UPDATE - we want to draw attention to a budget clarification that the total listed for Data and Monitoring for Plurality Labs (performed by OpenBlock Labs) is not 100K ARB but 149,500 ARB. The total ask of 21.52M remains unchanged.
Call to Action for Arbitrum ecosystem
This proposal represents a critical opportunity for our community to:
Notes:
This proposal outlines a one-time backfund to all "approved but not funded proposals’’ from Arbitrum STIP. The proposed AIP increases the total budget by 21.4M to 71.4M while increasing the total participating protocols by 26, for a total of 56 funded projects. The program plans to allocate DAO-owned ARB towards incentives while leveraging distribution systems, consensus, and delegate diligence already created from STIP 1.
This program is designed to backfund approved protocols while maintaining the timelines and systems of STIP 1:
Before this proposal was drafted, a working group was formed to gauge sentiment, gather key data points, and outline the proposal's structure. The working group collaborated with delegates and projects affected by the STIP, engaging in multiple calls—including sessions with the creators of the STIP and the Incentive Working Group—to solicit feedback and refine the proposal accordingly.
Key concerns discussed include:
First and foremost, we believe that the successful execution of this Backfund proposal will, in time, serve as a crucial catalyst for future grant structures, including a successful STIP round 2. Why? This opportunity will unify the Arbitrum ecosystem by addressing key weaknesses in the original STIP 1 structure by quickly providing approved projects and other stakeholders with the resources/data needed to design and support future programs.
Key issues associated with delaying an immediate backfund and moving towards a round 2 include:
While the budget was set at 50M, the original working group proposed 75M so that:
"The budget was raised to 75M ARB to accommodate larger protocols (Pinnacle Grants) without compromising smaller applications." tnorm, September 3rd 2023.
Excess demand was a significant possibility due to the high interest in STIP and the absence of a cap for Pinnacle grants. Voters lacked the data to ascertain whether the initial 50M would be adequate to achieve the objectives of STIP.
Noteworthy is that, in the event of excess demand, measures including backfunding were already outlined as potential options.
Proper design and fulfillment of a Round 2 or similar future funding programs may take time to develop. Meanwhile, projects that received approval but no funding have immediate initiatives requiring support. Our opportunity is to fund these initiatives, level the competitive playing field, and enhance the data available for the STIP process.
During our consultation process, we engaged in numerous discussions that brought forth questions about backfunding. Despite the criticisms, backfunding remains the most straightforward method to address the current STIP’s skewed sample size. We advocate that backfunding is the optimal approach to achieve the STIP’s intended outcomes—specifically, to examine the impact that incentives have on the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Furthermore, if the STIP continues without rectifying the issues with its sample, the analysis will be compromised by a significant methodological flaw. Backfunding is not just the “best” option; it is essential for preserving the integrity of the STIP overall.
Voting behavior might have differed if the budget cap were set at 75M or 100M. The only way to determine this would be to repeat the experiment with a raised cap (an option that is unfeasible as time travel has not yet been realized).
It's helpful for us to remember the original objectives of the STIP:
Motivation - A statement on why the Arbitrum community should implement the AIP.
How can Arbitrum create an incentives structure to grow the ecosystem? STIP started when the community began investigating creative uses for incentives. A short-term program was devised to act quickly, collect data about how incentives are used by Arbitrum protocols, and learn from the results to design new programs and grow the Arbitrum Ecosystem.
An unexpected budget problem caused many successful STIP applications to receive no funding. The real-world consequence of this mistake caused the STIP sample to be cut in half - but not at random. To determine the final STIP cohort, the applications were sorted by approval, which inadvertently skewed the sample towards incumbent protocols. This sampling bias is most egregious for collecting data about the smallest protocols; over 70% of Beacon grants were rejected due to the sorting algorithm that was used. Consequently, STIP may not be collecting sufficient data about new builders on Arbitrum.
This AIP seeks to achieve STIP's original motivations by:
This AIP will ensure an important builder population is included in the study, while increasing the validity of the STIP results.
One of the most important questions facing Arbitrum today is how to grow the ecosystem and win the L2 Wars. STIP is a novel study on the impact of incentives for growing the Arbitrum ecosystem. In practice, the STIP excluded most new builders from the study, severely limiting the data that will be collected about the early stages of the builder pipeline. This AIP includes a broader range of protocols in the STIP study, ensuring that Arbitrum gets the data it needs about how incentives impact new builders in the Arbitrum ecosystem. It stands to reason that extending incentives to smaller projects could serve to incubate projects that grow into the high-usage dApps of tomorrow. Extending the STIP may not only increase the inclusivity of the program but also incentivize significant growth for the broader Arbitrum ecosystem at a lower cost per project, and this possibility is worth exploring.
Rationale - An explanation of how the AIP aligns with the Arbitrum community's mission and guiding values
Arbitrum's community values highlight the importance of diversity, which increases the fitness of the entire Arbitrum ecosystem by representing the needs of many kinds of participants. The original work to design STIP was careful to consider how both large and small protocols would fare under the framework. However, the unexpected budget cutoff caused the sample to skew towards large protocols, which is at odds with the values of the Arbitrum community. The cost of falling short of this ideal is that STIP systematically overlooks the possibility that incentives might be uniquely interesting to small and new protocols. By failing to incorporate protocols at the first stages of the builders onboarding pipeline, Arbitrum will be unsure about how incentives operate among this crucial group of protocols.
The Arbitrum community also values neutrality, which received careful consideration during the STIP design stages. It was well-understood that incumbent protocols were likely to prevail with their STIP applications - but it was hoped this would not preclude smaller participants from also being funded. Unfortunately, this wish for inclusion was not fulfilled and - unintentional though it may have been - funding was nevertheless distributed according to a ranking that was likely to favor incumbents. Again, despite the best efforts of the DAO and the STIP designers, the result was at odds with the values of the Arbitrum community.
Above all, Arbitrum seeks to create and nurture a thriving ecosystem - and the DAO's values are designed to provide guiding values that will always trend towards the health of the ecosystem. When the values aren't met - even unintentionally - it is possible the best interests of the ecosystem aren't met, either. In the case of STIP, accidentally excluding Beacon grants falls short of the community values - which, in all likelihood, is a critical oversight that Arbitrum would benefit from fixing.
Specifications - A detailed breakdown of the platforms and technologies that will be used.
Will approve funding of an additional 21.4M ARB through the end of January 31, 2024.
Please note the STIP Backfund will leverage the multiple sections of AIP-9 such as Specification section and Outstanding Questions and Concerns and specifically:
Steps to Implement - The steps to implement the AIP, including associated costs, manpower, and other resources for each step where applicable. For the avoidance of doubt, any AIPs involving transactions with third parties (such as grants) will need to ensure that applicable legal documentation and procedures are also included.`
We used data provided by https://www.raho.me/stip to determine which successful STIP proposals did not receive funding. This list is also available via google docs.
Which protocols are included in this AIP?
We used data provided by https://www.raho.me/stip to determine which successful STIP proposals did not receive funding. This list is also available via google docs.
Total ARB for backfund
| Project | ARB Amount |
|---|---|
| WOOFi | 1,000,000 |
| Gains Network [1] | 4,500,000 |
| DefiEdge | 200,000 |
| Synapse | 2,000,000 |
| RabbitHole [3] | 1,000,000 |
| Notional | 500,000 |
| Rodeo Finance | 250,000 |
| Magpie | 1,250,000 |
| Stargate Finance | 2,000,000 |
| Savvy | 200,000 |
| Tales of Elleria | 50,000 |
| Thales | 500,000 |
| TIDE | 80,000 |
| Solv Protocol | 150,000 |
| Furucombo | 59,500 |
| dForce | 1,000,000 |
| Sanko GameCorp | 500,000 |
| Ramses | 1,248,000 |
| Vela | 1,000,000 |
| Thetanuts Finance | 200,000 |
| JoJo | 200,000 |
| Wormhole | 1,800,000 |
| Shell Protocol | 750,000 |
| Realm | 300,000 |
| unshETH | 375,000 |
| StakeDAO | 200,000 |
| WINR [4] | 38,000 |
[1] Gains Network originally asked for 7M ARB, but reduced their ask to 4.5M ARB. See announcement.
[2] PancakeSwap has removed their proposal from consideration because of KYC requirements.
[3] RabbitHole's inclusion in backfunding would replace their proposal titled: "Proposal: Grow Arbitrum & STIP Teams by leveraging Quest Protocol built by RabbitHole"
[4] Currently, WINR will receive 462,000 of their ask - with backfunding WINR would receive 500,000.
Overall Cost - The total cost to implement the AIP.
Overall Cost - 71.4M ARB
Timeline - Relevant timing details, including but not limited to start date, milestones, and completion dates.
*Note: Timeline may change based on option selected or amount of work needed to update and develop. For DAO proposals and voting procedures please see Section 2 in the constitution.
| Phase | Date / Duration | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 1: Temp check (1 week) | Th, Nov 2nd | Draft posted to forum | Discussion hosted on forum, revisions to draft, broader working group call and revisions to AIP. |
| Mon, Nov 6th | Temp check posted to snapshot by sponsor delegate | Reconvene in forum to post results and conclude temperature check. | |
| Phase 2: Formal AIP and call for voting (3 days): | Tues, Nov 8th | ||
| Phase 3: DAO votes on AIP, on Arbitrum One (14-16 days): | Thurs, Nov 10th | Snapshot vote begins(submit to Tally) | During this Phase 3, the ArbitrumDAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP. Vote to approve AIP for non-constitutional funding. Tally voting: Quorum ~71.4M ARB; greater than 50% voting in favor. |
| Thurs, Nov 24th | DAO vote ends, results are final | ||
| Phase 4: L2 Waiting Period (3 days) | Wait | Waiting period of 3 days; then schedule on-chain txs to disburse ARB |
UPDATE - we want to draw attention to a budget clarification that the total listed for Data and Monitoring for Plurality Labs (performed by OpenBlock Labs) is not 100K ARB but 149,500 ARB. The total ask of 21.52M remains unchanged.
Call to Action for Arbitrum ecosystem
This proposal represents a critical opportunity for our community to:
Notes:
This proposal outlines a one-time backfund to all "approved but not funded proposals’’ from Arbitrum STIP. The proposed AIP increases the total budget by 21.4M to 71.4M while increasing the total participating protocols by 26, for a total of 56 funded projects. The program plans to allocate DAO-owned ARB towards incentives while leveraging distribution systems, consensus, and delegate diligence already created from STIP 1.
This program is designed to backfund approved protocols while maintaining the timelines and systems of STIP 1:
Before this proposal was drafted, a working group was formed to gauge sentiment, gather key data points, and outline the proposal's structure. The working group collaborated with delegates and projects affected by the STIP, engaging in multiple calls—including sessions with the creators of the STIP and the Incentive Working Group—to solicit feedback and refine the proposal accordingly.
Key concerns discussed include:
First and foremost, we believe that the successful execution of this Backfund proposal will, in time, serve as a crucial catalyst for future grant structures, including a successful STIP round 2. Why? This opportunity will unify the Arbitrum ecosystem by addressing key weaknesses in the original STIP 1 structure by quickly providing approved projects and other stakeholders with the resources/data needed to design and support future programs.
Key issues associated with delaying an immediate backfund and moving towards a round 2 include:
While the budget was set at 50M, the original working group proposed 75M so that:
"The budget was raised to 75M ARB to accommodate larger protocols (Pinnacle Grants) without compromising smaller applications." tnorm, September 3rd 2023.
Excess demand was a significant possibility due to the high interest in STIP and the absence of a cap for Pinnacle grants. Voters lacked the data to ascertain whether the initial 50M would be adequate to achieve the objectives of STIP.
Noteworthy is that, in the event of excess demand, measures including backfunding were already outlined as potential options.
Proper design and fulfillment of a Round 2 or similar future funding programs may take time to develop. Meanwhile, projects that received approval but no funding have immediate initiatives requiring support. Our opportunity is to fund these initiatives, level the competitive playing field, and enhance the data available for the STIP process.
During our consultation process, we engaged in numerous discussions that brought forth questions about backfunding. Despite the criticisms, backfunding remains the most straightforward method to address the current STIP’s skewed sample size. We advocate that backfunding is the optimal approach to achieve the STIP’s intended outcomes—specifically, to examine the impact that incentives have on the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Furthermore, if the STIP continues without rectifying the issues with its sample, the analysis will be compromised by a significant methodological flaw. Backfunding is not just the “best” option; it is essential for preserving the integrity of the STIP overall.
Voting behavior might have differed if the budget cap were set at 75M or 100M. The only way to determine this would be to repeat the experiment with a raised cap (an option that is unfeasible as time travel has not yet been realized).
It's helpful for us to remember the original objectives of the STIP:
Motivation - A statement on why the Arbitrum community should implement the AIP.
How can Arbitrum create an incentives structure to grow the ecosystem? STIP started when the community began investigating creative uses for incentives. A short-term program was devised to act quickly, collect data about how incentives are used by Arbitrum protocols, and learn from the results to design new programs and grow the Arbitrum Ecosystem.
An unexpected budget problem caused many successful STIP applications to receive no funding. The real-world consequence of this mistake caused the STIP sample to be cut in half - but not at random. To determine the final STIP cohort, the applications were sorted by approval, which inadvertently skewed the sample towards incumbent protocols. This sampling bias is most egregious for collecting data about the smallest protocols; over 70% of Beacon grants were rejected due to the sorting algorithm that was used. Consequently, STIP may not be collecting sufficient data about new builders on Arbitrum.
This AIP seeks to achieve STIP's original motivations by:
This AIP will ensure an important builder population is included in the study, while increasing the validity of the STIP results.
One of the most important questions facing Arbitrum today is how to grow the ecosystem and win the L2 Wars. STIP is a novel study on the impact of incentives for growing the Arbitrum ecosystem. In practice, the STIP excluded most new builders from the study, severely limiting the data that will be collected about the early stages of the builder pipeline. This AIP includes a broader range of protocols in the STIP study, ensuring that Arbitrum gets the data it needs about how incentives impact new builders in the Arbitrum ecosystem. It stands to reason that extending incentives to smaller projects could serve to incubate projects that grow into the high-usage dApps of tomorrow. Extending the STIP may not only increase the inclusivity of the program but also incentivize significant growth for the broader Arbitrum ecosystem at a lower cost per project, and this possibility is worth exploring.
Rationale - An explanation of how the AIP aligns with the Arbitrum community's mission and guiding values
Arbitrum's community values highlight the importance of diversity, which increases the fitness of the entire Arbitrum ecosystem by representing the needs of many kinds of participants. The original work to design STIP was careful to consider how both large and small protocols would fare under the framework. However, the unexpected budget cutoff caused the sample to skew towards large protocols, which is at odds with the values of the Arbitrum community. The cost of falling short of this ideal is that STIP systematically overlooks the possibility that incentives might be uniquely interesting to small and new protocols. By failing to incorporate protocols at the first stages of the builders onboarding pipeline, Arbitrum will be unsure about how incentives operate among this crucial group of protocols.
The Arbitrum community also values neutrality, which received careful consideration during the STIP design stages. It was well-understood that incumbent protocols were likely to prevail with their STIP applications - but it was hoped this would not preclude smaller participants from also being funded. Unfortunately, this wish for inclusion was not fulfilled and - unintentional though it may have been - funding was nevertheless distributed according to a ranking that was likely to favor incumbents. Again, despite the best efforts of the DAO and the STIP designers, the result was at odds with the values of the Arbitrum community.
Above all, Arbitrum seeks to create and nurture a thriving ecosystem - and the DAO's values are designed to provide guiding values that will always trend towards the health of the ecosystem. When the values aren't met - even unintentionally - it is possible the best interests of the ecosystem aren't met, either. In the case of STIP, accidentally excluding Beacon grants falls short of the community values - which, in all likelihood, is a critical oversight that Arbitrum would benefit from fixing.
Specifications - A detailed breakdown of the platforms and technologies that will be used.
Will approve funding of an additional 21.4M ARB through the end of January 31, 2024.
