days. I'd make a bet that it isn't doing work other than hiring until Feb 2025 at the earliest. Yes, the happy path for OpCo would be to be setup in about 75 days, but we all know that in a DAO the happy path is rarely what happens!
Do we feel that Arbitrum is in a spot where it can wait for an undefined period of time to begin the work we are suggesting?
While I completely support hiring both Alex and Joe to the DAO, and I genuinely struggle to imagine any scenario where this is not a clear win for the DAO to have these two onboard, I think a couple clarifications are needed as to the future incentives of people hired directly by the DAO.
Who would you work for? Would you be overseeing councils or rather assisting them? Would you consider that role operations or also BD for Orbit chains?
While I completely support hiring both Alex and Joe to the DAO, and I genuinely struggle to imagine any scenario where this is not a clear win for the DAO to have these two onboard, I think a couple clarifications are needed as to the future incentives of people hired directly by the DAO.
Who would you work for? Would you be overseeing councils or rather assisting them? Would you consider that role operations or also BD for Orbit chains?
Excited for this, and I think that one year is a worthwhile trial period. It's not a major cost to the DAO and I think the upside is good enough to experiment with that. On a per worker basis, this is probably one of the cheapest options available to hire high context people.
Just wanted to note thanks for the clarification on the call. That makes sense and I'm for it, I originally was concerned as I thought that this would be in addition to the monthly one. I see the value in it.
Tagging @cliffton.eth and/or @AlexLumley --- can we add a discussion thread for the monthly one in the same manner as the Bi-Weekly's Latest Governance/Biweekly Proposals Discussions Call topics - Arbitrum. It probably can just go there (unless this is already happening elsewhere in the forum, and I missed it)
Just wanted to note thanks for the clarification on the call. That makes sense and I'm for it, I originally was concerned as I thought that this would be in addition to the monthly one. I see the value in it.
Tagging @cliffton.eth and/or @AlexLumley --- can we add a discussion thread for the monthly one in the same manner as the Bi-Weekly's Latest Governance/Biweekly Proposals Discussions Call topics - Arbitrum. It probably can just go there (unless this is already happening elsewhere in the forum, and I missed it)
As for Thrive, I guess the crux of me bringing that up is asking however if you two think this is something you could have prevented. It sounds like no based on the response? Is that out of scope issue of the project, or some other reason? I say that fully understanding the limitations around KYC items, but as noted with the Delegate / Builder / Contributor problem I think this situation is one of the issues that leads to that. As far as I know, many delegates weren't aware this was happening and we had builders in this scenario who seem to be (rightfully or wrongly) upset with the experience. I bring up this specifically as it was sort of the example that was actively being discussed and relevant at the time of my post. I have seen other examples of this too so I bring it up not as just a one-off issue.
Apologies if that wasn't clear, but the goal of the question was more of a "if you were in this role at the time, what would you have done" more so then a "what happened here" summary. For example - would you have proactively contacted Thrive in April so they understood how KYC / grant allocation has to be done to avoid delays like this? Would you have made the DAO aware this was going on, if so at what point? Would the Wikipedia address this type of thing? Would you be objectively fact checking the proposal made in the restitution post that is going to vote? Is this a discussion you'd bring to the DAO for problem resolution in the future? Things like that, if that makes sense.
Edit: I'll bring up another example, if you'd rather address the same question above but on a different topic since you were involved with the Thrive project. LTIPP Retroactive Grants - https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/ltipp-retroactive-community-funding/26903/55?u=bob-rossi. My thoughts are there, but relevant to this post I think this is another clear example of where the Delegate / Builder / Contributor triangle all left that process 'frustrated/losing faith/disengaged'. As IMO no retroactive grants were funded not due to quality of work but administrative issues. IF this was active what would you / Alex have done to avoid this?
I still plan to go ahead with the GRC tracking and reporting proposal. Will update and post soon.
Entropy has already contributed significantly by launching initiatives like the Multi-sig Support Service (MSS) (where both Alex and Joe serve as elected members) the Stylus sprint , the DAO Events Budget (where Joe is involved in). Entropy is also working on a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalizing DAO Ops proposal and a Unifying Mission, Vision, and Purpose for the DAO. Furthermore, Entropy has also already synced with high-impact DAO initiatives such as the Treasury Management Working Group and the ARDC to enhance alignment and request additional reporting.
Thank you for taking the time to update the proposal based on feedback from the other thread. I don't think my two questions in the original thread were ever addressed before it was locked, so copy + pasting here (https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/boosting-dao-efficiency-by-10x-aligning-accountability-increasing-throughput/27051/23).
- Pretty much everything you listed as problem areas I agree with. I’ve either experienced them myself or have had discussions with builders who echo similar sentiment. It’s unfortunate these issues still exist, as I know it’s been discussed for a while and different attempts have been made to resolve them. I’ve historically been supportive of any initiative that tries to resolve this, as I’ve gotten to the point of ‘throw enough crap to see what sticks’.
- You mentioned a monthly governance call… what extra value would this add beyond the bi-weekly calls & monthly call already in place with the DAO?
- As a though exercise, what would you have done to prevent this from happening had you been in this role earlier this year (Proposal for Financial Restitution For ArbitrumDAO Grant Winners )? This is just one example, but in my experience some of the roadblocks were seeing aren’t anything the DAO can necessarily control.
This proposal is very very interesting and I believe it is crucial to Arbitrum DAO short term (and potentially long term) success, especially with the current state of the market and landscape as well.
I'm glad you have reposted here as I didn't get to answer on the other thread in time. I'm pretty sure others have similar questions too.
Pretty much everything you listed as problem areas I agree with. I’ve either experienced them myself or have had discussions with builders who echo similar sentiment. It’s unfortunate these issues still exist, as I know it’s been discussed for a while and different attempts have been made to resolve them. I’ve historically been supportive of any initiative that tries to resolve this, as I’ve gotten to the point of ‘throw enough crap to see what sticks’.
Thank you Alex and Joe for sharing this proposal. We agree that Arbitrum should continue improving its governance processes. However, we see several significant issues with this proposal. First, it significantly overlaps with Entropy’s role. Second, it risks creating an environment of micro-management for existing and new workstreams. Lastly, it lacks quantifiable KPIs to ensure accountability.
Addressing each point individually:
Good day! Thanks for clarification. I think it's very necessary to hire an admin support.
Thank you for your response! 😊
Thank you @DisruptionJoe and @AlexLumley for this proposal! As a new delegate of Arbitrum, I find there are a lot of ressources about the DAO that can be difficult to find as they are spread in different places. So I would certainly value tools like a database for all current initiatives, meeting minutes, dedicated calls, "confidence in the DAO" score and others if they are well organized under a specific hub.
Regarding operational efficiency, I wonder if you have a concrete example from the past where a lack of coordination and operational follow-up was costly in terms of time, money, and alignment for the DAO. How could these issues have been resolved if you, as DAO contributors, had been elected at that time?
Our intention is not for implicit approval, but rather explicit approval. We've been working on forming the expert council roles this last week and hope to have the workstream proposal on Snapshot by the time this proposal hits Tally.
Alex and Joe's backgrounds and experience make them well suited to designing governance processes and driving strategy execution. Their addition to the team will help DAO establish clear accountability mechanisms, improve efficiency, and increase the confidence of key stakeholders in anticipation of improved governance effectiveness and advancement of key strategies. Questions: 1. Specific effectiveness measures: while the proposal lists overall goals, are there more specific KPIs or milestones to assess improvements in governance efficiency? For example, proposal success rate, improvement in governance process response time, etc. Recommendations: 1. Enhance Transparency: It is recommended that progress reports on governance and workflow improvements be issued regularly and that relevant data be made publicly available, which would allow the community to better track effectiveness and boost confidence in the proposal.
Entropy has already contributed significantly by launching initiatives like the Multi-sig Support Service (MSS) (where both Alex and Joe serve as elected members) the Stylus sprint , the DAO Events Budget (where Joe is involved in). Entropy is also working on a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalizing DAO Ops proposal and a Unifying Mission, Vision, and Purpose for the DAO. Furthermore, Entropy has also already synced with high-impact DAO initiatives such as the Treasury Management Working Group and the ARDC to enhance alignment and request additional reporting.
Given this overlap, it’s unclear how this proposal distinguishes itself from Entropy’s role and responsibilities, especially as Entropy continues to scale its team to fulfill their mandate.
There is a lot here, so I'll unpack one by one.
Entropy was brought on to “deliver strategic proposals, guide key partners through the DAO processes, and align the priorities of essential stakeholders for the betterment of Arbitrum”
So do I think these overlap, NO. There is plenty of work to be done. I'd prefer if @Entropy would comment if they feel there is overlap by identifying the specific issues if there are any. We've done about everything we can to resolve any overlap issues including attending their office hours regularly and participating in a TG chat which has mostly been productive with 2 way feedback.
Execute governance operations, designing better systems, documenting the role, and preparing for handoff to OpCo; and Strategic workstream design, building governance processes, executing governance operations, and preparing to hand off leadership to a future workstream steward.
Here is the list of what we are proposing to do.
Execute governance operations Governance operations happens at every meta-level of organization. At the full DAO level there is oversight & optimization functions and the supporting operational tasks. I haven't seen an initiative db, governance wiki creation in their proposal. Additionally, they had plenty of time to pick up hosting the monthly GRC call. To me it seems like different work.**
designing better systems For this to overlap without a doubt, it would require Entropy being responsible for designing and optimizing every system the DAO uses. This would be like the mayor being directly responsible for figuring out how the parks department schedules landscaping appointments.
documenting the role and preparing for handoff to OpCo the role doesn't exist yet. Delegates have specifically pointed us in this direction as a need. We are posturing in the most cooperative way possible to indicate that we will collaborate with a future OpCo. We also aren't dictating that the OpCo must use our work.**
Strategic workstream design We are working to design a single workstream. Entropy has expressed interest or activated multiple workstreams. No where have I seen designing repeatable and scalable processes for workstream governance in their mandate. However, they will by default be designing their workstream governance. Someone has to evaluate how these different budgets are governed to ensure that it doesn't become too complex for delegates to understand. Sure, there is overlap, but I'd argue this is healthy overlap - plus we are offering to take on the operational admin part of documenting across efforts.
building governance processes same answer as above
executing governance operations preparing to hand off leadership to a future workstream steward. This is referring to processes internal to a workstream. Unless you're reading thier offer to do some strategic governance work as "all strategic governance work" this doesn't overlap based on my assumption that the governance processes their referring to are in relation to the work scopes they have identified like Vision Mission Purpose - basically DAO executive level strategy setting and OpCo.
I don't understand, is this a reason we shouldn't do this work?
I wrote an events proposal and handed it to Entropy in an offer to collaborate rather than have my proposal compete with theirs. I did this even though I thought I had a great plan and knew I would likely be needing a role because I was planning to leave Thrive. I did this because it was on their objectives ratified in the Fund Entropy proposal which I supported, and I did not want to overlap. They graciously offered me a spot on the council for the work and support I gave. I don't think it is a paid role and I didn't specifically request it. I only asked them to use my name in the proposal and/or offer a position if they felt it would help get it passed, but I had no strings attached to my support.
