Non-Constitutional
A new version of the Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program, that allows to reward both voters and contributors to the Arbitrum DAO in a predictable, easy to understand, objective, and meritocratic way.
This program was designed with the goals of:
Every month, each delegate enrolled in the program can get 3 types of rewards, the First Dip (for their voting activity), the Second Dip (for their forum engagement), and the Third Dip (for their organic contributions), hence the tongue in cheek program name Arbitrum Triple Dip.
However, delegates will only get rewards if they qualify for them, according to the following process:
All parameters and amounts inside [square brackets] are just rough examples at this point, that should be decided by the DAO, as part of this collaborative process of designing the next version of the Delegate Incentive Program for Arbitrum DAO. Additionally, all other terms in bold in the diagram above, will be explained below.
A healthy Delegate Incentive Program is a requirement in any mature DAO that has actual onchain governance, and Arbitrum DAO is probably at a point where it cannot sustain itself without a program of this sort. The recent issues in achieving quorum on proposals, and the lack of organic, community driven initiatives and proposals since the introduction of the new vision in April, show that Arbitrum DAO clearly needs a program that incentivizes delegates adequately. This program should be designed to incentivize our community to show up, vote, and contribute to the DAO to the best of their abilities, and to attract new and talented members to our community.
Given how the past versions of the program evolved, and the feedback it generated, it is clear that the new delegate incentive program needs to be way more predictable, objective, efficient, and attractive.
I’m now sharing here on the forum this proposal for a new delegate incentive program with the intent to kick-start a public and open discussion and deliberation process about it. The goal is to have a new, more adequate version of the program in effect from November 2025 onwards. More importantly, to have a version of the program that is designed and shaped in the open, by the biggest and most diverse body of stakeholders possible.
EDIT: @Curia joined in on the program design, to contribute with the reward mechanism for the Second Dip and eventualy operationalize a live dashboard with the program results, given their relevant experience in other ecosystems.
This version of the Delegate Incentive Program, the Arbitrum Triple Dip, is focused on incentivizing 3 main outcomes:
These 3 main outcomes shaped the format, rules, and characteristics of this proposed Delegate Incentive Program and improve on the previous versions of this program, namely DIP 1.5, DIP 1.6, and the currently active DIP 1.7.
It also keeps certain characteristics of the previous versions of the Delegate Incentive Program, like the public Delegate Application Process and adherence to the Community Values in the Arbitrum DAO constitution, the Community Guidelines, and the DAO Code of Conduct.
This version of the Delegate Incentive Program, the Arbitrum Triple Dip, has the following rules, that we welcome all delegate feedback on, as presented in the illustrated process above:
Regarding the specific parameters values, the ones in [square brackets] both in the illustrated process and in the rules above, they are all up for further deliberation. These specific initially suggested values, mostly mimic the August results of the 1.7 version of the currently active Delegate Incentives Program, assuming a $0.50 USD ARB price.
(coming soon)
Every month, delegates that have applied to the Arbitrum Triple Dip in that same month, and comply with the rules and parameters above, will be eligible for First Dip and Second Dip rewards.
Every [quarter], delegates that have applied to the Arbitrum Triple Dip in that period, and comply with the rules and parameters above, will be eligible for Third Dip rewards.
During this cycle, delegates can vote, comment, and contribute as they normally would, and then after that cycle ends, they should:
Then, the Arbitrum Foundation and/or OpCo should process the payments in accordance to the rules and execute the First Dip and Second Dip payouts within 5 days, between the 1ˢᵗ and the 5ᵗʰ of every month, and execute the Third Dip payouts within 6 days, between the 14ᵗʰ and the 20ᵗʰ of the month after the [quarter] ending.
Any delegate that wishes to be rewarded would need to apply to the Arbitrum Double Dip by posting their application to the forum, in a dedicated thread, similar to how it was done for version 1.5 on onwards of the DIP. All applications from DIP 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 will be grandfathered in the Arbitrum Double Dip.
Only the Arbitrum Foundation or the OpCo can decide to suspend for 1 or more months, or ban a delegate from the Arbitrum Triple Dip. Affected delegates can appeal and revert the decision with an offchain vote that achieves a favorable vote of more than 3% of votable ARB tokens.
Any delegate can initiate a proposal here in the forum, and the respective offchain vote to change any of the rules and parameters in the Arbitrum Triple Dip. Any change could never be done retroactively, and would only be considered a valid change if it achieves a favorable vote of more than 3% of votable ARB tokens.
It depends on how the community receives this proposal. If this design for a Delegate Incentive Program is well received, we need to collaboratively define how to best implement this program in coordination with the relevant AAEs, namely the Arbitrum Foundation and OpCo.
The only operational thing that would be needed is to include the future Snapshot space for the contributor evaluation vote, as a sub-space of the arbitrumfoundation.eth Snapshot space, so that it could inherit the Snapshot PRO benefits of our current subscription that are needed to correctly realize the contributor evaluaton vote, every [quarter].
This proposal aims for this version of the Delegate Incentive Program, the Arbitrum Triple Dip, to be in effect, from the month of November 2025 onwards.
To achieve that we should, in this order:
Depends on the reward amounts that are chosen in the final offchain temperature check vote. Will update this section of the proposal accordingly, as soon as there is consensus in the first temperature check vote and before the second, binding, offchain vote that needs to achieve the non-constitutional quorum to pass.
Assuming the preliminary parameters defined above, that were picked to mimic the spending of the last month of August under the DIP 1.7 version, this version of the Delegate Incentive Program would distribute 1,200,000 ARB per year at $0.50 USD per ARB, with virtually 0 admin costs, assuming the OpCo and/or the Arbitrum Foundation would take care of the minimal admin required, which they are already doing for the DIP 1.7 version.
Assuming this proposal passes, we will use the still available DIP 1.5/6/7 budget and multisig controlled by the Arbitrum Foundation.
Non-Constitutional
A new version of the Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program, that allows to reward both voters and contributors to the Arbitrum DAO in a predictable, easy to understand, objective, and meritocratic way.
This program was designed with the goals of:
Every month, each delegate enrolled in the program can get 3 types of rewards, the First Dip (for their voting activity), the Second Dip (for their forum engagement), and the Third Dip (for their organic contributions), hence the tongue in cheek program name Arbitrum Triple Dip.
However, delegates will only get rewards if they qualify for them, according to the following process:
All parameters and amounts inside [square brackets] are just rough examples at this point, that should be decided by the DAO, as part of this collaborative process of designing the next version of the Delegate Incentive Program for Arbitrum DAO. Additionally, all other terms in bold in the diagram above, will be explained below.
A healthy Delegate Incentive Program is a requirement in any mature DAO that has actual onchain governance, and Arbitrum DAO is probably at a point where it cannot sustain itself without a program of this sort. The recent issues in achieving quorum on proposals, and the lack of organic, community driven initiatives and proposals since the introduction of the new vision in April, show that Arbitrum DAO clearly needs a program that incentivizes delegates adequately. This program should be designed to incentivize our community to show up, vote, and contribute to the DAO to the best of their abilities, and to attract new and talented members to our community.
Given how the past versions of the program evolved, and the feedback it generated, it is clear that the new delegate incentive program needs to be way more predictable, objective, efficient, and attractive.
I’m now sharing here on the forum this proposal for a new delegate incentive program with the intent to kick-start a public and open discussion and deliberation process about it. The goal is to have a new, more adequate version of the program in effect from November 2025 onwards. More importantly, to have a version of the program that is designed and shaped in the open, by the biggest and most diverse body of stakeholders possible.
EDIT: @Curia joined in on the program design, to contribute with the reward mechanism for the Second Dip and eventualy operationalize a live dashboard with the program results, given their relevant experience in other ecosystems.
This version of the Delegate Incentive Program, the Arbitrum Triple Dip, is focused on incentivizing 3 main outcomes:
These 3 main outcomes shaped the format, rules, and characteristics of this proposed Delegate Incentive Program and improve on the previous versions of this program, namely DIP 1.5, DIP 1.6, and the currently active DIP 1.7.
It also keeps certain characteristics of the previous versions of the Delegate Incentive Program, like the public Delegate Application Process and adherence to the Community Values in the Arbitrum DAO constitution, the Community Guidelines, and the DAO Code of Conduct.
This version of the Delegate Incentive Program, the Arbitrum Triple Dip, has the following rules, that we welcome all delegate feedback on, as presented in the illustrated process above:
Regarding the specific parameters values, the ones in [square brackets] both in the illustrated process and in the rules above, they are all up for further deliberation. These specific initially suggested values, mostly mimic the August results of the 1.7 version of the currently active Delegate Incentives Program, assuming a $0.50 USD ARB price.
(coming soon)
Every month, delegates that have applied to the Arbitrum Triple Dip in that same month, and comply with the rules and parameters above, will be eligible for First Dip and Second Dip rewards.
Every [quarter], delegates that have applied to the Arbitrum Triple Dip in that period, and comply with the rules and parameters above, will be eligible for Third Dip rewards.
During this cycle, delegates can vote, comment, and contribute as they normally would, and then after that cycle ends, they should:
Then, the Arbitrum Foundation and/or OpCo should process the payments in accordance to the rules and execute the First Dip and Second Dip payouts within 5 days, between the 1ˢᵗ and the 5ᵗʰ of every month, and execute the Third Dip payouts within 6 days, between the 14ᵗʰ and the 20ᵗʰ of the month after the [quarter] ending.
Any delegate that wishes to be rewarded would need to apply to the Arbitrum Double Dip by posting their application to the forum, in a dedicated thread, similar to how it was done for version 1.5 on onwards of the DIP. All applications from DIP 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 will be grandfathered in the Arbitrum Double Dip.
Only the Arbitrum Foundation or the OpCo can decide to suspend for 1 or more months, or ban a delegate from the Arbitrum Triple Dip. Affected delegates can appeal and revert the decision with an offchain vote that achieves a favorable vote of more than 3% of votable ARB tokens.
Any delegate can initiate a proposal here in the forum, and the respective offchain vote to change any of the rules and parameters in the Arbitrum Triple Dip. Any change could never be done retroactively, and would only be considered a valid change if it achieves a favorable vote of more than 3% of votable ARB tokens.
It depends on how the community receives this proposal. If this design for a Delegate Incentive Program is well received, we need to collaboratively define how to best implement this program in coordination with the relevant AAEs, namely the Arbitrum Foundation and OpCo.
The only operational thing that would be needed is to include the future Snapshot space for the contributor evaluation vote, as a sub-space of the arbitrumfoundation.eth Snapshot space, so that it could inherit the Snapshot PRO benefits of our current subscription that are needed to correctly realize the contributor evaluaton vote, every [quarter].
This proposal aims for this version of the Delegate Incentive Program, the Arbitrum Triple Dip, to be in effect, from the month of November 2025 onwards.
To achieve that we should, in this order:
Depends on the reward amounts that are chosen in the final offchain temperature check vote. Will update this section of the proposal accordingly, as soon as there is consensus in the first temperature check vote and before the second, binding, offchain vote that needs to achieve the non-constitutional quorum to pass.
Assuming the preliminary parameters defined above, that were picked to mimic the spending of the last month of August under the DIP 1.7 version, this version of the Delegate Incentive Program would distribute 1,200,000 ARB per year at $0.50 USD per ARB, with virtually 0 admin costs, assuming the OpCo and/or the Arbitrum Foundation would take care of the minimal admin required, which they are already doing for the DIP 1.7 version.
Assuming this proposal passes, we will use the still available DIP 1.5/6/7 budget and multisig controlled by the Arbitrum Foundation.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-triple-dip-delegate-incentive-program/30054/41
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-triple-dip-delegate-incentive-program/30054/41
I do like the idea of incentivizing a baseline 100% voting metric for delegates. I'm not sure I agree with having delegates review each others work for gamification reasons. i'll add - I understand that this has '0 overhead' from the traditional standpoint. But paying a single entity to subjectively review voters is overhead, so it stands to reason paying a group of delegates to do a subjective review is the same thing. So I don't think there being 0 overhead is exactly accurate.
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-136): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-136
The Event Horizon Community voted FOR on this proposal (ehARB-136): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-136
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-triple-dip-delegate-incentive-program/30054/38
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-triple-dip-delegate-incentive-program/30054/38?u=tempetechie
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-triple-dip-delegate-incentive-program/30054/37?u=castlecapital
For, As active voting participation and forum engagement is very essential, this program will help support and accelerate human coordination.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-triple-dip-delegate-incentive-program/30054/36?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/curia-delegate-communication-thread/23600/41
Quantity of participation and hoop-jumping =/= quality of participation and value creation.
I do like the idea of incentivizing a baseline 100% voting metric for delegates. I'm not sure I agree with having delegates review each others work for gamification reasons. i'll add - I understand that this has '0 overhead' from the traditional standpoint. But paying a single entity to subjectively review voters is overhead, so it stands to reason paying a group of delegates to do a subjective review is the same thing. So I don't think there being 0 overhead is exactly accurate.
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-136): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-136
The Event Horizon Community voted FOR on this proposal (ehARB-136): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-136
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-triple-dip-delegate-incentive-program/30054/38
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-triple-dip-delegate-incentive-program/30054/38?u=tempetechie
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-triple-dip-delegate-incentive-program/30054/37?u=castlecapital
For, As active voting participation and forum engagement is very essential, this program will help support and accelerate human coordination.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-triple-dip-delegate-incentive-program/30054/36?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/curia-delegate-communication-thread/23600/41
Quantity of participation and hoop-jumping =/= quality of participation and value creation.
voting Abstain on the current offchain vote because I wrote this proposal.
voting Abstain on the current offchain vote because I wrote this proposal.
the main question in your Snapshot vote is whether we want a predictable, algorithmic DIP.
the main question in your Snapshot vote is whether we want a predictable, algorithmic DIP.
Hey @TempeTechie just to clarify that, as it says in the intro of the offchain vote proposal text, the main thing this vote is trying to do is:
...to sense the appetite of the DAO towards experimenting with an objective, rules-based, and algorithmic based Delegate Incentive Program, that doesn't require a dedicated program manager to run it, and rewards delegates in a predictable, transparent, automatic, meritocratic, and faster way.
also, regarding this argument of yours to justify a centralized program manager instead:
The main reason is that every system eventually gets gamed. That’s why we need flexibility, so that rules can be quickly adjusted when that happens. This naturally requires some level of centralization, in the form of a program manager.
because... on the other hand... I can produce evidence of a centralized program manager gaming the current DIP system, last month: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/dip-v1-7-delegate-incentive-program-questions-and-feedback/27798/45?u=paulofonseca
and clearly abusing it's power to actively penalize contributors based on forum comments, in May:
and also abusing it's power to straight up suspend contributors for tweeting an image, in June: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/dip-v1-6-delegate-incentive-program-results-june-2025/29657#p-72715-delegate-suspension-13
so I would ask, aren't we really capable of figuring out a way, collaboratively, to have a Delegate Incentive Program that rewards delegates for the value they provide, with a collection of rules that can't be gamed?
I mean... I personally believe that the whole point of smart contracts running in public decentralized blockchains, is indeed to design incentive systems that can't be gamed. That's why I'm here. And that's precisely what I'm trying to do with this proposal.
And I would appreciate feedback regarding exactly that, how do you think the specific rules and parameters of this program can be gamed?
Hey @paulofonseca, as you mentioned on yesterday's call, the main question in your Snapshot vote is whether we want a predictable, algorithmic DIP.
Your proposal has more hard-coded rules, while DIP 2.0 is more flexible (meaning the PM or OpCo can adjust the rules as needed).
Hey @paulofonseca, as you mentioned on yesterday's call, the main question in your Snapshot vote is whether we want a predictable, algorithmic DIP.
Your proposal has more hard-coded rules, while DIP 2.0 is more flexible (meaning the PM or OpCo can adjust the rules as needed).