Please note the STIP Backfund will leverage the multiple sections of AIP-9 such as Specification section and Outstanding Questions and Concerns and specifically:
Steps to Implement - The steps to implement the AIP, including associated costs, manpower, and other resources for each step where applicable. For the avoidance of doubt, any AIPs involving transactions with third parties (such as grants) will need to ensure that applicable legal documentation and procedures are also included.`
We used data provided by https://www.raho.me/stip to determine which successful STIP proposals did not receive funding. This list is also available via google docs.
Which protocols are included in this AIP?
We used data provided by https://www.raho.me/stip to determine which successful STIP proposals did not receive funding. This list is also available via google docs.
Total ARB for backfund
| Project | ARB Amount |
|---|---|
| WOOFi | 1,000,000 |
| Gains Network [1] | 4,500,000 |
| DefiEdge | 200,000 |
| Synapse | 2,000,000 |
| RabbitHole [3] | 1,000,000 |
| Notional | 500,000 |
| Rodeo Finance | 250,000 |
| Magpie | 1,250,000 |
| Stargate Finance | 2,000,000 |
| Savvy | 200,000 |
| Tales of Elleria | 50,000 |
| Thales | 500,000 |
| TIDE | 80,000 |
| Solv Protocol | 150,000 |
| Furucombo | 59,500 |
| dForce | 1,000,000 |
| Sanko GameCorp | 500,000 |
| Ramses | 1,248,000 |
| Vela | 1,000,000 |
| Thetanuts Finance | 200,000 |
| JoJo | 200,000 |
| Wormhole | 1,800,000 |
| Shell Protocol | 750,000 |
| Realm | 300,000 |
| unshETH | 375,000 |
| StakeDAO | 200,000 |
| WINR [4] | 38,000 |
[1] Gains Network originally asked for 7M ARB, but reduced their ask to 4.5M ARB. See announcement.
[2] PancakeSwap has removed their proposal from consideration because of KYC requirements.
[3] RabbitHole's inclusion in backfunding would replace their proposal titled: "Proposal: Grow Arbitrum & STIP Teams by leveraging Quest Protocol built by RabbitHole"
[4] Currently, WINR will receive 462,000 of their ask - with backfunding WINR would receive 500,000.
Overall Cost - The total cost to implement the AIP.
Overall Cost - 71.4M ARB
Timeline - Relevant timing details, including but not limited to start date, milestones, and completion dates.
*Note: Timeline may change based on option selected or amount of work needed to update and develop. For DAO proposals and voting procedures please see Section 2 in the constitution.
| Phase | Date / Duration | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 1: Temp check (1 week) | Th, Nov 2nd | Draft posted to forum | Discussion hosted on forum, revisions to draft, broader working group call and revisions to AIP. |
| Mon, Nov 6th | Temp check posted to snapshot by sponsor delegate | Reconvene in forum to post results and conclude temperature check. | |
| Phase 2: Formal AIP and call for voting (3 days): | Tues, Nov 8th | ||
| Phase 3: DAO votes on AIP, on Arbitrum One (14-16 days): | Thurs, Nov 10th | Snapshot vote begins(submit to Tally) | During this Phase 3, the ArbitrumDAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP. Vote to approve AIP for non-constitutional funding. Tally voting: Quorum ~71.4M ARB; greater than 50% voting in favor. |
| Thurs, Nov 24th | DAO vote ends, results are final | ||
| Phase 4: L2 Waiting Period (3 days) | Wait | Waiting period of 3 days; then schedule on-chain txs to disburse ARB |
StableLab would have preferred a full round 2 opposed to a backfund as we believe that would have been a more fair way to include additional protocols in an incentives program. We also believe many aspects of this proposal such as the timeline were not adequate considered before going to a vote. However, since the community has demonstrated their desire for the backfund, we will be happy to manage this program and will work hard to ensure it runs smoothly.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/133?u=krst
StableLab would have preferred a full round 2 opposed to a backfund as we believe that would have been a more fair way to include additional protocols in an incentives program. We also believe many aspects of this proposal such as the timeline were not adequate considered before going to a vote. However, since the community has demonstrated their desire for the backfund, we will be happy to manage this program and will work hard to ensure it runs smoothly.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/133?u=krst
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/132?u=plutus
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/treasure-delegate-communication-thread/18873/4?u=treasuredao
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/98
We support this proposal to backfund projects from Round 1 of the STIP and ensure broad-based support for this cohort. We understand that the est. 21M cost for 26 approved projects constitutes c. 10% of budgeted spend for Q4 2023, and we see this as a good use of funds in terms of investing in growth, building out the ecosystem, and supporting smaller and more innovative projects to improve the diversity and resiliency of the ecosystem. That said, we would caution against future repeated use of backfunding as it may set the wrong precedent for overruling due process (incl. funding prospects for STIP Round 2).
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/97?u=bob-rossi
I'd like to see a broader set of protocols receive STIP funding. I think the set that received the initial 50M in funding is too small to generate meaningful data on the efficacy of STIP. I also want a broader set of protocols to benefit from the STIP funding.
This Initiative and STIP Round Two should be consolidated together.
Although MUX delegates voted “Abstain” on the Snapshot vote, MUX delegates will vote “Against” on the Tally vote after careful consideration. Proposals with good protocol fundamentals, proper incentives execution strategies and reasonable grant size should be supported, but not in a bundle of proposals with mixed quality.
https://twitter.com/CarlZielinski/status/1722845915973665158
Good opportunity for smaller projects to feel supported by the ecosystem.
We would love to see how the qualified projects (that were included to receive the 50m ARB) perform before sending out more STIP funds
https://x.com/maxlomu/status/1726610110649413954?s=20
The work the community put is was admirable. They gathered evidence and showed how this is a benefit to Arbitrum overall.
Thoughts: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/72
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/102?u=realdumbird
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/103?u=krst
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/97
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/treasure-delegate-communication-thread/18873/4?u=treasuredao
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/72
STIP Voters voted based off the STIP rules. We don't think back funding accurately reflects voters desires. We would prefer a full round 2.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/69?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/65?u=coinflip
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/64?u=blueclarity
I think we should fund a full round 2. Round 1 had its rules and projects were voted according to those
Bringing 26 more projects in for 40% more sounds better than excluding them. Hate increasing the spend, but we are where we are.
https://twitter.com/CarlZielinski/status/1722845915973665158
I don’t support emptying the national treasury to aid some new projects that make no contribution. Can all projects in the future apply for
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/132?u=plutus
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/treasure-delegate-communication-thread/18873/4?u=treasuredao
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/98
We support this proposal to backfund projects from Round 1 of the STIP and ensure broad-based support for this cohort. We understand that the est. 21M cost for 26 approved projects constitutes c. 10% of budgeted spend for Q4 2023, and we see this as a good use of funds in terms of investing in growth, building out the ecosystem, and supporting smaller and more innovative projects to improve the diversity and resiliency of the ecosystem. That said, we would caution against future repeated use of backfunding as it may set the wrong precedent for overruling due process (incl. funding prospects for STIP Round 2).
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/97?u=bob-rossi
I'd like to see a broader set of protocols receive STIP funding. I think the set that received the initial 50M in funding is too small to generate meaningful data on the efficacy of STIP. I also want a broader set of protocols to benefit from the STIP funding.
This Initiative and STIP Round Two should be consolidated together.
Although MUX delegates voted “Abstain” on the Snapshot vote, MUX delegates will vote “Against” on the Tally vote after careful consideration. Proposals with good protocol fundamentals, proper incentives execution strategies and reasonable grant size should be supported, but not in a bundle of proposals with mixed quality.
https://twitter.com/CarlZielinski/status/1722845915973665158
Good opportunity for smaller projects to feel supported by the ecosystem.
We would love to see how the qualified projects (that were included to receive the 50m ARB) perform before sending out more STIP funds
https://x.com/maxlomu/status/1726610110649413954?s=20
The work the community put is was admirable. They gathered evidence and showed how this is a benefit to Arbitrum overall.
Thoughts: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/72
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/102?u=realdumbird
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/103?u=krst
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/97
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/treasure-delegate-communication-thread/18873/4?u=treasuredao
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/72
STIP Voters voted based off the STIP rules. We don't think back funding accurately reflects voters desires. We would prefer a full round 2.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/69?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/65?u=coinflip
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-to-backfund-successful-stip-proposals-savvy-dao-draft/19046/64?u=blueclarity
I think we should fund a full round 2. Round 1 had its rules and projects were voted according to those
Bringing 26 more projects in for 40% more sounds better than excluding them. Hate increasing the spend, but we are where we are.
https://twitter.com/CarlZielinski/status/1722845915973665158
I don’t support emptying the national treasury to aid some new projects that make no contribution. Can all projects in the future apply for
Love the fact that successful projects that meet the criteria will have their proposals in, looking forward to Bitsave's Success in Q4 on Arbitrum.
Will keep updated on this.
Love the fact that successful projects that meet the criteria will have their proposals in, looking forward to Bitsave's Success in Q4 on Arbitrum.
Will keep updated on this.
the delegates can’t seem to align with the bundle backfund approach. Several proposals involve strategies that can simply initiate sybil-attack type of transactions that will likely boost transactions when the incentives are live
the delegates can’t seem to align with the bundle backfund approach. Several proposals involve strategies that can simply initiate sybil-attack type of transactions that will likely boost transactions when the incentives are live
If Sybil attacks gaming transactions with STIP incentives are a plausible concern, then Sybil attacks on individual protocol proposal voting should also be considered a concern. The potential for profit is greater with griefing individual protocol proposal voting, as it's not capped by grant size.
If a protocol token can be short margin traded, there is an opportunity for significantly more profit using the ancient Italian gambit (gambetto, before chess), the act of tripping someone with the leg to make them fall. For example, voting Against & Abstain can be used maliciously against an individual competitor protocol, enabling predictable profitable short margin trades or price drops for profitable spot trades.
The DAO does not conduct Sybil checks. This absence of systems to monitor for Sybil and self-dealing necessitates proposal bundling. When proposals are voted on individually, it creates an opportunity for profitable Sybil attacks and facilitates self-dealing. On the other hand, bundling aligns interests; it becomes highly implausible for many attacks to affect the entire bundle without being obvious and unprofitable.
Preliminary network analysis of STIP round one, shows self-dealing happens. A delegate, not MUX, who openly opposed and voted against a particular protocol, has profited from trading(last day of STIP voting) the token of the protocol they both, openly advocated against & voted against. Individual proposals cater to self-interest when there are no systems to conduct Sybil & self-dealing checks.
Finally, I agree that certain projects ought to be excluded, but on verifiable, testable, objective values regarding security and trust. For instance, hypothetically, if they deploy into production unaudited contracts, omit critical information from incentives proposals or finger prints link to a sybil attack.
Which projects do you expect to initiate "sybil-attacks"?
MUX voted "For" for many of the proposals included in the backfund proposal during round 1 if you checked the record. Voting "Agansit" doesn't mean we are not supporting some of these proposals, since I have indicated in every comment so far that MUX delegates would love to support many individual proposals included in this bundle, but the delegates can’t seem to all align with the bundle backfund approach.
As an aggregator, MUX's proposal has always been using the grant toward 4 perps protocols with a combined liquidity depth of $550M+, with the goal of using the grant to cross the fee barrier and onboard more real traders for the ecosystem and multiple protocols. The increased volume will also mean higher income for GLP, GM, gDAI, MUXLP, and all of the protocols and pools built on top of them. Based on this context, the original 9M size was proposed. It would've been more reasonable to include the context than using numbers only to point fingers.
In addition, after realizing the total grant size from all proposals was very high during the review period, MUX was one of the first protocols to voluntarily lower the size to 6M with a 30% drop (one of the highest drop, plus this happened during the review period, not one day before voting period ended :) ), while still keeping the original execution strategy even when that means the campaign will end earlier than expected.
You could have supported many of the protocols with the round 1 stip and voting for those you deemed suitable rather than abstaining.
Now your team deems it necessary to block instead of abstain.
To me this feels like another maneuver to give certain projects a longer runway against their competition.
although MUX delegates would love to support many individual proposals included in this bundle, the delegates can’t seem to all align with the backfund approach and reasonings behind this proposal. Therefore, MUX delegates will vote “Abstain.”
It's important to remember that when MUX first put up their draft for a grant they asked for 9 Million ARB. 9M ARB for a GMX v1 clone that integrated Gains and GMX as an aggregator on top.
Then they abstained for every vote during the STIP. But now they really want to express themselves and deny 21.4M ARB to a group of 26 Protocols.
Curious why an AGAINST vote was submitted now? Did anything materially change since this post? Would appreciate some transparency and what swayed your thoughts.
Edit: I see the comment on Tally now, still would like clarity on what changed.
Question, so for those who are stuck in this voting process, if this vote fails to pass, then we will not get an opportunity to apply for STIP round 2. How do we consider those protocols that might have wanted to make a submission, but are waiting for the results of this vote?
After the original STIP allocation was distributed (mostly uncapped and favoring already massively established projects ahem), there have been plenty of opportunities to contribute to the discussion of this backfund. The results?
Overwhelmingly positive by all those who actually participated in the discussion. I urge the community and our delegates- please don't let this blunder of over expenditure towards a handful of projects be what drives small startups and innovation away. What we see here are the few gate keeping the many.
After the original STIP allocation was distributed (mostly uncapped and favoring already massively established projects ahem), there have been plenty of opportunities to contribute to the discussion of this backfund. The results?
Overwhelmingly positive by all those who actually participated in the discussion. I urge the community and our delegates- please don't let this blunder of over expenditure towards a handful of projects be what drives small startups and innovation away. What we see here are the few gate keeping the many.
Good job, decentralization.
the delegates can’t seem to align with the bundle backfund approach. Several proposals involve strategies that can simply initiate sybil-attack type of transactions that will likely boost transactions when the incentives are live
the delegates can’t seem to align with the bundle backfund approach. Several proposals involve strategies that can simply initiate sybil-attack type of transactions that will likely boost transactions when the incentives are live
If Sybil attacks gaming transactions with STIP incentives are a plausible concern, then Sybil attacks on individual protocol proposal voting should also be considered a concern. The potential for profit is greater with griefing individual protocol proposal voting, as it's not capped by grant size.
If a protocol token can be short margin traded, there is an opportunity for significantly more profit using the ancient Italian gambit (gambetto, before chess), the act of tripping someone with the leg to make them fall. For example, voting Against & Abstain can be used maliciously against an individual competitor protocol, enabling predictable profitable short margin trades or price drops for profitable spot trades.
The DAO does not conduct Sybil checks. This absence of systems to monitor for Sybil and self-dealing necessitates proposal bundling. When proposals are voted on individually, it creates an opportunity for profitable Sybil attacks and facilitates self-dealing. On the other hand, bundling aligns interests; it becomes highly implausible for many attacks to affect the entire bundle without being obvious and unprofitable.
Preliminary network analysis of STIP round one, shows self-dealing happens. A delegate, not MUX, who openly opposed and voted against a particular protocol, has profited from trading(last day of STIP voting) the token of the protocol they both, openly advocated against & voted against. Individual proposals cater to self-interest when there are no systems to conduct Sybil & self-dealing checks.
Finally, I agree that certain projects ought to be excluded, but on verifiable, testable, objective values regarding security and trust. For instance, hypothetically, if they deploy into production unaudited contracts, omit critical information from incentives proposals or finger prints link to a sybil attack.
Which projects do you expect to initiate "sybil-attacks"?
MUX voted "For" for many of the proposals included in the backfund proposal during round 1 if you checked the record. Voting "Agansit" doesn't mean we are not supporting some of these proposals, since I have indicated in every comment so far that MUX delegates would love to support many individual proposals included in this bundle, but the delegates can’t seem to all align with the bundle backfund approach.
As an aggregator, MUX's proposal has always been using the grant toward 4 perps protocols with a combined liquidity depth of $550M+, with the goal of using the grant to cross the fee barrier and onboard more real traders for the ecosystem and multiple protocols. The increased volume will also mean higher income for GLP, GM, gDAI, MUXLP, and all of the protocols and pools built on top of them. Based on this context, the original 9M size was proposed. It would've been more reasonable to include the context than using numbers only to point fingers.
In addition, after realizing the total grant size from all proposals was very high during the review period, MUX was one of the first protocols to voluntarily lower the size to 6M with a 30% drop (one of the highest drop, plus this happened during the review period, not one day before voting period ended :) ), while still keeping the original execution strategy even when that means the campaign will end earlier than expected.