Yes they are. And we are not.
We've offered to be big supporters of this. I like most of the direction they are taking. It is a tough task. We aren't doing anything that overlaps with this work.
Yes. And they are off to a great start in supporting these initiatives. We believe that initiatives in the DAO should have feedback from multiple parties. I commend the work Entropy is doing, but I think it is safe to say that even they would disagree that they should be the only people providing feedback and guidance to initiatives. (I didn't check that with them - my assumption entirely!)
We recommend continuing to focus on driving results for your current initiatives, where your time and resources are already committed.
I don't understand. Should everyone on the MSS be unable to work another job? Is my performance on the MSS lacking?
Thanks for your time. I understand how some of this can seem like overlap, but mostly because there are similar needs and roles across many functions and verticals and at many meta-levels of organization. I believe there is plenty of work to do.
We are in a tech market which is leading innovation next to AI, nano-tech, and space exploration. Not only that, we are in a competitive landscape at the edge of EXCELLENCE and INNOVATION. We need to execute and iterate quickly if we want to stay relevant.
I'd also really appreciate clarification from @Entropy if they do feel that we are indeed overlapping. That is the simple way to solve this problem if it even exists.
Thank you for taking the time to update the proposal based on feedback from the other thread. I don't think my two questions in the original thread were ever addressed before it was locked, so copy + pasting here (https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/boosting-dao-efficiency-by-10x-aligning-accountability-increasing-throughput/27051/23).
- Pretty much everything you listed as problem areas I agree with. I’ve either experienced them myself or have had discussions with builders who echo similar sentiment. It’s unfortunate these issues still exist, as I know it’s been discussed for a while and different attempts have been made to resolve them. I’ve historically been supportive of any initiative that tries to resolve this, as I’ve gotten to the point of ‘throw enough crap to see what sticks’.
- You mentioned a monthly governance call… what extra value would this add beyond the bi-weekly calls & monthly call already in place with the DAO?
- As a though exercise, what would you have done to prevent this from happening had you been in this role earlier this year (Proposal for Financial Restitution For ArbitrumDAO Grant Winners )? This is just one example, but in my experience some of the roadblocks were seeing aren’t anything the DAO can necessarily control.
I'll add a brainstormy-type question here: In the event the entire proposal does not pass, is there willingness to fund a smaller amount to get some of the smaller projects accomplished? I can see something like building a Governance Wiki or the Tracking system could add value to the DAO.
This proposal is very very interesting and I believe it is crucial to Arbitrum DAO short term (and potentially long term) success, especially with the current state of the market and landscape as well.
The DAO is currently struggling to execute its most impactful initiatives, resulting in a lack of confidence from key stakeholders.
Delegates, builders, and contributors face similar problems:
I think everyone resonates with this, the proposal addresses the most important issue that Arbitrum DAO has atm -coordination! Imo there are frictions in the following areas: delegations, governance, DAO "leadership" and "menthorship", communications, audits, grant giving, events, a low appetite for small-medium sized DAO lead positive sum experimentation
If this proposal can address some of these issues it would be extremely beneficial for the DAO. There is a certain "chaotic" element in Arbitrum DAO governance at the moment and it is not in it's advantage.
All the items here are very much needed in Arbitrum DAO atm imo, the calls are great for coordinating with more user personas.
Also as a side note, I believe both Joe and Alex have facilitated a lot of extremely beneficial conversations, have pushed their limits and contributed a lot of value to Arbitrum Dao for free**, from STIP to micro-management, from tutoring newbies to adding crucial feedback in important DAO initiatives+ other things that I may not even be aware of. If natural selection has any meaning in DAOs, they should be supported to run this proposal and to continue to help nurture the Arbitrum DAO-with guidance from the DAO ofc. I'm not the best person to comment on the organizational aspects of it tho
Contributors are disengaging because of unclear priorities, inefficient proposal updates, and a lack of transparent decision-making.
I would add that contributors feel they have nothing to add to the conversations that are ongoing because there is no "starting ground" or "refferrence point"
Alex and Joe will commit to working full-time with Arbitrum, leading governance operations and developing strategic workstreams. They will participate in work groups, facilitate meetings, and act as points of contact for general DAO inquiries.
As someone who has been full time working in DAOs since 2020, I find it unbelievable that after over a year, Arbitrum DAO doesn't have a workstream structure in place, this is the most important thing that this proposal can help solve: workstreams! It's also a very very complex thing to kickstart workstreams, as they can be both a blessing and a pain. In most DAOs workstreams always get politicized or "captured" one way of the other by a "group" - it is just how humans function and I am speaking from experience, unfortunately I have not contributed to a DAO that has solved "workstreams" in a way that doesn't waste a lot of capital and human resources.
I strongly believe that if Arbitrum DAO doesn't want to have those issues it must have mechanisms in place that can make sure these workstreams will not centralize or function without extremely clear missions of ethical principles(that are enforced). The good part is Arbitrum DAO has the resources(people, capital, knowledge) and the tools available today to make these things happen.
Also, extremely curious how the strategic workstreams will be conceptualized and how they will function. Some questions that are on my mind are:
*1. Is this going to be similar to an RFP process or feedback gathering process? * *2. Will the DAO be able to contribute to the workstreams? * 3. How will contributors for the workstreams recruited?
I support this initiative and believe Alex and Joe are the right people to push something like this forward as they are excelent facilitators and can coordinate with large groups of people in an effective way -which is a prerequisite to the success of a huge effort like this which requires the whole DAOs support and collective intelligence.
I'm glad you have reposted here as I didn't get to answer on the other thread in time. I'm pretty sure others have similar questions too.
Pretty much everything you listed as problem areas I agree with. I’ve either experienced them myself or have had discussions with builders who echo similar sentiment. It’s unfortunate these issues still exist, as I know it’s been discussed for a while and different attempts have been made to resolve them. I’ve historically been supportive of any initiative that tries to resolve this, as I’ve gotten to the point of ‘throw enough crap to see what sticks’.
Yes. I think there are reasons they don't stick. One of the biggest issues is that DAOs lack of a specific scope of work - governance operations - which goes under the radar because it is accounted for in centralized systems.
In corporations, you have strategic work done by executives to set higher level objectives and tactical work done by departments. There is implicit understanding that executives are then accountable for the reception of these objectives. They not only facilitate their own design thinking processes to select the best objectives, they also create rituals and processes they use to help keep the lower levels aligned and on track.
In a DAO, the executive function of setting objectives can be done by consensus vote, but then there isn't an individual responsible for making these things happen after a collective decision. Even if a budget is funded, it funds the tactical execution, but not the counterparty to the work being done. You may think of it as setting the "R" in a RACI, but there is no one there to be the "A".
This missing role in decentralized systems is what I (and others) call governance operations. It facilitates processes to help optimize and hold accountable how one level of the system works with another level. It also can help compile the strategic level objectives into tactical initiatives when there isn't an executive that naturally holds accountability for doing so when the DAO collectively makes a decision.
I do believe that my years of participating in DAOs at the highest levels has shown me insights into what works and what doesn't. Hopefully, we can make a real impact here by utilizing proper systems and operational design thinking in connection with real experience.
Another benefit of having us full-time is that I like to address problems when we see them. There isn't just a lack of an alignment system or operating system for the DAO, we don't even speak the same language. I've had multiple conversations where we thought there was overlap because I'm calling something a "pillar" and someone else interprets that as what they think of as North star. However, my intention was to mean a set of funded initiatives that all align to a desired outcome, but it likely would be an outcome that serves the north star vision - if we had one!
If I was being paid full-time, I would write a forum post to spark and steward a discussion to help us ratify a glossary of terms and avoid this problem in the future. Now, I don't want to say this is a deliverable becuse the important thing is that I'm able to address the most important problems at the right time. When you hire someone at your company, you don't ask exactly what deliverables they will give at the beginning. You agree to some regular outputs, then judge them based on what they do.
By demanding a set of unknowable deliverables, we sometimes limit what talented people would do.
You mentioned a monthly governance call… what extra value would this add beyond the bi-weekly calls & monthly call already in place with the DAO?
This is referring to the Monthly GRC that happened yesterday. Three month ago we split it from the bi-weekly proposals call which is now used to talk about upcoming votes. Alex has been stewarding this call unpaid since August. I've been helping a bit this last month.
Behind the scenes Alex conducted at least 15 half hour calls with initiatives and likely more time with delegates. We have been refining the call to serve the delegates needs. Yesterday, I think I even heard a compliment from L2 Beat saying the call was exactly what they needed. There is still work to be done though!
What I can say is that Thrive itself had the M1B proposal pass on Tally on 4/2/24, but couldn't access funds until mid July! However, even with that issue, they delivered most M1B funds 1-4 weeks. They did this by spending funds parntering with the Thrive Impact Foundation, a new Cayman Entity which could help them to compliantly allocate grant funds.
The issue you refer to in M1B wasn't any one actors fault, there were too many cooks and process dependencies. Thrive couldn't get validation to payout any individual week until all four of the winners passed KYC. This wasn't a policy Thrive made. Then at the end there was the list of all remaining payout, which again had to wait until everyone passed KYC to payout. It took some public tweets to execute the payments for everyone who was passed, and then hold the payments for those who weren't.
While not blaming anyone, I think the record of the discussion on that post shows repeatedly that Thrive was very responsive. Additionally, with M1B program managers, our exit interviews all rated Thrive performance as an 8,9, or 10 on the would they work with us again scale.
Thanks for the thoughtful questions Bob. We'd really appreciate your support.
Let's look at your concerns.
We are drafting a response separately to show how minimal, if any, overlap there is to Entropy.
Second, it risks creating an environment of micro-management for existing and new workstreams.
Yes. All managerial and/or operational work does hold this risk, but it isn't a reason not to do the work imho. Because, I hate micro-management, and have lots of management experience across multiple industries, I am well equipped to avoid this risk.
We are getting feedback on how to structure comp in relation to achieving milestones. However, there are mixed feelings on the operational work having milestones. Some believe this role is more like a hired job, but since there isn't a role or job description, it requires someone to create it. See my first response to Bob above. Also, this hired role would usually be accountable to a manager or executive, rather than needing to identify a set of SMART goals.
I promise we will clarify these issues before moving forward.
As of now it looks like we will have two "work packages"
As of now the comp suggestion getting the best responses in private conversations is something that works conceptually like this.
This isn't finalized, but I'm okay with sharing for feedback at this conceptual level.
This response is presumptive — assuming that existing initiatives focus their reporting calls on the wrong items and Alex & Joe know what should be discussed.
Thanks for pointing this out. I didn't intend for it to be presumptive. Alex and I have been discussing these calls with delegates and this is one of the primary things they have pointed out as being a problem with the calls as they have been done in the past. This isn't my presumption of what is needed. Additionally, we combined it with a survey yesterday to get better feedback on how to update as it moves forward. We will be posting the survey results with some analysis soon.
Regarding operational efficiency, I wonder if you have a concrete example from the past where a lack of coordination and operational follow-up was costly in terms of time, money, and alignment for the DAO. How could these issues have been resolved if you, as DAO contributors, had been elected at that time?