At ETH Warsaw, Mateusz from Arbitrum Foundation asked me the same question: do I prefer a predictable, hard-coded system or a flexible one? I told him I prefer flexibility, and I still feel the same way.
The main reason is that every system eventually gets gamed. That's why we need flexibility, so that rules can be quickly adjusted when that happens. This naturally requires some level of centralization, in the form of a program manager.
And it's not just about preventing the system from being gamed. If we notice that a rule (or set of rules) within the DIP isn't working as intended, it should be possible to change it and try something else, without having to go through the governance vote each time.
That's why I voted against your proposal on Snapshot. That said, I think your proposal includes some interesting ideas that could be incorporated into future iterations of DIP 2.0.
We thank @paulofonseca for his proactiveness in bringing a new DIP proposal. We believe, as @Griff states, more proposals should come from the community; however, that should not be the driving force for support.
For this particular proposal, we are concerned about a few points, in particular:
We thank @paulofonseca for his proactiveness in bringing a new DIP proposal. We believe, as @Griff states, more proposals should come from the community; however, that should not be the driving force for support.
For this particular proposal, we are concerned about a few points, in particular:
For these reasons, we will be voting AGAINST this proposal.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting ABSTAIN for this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting ABSTAIN for this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
Thank you, @paulofonseca, we recognise the work and thought that has gone into this proposal. Over the past several cycles, DIP has gone through multiple iterations, each trying to address specific challenges. This proposal builds on that history by splitting incentives across three layers: voting, forum engagement, and quarterly contributions. That is a logical and needed progression.
Our decision to vote abstain is not a rejection of the direction. It is a reflection that some core components of this framework are not yet mature enough to be implemented at the scale and importance that this program carries.
The introduction of the Peer Recognition Score (PRS) adds a new layer to delegate incentives. Forum engagement has always been part of the ecosystem, but turning peer recognition into a direct reward mechanism will shape delegate behaviour in ways that are not entirely predictable. Peer-weighted models can be powerful, but they can also lead to concentration of influence and feedback loops that reward popularity over value. This is not an abstract concern. It is a pattern we have observed in other systems and even in softer forms within earlier versions of the DIP. Calibrating PRS correctly is essential, and the current draft does not fully answer how this will be managed over time.
The move to quarterly contribution voting is a meaningful improvement because it reduces frequency and offers delegates a more structured moment to evaluate impact. However, it still depends heavily on subjective interpretation. Across DIP 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7, contribution evaluation was consistently the point where disagreements and disputes originated. Changing the timeline alone does not fix this. Without clear boundaries on what counts as an impactful contribution and how different kinds of work should be weighed against each other, the program risks reintroducing the same problems in a slightly different format. The friction would simply reappear later in the cycle.
Several operational questions also remain open, and these are not minor details. The proposal has not yet clearly outlined how gaming in the PRS system will be identified or handled, what minimum evidence standards will be required for contribution claims, or how collusive behaviour and tie situations will be addressed. In past DIPs, lack of clarity at this level directly led to disputes, delays, and shifting expectations among delegates. These issues tend to surface only when payouts are on the line, which is why they need to be resolved before the program is implemented.
We find this to be a complete failure of the DAO governance process and us, as people behind it.
As @krst rightly pointed out, there’s a deeper issue beyond the design itself. We now have two separate proposals addressing the same problem, moving forward in parallel instead of converging on a shared solution. This reflects a gap in how we collaborate as a DAO. Differences are natural in a decentralized system, but failing to set them aside and align on common ground is a missed opportunity to build something stronger together.
This could have been a moment to bring ideas together into a single, robust framework rather than asking delegates to choose between competing visions. The DAO’s strength has always come from constructive debate followed by collective action. That spirit feels absent here, and we fully align with this point. A coordinated approach would have served the DAO better than fragmented efforts.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in its current form.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in its current form.
First, we’d like to thank Paulo for the time and effort he put into developing this proposal. Whether one agrees with it or not, it’s a well-thought-out initiative with a coherent structure and mechanism - something we haven’t seen here in quite a while.
Let us first list things that we like in this proposal:
However, there are also things we don’t like in this proposal:
To sum it up, while we like the overall approach, we feel it still doesn’t answer the fundamental question of what exactly we want delegates/contributors to do in the DAO. Two years ago, leaving this undefined may have been acceptable. Today, with our collective experience, it’s time to answer that question before designing mechanisms that distribute rewards simply for participation’s sake.
For this reason, we will also be voting against the other proposal currently on the forum, as it suffers from the same issue.
Ultimately, we’d like to point out that we have two separate proposals addressing the same issue, competing with each other and not working together. We find this to be a complete failure of the DAO governance process and us, as people behind it. I totally understand that there are differences between people in any community, especially one as decentralized as this one. Yet the fact that we cannot put our differences aside and seek value in the ideas shared here means that we’re doing something really wrong. This represents a missed opportunity to align efforts and create impact and it’s a waste of time, effort, and potential.
This DAO once thrived because we could debate - passionately, even heatedly - while still adding value to the ecosystem. Sadly, that spirit of collaboration and constructive dialogue feels lost. And that’s a loss for all of us.
I’ll be voting against this proposal for a number of reasons, including the use of forum likes in the algorithm (leads to gaming and potential cartels), the claim of zero admins (I believe oversight is useful) and more.
Today’s call recording is here https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oAIrkY-dr08V8dEPvf_1fgQ7PVr3y8RR/view?usp=drive_web
And the chat transcript is here https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EmFGoemrwX6CA3eao3LEWNwaCwAF0m4n/view?usp=drive_web
I love this proposal, and I support exploring alternative mechanisms for rewarding delegates and contributors. I particularly appreciate the distinction made between these two groups, it's something I've advocated for previously, and seeing it reflected here is definitely a step in the right direction.
Thank you for the proposal!
I have carefully followed all discussions regarding the DIP.
Thank you for the proposal!
I have carefully followed all discussions regarding the DIP.
During the October 21st discussion, @paulofonseca , you mentioned that, in essence, the proposal is about whether we want an algorithm to determine the distribution of rewards among delegates. Personally, I find this approach efficient. I agree that an algorithm, not a person, should make that judgment. However, as presented, the proposal focuses mainly on showcasing the triple DIP rather than exploring the differences between a system governed by an algorithm and one led by a human group. Therefore, inevitably, what is being evaluated is not only the concept but also the way it is presented. At least according to my understanding.
There are parts of the proposal that, given the current state of the DAO, I disagree with, for example, using likes as a form of evaluation. About the rest, I would happily discuss if we had all the maths done.
In general, prompted by the broader discussion around the DIP, I’d like to say the following:
As I mentioned during the call, there’s no need for tension. I understand the need for incentives for larger delegates, since they play a key role in helping reach quorum. However, smaller delegates need clarity on two important points:
Does participation matter in terms of pluralism and genuine decentralization? If yes, then, plain and simple, there should be some form of reward, even if symbolic, for smaller delegates as well, within a proof-of-work logic.
Is there an intention within the DAO to create space for smaller contributors? If so, we need to understand what kind of contributions the DAO expects from us, so we can focus our energy productively instead of on irrelevant issues that lead to frustration and friction.
I believe that by answering the two former questions, the noise over the DIP will stop and we will be able to focus on how we can attract more capital and increase revenues, since this is the sector that demands the most focus and energy.
Summing up, even if I do not totally agree with the proposal, I will vote Abstain, because I do not want to oppose @paulofonseca ’s proposal. On the contrary, I recognize the effort and commitment he’s put in. He clearly respects the ecosystem and is an active participant. His proposal reflects one core value: fairness!!
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
Whilst we are understanding of @paulofonseca’s intent in fostering and inspiring delegate participation with a tiered rewarding mechanisms. This in the added novelty of the adoption of @Curia Peer Recognition Score for the triple dip. Sharing close similarities with V1 of Coordinape’s “Give system”.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
Whilst we are understanding of @paulofonseca’s intent in fostering and inspiring delegate participation with a tiered rewarding mechanisms. This in the added novelty of the adoption of @Curia Peer Recognition Score for the triple dip. Sharing close similarities with V1 of Coordinape’s “Give system”.
We feel the system may incur some unintended consequences, as with @cp0x’s thoughts, the 500K voting power, limits activity to currently 66 delegates, and requiring their participation to enhance the ecosystem of governance in Arbitrum. This curtails the success of smaller delegates (protocol/builder alike) and their rewarded inputs into the dialogue.
We’d like to see remediation on the operational burden in the delivery for the program, since all individual contributions need to be assessed by individual delegates. Having this responsibility of reviewing the brevity of individual contribution, by installing a third-party program manager this will prevent colluding, bias, or just lack of awareness.
In conclusion, while we support the program’s intent, its current mechanics are counterproductive. The 500K voting power threshold centralises influence and excludes smaller delegates, while the delegate review process is operationally burdensome and risks bias. We are AGAINST this proposal in its current form.
We will have a DAO call in a little less than 1 hour to go through this proposal, get feedback on it, and discuss it at lenght. If you would like to join us, this is the call link: https://meet.google.com/yad-hqxo-kam
hey there @ITUblockchain
I voted FOR on this TEMP CHECK as I believe it is something we need. While I disagree with some points, I don't believe it is a reason strong enough to kill the discussion.
the main question in your Snapshot vote is whether we want a predictable, algorithmic DIP.
the main question in your Snapshot vote is whether we want a predictable, algorithmic DIP.
Hey @TempeTechie just to clarify that, as it says in the intro of the offchain vote proposal text, the main thing this vote is trying to do is:
...to sense the appetite of the DAO towards experimenting with an objective, rules-based, and algorithmic based Delegate Incentive Program, that doesn't require a dedicated program manager to run it, and rewards delegates in a predictable, transparent, automatic, meritocratic, and faster way.
also, regarding this argument of yours to justify a centralized program manager instead:
The main reason is that every system eventually gets gamed. That’s why we need flexibility, so that rules can be quickly adjusted when that happens. This naturally requires some level of centralization, in the form of a program manager.
because... on the other hand... I can produce evidence of a centralized program manager gaming the current DIP system, last month: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/dip-v1-7-delegate-incentive-program-questions-and-feedback/27798/45?u=paulofonseca
and clearly abusing it's power to actively penalize contributors based on forum comments, in May:
and also abusing it's power to straight up suspend contributors for tweeting an image, in June: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/dip-v1-6-delegate-incentive-program-results-june-2025/29657#p-72715-delegate-suspension-13
so I would ask, aren't we really capable of figuring out a way, collaboratively, to have a Delegate Incentive Program that rewards delegates for the value they provide, with a collection of rules that can't be gamed?
I mean... I personally believe that the whole point of smart contracts running in public decentralized blockchains, is indeed to design incentive systems that can't be gamed. That's why I'm here. And that's precisely what I'm trying to do with this proposal.
And I would appreciate feedback regarding exactly that, how do you think the specific rules and parameters of this program can be gamed?
Hey @paulofonseca, as you mentioned on yesterday's call, the main question in your Snapshot vote is whether we want a predictable, algorithmic DIP.
Your proposal has more hard-coded rules, while DIP 2.0 is more flexible (meaning the PM or OpCo can adjust the rules as needed).
Hey @paulofonseca, as you mentioned on yesterday's call, the main question in your Snapshot vote is whether we want a predictable, algorithmic DIP.
Your proposal has more hard-coded rules, while DIP 2.0 is more flexible (meaning the PM or OpCo can adjust the rules as needed).
At ETH Warsaw, Mateusz from Arbitrum Foundation asked me the same question: do I prefer a predictable, hard-coded system or a flexible one? I told him I prefer flexibility, and I still feel the same way.
The main reason is that every system eventually gets gamed. That's why we need flexibility, so that rules can be quickly adjusted when that happens. This naturally requires some level of centralization, in the form of a program manager.
And it's not just about preventing the system from being gamed. If we notice that a rule (or set of rules) within the DIP isn't working as intended, it should be possible to change it and try something else, without having to go through the governance vote each time.
That's why I voted against your proposal on Snapshot. That said, I think your proposal includes some interesting ideas that could be incorporated into future iterations of DIP 2.0.
We thank @paulofonseca for his proactiveness in bringing a new DIP proposal. We believe, as @Griff states, more proposals should come from the community; however, that should not be the driving force for support.
For this particular proposal, we are concerned about a few points, in particular:
We thank @paulofonseca for his proactiveness in bringing a new DIP proposal. We believe, as @Griff states, more proposals should come from the community; however, that should not be the driving force for support.
For this particular proposal, we are concerned about a few points, in particular:
For these reasons, we will be voting AGAINST this proposal.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting ABSTAIN for this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting ABSTAIN for this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
Thank you, @paulofonseca, we recognise the work and thought that has gone into this proposal. Over the past several cycles, DIP has gone through multiple iterations, each trying to address specific challenges. This proposal builds on that history by splitting incentives across three layers: voting, forum engagement, and quarterly contributions. That is a logical and needed progression.
Our decision to vote abstain is not a rejection of the direction. It is a reflection that some core components of this framework are not yet mature enough to be implemented at the scale and importance that this program carries.
The introduction of the Peer Recognition Score (PRS) adds a new layer to delegate incentives. Forum engagement has always been part of the ecosystem, but turning peer recognition into a direct reward mechanism will shape delegate behaviour in ways that are not entirely predictable. Peer-weighted models can be powerful, but they can also lead to concentration of influence and feedback loops that reward popularity over value. This is not an abstract concern. It is a pattern we have observed in other systems and even in softer forms within earlier versions of the DIP. Calibrating PRS correctly is essential, and the current draft does not fully answer how this will be managed over time.
The move to quarterly contribution voting is a meaningful improvement because it reduces frequency and offers delegates a more structured moment to evaluate impact. However, it still depends heavily on subjective interpretation. Across DIP 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7, contribution evaluation was consistently the point where disagreements and disputes originated. Changing the timeline alone does not fix this. Without clear boundaries on what counts as an impactful contribution and how different kinds of work should be weighed against each other, the program risks reintroducing the same problems in a slightly different format. The friction would simply reappear later in the cycle.
Several operational questions also remain open, and these are not minor details. The proposal has not yet clearly outlined how gaming in the PRS system will be identified or handled, what minimum evidence standards will be required for contribution claims, or how collusive behaviour and tie situations will be addressed. In past DIPs, lack of clarity at this level directly led to disputes, delays, and shifting expectations among delegates. These issues tend to surface only when payouts are on the line, which is why they need to be resolved before the program is implemented.
We find this to be a complete failure of the DAO governance process and us, as people behind it.
As @krst rightly pointed out, there’s a deeper issue beyond the design itself. We now have two separate proposals addressing the same problem, moving forward in parallel instead of converging on a shared solution. This reflects a gap in how we collaborate as a DAO. Differences are natural in a decentralized system, but failing to set them aside and align on common ground is a missed opportunity to build something stronger together.
This could have been a moment to bring ideas together into a single, robust framework rather than asking delegates to choose between competing visions. The DAO’s strength has always come from constructive debate followed by collective action. That spirit feels absent here, and we fully align with this point. A coordinated approach would have served the DAO better than fragmented efforts.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in its current form.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in its current form.
First, we’d like to thank Paulo for the time and effort he put into developing this proposal. Whether one agrees with it or not, it’s a well-thought-out initiative with a coherent structure and mechanism - something we haven’t seen here in quite a while.
Let us first list things that we like in this proposal:
However, there are also things we don’t like in this proposal:
To sum it up, while we like the overall approach, we feel it still doesn’t answer the fundamental question of what exactly we want delegates/contributors to do in the DAO. Two years ago, leaving this undefined may have been acceptable. Today, with our collective experience, it’s time to answer that question before designing mechanisms that distribute rewards simply for participation’s sake.