You could have supported many of the protocols with the round 1 stip and voting for those you deemed suitable rather than abstaining.
Now your team deems it necessary to block instead of abstain.
To me this feels like another maneuver to give certain projects a longer runway against their competition.
although MUX delegates would love to support many individual proposals included in this bundle, the delegates can’t seem to all align with the backfund approach and reasonings behind this proposal. Therefore, MUX delegates will vote “Abstain.”
It's important to remember that when MUX first put up their draft for a grant they asked for 9 Million ARB. 9M ARB for a GMX v1 clone that integrated Gains and GMX as an aggregator on top.
Then they abstained for every vote during the STIP. But now they really want to express themselves and deny 21.4M ARB to a group of 26 Protocols.
Curious why an AGAINST vote was submitted now? Did anything materially change since this post? Would appreciate some transparency and what swayed your thoughts.
Edit: I see the comment on Tally now, still would like clarity on what changed.
Question, so for those who are stuck in this voting process, if this vote fails to pass, then we will not get an opportunity to apply for STIP round 2. How do we consider those protocols that might have wanted to make a submission, but are waiting for the results of this vote?
After the original STIP allocation was distributed (mostly uncapped and favoring already massively established projects ahem), there have been plenty of opportunities to contribute to the discussion of this backfund. The results?
Overwhelmingly positive by all those who actually participated in the discussion. I urge the community and our delegates- please don't let this blunder of over expenditure towards a handful of projects be what drives small startups and innovation away. What we see here are the few gate keeping the many.
After the original STIP allocation was distributed (mostly uncapped and favoring already massively established projects ahem), there have been plenty of opportunities to contribute to the discussion of this backfund. The results?
Overwhelmingly positive by all those who actually participated in the discussion. I urge the community and our delegates- please don't let this blunder of over expenditure towards a handful of projects be what drives small startups and innovation away. What we see here are the few gate keeping the many.
Good job, decentralization.
although MUX delegates would love to support many individual proposals included in this bundle, the delegates can’t seem to all align with the backfund approach and reasonings behind this proposal. Therefore, MUX delegates will vote “Abstain.”
Mostly because of these reasons that were indicated in the original comment:
The 25+ proposals in this backfund bundle have mixed quality; some are worthy of support, while some are questionable, considering the protocol fundamentals, incentives execution strategies, and actual grant requested.
It would be more reasonable to have the proposals being voted on individually in a round 2 type of event instead of binding all the proposals together.
The term “inclusion” was used frequently in this conversation to back up the intention. However, it seems the phrase has been used to dodge the fact that the original grant size was set according to supply & demand + DAO treasury fund management concerns instead of being “exclusive”.
Round 1 was made possible by DAO members advocating for a framework so more protocols and builders who are building projects with solid fundamentals and clear benefits to the ecosystem can be supported. Some of the claims that tried to twist the original intention in this forum thread are a bit sickening to see.
Passing the quorum wasn’t a solid reason to back up the claim for a “guaranteed” grant; Passing the quorum + making it to the cutoff line was, given the fact that the VOTED size for the first STIP was 50M.
We hope the backfund attempt won’t become a recurring behavior that will always happen after all STIP types of events
Although MUX delegates would love to support many individual proposals included in this bundle, the delegates can’t seem to align with the bundle backfund approach. Several proposals involve strategies that can simply initiate sybil-attack type of transactions that will likely boost transactions when the incentives are live, and then the majority of the "ingenuine" addresses will leave after the incentives run out. We simply won't want to see that happen cuz that will waste DAO funds for nothing. Again, we would love to support many individual proposals included in the backfund proposal, and would have been ideal if it were individual voting.
I keep seeing point 4 about certain groups making compromises like that's a bad thing. One of the main reasons why so many projects didn't get funded even after making quorum is because of the percentage of the pie certain projects received in the first place. We would have the same problem of all these projects not getting funded if they hadn't made those compromises so it's a non point.
Gm everyone
As Alex and the gang at Savvy know, we were not always in favor of this backfund proposal over at Serious People. We tend to be extremely conservative in our approach to token emissions or token spends of any kind. We have developed our entire research methodology around trying to maximize the dollar value that a protocol can receive in return for every token that they emit or spend.
Gm everyone
As Alex and the gang at Savvy know, we were not always in favor of this backfund proposal over at Serious People. We tend to be extremely conservative in our approach to token emissions or token spends of any kind. We have developed our entire research methodology around trying to maximize the dollar value that a protocol can receive in return for every token that they emit or spend.
With that particular framework in mind alone we were weary of the STIP in the first place, and especially wear about increasing the size of something that we already were not necessarily in favor of.
However, after countless conversations with delegates, protocols, the team at Savvy and others, and joining several working calls, I am pleased to say that our opinion has been changed. While we are still firmly of the belief that there are more efficient ways of spending tokens in regards to the dollars that one can get in return, we have come around for a couple of reasons.
The optics of this are very important. Builders and web3 enthusiasts are looking across the crypto landscape at various ecosystems in order to decide where they want to spend their time building or deploying their capital. By funding a significantly larger sample size of protocols, especially the smaller ones, Arbitrum positions itself to attract more and more builders and therefore more and more users.
There is an unlock coming in March that nearly 2Xes the token supply overnight. Over a billion tokens are being unlocked and the 50M-71M STIP funding is a mere drop in the bucket in comparison. With this unlock in mind in it imperative that the DAO does what it can to stimulate enough interest in the ecosystem that we are adequately prepared for that unlock in terms of buy-side liquidity.
We have collaborated with several different individuals and teams to analyze the price impact of the STIP and subsequent backfund + even a round 2. The conclusions that we have come to suggest that the $ARB token is far more resilient than we had previously given it credit for. We still contest that $ARB's on-chain liquidity profile is far from perfect, its centralized liquidity is stalwart for now.
In conclusion, Serious People, Inc. stands behind and in full support of this proposal.
Reviewing the community's perspectives on our proposal to backfund STIP projects, it's encouraging to see a consensus around the importance of innovation and diversification in the Arbitrum ecosystem. As an applicant seeking support from the Arbitrum Foundation, we resonate with these values. We believe that such initiatives can significantly contribute to a more robust and interconnected network, fostering not only technological advancement but also commercial growth. This approach aligns perfectly with the ethos of decentralized finance, paving the way for a stronger, more dynamic ecosystem.
"We strongly support the inclusion of more for the biggest protocols - we wouldve asked for more"
guh. I mean sorry - but the implication that it wouldve resulted in just more funds going to the biggest protocol is precisely what I mean about the trend against diversity here.
This is reasonable. I believe that a Back-fund proposal has more disadvantages than advantages. Well-thought-out Round 2 is a much better solution. Many mistakes made during STIP 1 could be avoided (they should be), and the whole process could be done rather quickly. Projects could get grants as early as January, so there is little advantage to rushing with the back-fund proposal on that front. Yes, projects would have to go through an additional round of voting (and all the stress surrounding it), but I don't see anything wrong there; they failed at the first attempt, but they will improve their proposals and try again. I know many community members don't share my opinion, so maybe it would be best to let delegates decide between Back-fund and Round 2.
First of all, MUX delegates sincerely appreciate all the DAO members who pushed for the productive yet intense STIP program, and we also respect all the efforts that went into this backfund proposal. After internal debates and long discussions, we have decided to vote "Abstain" for this proposal.
Although MUX delegates totally support the idea of having more protocols and builders to be supported, backfunding doesn't seem to be the most reasonable approach:
First of all, MUX delegates sincerely appreciate all the DAO members who pushed for the productive yet intense STIP program, and we also respect all the efforts that went into this backfund proposal. After internal debates and long discussions, we have decided to vote "Abstain" for this proposal.
Although MUX delegates totally support the idea of having more protocols and builders to be supported, backfunding doesn't seem to be the most reasonable approach:
To conclude, although MUX delegates would love to support many individual proposals included in this bundle, the delegates can't seem to all align with the backfund approach and reasonings behind this proposal. Therefore, MUX delegates will vote "Abstain."
Additional Disclaimer: Previously MUX delegates didn't have a chance to participate in the backfund proposal AMA hosted by @SavvyDeFi due to time conflicts, but we listened to the full recording.
As a delegate I would like to assess the merits of each project individually.
While I am in support of fostering diversity in the Arbitrum ecosystem I am not in favour of this "backfund" approach.
As a delegate I would like to assess the merits of each project individually.
I would support a Round 2 where projects who didn't get R1 funding (and others) can apply again or a more streamlined, continuous process with a Collective overseeing grant requests.
If they wanted to be fair and inclusive they could have distributed the first round proportionally to every project that passed quorum.
although MUX delegates would love to support many individual proposals included in this bundle, the delegates can’t seem to all align with the backfund approach and reasonings behind this proposal. Therefore, MUX delegates will vote “Abstain.”
Mostly because of these reasons that were indicated in the original comment:
The 25+ proposals in this backfund bundle have mixed quality; some are worthy of support, while some are questionable, considering the protocol fundamentals, incentives execution strategies, and actual grant requested.
It would be more reasonable to have the proposals being voted on individually in a round 2 type of event instead of binding all the proposals together.
The term “inclusion” was used frequently in this conversation to back up the intention. However, it seems the phrase has been used to dodge the fact that the original grant size was set according to supply & demand + DAO treasury fund management concerns instead of being “exclusive”.
Round 1 was made possible by DAO members advocating for a framework so more protocols and builders who are building projects with solid fundamentals and clear benefits to the ecosystem can be supported. Some of the claims that tried to twist the original intention in this forum thread are a bit sickening to see.
Passing the quorum wasn’t a solid reason to back up the claim for a “guaranteed” grant; Passing the quorum + making it to the cutoff line was, given the fact that the VOTED size for the first STIP was 50M.
We hope the backfund attempt won’t become a recurring behavior that will always happen after all STIP types of events
Although MUX delegates would love to support many individual proposals included in this bundle, the delegates can’t seem to align with the bundle backfund approach. Several proposals involve strategies that can simply initiate sybil-attack type of transactions that will likely boost transactions when the incentives are live, and then the majority of the "ingenuine" addresses will leave after the incentives run out. We simply won't want to see that happen cuz that will waste DAO funds for nothing. Again, we would love to support many individual proposals included in the backfund proposal, and would have been ideal if it were individual voting.
I keep seeing point 4 about certain groups making compromises like that's a bad thing. One of the main reasons why so many projects didn't get funded even after making quorum is because of the percentage of the pie certain projects received in the first place. We would have the same problem of all these projects not getting funded if they hadn't made those compromises so it's a non point.
Gm everyone
As Alex and the gang at Savvy know, we were not always in favor of this backfund proposal over at Serious People. We tend to be extremely conservative in our approach to token emissions or token spends of any kind. We have developed our entire research methodology around trying to maximize the dollar value that a protocol can receive in return for every token that they emit or spend.
Gm everyone
As Alex and the gang at Savvy know, we were not always in favor of this backfund proposal over at Serious People. We tend to be extremely conservative in our approach to token emissions or token spends of any kind. We have developed our entire research methodology around trying to maximize the dollar value that a protocol can receive in return for every token that they emit or spend.
With that particular framework in mind alone we were weary of the STIP in the first place, and especially wear about increasing the size of something that we already were not necessarily in favor of.
However, after countless conversations with delegates, protocols, the team at Savvy and others, and joining several working calls, I am pleased to say that our opinion has been changed. While we are still firmly of the belief that there are more efficient ways of spending tokens in regards to the dollars that one can get in return, we have come around for a couple of reasons.
The optics of this are very important. Builders and web3 enthusiasts are looking across the crypto landscape at various ecosystems in order to decide where they want to spend their time building or deploying their capital. By funding a significantly larger sample size of protocols, especially the smaller ones, Arbitrum positions itself to attract more and more builders and therefore more and more users.
There is an unlock coming in March that nearly 2Xes the token supply overnight. Over a billion tokens are being unlocked and the 50M-71M STIP funding is a mere drop in the bucket in comparison. With this unlock in mind in it imperative that the DAO does what it can to stimulate enough interest in the ecosystem that we are adequately prepared for that unlock in terms of buy-side liquidity.
We have collaborated with several different individuals and teams to analyze the price impact of the STIP and subsequent backfund + even a round 2. The conclusions that we have come to suggest that the $ARB token is far more resilient than we had previously given it credit for. We still contest that $ARB's on-chain liquidity profile is far from perfect, its centralized liquidity is stalwart for now.
In conclusion, Serious People, Inc. stands behind and in full support of this proposal.
Reviewing the community's perspectives on our proposal to backfund STIP projects, it's encouraging to see a consensus around the importance of innovation and diversification in the Arbitrum ecosystem. As an applicant seeking support from the Arbitrum Foundation, we resonate with these values. We believe that such initiatives can significantly contribute to a more robust and interconnected network, fostering not only technological advancement but also commercial growth. This approach aligns perfectly with the ethos of decentralized finance, paving the way for a stronger, more dynamic ecosystem.
"We strongly support the inclusion of more for the biggest protocols - we wouldve asked for more"
guh. I mean sorry - but the implication that it wouldve resulted in just more funds going to the biggest protocol is precisely what I mean about the trend against diversity here.
This is reasonable. I believe that a Back-fund proposal has more disadvantages than advantages. Well-thought-out Round 2 is a much better solution. Many mistakes made during STIP 1 could be avoided (they should be), and the whole process could be done rather quickly. Projects could get grants as early as January, so there is little advantage to rushing with the back-fund proposal on that front. Yes, projects would have to go through an additional round of voting (and all the stress surrounding it), but I don't see anything wrong there; they failed at the first attempt, but they will improve their proposals and try again. I know many community members don't share my opinion, so maybe it would be best to let delegates decide between Back-fund and Round 2.
First of all, MUX delegates sincerely appreciate all the DAO members who pushed for the productive yet intense STIP program, and we also respect all the efforts that went into this backfund proposal. After internal debates and long discussions, we have decided to vote "Abstain" for this proposal.
Although MUX delegates totally support the idea of having more protocols and builders to be supported, backfunding doesn't seem to be the most reasonable approach:
First of all, MUX delegates sincerely appreciate all the DAO members who pushed for the productive yet intense STIP program, and we also respect all the efforts that went into this backfund proposal. After internal debates and long discussions, we have decided to vote "Abstain" for this proposal.
Although MUX delegates totally support the idea of having more protocols and builders to be supported, backfunding doesn't seem to be the most reasonable approach:
To conclude, although MUX delegates would love to support many individual proposals included in this bundle, the delegates can't seem to all align with the backfund approach and reasonings behind this proposal. Therefore, MUX delegates will vote "Abstain."
Additional Disclaimer: Previously MUX delegates didn't have a chance to participate in the backfund proposal AMA hosted by @SavvyDeFi due to time conflicts, but we listened to the full recording.
As a delegate I would like to assess the merits of each project individually.
While I am in support of fostering diversity in the Arbitrum ecosystem I am not in favour of this "backfund" approach.
As a delegate I would like to assess the merits of each project individually.
I would support a Round 2 where projects who didn't get R1 funding (and others) can apply again or a more streamlined, continuous process with a Collective overseeing grant requests.
If they wanted to be fair and inclusive they could have distributed the first round proportionally to every project that passed quorum.
As a delegate I would like to assess the merits of each project individually.
Just want to point out that this has/should have been done during the actual STIP Rd 1. These are all projects that received a majority FOR vote AND met quorum.
Also, a Round 2 working group is/has been formed, and this proposal in no way impacts that. Why should those who were ready and did put the time in for round 1, and as previously mentioned DID obtain the required votes to pass - a taxing task in itself for smaller projects who could better spend their time building their products rather than lobbying delegates - be punished by having to apply again and go through this whole process...
But, I appreciate the response/reasoning. Just think there's been a lot of confusion about this proposal and who it's rewarding.
I mean what Dog said is correct. I feel like what we are seeing here is an attempt to actively prevent protocols from having resources to flourish and thus compete. It really is. The votes speak for themselves as to the projects which should be next in line for funding. Not back funding and going to another round is a way for those who were funded in round 1 to have a shot at pushing out smaller projects again - plain and simple.
Its actually absurd that people could claim to care about diveristy in the Arb ecosystem and then not want to fund a list of the projects which (after those which have just received funding) are the most highly voted for among the community.