Great question. I think the problem has been that the delegates don't know when there is an issue to flag. Someone yesterday said "Aren't the initiatives all posting on the forum?". The answer is most, but not all. The delegates would have to go an find every update thread once a week to flag a missing post in time to make corrections! Sometimes that post is it's own thread and others respond to their initial tally. All of this uses valuable time. (Not that I think a missing post is a huge issue)
The problem is that there isn't a backbone system linking to relevant documentation. This lack of an organizing system costs every active delegate either 1) hours of time looking up posts or worse 2) they don't keep initiatives accountable until an emergency happens. Some initiatives have been done well, but delegates expected that they would have results many months sooner.
Here are some insights we shared based on this last months work.

I would appreciate more clarity on the potential overlaps with what Entropy does and the existing calls, perhaps through something like a RACI matrix?
Governance operations includes a set of responsibilities that connect the strategic to the tactical, and each “level” connected to the system as a whole.
| DAO Level | Workstream | Initiative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic Design | Entropy | AJ | Initiative Lead |
| Governance Operations | AJ now, OpCo later? | AJ now, OpCo Later? | AJ supporting initiative |
| Tactical Execution | AJ now, OpCo later? | AJ now, Workstream Steward | Initiative |
Let's answer some of your questions!
What objective criteria can we use to measure the success of this initiative?
More details are in an answer to Bob above, but we are still negotiating this with some top delegates and foundation to find an acceptable accountability practice. It will likely be similar to how Entropy is being held acountable with regular forum updates and a set of deliverables that are clearly acheived or not. Additionally, we will have to participate in the governance operations setup we are designing to make it easier for delegates to hold us accountable.
Could you clarify how this resource will differ from existing materials?
Referring to the Governance Wiki - This will have the types of decisions and methods for making them at every level with best practices. For example, every initiative holding a budget has a council of some sort. Should we require role documentation? When should elections use ranked choice? Is an election or hiring better for a specific circumstance?
While some solutions may be ratified, our intention is to make the options known and available with suggestions of norms and best practices. This can also guide controlled experimentation for specific issues we may face.
With various calls already scheduled across different initiatives, might adding another monthly call increase operational overhead? What motivation would builders, delegates and contributors have to join these?
This call is already happening! See my explanation in an answer above where I discuss the call's origin story.
Thanks for more quality questions everyone!
Thank you Alex and Joe for sharing this proposal. We agree that Arbitrum should continue improving its governance processes. However, we see several significant issues with this proposal. First, it significantly overlaps with Entropy’s role. Second, it risks creating an environment of micro-management for existing and new workstreams. Lastly, it lacks quantifiable KPIs to ensure accountability.
Addressing each point individually:
First, Entropy was brought on to “deliver strategic proposals, guide key partners through the DAO processes, and align the priorities of essential stakeholders for the betterment of Arbitrum” (Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working With Arbitrum DAO), which closely resembles the goals stated in this proposal to “Execute governance operations, designing better systems, documenting the role, and preparing for handoff to OpCo; and Strategic workstream design, building governance processes, executing governance operations, and preparing to hand off leadership to a future workstream steward.
Entropy has already contributed significantly by launching initiatives like the Multi-sig Support Service (MSS) (where both Alex and Joe serve as elected members) the Stylus sprint, the DAO Events Budget (where Joe is involved in). Entropy is also working on a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalizing DAO Ops proposal and a Unifying Mission, Vision, and Purpose for the DAO. Furthermore, Entropy has also already synced with high-impact DAO initiatives such as the Treasury Management Working Group and the ARDC to enhance alignment and request additional reporting.
Given this overlap, it’s unclear how this proposal distinguishes itself from Entropy’s role and responsibilities, especially as Entropy continues to scale its team to fulfill their mandate.
Expanding on our point of of micro-managing initiatives, we would like to draw attention to Joe’s response to Karpatkey’s comment where they asked,
can you please give some concrete examples of the governance operations and tactical execution you would be executing?
Joe responded,
Sure. Governance operations at the DAO level includes acting as a counterparty to current initiatives. Tactical might include setting up the initiative db and restructuring reporting calls to discuss relevant info rather than just the positives and initiative wants to talk about.
This response is presumptive — assuming that existing initiatives focus their reporting calls on the wrong items and Alex & Joe know what should be discussed.
Finally on KPIs, we would like to draw attention to Joe’s response to Duokongcrypto who asked,
are there more specific KPIs or milestones to assess improvements in governance efficiency? For example, proposal success rate, improvement in governance process response time, etc.
Joe responded,
Honestly, we could say some of the metrics you suggested, but I’d feel like a pompous asshole saying them because none of those things are being tracked or understood right now. That is the real problem.
While an NPS-style score can provide a sentiment check, it alone is insufficient. The DAO also needs quantitative metrics to effectively assess the work that it is funding.
We recommend continuing to focus on driving results for your current initiatives, where your time and resources are already committed.
Thank you @DisruptionJoe and @AlexLumley for this proposal! As a new delegate of Arbitrum, I find there are a lot of ressources about the DAO that can be difficult to find as they are spread in different places. So I would certainly value tools like a database for all current initiatives, meeting minutes, dedicated calls, "confidence in the DAO" score and others if they are well organized under a specific hub.
Regarding operational efficiency, I wonder if you have a concrete example from the past where a lack of coordination and operational follow-up was costly in terms of time, money, and alignment for the DAO. How could these issues have been resolved if you, as DAO contributors, had been elected at that time?
Also, as mentioned by @pedrob, I would appreciate more clarity on the potential overlaps with what Entropy does and the existing calls, perhaps through something like a RACI matrix?
I appreciate the vesting schedule that aligns their interests with those of the Arbitrum DAO for the long term. If the final compensation package meets industry standards, this could be a good opportunity to conduct a trial run for 6 months and then reassess based on agreed KPIs.
Our intention is not for implicit approval, but rather explicit approval. We've been working on forming the expert council roles this last week and hope to have the workstream proposal on Snapshot by the time this proposal hits Tally.
Then we workshop it and get something strategic and deserving of our salaries to pass or risk being fired by the DAO. What would have happened if Entropy didn’t pass the Stylus fund?
and
A difference is that we are hoping to execute on a timeframe that would have a snapshot vote started for the workstream budget before this proposal goes to Tally. Hopefully!
Does this help to show that it is not trying to take advantage of governance with implicity buy in?
From what is presented, it’s unclear how previous work—such as governance reporting calls or passing a few proposals—equips them to address the intricate challenges currently facing Orbit and the DAO. Looking at the contributors’ resume such as STIP Backfund or Plurality Labs, the work does not demonstrate the depth of expertise required to lead a working group focused on such an important and technical concept.
I've previously shared my background. I ran sybil defense at Gitcoin for 2 years. I'm deeply knowledgeable about onchain forensics, adversarial systems, threat modeling, governance design and other topics which come up in crypto including understanding trust assumptions. I've operationally led a workstream which ran a machine learning operations pipeline as a DAO, and have the experience of navigating governance and legal challenges of fraud defense.
I was also giving talks and teaching about bitcoin, ethereum, and crypto in general in 2017 with an official partnership to 1871 - the largest tech incubator in Chicago.
It would be more strategic for the DAO to first approve the 10M ARB unified orbit proposal and then engage individuals with proven capabilities to manage this critical initiative.
Who would you suggest operationally run the process of finding and selecting these individuals? This is the problem we are solving here. We believe that with the proper expert council, we can operationally drive to best outcomes.
We would love to collaborate with ADPC and Entropy on this work. In fact, we've already reached out to both explicitly asking about their bandwidth for collaboration. We've asked Entropy to have a seat on the council. They have a lot of work already moving and it likely makes sense to have more contributors rather than Entropy running everything!
While not the technical wizard myself, I can keep up on most technical conversations. I'd be happy to do a twitter space where we discuss further.
This is quite the interesting post from a first time poster on this forum. Would you be willing to take the anon front off and share your concerns with skin in the game? Either way - Welcome!
I'm glad to see this proposal! The issues you're tackling definitely need attention, and I fully back Alex and Joe—they’re perfect for the job. I have a couple of thoughts:
Let's avoid falling into the "Bureaucracy Trap." It’s easy to add steps between steps or create extra reports on top of reports, but nobody wants that! Let’s focus on setting up systems that make our DAO run smoother, not more complicated.
Good call from Larva—the workload sounds like a lot for just two people, especially since they’re already busy with other DAO tasks. Maybe consider expanding the team or forming a workgroup?
It is hard to review a proposal without the budget! Could you give us at least a ballpark range?
I like that the operations plan includes updates, bi-weekly check-ins, reports, and testing for ongoing process improvements. Following this routine will give us solid results, enabling quicker decision-making through constant monitoring. The project stages over six months are well-defined, and I think that's a good timeframe to see real progress. I believe that with Alex and Joe’s experience, along with Entropy, things will be done right. I’d just like to know if this is a updated version or a different proposal from the one Joe made a couple of weeks ago, requesting a 200K budget also for 6 months?
Hello!
I have to admit, I’m a bit confused by the proposal.
Builders are losing faith in the ecosystem due to slow DAO processes, unclear timelines, and lack of clarity or inconsistency of builder support. (OCL can’t keep up with growth!)
Hello!
I have to admit, I’m a bit confused by the proposal.
Builders are losing faith in the ecosystem due to slow DAO processes, unclear timelines, and lack of clarity or inconsistency of builder support. (OCL can’t keep up with growth!)
If you have any statistics or further analysis on this, I’d love it if you could share! In my opinion, there has been a lot of support for builders (numerous past DAO incentive programs + grants from the AF + future incentive programs as Stylus and an incentives WG currently working on the new version of them), though I could be mistaken, and I would love a deeper understanding of this point.
Contributors are disengaging because of unclear priorities, inefficient proposal updates, and a lack of transparent decision-making.
I’d also appreciate it if you could expand on this with data or a report. In my opinion (although I don’t have data, just a sense from having been around for a while), the DAO seems to have more contributors over time.
How would you describe the success rate of the initiatives so far? Where do you consider you'd be starting, and where do you want to go?
I don’t fully understand this. Is the idea that you would act as council supervisors? By this proposal, would all future councils operate under you?
Or is the plan to create a council under your leadership that would then supervise the other councils? I’m a bit confused—apologies if I’m not getting it.
or this proposal to be possible, we will also need to pass the workstream budget proposal. Here is the current draft .
And why is it necessary to approve funds for an Orbit strategy for this proposal to pass? That part also has me confused.
Thank you for the new proposal, though many of the questions I raised in the previous one haven’t been answered
What we are missing is a watchdog—someone who applies a certain level of “pressure” and oversees the execution of proposals, providing expert opinions on how things are progressing and recommending actions if something starts deviating from what was promised. The thing is that it’s a very unpopular role. But in my opinion, given the current state, this is exactly what the DAO needs today. And I would vote in favor of it.
That said, I have a couple of questions about the execution of the proposal and the budget.
Why do you think two people in a “senior” role (17K USD per month) are necessary to execute the proposal? Honestly, the pricing seems a bit excessive to me. It would be great if, beyond expressing your full-time commitment, you could explain a bit more about the rationale behind the number.