For this reason, we will also be voting against the other proposal currently on the forum, as it suffers from the same issue.
Ultimately, we’d like to point out that we have two separate proposals addressing the same issue, competing with each other and not working together. We find this to be a complete failure of the DAO governance process and us, as people behind it. I totally understand that there are differences between people in any community, especially one as decentralized as this one. Yet the fact that we cannot put our differences aside and seek value in the ideas shared here means that we’re doing something really wrong. This represents a missed opportunity to align efforts and create impact and it’s a waste of time, effort, and potential.
This DAO once thrived because we could debate - passionately, even heatedly - while still adding value to the ecosystem. Sadly, that spirit of collaboration and constructive dialogue feels lost. And that’s a loss for all of us.
I’ll be voting against this proposal for a number of reasons, including the use of forum likes in the algorithm (leads to gaming and potential cartels), the claim of zero admins (I believe oversight is useful) and more.
Today’s call recording is here https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oAIrkY-dr08V8dEPvf_1fgQ7PVr3y8RR/view?usp=drive_web
And the chat transcript is here https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EmFGoemrwX6CA3eao3LEWNwaCwAF0m4n/view?usp=drive_web
I love this proposal, and I support exploring alternative mechanisms for rewarding delegates and contributors. I particularly appreciate the distinction made between these two groups, it's something I've advocated for previously, and seeing it reflected here is definitely a step in the right direction.
Thank you for the proposal!
I have carefully followed all discussions regarding the DIP.
Thank you for the proposal!
I have carefully followed all discussions regarding the DIP.
During the October 21st discussion, @paulofonseca , you mentioned that, in essence, the proposal is about whether we want an algorithm to determine the distribution of rewards among delegates. Personally, I find this approach efficient. I agree that an algorithm, not a person, should make that judgment. However, as presented, the proposal focuses mainly on showcasing the triple DIP rather than exploring the differences between a system governed by an algorithm and one led by a human group. Therefore, inevitably, what is being evaluated is not only the concept but also the way it is presented. At least according to my understanding.
There are parts of the proposal that, given the current state of the DAO, I disagree with, for example, using likes as a form of evaluation. About the rest, I would happily discuss if we had all the maths done.
In general, prompted by the broader discussion around the DIP, I’d like to say the following:
As I mentioned during the call, there’s no need for tension. I understand the need for incentives for larger delegates, since they play a key role in helping reach quorum. However, smaller delegates need clarity on two important points:
Does participation matter in terms of pluralism and genuine decentralization? If yes, then, plain and simple, there should be some form of reward, even if symbolic, for smaller delegates as well, within a proof-of-work logic.
Is there an intention within the DAO to create space for smaller contributors? If so, we need to understand what kind of contributions the DAO expects from us, so we can focus our energy productively instead of on irrelevant issues that lead to frustration and friction.
I believe that by answering the two former questions, the noise over the DIP will stop and we will be able to focus on how we can attract more capital and increase revenues, since this is the sector that demands the most focus and energy.
Summing up, even if I do not totally agree with the proposal, I will vote Abstain, because I do not want to oppose @paulofonseca ’s proposal. On the contrary, I recognize the effort and commitment he’s put in. He clearly respects the ecosystem and is an active participant. His proposal reflects one core value: fairness!!
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
Whilst we are understanding of @paulofonseca’s intent in fostering and inspiring delegate participation with a tiered rewarding mechanisms. This in the added novelty of the adoption of @Curia Peer Recognition Score for the triple dip. Sharing close similarities with V1 of Coordinape’s “Give system”.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
Whilst we are understanding of @paulofonseca’s intent in fostering and inspiring delegate participation with a tiered rewarding mechanisms. This in the added novelty of the adoption of @Curia Peer Recognition Score for the triple dip. Sharing close similarities with V1 of Coordinape’s “Give system”.
We feel the system may incur some unintended consequences, as with @cp0x’s thoughts, the 500K voting power, limits activity to currently 66 delegates, and requiring their participation to enhance the ecosystem of governance in Arbitrum. This curtails the success of smaller delegates (protocol/builder alike) and their rewarded inputs into the dialogue.
We’d like to see remediation on the operational burden in the delivery for the program, since all individual contributions need to be assessed by individual delegates. Having this responsibility of reviewing the brevity of individual contribution, by installing a third-party program manager this will prevent colluding, bias, or just lack of awareness.
In conclusion, while we support the program’s intent, its current mechanics are counterproductive. The 500K voting power threshold centralises influence and excludes smaller delegates, while the delegate review process is operationally burdensome and risks bias. We are AGAINST this proposal in its current form.
We will have a DAO call in a little less than 1 hour to go through this proposal, get feedback on it, and discuss it at lenght. If you would like to join us, this is the call link: https://meet.google.com/yad-hqxo-kam
hey there @ITUblockchain
I voted FOR on this TEMP CHECK as I believe it is something we need. While I disagree with some points, I don't believe it is a reason strong enough to kill the discussion.
I love this proposal, and I support exploring alternative mechanisms for rewarding delegates and contributors. I particularly appreciate the distinction made between these two groups, it's something I've advocated for previously, and seeing it reflected here is definitely a step in the right direction.
I love the auto peer monitoring concept, which aligns well with Ostrom's principles (I’m an Ostrom Maxi) and avoids the need for a lot of oversight using more of a coordinape approach.
I don’t like the idea of NO admin.... We'll need some form of program management, and I’d love to see a budget to expand AI assistance capabilities for this. While I recognize we're not yet at the point where AI can fully automate this work, I think it can help a lot… if this passes I’d like to see OpCo involved in the program management in a more active way, supporting iterative improvement.
I think the model is simple and clear, we will need to tweak the numbers of course, but thats ok... It's so great that this is coming from the community and not an AAE, we should encourage more grassroots efforts from outside our inner circles, this is probably 30% of the reason I want to support this proposal, it's good enough to work, and we should have bias in favor of proposals that come from the community IMO.
Thank you Paulo for the great proposal, I doubt it passes but it really should, and has my support.
hey there @ITUblockchain
this vote is not to approve the specific parameters of [100%] voting participation for example. it’s just to do a temperature check if a design like this for a Delegate Incentive Program, would be something the DAO would be interested in, at all.
the proposal was changed to make this process for the now called Third Dip, a quarterly process, not monthly, precisely because of the feedback received.
Thanks, Paulo. We know this is a temp check and the review moved to quarterly. however; We’re still against. Even quarterly peer reviews can add extra workload (especially for smaller delegates), and also we think that a participation signal without a clear excused-absence path is too strict.
And also, Our concern on this issue still stands.
For this temp check, we voted against, but we’re open to re-evaluating a revised version in the future
Thank you to @paulofonseca for driving this discussion and putting forward a concrete design.
We voted AGAINST in this temp check. While separating voter vs. contributor tracks makes sense in principle, as implemented here the design isn’t workable.
Thank you to @paulofonseca for driving this discussion and putting forward a concrete design.
We voted AGAINST in this temp check. While separating voter vs. contributor tracks makes sense in principle, as implemented here the design isn’t workable.
The 100% participation requirement is too rigid and will penalize good-faith delegates for travel/emergencies/scheduling. A realistic target would be 95–98% with an excused-absence path—but since that’s not what’s on the table now, we can’t support it.
Requiring everyone to post and review five “top contributions” every month creates heavy operational overhead and reviewer fatigue, likely discouraging smaller delegates—and, as several delegates have already pointed out, this would be overly burdensome in practice. And as JoJo noted, mixing voter and contributor tracks can penalize builder/protocol-focused delegates (who spend time on-chain/product work rather than the forum) and drift into an echo chamber.
If the proposal returns with softer participation thresholds and a lighter, less frequent, more objective contribution process, we’d be open to reconsidering. For this iteration, we are AGAINST.
So it’s not fair to say that we are paying delegates to review other delegates work. We are paying delegates for their contributions, but they only get paid if they self-report their contributions and vote on the monthly evaluation vote (which would required them to review other people’s work). It’s different.
So it’s not fair to say that we are paying delegates to review other delegates work. We are paying delegates for their contributions, but they only get paid if they self-report their contributions and vote on the monthly evaluation vote (which would required them to review other people’s work). It’s different.
how can i vote on the contribution of 30 delegates, each putting out 5 different things they did, if I don't evaluate what these things are? We are paying delegates for their contribution the moment in which they are evaluated by other delegates about these very contributions. This likely takes more time than anything else because of the staggering amount of different things that can pop up (from being in an event, to run a podcast, to spin up a pool for two new assets, to have a BD call with a team to migrate in our chain, to a report about the status of the eco, to whatever else comes to mind).
Also, the benefit of “forcing” delegates to review everybody else’s work is that it is the only way to ensure everybody has the most amount of context of what everybody else is doing, and avoid duplicated work and even better, serendipitously provoke collaboration between delegates, which we desperately need to both onboard new talent and get better outcomes from those contributions.
This is what I was trying to communicate to you, which in this discussion represent, effectively, a proposer of something we need to vote upon. And, for this reason,
I won't comment neither on this statement nor the tone of it.
@JoJo as usual, you are twisting my words quite a bit.
To clarify, I said that for delegates that want to get Second Dip rewards, they need to:
@JoJo as usual, you are twisting my words quite a bit.
To clarify, I said that for delegates that want to get Second Dip rewards, they need to:
So it's not fair to say that we are paying delegates to review other delegates work. We are paying delegates for their contributions, but they only get paid if they self-report their contributions and vote on the monthly evaluation vote (which would required them to review other people's work). It's different.
Also, the benefit of "forcing" delegates to review everybody else's work is that it is the only way to ensure everybody has the most amount of context of what everybody else is doing, and avoid duplicated work and even better, serendipitously provoke collaboration between delegates, which we desperately need to both onboard new talent and get better outcomes from those contributions.
Also, delegates don't need to read all the forum posts of all the delegates every month, but only the ones, up to [5], that each delegate considered most impactful in their self report. This has the advantage of both being mindful of the attention span of evaluating delegates and opening the scope of contributions to be much bigger than just forum posts, which is currently the only thing awarded with Delegate Feedback in DIP 1.5/6/7 and makes up for 40% of the monthly score.
With this Double Dip design, delegates are able to report many more types of valuable contributions and get evaluated for those in a decentralized, transparent, and token weighted way.
The next step would be to create a template forum post, in a specific category of this forum, for delegates to create this monthly self-report, and that template should limit the description of each contribution to one paragraph only and offer an option to include a link to verify the contribution. So, every month evaluating delegates would only have to read up to [5] paragraphs per each delegate that qualifies for Second Dip rewards.
requiring delegates to review every other delegate’s monthly contributions may not be realistic.
requiring delegates to review every other delegate’s monthly contributions may not be realistic.
it’s a requirement to get paid.
This is probably the biggest flaw here. There is a lot of to be said on what we are paying delegates for.
The impact, today, has to go through voting. It can also happen through initiatives but the low hanging fruit (and fundamental need) is to have a strong base of voters.
Paying all delegates to watch what they are all doing in the ecosystem, is probably a collective waste of time, energy and money
This is the wrong value proposition.
Note, it doesn't mean we shouldn't find a way to pay contributors. We definitely should. The system above is in my opinion a very wrong way of doing it.
requiring delegates to review every other delegate’s monthly contributions may not be realistic.
requiring delegates to review every other delegate’s monthly contributions may not be realistic.
it’s a requirement to get paid. currently, delegates spend time to dispute the results as well when that same energy could be put into evaluating what everybody else is contributing which would after the side effect of increasing the context of knowing what’s going on in the DAO.
this is also a concern for the current model, right?
actually probably even more so, because the bias would be bigger in a centralized evaluation model since there would be way less people evaluating. the advantage of a decentralized evaluation model is that the biases get faded in the end result because different human beings have different biases so they compensate for each other.
Thanks for putting forward such a detailed and forward-looking framework for the Delegate Incentive Program. The ADD proposal clearly moves the conversation in a positive direction — separating voting performance from qualitative contributions and aiming for a more decentralized, peer-driven model.
I see a lot of merit in ADD, especially in its effort to build a fair and transparent process for evaluating delegate contributions. At the same time, I think the current DIP has done a commendable job of defining what counts as a contribution — setting clear expectations and encouraging healthy participation across the ecosystem.
Thanks for putting forward such a detailed and forward-looking framework for the Delegate Incentive Program. The ADD proposal clearly moves the conversation in a positive direction — separating voting performance from qualitative contributions and aiming for a more decentralized, peer-driven model.
I see a lot of merit in ADD, especially in its effort to build a fair and transparent process for evaluating delegate contributions. At the same time, I think the current DIP has done a commendable job of defining what counts as a contribution — setting clear expectations and encouraging healthy participation across the ecosystem.
Where the current DIP can improve is in how those contributions are evaluated — and that’s exactly where ADD introduces valuable ideas worth building on. That said, I do have a few concerns and would appreciate more clarity around certain aspects of the proposed structure.
Under the proposed peer review model for the second dip, requiring delegates to review every other delegate’s monthly contributions may not be realistic.
Most active delegates are already busy with proposal reviews, voting, and governance calls. Adding another layer of time-intensive reviews could quickly lead to fatigue and, ultimately, lower-quality participation.
There’s also a potential for bias or reciprocal voting, especially within a small and familiar delegate circle. Since evaluating contributions is inherently subjective, these dynamics would be hard to identify and completely prevent.
Delegates come from a wide range of backgrounds — research, governance, community engagement, defi — and not everyone has the expertise to fairly evaluate every type of contribution.
That diversity is a strength of the DAO, but it also means that full peer evaluation across all contribution types could be inconsistent or unfair, especially when comparing very different kinds of work.
Instead of relying entirely on peer evaluation or assigning a single entity to manage the program, it might be worth exploring a middle-ground approach — forming a small working group of elected stakeholders.
This group could review and score contribution reports using predefined rubrics, while still leaving space for delegates to provide light peer input — for example, nominating standout contributions or offering feedback.
The idea is similar to the current Domain Allocator (formerly Questbook) structure, where a few members each cover different verticals.
Each member would focus on identifying contributions within their area and lead discussions on evaluating them.
For contributions that don’t clearly fit into a specific domain, the group as a whole could assess them collectively to ensure fairness.
Such a setup would:
Keep the process decentralized yet accountable,
Reduce the workload for individual delegates,
Leverage domain expertise for more consistent and fair evaluations, and
Minimize risks of bias or vote-trading.
One open question for this model is whether it would introduce additional costs to the DAO.
It’s worth discussing how to handle this efficiently — whether these costs could be covered within the existing DIP budget, or if a small separate allocation would make sense.
Entropy will be voting against this proposal. In the past, we have seen formulaic scoring systems for forum comments reward/encourage low value behavior. The proposed program is overly complex and it is our view that such an initiative requires the subjective human input from a program manager, if we must have delegate incentives at all.
Thanks to @paulofonseca for incorporating the Peer Recognition Score (PRS) framework into the updated Triple Dip model. This concept grew from our earlier feedback on the need for a peer-driven evaluation layer to enhance the program's transparency and fairness.
The parameters detailed in the PRS Notion doc are a starting point, and we are actively refining them to best suit the ArbitrumDAO context. We invite all interested community members to contribute their thoughts and feedback to help improve this system.
Thanks to @paulofonseca for incorporating the Peer Recognition Score (PRS) framework into the updated Triple Dip model. This concept grew from our earlier feedback on the need for a peer-driven evaluation layer to enhance the program's transparency and fairness.
The parameters detailed in the PRS Notion doc are a starting point, and we are actively refining them to best suit the ArbitrumDAO context. We invite all interested community members to contribute their thoughts and feedback to help improve this system.
Based on the community's initial sentiment in a Snapshot vote, we are prepared to move forward with a more detailed phase of refinement and modeling, including simulations to show how the system would function.