I mean what Dog said is correct. I feel like what we are seeing here is an attempt to actively prevent protocols from having resources to flourish and thus compete. It really is. The votes speak for themselves as to the projects which should be next in line for funding. Not back funding and going to another round is a way for those who were funded in round 1 to have a shot at pushing out smaller projects again - plain and simple.
Its actually absurd that people could claim to care about diveristy in the Arb ecosystem and then not want to fund a list of the projects which (after those which have just received funding) are the most highly voted for among the community.
Its actually sad and breaks my heart. With all due respect Arbitrum still has work in progress on the front of decreasing centralisation (https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/state-of-progressive-decentralization), de/centralisation isnt just about the sequencer, its about the state of the ecosystem,. Those against funding the projects which are 1. The most desired after those already funded and 2. Are highly actively contributing to that ecosytem - clearly demonstrate their intention is not to promote diversity but to infact directly mitigate the risks diveristy might pose to them. Of course, this will be sold under the guise of myriad other excuses which people will desperately try to pull out in an attempt to distract from their actual intentions.
Anyone who doesn't realise that we only win if we win together is setting themself up for building an ecosystem on stilts which they then frustratedly cast aside when one of the stilts gets knocked out. Funding diversity - which we have a clear, direct, voted for list - is ensuring that a wider range of users are drawn to Arbitrum, and thus to ALL protocols - including those already funded. This is the only way the ecosystem strengthens. If you want to look back in 2 years time and be like "damn, I see what he meant" please consider your perception of other chains and their diversity.
Look at Cardano - even seeing that name makes you cringe - yes, the tech is different and that might be the reason - its decentral but ultimately its because THERE IS NO ECOSYTEM BEYOND A COUPLE OF PROTOCOLS. If it had an ecosystem of 100s of projects, think of how vastly different the perception would be.
Look at BNB - and maybe that doesn't make you cringe as hard because you might have made money on one of the many projects there - its more DIVERSE but suffers greatly from its lack of decentralisation.
Of course, look at eth. Decentral. Diverse. Loved. Huge -- and not going anywhere. Do we really think that Arbitrum in its present form is the be all and end all of Eth-adjacent chains? There will be in future, other competitor chains which appear - at which point, the tech difference between Arbitrum and a competing chain may be little to even negative When that happens - and you are foolish if you think it never will - the reliance will be upon the diversity of the ecosystem to retain users.
Look at the layer 1s, I think QANplatform has a solid case for being a better L1 than eth - and some people (which doesnt include me) would even say SOL or FTM are. Why do we have a good chuckle when we see that? Because we know from BTC/ETH (make no mistake, the BTC ecosystem is highly diverse, just not on chain) that unseating a diverse chain if done in less than a decade would be a fast deseating. We see chains with ecosystems which aren't diverse be in the top 5 for a little while then drop down to the top 20 as people lose interest. Arb is still only 42. We simply don't have time to be f***ing around and not building the community as big as possible as fast as possible.
I think anyone against backfunding is failing to consider this. If you want to retain users when another chain comes along, you need many reasons for people to stay, not just a couple. The long term consequences will truly be upon the entire chain to bear whether voters realise it or not.
AND the working group for STIP 1 acknowledged this flaw and had backup plans, INCLUDING A BACKFUND
AND the working group for STIP 1 acknowledged this flaw and had backup plans, INCLUDING A BACKFUND
I can't echo these points enough. I do not believe doing a backfund is "altering the passed vote." In fact, it's the most logical thing since there was a clause for it. Anyone claiming otherwise really makes me question a lot of things. If someone voted "FOR" passing the STIP AIP, then using the above argument to vote Against the backfund means they do not agree with the original STIP AIP and are now backtracking.
This new proposal removes the nuance of any review and asks us to simply fund all of them in full on the basis of a backfill.
This new proposal removes the nuance of any review and asks us to simply fund all of them in full on the basis of a backfill.
How does it remove nuance of any review, when the Round 1 STIP was the time to review them individually AND all the projects in this backfunding proposal PASSED with majority AND met quorum.
Everyone can see what is really happening here...
How about instead of focusing on the name calling (which I don't condone) you comment on the relevant points others are making. Round 2 is still in play and there's a working group (which I see you're part of) set up to discuss.
You can't be the top dog and eat all the meat off the bone if you want a vibrant ecosystem on Arbitrum imo
How about instead of focusing on the name calling (which I don't condone) you comment on the relevant points others are making. Round 2 is still in play and there's a working group (which I see you're part of) set up to discuss.
You can't be the top dog and eat all the meat off the bone if you want a vibrant ecosystem on Arbitrum imo
What new protocol is going to build on arb after seeing this STIP governance play out. Rewarding the largest protocols, and leaving the smaller, new projects out to dry (even though they majority passed and met quorum), which is the exact opposite of the intent of the STIP in the first place...
Make it make sense.
Thanks for always elaborating on your votes.
If I may address the points your raised:
To your first point, while the 50m was indeed the planned budget, many large delegates, potentially yourself included, voted FOR on more proposals than would fit the said budget, thus indicating a realization that more than 50m is needed to support all deserving applications.
Thanks for always elaborating on your votes.
If I may address the points your raised:
To your first point, while the 50m was indeed the planned budget, many large delegates, potentially yourself included, voted FOR on more proposals than would fit the said budget, thus indicating a realization that more than 50m is needed to support all deserving applications.
Regarding your second point, it strikes me as pragmatical to execute the backfunding for round 1 without much added friction and then have an independent budget for new entries and round 2.
Pretty clear this is a defensive position for their investment. Delay the stip to ensure some protocols have a longer runway to utilize what they received while other quality projects have to fight for round 2.
I can't see any thoughtful reason to force products that made quorum fight for round two other than to stifle and muddy the waters for other projects. A vote no is a vote for self serving interests and not in the best interests of Arbitrum.
The only people voting against seem to be the same who passed the initial cutoff. Such behavior does not go unnoticed. GMX (coinflip) for example gets 12M and now wants to limit others to 500k. They are anti-Arbitrum.
As just a small remark, i feel like the threeway vote should have never happened. It became de facto a vote for either 25M ARB or more than 25M ARB (represented by the 50M vote) Because 25M had so much traction early on, more frivolous spenders among the delegates decided to opt for 50M and did not want their support be split among the 50M and 75M options. The fact that 75M did not win that vote should not be regarded as a vote against 75M ARB in funding in my honest opinion.
I appreciate your detailed response and your thoughtful analysis of the proposal. You've raised valid points regarding the allocation of funds, and I understand your reservations. However, I'd like to draw your attention to some critical aspects of the "Call to Action for Arbitrum ecosystem" and the proposal itself:
The proposal's core objective is to support a diverse range of emerging builders and create a more inviting environment for new projects within the Arbitrum ecosystem. It also places importance on upholding values of inclusion and avoiding any potential harm to small but promising builders. It would be best to attract more projects to build here because rewards were accurately spread, which is paramount for our ecosystem's growth.
The proposal addresses a significant issue where smaller projects were excluded from the study due to budget constraints. This exclusion can impact the ecosystem's growth and limit our learning. Many projects passed the quorum votes, and the original design was more extensive than 50M ARB.
The backfund proposal is designed to swiftly provide resources and data to support future programs and enhance the Arbitrum ecosystem.
The majority of proposals approved in ST1P were smaller scale sized / newer protocols with grant requests of $1m or under. While I understand how it was difficult for smaller protocols to gain attention so did make their case successfully, many large established protocols (who had no shortage of attention) finally didn’t qualify IMHO partly over concerns on the grant applications (size, means of distribution, alignment with Arbitrum).
As a delegate I would like to assess the merits of each project individually.
Just want to point out that this has/should have been done during the actual STIP Rd 1. These are all projects that received a majority FOR vote AND met quorum.
Also, a Round 2 working group is/has been formed, and this proposal in no way impacts that. Why should those who were ready and did put the time in for round 1, and as previously mentioned DID obtain the required votes to pass - a taxing task in itself for smaller projects who could better spend their time building their products rather than lobbying delegates - be punished by having to apply again and go through this whole process...
But, I appreciate the response/reasoning. Just think there's been a lot of confusion about this proposal and who it's rewarding.
I mean what Dog said is correct. I feel like what we are seeing here is an attempt to actively prevent protocols from having resources to flourish and thus compete. It really is. The votes speak for themselves as to the projects which should be next in line for funding. Not back funding and going to another round is a way for those who were funded in round 1 to have a shot at pushing out smaller projects again - plain and simple.
Its actually absurd that people could claim to care about diveristy in the Arb ecosystem and then not want to fund a list of the projects which (after those which have just received funding) are the most highly voted for among the community.
I mean what Dog said is correct. I feel like what we are seeing here is an attempt to actively prevent protocols from having resources to flourish and thus compete. It really is. The votes speak for themselves as to the projects which should be next in line for funding. Not back funding and going to another round is a way for those who were funded in round 1 to have a shot at pushing out smaller projects again - plain and simple.
Its actually absurd that people could claim to care about diveristy in the Arb ecosystem and then not want to fund a list of the projects which (after those which have just received funding) are the most highly voted for among the community.
Its actually sad and breaks my heart. With all due respect Arbitrum still has work in progress on the front of decreasing centralisation (https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/state-of-progressive-decentralization), de/centralisation isnt just about the sequencer, its about the state of the ecosystem,. Those against funding the projects which are 1. The most desired after those already funded and 2. Are highly actively contributing to that ecosytem - clearly demonstrate their intention is not to promote diversity but to infact directly mitigate the risks diveristy might pose to them. Of course, this will be sold under the guise of myriad other excuses which people will desperately try to pull out in an attempt to distract from their actual intentions.
Anyone who doesn't realise that we only win if we win together is setting themself up for building an ecosystem on stilts which they then frustratedly cast aside when one of the stilts gets knocked out. Funding diversity - which we have a clear, direct, voted for list - is ensuring that a wider range of users are drawn to Arbitrum, and thus to ALL protocols - including those already funded. This is the only way the ecosystem strengthens. If you want to look back in 2 years time and be like "damn, I see what he meant" please consider your perception of other chains and their diversity.
Look at Cardano - even seeing that name makes you cringe - yes, the tech is different and that might be the reason - its decentral but ultimately its because THERE IS NO ECOSYTEM BEYOND A COUPLE OF PROTOCOLS. If it had an ecosystem of 100s of projects, think of how vastly different the perception would be.
Look at BNB - and maybe that doesn't make you cringe as hard because you might have made money on one of the many projects there - its more DIVERSE but suffers greatly from its lack of decentralisation.
Of course, look at eth. Decentral. Diverse. Loved. Huge -- and not going anywhere. Do we really think that Arbitrum in its present form is the be all and end all of Eth-adjacent chains? There will be in future, other competitor chains which appear - at which point, the tech difference between Arbitrum and a competing chain may be little to even negative When that happens - and you are foolish if you think it never will - the reliance will be upon the diversity of the ecosystem to retain users.
Look at the layer 1s, I think QANplatform has a solid case for being a better L1 than eth - and some people (which doesnt include me) would even say SOL or FTM are. Why do we have a good chuckle when we see that? Because we know from BTC/ETH (make no mistake, the BTC ecosystem is highly diverse, just not on chain) that unseating a diverse chain if done in less than a decade would be a fast deseating. We see chains with ecosystems which aren't diverse be in the top 5 for a little while then drop down to the top 20 as people lose interest. Arb is still only 42. We simply don't have time to be f***ing around and not building the community as big as possible as fast as possible.
I think anyone against backfunding is failing to consider this. If you want to retain users when another chain comes along, you need many reasons for people to stay, not just a couple. The long term consequences will truly be upon the entire chain to bear whether voters realise it or not.
AND the working group for STIP 1 acknowledged this flaw and had backup plans, INCLUDING A BACKFUND
AND the working group for STIP 1 acknowledged this flaw and had backup plans, INCLUDING A BACKFUND
I can't echo these points enough. I do not believe doing a backfund is "altering the passed vote." In fact, it's the most logical thing since there was a clause for it. Anyone claiming otherwise really makes me question a lot of things. If someone voted "FOR" passing the STIP AIP, then using the above argument to vote Against the backfund means they do not agree with the original STIP AIP and are now backtracking.
This new proposal removes the nuance of any review and asks us to simply fund all of them in full on the basis of a backfill.
This new proposal removes the nuance of any review and asks us to simply fund all of them in full on the basis of a backfill.
How does it remove nuance of any review, when the Round 1 STIP was the time to review them individually AND all the projects in this backfunding proposal PASSED with majority AND met quorum.
Everyone can see what is really happening here...
How about instead of focusing on the name calling (which I don't condone) you comment on the relevant points others are making. Round 2 is still in play and there's a working group (which I see you're part of) set up to discuss.
You can't be the top dog and eat all the meat off the bone if you want a vibrant ecosystem on Arbitrum imo
How about instead of focusing on the name calling (which I don't condone) you comment on the relevant points others are making. Round 2 is still in play and there's a working group (which I see you're part of) set up to discuss.
You can't be the top dog and eat all the meat off the bone if you want a vibrant ecosystem on Arbitrum imo
What new protocol is going to build on arb after seeing this STIP governance play out. Rewarding the largest protocols, and leaving the smaller, new projects out to dry (even though they majority passed and met quorum), which is the exact opposite of the intent of the STIP in the first place...
Make it make sense.
Thanks for always elaborating on your votes.
If I may address the points your raised:
To your first point, while the 50m was indeed the planned budget, many large delegates, potentially yourself included, voted FOR on more proposals than would fit the said budget, thus indicating a realization that more than 50m is needed to support all deserving applications.
Thanks for always elaborating on your votes.
If I may address the points your raised:
To your first point, while the 50m was indeed the planned budget, many large delegates, potentially yourself included, voted FOR on more proposals than would fit the said budget, thus indicating a realization that more than 50m is needed to support all deserving applications.
Regarding your second point, it strikes me as pragmatical to execute the backfunding for round 1 without much added friction and then have an independent budget for new entries and round 2.
Pretty clear this is a defensive position for their investment. Delay the stip to ensure some protocols have a longer runway to utilize what they received while other quality projects have to fight for round 2.
I can't see any thoughtful reason to force products that made quorum fight for round two other than to stifle and muddy the waters for other projects. A vote no is a vote for self serving interests and not in the best interests of Arbitrum.
The only people voting against seem to be the same who passed the initial cutoff. Such behavior does not go unnoticed. GMX (coinflip) for example gets 12M and now wants to limit others to 500k. They are anti-Arbitrum.
As just a small remark, i feel like the threeway vote should have never happened. It became de facto a vote for either 25M ARB or more than 25M ARB (represented by the 50M vote) Because 25M had so much traction early on, more frivolous spenders among the delegates decided to opt for 50M and did not want their support be split among the 50M and 75M options. The fact that 75M did not win that vote should not be regarded as a vote against 75M ARB in funding in my honest opinion.
I appreciate your detailed response and your thoughtful analysis of the proposal. You've raised valid points regarding the allocation of funds, and I understand your reservations. However, I'd like to draw your attention to some critical aspects of the "Call to Action for Arbitrum ecosystem" and the proposal itself:
The proposal's core objective is to support a diverse range of emerging builders and create a more inviting environment for new projects within the Arbitrum ecosystem. It also places importance on upholding values of inclusion and avoiding any potential harm to small but promising builders. It would be best to attract more projects to build here because rewards were accurately spread, which is paramount for our ecosystem's growth.
The proposal addresses a significant issue where smaller projects were excluded from the study due to budget constraints. This exclusion can impact the ecosystem's growth and limit our learning. Many projects passed the quorum votes, and the original design was more extensive than 50M ARB.
The backfund proposal is designed to swiftly provide resources and data to support future programs and enhance the Arbitrum ecosystem.
The majority of proposals approved in ST1P were smaller scale sized / newer protocols with grant requests of $1m or under. While I understand how it was difficult for smaller protocols to gain attention so did make their case successfully, many large established protocols (who had no shortage of attention) finally didn’t qualify IMHO partly over concerns on the grant applications (size, means of distribution, alignment with Arbitrum).