Joe, apologies if you’ve posted or mentioned this somewhere before, but I couldn’t find any reference. Does this mean you’ve set aside the execution of Plurality Labs milestones and the pluralistic grants?
Lastly, I would like to know your thoughts on the compatibility of accessing this proposal while maintaining the incentivized role as a delegate .
My personal opinion:
I believe the actions included in "Governance Operations" are valuable and necessary for the DAO. I would focus the proposal on that, ideally working together with Entropy to avoid overlap.
Thank you very much.
Hey Pedro,
Sorry we missed answering on the previous proposal and thanks for the new questions! I'll try to address them all today!
Hey Pedro,
Sorry we missed answering on the previous proposal and thanks for the new questions! I'll try to address them all today!
If you have any statistics or further analysis on this, I’d love it if you could share! In my opinion, there has been a lot of support for builders (numerous past DAO incentive programs + grants from the AF + future incentive programs as Stylus and an incentives WG currently working on the new version of them), though I could be mistaken, and I would love a deeper understanding of this point.
Yes, some work is getting done. The ones you mentioned are great. When we say "builders", we are referring to the stakeholder group of builders of protocols or dapps using the Arbitrum tech stack whether that is Orbit Chains or Arbitrum One/Nova.
Just look at Treasure DAO who clearly sighted lack of the DAO being able to progress at reasonable speeds. Another indicator is how few protocol builders are regularly participating in DAO calls. Even the most hungry have pulled back - so you have to ask yourself why @Soby @IronBoots @dk3 and other builders aren't spending the time they were in the DAO?
While the programs you mention are great, we need people actually talking to builders. Where are our user interviews with new orbit chain builders asking what they really care about when deciding where to build? This is the point.
(For the record, delegate incentives has been a highlight and example of a well run initiative.)
I’d also appreciate it if you could expand on this with data or a report. In my opinion (although I don’t have data, just a sense from having been around for a while), the DAO seems to have more contributors over time.
I think its an unrealistic request to ask for the data - talk about a circular problem! We've never had operational work done to track contributors. Do we have more contributors or louder people? Whats the membrane? Who counts as a contributor? I'll cede that we could be wrong in this assessment, but I doubt many have done a wider set of stakeholder interviews on which they base their assumptions.
How would you describe the success rate of the initiatives so far? Where do you consider you’d be starting, and where do you want to go?
Starting with building an initiatives db, checkins with current initiatives, and exit interviews with past initiatives. We also have a lot of other key stakeholder engagement to do.
Or is the plan to create a council under your leadership that would then supervise the other councils?
This is what people always miss about operations, especially governance operations - it's not just you! To start, NO, we would not be the council supervisors - we would conduct the processes of drafting role descriptions (ie. must have one relevant person from OCL) selecting potentials, and organizing calls.
This in between work to get it done is governance operations. In a centralized system, the executive makes a decision and then is responsible for their reports receiving the message accurately and overseeing their accountability. In a decentralized system, the community decides in role of the executive - and maybe even decides who tactically does the work - but puts no one in place to oversee or act as a counterparty.
Our work would be in service to the council, acting as a budget steward while defining the role well enough to hire/elect or hand it off.
Our feedback from large delegates was that governance operations isn't enough to earn the salary needed to keep us here - that would require us doing more strategic or creative work.
The budget is an opportunity for us to drive some strategic work that requires strong multi-party alignment unlike any collaboration we've see this far in the overall Arbitrum ecosystem.
Why do you think two people in a “senior” role (17K USD per month) are necessary to execute the proposal? Honestly, the pricing seems a bit excessive to me. It would be great if, beyond expressing your full-time commitment, you could explain a bit more about the rationale behind the number.
We are currently combining feedback from the foundation and top delegates to put together the exact comp package.
Not speaking for Alex, but for me - I need to make at minimum what I've made in the past. There is no reason for me to take a role without benefits, travel expenses, bonus, commission, equity or tokens AND do it for less than my salary the last 4 years. While I'd like to stay working with Arbitrum, that is a hard constraint for me - I'm willing to not negotiate to match my opportunity cost, but I can't take a role that is a huge backward step financially. (Which I've done before with early team roles at startups - because we negotiated for higher equity.)
Yes. I have left Thrive protocol. We had a fork in the road: I wanted to design pluralist grants governance which is capture resistant and they want to refine and scale their method of funding grants at critical milestones of value creation. They do great work, but the governance design requires different motivations. I am taking the risk of leaving them because I believe it the right thing to do as my interests don't lie in product refinement & scaling. I'm still very supportive of them and see many ways they can help our grants programs in the future.
I've actually never been paid from it - I don't believe so anyway. I always put my rational on snapshot or tally, but don't have a thread. I'm such a small delegate anyway that I almost felt embarassed collecting because I was earning from Plurality Labs/Thrive. I'll admit it was a little frustrating this last month since I see tons of delegates putting short sweet answers in their thread while I spend a lot of time actively participating!
I believe the actions included in “Governance Operations” are valuable and necessary for the DAO. I would focus the proposal on that, ideally working together with Entropy to avoid overlap.
We've offered them a seat on the council for the Orbit Chain Mesh workstream budget and have been in communication around the OpCo. While we haven't seen any details related to OpCo yet, we fully intend to collaborate.
I also have a history of making good on my word. I shut down the FDD workstream at Gitcoin when the protocol launched because it was time and I had previously committed to doing so. I also started up and spun out multiple workstreams there. We had needs like DAO Ops and Support which we had budget to kickstart and some delegates worried I was "power grabbing" but we spun out and handed off responsibility every time.
Thanks for your questions and valuable time spent considering our proposal.
I hope everyone enjoyed their weekend. We will be answering all the questions today.
Thanks for this proposal. Is it a follow-up to the one Joe posted last time?
I hope everyone enjoyed their weekend. We will be answering all the questions today.
Thanks for this proposal. Is it a follow-up to the one Joe posted last time?
Yes, it is. We got delegate feedback and decided to restart this proposal to focus on the two areas of Live Governance Operations and the Orbit Chain Mesh Workstream.
However, this doesn’t seem like an easy task—will it be too much for just the two of you? Are you considering hiring others to help, or will the council you’re forming be enough to support you in completing all the work?
We are considering a little extra budget available to hire admin support.
The council is for the Orbit Chain Mesh workstream budget. This will be it’s own proposal separate from this one, though intertwined. That proposal would have its own budget to fund initiatives within it’s mandate while our full-time compensation would come from this proposal. It’s possible that a handoff of the basic governance operations to OpCo would necessitate our salaries be attributed to this workstream, but unlikely.
Will the council member be known before this proposal goes live for vote?
It will be - before the workstream budget proposal goes to snapshot.
This is still undetermined for the Orbit Chain Mesh workstream budget. Our salaries would be included here.
You mention that for this to pass, the Workstream: A Unified Orbit Experience (currently as a draft) need to pass. Looking at the timeline proposed, this other proposal will not be voted before this one. What happens if the other fails?
Then we workshop it and get something strategic and deserving of our salaries to pass or risk being fired by the DAO. What would have happened if Entropy didn’t pass the Stylus fund?
regarding the funding for the Chain abstraction proposal, are you mentioning the full-fledged proposal or for the “snapshot proposal to the DAO next week for the initial budget allocation”, as mentioned in the other thread?
Here’s a quick video about the connection between Max’s Embracing Chain Abstraction proposal and the workstream we are proposing. https://share.zight.com/yAuezGyr
can you please give some concrete examples of the governance operations and tactical execution you would be executing?
Sure. Governance operations at the DAO level includes acting as a counterparty to current initiatives. Tactical might include setting up the initiative db and restructuring reporting calls to discuss relevant info rather than just the positives and initiative wants to talk about.
At the workstream level, governance operations would include running the processes to select (elect/hire/other) council members and a budget steward. Tactical would be conducting open bid RFPs for service providers to conduct S.M.A.R.T. initiatives.
are we correct in assuming your role would be “interim” and it would be either dismissed or incorporated within the OpCo, once it is live? And, any ETA on the OpCo being live?
No particular ETA. That is in the hands of Entropy. My hopeful thinking would be that OpCo is fully enstantiated and ready to hire in January, and we are then able to handoff the governance operations at the DAO level to do more strategic building at the Workstream level. This may also include helping other important proposals pass to address objectives identified in Entropy’s DAO strategic vision work.
Additionally, we see that this proposal depends entirely on a draft proposal. Have you considered consolidating both into a single proposal?
Yes, but this felt cleaner. We also used the example of Entropy proposal to fund the company vs the Stylus fund proposal. A difference is that we are hoping to execute on a timeframe that would have a snapshot vote started for the workstream budget before this proposal goes to Tally. Hopefully!
I’d just like to know if this is a updated version or a different proposal from the one Joe made a couple of weeks ago, requesting a 200K budget also for 6 months?
This is the updated proposal. Newly minted with all relevant feedback.
Let’s avoid falling into the “Bureaucracy Trap.” It’s easy to add steps between steps or create extra reports on top of reports, but nobody wants that! Let’s focus on setting up systems that make our DAO run smoother, not more complicated.
Absolutely. Systems not processes for most items. Let’s face it, this is low hanging fruit to start. We don’t even have a db of all the current initiatives!
It is hard to review a proposal without the budget! Could you give us at least a ballpark range?
Yes. Both of us need to make a salary which will keep us here, plus bonus, commission, tokens, whatever. For me, that is a personal minimum after years of making higher than that and having equity or tokens in addition to base pay in past opportunities. This doesn’t even consider opportunity cost.
We want to be here. I love the culture modeled by OCL of shipping and launching real products that work as advertised. Products on the cutting edge of what’s possible. I want to support ethereum and this is the best place to do it.
We think a package should put us in range (considering we have to pay for travel, benefits, all out of pocket) and offers a vesting structure that is attractive to us and to the DAO to entice us to stay long-term.
Plus, we may need a little extra available for admin support. More coming upon our completion of talks with the foundation.
Our main one is a monthly “confidence in the DAO” score. Like an NPS, it is a trend metric to see how things are moving and not meaningful done as a one-off assessment.
Honestly, we could say some of the metrics you suggested, but I’d feel like a pompous asshole saying them because none of those things are being tracked or understood right now. That is the real problem.
Proposal success rate - Great if we could know the counter metric to make sure it isn’t bad proposals at a higher rate.
Response time - Is this a problem? Who measures it? How is it connected to TVL, FDV, Sticky Users, protocol market share in a vertical…
This is the nature of the beast that is operations. No one notices it until it screws up. I think we all feel it could be better, but I’d rather smart people work nimbly on affecting real change than providing vanity metrics!
(However, the intention of multiple listed deliverables is to make meaningful metrics available to then be able to use in this way!)
Yes. Starting with the initiatives DB and regular updates! Additionally, meeting minutes from monthly updates.
It is mentioned in the proposal that OpCo may take over the governance role in the future, but is there a clear handover plan?
No, there is not. OpCo hasn’t been voted into existence yet, and there are differing opinions on how it should run. What we are saying is that we will document the work in the roles we are creating such that the roles could be handed over to an OpCo or another contributor..
On the other hand, we don’t want to create the expectation that OpCo HAS to hire us. That should be the choice of OpCo leadership.
I see three paths for our work, assuming OpCo becomes a reality.