Voting against this proposal in the temp check.
Voting against this proposal in the temp check.
First, most of the points i posted above were not properly addressed. Just from an operational standpoint, thinking that a program that rewards delegates has none or minimal costs (in term of time, people and discussion) is quite naive. It doesn't matter if, on paper, is totally algo based: delegates will complain, will ask for clarifications, will look for authority to address perceived issues. One of the thing I said, more than 1 year ago, to SeedGov, was that they were asking for too low of a pay considering the amount of trouble they were getting into, and looking at the amount of work they did per month for a year I was probably right. All this to say: there is the need of a program manager, just because we are here about rewarding people for contributions here. Even just the simple action of voting might need tweaking: if we go back to a situation stip like, it might just not matter if a delegate is not able to vote on all proposals for example. TLDR: all algo only exists on paper.
I am also a bit surprised about the fact that the proposal got more complex over time, just now going to vote I saw that a third mechanism was added. I do understand that the third one is effectively a simplification of the previous second, going for a quarterly type of review. But the second one, based on likes, IMHO doesn't work.
While there are weights for "likes" based on who puts these out (author vs foundation vs dip delegate vs unknown user) the system does not take in account that there is an heavy skew of users activity in the forum itself. As napkin rule, we can see that the biggest a delegate, the less the participation in the forum is, with a few exception. And this is still tied to what I posted above.
Governance is already cumbersome for most delegates, especially the ones that have a vested interest in the chain (think about builders and protocols) but not the DAO
Even just cutting out this latter portion and keeping the DIP delegates as interaction, is fairly easy to see how the participants to this activity will only be a small subset of the current DIP enrolled people, which still lean toward the echo chamber approach.
I want to add a final remark. I was thinking about voting abstain, to also have more time and reflection on the proposal from the foundation as well that should follow this one next week, and give space for more discussion and alternatives. But the more I read this proposal (that got more complex over time), the more I understand how it fails to address the fact that we have basically people doing activities and being rewarded for such activities. Thinking that this setup doesn't require a central entity to which the community as a whole can fall back for issues, questions, problems and discussion, and thinking that this role is implicitly for foundation to take at almost 0 cost in term of time and energy, shows how imho there is little understanding for these social dynamics. As a second note, the added complexity of this version of the program is not calibrated to solve for properly evaluating impact of activity of delegates, since it falls into an echo chamber approach.
how can i vote on the contribution of 30 delegates, each putting out 5 different things they did
what if it was just [1] contribution a month per delegate?
how can i vote on the contribution of 30 delegates, each putting out 5 different things they did
what if it was just [1] contribution a month per delegate?
the idea of this proposal is that these parameters are decided collaboratively to start and adjusted at any time (but not retroactively).
do you think it would be feasible if it was limited to just 1 major contribution per month? and the contribution description had a character limit and strict format?
A lot of delegates care only about a portion of the DAO and ecosystem and for good reasons: they work in a specific department, and don’t have the time, expertise, energy or even interest to evaluate other things. I think this is both fine and in line with normal social norms of people gathered in a place (real or virtual) to achieve a goal: they don’t necessary need the full context of everybody else.
I know and I agree with your description of the situation but the problem is that, in Arbitrum DAO (and most token weighted, single house DAOs) all delegates need to vote on all the things. And in Arbitrum in specifically right now, because of the quorum issues, more and more delegates that have very little context about the DAO, will need to be activated to vote on proposals. The goal of the First Dip is to do exactly that and I think we all agree that is required at this point. Therefore, we risk paying low-context delegates to vote, which we know will lead to bad outcomes and decisions. there’s no escaping that in my opinion.
that’s why i think that actually “forcing” delegates that want to get paid for their contributions to review everybody else’s contributions every month is a value add activity for the DAO, because as I said before, it will lead to more shared context, collaboration and serendipity between delegates.
but I think you and me will probably always disagree on this point. and that’s ok. that’s why we need diverse and more, way more, perspectives in this DAO.
Hey all!
As suggested initially here:
Hey all!
As suggested initially here:
...me and the fine folks at @Curia transformed this Double Dip proposal into a Triple Dip Incentive Program.
I've edited the proposal to reflect the new program design with 3 separate "Dips", and taking into account the feedback offered by several delegates above in this thread.
Hey there!
Just posted an offchain vote for a temperature check on this proposal here.
To highlight the fact that this is not a binding vote, I've included an introductory text on the Snapshot proposal that reads:
I understand the concern regarding imbalance of payout, but you are comparing different things. The value of voting, and the value of contributing. That's why I designed this system with 2 very different mechanisms so that we don't conflate the value between the 2.
One potential concern, though, is that contributors might “secretly partner” to secure rewards (e.g., delegate A and B consistently voting for each other regardless of actual performance). While this seems like an edge case and probably not a major issue in practice, it’s worth keeping in mind as part of the broader tradeoff between decentralisation and system integrity.
I like this idea a lot!
In fact, I initially started looking into new ways of evaluating delegate contributions exactly from this perspective.
Forum comments that have received a like from a delegate with high voting power, are more valuable than others.
I like this idea a lot!
In fact, I initially started looking into new ways of evaluating delegate contributions exactly from this perspective.
Forum comments that have received a like from a delegate with high voting power, are more valuable than others.
In fact, @SEEDGov has used this same heuristic before to reward this, now infamous, comment of mine.
As it can be seen here in the SEEDGov Notion notes for the month of May.
So yeah, I like this idea a lot and I think we should follow this. I assume the current Curia dashboard will evolve to show this kind of info, most likely here, correct?
In regard to the algorithm to calculate the Peer Recognition Score, I think we can also try to mitigate some potential for gaming the results by analyzing habitual liking patterns where the same delegates always like the same people. Also, there is a challenge of correctly mapping several forum accounts that belong to the same organization and excluding self-likes where for example @Sinkas almost always like comments from @krst and that shouldn't count for this score.
But, in general, I like this a lot, and we should meet to talk better about this. Sorry that I haven't responded to your DM yet.
Let's make this not just a Double Dip, but a Triple Dip =)
transfers that subjectivity from a Program Manager to an undefined and variable collective.
First of all, I want to thank you for such a detailed and fresh approach to rewarding delegates – it’s important not to stand still and to keep proposing new systems.
Why this matters: a lot of teams and individuals are now dedicating full time to delegation (cp0x included), and like in any job, there needs to be some stability and a sense that the work you’re doing is meaningful and will be rewarded.
First of all, I want to thank you for such a detailed and fresh approach to rewarding delegates – it’s important not to stand still and to keep proposing new systems.
Why this matters: a lot of teams and individuals are now dedicating full time to delegation (cp0x included), and like in any job, there needs to be some stability and a sense that the work you’re doing is meaningful and will be rewarded.
What I like:
Some questions we’ve already discussed with Paulo – but for the new version, I also have the following:
Thank you for this thoughtful proposal. We strongly support the direction of creating a more objective incentive program, which addresses several key challenges with the current model. The goal of moving towards a peer-driven system is one we fully align with.
That said, there’s one aspect that we believe could be refined further. Our primary feedback centers on the mechanics of the "Second Dip”. While we support the peer-voting model over centralized committees, a key challenge will be the "apples-to-oranges" comparison of diverse, self-reported contributions (e.g., forum delegate feedback vs. research reports vs. leading initiatives). This ambiguity could reintroduce the subjectivity the program aims to reduce.
yes! good catch! just edited. thank you!
I love this proposal, and I support exploring alternative mechanisms for rewarding delegates and contributors. I particularly appreciate the distinction made between these two groups, it's something I've advocated for previously, and seeing it reflected here is definitely a step in the right direction.
I love the auto peer monitoring concept, which aligns well with Ostrom's principles (I’m an Ostrom Maxi) and avoids the need for a lot of oversight using more of a coordinape approach.
I don’t like the idea of NO admin.... We'll need some form of program management, and I’d love to see a budget to expand AI assistance capabilities for this. While I recognize we're not yet at the point where AI can fully automate this work, I think it can help a lot… if this passes I’d like to see OpCo involved in the program management in a more active way, supporting iterative improvement.
I think the model is simple and clear, we will need to tweak the numbers of course, but thats ok... It's so great that this is coming from the community and not an AAE, we should encourage more grassroots efforts from outside our inner circles, this is probably 30% of the reason I want to support this proposal, it's good enough to work, and we should have bias in favor of proposals that come from the community IMO.
Thank you Paulo for the great proposal, I doubt it passes but it really should, and has my support.
hey there @ITUblockchain
this vote is not to approve the specific parameters of [100%] voting participation for example. it’s just to do a temperature check if a design like this for a Delegate Incentive Program, would be something the DAO would be interested in, at all.
the proposal was changed to make this process for the now called Third Dip, a quarterly process, not monthly, precisely because of the feedback received.
Thanks, Paulo. We know this is a temp check and the review moved to quarterly. however; We’re still against. Even quarterly peer reviews can add extra workload (especially for smaller delegates), and also we think that a participation signal without a clear excused-absence path is too strict.
And also, Our concern on this issue still stands.
For this temp check, we voted against, but we’re open to re-evaluating a revised version in the future
Thank you to @paulofonseca for driving this discussion and putting forward a concrete design.
We voted AGAINST in this temp check. While separating voter vs. contributor tracks makes sense in principle, as implemented here the design isn’t workable.
Thank you to @paulofonseca for driving this discussion and putting forward a concrete design.
We voted AGAINST in this temp check. While separating voter vs. contributor tracks makes sense in principle, as implemented here the design isn’t workable.
The 100% participation requirement is too rigid and will penalize good-faith delegates for travel/emergencies/scheduling. A realistic target would be 95–98% with an excused-absence path—but since that’s not what’s on the table now, we can’t support it.
Requiring everyone to post and review five “top contributions” every month creates heavy operational overhead and reviewer fatigue, likely discouraging smaller delegates—and, as several delegates have already pointed out, this would be overly burdensome in practice. And as JoJo noted, mixing voter and contributor tracks can penalize builder/protocol-focused delegates (who spend time on-chain/product work rather than the forum) and drift into an echo chamber.
If the proposal returns with softer participation thresholds and a lighter, less frequent, more objective contribution process, we’d be open to reconsidering. For this iteration, we are AGAINST.
So it’s not fair to say that we are paying delegates to review other delegates work. We are paying delegates for their contributions, but they only get paid if they self-report their contributions and vote on the monthly evaluation vote (which would required them to review other people’s work). It’s different.
So it’s not fair to say that we are paying delegates to review other delegates work. We are paying delegates for their contributions, but they only get paid if they self-report their contributions and vote on the monthly evaluation vote (which would required them to review other people’s work). It’s different.
how can i vote on the contribution of 30 delegates, each putting out 5 different things they did, if I don't evaluate what these things are? We are paying delegates for their contribution the moment in which they are evaluated by other delegates about these very contributions. This likely takes more time than anything else because of the staggering amount of different things that can pop up (from being in an event, to run a podcast, to spin up a pool for two new assets, to have a BD call with a team to migrate in our chain, to a report about the status of the eco, to whatever else comes to mind).
Also, the benefit of “forcing” delegates to review everybody else’s work is that it is the only way to ensure everybody has the most amount of context of what everybody else is doing, and avoid duplicated work and even better, serendipitously provoke collaboration between delegates, which we desperately need to both onboard new talent and get better outcomes from those contributions.
This is what I was trying to communicate to you, which in this discussion represent, effectively, a proposer of something we need to vote upon. And, for this reason,
I won't comment neither on this statement nor the tone of it.
@JoJo as usual, you are twisting my words quite a bit.
To clarify, I said that for delegates that want to get Second Dip rewards, they need to:
@JoJo as usual, you are twisting my words quite a bit.
To clarify, I said that for delegates that want to get Second Dip rewards, they need to:
So it's not fair to say that we are paying delegates to review other delegates work. We are paying delegates for their contributions, but they only get paid if they self-report their contributions and vote on the monthly evaluation vote (which would required them to review other people's work). It's different.
Also, the benefit of "forcing" delegates to review everybody else's work is that it is the only way to ensure everybody has the most amount of context of what everybody else is doing, and avoid duplicated work and even better, serendipitously provoke collaboration between delegates, which we desperately need to both onboard new talent and get better outcomes from those contributions.
Also, delegates don't need to read all the forum posts of all the delegates every month, but only the ones, up to [5], that each delegate considered most impactful in their self report. This has the advantage of both being mindful of the attention span of evaluating delegates and opening the scope of contributions to be much bigger than just forum posts, which is currently the only thing awarded with Delegate Feedback in DIP 1.5/6/7 and makes up for 40% of the monthly score.
With this Double Dip design, delegates are able to report many more types of valuable contributions and get evaluated for those in a decentralized, transparent, and token weighted way.
The next step would be to create a template forum post, in a specific category of this forum, for delegates to create this monthly self-report, and that template should limit the description of each contribution to one paragraph only and offer an option to include a link to verify the contribution. So, every month evaluating delegates would only have to read up to [5] paragraphs per each delegate that qualifies for Second Dip rewards.
requiring delegates to review every other delegate’s monthly contributions may not be realistic.
requiring delegates to review every other delegate’s monthly contributions may not be realistic.
it’s a requirement to get paid.
This is probably the biggest flaw here. There is a lot of to be said on what we are paying delegates for.
The impact, today, has to go through voting. It can also happen through initiatives but the low hanging fruit (and fundamental need) is to have a strong base of voters.
Paying all delegates to watch what they are all doing in the ecosystem, is probably a collective waste of time, energy and money
This is the wrong value proposition.
Note, it doesn't mean we shouldn't find a way to pay contributors. We definitely should. The system above is in my opinion a very wrong way of doing it.
requiring delegates to review every other delegate’s monthly contributions may not be realistic.
requiring delegates to review every other delegate’s monthly contributions may not be realistic.
it’s a requirement to get paid. currently, delegates spend time to dispute the results as well when that same energy could be put into evaluating what everybody else is contributing which would after the side effect of increasing the context of knowing what’s going on in the DAO.
this is also a concern for the current model, right?
actually probably even more so, because the bias would be bigger in a centralized evaluation model since there would be way less people evaluating. the advantage of a decentralized evaluation model is that the biases get faded in the end result because different human beings have different biases so they compensate for each other.
Thanks for putting forward such a detailed and forward-looking framework for the Delegate Incentive Program. The ADD proposal clearly moves the conversation in a positive direction — separating voting performance from qualitative contributions and aiming for a more decentralized, peer-driven model.
I see a lot of merit in ADD, especially in its effort to build a fair and transparent process for evaluating delegate contributions. At the same time, I think the current DIP has done a commendable job of defining what counts as a contribution — setting clear expectations and encouraging healthy participation across the ecosystem.
Thanks for putting forward such a detailed and forward-looking framework for the Delegate Incentive Program. The ADD proposal clearly moves the conversation in a positive direction — separating voting performance from qualitative contributions and aiming for a more decentralized, peer-driven model.
I see a lot of merit in ADD, especially in its effort to build a fair and transparent process for evaluating delegate contributions. At the same time, I think the current DIP has done a commendable job of defining what counts as a contribution — setting clear expectations and encouraging healthy participation across the ecosystem.
Where the current DIP can improve is in how those contributions are evaluated — and that’s exactly where ADD introduces valuable ideas worth building on. That said, I do have a few concerns and would appreciate more clarity around certain aspects of the proposed structure.
Under the proposed peer review model for the second dip, requiring delegates to review every other delegate’s monthly contributions may not be realistic.
Most active delegates are already busy with proposal reviews, voting, and governance calls. Adding another layer of time-intensive reviews could quickly lead to fatigue and, ultimately, lower-quality participation.
There’s also a potential for bias or reciprocal voting, especially within a small and familiar delegate circle. Since evaluating contributions is inherently subjective, these dynamics would be hard to identify and completely prevent.