I appreciate your detailed response and your thoughtful analysis of the proposal. You've raised valid points regarding the allocation of funds, and I understand your reservations. However, I'd like to draw your attention to some critical aspects of the "Call to Action for Arbitrum ecosystem" and the proposal itself:
The proposal's core objective is to support a diverse range of emerging builders and create a more inviting environment for new projects within the Arbitrum ecosystem. It also places importance on upholding values of inclusion and avoiding any potential harm to small but promising builders. It would be best to attract more projects to build here because rewards were accurately spread, which is paramount for our ecosystem's growth.
The proposal addresses a significant issue where smaller projects were excluded from the study due to budget constraints. This exclusion can impact the ecosystem's growth and limit our learning. Many projects passed the quorum votes, and the original design was more extensive than 50M ARB.
The backfund proposal is designed to swiftly provide resources and data to support future programs and enhance the Arbitrum ecosystem.
While I acknowledge your support for Round 2, it's essential to consider the immediate opportunities and benefits that the backfund proposal can bring now which is pivotal for Arbitrum's growth. It has the potential to bridge the gap for smaller projects and contribute significantly to the overall development of our ecosystem.
It is fair to say that several projects sought disproportionate amounts of ARB that would not provide as much ROI to Arbitrum and would not result from a net new amount of users and capital.
The majority of proposals approved in ST1P were smaller scale sized / newer protocols with grant requests of $1m or under. While I understand how it was difficult for smaller protocols to gain attention so did make their case successfully, many large established protocols (who had no shortage of attention) finally didn’t qualify IMHO partly over concerns on the grant applications (size, means of distribution, alignment with Arbitrum).
This seems like an odd thing to say since in the original STIP, 50M ARB got distributed to only 30 projects meaning that the average project grant was 1.67M ARB. In comparison, this backfund asks for a distribution of 21.4M ARB to 26 protocols or 0.82M ARB per protocol on average. So to make the claim that this backfund, where the grants are on average half the size of the original STIP grants, would fund too many protocols that demand a too large size of a grant seems an odd claim to make.
It becomes even more peculiar when one takes into account that this concern of too large grant sizes is being being expressed by the protocol that took a 12M ARB grant for itself, almost a quarter of the original STIP allocation.
Furthermore, I would like to note that each grant proposal already got assessed individually and received support from the Arbitrum delegations to the extent of passing quorum. So I also don't quite follow you on that point.
To be honest, this feels a bit as if this vote, comment and future intent to publish a round 2 proposal in the coming days, is a deliberate move to make Arbitrum into a walled garden where only a certain number of established entities are well nourished instead of letting the ecosystem expand and flourish freely by maintaining a level playing field amongst all participants.
"As we consider allocating over 20 million ARB to a specific set of proposals, I express concern. This significant approval differs from enabling frameworks or reviewing grant applications individually through delegates, committees or grant programs. This new proposal removes the nuance of any review and asks us to simply fund all of them in full on the basis of a backfill."
The protocols to be backfilled reached quorum. How can the above thought process exist when they have all been reviewed by the DAO and achieved quorum?
Your comment presents a thoughtful perspective on the STIP 1 grant allocation process and the proposed Round 2. However, there are several underlying biases and contradictions in your argument worth addressing.
Firstly, your emphasis on the challenges faced by larger, established protocols in the STIP 1 grant process, while understanding the need for smaller protocols to gain attention, seems to inadvertently lean towards a more selective approach that could favor established entities. This stance inherently supports increasing the barriers of entry for emerging protocols, which contradicts the decentralized and inclusive ethos that many DAOs, including those associated with Arbitrum, strive to uphold. By advocating for larger grants to already well-established protocols, you seem to be favoring a more monopolistic approach under the guise of alignment with Arbitrum's interests.
Your comment presents a thoughtful perspective on the STIP 1 grant allocation process and the proposed Round 2. However, there are several underlying biases and contradictions in your argument worth addressing.
Firstly, your emphasis on the challenges faced by larger, established protocols in the STIP 1 grant process, while understanding the need for smaller protocols to gain attention, seems to inadvertently lean towards a more selective approach that could favor established entities. This stance inherently supports increasing the barriers of entry for emerging protocols, which contradicts the decentralized and inclusive ethos that many DAOs, including those associated with Arbitrum, strive to uphold. By advocating for larger grants to already well-established protocols, you seem to be favoring a more monopolistic approach under the guise of alignment with Arbitrum's interests.
Secondly, while you voice support for a Round 2 of STIP and acknowledge the importance of diversity in grant allocation, your actions suggest otherwise. You fail to mention that you have not joined the open group working on Round 2, preferring instead to work on a separate proposal in a more controlled, closed group setting. This choice raises questions about your commitment to inclusivity and transparency, core principles of DAO governance. It appears that you prefer a scenario where you can exert more influence over the outcome, which might not align with the broader community's interests.
The concern about resource allocation limiting the possibility of a Round 2 is valid. However, it's crucial to balance immediate needs with long-term strategies. The backfill proposal aims to address immediate gaps, while Round 2 is about future opportunities. The DAO needs to consider both without unduly favoring one over the other.
Your call for support for the initiation of a Round 2, independent of specific proposals, is indeed commendable albeit superficial. However, it's important that this support not be used to undermine current initiatives that also hold value for the community. A more balanced approach would be to advocate for efficient resource allocation that accommodates both the backfill proposal and the potential for a robust Round 2.
In conclusion, while your insights into the grant allocation process are valuable, it's important to reflect on how your preferences and actions may inadvertently promote a less inclusive, more monopolistic approach. True support for the community involves embracing diversity, transparency, and equal opportunities for both established and emerging protocols.
Hi all, Blue representing the Trader Joe Governance Committee.
We have cast our vote in favor of supporting the backfund with the reasons detailed below. There are, however, concerns on the implications of this backfund that need to be carefully thought about in the next steps for this proposal.
Our internal voting:
Hi all, Blue representing the Trader Joe Governance Committee.
We have cast our vote in favor of supporting the backfund with the reasons detailed below. There are, however, concerns on the implications of this backfund that need to be carefully thought about in the next steps for this proposal.
Our internal voting:
The Trader Joe Governance Committee have therefore voted in favor of supporting an additional 21.4 million ARB to be distributed among 26 more projects, thereby extending the STIP to encompass 56 projects in total. Our key reasons voting favor of supporting this are:
However, in the spirit of constructive feedback and transparency, we also wish to address the reasons why a vote against the backfund could be considered:
In conclusion, while we have voted in favor of the backfund with the intention of fostering growth and inclusivity, we also recognize a number of above highlighted concerns.
We hope this feedback will be valuable for the proposal's next steps and for the ongoing growth and development of the Arbitrum ecosystem and how the DAO operates.
As one of the projects that would receive funding (Furucombo) if this were to pass, it's in our best interests to align with this proposal, but there are some very good points of of consideration while trying to be unbiased.
As one of the projects that would receive funding (Furucombo) if this were to pass, it's in our best interests to align with this proposal, but there are some very good points of of consideration while trying to be unbiased.
Just a few comments from myself, appreciate all the time and dedication everyone has taken towards this discussion, its fantastic to see regardless of how the proposal shapes up.
@AlexLumley has done a great job assembling a team to work on a STIP round 2 proposal, alongside the backfund proposal.
Although I agree with you @mint_cloud that the backfund proposal is not inclusive enough and would be more in favor of something that gives others a chance to apply for, I agree with @AlexLumley that there is room for both programs.
@AlexLumley has done a great job assembling a team to work on a STIP round 2 proposal, alongside the backfund proposal.
Although I agree with you @mint_cloud that the backfund proposal is not inclusive enough and would be more in favor of something that gives others a chance to apply for, I agree with @AlexLumley that there is room for both programs.
Regardless, I urge you to reach out to Alex so you can become more involved with the STIP round 2 proposal.
PancakeSwap supports this proposal to backfund the approved but not funded Round 1 projects of the Arbitrum STIP. Diversifying the list of projects that receive a STIP grant, especially for smaller players, is crucial to continue making Arbitrum a great L2.
I voiced my concerns related to delaying STIP extension in post below, I do support back-funding proposal efforts led by SavvyDAO. I'm also aware of Sushi and SavyyDAO contributions to drafting round 2 funding proposal to support all projects that were not included in previous rounds and those that can't afford extra man power to lobby delegates or follow governance process but are very valuable to Arbitrum ecosystem in terms of their KPIs ( ex. Hegic ) I command all the teams efforts that fight for projects that can't voice themselves. It's truly shameful to see protocols that got funded in round 1, some are also major delegates, but don't see urgency how their lack of action can have a destructive impact on entire ecosystem.
Agree with this perspective. Hopefully our proposal (and many other projects) will have a chance to get voting from the community through a round 2.
By concentrating exclusively on round 1 applicants for the extended budget, we might unintentionally sideline potential candidates who were gearing up for round 2 or those who missed the first round. It’s imperative to ensure adaptability in our approach. Delegates and ARB token holders, after observing the outcomes of round 1 allocations, might have a renewed perspective on which projects truly merit the funding. Their evaluation criteria might have evolved, or they may now identify a previously overlooked candidate as more deserving.
I thought this was being discussed in https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/extension-of-arbitrum-s-short-term-incentive-program/18800/
As stated there I will vote against it as I believe we should Option 1: Continue with round 2. Continue with the existing program structure where we hold a round 2, everyone from round 1 who had not qualified can retry in round 2. Supporters - @limes @DanThales @mint_cloud @deBridge
I support this proposal where all of these projects already met the requirement of STIP-1.
I appreciate your detailed response and your thoughtful analysis of the proposal. You've raised valid points regarding the allocation of funds, and I understand your reservations. However, I'd like to draw your attention to some critical aspects of the "Call to Action for Arbitrum ecosystem" and the proposal itself:
The proposal's core objective is to support a diverse range of emerging builders and create a more inviting environment for new projects within the Arbitrum ecosystem. It also places importance on upholding values of inclusion and avoiding any potential harm to small but promising builders. It would be best to attract more projects to build here because rewards were accurately spread, which is paramount for our ecosystem's growth.
The proposal addresses a significant issue where smaller projects were excluded from the study due to budget constraints. This exclusion can impact the ecosystem's growth and limit our learning. Many projects passed the quorum votes, and the original design was more extensive than 50M ARB.
The backfund proposal is designed to swiftly provide resources and data to support future programs and enhance the Arbitrum ecosystem.
While I acknowledge your support for Round 2, it's essential to consider the immediate opportunities and benefits that the backfund proposal can bring now which is pivotal for Arbitrum's growth. It has the potential to bridge the gap for smaller projects and contribute significantly to the overall development of our ecosystem.
It is fair to say that several projects sought disproportionate amounts of ARB that would not provide as much ROI to Arbitrum and would not result from a net new amount of users and capital.
The majority of proposals approved in ST1P were smaller scale sized / newer protocols with grant requests of $1m or under. While I understand how it was difficult for smaller protocols to gain attention so did make their case successfully, many large established protocols (who had no shortage of attention) finally didn’t qualify IMHO partly over concerns on the grant applications (size, means of distribution, alignment with Arbitrum).
This seems like an odd thing to say since in the original STIP, 50M ARB got distributed to only 30 projects meaning that the average project grant was 1.67M ARB. In comparison, this backfund asks for a distribution of 21.4M ARB to 26 protocols or 0.82M ARB per protocol on average. So to make the claim that this backfund, where the grants are on average half the size of the original STIP grants, would fund too many protocols that demand a too large size of a grant seems an odd claim to make.
It becomes even more peculiar when one takes into account that this concern of too large grant sizes is being being expressed by the protocol that took a 12M ARB grant for itself, almost a quarter of the original STIP allocation.
Furthermore, I would like to note that each grant proposal already got assessed individually and received support from the Arbitrum delegations to the extent of passing quorum. So I also don't quite follow you on that point.
To be honest, this feels a bit as if this vote, comment and future intent to publish a round 2 proposal in the coming days, is a deliberate move to make Arbitrum into a walled garden where only a certain number of established entities are well nourished instead of letting the ecosystem expand and flourish freely by maintaining a level playing field amongst all participants.
"As we consider allocating over 20 million ARB to a specific set of proposals, I express concern. This significant approval differs from enabling frameworks or reviewing grant applications individually through delegates, committees or grant programs. This new proposal removes the nuance of any review and asks us to simply fund all of them in full on the basis of a backfill."
The protocols to be backfilled reached quorum. How can the above thought process exist when they have all been reviewed by the DAO and achieved quorum?
Your comment presents a thoughtful perspective on the STIP 1 grant allocation process and the proposed Round 2. However, there are several underlying biases and contradictions in your argument worth addressing.
Firstly, your emphasis on the challenges faced by larger, established protocols in the STIP 1 grant process, while understanding the need for smaller protocols to gain attention, seems to inadvertently lean towards a more selective approach that could favor established entities. This stance inherently supports increasing the barriers of entry for emerging protocols, which contradicts the decentralized and inclusive ethos that many DAOs, including those associated with Arbitrum, strive to uphold. By advocating for larger grants to already well-established protocols, you seem to be favoring a more monopolistic approach under the guise of alignment with Arbitrum's interests.
Your comment presents a thoughtful perspective on the STIP 1 grant allocation process and the proposed Round 2. However, there are several underlying biases and contradictions in your argument worth addressing.
Firstly, your emphasis on the challenges faced by larger, established protocols in the STIP 1 grant process, while understanding the need for smaller protocols to gain attention, seems to inadvertently lean towards a more selective approach that could favor established entities. This stance inherently supports increasing the barriers of entry for emerging protocols, which contradicts the decentralized and inclusive ethos that many DAOs, including those associated with Arbitrum, strive to uphold. By advocating for larger grants to already well-established protocols, you seem to be favoring a more monopolistic approach under the guise of alignment with Arbitrum's interests.
Secondly, while you voice support for a Round 2 of STIP and acknowledge the importance of diversity in grant allocation, your actions suggest otherwise. You fail to mention that you have not joined the open group working on Round 2, preferring instead to work on a separate proposal in a more controlled, closed group setting. This choice raises questions about your commitment to inclusivity and transparency, core principles of DAO governance. It appears that you prefer a scenario where you can exert more influence over the outcome, which might not align with the broader community's interests.
The concern about resource allocation limiting the possibility of a Round 2 is valid. However, it's crucial to balance immediate needs with long-term strategies. The backfill proposal aims to address immediate gaps, while Round 2 is about future opportunities. The DAO needs to consider both without unduly favoring one over the other.
Your call for support for the initiation of a Round 2, independent of specific proposals, is indeed commendable albeit superficial. However, it's important that this support not be used to undermine current initiatives that also hold value for the community. A more balanced approach would be to advocate for efficient resource allocation that accommodates both the backfill proposal and the potential for a robust Round 2.
In conclusion, while your insights into the grant allocation process are valuable, it's important to reflect on how your preferences and actions may inadvertently promote a less inclusive, more monopolistic approach. True support for the community involves embracing diversity, transparency, and equal opportunities for both established and emerging protocols.
Hi all, Blue representing the Trader Joe Governance Committee.
We have cast our vote in favor of supporting the backfund with the reasons detailed below. There are, however, concerns on the implications of this backfund that need to be carefully thought about in the next steps for this proposal.
Our internal voting:
Hi all, Blue representing the Trader Joe Governance Committee.
We have cast our vote in favor of supporting the backfund with the reasons detailed below. There are, however, concerns on the implications of this backfund that need to be carefully thought about in the next steps for this proposal.
Our internal voting:
The Trader Joe Governance Committee have therefore voted in favor of supporting an additional 21.4 million ARB to be distributed among 26 more projects, thereby extending the STIP to encompass 56 projects in total. Our key reasons voting favor of supporting this are:
However, in the spirit of constructive feedback and transparency, we also wish to address the reasons why a vote against the backfund could be considered:
In conclusion, while we have voted in favor of the backfund with the intention of fostering growth and inclusivity, we also recognize a number of above highlighted concerns.
We hope this feedback will be valuable for the proposal's next steps and for the ongoing growth and development of the Arbitrum ecosystem and how the DAO operates.
As one of the projects that would receive funding (Furucombo) if this were to pass, it's in our best interests to align with this proposal, but there are some very good points of of consideration while trying to be unbiased.
As one of the projects that would receive funding (Furucombo) if this were to pass, it's in our best interests to align with this proposal, but there are some very good points of of consideration while trying to be unbiased.