I guess this also assumes that the DAO doesn’t want to fire us! This will be possible at any point during the contract.
How will it be ensured that there is a smooth transition of governance without a break after Alex and Joe have completed their roles? It is suggested that effectiveness tracking and long-term role arrangements be further refined to ensure that the objectives of the proposal are actually realized.
As my previous answer stated, it is not clear for very valid reasons. I don’t advise us rushing to waterfall these things because we have problems that could be solved today. A commitment to collaboration should suffice. Now, I do understand that there is a possibility that we both turn out to be subpar performers, but the DAO has the ability to fire us at any time.
Hey, Alex! Thanks for this proposal. Is it a follow-up to the one Joe posted last time? I think this work is indeed very important, and both of you are the best candidates to take it on with your skills and experience. However, this doesn’t seem like an easy task—will it be too much for just the two of you? Are you considering hiring others to help, or will the council you’re forming be enough to support you in completing all the work? I think this issue is critical because it has a big impact on the budget.
Saving this for commentary
:grinning:Suggestion to expand community feedback channels: In terms of collecting community feedback, it may be worthwhile to add, for example, regular questionnaires or AMA activities, so that more contributors can participate in the feedback and a broader consensus can be formed. It is mentioned in the proposal that OpCo may take over the governance role in the future, but is there a clear handover plan? How will it be ensured that there is a smooth transition of governance without a break after Alex and Joe have completed their roles? It is suggested that effectiveness tracking and long-term role arrangements be further refined to ensure that the objectives of the proposal are actually realized.
Thank you for the proposal @AlexLumley.
This seems to be an alternative, more focused approach than the one proposed in the Boosting DAO efficiency by 10x proposal. Is it correct to assume this proposal effectively replaces the previous one?
In general, we appreciate the additional clarity on how this would relate with the work of @Entropy, which was our main concern in the previous proposal.
Thank you for the proposal @AlexLumley.
This seems to be an alternative, more focused approach than the one proposed in the Boosting DAO efficiency by 10x proposal. Is it correct to assume this proposal effectively replaces the previous one?
In general, we appreciate the additional clarity on how this would relate with the work of @Entropy, which was our main concern in the previous proposal.
This proposal includes executing governance operations while Entropy designs long-term systems driven through an OpCo, in preparation for a handoff - recognizing that doing the work cannot wait for an entity to be established. By immediately addressing key operational gaps and establishing governance processes, this proposal ensures Arbitrum begins executing important work without delay, while building scalable systems for long-term effectiveness. Governance operations includes a set of responsibilities that connect the strategic to the tactical, and each “level” connected to the system as a whole.
A couple follow-up questions:
Hello, Thanks for your proposal!
I have a few questions about the following:
Hello, Thanks for your proposal!
I have a few questions about the following:
For this proposal to be possible, we will also need to pass the workstream budget proposal. Here is the current draft . We are working on recruiting the council already. If passed, this workstream could fund and support Max’s Embracing Chain Abstraction proposal . We are currently recruiting expert council members.
We share the same question regarding whether this proposal replaces or is related to the proposal Boosting DAO Efficiency by 10x. We believe it’s important to clarify this point.
As we mentioned in the previous proposal, we find the work you aim to carry out essential for the DAO, and we do not doubt either of your abilities to achieve it. However, the current proposal has left us with some questions.
We share the same question regarding whether this proposal replaces or is related to the proposal Boosting DAO Efficiency by 10x. We believe it’s important to clarify this point.
As we mentioned in the previous proposal, we find the work you aim to carry out essential for the DAO, and we do not doubt either of your abilities to achieve it. However, the current proposal has left us with some questions.
We feel it is unclear how the proposal's costs will be covered, perhaps further explanation on this would be necessary.
For this proposal to be possible, we will also need to pass the workstream budget proposal. Here is the current draft
Additionally, we see that this proposal depends entirely on a draft proposal. Have you considered consolidating both into a single proposal?
Entropy has already contributed significantly by launching initiatives like the Multi-sig Support Service (MSS) (where both Alex and Joe serve as elected members) the Stylus sprint , the DAO Events Budget (where Joe is involved in). Entropy is also working on a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalizing DAO Ops proposal and a Unifying Mission, Vision, and Purpose for the DAO. Furthermore, Entropy has also already synced with high-impact DAO initiatives such as the Treasury Management Working Group and the ARDC to enhance alignment and request additional reporting.
Given this overlap, it’s unclear how this proposal distinguishes itself from Entropy’s role and responsibilities, especially as Entropy continues to scale its team to fulfill their mandate.
There is a lot here, so I'll unpack one by one.
Entropy was brought on to “deliver strategic proposals, guide key partners through the DAO processes, and align the priorities of essential stakeholders for the betterment of Arbitrum”
So do I think these overlap, NO. There is plenty of work to be done. I'd prefer if @Entropy would comment if they feel there is overlap by identifying the specific issues if there are any. We've done about everything we can to resolve any overlap issues including attending their office hours regularly and participating in a TG chat which has mostly been productive with 2 way feedback.
Execute governance operations, designing better systems, documenting the role, and preparing for handoff to OpCo; and Strategic workstream design, building governance processes, executing governance operations, and preparing to hand off leadership to a future workstream steward.
Here is the list of what we are proposing to do.
Execute governance operations Governance operations happens at every meta-level of organization. At the full DAO level there is oversight & optimization functions and the supporting operational tasks. I haven't seen an initiative db, governance wiki creation in their proposal. Additionally, they had plenty of time to pick up hosting the monthly GRC call. To me it seems like different work.**
designing better systems For this to overlap without a doubt, it would require Entropy being responsible for designing and optimizing every system the DAO uses. This would be like the mayor being directly responsible for figuring out how the parks department schedules landscaping appointments.
documenting the role and preparing for handoff to OpCo the role doesn't exist yet. Delegates have specifically pointed us in this direction as a need. We are posturing in the most cooperative way possible to indicate that we will collaborate with a future OpCo. We also aren't dictating that the OpCo must use our work.**
Strategic workstream design We are working to design a single workstream. Entropy has expressed interest or activated multiple workstreams. No where have I seen designing repeatable and scalable processes for workstream governance in their mandate. However, they will by default be designing their workstream governance. Someone has to evaluate how these different budgets are governed to ensure that it doesn't become too complex for delegates to understand. Sure, there is overlap, but I'd argue this is healthy overlap - plus we are offering to take on the operational admin part of documenting across efforts.
building governance processes same answer as above
executing governance operations preparing to hand off leadership to a future workstream steward. This is referring to processes internal to a workstream. Unless you're reading thier offer to do some strategic governance work as "all strategic governance work" this doesn't overlap based on my assumption that the governance processes their referring to are in relation to the work scopes they have identified like Vision Mission Purpose - basically DAO executive level strategy setting and OpCo.
I don't understand, is this a reason we shouldn't do this work?
I wrote an events proposal and handed it to Entropy in an offer to collaborate rather than have my proposal compete with theirs. I did this even though I thought I had a great plan and knew I would likely be needing a role because I was planning to leave Thrive. I did this because it was on their objectives ratified in the Fund Entropy proposal which I supported, and I did not want to overlap. They graciously offered me a spot on the council for the work and support I gave. I don't think it is a paid role and I didn't specifically request it. I only asked them to use my name in the proposal and/or offer a position if they felt it would help get it passed, but I had no strings attached to my support.
Yes they are. And we are not.
We've offered to be big supporters of this. I like most of the direction they are taking. It is a tough task. We aren't doing anything that overlaps with this work.
Yes. And they are off to a great start in supporting these initiatives. We believe that initiatives in the DAO should have feedback from multiple parties. I commend the work Entropy is doing, but I think it is safe to say that even they would disagree that they should be the only people providing feedback and guidance to initiatives. (I didn't check that with them - my assumption entirely!)
We recommend continuing to focus on driving results for your current initiatives, where your time and resources are already committed.
I don't understand. Should everyone on the MSS be unable to work another job? Is my performance on the MSS lacking?
Thanks for your time. I understand how some of this can seem like overlap, but mostly because there are similar needs and roles across many functions and verticals and at many meta-levels of organization. I believe there is plenty of work to do.
We are in a tech market which is leading innovation next to AI, nano-tech, and space exploration. Not only that, we are in a competitive landscape at the edge of EXCELLENCE and INNOVATION. We need to execute and iterate quickly if we want to stay relevant.
I'd also really appreciate clarification from @Entropy if they do feel that we are indeed overlapping. That is the simple way to solve this problem if it even exists.
Thank you for taking the time to update the proposal based on feedback from the other thread. I don't think my two questions in the original thread were ever addressed before it was locked, so copy + pasting here (https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/boosting-dao-efficiency-by-10x-aligning-accountability-increasing-throughput/27051/23).
- Pretty much everything you listed as problem areas I agree with. I’ve either experienced them myself or have had discussions with builders who echo similar sentiment. It’s unfortunate these issues still exist, as I know it’s been discussed for a while and different attempts have been made to resolve them. I’ve historically been supportive of any initiative that tries to resolve this, as I’ve gotten to the point of ‘throw enough crap to see what sticks’.
- You mentioned a monthly governance call… what extra value would this add beyond the bi-weekly calls & monthly call already in place with the DAO?
- As a though exercise, what would you have done to prevent this from happening had you been in this role earlier this year (Proposal for Financial Restitution For ArbitrumDAO Grant Winners )? This is just one example, but in my experience some of the roadblocks were seeing aren’t anything the DAO can necessarily control.
I'll add a brainstormy-type question here: In the event the entire proposal does not pass, is there willingness to fund a smaller amount to get some of the smaller projects accomplished? I can see something like building a Governance Wiki or the Tracking system could add value to the DAO.
This proposal is very very interesting and I believe it is crucial to Arbitrum DAO short term (and potentially long term) success, especially with the current state of the market and landscape as well.
The DAO is currently struggling to execute its most impactful initiatives, resulting in a lack of confidence from key stakeholders.
Delegates, builders, and contributors face similar problems:
I think everyone resonates with this, the proposal addresses the most important issue that Arbitrum DAO has atm -coordination! Imo there are frictions in the following areas: delegations, governance, DAO "leadership" and "menthorship", communications, audits, grant giving, events, a low appetite for small-medium sized DAO lead positive sum experimentation
If this proposal can address some of these issues it would be extremely beneficial for the DAO. There is a certain "chaotic" element in Arbitrum DAO governance at the moment and it is not in it's advantage.
All the items here are very much needed in Arbitrum DAO atm imo, the calls are great for coordinating with more user personas.
Also as a side note, I believe both Joe and Alex have facilitated a lot of extremely beneficial conversations, have pushed their limits and contributed a lot of value to Arbitrum Dao for free**, from STIP to micro-management, from tutoring newbies to adding crucial feedback in important DAO initiatives+ other things that I may not even be aware of. If natural selection has any meaning in DAOs, they should be supported to run this proposal and to continue to help nurture the Arbitrum DAO-with guidance from the DAO ofc. I'm not the best person to comment on the organizational aspects of it tho
Contributors are disengaging because of unclear priorities, inefficient proposal updates, and a lack of transparent decision-making.