Delegates come from a wide range of backgrounds — research, governance, community engagement, defi — and not everyone has the expertise to fairly evaluate every type of contribution.
That diversity is a strength of the DAO, but it also means that full peer evaluation across all contribution types could be inconsistent or unfair, especially when comparing very different kinds of work.
Instead of relying entirely on peer evaluation or assigning a single entity to manage the program, it might be worth exploring a middle-ground approach — forming a small working group of elected stakeholders.
This group could review and score contribution reports using predefined rubrics, while still leaving space for delegates to provide light peer input — for example, nominating standout contributions or offering feedback.
The idea is similar to the current Domain Allocator (formerly Questbook) structure, where a few members each cover different verticals.
Each member would focus on identifying contributions within their area and lead discussions on evaluating them.
For contributions that don’t clearly fit into a specific domain, the group as a whole could assess them collectively to ensure fairness.
Such a setup would:
Keep the process decentralized yet accountable,
Reduce the workload for individual delegates,
Leverage domain expertise for more consistent and fair evaluations, and
Minimize risks of bias or vote-trading.
One open question for this model is whether it would introduce additional costs to the DAO.
It’s worth discussing how to handle this efficiently — whether these costs could be covered within the existing DIP budget, or if a small separate allocation would make sense.
Entropy will be voting against this proposal. In the past, we have seen formulaic scoring systems for forum comments reward/encourage low value behavior. The proposed program is overly complex and it is our view that such an initiative requires the subjective human input from a program manager, if we must have delegate incentives at all.
Thanks to @paulofonseca for incorporating the Peer Recognition Score (PRS) framework into the updated Triple Dip model. This concept grew from our earlier feedback on the need for a peer-driven evaluation layer to enhance the program's transparency and fairness.
The parameters detailed in the PRS Notion doc are a starting point, and we are actively refining them to best suit the ArbitrumDAO context. We invite all interested community members to contribute their thoughts and feedback to help improve this system.
Thanks to @paulofonseca for incorporating the Peer Recognition Score (PRS) framework into the updated Triple Dip model. This concept grew from our earlier feedback on the need for a peer-driven evaluation layer to enhance the program's transparency and fairness.
The parameters detailed in the PRS Notion doc are a starting point, and we are actively refining them to best suit the ArbitrumDAO context. We invite all interested community members to contribute their thoughts and feedback to help improve this system.
Based on the community's initial sentiment in a Snapshot vote, we are prepared to move forward with a more detailed phase of refinement and modeling, including simulations to show how the system would function.
Voting against this proposal in the temp check.
Voting against this proposal in the temp check.
First, most of the points i posted above were not properly addressed. Just from an operational standpoint, thinking that a program that rewards delegates has none or minimal costs (in term of time, people and discussion) is quite naive. It doesn't matter if, on paper, is totally algo based: delegates will complain, will ask for clarifications, will look for authority to address perceived issues. One of the thing I said, more than 1 year ago, to SeedGov, was that they were asking for too low of a pay considering the amount of trouble they were getting into, and looking at the amount of work they did per month for a year I was probably right. All this to say: there is the need of a program manager, just because we are here about rewarding people for contributions here. Even just the simple action of voting might need tweaking: if we go back to a situation stip like, it might just not matter if a delegate is not able to vote on all proposals for example. TLDR: all algo only exists on paper.
I am also a bit surprised about the fact that the proposal got more complex over time, just now going to vote I saw that a third mechanism was added. I do understand that the third one is effectively a simplification of the previous second, going for a quarterly type of review. But the second one, based on likes, IMHO doesn't work.
While there are weights for "likes" based on who puts these out (author vs foundation vs dip delegate vs unknown user) the system does not take in account that there is an heavy skew of users activity in the forum itself. As napkin rule, we can see that the biggest a delegate, the less the participation in the forum is, with a few exception. And this is still tied to what I posted above.
Governance is already cumbersome for most delegates, especially the ones that have a vested interest in the chain (think about builders and protocols) but not the DAO
Even just cutting out this latter portion and keeping the DIP delegates as interaction, is fairly easy to see how the participants to this activity will only be a small subset of the current DIP enrolled people, which still lean toward the echo chamber approach.
I want to add a final remark. I was thinking about voting abstain, to also have more time and reflection on the proposal from the foundation as well that should follow this one next week, and give space for more discussion and alternatives. But the more I read this proposal (that got more complex over time), the more I understand how it fails to address the fact that we have basically people doing activities and being rewarded for such activities. Thinking that this setup doesn't require a central entity to which the community as a whole can fall back for issues, questions, problems and discussion, and thinking that this role is implicitly for foundation to take at almost 0 cost in term of time and energy, shows how imho there is little understanding for these social dynamics. As a second note, the added complexity of this version of the program is not calibrated to solve for properly evaluating impact of activity of delegates, since it falls into an echo chamber approach.
how can i vote on the contribution of 30 delegates, each putting out 5 different things they did
what if it was just [1] contribution a month per delegate?
how can i vote on the contribution of 30 delegates, each putting out 5 different things they did
what if it was just [1] contribution a month per delegate?
the idea of this proposal is that these parameters are decided collaboratively to start and adjusted at any time (but not retroactively).
do you think it would be feasible if it was limited to just 1 major contribution per month? and the contribution description had a character limit and strict format?
A lot of delegates care only about a portion of the DAO and ecosystem and for good reasons: they work in a specific department, and don’t have the time, expertise, energy or even interest to evaluate other things. I think this is both fine and in line with normal social norms of people gathered in a place (real or virtual) to achieve a goal: they don’t necessary need the full context of everybody else.
I know and I agree with your description of the situation but the problem is that, in Arbitrum DAO (and most token weighted, single house DAOs) all delegates need to vote on all the things. And in Arbitrum in specifically right now, because of the quorum issues, more and more delegates that have very little context about the DAO, will need to be activated to vote on proposals. The goal of the First Dip is to do exactly that and I think we all agree that is required at this point. Therefore, we risk paying low-context delegates to vote, which we know will lead to bad outcomes and decisions. there’s no escaping that in my opinion.
that’s why i think that actually “forcing” delegates that want to get paid for their contributions to review everybody else’s contributions every month is a value add activity for the DAO, because as I said before, it will lead to more shared context, collaboration and serendipity between delegates.
but I think you and me will probably always disagree on this point. and that’s ok. that’s why we need diverse and more, way more, perspectives in this DAO.
Hey all!
As suggested initially here:
Hey all!
As suggested initially here:
...me and the fine folks at @Curia transformed this Double Dip proposal into a Triple Dip Incentive Program.
I've edited the proposal to reflect the new program design with 3 separate "Dips", and taking into account the feedback offered by several delegates above in this thread.
Hey there!
Just posted an offchain vote for a temperature check on this proposal here.
To highlight the fact that this is not a binding vote, I've included an introductory text on the Snapshot proposal that reads:
I understand the concern regarding imbalance of payout, but you are comparing different things. The value of voting, and the value of contributing. That's why I designed this system with 2 very different mechanisms so that we don't conflate the value between the 2.
One potential concern, though, is that contributors might “secretly partner” to secure rewards (e.g., delegate A and B consistently voting for each other regardless of actual performance). While this seems like an edge case and probably not a major issue in practice, it’s worth keeping in mind as part of the broader tradeoff between decentralisation and system integrity.
I like this idea a lot!
In fact, I initially started looking into new ways of evaluating delegate contributions exactly from this perspective.
Forum comments that have received a like from a delegate with high voting power, are more valuable than others.
I like this idea a lot!
In fact, I initially started looking into new ways of evaluating delegate contributions exactly from this perspective.
Forum comments that have received a like from a delegate with high voting power, are more valuable than others.
In fact, @SEEDGov has used this same heuristic before to reward this, now infamous, comment of mine.
As it can be seen here in the SEEDGov Notion notes for the month of May.
So yeah, I like this idea a lot and I think we should follow this. I assume the current Curia dashboard will evolve to show this kind of info, most likely here, correct?
In regard to the algorithm to calculate the Peer Recognition Score, I think we can also try to mitigate some potential for gaming the results by analyzing habitual liking patterns where the same delegates always like the same people. Also, there is a challenge of correctly mapping several forum accounts that belong to the same organization and excluding self-likes where for example @Sinkas almost always like comments from @krst and that shouldn't count for this score.
But, in general, I like this a lot, and we should meet to talk better about this. Sorry that I haven't responded to your DM yet.
Let's make this not just a Double Dip, but a Triple Dip =)
transfers that subjectivity from a Program Manager to an undefined and variable collective.
First of all, I want to thank you for such a detailed and fresh approach to rewarding delegates – it’s important not to stand still and to keep proposing new systems.
Why this matters: a lot of teams and individuals are now dedicating full time to delegation (cp0x included), and like in any job, there needs to be some stability and a sense that the work you’re doing is meaningful and will be rewarded.
First of all, I want to thank you for such a detailed and fresh approach to rewarding delegates – it’s important not to stand still and to keep proposing new systems.
Why this matters: a lot of teams and individuals are now dedicating full time to delegation (cp0x included), and like in any job, there needs to be some stability and a sense that the work you’re doing is meaningful and will be rewarded.
What I like:
Some questions we’ve already discussed with Paulo – but for the new version, I also have the following:
Thank you for this thoughtful proposal. We strongly support the direction of creating a more objective incentive program, which addresses several key challenges with the current model. The goal of moving towards a peer-driven system is one we fully align with.
That said, there’s one aspect that we believe could be refined further. Our primary feedback centers on the mechanics of the "Second Dip”. While we support the peer-voting model over centralized committees, a key challenge will be the "apples-to-oranges" comparison of diverse, self-reported contributions (e.g., forum delegate feedback vs. research reports vs. leading initiatives). This ambiguity could reintroduce the subjectivity the program aims to reduce.
yes! good catch! just edited. thank you!
Hey there!
Just posted an offchain vote for a temperature check on this proposal here.
To highlight the fact that this is not a binding vote, I've included an introductory text on the Snapshot proposal that reads:
Hello all!
This is not a binding vote. It's just a temperature check vote to sense the appetite of the DAO towards experimenting with an objective, rules-based, and algorithmic based Delegate Incentive Program, that doesn't require a dedicated program manager to run it, and rewards delegates in a predictable, transparent, automatic, meritocratic, and faster way.
Please read the proposal below to understand the proposed program process, general rules, and specific parameters. All specific [values] are just a indicative example at this stage and will be decided and put for a binding vote later, but only if this vote has a favourable result.
Thank you for voting!
Thank you for your attention!
I understand the concern regarding imbalance of payout, but you are comparing different things. The value of voting, and the value of contributing. That's why I designed this system with 2 very different mechanisms so that we don't conflate the value between the 2.
I think the DAO should decide how much money, per month, wants to pay for voting (I suggested the 30,000 ARB) and how much money, per month, wants to pay for contributions (I suggested the 70,000 ARB).
I welcome other suggestions for these amounts and for a different ratio between these amounts for First Dip and Second Dip.
I agree that we should have clear goals as a DAO, but that is a bigger problem than the DIP. It's something we've been trying to solve with the SOS initiative, but unfortunately there hasn't been much progress on that front.
I think the bigger question we should ask is, should we have a Delegate Incentive Program, of any shape or format, even when we don't have defined and set goals as a DAO? I would argue that since the current status quo is that we have a DIP but don't have clear goals as a DAO, the answer to that question currently is... yes.
I would argue that this would not be that much work to be honest. It would be the equivalent amount of work as to review a semi complicated DAO proposal before voting. Most delegates are expected to conduct proper due diligence before voting either way, this would be the same case.
I don't think we should have a minimum guaranteed payout, but I think that maybe, we will need to have a maximum amount of people that would get paid from Second Dip rewards, so that each individual payout is worth the delegate's time and effort.
Either way, given that the current status quo is that the number of delegates being rewarded by the DIP has been steadily decreasing over time, we should firstly be concerned with onboarding as many new delegates as we can, and secondly, in restricting the number of delegates being paid when the individual rewards will start getting too small to share with everybody. Or just increase the total amount of budget for Second Dip.
A question about the 500k threshold: Why specifically 500k, and not 450k or 799k? It might be worth raising this figure, since the 500k threshold seems to have come out of nowhere from the previous DIP It seems to me that this category should not include too many delegates – only those who are large enough to have influence but do not want to spend their time on discussions. In essence, the formula now being proposed is: if you receive delegations of 500k ARB, you’ll get about 1,200 ARB per month (based on August’s calculations) – roughly 3% annual yield. This won’t attract any new participants – the percentage is too small – but it will reduce the activity of delegates holding between 500k and 1M. I see only downsides in lowering this threshold
I don't have a strong opinion about how much this parameter should be. I used 500,000 ARB to facilitate the direct comparison of distribution of rewards with the August results following the DIP 1.7 rules.
I want to highlight, as I commented above, that the First Dip rewards are proportional to the casted voting power of each delegate, meaning that if a delegate with 1,000,000 ARB gets $100 USD in First Dip rewards, a delegate with 10,000,000 ARB would get $1,000 USD that same month.
The reward amount would vary given how many delegates qualify for each month for First Dip rewards. To the extreme where if only 1 delegate with 500,000 ARB has 100% voting participation that month, that delegate would get all the 30,000 ARB for First Dip rewards.
One potential concern, though, is that contributors might “secretly partner” to secure rewards (e.g., delegate A and B consistently voting for each other regardless of actual performance). While this seems like an edge case and probably not a major issue in practice, it’s worth keeping in mind as part of the broader tradeoff between decentralisation and system integrity.
Yes, this is a risk. But I don't think this would work for more than 1 month, because the other delegates would probably notice that behavior, call it out, and then punish those delegates in the following months by not voting for them in the Second Dip monthly contribution evaluation vote.
Also, the way the rewards of the Second Dip are distributed, ensures that the delegate that is voted the highest, not just gets the highest reward, but also raises the bar for all the other contributions that would be rewarded, since only contributions that were at least 10% as valuable as the most valuable contribution get rewarded in the end.
That's the role of the Minimum Relative Contribution Cutoff = [10%].
If we increase this parameter to 20% for example, way less delegates get rewarded, but the ones that do, they get rewarded a higher amount.
transfers that subjectivity from a Program Manager to an undefined and variable collective.
wouldn't you say, this is just another way of saying that, this proposed model decentralizes the process? because that is the goal of the whole design, yes. Also, I'm not sure what you mean by this collective being undefined, because the rules of membership are very clear, so we would know exactly what defines the membership of this collective.
it’s debatable whether that collective would be any more predictable than a Program Manager, since that predictability would depend on its stability over time.
I would say that currently, the issues are not really about predictability of the Program Manager's decisions, but more about inherent human bias and perceived or actual unfairness. That's why there were so many disputes of the monthly results, at least until they were outlawed in DIP 1.7.
The proposed Double Dip process would have less bias since the evaluation would be decentralized among the diverse set of participating delegates, and more fair in the sense that the decision-making is decentralized, since it follows the will of the delegates with the most voting power, which is the most legitimate decision-making tool we have in this, or any, DAO really.
our governance model has recently shifted away from placing the operational burden on delegates, moving instead toward full-time teams with context and long-term vision. The double dip model you’re proposing would represent a step backward in that shift, as it would place a heavy operational load on delegates, something we should aim to avoid.
Well, do you think a program to incentivize delegates for the ad-hoc contributions they do for the DAO, should even exist, then? Because if so, the operational load of managing a program that rewards delegates for their subjective contributions will always exist as well. So its operationality needs to be managed either on a centralized way like it does on DIP 1.7, to the tune of $27,5k USD a month, or in a decentralized way like I'm proposing here, where all the interested parties in receiving funds would have to participate on reporting their own contributions, evaluating other delegates contributions, and voting on the weighted shielded offchain vote, every month.