Just a few comments from myself, appreciate all the time and dedication everyone has taken towards this discussion, its fantastic to see regardless of how the proposal shapes up.
@AlexLumley has done a great job assembling a team to work on a STIP round 2 proposal, alongside the backfund proposal.
Although I agree with you @mint_cloud that the backfund proposal is not inclusive enough and would be more in favor of something that gives others a chance to apply for, I agree with @AlexLumley that there is room for both programs.
@AlexLumley has done a great job assembling a team to work on a STIP round 2 proposal, alongside the backfund proposal.
Although I agree with you @mint_cloud that the backfund proposal is not inclusive enough and would be more in favor of something that gives others a chance to apply for, I agree with @AlexLumley that there is room for both programs.
Regardless, I urge you to reach out to Alex so you can become more involved with the STIP round 2 proposal.
PancakeSwap supports this proposal to backfund the approved but not funded Round 1 projects of the Arbitrum STIP. Diversifying the list of projects that receive a STIP grant, especially for smaller players, is crucial to continue making Arbitrum a great L2.
I voiced my concerns related to delaying STIP extension in post below, I do support back-funding proposal efforts led by SavvyDAO. I'm also aware of Sushi and SavyyDAO contributions to drafting round 2 funding proposal to support all projects that were not included in previous rounds and those that can't afford extra man power to lobby delegates or follow governance process but are very valuable to Arbitrum ecosystem in terms of their KPIs ( ex. Hegic ) I command all the teams efforts that fight for projects that can't voice themselves. It's truly shameful to see protocols that got funded in round 1, some are also major delegates, but don't see urgency how their lack of action can have a destructive impact on entire ecosystem.
Agree with this perspective. Hopefully our proposal (and many other projects) will have a chance to get voting from the community through a round 2.
By concentrating exclusively on round 1 applicants for the extended budget, we might unintentionally sideline potential candidates who were gearing up for round 2 or those who missed the first round. It’s imperative to ensure adaptability in our approach. Delegates and ARB token holders, after observing the outcomes of round 1 allocations, might have a renewed perspective on which projects truly merit the funding. Their evaluation criteria might have evolved, or they may now identify a previously overlooked candidate as more deserving.
I thought this was being discussed in https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/extension-of-arbitrum-s-short-term-incentive-program/18800/
As stated there I will vote against it as I believe we should Option 1: Continue with round 2. Continue with the existing program structure where we hold a round 2, everyone from round 1 who had not qualified can retry in round 2. Supporters - @limes @DanThales @mint_cloud @deBridge
I support this proposal where all of these projects already met the requirement of STIP-1.
By concentrating exclusively on round 1 applicants for the extended budget, we might unintentionally sideline potential candidates who were gearing up for round 2 or those who missed the first round. It’s imperative to ensure adaptability in our approach. Delegates and ARB token holders, after observing the outcomes of round 1 allocations, might have a renewed perspective on which projects truly merit the funding. Their evaluation criteria might have evolved, or they may now identify a previously overlooked candidate as more deserving.
confirming that matcha.xyz was waiting for round 2 to apply so if this proposal passes won't be able to participate until a round 2 (which does seem more difficult to be happening given the additional funds deployed for the backfund)
I thought this was being discussed in https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/extension-of-arbitrum-s-short-term-incentive-program/18800/
As stated there I will vote against it as I believe we should Option 1: Continue with round 2. Continue with the existing program structure where we hold a round 2, everyone from round 1 who had not qualified can retry in round 2. Supporters - @limes @DanThales @mint_cloud @deBridge
Selfishly we from matcha.xyz were awaiting round 2 to apply and find it not unfair to not been given the opportunity to participate
What happens to potential projects who did (or were planning to) apply for round 2? This proposal seems to give an unfair advantage to projects of round 1, as they get indiscriminately included in this possible extension of grants. It's possible that delegates who voted in round 1 would prefer other candidates of round 2, but they don't seem to be able to voice their opinion through the structure of this proposal (other than of course not voting in favor of it).
There was another discussion in #grants-discussions where it was proposed that the program should be extended for a round 2, where projects who didn't make it in round 1 would have to re-apply along with projects who planned to apply in round 2, which has many opinions in favor.
What happens to potential projects who did (or were planning to) apply for round 2? This proposal seems to give an unfair advantage to projects of round 1, as they get indiscriminately included in this possible extension of grants. It's possible that delegates who voted in round 1 would prefer other candidates of round 2, but they don't seem to be able to voice their opinion through the structure of this proposal (other than of course not voting in favor of it).
There was another discussion in #grants-discussions where it was proposed that the program should be extended for a round 2, where projects who didn't make it in round 1 would have to re-apply along with projects who planned to apply in round 2, which has many opinions in favor.
So the voting options for delegates of this proposal could be:
The drawback of course would be that it would create some overhead once again for reviewers, delegates etc.
The Magpie Ecosystem supports this initiative and the provision of back-funding for successful STIP proposals.
We are fully supportive of this proposal as written. We believe that reaching some solution for the backfunding issue is critical to the Arbitrum ecosystem and believe this particular proposal has done excellent work in balancing what is essential and what is practical to put forth a workable solution.
Savvy DAO has done an exceptional job putting this together We have been involved in this process and cannot adequately express the amount of work and thought put into this proposal. Savvy has spoken to every stakeholder and considered all arguments with an open mind. I believe they have sincerely tried to be unbiased and taken precautions only to accept arguments supported by compelling analysis. I believe the process alone is an example of well-intentioned and thoughtful DAO governance.
We are fully supportive of this proposal as written. We believe that reaching some solution for the backfunding issue is critical to the Arbitrum ecosystem and believe this particular proposal has done excellent work in balancing what is essential and what is practical to put forth a workable solution.
Savvy DAO has done an exceptional job putting this together We have been involved in this process and cannot adequately express the amount of work and thought put into this proposal. Savvy has spoken to every stakeholder and considered all arguments with an open mind. I believe they have sincerely tried to be unbiased and taken precautions only to accept arguments supported by compelling analysis. I believe the process alone is an example of well-intentioned and thoughtful DAO governance.
Arbitrum lives by the strength of its small teams. The Arbitrum delegates were impressed with and supportive of the teams that passed the initial round with a quorum but were excluded due to the 50M cutoff and small print that explained how that cutoff would exclude teams with fewer votes.
There are many reasons to backfund these ~30 projects:
Backfunding the STIP is cheap. It's entirely normal for companies and ecosystems to spend to strengthen network effects. Arbitrum is worth $10B FDV — Spotify, Uber, Twitter, Netflix, and Amazon were all spending significantly over $1B per year when they were at $10B.
In this proposal, we are spending a marginal $25M to repair a situation that is disproportionately hurting small, hardworking teams that are the lifeblood of Arbitrum's ecosystem and network effect. Please do not underestimate how hard it is for a small team to compete with a larger project that has a large amount of incentives. As one example, we estimate that GMX's $12M of ARB incentives will lead to between $15B and $25B of incremental volumes. How can a small team compete for those volumes if they don't have incentives because we are waiting to see the data from the first round?
What matters for Arbitrum is the demand story. Investors want Arbitrum to bring on more teams, community members, investors, and customers. Investors want to see Arbitrum grow transactions and volumes. They want to see Arbitrum's network effect strengthened. They want Arbitrum to regain and retain its title as the undisputed leader of defi built by small, decentralized teams.
Instead, if ~30 small Arbitrum teams feel disenfranchised by the political process (and a few of these teams shut down because they can't compete with large teams that have a few million of ARB to spend) then Arbitrum will become a less interesting place to invest.
Arbitrum has a golden opportunity to regain its position as the undisputed leader in defi after falling a bit behind Optimism (in large part due to intelligent allocation of OP incentives). It can do this as market volumes and volatility are coming back, which is lucky. We should be focused on giving this our best shot at a reasonable price. It doesn't really matter if Arbitrum spends 25, 50, or 75bps of FDV (e.g. 25M ARB is 25bps of Arbitrum FDV). What matters is that the program works to attract teams and users that can drive innovation and strengthen Arbitrum's network effects.
Theia is highly aligned with the Arbitrum ecosystem. We have investments in Arbitrum, GMX, GNS, GMD and Trader Joe. After meeting with a lot of the teams that stand to be left out in the cold by this proposal, we also have an emotional investment in the outcome of this vote.
Thank you for the very well thought out and detailed proposal.
I think this addresses the concerns many have had with the results of the first round in the most effective and timely way possible. Restarting a new round would be time consuming for everyone involved, taking valuable time better spent developing. It would also skew the advantage in favour of the first round 'winners', when the intent is to benefit the ecosystem as a whole.
Thank you for the very well thought out and detailed proposal.
I think this addresses the concerns many have had with the results of the first round in the most effective and timely way possible. Restarting a new round would be time consuming for everyone involved, taking valuable time better spent developing. It would also skew the advantage in favour of the first round 'winners', when the intent is to benefit the ecosystem as a whole.
It's clear these projects were intended to be funded, as they received enough votes to be in favour. It only makes sense that this intention is realized by extending the grant.
I have to commend Alex and the rest of the Working Group on the amount of thought, effort and coordination put into this proposal. For those who weren't close to the process, this has been tirelessly worked on for 7 days a week since the day voting ended on Round 1. Every effort has been made to engage with delegates, successful Round 1 projects and wider community members to ensure each aspect was considered.
Naturally, the Stargate Foundation supports this proposal. An additional 26 projects being funded, especially for a lot of smaller grants, will enable significantly more growth and development of the ecosystem. This is particularly obvious when considering how successful the initial funding of 50M ARB has already proven to be with TVL up 15% and volumes up almost 100%.
I have to commend Alex and the rest of the Working Group on the amount of thought, effort and coordination put into this proposal. For those who weren't close to the process, this has been tirelessly worked on for 7 days a week since the day voting ended on Round 1. Every effort has been made to engage with delegates, successful Round 1 projects and wider community members to ensure each aspect was considered.
Naturally, the Stargate Foundation supports this proposal. An additional 26 projects being funded, especially for a lot of smaller grants, will enable significantly more growth and development of the ecosystem. This is particularly obvious when considering how successful the initial funding of 50M ARB has already proven to be with TVL up 15% and volumes up almost 100%.
The STIP process was a huge learning opportunity for the ArbitrumDAO on how to best run a similar process in the future, but also how popular Arbitrum is as an L2 and how many protocols are willing to put in work to support it. This proposal closes the loop and signals support for all projects that were initially voted on to help the DAO achieve its goals.
We look forward to continuing our support for Arbitrum and it's participants.
I support this proposal. These projects all met the requirement of STIP 1. The current all-or-nothing cut-off at 50M would create an unlevel playing field within the arbitrum ecosystem that frankly is not necessary nor beneficial to the arbitrum chain. I believe further funding to the tune of 21.4M ARB is a small price to pay for this and would benefit the 26 important protocols that took a lot of time and effort to get their proposal to pass STIP-1.
We at Gains Network strongly support the backfunding proposal by the Savvy DAO. This initiative stands to significantly bolster the Arbitrum ecosystem by providing much-needed support to diverse and emerging builders, which is vital for innovation and growth. By addressing the limitations of STIP 1, we can ensure that our commitment to inclusivity isn't just aspirational but actionable. This proposal isn't merely about allocating funds; it's about upholding our community's values and fostering an environment where all builders, regardless of size, have the opportunity to thrive. It's a strategic move that acknowledges the importance of diversity in our ecosystem and reinforces our dedication to nurturing high-potential projects that may otherwise face undue hardships.
Strongly believe that we need to provide funding to those who made it to STIP-I and passed the quorum. All these projects passed on the basis of merit showcasing their hard work and achievements in the past.
This vote for funding will showcase that tech prowess and user acquisition stats matter more than being close to whales or having ARB OGs on cap table.
It will also establish that Arbitrum as an ecosystem maintains a relatively neutral stance as long as there was a demonstrated historical performance and the system doesn’t try to nitpick winners. All capable candidates need a level playing field and funding the remaining STIP projects will more or less enable this.
Strongly believe that we need to provide funding to those who made it to STIP-I and passed the quorum. All these projects passed on the basis of merit showcasing their hard work and achievements in the past.
This vote for funding will showcase that tech prowess and user acquisition stats matter more than being close to whales or having ARB OGs on cap table.
It will also establish that Arbitrum as an ecosystem maintains a relatively neutral stance as long as there was a demonstrated historical performance and the system doesn’t try to nitpick winners. All capable candidates need a level playing field and funding the remaining STIP projects will more or less enable this.
Firmly support this!
I support the extension and I think its fair to the teams that got their proposal approved. That said I would like to understand what is the criteria for the cut, since Beefy (the protocol I collaborate for) is not on the list. Based on my understanding the proposal should include funding up to "Prime protocol".
There are a number of protocols that reached the passing criteria for the STIP that are not included here. Would be odd and unfair to not include all of the proposals that passed according to the criteria listed.
"To succeed, an application must reach a 71.51M ARB Quorum and receive more than 50% of votes in favor of the proposal."
I see the proposal very favorable, wouldn't change a thing in it.
The prop should be put up for voting, not only because it would be fair, but because it would benefit the diversity of projects being built in the Arbitrum ecosystem as such. Same problems sometimes need different approaches to be dealt with in an agile and efficient way.
I see the proposal very favorable, wouldn't change a thing in it.
The prop should be put up for voting, not only because it would be fair, but because it would benefit the diversity of projects being built in the Arbitrum ecosystem as such. Same problems sometimes need different approaches to be dealt with in an agile and efficient way.
The main advantage I see, is the opportunity of collecting as much data as possible via the STIP distribution, analyzing it and making the according adjustments in the future STIPs or any other subsidies the Arbitrum DAO may or may not provide. So having an almost twice the data sample size, makes decision making a lot more efficient.
So, you mustn't look at this part of the grant as a "pitty giveaway", you should see it as an investment in the ecosystem as such.
Very supportive of this STIP for a couple reasons. The first reason is the projects already did get community consensus to be funded. The community agreed that each project that reached quorum SHOULD get funding, but the way the program was set up not all could receive funding. It wasn't the quality of the projects and their proposals that were causing them to not get funded, it was the fact that there wasn't enough funds for all of them.
The second reason is, I tend to think that Layer 2's right now are in a position where there is fierce competition. Virtually every single Layer 2 is fighting to get mindshare and dapp activity up. The arbitrum DAO has been conservative so far, but it is time to make moves as more and more L2s are going to launch with big incentive programs. Take advantage of being one of the earlier ones and use this head start to build up a strong dapp ecosystem which can serve as a moat. Giving these projects incentives is one way to jump start that.
I think this is a very sensible proposal that will help increase the diversity and resilience of Arbitrum’s ecosystem
The delegates did an outstanding job analyzing a vast array of grant requests. It would have been impossible for the delegates to 'game' out which protocols would get not only the FOR votes but also into the top 50, without using the entire process in a mercenary sort of fashion. Their job was to vote on protocols they understood and/or believed in. Not voting for something is not the same as voting NO.
To that end, the benefits to the Arbitrum ecosystem in extending the grant applications are many. We need to build out more users and a bigger base of defi and crypto enthusiasts NOW as we get ready to enter the next leg of the bull market. Increasing trading volume through the allocation of these grants is designed to do just that. Having this increased flow of capital through these grants, becomes our ecosystem MOAT and gives us strength in comparison to BASE or Polygon or others.
The delegates did an outstanding job analyzing a vast array of grant requests. It would have been impossible for the delegates to 'game' out which protocols would get not only the FOR votes but also into the top 50, without using the entire process in a mercenary sort of fashion. Their job was to vote on protocols they understood and/or believed in. Not voting for something is not the same as voting NO.
To that end, the benefits to the Arbitrum ecosystem in extending the grant applications are many. We need to build out more users and a bigger base of defi and crypto enthusiasts NOW as we get ready to enter the next leg of the bull market. Increasing trading volume through the allocation of these grants is designed to do just that. Having this increased flow of capital through these grants, becomes our ecosystem MOAT and gives us strength in comparison to BASE or Polygon or others.
However, limiting competition effectively undermines this moat we are building, the BIG players already got big allocations and this will help to solidify their moats. But, these moats may be at the expense of innovation in our ecosystem and may in turn drive smaller players away to our competitors.