I would add that contributors feel they have nothing to add to the conversations that are ongoing because there is no "starting ground" or "refferrence point"
Alex and Joe will commit to working full-time with Arbitrum, leading governance operations and developing strategic workstreams. They will participate in work groups, facilitate meetings, and act as points of contact for general DAO inquiries.
As someone who has been full time working in DAOs since 2020, I find it unbelievable that after over a year, Arbitrum DAO doesn't have a workstream structure in place, this is the most important thing that this proposal can help solve: workstreams! It's also a very very complex thing to kickstart workstreams, as they can be both a blessing and a pain. In most DAOs workstreams always get politicized or "captured" one way of the other by a "group" - it is just how humans function and I am speaking from experience, unfortunately I have not contributed to a DAO that has solved "workstreams" in a way that doesn't waste a lot of capital and human resources.
I strongly believe that if Arbitrum DAO doesn't want to have those issues it must have mechanisms in place that can make sure these workstreams will not centralize or function without extremely clear missions of ethical principles(that are enforced). The good part is Arbitrum DAO has the resources(people, capital, knowledge) and the tools available today to make these things happen.
Also, extremely curious how the strategic workstreams will be conceptualized and how they will function. Some questions that are on my mind are:
*1. Is this going to be similar to an RFP process or feedback gathering process? * *2. Will the DAO be able to contribute to the workstreams? * 3. How will contributors for the workstreams recruited?
I support this initiative and believe Alex and Joe are the right people to push something like this forward as they are excelent facilitators and can coordinate with large groups of people in an effective way -which is a prerequisite to the success of a huge effort like this which requires the whole DAOs support and collective intelligence.
I'm glad you have reposted here as I didn't get to answer on the other thread in time. I'm pretty sure others have similar questions too.
Pretty much everything you listed as problem areas I agree with. I’ve either experienced them myself or have had discussions with builders who echo similar sentiment. It’s unfortunate these issues still exist, as I know it’s been discussed for a while and different attempts have been made to resolve them. I’ve historically been supportive of any initiative that tries to resolve this, as I’ve gotten to the point of ‘throw enough crap to see what sticks’.
Yes. I think there are reasons they don't stick. One of the biggest issues is that DAOs lack of a specific scope of work - governance operations - which goes under the radar because it is accounted for in centralized systems.
In corporations, you have strategic work done by executives to set higher level objectives and tactical work done by departments. There is implicit understanding that executives are then accountable for the reception of these objectives. They not only facilitate their own design thinking processes to select the best objectives, they also create rituals and processes they use to help keep the lower levels aligned and on track.
In a DAO, the executive function of setting objectives can be done by consensus vote, but then there isn't an individual responsible for making these things happen after a collective decision. Even if a budget is funded, it funds the tactical execution, but not the counterparty to the work being done. You may think of it as setting the "R" in a RACI, but there is no one there to be the "A".
This missing role in decentralized systems is what I (and others) call governance operations. It facilitates processes to help optimize and hold accountable how one level of the system works with another level. It also can help compile the strategic level objectives into tactical initiatives when there isn't an executive that naturally holds accountability for doing so when the DAO collectively makes a decision.
I do believe that my years of participating in DAOs at the highest levels has shown me insights into what works and what doesn't. Hopefully, we can make a real impact here by utilizing proper systems and operational design thinking in connection with real experience.
Another benefit of having us full-time is that I like to address problems when we see them. There isn't just a lack of an alignment system or operating system for the DAO, we don't even speak the same language. I've had multiple conversations where we thought there was overlap because I'm calling something a "pillar" and someone else interprets that as what they think of as North star. However, my intention was to mean a set of funded initiatives that all align to a desired outcome, but it likely would be an outcome that serves the north star vision - if we had one!
If I was being paid full-time, I would write a forum post to spark and steward a discussion to help us ratify a glossary of terms and avoid this problem in the future. Now, I don't want to say this is a deliverable becuse the important thing is that I'm able to address the most important problems at the right time. When you hire someone at your company, you don't ask exactly what deliverables they will give at the beginning. You agree to some regular outputs, then judge them based on what they do.
By demanding a set of unknowable deliverables, we sometimes limit what talented people would do.
You mentioned a monthly governance call… what extra value would this add beyond the bi-weekly calls & monthly call already in place with the DAO?
This is referring to the Monthly GRC that happened yesterday. Three month ago we split it from the bi-weekly proposals call which is now used to talk about upcoming votes. Alex has been stewarding this call unpaid since August. I've been helping a bit this last month.
Behind the scenes Alex conducted at least 15 half hour calls with initiatives and likely more time with delegates. We have been refining the call to serve the delegates needs. Yesterday, I think I even heard a compliment from L2 Beat saying the call was exactly what they needed. There is still work to be done though!
What I can say is that Thrive itself had the M1B proposal pass on Tally on 4/2/24, but couldn't access funds until mid July! However, even with that issue, they delivered most M1B funds 1-4 weeks. They did this by spending funds parntering with the Thrive Impact Foundation, a new Cayman Entity which could help them to compliantly allocate grant funds.
The issue you refer to in M1B wasn't any one actors fault, there were too many cooks and process dependencies. Thrive couldn't get validation to payout any individual week until all four of the winners passed KYC. This wasn't a policy Thrive made. Then at the end there was the list of all remaining payout, which again had to wait until everyone passed KYC to payout. It took some public tweets to execute the payments for everyone who was passed, and then hold the payments for those who weren't.
While not blaming anyone, I think the record of the discussion on that post shows repeatedly that Thrive was very responsive. Additionally, with M1B program managers, our exit interviews all rated Thrive performance as an 8,9, or 10 on the would they work with us again scale.
Thanks for the thoughtful questions Bob. We'd really appreciate your support.
Let's look at your concerns.
We are drafting a response separately to show how minimal, if any, overlap there is to Entropy.
Second, it risks creating an environment of micro-management for existing and new workstreams.
Yes. All managerial and/or operational work does hold this risk, but it isn't a reason not to do the work imho. Because, I hate micro-management, and have lots of management experience across multiple industries, I am well equipped to avoid this risk.
We are getting feedback on how to structure comp in relation to achieving milestones. However, there are mixed feelings on the operational work having milestones. Some believe this role is more like a hired job, but since there isn't a role or job description, it requires someone to create it. See my first response to Bob above. Also, this hired role would usually be accountable to a manager or executive, rather than needing to identify a set of SMART goals.
I promise we will clarify these issues before moving forward.
As of now it looks like we will have two "work packages"
As of now the comp suggestion getting the best responses in private conversations is something that works conceptually like this.
This isn't finalized, but I'm okay with sharing for feedback at this conceptual level.
This response is presumptive — assuming that existing initiatives focus their reporting calls on the wrong items and Alex & Joe know what should be discussed.
Thanks for pointing this out. I didn't intend for it to be presumptive. Alex and I have been discussing these calls with delegates and this is one of the primary things they have pointed out as being a problem with the calls as they have been done in the past. This isn't my presumption of what is needed. Additionally, we combined it with a survey yesterday to get better feedback on how to update as it moves forward. We will be posting the survey results with some analysis soon.
Regarding operational efficiency, I wonder if you have a concrete example from the past where a lack of coordination and operational follow-up was costly in terms of time, money, and alignment for the DAO. How could these issues have been resolved if you, as DAO contributors, had been elected at that time?
Great question. I think the problem has been that the delegates don't know when there is an issue to flag. Someone yesterday said "Aren't the initiatives all posting on the forum?". The answer is most, but not all. The delegates would have to go an find every update thread once a week to flag a missing post in time to make corrections! Sometimes that post is it's own thread and others respond to their initial tally. All of this uses valuable time. (Not that I think a missing post is a huge issue)
The problem is that there isn't a backbone system linking to relevant documentation. This lack of an organizing system costs every active delegate either 1) hours of time looking up posts or worse 2) they don't keep initiatives accountable until an emergency happens. Some initiatives have been done well, but delegates expected that they would have results many months sooner.
Here are some insights we shared based on this last months work.

I would appreciate more clarity on the potential overlaps with what Entropy does and the existing calls, perhaps through something like a RACI matrix?
Governance operations includes a set of responsibilities that connect the strategic to the tactical, and each “level” connected to the system as a whole.
| DAO Level | Workstream | Initiative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic Design | Entropy | AJ | Initiative Lead |
| Governance Operations | AJ now, OpCo later? | AJ now, OpCo Later? | AJ supporting initiative |
| Tactical Execution | AJ now, OpCo later? | AJ now, Workstream Steward | Initiative |
Let's answer some of your questions!
What objective criteria can we use to measure the success of this initiative?
More details are in an answer to Bob above, but we are still negotiating this with some top delegates and foundation to find an acceptable accountability practice. It will likely be similar to how Entropy is being held acountable with regular forum updates and a set of deliverables that are clearly acheived or not. Additionally, we will have to participate in the governance operations setup we are designing to make it easier for delegates to hold us accountable.
Could you clarify how this resource will differ from existing materials?
Referring to the Governance Wiki - This will have the types of decisions and methods for making them at every level with best practices. For example, every initiative holding a budget has a council of some sort. Should we require role documentation? When should elections use ranked choice? Is an election or hiring better for a specific circumstance?
While some solutions may be ratified, our intention is to make the options known and available with suggestions of norms and best practices. This can also guide controlled experimentation for specific issues we may face.
With various calls already scheduled across different initiatives, might adding another monthly call increase operational overhead? What motivation would builders, delegates and contributors have to join these?
This call is already happening! See my explanation in an answer above where I discuss the call's origin story.
Thanks for more quality questions everyone!
Thank you Alex and Joe for sharing this proposal. We agree that Arbitrum should continue improving its governance processes. However, we see several significant issues with this proposal. First, it significantly overlaps with Entropy’s role. Second, it risks creating an environment of micro-management for existing and new workstreams. Lastly, it lacks quantifiable KPIs to ensure accountability.
Addressing each point individually:
First, Entropy was brought on to “deliver strategic proposals, guide key partners through the DAO processes, and align the priorities of essential stakeholders for the betterment of Arbitrum” (Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working With Arbitrum DAO), which closely resembles the goals stated in this proposal to “Execute governance operations, designing better systems, documenting the role, and preparing for handoff to OpCo; and Strategic workstream design, building governance processes, executing governance operations, and preparing to hand off leadership to a future workstream steward.
Entropy has already contributed significantly by launching initiatives like the Multi-sig Support Service (MSS) (where both Alex and Joe serve as elected members) the Stylus sprint, the DAO Events Budget (where Joe is involved in). Entropy is also working on a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalizing DAO Ops proposal and a Unifying Mission, Vision, and Purpose for the DAO. Furthermore, Entropy has also already synced with high-impact DAO initiatives such as the Treasury Management Working Group and the ARDC to enhance alignment and request additional reporting.
Given this overlap, it’s unclear how this proposal distinguishes itself from Entropy’s role and responsibilities, especially as Entropy continues to scale its team to fulfill their mandate.
Expanding on our point of of micro-managing initiatives, we would like to draw attention to Joe’s response to Karpatkey’s comment where they asked,
can you please give some concrete examples of the governance operations and tactical execution you would be executing?