Those costs would simply be transferred to the participants in the program, namely the delegates. Also, I don’t think reducing administrative costs should be a goal in itself.
But then a fairer question would be, what would the DAO prefer?
Delegates getting around $50k a month between themselves for their contributions that are decided by a Program Manager that gets $20k a month and a service provider that gets $7.5k a month for the dashboard where everybody can see those results in detail...
VS.
The delegates putting in the work of reporting their contributions and evaluating each other every month to distribute $77.5k USD a month?
Given that you’re planning to move this proposal to a vote this Thursday, I’d suggest waiting until the proposal being prepared by SEED and the AF is published on the forum. That way, we can have a broader discussion about the trade-offs between both approaches and reach a vote that reflects a stronger overall consensus on the path forward.
Yeah, I agree. Let's wait a little bit more for the other proposal to show up. Even though, whatever proposal gets approved, in the fastest timeline possible, we are already late in this process unfortunately, since ideally delegates should know, before the beginning of November, what is the framework that they are going to be evaluated on, and if there's even one at all, with the confidence of an onchain vote. Postponing the offchain vote for another week, means that the soonest the onchain vote could get approved is November 13th, or 15th if the late quorum extension is needed.
I edited the proposal according to this new timeline.
Thank you for this thoughtful proposal. We strongly support the direction of creating a more objective incentive program, which addresses several key challenges with the current model. The goal of moving towards a peer-driven system is one we fully align with.
That said, there’s one aspect that we believe could be refined further. Our primary feedback centers on the mechanics of the "Second Dip”. While we support the peer-voting model over centralized committees, a key challenge will be the "apples-to-oranges" comparison of diverse, self-reported contributions (e.g., forum delegate feedback vs. research reports vs. leading initiatives). This ambiguity could reintroduce the subjectivity the program aims to reduce.
We believe the system's objectivity could be significantly improved by creating distinct evaluation tracks for different types of contributions. We propose considering a split of the "Second Dip" into two specialized pools:
To complement this approach, we’ve been working on a data-driven evaluation system, the forum Peer Recognition Score (PRS), which aim to introduces a peer-weighted way to measure contribution quality without relying on centralized evaluators. We believe this kind of mechanism could strengthen the second layer of the program by rewarding genuine impact in a transparent, community-validated way. We think that by adopting a specialized, dual-track structure like this would allow the peer vote to focus solely on comparing major contribution that is distinct to delegate feedbacks on the forum, making the entire evaluation more focused and objective.
We’re sharing this as a constructive addition to the discussion. This is an early-stage idea, and we would value hearing how others think about this approach. Our hope is to help shape an incentive program that effectively balances fairness, objectivity, and genuine participation.
yes! good catch! just edited. thank you!
if you don’t have a reward cap, it can become a zero-sum game with an incentive to prevent competition from being eligible.
I’m not sure I understand what you mean here. Are you talking for the First Dip rewards only? or for both First and Second Dip rewards?
In both, delegates cannot prevent other delegates from participating as this is a permissionless system both for voting and receiving First Dip rewards, and for contributing and competing for receiving Second Dip rewards.
I think we shouldn't go with full distribution. Instead we should have reward caps (for how much a single delegate can get). The reason is purely game theory: if you don't have a reward cap, it can become a zero-sum game with an incentive to prevent competition from being eligible.
If in a given month, any offchain or onchain vote does have meaningful participation,
Did you mean "does not have"?
Hey @paulofonseca, thank you for the thoughtful and very supportive reply! We're glad the concept resonates with you, and the SEEDGov example is a good validation of this approach in practice.
You've pinpointed a couple of critical points on potential gaming vectors: habitual liking and mapping same-team accounts. We've been considering these issues carefully and have a couple of ideas on how to mitigate them. For example, we're exploring concepts like a "mutual-like dampener" for habitual patterns, as well as a way to handle likes within a delegate team or between co-authors on the same proposal. This would require the kind of team mapping we implemented for Scroll DAO's GCR program (before the recent gov slowdown), so we're confident these are solvable challenges.
Hey @paulofonseca, thank you for the thoughtful and very supportive reply! We're glad the concept resonates with you, and the SEEDGov example is a good validation of this approach in practice.
You've pinpointed a couple of critical points on potential gaming vectors: habitual liking and mapping same-team accounts. We've been considering these issues carefully and have a couple of ideas on how to mitigate them. For example, we're exploring concepts like a "mutual-like dampener" for habitual patterns, as well as a way to handle likes within a delegate team or between co-authors on the same proposal. This would require the kind of team mapping we implemented for Scroll DAO's GCR program (before the recent gov slowdown), so we're confident these are solvable challenges.
Regarding your question about our dashboard, should this become an official program, our current thinking is to give the Peer Recognition Score its own dedicated tab, rather than adding it to "Content performance." The PRS is a distinct, composite score measuring peer-validated influence, and giving it its own space would make it clearer and more impactful for delegates to track. We are also exploring the potential for a Discourse plugin to surface this data directly on the forum.
Happy to dive deeper into the specifics of these mechanics with you and the community as this develops. Really appreciate your engagement.
First of all, we would like to thank @paulofonseca for taking the initiative to rethink and redesign the Delegate Incentive Program. The current DIP framework has certainly improved over time, but as this proposal highlights, there are still structural challenges worth addressing.
We recognize that there is no such thing as a perfect evaluation system, but at this point, the most evident and structural challenges appear to be the lack of trust and acceptance toward evaluation results, and the growing cost and complexity of the evaluation process itself.
First of all, we would like to thank @paulofonseca for taking the initiative to rethink and redesign the Delegate Incentive Program. The current DIP framework has certainly improved over time, but as this proposal highlights, there are still structural challenges worth addressing.
We recognize that there is no such thing as a perfect evaluation system, but at this point, the most evident and structural challenges appear to be the lack of trust and acceptance toward evaluation results, and the growing cost and complexity of the evaluation process itself.
To address these, we believe the fundamental approaches are to rotate or decentralize evaluators, and to redesign the evaluation criteria to be as objective and simple as possible. In particular, in the current situation, much of the loss of trust and legitimacy in the evaluation process seems to stem from the excessive complexity of the existing incentive program.
This proposal primarily focuses on the issue of who evaluates whom, rather than the method or criteria of evaluation itself, as we understand. However, we believe there is also a clear need for a separate discussion on the evaluation methodology and underlying criteria.
Regarding Paulo’s current proposal, we see merit in the direction, but also share the concern that full peer-to-peer evaluation across all participants may become burdensome. One possible middle ground could be that each DIP participant evaluates three to five other participants, while each participant receives evaluations from around three to five different teams. This structure could lead to more standardized outcomes while keeping the process manageable. Extreme outliers in scoring could be mitigated by adjusting the weight of evaluations from those who consistently give overly generous or harsh scores.
Even with such adjustments, the process would likely remain somewhat heavy, but we view this as a constructive way to make this model more practical and appealing.
Alternatively, a completely different approach would be to adopt a committee-based system for evaluators. For example, a 10-member committee could be established initially, and after about three months, delegates could evaluate the evaluators themselves and narrow the group down to three trusted members. This model would not require frequent turnover but could enhance accountability and confidence in the evaluation process.
Quantative wise, I think is definitely more aggressive than what we currently have. I am not necessarily saying this is good or bad, but this will definitely discourage lower VP delegates from participation.
Quantative wise, I think is definitely more aggressive than what we currently have. I am not necessarily saying this is good or bad, but this will definitely discourage lower VP delegates from participation.
Yeah, the Double Dip method I'm proposing is more aggressive in the sense that in the DIP 1.7, the Tier X rewards only vary between $1,000 USD for those that have 500,000 ARB in voting power and $1,500 USD for those that have many more times that voting power. The idea is that if we are going to pay delegates to just vote, mostly to be able to achieve quorum on out proposals, the value of that contribution is just the casted voting power of each delegate. So a delegate that has 10x more voting power than the next, should get 10x the rewards for voting. That seems fair to me.
Everything that has been awarded previously in DIP, as Delegate Feedback (good value add comments in this forum) and Bonus Points (outstanding contributions that have ranged from twitter threads, to podcasts, to organizing events, to proposing something without asking for self-payment, etc).
Of course that delegates would frame every kind of contribution in this setup, but it would need to be a contribution for which the delegate has not been paid directly, or financially benefited, at all, of course. So when posting their up to [5] monthly contributions in the forum, delegates need to prove that they haven't been compensated for those contributions yet. And they can't repeat contributions from one month to the next.
This is basically the same thing @SEEDGov does every month to make sure they don't reward people with Bonus Points for things they've already been paid to do. But in Double Dip, all delegates should do that due diligence when they vote to evaluate the contributions every month.
If delegates don't vote in the monthly contributor vote, they don't get Second Dip rewards, and that's ok. Big delegates, with big delegations, would basically earn the same, under this Double Dip model, just for voting, from First Dip rewards. The delegates that don't have enough voting power to qualify for juicy First Dip rewards, would be the ones that would voluntarily contribute and compete for Second Dip rewards, and therefore would take the time to review everybody's contributions and vote on the monthly contributors evaluation vote.
I see this differently. I see only one role, the one of delegates, aka, those that have ARB tokens delegated to their wallet and can vote on proposals. I like this definition because it is an onchain definition that everybody can track at any time. Then those delegates can decide to contribute to the DAO in several ways, and the DAO should have a program that rewards all types of different contributions that the community finds valuable. Now the trick is how do we determine what is valuable, of course. Up until now, SEEDGov has been determining what is a valuable contribution, but has been doing so with much contention, to say the least.
This Double Dip design proposes to enshrine a specific type of contribution, voting, with a specific type of reward mechanism that pays more to those that have more voting power casted. That's the goal of the rewards in the First Dip.
Then, the Second Dip, rewards every other type of contribution, and the way it determines the value of any other type of contribution is by having the whole body of delegates enrolled in the program participate in a monthly contributor evaluation vote, which is a much more decentralized and crowdsourced way to accomplish the same thing, without contention, and that allows to have the monthly results sooner and therefore pay delegates faster.
Even just managing communications, both broadcast and unicast, takes a lot of time.
There would be no need to do this. Any delegate can propose to change a rule or parameter at any time via an offchain vote, and that proposal would be all the communication needed.
Managing issues such as changing addresses, new kyb/c, fringe cases, verification of addresses, is something that happens more often than not
This specific type of work would have to be done mostly by the AF/OpCo either way. We could however setup a simple app for delegates to apply to the program, update their data, and track their rewards. I even believe this features could be something Karma could add to their current Delegate Compensation Dashboard.
this proposal follows the idea that most of us agree on and was already implemented in the latest DIP: separating incentives for voting from incentives for contributions.
this proposal follows the idea that most of us agree on and was already implemented in the latest DIP: separating incentives for voting from incentives for contributions.
Yes. the difference is that the incentives for voting, in this Double Dip model, are proportional to the voting power of each delegate, and the delegate with the most voting power enrolled in the program, receives the biggest share of First Dip rewards. Comparing to DIP 1.7, a delegate with 552,100 ARB like @TodayInDeFi would receive way less in this model than in DIP 1.7 ($65.34 USD vs $1,000 USD equivalent which is the Tier X minimum), and a delegate with 15,610,000 ARB like L2BEAT (@krst) would receive more in this model than in DIP 1.7 (1,847.43 USD vs $1,500 USD equivalent which is the Tier X maximum). You can check the comparable amounts for August here.
This was designed so that delegates with less voting power that would still qualify for voting incentives would look for opportunities to also contribute to the DAO, and get Second Dip rewards as well. Right now, in DIP 1.7, it doesn’t make a lot of sense to me that delegates with just barely more than 500,000 ARB immediately get $1,000 USD a month just for voting. And by the way, I’m arguing and proposing this Double Dip model against myself here, because I think is just better for the DAO. Otherwise I could just vote (2 or 3 times a month) with the +700,000 ARB delegated to me and collect more than $1,000 USD a month.
I’m also thinking of adding another rule for delegates to be able to receive First Dip rewards, which is that they need to cast [100%] of their votes with a reason for every offchain and onchain vote.
it could be gamed after some time. That’s why I prefer keeping some flexibility within the DIP, so the evaluation criteria can be adjusted if they start being gamed (or if they lead to unwanted outcomes or disruptions within the community)
Any delegate can monitor if the system is being gamed, just like we’ve been doing for the past few months, since the data is available to us all. For example, with the last DIP 1.7 results, delegates complained about the results, and even though disputes were outlawed, the results still changed based on those outlawed disputes. For those that followed the reaction to the latest August DIP 1.7 results in the telegram chat, they know that delegates are paying attention to how the other delegates are behaving and how they are being rewarded. In this Double Dip system, anybody would be able to propose a rule or parameter change at any time, via an offchain vote (but the change can't be retroactively applied, which has been a problem in DIP).
posting evaluation votes, preparing payout calculations, onboarding new delegates/contributors, doing BD to attract large VP delegates to First Dip, monitoring how well the system works and whether it’s being gamed, etc
I think these are all examples of value add contributions that any delegate could do, and submit them every month as their contributions to qualify for Second Dip rewards. These things could even be done by @SEEDGov to be honest.
Hi Paulo,
Thank you very much for the proposal. Taking the time to think through and suggest solutions to some of the toughest problems we face as a DAO takes courage and a lot of effort, which is truly appreciated.
Hi Paulo,
Thank you very much for the proposal. Taking the time to think through and suggest solutions to some of the toughest problems we face as a DAO takes courage and a lot of effort, which is truly appreciated.
I believe your proposal correctly identifies one of the main lessons we’ve learned from the DIP in its various iterations: the diversity of stakeholders involved in governance, and the need for a program that recognizes their different needs and motivations in order to ensure both the DAOs security and meaningful participation.
In that regard, I think it’s important to note that @SEEDGov , in its role as Program Manager with extensive experience tackling this challenge, together with the Arbitrum Foundation, have recently been working on a program that seeks to address this same issue and will soon be published for the DAO feedback.
On the other hand, a few points to consider.
I think that the proposed model doesn’t actually reduce subjectivity or make the process more objective, but rather transfers that subjectivity from a Program Manager to an undefined and variable collective. Therefore, it’s debatable whether that collective would be any more predictable than a Program Manager, since that predictability would depend on its stability over time.
In that regard, our governance model has recently shifted away from placing the operational burden on delegates, moving instead toward full-time teams with context and long-term vision. The double dip model you’re proposing would represent a step backward in that shift, as it would place a heavy operational load on delegates, something we should aim to avoid.
For that reason, I also don’t believe there would be a real reduction in operational costs. Those costs would simply be transferred to the participants in the program, namely the delegates. Also, I don’t think reducing administrative costs should be a goal in itself.
I find it very valuable that you’ve highlighted the importance of recognizing the influence of delegates with higher VP, while also seeking a way to acknowledge the contributions of those who, despite holding less VP, bring meaningful value to the DAO.
Given that you’re planning to move this proposal to a vote this Thursday, I’d suggest waiting until the proposal being prepared by SEED and the AF is published on the forum. That way, we can have a broader discussion about the trade-offs between both approaches and reach a vote that reflects a stronger overall consensus on the path forward.
Note: This comment reflects my opinion.
Thank you for your proposal.
First, the initial part about voting. It makes total sense, and it makes also sense in having points/compensation/valuation based on the amount of VP owned. In the end, L2beat/Wintermute/Gauntlet will always have a bigger impact compared to 1 million and below delegates for obvious reasons. This matches qualitative the idea of the current DIP. Quantative wise, I think is definitely more aggressive than what we currently have. I am not necessarily saying this is good or bad, but this will definitely discourage lower VP delegates from participation. The current weight system seems more balanced but maybe there is ground for this one as well.
Thank you for your proposal.