In other words, the BIG players are already established and will use their allocations to prevent competition from challenging their established positions. This does not help our ecosystem as effectively as providing grants to protocols that have already demonstrated utility and delegate confidence, even if with slightly less votes. Overall, this is a very modest request in the big scheme of things and will provide a great opportunity to measure effectiveness and growth across the ecosystem.
In favor of this proposal in order to not stifle innovation on Arbitrum. Plenty of small technologically innovative projects (who reached quorum for ARB incentives on the original STIP) may fall to the wayside because their less innovative and less capital efficient competitors are being propped up by disproportionate STIP funds. Everyone should get the opportunity to showcase their tech on a somewhat equal playing field, only way to really see which teams are pushing the envelope and which ones are lacking (something that can be covered up for a time with disproportionate external incentives).
I'm in favor of this proposal. Notional would benefit from backfunding so you have to take my words with a grain of salt, but I think that Savvy make a good case that it is in the long-term interests of Arbitrum.
In my opinion, the most important thing here is to design and produce a longer-term incentive framework that achieves the DAO's longer-term goals. Backfunding STIP proposals would significantly broaden the sample size of this program and give the DAO a better starting point to work off of as it puts together the longer-term incentive framework.
I'm in favor of this proposal. Notional would benefit from backfunding so you have to take my words with a grain of salt, but I think that Savvy make a good case that it is in the long-term interests of Arbitrum.
In my opinion, the most important thing here is to design and produce a longer-term incentive framework that achieves the DAO's longer-term goals. Backfunding STIP proposals would significantly broaden the sample size of this program and give the DAO a better starting point to work off of as it puts together the longer-term incentive framework.
I believe that the data gained from passing this proposal would lead to better decision-making and design with respect to the longer term incentive framework. I support it.
By concentrating exclusively on round 1 applicants for the extended budget, we might unintentionally sideline potential candidates who were gearing up for round 2 or those who missed the first round. It’s imperative to ensure adaptability in our approach. Delegates and ARB token holders, after observing the outcomes of round 1 allocations, might have a renewed perspective on which projects truly merit the funding. Their evaluation criteria might have evolved, or they may now identify a previously overlooked candidate as more deserving.
confirming that matcha.xyz was waiting for round 2 to apply so if this proposal passes won't be able to participate until a round 2 (which does seem more difficult to be happening given the additional funds deployed for the backfund)
I thought this was being discussed in https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/extension-of-arbitrum-s-short-term-incentive-program/18800/
As stated there I will vote against it as I believe we should Option 1: Continue with round 2. Continue with the existing program structure where we hold a round 2, everyone from round 1 who had not qualified can retry in round 2. Supporters - @limes @DanThales @mint_cloud @deBridge
Selfishly we from matcha.xyz were awaiting round 2 to apply and find it not unfair to not been given the opportunity to participate
What happens to potential projects who did (or were planning to) apply for round 2? This proposal seems to give an unfair advantage to projects of round 1, as they get indiscriminately included in this possible extension of grants. It's possible that delegates who voted in round 1 would prefer other candidates of round 2, but they don't seem to be able to voice their opinion through the structure of this proposal (other than of course not voting in favor of it).
There was another discussion in #grants-discussions where it was proposed that the program should be extended for a round 2, where projects who didn't make it in round 1 would have to re-apply along with projects who planned to apply in round 2, which has many opinions in favor.
What happens to potential projects who did (or were planning to) apply for round 2? This proposal seems to give an unfair advantage to projects of round 1, as they get indiscriminately included in this possible extension of grants. It's possible that delegates who voted in round 1 would prefer other candidates of round 2, but they don't seem to be able to voice their opinion through the structure of this proposal (other than of course not voting in favor of it).
There was another discussion in #grants-discussions where it was proposed that the program should be extended for a round 2, where projects who didn't make it in round 1 would have to re-apply along with projects who planned to apply in round 2, which has many opinions in favor.
So the voting options for delegates of this proposal could be:
The drawback of course would be that it would create some overhead once again for reviewers, delegates etc.
The Magpie Ecosystem supports this initiative and the provision of back-funding for successful STIP proposals.
We are fully supportive of this proposal as written. We believe that reaching some solution for the backfunding issue is critical to the Arbitrum ecosystem and believe this particular proposal has done excellent work in balancing what is essential and what is practical to put forth a workable solution.
Savvy DAO has done an exceptional job putting this together We have been involved in this process and cannot adequately express the amount of work and thought put into this proposal. Savvy has spoken to every stakeholder and considered all arguments with an open mind. I believe they have sincerely tried to be unbiased and taken precautions only to accept arguments supported by compelling analysis. I believe the process alone is an example of well-intentioned and thoughtful DAO governance.
We are fully supportive of this proposal as written. We believe that reaching some solution for the backfunding issue is critical to the Arbitrum ecosystem and believe this particular proposal has done excellent work in balancing what is essential and what is practical to put forth a workable solution.
Savvy DAO has done an exceptional job putting this together We have been involved in this process and cannot adequately express the amount of work and thought put into this proposal. Savvy has spoken to every stakeholder and considered all arguments with an open mind. I believe they have sincerely tried to be unbiased and taken precautions only to accept arguments supported by compelling analysis. I believe the process alone is an example of well-intentioned and thoughtful DAO governance.
Arbitrum lives by the strength of its small teams. The Arbitrum delegates were impressed with and supportive of the teams that passed the initial round with a quorum but were excluded due to the 50M cutoff and small print that explained how that cutoff would exclude teams with fewer votes.
There are many reasons to backfund these ~30 projects:
Backfunding the STIP is cheap. It's entirely normal for companies and ecosystems to spend to strengthen network effects. Arbitrum is worth $10B FDV — Spotify, Uber, Twitter, Netflix, and Amazon were all spending significantly over $1B per year when they were at $10B.
In this proposal, we are spending a marginal $25M to repair a situation that is disproportionately hurting small, hardworking teams that are the lifeblood of Arbitrum's ecosystem and network effect. Please do not underestimate how hard it is for a small team to compete with a larger project that has a large amount of incentives. As one example, we estimate that GMX's $12M of ARB incentives will lead to between $15B and $25B of incremental volumes. How can a small team compete for those volumes if they don't have incentives because we are waiting to see the data from the first round?
What matters for Arbitrum is the demand story. Investors want Arbitrum to bring on more teams, community members, investors, and customers. Investors want to see Arbitrum grow transactions and volumes. They want to see Arbitrum's network effect strengthened. They want Arbitrum to regain and retain its title as the undisputed leader of defi built by small, decentralized teams.
Instead, if ~30 small Arbitrum teams feel disenfranchised by the political process (and a few of these teams shut down because they can't compete with large teams that have a few million of ARB to spend) then Arbitrum will become a less interesting place to invest.
Arbitrum has a golden opportunity to regain its position as the undisputed leader in defi after falling a bit behind Optimism (in large part due to intelligent allocation of OP incentives). It can do this as market volumes and volatility are coming back, which is lucky. We should be focused on giving this our best shot at a reasonable price. It doesn't really matter if Arbitrum spends 25, 50, or 75bps of FDV (e.g. 25M ARB is 25bps of Arbitrum FDV). What matters is that the program works to attract teams and users that can drive innovation and strengthen Arbitrum's network effects.
Theia is highly aligned with the Arbitrum ecosystem. We have investments in Arbitrum, GMX, GNS, GMD and Trader Joe. After meeting with a lot of the teams that stand to be left out in the cold by this proposal, we also have an emotional investment in the outcome of this vote.
Thank you for the very well thought out and detailed proposal.
I think this addresses the concerns many have had with the results of the first round in the most effective and timely way possible. Restarting a new round would be time consuming for everyone involved, taking valuable time better spent developing. It would also skew the advantage in favour of the first round 'winners', when the intent is to benefit the ecosystem as a whole.
Thank you for the very well thought out and detailed proposal.
I think this addresses the concerns many have had with the results of the first round in the most effective and timely way possible. Restarting a new round would be time consuming for everyone involved, taking valuable time better spent developing. It would also skew the advantage in favour of the first round 'winners', when the intent is to benefit the ecosystem as a whole.
It's clear these projects were intended to be funded, as they received enough votes to be in favour. It only makes sense that this intention is realized by extending the grant.
I have to commend Alex and the rest of the Working Group on the amount of thought, effort and coordination put into this proposal. For those who weren't close to the process, this has been tirelessly worked on for 7 days a week since the day voting ended on Round 1. Every effort has been made to engage with delegates, successful Round 1 projects and wider community members to ensure each aspect was considered.
Naturally, the Stargate Foundation supports this proposal. An additional 26 projects being funded, especially for a lot of smaller grants, will enable significantly more growth and development of the ecosystem. This is particularly obvious when considering how successful the initial funding of 50M ARB has already proven to be with TVL up 15% and volumes up almost 100%.
I have to commend Alex and the rest of the Working Group on the amount of thought, effort and coordination put into this proposal. For those who weren't close to the process, this has been tirelessly worked on for 7 days a week since the day voting ended on Round 1. Every effort has been made to engage with delegates, successful Round 1 projects and wider community members to ensure each aspect was considered.
Naturally, the Stargate Foundation supports this proposal. An additional 26 projects being funded, especially for a lot of smaller grants, will enable significantly more growth and development of the ecosystem. This is particularly obvious when considering how successful the initial funding of 50M ARB has already proven to be with TVL up 15% and volumes up almost 100%.
The STIP process was a huge learning opportunity for the ArbitrumDAO on how to best run a similar process in the future, but also how popular Arbitrum is as an L2 and how many protocols are willing to put in work to support it. This proposal closes the loop and signals support for all projects that were initially voted on to help the DAO achieve its goals.
We look forward to continuing our support for Arbitrum and it's participants.
I support this proposal. These projects all met the requirement of STIP 1. The current all-or-nothing cut-off at 50M would create an unlevel playing field within the arbitrum ecosystem that frankly is not necessary nor beneficial to the arbitrum chain. I believe further funding to the tune of 21.4M ARB is a small price to pay for this and would benefit the 26 important protocols that took a lot of time and effort to get their proposal to pass STIP-1.
We at Gains Network strongly support the backfunding proposal by the Savvy DAO. This initiative stands to significantly bolster the Arbitrum ecosystem by providing much-needed support to diverse and emerging builders, which is vital for innovation and growth. By addressing the limitations of STIP 1, we can ensure that our commitment to inclusivity isn't just aspirational but actionable. This proposal isn't merely about allocating funds; it's about upholding our community's values and fostering an environment where all builders, regardless of size, have the opportunity to thrive. It's a strategic move that acknowledges the importance of diversity in our ecosystem and reinforces our dedication to nurturing high-potential projects that may otherwise face undue hardships.
Strongly believe that we need to provide funding to those who made it to STIP-I and passed the quorum. All these projects passed on the basis of merit showcasing their hard work and achievements in the past.
This vote for funding will showcase that tech prowess and user acquisition stats matter more than being close to whales or having ARB OGs on cap table.
It will also establish that Arbitrum as an ecosystem maintains a relatively neutral stance as long as there was a demonstrated historical performance and the system doesn’t try to nitpick winners. All capable candidates need a level playing field and funding the remaining STIP projects will more or less enable this.
Strongly believe that we need to provide funding to those who made it to STIP-I and passed the quorum. All these projects passed on the basis of merit showcasing their hard work and achievements in the past.
This vote for funding will showcase that tech prowess and user acquisition stats matter more than being close to whales or having ARB OGs on cap table.
It will also establish that Arbitrum as an ecosystem maintains a relatively neutral stance as long as there was a demonstrated historical performance and the system doesn’t try to nitpick winners. All capable candidates need a level playing field and funding the remaining STIP projects will more or less enable this.
Firmly support this!
I support the extension and I think its fair to the teams that got their proposal approved. That said I would like to understand what is the criteria for the cut, since Beefy (the protocol I collaborate for) is not on the list. Based on my understanding the proposal should include funding up to "Prime protocol".
There are a number of protocols that reached the passing criteria for the STIP that are not included here. Would be odd and unfair to not include all of the proposals that passed according to the criteria listed.
"To succeed, an application must reach a 71.51M ARB Quorum and receive more than 50% of votes in favor of the proposal."
I see the proposal very favorable, wouldn't change a thing in it.
The prop should be put up for voting, not only because it would be fair, but because it would benefit the diversity of projects being built in the Arbitrum ecosystem as such. Same problems sometimes need different approaches to be dealt with in an agile and efficient way.
I see the proposal very favorable, wouldn't change a thing in it.
The prop should be put up for voting, not only because it would be fair, but because it would benefit the diversity of projects being built in the Arbitrum ecosystem as such. Same problems sometimes need different approaches to be dealt with in an agile and efficient way.
The main advantage I see, is the opportunity of collecting as much data as possible via the STIP distribution, analyzing it and making the according adjustments in the future STIPs or any other subsidies the Arbitrum DAO may or may not provide. So having an almost twice the data sample size, makes decision making a lot more efficient.
So, you mustn't look at this part of the grant as a "pitty giveaway", you should see it as an investment in the ecosystem as such.
Very supportive of this STIP for a couple reasons. The first reason is the projects already did get community consensus to be funded. The community agreed that each project that reached quorum SHOULD get funding, but the way the program was set up not all could receive funding. It wasn't the quality of the projects and their proposals that were causing them to not get funded, it was the fact that there wasn't enough funds for all of them.
The second reason is, I tend to think that Layer 2's right now are in a position where there is fierce competition. Virtually every single Layer 2 is fighting to get mindshare and dapp activity up. The arbitrum DAO has been conservative so far, but it is time to make moves as more and more L2s are going to launch with big incentive programs. Take advantage of being one of the earlier ones and use this head start to build up a strong dapp ecosystem which can serve as a moat. Giving these projects incentives is one way to jump start that.
I think this is a very sensible proposal that will help increase the diversity and resilience of Arbitrum’s ecosystem
The delegates did an outstanding job analyzing a vast array of grant requests. It would have been impossible for the delegates to 'game' out which protocols would get not only the FOR votes but also into the top 50, without using the entire process in a mercenary sort of fashion. Their job was to vote on protocols they understood and/or believed in. Not voting for something is not the same as voting NO.
To that end, the benefits to the Arbitrum ecosystem in extending the grant applications are many. We need to build out more users and a bigger base of defi and crypto enthusiasts NOW as we get ready to enter the next leg of the bull market. Increasing trading volume through the allocation of these grants is designed to do just that. Having this increased flow of capital through these grants, becomes our ecosystem MOAT and gives us strength in comparison to BASE or Polygon or others.
The delegates did an outstanding job analyzing a vast array of grant requests. It would have been impossible for the delegates to 'game' out which protocols would get not only the FOR votes but also into the top 50, without using the entire process in a mercenary sort of fashion. Their job was to vote on protocols they understood and/or believed in. Not voting for something is not the same as voting NO.
To that end, the benefits to the Arbitrum ecosystem in extending the grant applications are many. We need to build out more users and a bigger base of defi and crypto enthusiasts NOW as we get ready to enter the next leg of the bull market. Increasing trading volume through the allocation of these grants is designed to do just that. Having this increased flow of capital through these grants, becomes our ecosystem MOAT and gives us strength in comparison to BASE or Polygon or others.
However, limiting competition effectively undermines this moat we are building, the BIG players already got big allocations and this will help to solidify their moats. But, these moats may be at the expense of innovation in our ecosystem and may in turn drive smaller players away to our competitors.
In other words, the BIG players are already established and will use their allocations to prevent competition from challenging their established positions. This does not help our ecosystem as effectively as providing grants to protocols that have already demonstrated utility and delegate confidence, even if with slightly less votes. Overall, this is a very modest request in the big scheme of things and will provide a great opportunity to measure effectiveness and growth across the ecosystem.
In favor of this proposal in order to not stifle innovation on Arbitrum. Plenty of small technologically innovative projects (who reached quorum for ARB incentives on the original STIP) may fall to the wayside because their less innovative and less capital efficient competitors are being propped up by disproportionate STIP funds. Everyone should get the opportunity to showcase their tech on a somewhat equal playing field, only way to really see which teams are pushing the envelope and which ones are lacking (something that can be covered up for a time with disproportionate external incentives).