Joe responded,
Sure. Governance operations at the DAO level includes acting as a counterparty to current initiatives. Tactical might include setting up the initiative db and restructuring reporting calls to discuss relevant info rather than just the positives and initiative wants to talk about.
This response is presumptive — assuming that existing initiatives focus their reporting calls on the wrong items and Alex & Joe know what should be discussed.
Finally on KPIs, we would like to draw attention to Joe’s response to Duokongcrypto who asked,
are there more specific KPIs or milestones to assess improvements in governance efficiency? For example, proposal success rate, improvement in governance process response time, etc.
Joe responded,
Honestly, we could say some of the metrics you suggested, but I’d feel like a pompous asshole saying them because none of those things are being tracked or understood right now. That is the real problem.
While an NPS-style score can provide a sentiment check, it alone is insufficient. The DAO also needs quantitative metrics to effectively assess the work that it is funding.
We recommend continuing to focus on driving results for your current initiatives, where your time and resources are already committed.
Thank you @DisruptionJoe and @AlexLumley for this proposal! As a new delegate of Arbitrum, I find there are a lot of ressources about the DAO that can be difficult to find as they are spread in different places. So I would certainly value tools like a database for all current initiatives, meeting minutes, dedicated calls, "confidence in the DAO" score and others if they are well organized under a specific hub.
Regarding operational efficiency, I wonder if you have a concrete example from the past where a lack of coordination and operational follow-up was costly in terms of time, money, and alignment for the DAO. How could these issues have been resolved if you, as DAO contributors, had been elected at that time?
Also, as mentioned by @pedrob, I would appreciate more clarity on the potential overlaps with what Entropy does and the existing calls, perhaps through something like a RACI matrix?
I appreciate the vesting schedule that aligns their interests with those of the Arbitrum DAO for the long term. If the final compensation package meets industry standards, this could be a good opportunity to conduct a trial run for 6 months and then reassess based on agreed KPIs.
Our intention is not for implicit approval, but rather explicit approval. We've been working on forming the expert council roles this last week and hope to have the workstream proposal on Snapshot by the time this proposal hits Tally.
Then we workshop it and get something strategic and deserving of our salaries to pass or risk being fired by the DAO. What would have happened if Entropy didn’t pass the Stylus fund?
and
A difference is that we are hoping to execute on a timeframe that would have a snapshot vote started for the workstream budget before this proposal goes to Tally. Hopefully!
Does this help to show that it is not trying to take advantage of governance with implicity buy in?
From what is presented, it’s unclear how previous work—such as governance reporting calls or passing a few proposals—equips them to address the intricate challenges currently facing Orbit and the DAO. Looking at the contributors’ resume such as STIP Backfund or Plurality Labs, the work does not demonstrate the depth of expertise required to lead a working group focused on such an important and technical concept.
I've previously shared my background. I ran sybil defense at Gitcoin for 2 years. I'm deeply knowledgeable about onchain forensics, adversarial systems, threat modeling, governance design and other topics which come up in crypto including understanding trust assumptions. I've operationally led a workstream which ran a machine learning operations pipeline as a DAO, and have the experience of navigating governance and legal challenges of fraud defense.
I was also giving talks and teaching about bitcoin, ethereum, and crypto in general in 2017 with an official partnership to 1871 - the largest tech incubator in Chicago.
It would be more strategic for the DAO to first approve the 10M ARB unified orbit proposal and then engage individuals with proven capabilities to manage this critical initiative.
Who would you suggest operationally run the process of finding and selecting these individuals? This is the problem we are solving here. We believe that with the proper expert council, we can operationally drive to best outcomes.
We would love to collaborate with ADPC and Entropy on this work. In fact, we've already reached out to both explicitly asking about their bandwidth for collaboration. We've asked Entropy to have a seat on the council. They have a lot of work already moving and it likely makes sense to have more contributors rather than Entropy running everything!
While not the technical wizard myself, I can keep up on most technical conversations. I'd be happy to do a twitter space where we discuss further.
This is quite the interesting post from a first time poster on this forum. Would you be willing to take the anon front off and share your concerns with skin in the game? Either way - Welcome!
I'm glad to see this proposal! The issues you're tackling definitely need attention, and I fully back Alex and Joe—they’re perfect for the job. I have a couple of thoughts:
Let's avoid falling into the "Bureaucracy Trap." It’s easy to add steps between steps or create extra reports on top of reports, but nobody wants that! Let’s focus on setting up systems that make our DAO run smoother, not more complicated.
Good call from Larva—the workload sounds like a lot for just two people, especially since they’re already busy with other DAO tasks. Maybe consider expanding the team or forming a workgroup?
It is hard to review a proposal without the budget! Could you give us at least a ballpark range?
I like that the operations plan includes updates, bi-weekly check-ins, reports, and testing for ongoing process improvements. Following this routine will give us solid results, enabling quicker decision-making through constant monitoring. The project stages over six months are well-defined, and I think that's a good timeframe to see real progress. I believe that with Alex and Joe’s experience, along with Entropy, things will be done right. I’d just like to know if this is a updated version or a different proposal from the one Joe made a couple of weeks ago, requesting a 200K budget also for 6 months?
Hello!
I have to admit, I’m a bit confused by the proposal.
Builders are losing faith in the ecosystem due to slow DAO processes, unclear timelines, and lack of clarity or inconsistency of builder support. (OCL can’t keep up with growth!)
Hello!
I have to admit, I’m a bit confused by the proposal.
Builders are losing faith in the ecosystem due to slow DAO processes, unclear timelines, and lack of clarity or inconsistency of builder support. (OCL can’t keep up with growth!)
If you have any statistics or further analysis on this, I’d love it if you could share! In my opinion, there has been a lot of support for builders (numerous past DAO incentive programs + grants from the AF + future incentive programs as Stylus and an incentives WG currently working on the new version of them), though I could be mistaken, and I would love a deeper understanding of this point.
Contributors are disengaging because of unclear priorities, inefficient proposal updates, and a lack of transparent decision-making.
I’d also appreciate it if you could expand on this with data or a report. In my opinion (although I don’t have data, just a sense from having been around for a while), the DAO seems to have more contributors over time.
How would you describe the success rate of the initiatives so far? Where do you consider you'd be starting, and where do you want to go?
I don’t fully understand this. Is the idea that you would act as council supervisors? By this proposal, would all future councils operate under you?
Or is the plan to create a council under your leadership that would then supervise the other councils? I’m a bit confused—apologies if I’m not getting it.
or this proposal to be possible, we will also need to pass the workstream budget proposal. Here is the current draft .
And why is it necessary to approve funds for an Orbit strategy for this proposal to pass? That part also has me confused.
Thank you for the new proposal, though many of the questions I raised in the previous one haven’t been answered
What we are missing is a watchdog—someone who applies a certain level of “pressure” and oversees the execution of proposals, providing expert opinions on how things are progressing and recommending actions if something starts deviating from what was promised. The thing is that it’s a very unpopular role. But in my opinion, given the current state, this is exactly what the DAO needs today. And I would vote in favor of it.
That said, I have a couple of questions about the execution of the proposal and the budget.
Why do you think two people in a “senior” role (17K USD per month) are necessary to execute the proposal? Honestly, the pricing seems a bit excessive to me. It would be great if, beyond expressing your full-time commitment, you could explain a bit more about the rationale behind the number.
Joe, apologies if you’ve posted or mentioned this somewhere before, but I couldn’t find any reference. Does this mean you’ve set aside the execution of Plurality Labs milestones and the pluralistic grants?
Lastly, I would like to know your thoughts on the compatibility of accessing this proposal while maintaining the incentivized role as a delegate .
My personal opinion:
I believe the actions included in "Governance Operations" are valuable and necessary for the DAO. I would focus the proposal on that, ideally working together with Entropy to avoid overlap.
Thank you very much.
Hey Pedro,
Sorry we missed answering on the previous proposal and thanks for the new questions! I'll try to address them all today!
Hey Pedro,
Sorry we missed answering on the previous proposal and thanks for the new questions! I'll try to address them all today!
If you have any statistics or further analysis on this, I’d love it if you could share! In my opinion, there has been a lot of support for builders (numerous past DAO incentive programs + grants from the AF + future incentive programs as Stylus and an incentives WG currently working on the new version of them), though I could be mistaken, and I would love a deeper understanding of this point.
Yes, some work is getting done. The ones you mentioned are great. When we say "builders", we are referring to the stakeholder group of builders of protocols or dapps using the Arbitrum tech stack whether that is Orbit Chains or Arbitrum One/Nova.
Just look at Treasure DAO who clearly sighted lack of the DAO being able to progress at reasonable speeds. Another indicator is how few protocol builders are regularly participating in DAO calls. Even the most hungry have pulled back - so you have to ask yourself why @Soby @IronBoots @dk3 and other builders aren't spending the time they were in the DAO?
While the programs you mention are great, we need people actually talking to builders. Where are our user interviews with new orbit chain builders asking what they really care about when deciding where to build? This is the point.
(For the record, delegate incentives has been a highlight and example of a well run initiative.)
I’d also appreciate it if you could expand on this with data or a report. In my opinion (although I don’t have data, just a sense from having been around for a while), the DAO seems to have more contributors over time.
I think its an unrealistic request to ask for the data - talk about a circular problem! We've never had operational work done to track contributors. Do we have more contributors or louder people? Whats the membrane? Who counts as a contributor? I'll cede that we could be wrong in this assessment, but I doubt many have done a wider set of stakeholder interviews on which they base their assumptions.
How would you describe the success rate of the initiatives so far? Where do you consider you’d be starting, and where do you want to go?
Starting with building an initiatives db, checkins with current initiatives, and exit interviews with past initiatives. We also have a lot of other key stakeholder engagement to do.
Or is the plan to create a council under your leadership that would then supervise the other councils?
This is what people always miss about operations, especially governance operations - it's not just you! To start, NO, we would not be the council supervisors - we would conduct the processes of drafting role descriptions (ie. must have one relevant person from OCL) selecting potentials, and organizing calls.
This in between work to get it done is governance operations. In a centralized system, the executive makes a decision and then is responsible for their reports receiving the message accurately and overseeing their accountability. In a decentralized system, the community decides in role of the executive - and maybe even decides who tactically does the work - but puts no one in place to oversee or act as a counterparty.
Our work would be in service to the council, acting as a budget steward while defining the role well enough to hire/elect or hand it off.
Our feedback from large delegates was that governance operations isn't enough to earn the salary needed to keep us here - that would require us doing more strategic or creative work.
The budget is an opportunity for us to drive some strategic work that requires strong multi-party alignment unlike any collaboration we've see this far in the overall Arbitrum ecosystem.
Why do you think two people in a “senior” role (17K USD per month) are necessary to execute the proposal? Honestly, the pricing seems a bit excessive to me. It would be great if, beyond expressing your full-time commitment, you could explain a bit more about the rationale behind the number.
We are currently combining feedback from the foundation and top delegates to put together the exact comp package.
Not speaking for Alex, but for me - I need to make at minimum what I've made in the past. There is no reason for me to take a role without benefits, travel expenses, bonus, commission, equity or tokens AND do it for less than my salary the last 4 years. While I'd like to stay working with Arbitrum, that is a hard constraint for me - I'm willing to not negotiate to match my opportunity cost, but I can't take a role that is a huge backward step financially. (Which I've done before with early team roles at startups - because we negotiated for higher equity.)