First, the initial part about voting. It makes total sense, and it makes also sense in having points/compensation/valuation based on the amount of VP owned. In the end, L2beat/Wintermute/Gauntlet will always have a bigger impact compared to 1 million and below delegates for obvious reasons. This matches qualitative the idea of the current DIP. Quantative wise, I think is definitely more aggressive than what we currently have. I am not necessarily saying this is good or bad, but this will definitely discourage lower VP delegates from participation. The current weight system seems more balanced but maybe there is ground for this one as well.
This is something I think doesn't make sense at a lot of levels.
assuming the OpCo and/or the Arbitrum Foundation would take care of the minimal admin required, which they are already doing for the DIP 1.7 version.
This is another assumption that might just not be true. There is a huge amount of work behind a program as broad as the DIP. Even just managing communications, both broadcast and unicast, takes a lot of time. Managing issues such as changing addresses, new kyb/c, fringe cases, verification of addresses, is something that happens more often than note. The effort and time to run this thing will be there, is definitely non zero, and a program manager is imho needed.
In general, I think this proposal follows the idea that most of us agree on and was already implemented in the latest DIP: separating incentives for voting from incentives for contributions.
Implementing voting rewards is relatively easy since it relies on clear, objective requirements.
In general, I think this proposal follows the idea that most of us agree on and was already implemented in the latest DIP: separating incentives for voting from incentives for contributions.
Implementing voting rewards is relatively easy since it relies on clear, objective requirements.
However, properly rewarding contributions is a much tougher challenge. There are so many different types of contributions people can make, and everyone values them differently.
The approach suggested in your proposal is one possible way to evaluate contributions, and it could be a solid starting point. What I'm worried about is that it could be gamed after some time. That's why I prefer keeping some flexibility within the DIP, so the evaluation criteria can be adjusted if they start being gamed (or if they lead to unwanted outcomes or disruptions within the community).
The $0 admin costs... I'm highly skeptical of this. The process would still require quite a bit of administrative work beyond what OpCo is supposed to handle, e.g. posting evaluation votes, preparing payout calculations, onboarding new delegates/contributors, doing BD to attract large VP delegates to First Dip, monitoring how well the system works and whether it's being gamed, etc (I very likely left out some important tasks that a lot of us are not even aware of). This is far from being a $0 admin costs thing.
Personally, I'd rather have a dedicated DIP program manager, who not only does administration work, but also monitors the program and adjusts it to prevent unwanted outcomes or even manipulation.
We can all try out an example of a monthly contributor evaluation vote, here: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumdoubledip.eth/proposal/0x5744ce013531ba5856d91c927e9a4814dfc774f0f09c09396cbd4e8586a66e1b
Overall, we believe the proposed Double Dip program effectively identifies the key areas that need improvement in a new version of the initiative — primarily the subjectivity of the scoring system and the removal of a single evaluation framework for two distinct participant types.
We agree that the current scoring setup relies too heavily on the subjectivity of the program manager — a factor that definitely needs reconsideration. One potential concern, though, is that contributors might "secretly partner" to secure rewards (e.g., delegate A and B consistently voting for each other regardless of actual performance). While this seems like an edge case and probably not a major issue in practice, it’s worth keeping in mind as part of the broader tradeoff between decentralisation and system integrity. Additionally, we recognise @JoJo raised a valid point on the delegate workload that would be introduced by this system.
Overall, we believe the proposed Double Dip program effectively identifies the key areas that need improvement in a new version of the initiative — primarily the subjectivity of the scoring system and the removal of a single evaluation framework for two distinct participant types.
We agree that the current scoring setup relies too heavily on the subjectivity of the program manager — a factor that definitely needs reconsideration. One potential concern, though, is that contributors might "secretly partner" to secure rewards (e.g., delegate A and B consistently voting for each other regardless of actual performance). While this seems like an edge case and probably not a major issue in practice, it’s worth keeping in mind as part of the broader tradeoff between decentralisation and system integrity. Additionally, we recognise @JoJo raised a valid point on the delegate workload that would be introduced by this system.
all delegates will have to vote, every month, on the contribution of another 10, 20, 30 people, by reading their thread and evaluating their “contributions”, and vote accordingly. This will be, to be blunt, something that just won’t happen.
We agree with the idea of separating voting delegates and contributors. Both bring real value to the DAO, but their work is fundamentally different, so it makes sense that they should be evaluated differently. This is a core improvement we appreciate seeing in the Double Dip proposal.
Huge thanks to @paulofonseca for putting in the work and bringing forward an alternative approach to delegate incentives — it’s great to see thoughtful experimentation here. As we understand it, @SEEDGov and the AF are also working on a new version of the DIP.
Having multiple approaches on the table helps highlight the tradeoffs and makes it easier for the community to evaluate which direction might be the best fit. We’ll hold off on deeper feedback until DIP v2 is published, so we can assess both proposals side by side and weigh the tradeoffs more concretely.
this proposal was submitted on this forum at around 22:00 UTC on October 2nd, 2025
and it was approved by the forum moderators roughly 13 hours later
Hey there!
Just posted an offchain vote for a temperature check on this proposal here.
To highlight the fact that this is not a binding vote, I've included an introductory text on the Snapshot proposal that reads:
Hello all!
This is not a binding vote. It's just a temperature check vote to sense the appetite of the DAO towards experimenting with an objective, rules-based, and algorithmic based Delegate Incentive Program, that doesn't require a dedicated program manager to run it, and rewards delegates in a predictable, transparent, automatic, meritocratic, and faster way.
Please read the proposal below to understand the proposed program process, general rules, and specific parameters. All specific [values] are just a indicative example at this stage and will be decided and put for a binding vote later, but only if this vote has a favourable result.
Thank you for voting!
Thank you for your attention!
I understand the concern regarding imbalance of payout, but you are comparing different things. The value of voting, and the value of contributing. That's why I designed this system with 2 very different mechanisms so that we don't conflate the value between the 2.
I think the DAO should decide how much money, per month, wants to pay for voting (I suggested the 30,000 ARB) and how much money, per month, wants to pay for contributions (I suggested the 70,000 ARB).
I welcome other suggestions for these amounts and for a different ratio between these amounts for First Dip and Second Dip.
I agree that we should have clear goals as a DAO, but that is a bigger problem than the DIP. It's something we've been trying to solve with the SOS initiative, but unfortunately there hasn't been much progress on that front.
I think the bigger question we should ask is, should we have a Delegate Incentive Program, of any shape or format, even when we don't have defined and set goals as a DAO? I would argue that since the current status quo is that we have a DIP but don't have clear goals as a DAO, the answer to that question currently is... yes.
I would argue that this would not be that much work to be honest. It would be the equivalent amount of work as to review a semi complicated DAO proposal before voting. Most delegates are expected to conduct proper due diligence before voting either way, this would be the same case.
I don't think we should have a minimum guaranteed payout, but I think that maybe, we will need to have a maximum amount of people that would get paid from Second Dip rewards, so that each individual payout is worth the delegate's time and effort.
Either way, given that the current status quo is that the number of delegates being rewarded by the DIP has been steadily decreasing over time, we should firstly be concerned with onboarding as many new delegates as we can, and secondly, in restricting the number of delegates being paid when the individual rewards will start getting too small to share with everybody. Or just increase the total amount of budget for Second Dip.
A question about the 500k threshold: Why specifically 500k, and not 450k or 799k? It might be worth raising this figure, since the 500k threshold seems to have come out of nowhere from the previous DIP It seems to me that this category should not include too many delegates – only those who are large enough to have influence but do not want to spend their time on discussions. In essence, the formula now being proposed is: if you receive delegations of 500k ARB, you’ll get about 1,200 ARB per month (based on August’s calculations) – roughly 3% annual yield. This won’t attract any new participants – the percentage is too small – but it will reduce the activity of delegates holding between 500k and 1M. I see only downsides in lowering this threshold
I don't have a strong opinion about how much this parameter should be. I used 500,000 ARB to facilitate the direct comparison of distribution of rewards with the August results following the DIP 1.7 rules.
I want to highlight, as I commented above, that the First Dip rewards are proportional to the casted voting power of each delegate, meaning that if a delegate with 1,000,000 ARB gets $100 USD in First Dip rewards, a delegate with 10,000,000 ARB would get $1,000 USD that same month.
The reward amount would vary given how many delegates qualify for each month for First Dip rewards. To the extreme where if only 1 delegate with 500,000 ARB has 100% voting participation that month, that delegate would get all the 30,000 ARB for First Dip rewards.
One potential concern, though, is that contributors might “secretly partner” to secure rewards (e.g., delegate A and B consistently voting for each other regardless of actual performance). While this seems like an edge case and probably not a major issue in practice, it’s worth keeping in mind as part of the broader tradeoff between decentralisation and system integrity.
Yes, this is a risk. But I don't think this would work for more than 1 month, because the other delegates would probably notice that behavior, call it out, and then punish those delegates in the following months by not voting for them in the Second Dip monthly contribution evaluation vote.
Also, the way the rewards of the Second Dip are distributed, ensures that the delegate that is voted the highest, not just gets the highest reward, but also raises the bar for all the other contributions that would be rewarded, since only contributions that were at least 10% as valuable as the most valuable contribution get rewarded in the end.
That's the role of the Minimum Relative Contribution Cutoff = [10%].
If we increase this parameter to 20% for example, way less delegates get rewarded, but the ones that do, they get rewarded a higher amount.
transfers that subjectivity from a Program Manager to an undefined and variable collective.
wouldn't you say, this is just another way of saying that, this proposed model decentralizes the process? because that is the goal of the whole design, yes. Also, I'm not sure what you mean by this collective being undefined, because the rules of membership are very clear, so we would know exactly what defines the membership of this collective.
it’s debatable whether that collective would be any more predictable than a Program Manager, since that predictability would depend on its stability over time.
I would say that currently, the issues are not really about predictability of the Program Manager's decisions, but more about inherent human bias and perceived or actual unfairness. That's why there were so many disputes of the monthly results, at least until they were outlawed in DIP 1.7.
The proposed Double Dip process would have less bias since the evaluation would be decentralized among the diverse set of participating delegates, and more fair in the sense that the decision-making is decentralized, since it follows the will of the delegates with the most voting power, which is the most legitimate decision-making tool we have in this, or any, DAO really.
our governance model has recently shifted away from placing the operational burden on delegates, moving instead toward full-time teams with context and long-term vision. The double dip model you’re proposing would represent a step backward in that shift, as it would place a heavy operational load on delegates, something we should aim to avoid.
Well, do you think a program to incentivize delegates for the ad-hoc contributions they do for the DAO, should even exist, then? Because if so, the operational load of managing a program that rewards delegates for their subjective contributions will always exist as well. So its operationality needs to be managed either on a centralized way like it does on DIP 1.7, to the tune of $27,5k USD a month, or in a decentralized way like I'm proposing here, where all the interested parties in receiving funds would have to participate on reporting their own contributions, evaluating other delegates contributions, and voting on the weighted shielded offchain vote, every month.
Those costs would simply be transferred to the participants in the program, namely the delegates. Also, I don’t think reducing administrative costs should be a goal in itself.
But then a fairer question would be, what would the DAO prefer?
Delegates getting around $50k a month between themselves for their contributions that are decided by a Program Manager that gets $20k a month and a service provider that gets $7.5k a month for the dashboard where everybody can see those results in detail...
VS.
The delegates putting in the work of reporting their contributions and evaluating each other every month to distribute $77.5k USD a month?
Given that you’re planning to move this proposal to a vote this Thursday, I’d suggest waiting until the proposal being prepared by SEED and the AF is published on the forum. That way, we can have a broader discussion about the trade-offs between both approaches and reach a vote that reflects a stronger overall consensus on the path forward.
Yeah, I agree. Let's wait a little bit more for the other proposal to show up. Even though, whatever proposal gets approved, in the fastest timeline possible, we are already late in this process unfortunately, since ideally delegates should know, before the beginning of November, what is the framework that they are going to be evaluated on, and if there's even one at all, with the confidence of an onchain vote. Postponing the offchain vote for another week, means that the soonest the onchain vote could get approved is November 13th, or 15th if the late quorum extension is needed.
I edited the proposal according to this new timeline.
Thank you for this thoughtful proposal. We strongly support the direction of creating a more objective incentive program, which addresses several key challenges with the current model. The goal of moving towards a peer-driven system is one we fully align with.
That said, there’s one aspect that we believe could be refined further. Our primary feedback centers on the mechanics of the "Second Dip”. While we support the peer-voting model over centralized committees, a key challenge will be the "apples-to-oranges" comparison of diverse, self-reported contributions (e.g., forum delegate feedback vs. research reports vs. leading initiatives). This ambiguity could reintroduce the subjectivity the program aims to reduce.
We believe the system's objectivity could be significantly improved by creating distinct evaluation tracks for different types of contributions. We propose considering a split of the "Second Dip" into two specialized pools:
To complement this approach, we’ve been working on a data-driven evaluation system, the forum Peer Recognition Score (PRS), which aim to introduces a peer-weighted way to measure contribution quality without relying on centralized evaluators. We believe this kind of mechanism could strengthen the second layer of the program by rewarding genuine impact in a transparent, community-validated way. We think that by adopting a specialized, dual-track structure like this would allow the peer vote to focus solely on comparing major contribution that is distinct to delegate feedbacks on the forum, making the entire evaluation more focused and objective.
We’re sharing this as a constructive addition to the discussion. This is an early-stage idea, and we would value hearing how others think about this approach. Our hope is to help shape an incentive program that effectively balances fairness, objectivity, and genuine participation.
yes! good catch! just edited. thank you!
if you don’t have a reward cap, it can become a zero-sum game with an incentive to prevent competition from being eligible.
I’m not sure I understand what you mean here. Are you talking for the First Dip rewards only? or for both First and Second Dip rewards?
In both, delegates cannot prevent other delegates from participating as this is a permissionless system both for voting and receiving First Dip rewards, and for contributing and competing for receiving Second Dip rewards.
I think we shouldn't go with full distribution. Instead we should have reward caps (for how much a single delegate can get). The reason is purely game theory: if you don't have a reward cap, it can become a zero-sum game with an incentive to prevent competition from being eligible.
If in a given month, any offchain or onchain vote does have meaningful participation,
Did you mean "does not have"?
Hey @paulofonseca, thank you for the thoughtful and very supportive reply! We're glad the concept resonates with you, and the SEEDGov example is a good validation of this approach in practice.
You've pinpointed a couple of critical points on potential gaming vectors: habitual liking and mapping same-team accounts. We've been considering these issues carefully and have a couple of ideas on how to mitigate them. For example, we're exploring concepts like a "mutual-like dampener" for habitual patterns, as well as a way to handle likes within a delegate team or between co-authors on the same proposal. This would require the kind of team mapping we implemented for Scroll DAO's GCR program (before the recent gov slowdown), so we're confident these are solvable challenges.
Hey @paulofonseca, thank you for the thoughtful and very supportive reply! We're glad the concept resonates with you, and the SEEDGov example is a good validation of this approach in practice.
You've pinpointed a couple of critical points on potential gaming vectors: habitual liking and mapping same-team accounts. We've been considering these issues carefully and have a couple of ideas on how to mitigate them. For example, we're exploring concepts like a "mutual-like dampener" for habitual patterns, as well as a way to handle likes within a delegate team or between co-authors on the same proposal. This would require the kind of team mapping we implemented for Scroll DAO's GCR program (before the recent gov slowdown), so we're confident these are solvable challenges.
Regarding your question about our dashboard, should this become an official program, our current thinking is to give the Peer Recognition Score its own dedicated tab, rather than adding it to "Content performance." The PRS is a distinct, composite score measuring peer-validated influence, and giving it its own space would make it clearer and more impactful for delegates to track. We are also exploring the potential for a Discourse plugin to surface this data directly on the forum.
Happy to dive deeper into the specifics of these mechanics with you and the community as this develops. Really appreciate your engagement.
First of all, we would like to thank @paulofonseca for taking the initiative to rethink and redesign the Delegate Incentive Program. The current DIP framework has certainly improved over time, but as this proposal highlights, there are still structural challenges worth addressing.
We recognize that there is no such thing as a perfect evaluation system, but at this point, the most evident and structural challenges appear to be the lack of trust and acceptance toward evaluation results, and the growing cost and complexity of the evaluation process itself.
First of all, we would like to thank @paulofonseca for taking the initiative to rethink and redesign the Delegate Incentive Program. The current DIP framework has certainly improved over time, but as this proposal highlights, there are still structural challenges worth addressing.
We recognize that there is no such thing as a perfect evaluation system, but at this point, the most evident and structural challenges appear to be the lack of trust and acceptance toward evaluation results, and the growing cost and complexity of the evaluation process itself.
To address these, we believe the fundamental approaches are to rotate or decentralize evaluators, and to redesign the evaluation criteria to be as objective and simple as possible. In particular, in the current situation, much of the loss of trust and legitimacy in the evaluation process seems to stem from the excessive complexity of the existing incentive program.
This proposal primarily focuses on the issue of who evaluates whom, rather than the method or criteria of evaluation itself, as we understand. However, we believe there is also a clear need for a separate discussion on the evaluation methodology and underlying criteria.
Regarding Paulo’s current proposal, we see merit in the direction, but also share the concern that full peer-to-peer evaluation across all participants may become burdensome. One possible middle ground could be that each DIP participant evaluates three to five other participants, while each participant receives evaluations from around three to five different teams. This structure could lead to more standardized outcomes while keeping the process manageable. Extreme outliers in scoring could be mitigated by adjusting the weight of evaluations from those who consistently give overly generous or harsh scores.
Even with such adjustments, the process would likely remain somewhat heavy, but we view this as a constructive way to make this model more practical and appealing.
Alternatively, a completely different approach would be to adopt a committee-based system for evaluators. For example, a 10-member committee could be established initially, and after about three months, delegates could evaluate the evaluators themselves and narrow the group down to three trusted members. This model would not require frequent turnover but could enhance accountability and confidence in the evaluation process.
Quantative wise, I think is definitely more aggressive than what we currently have. I am not necessarily saying this is good or bad, but this will definitely discourage lower VP delegates from participation.
Quantative wise, I think is definitely more aggressive than what we currently have. I am not necessarily saying this is good or bad, but this will definitely discourage lower VP delegates from participation.
Yeah, the Double Dip method I'm proposing is more aggressive in the sense that in the DIP 1.7, the Tier X rewards only vary between $1,000 USD for those that have 500,000 ARB in voting power and $1,500 USD for those that have many more times that voting power. The idea is that if we are going to pay delegates to just vote, mostly to be able to achieve quorum on out proposals, the value of that contribution is just the casted voting power of each delegate. So a delegate that has 10x more voting power than the next, should get 10x the rewards for voting. That seems fair to me.
Everything that has been awarded previously in DIP, as Delegate Feedback (good value add comments in this forum) and Bonus Points (outstanding contributions that have ranged from twitter threads, to podcasts, to organizing events, to proposing something without asking for self-payment, etc).
Of course that delegates would frame every kind of contribution in this setup, but it would need to be a contribution for which the delegate has not been paid directly, or financially benefited, at all, of course. So when posting their up to [5] monthly contributions in the forum, delegates need to prove that they haven't been compensated for those contributions yet. And they can't repeat contributions from one month to the next.
This is basically the same thing @SEEDGov does every month to make sure they don't reward people with Bonus Points for things they've already been paid to do. But in Double Dip, all delegates should do that due diligence when they vote to evaluate the contributions every month.
If delegates don't vote in the monthly contributor vote, they don't get Second Dip rewards, and that's ok. Big delegates, with big delegations, would basically earn the same, under this Double Dip model, just for voting, from First Dip rewards. The delegates that don't have enough voting power to qualify for juicy First Dip rewards, would be the ones that would voluntarily contribute and compete for Second Dip rewards, and therefore would take the time to review everybody's contributions and vote on the monthly contributors evaluation vote.
I see this differently. I see only one role, the one of delegates, aka, those that have ARB tokens delegated to their wallet and can vote on proposals. I like this definition because it is an onchain definition that everybody can track at any time. Then those delegates can decide to contribute to the DAO in several ways, and the DAO should have a program that rewards all types of different contributions that the community finds valuable. Now the trick is how do we determine what is valuable, of course. Up until now, SEEDGov has been determining what is a valuable contribution, but has been doing so with much contention, to say the least.
This Double Dip design proposes to enshrine a specific type of contribution, voting, with a specific type of reward mechanism that pays more to those that have more voting power casted. That's the goal of the rewards in the First Dip.
Then, the Second Dip, rewards every other type of contribution, and the way it determines the value of any other type of contribution is by having the whole body of delegates enrolled in the program participate in a monthly contributor evaluation vote, which is a much more decentralized and crowdsourced way to accomplish the same thing, without contention, and that allows to have the monthly results sooner and therefore pay delegates faster.
Even just managing communications, both broadcast and unicast, takes a lot of time.
There would be no need to do this. Any delegate can propose to change a rule or parameter at any time via an offchain vote, and that proposal would be all the communication needed.
Managing issues such as changing addresses, new kyb/c, fringe cases, verification of addresses, is something that happens more often than not
This specific type of work would have to be done mostly by the AF/OpCo either way. We could however setup a simple app for delegates to apply to the program, update their data, and track their rewards. I even believe this features could be something Karma could add to their current Delegate Compensation Dashboard.
this proposal follows the idea that most of us agree on and was already implemented in the latest DIP: separating incentives for voting from incentives for contributions.
this proposal follows the idea that most of us agree on and was already implemented in the latest DIP: separating incentives for voting from incentives for contributions.
Yes. the difference is that the incentives for voting, in this Double Dip model, are proportional to the voting power of each delegate, and the delegate with the most voting power enrolled in the program, receives the biggest share of First Dip rewards. Comparing to DIP 1.7, a delegate with 552,100 ARB like @TodayInDeFi would receive way less in this model than in DIP 1.7 ($65.34 USD vs $1,000 USD equivalent which is the Tier X minimum), and a delegate with 15,610,000 ARB like L2BEAT (@krst) would receive more in this model than in DIP 1.7 (1,847.43 USD vs $1,500 USD equivalent which is the Tier X maximum). You can check the comparable amounts for August here.
This was designed so that delegates with less voting power that would still qualify for voting incentives would look for opportunities to also contribute to the DAO, and get Second Dip rewards as well. Right now, in DIP 1.7, it doesn’t make a lot of sense to me that delegates with just barely more than 500,000 ARB immediately get $1,000 USD a month just for voting. And by the way, I’m arguing and proposing this Double Dip model against myself here, because I think is just better for the DAO. Otherwise I could just vote (2 or 3 times a month) with the +700,000 ARB delegated to me and collect more than $1,000 USD a month.
I’m also thinking of adding another rule for delegates to be able to receive First Dip rewards, which is that they need to cast [100%] of their votes with a reason for every offchain and onchain vote.
it could be gamed after some time. That’s why I prefer keeping some flexibility within the DIP, so the evaluation criteria can be adjusted if they start being gamed (or if they lead to unwanted outcomes or disruptions within the community)
Any delegate can monitor if the system is being gamed, just like we’ve been doing for the past few months, since the data is available to us all. For example, with the last DIP 1.7 results, delegates complained about the results, and even though disputes were outlawed, the results still changed based on those outlawed disputes. For those that followed the reaction to the latest August DIP 1.7 results in the telegram chat, they know that delegates are paying attention to how the other delegates are behaving and how they are being rewarded. In this Double Dip system, anybody would be able to propose a rule or parameter change at any time, via an offchain vote (but the change can't be retroactively applied, which has been a problem in DIP).
posting evaluation votes, preparing payout calculations, onboarding new delegates/contributors, doing BD to attract large VP delegates to First Dip, monitoring how well the system works and whether it’s being gamed, etc
I think these are all examples of value add contributions that any delegate could do, and submit them every month as their contributions to qualify for Second Dip rewards. These things could even be done by @SEEDGov to be honest.
Hi Paulo,
Thank you very much for the proposal. Taking the time to think through and suggest solutions to some of the toughest problems we face as a DAO takes courage and a lot of effort, which is truly appreciated.
Hi Paulo,
Thank you very much for the proposal. Taking the time to think through and suggest solutions to some of the toughest problems we face as a DAO takes courage and a lot of effort, which is truly appreciated.
I believe your proposal correctly identifies one of the main lessons we’ve learned from the DIP in its various iterations: the diversity of stakeholders involved in governance, and the need for a program that recognizes their different needs and motivations in order to ensure both the DAOs security and meaningful participation.
In that regard, I think it’s important to note that @SEEDGov , in its role as Program Manager with extensive experience tackling this challenge, together with the Arbitrum Foundation, have recently been working on a program that seeks to address this same issue and will soon be published for the DAO feedback.
On the other hand, a few points to consider.
I think that the proposed model doesn’t actually reduce subjectivity or make the process more objective, but rather transfers that subjectivity from a Program Manager to an undefined and variable collective. Therefore, it’s debatable whether that collective would be any more predictable than a Program Manager, since that predictability would depend on its stability over time.
In that regard, our governance model has recently shifted away from placing the operational burden on delegates, moving instead toward full-time teams with context and long-term vision. The double dip model you’re proposing would represent a step backward in that shift, as it would place a heavy operational load on delegates, something we should aim to avoid.
For that reason, I also don’t believe there would be a real reduction in operational costs. Those costs would simply be transferred to the participants in the program, namely the delegates. Also, I don’t think reducing administrative costs should be a goal in itself.
I find it very valuable that you’ve highlighted the importance of recognizing the influence of delegates with higher VP, while also seeking a way to acknowledge the contributions of those who, despite holding less VP, bring meaningful value to the DAO.
Given that you’re planning to move this proposal to a vote this Thursday, I’d suggest waiting until the proposal being prepared by SEED and the AF is published on the forum. That way, we can have a broader discussion about the trade-offs between both approaches and reach a vote that reflects a stronger overall consensus on the path forward.
Note: This comment reflects my opinion.
Thank you for your proposal.
First, the initial part about voting. It makes total sense, and it makes also sense in having points/compensation/valuation based on the amount of VP owned. In the end, L2beat/Wintermute/Gauntlet will always have a bigger impact compared to 1 million and below delegates for obvious reasons. This matches qualitative the idea of the current DIP. Quantative wise, I think is definitely more aggressive than what we currently have. I am not necessarily saying this is good or bad, but this will definitely discourage lower VP delegates from participation. The current weight system seems more balanced but maybe there is ground for this one as well.
Thank you for your proposal.
First, the initial part about voting. It makes total sense, and it makes also sense in having points/compensation/valuation based on the amount of VP owned. In the end, L2beat/Wintermute/Gauntlet will always have a bigger impact compared to 1 million and below delegates for obvious reasons. This matches qualitative the idea of the current DIP. Quantative wise, I think is definitely more aggressive than what we currently have. I am not necessarily saying this is good or bad, but this will definitely discourage lower VP delegates from participation. The current weight system seems more balanced but maybe there is ground for this one as well.
This is something I think doesn't make sense at a lot of levels.
assuming the OpCo and/or the Arbitrum Foundation would take care of the minimal admin required, which they are already doing for the DIP 1.7 version.
This is another assumption that might just not be true. There is a huge amount of work behind a program as broad as the DIP. Even just managing communications, both broadcast and unicast, takes a lot of time. Managing issues such as changing addresses, new kyb/c, fringe cases, verification of addresses, is something that happens more often than note. The effort and time to run this thing will be there, is definitely non zero, and a program manager is imho needed.
In general, I think this proposal follows the idea that most of us agree on and was already implemented in the latest DIP: separating incentives for voting from incentives for contributions.
Implementing voting rewards is relatively easy since it relies on clear, objective requirements.
In general, I think this proposal follows the idea that most of us agree on and was already implemented in the latest DIP: separating incentives for voting from incentives for contributions.
Implementing voting rewards is relatively easy since it relies on clear, objective requirements.
However, properly rewarding contributions is a much tougher challenge. There are so many different types of contributions people can make, and everyone values them differently.
The approach suggested in your proposal is one possible way to evaluate contributions, and it could be a solid starting point. What I'm worried about is that it could be gamed after some time. That's why I prefer keeping some flexibility within the DIP, so the evaluation criteria can be adjusted if they start being gamed (or if they lead to unwanted outcomes or disruptions within the community).
The $0 admin costs... I'm highly skeptical of this. The process would still require quite a bit of administrative work beyond what OpCo is supposed to handle, e.g. posting evaluation votes, preparing payout calculations, onboarding new delegates/contributors, doing BD to attract large VP delegates to First Dip, monitoring how well the system works and whether it's being gamed, etc (I very likely left out some important tasks that a lot of us are not even aware of). This is far from being a $0 admin costs thing.
Personally, I'd rather have a dedicated DIP program manager, who not only does administration work, but also monitors the program and adjusts it to prevent unwanted outcomes or even manipulation.
We can all try out an example of a monthly contributor evaluation vote, here: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumdoubledip.eth/proposal/0x5744ce013531ba5856d91c927e9a4814dfc774f0f09c09396cbd4e8586a66e1b
Overall, we believe the proposed Double Dip program effectively identifies the key areas that need improvement in a new version of the initiative — primarily the subjectivity of the scoring system and the removal of a single evaluation framework for two distinct participant types.
We agree that the current scoring setup relies too heavily on the subjectivity of the program manager — a factor that definitely needs reconsideration. One potential concern, though, is that contributors might "secretly partner" to secure rewards (e.g., delegate A and B consistently voting for each other regardless of actual performance). While this seems like an edge case and probably not a major issue in practice, it’s worth keeping in mind as part of the broader tradeoff between decentralisation and system integrity. Additionally, we recognise @JoJo raised a valid point on the delegate workload that would be introduced by this system.
Overall, we believe the proposed Double Dip program effectively identifies the key areas that need improvement in a new version of the initiative — primarily the subjectivity of the scoring system and the removal of a single evaluation framework for two distinct participant types.
We agree that the current scoring setup relies too heavily on the subjectivity of the program manager — a factor that definitely needs reconsideration. One potential concern, though, is that contributors might "secretly partner" to secure rewards (e.g., delegate A and B consistently voting for each other regardless of actual performance). While this seems like an edge case and probably not a major issue in practice, it’s worth keeping in mind as part of the broader tradeoff between decentralisation and system integrity. Additionally, we recognise @JoJo raised a valid point on the delegate workload that would be introduced by this system.
all delegates will have to vote, every month, on the contribution of another 10, 20, 30 people, by reading their thread and evaluating their “contributions”, and vote accordingly. This will be, to be blunt, something that just won’t happen.
We agree with the idea of separating voting delegates and contributors. Both bring real value to the DAO, but their work is fundamentally different, so it makes sense that they should be evaluated differently. This is a core improvement we appreciate seeing in the Double Dip proposal.
Huge thanks to @paulofonseca for putting in the work and bringing forward an alternative approach to delegate incentives — it’s great to see thoughtful experimentation here. As we understand it, @SEEDGov and the AF are also working on a new version of the DIP.
Having multiple approaches on the table helps highlight the tradeoffs and makes it easier for the community to evaluate which direction might be the best fit. We’ll hold off on deeper feedback until DIP v2 is published, so we can assess both proposals side by side and weigh the tradeoffs more concretely.
this proposal was submitted on this forum at around 22:00 UTC on October 2nd, 2025
and it was approved by the forum moderators roughly 13 hours later