Yes. I have left Thrive protocol. We had a fork in the road: I wanted to design pluralist grants governance which is capture resistant and they want to refine and scale their method of funding grants at critical milestones of value creation. They do great work, but the governance design requires different motivations. I am taking the risk of leaving them because I believe it the right thing to do as my interests don't lie in product refinement & scaling. I'm still very supportive of them and see many ways they can help our grants programs in the future.
I've actually never been paid from it - I don't believe so anyway. I always put my rational on snapshot or tally, but don't have a thread. I'm such a small delegate anyway that I almost felt embarassed collecting because I was earning from Plurality Labs/Thrive. I'll admit it was a little frustrating this last month since I see tons of delegates putting short sweet answers in their thread while I spend a lot of time actively participating!
I believe the actions included in “Governance Operations” are valuable and necessary for the DAO. I would focus the proposal on that, ideally working together with Entropy to avoid overlap.
We've offered them a seat on the council for the Orbit Chain Mesh workstream budget and have been in communication around the OpCo. While we haven't seen any details related to OpCo yet, we fully intend to collaborate.
I also have a history of making good on my word. I shut down the FDD workstream at Gitcoin when the protocol launched because it was time and I had previously committed to doing so. I also started up and spun out multiple workstreams there. We had needs like DAO Ops and Support which we had budget to kickstart and some delegates worried I was "power grabbing" but we spun out and handed off responsibility every time.
Thanks for your questions and valuable time spent considering our proposal.
I hope everyone enjoyed their weekend. We will be answering all the questions today.
Thanks for this proposal. Is it a follow-up to the one Joe posted last time?
I hope everyone enjoyed their weekend. We will be answering all the questions today.
Thanks for this proposal. Is it a follow-up to the one Joe posted last time?
Yes, it is. We got delegate feedback and decided to restart this proposal to focus on the two areas of Live Governance Operations and the Orbit Chain Mesh Workstream.
However, this doesn’t seem like an easy task—will it be too much for just the two of you? Are you considering hiring others to help, or will the council you’re forming be enough to support you in completing all the work?
We are considering a little extra budget available to hire admin support.
The council is for the Orbit Chain Mesh workstream budget. This will be it’s own proposal separate from this one, though intertwined. That proposal would have its own budget to fund initiatives within it’s mandate while our full-time compensation would come from this proposal. It’s possible that a handoff of the basic governance operations to OpCo would necessitate our salaries be attributed to this workstream, but unlikely.
Will the council member be known before this proposal goes live for vote?
It will be - before the workstream budget proposal goes to snapshot.
This is still undetermined for the Orbit Chain Mesh workstream budget. Our salaries would be included here.
You mention that for this to pass, the Workstream: A Unified Orbit Experience (currently as a draft) need to pass. Looking at the timeline proposed, this other proposal will not be voted before this one. What happens if the other fails?
Then we workshop it and get something strategic and deserving of our salaries to pass or risk being fired by the DAO. What would have happened if Entropy didn’t pass the Stylus fund?
regarding the funding for the Chain abstraction proposal, are you mentioning the full-fledged proposal or for the “snapshot proposal to the DAO next week for the initial budget allocation”, as mentioned in the other thread?
Here’s a quick video about the connection between Max’s Embracing Chain Abstraction proposal and the workstream we are proposing. https://share.zight.com/yAuezGyr
can you please give some concrete examples of the governance operations and tactical execution you would be executing?
Sure. Governance operations at the DAO level includes acting as a counterparty to current initiatives. Tactical might include setting up the initiative db and restructuring reporting calls to discuss relevant info rather than just the positives and initiative wants to talk about.
At the workstream level, governance operations would include running the processes to select (elect/hire/other) council members and a budget steward. Tactical would be conducting open bid RFPs for service providers to conduct S.M.A.R.T. initiatives.
are we correct in assuming your role would be “interim” and it would be either dismissed or incorporated within the OpCo, once it is live? And, any ETA on the OpCo being live?
No particular ETA. That is in the hands of Entropy. My hopeful thinking would be that OpCo is fully enstantiated and ready to hire in January, and we are then able to handoff the governance operations at the DAO level to do more strategic building at the Workstream level. This may also include helping other important proposals pass to address objectives identified in Entropy’s DAO strategic vision work.
Additionally, we see that this proposal depends entirely on a draft proposal. Have you considered consolidating both into a single proposal?
Yes, but this felt cleaner. We also used the example of Entropy proposal to fund the company vs the Stylus fund proposal. A difference is that we are hoping to execute on a timeframe that would have a snapshot vote started for the workstream budget before this proposal goes to Tally. Hopefully!
I’d just like to know if this is a updated version or a different proposal from the one Joe made a couple of weeks ago, requesting a 200K budget also for 6 months?
This is the updated proposal. Newly minted with all relevant feedback.
Let’s avoid falling into the “Bureaucracy Trap.” It’s easy to add steps between steps or create extra reports on top of reports, but nobody wants that! Let’s focus on setting up systems that make our DAO run smoother, not more complicated.
Absolutely. Systems not processes for most items. Let’s face it, this is low hanging fruit to start. We don’t even have a db of all the current initiatives!
It is hard to review a proposal without the budget! Could you give us at least a ballpark range?
Yes. Both of us need to make a salary which will keep us here, plus bonus, commission, tokens, whatever. For me, that is a personal minimum after years of making higher than that and having equity or tokens in addition to base pay in past opportunities. This doesn’t even consider opportunity cost.
We want to be here. I love the culture modeled by OCL of shipping and launching real products that work as advertised. Products on the cutting edge of what’s possible. I want to support ethereum and this is the best place to do it.
We think a package should put us in range (considering we have to pay for travel, benefits, all out of pocket) and offers a vesting structure that is attractive to us and to the DAO to entice us to stay long-term.
Plus, we may need a little extra available for admin support. More coming upon our completion of talks with the foundation.
Our main one is a monthly “confidence in the DAO” score. Like an NPS, it is a trend metric to see how things are moving and not meaningful done as a one-off assessment.
Honestly, we could say some of the metrics you suggested, but I’d feel like a pompous asshole saying them because none of those things are being tracked or understood right now. That is the real problem.
Proposal success rate - Great if we could know the counter metric to make sure it isn’t bad proposals at a higher rate.
Response time - Is this a problem? Who measures it? How is it connected to TVL, FDV, Sticky Users, protocol market share in a vertical…
This is the nature of the beast that is operations. No one notices it until it screws up. I think we all feel it could be better, but I’d rather smart people work nimbly on affecting real change than providing vanity metrics!
(However, the intention of multiple listed deliverables is to make meaningful metrics available to then be able to use in this way!)
Yes. Starting with the initiatives DB and regular updates! Additionally, meeting minutes from monthly updates.
It is mentioned in the proposal that OpCo may take over the governance role in the future, but is there a clear handover plan?
No, there is not. OpCo hasn’t been voted into existence yet, and there are differing opinions on how it should run. What we are saying is that we will document the work in the roles we are creating such that the roles could be handed over to an OpCo or another contributor..
On the other hand, we don’t want to create the expectation that OpCo HAS to hire us. That should be the choice of OpCo leadership.
I see three paths for our work, assuming OpCo becomes a reality.
I guess this also assumes that the DAO doesn’t want to fire us! This will be possible at any point during the contract.
How will it be ensured that there is a smooth transition of governance without a break after Alex and Joe have completed their roles? It is suggested that effectiveness tracking and long-term role arrangements be further refined to ensure that the objectives of the proposal are actually realized.
As my previous answer stated, it is not clear for very valid reasons. I don’t advise us rushing to waterfall these things because we have problems that could be solved today. A commitment to collaboration should suffice. Now, I do understand that there is a possibility that we both turn out to be subpar performers, but the DAO has the ability to fire us at any time.
Hey, Alex! Thanks for this proposal. Is it a follow-up to the one Joe posted last time? I think this work is indeed very important, and both of you are the best candidates to take it on with your skills and experience. However, this doesn’t seem like an easy task—will it be too much for just the two of you? Are you considering hiring others to help, or will the council you’re forming be enough to support you in completing all the work? I think this issue is critical because it has a big impact on the budget.
Saving this for commentary
:grinning:Suggestion to expand community feedback channels: In terms of collecting community feedback, it may be worthwhile to add, for example, regular questionnaires or AMA activities, so that more contributors can participate in the feedback and a broader consensus can be formed. It is mentioned in the proposal that OpCo may take over the governance role in the future, but is there a clear handover plan? How will it be ensured that there is a smooth transition of governance without a break after Alex and Joe have completed their roles? It is suggested that effectiveness tracking and long-term role arrangements be further refined to ensure that the objectives of the proposal are actually realized.
Thank you for the proposal @AlexLumley.
This seems to be an alternative, more focused approach than the one proposed in the Boosting DAO efficiency by 10x proposal. Is it correct to assume this proposal effectively replaces the previous one?
In general, we appreciate the additional clarity on how this would relate with the work of @Entropy, which was our main concern in the previous proposal.
Thank you for the proposal @AlexLumley.
This seems to be an alternative, more focused approach than the one proposed in the Boosting DAO efficiency by 10x proposal. Is it correct to assume this proposal effectively replaces the previous one?
In general, we appreciate the additional clarity on how this would relate with the work of @Entropy, which was our main concern in the previous proposal.
This proposal includes executing governance operations while Entropy designs long-term systems driven through an OpCo, in preparation for a handoff - recognizing that doing the work cannot wait for an entity to be established. By immediately addressing key operational gaps and establishing governance processes, this proposal ensures Arbitrum begins executing important work without delay, while building scalable systems for long-term effectiveness. Governance operations includes a set of responsibilities that connect the strategic to the tactical, and each “level” connected to the system as a whole.
A couple follow-up questions:
Hello, Thanks for your proposal!
I have a few questions about the following:
Hello, Thanks for your proposal!
I have a few questions about the following:
For this proposal to be possible, we will also need to pass the workstream budget proposal. Here is the current draft . We are working on recruiting the council already. If passed, this workstream could fund and support Max’s Embracing Chain Abstraction proposal . We are currently recruiting expert council members.
We share the same question regarding whether this proposal replaces or is related to the proposal Boosting DAO Efficiency by 10x. We believe it’s important to clarify this point.
As we mentioned in the previous proposal, we find the work you aim to carry out essential for the DAO, and we do not doubt either of your abilities to achieve it. However, the current proposal has left us with some questions.
We share the same question regarding whether this proposal replaces or is related to the proposal Boosting DAO Efficiency by 10x. We believe it’s important to clarify this point.
As we mentioned in the previous proposal, we find the work you aim to carry out essential for the DAO, and we do not doubt either of your abilities to achieve it. However, the current proposal has left us with some questions.
We feel it is unclear how the proposal's costs will be covered, perhaps further explanation on this would be necessary.
For this proposal to be possible, we will also need to pass the workstream budget proposal. Here is the current draft
Additionally, we see that this proposal depends entirely on a draft proposal. Have you considered consolidating both into a single proposal?