I'm in favor of this proposal. Notional would benefit from backfunding so you have to take my words with a grain of salt, but I think that Savvy make a good case that it is in the long-term interests of Arbitrum.
In my opinion, the most important thing here is to design and produce a longer-term incentive framework that achieves the DAO's longer-term goals. Backfunding STIP proposals would significantly broaden the sample size of this program and give the DAO a better starting point to work off of as it puts together the longer-term incentive framework.
I'm in favor of this proposal. Notional would benefit from backfunding so you have to take my words with a grain of salt, but I think that Savvy make a good case that it is in the long-term interests of Arbitrum.
In my opinion, the most important thing here is to design and produce a longer-term incentive framework that achieves the DAO's longer-term goals. Backfunding STIP proposals would significantly broaden the sample size of this program and give the DAO a better starting point to work off of as it puts together the longer-term incentive framework.
I believe that the data gained from passing this proposal would lead to better decision-making and design with respect to the longer term incentive framework. I support it.
Very supportive of this STIP for a couple reasons. The first reason is the projects already did get community consensus to be funded. The community agreed that each project that reached quorum SHOULD get funding, but the way the program was set up not all could receive funding. It wasn't the quality of the projects and their proposals that were causing them to not get funded, it was the fact that there wasn't enough funds for all of them.
The second reason is, I tend to think that Layer 2's right now are in a position where there is fierce competition. Virtually every single Layer 2 is fighting to get mindshare and dapp activity up. The arbitrum DAO has been conservative so far, but it is time to make moves as more and more L2s are going to launch with big incentive programs. Take advantage of being one of the earlier ones and use this head start to build up a strong dapp ecosystem which can serve as a moat. Giving these projects incentives is one way to jump start that.
Final reason is that the projects that got the most votes last time were the ones who asked for the most and had the biggest community. The STIP basically acted as a way to make the stronger protocols get stronger and solidify their lead. With apps, I believe it is worth funding many different apps as there may be better designs for a particular type of app and this type of a proposal can help kick start these newer and smaller project's growth.
I've been looking at DefiEdge for a few weeks now. They are building some incredible tools that work across many platforms. And they are starving for capital. I have been wanting to test out these tools but have avoided doing so. Why? Because they did not get a grant and I am waiting for the grants to drop so I can put my funds in some useless low-efficiency Camelot or Balancer pool and farm and dump ARB. The truth is I don't even care if this additional STIP passes because I firmly hate Arbitrum now and as soon as the previously passed farm-and-dump program is done I am leaving Arbitrum altogether and not coming back. Well done you geniuses.
Absolutely in favour of this proposal. It's clear that the original proposal, while well intentioned, penalised some of the smaller protocols that nevertheless are deserving of support.
This would go a long way to rectify that in an efficient, straightforward manner.
Fully believe this is the best outcome for the ecosystem and to help keep Arbitrum competitive.
Certainly a good idea to broaden the scope of participation in the STIP. Will be good for Arbitrum which is under heavy competition from an array of L2s. Need the small good projects to have a chance to take off and create greatness within ARB. Some huge players are ripe to be knocked down a few pegs if some of the small projects get a bit of funding (Ramses in particular);
great community whpo has great understanding of projects..... here
In favor backfunding the sussefful STIP proposals.
I also wanted to point out/ask the community for clarity on a point that continues to be brought up: Are there actually a robust community of protocols that held out and were waiting for round 2? My guess is that most protocols that planned to make a proposals did so in round 1 and the number of protocols that decided they wanted to put a proposal together but wait until round 2 is very small?
A voted in STIP is a voted in STIP. I fully support this proposal of continuing the funding of all voted in STIPs that did not receive the funds.
The wide spread of the funds across smaller projects and the way the emissions are planned in individual STIPs should not pose selling pressure risks. These risks are negligible, while the potential growth of the Arbitrum Ecosystem from this proposal is significant.
Very supportive of this STIP for a couple reasons. The first reason is the projects already did get community consensus to be funded. The community agreed that each project that reached quorum SHOULD get funding, but the way the program was set up not all could receive funding. It wasn't the quality of the projects and their proposals that were causing them to not get funded, it was the fact that there wasn't enough funds for all of them.
The second reason is, I tend to think that Layer 2's right now are in a position where there is fierce competition. Virtually every single Layer 2 is fighting to get mindshare and dapp activity up. The arbitrum DAO has been conservative so far, but it is time to make moves as more and more L2s are going to launch with big incentive programs. Take advantage of being one of the earlier ones and use this head start to build up a strong dapp ecosystem which can serve as a moat. Giving these projects incentives is one way to jump start that.
Final reason is that the projects that got the most votes last time were the ones who asked for the most and had the biggest community. The STIP basically acted as a way to make the stronger protocols get stronger and solidify their lead. With apps, I believe it is worth funding many different apps as there may be better designs for a particular type of app and this type of a proposal can help kick start these newer and smaller project's growth.
I've been looking at DefiEdge for a few weeks now. They are building some incredible tools that work across many platforms. And they are starving for capital. I have been wanting to test out these tools but have avoided doing so. Why? Because they did not get a grant and I am waiting for the grants to drop so I can put my funds in some useless low-efficiency Camelot or Balancer pool and farm and dump ARB. The truth is I don't even care if this additional STIP passes because I firmly hate Arbitrum now and as soon as the previously passed farm-and-dump program is done I am leaving Arbitrum altogether and not coming back. Well done you geniuses.
Absolutely in favour of this proposal. It's clear that the original proposal, while well intentioned, penalised some of the smaller protocols that nevertheless are deserving of support.
This would go a long way to rectify that in an efficient, straightforward manner.
Fully believe this is the best outcome for the ecosystem and to help keep Arbitrum competitive.
Certainly a good idea to broaden the scope of participation in the STIP. Will be good for Arbitrum which is under heavy competition from an array of L2s. Need the small good projects to have a chance to take off and create greatness within ARB. Some huge players are ripe to be knocked down a few pegs if some of the small projects get a bit of funding (Ramses in particular);
great community whpo has great understanding of projects..... here
In favor backfunding the sussefful STIP proposals.
I also wanted to point out/ask the community for clarity on a point that continues to be brought up: Are there actually a robust community of protocols that held out and were waiting for round 2? My guess is that most protocols that planned to make a proposals did so in round 1 and the number of protocols that decided they wanted to put a proposal together but wait until round 2 is very small?
A voted in STIP is a voted in STIP. I fully support this proposal of continuing the funding of all voted in STIPs that did not receive the funds.
The wide spread of the funds across smaller projects and the way the emissions are planned in individual STIPs should not pose selling pressure risks. These risks are negligible, while the potential growth of the Arbitrum Ecosystem from this proposal is significant.
Fully supportive of backfunding successfull STIPs. If a STIP was already voted in, I see no reason to add overhead and stress to delegates by doing another round of 100 applications to review.
A round 2 and future grant cycles should receive additional budget.
Fully supportive of backfunding successfull STIPs. If a STIP was already voted in, I see no reason to add overhead and stress to delegates by doing another round of 100 applications to review.
A round 2 and future grant cycles should receive additional budget.
While the concern of additional sell pressure is justified, in case of Optimism, incentivizing multiple and diverse smaller projects did very well for the ecosystem, and token price if you will, and its where Arbitrum needs to step up, rather that awarding 50% of the total budget to existing well establish protocols who already have 7 digits worth of unspent ARB tokens...
Great proposal. Backfund successful STIP proposals
The cap would stay for the future, no 1 project deserves 12m arb if in return it denies 20 other projects the chance of funding innovation. This would spark growth and stop leeching of 12m and 6m arb. If the cap would have been there all the projects would have been funded and there would even have been arb leftover. Sell pressure down in the future because there would be tons of projects building and less arb given out with the cap... Anyway long term vision, this is the time to build during bear market!
everything is going well ... so please keep supporting Arb Eco Sys :pray: :pray:
Frankly capping it to 500k per protocol on the extension would just give the "monopoly" more benefit, which is one of your concerns. Sell pressure concerns are a red herring -- the airdrop's unallocated/clawed back ARB was included in all financial models prior, thus a solid 50m+ ARB was already accounted as being sell pressure-- which now is not.
My opinion is to extend now, but put a cap of 500k on the individual projects from this extension on. GMX did not need 12M ARB. For r&d and ecosystem growth it's better to incentivise 50 smaller projects then one that already has a monopoly...If there had been a cap this would not have been such a discussion.
My idea is to extend but with a cap of 300-500.000 / project, the total extension would then only need 10M arb or so but provide all of the remaining projects. This would ease @Englandzz_Curia sell pressure concerns by save ARB now and in the future. In return there will be a ton of growth on ARB. And some return to equality.
Thanks for the well articulated proposal. After reading @0xRamen 's proposal, as well as this proposal, I would like to highlight a potential area of concern.
By concentrating exclusively on round 1 applicants for the extended budget, we might unintentionally sideline potential candidates who were gearing up for round 2 or those who missed the first round. It's imperative to ensure adaptability in our approach. Delegates and ARB token holders, after observing the outcomes of round 1 allocations, might have a renewed perspective on which projects truly merit the funding. Their evaluation criteria might have evolved, or they may now identify a previously overlooked candidate as more deserving.
Fully supportive of backfunding successfull STIPs. If a STIP was already voted in, I see no reason to add overhead and stress to delegates by doing another round of 100 applications to review.
A round 2 and future grant cycles should receive additional budget.
Fully supportive of backfunding successfull STIPs. If a STIP was already voted in, I see no reason to add overhead and stress to delegates by doing another round of 100 applications to review.
A round 2 and future grant cycles should receive additional budget.
While the concern of additional sell pressure is justified, in case of Optimism, incentivizing multiple and diverse smaller projects did very well for the ecosystem, and token price if you will, and its where Arbitrum needs to step up, rather that awarding 50% of the total budget to existing well establish protocols who already have 7 digits worth of unspent ARB tokens...
Great proposal. Backfund successful STIP proposals
The cap would stay for the future, no 1 project deserves 12m arb if in return it denies 20 other projects the chance of funding innovation. This would spark growth and stop leeching of 12m and 6m arb. If the cap would have been there all the projects would have been funded and there would even have been arb leftover. Sell pressure down in the future because there would be tons of projects building and less arb given out with the cap... Anyway long term vision, this is the time to build during bear market!
everything is going well ... so please keep supporting Arb Eco Sys :pray: :pray:
Frankly capping it to 500k per protocol on the extension would just give the "monopoly" more benefit, which is one of your concerns. Sell pressure concerns are a red herring -- the airdrop's unallocated/clawed back ARB was included in all financial models prior, thus a solid 50m+ ARB was already accounted as being sell pressure-- which now is not.
My opinion is to extend now, but put a cap of 500k on the individual projects from this extension on. GMX did not need 12M ARB. For r&d and ecosystem growth it's better to incentivise 50 smaller projects then one that already has a monopoly...If there had been a cap this would not have been such a discussion.
My idea is to extend but with a cap of 300-500.000 / project, the total extension would then only need 10M arb or so but provide all of the remaining projects. This would ease @Englandzz_Curia sell pressure concerns by save ARB now and in the future. In return there will be a ton of growth on ARB. And some return to equality.
Thanks for the well articulated proposal. After reading @0xRamen 's proposal, as well as this proposal, I would like to highlight a potential area of concern.
By concentrating exclusively on round 1 applicants for the extended budget, we might unintentionally sideline potential candidates who were gearing up for round 2 or those who missed the first round. It's imperative to ensure adaptability in our approach. Delegates and ARB token holders, after observing the outcomes of round 1 allocations, might have a renewed perspective on which projects truly merit the funding. Their evaluation criteria might have evolved, or they may now identify a previously overlooked candidate as more deserving.
Thanks for the well articulated proposal. After reading @0xRamen 's proposal, as well as this proposal, I would like to highlight a potential area of concern.
By concentrating exclusively on round 1 applicants for the extended budget, we might unintentionally sideline potential candidates who were gearing up for round 2 or those who missed the first round. It's imperative to ensure adaptability in our approach. Delegates and ARB token holders, after observing the outcomes of round 1 allocations, might have a renewed perspective on which projects truly merit the funding. Their evaluation criteria might have evolved, or they may now identify a previously overlooked candidate as more deserving.
I do acknowledge and value the time and effort our delegates invested in evaluating the round 1 applications. But, using that as a basis, it's also worth noting that they wouldn't necessarily need to double their efforts for a potential round 2. Many of the proposals would likely be identical to those previously evaluated, making it essentially a revote rather than a complete re-evaluation.
By keeping a more flexible approach, we can ensure that all deserving projects get the opportunity they warrant. This proposal, in its current state, seems like just a mere retroactive airdrop and it would be hard for me to support.
I believe an AIP acknowledging round 2 participants, including all other round 1 previous applicants, would be the best way to ensure a fair distribution of grant proceeds if an extension were to occur.
Thanks for the well articulated proposal. After reading @0xRamen 's proposal, as well as this proposal, I would like to highlight a potential area of concern.
By concentrating exclusively on round 1 applicants for the extended budget, we might unintentionally sideline potential candidates who were gearing up for round 2 or those who missed the first round. It's imperative to ensure adaptability in our approach. Delegates and ARB token holders, after observing the outcomes of round 1 allocations, might have a renewed perspective on which projects truly merit the funding. Their evaluation criteria might have evolved, or they may now identify a previously overlooked candidate as more deserving.
I do acknowledge and value the time and effort our delegates invested in evaluating the round 1 applications. But, using that as a basis, it's also worth noting that they wouldn't necessarily need to double their efforts for a potential round 2. Many of the proposals would likely be identical to those previously evaluated, making it essentially a revote rather than a complete re-evaluation.
By keeping a more flexible approach, we can ensure that all deserving projects get the opportunity they warrant. This proposal, in its current state, seems like just a mere retroactive airdrop and it would be hard for me to support.
I believe an AIP acknowledging round 2 participants, including all other round 1 previous applicants, would be the best way to ensure a fair distribution of grant proceeds if an extension were to occur.
The on-chain AIP to backfund successful STIP proposals has passed!
Congratulations to the 26 projects that are eligible for the backfunding. The Arbitrum Foundation, with the STIP multi-sig’s buy-in, is tasked by the STIP proposal to handle all KYC/KYB checks on teams who are eligible to receive the funds and for arranging the Grant Agreements to be signed prior to the ARB disbursement.
The on-chain AIP to backfund successful STIP proposals has passed!
Congratulations to the 26 projects that are eligible for the backfunding. The Arbitrum Foundation, with the STIP multi-sig’s buy-in, is tasked by the STIP proposal to handle all KYC/KYB checks on teams who are eligible to receive the funds and for arranging the Grant Agreements to be signed prior to the ARB disbursement.
As next steps, please follow the instructions in this post to kickstart the compliance process.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/stip-winning-proposals-next-steps/19033
Upon receipt of the email, the Foundation will start the compliance process with a third party service provider.
All formal communication will be conducted over email with [email protected]. Please double-check all email addresses and, if in doubt you may contact @stonecoldpat or @cliffton.eth on the forum.
I believe they want to include Round 2 too and the backfund will likely deteriorate the previous vote for STIP integrity.
The on-chain AIP to backfund successful STIP proposals has passed!
Congratulations to the 26 projects that are eligible for the backfunding. The Arbitrum Foundation, with the STIP multi-sig’s buy-in, is tasked by the STIP proposal to handle all KYC/KYB checks on teams who are eligible to receive the funds and for arranging the Grant Agreements to be signed prior to the ARB disbursement.
The on-chain AIP to backfund successful STIP proposals has passed!
Congratulations to the 26 projects that are eligible for the backfunding. The Arbitrum Foundation, with the STIP multi-sig’s buy-in, is tasked by the STIP proposal to handle all KYC/KYB checks on teams who are eligible to receive the funds and for arranging the Grant Agreements to be signed prior to the ARB disbursement.
As next steps, please follow the instructions in this post to kickstart the compliance process.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/stip-winning-proposals-next-steps/19033
Upon receipt of the email, the Foundation will start the compliance process with a third party service provider.
All formal communication will be conducted over email with [email protected]. Please double-check all email addresses and, if in doubt you may contact @stonecoldpat or @cliffton.eth on the forum.
I believe they want to include Round 2 too and the backfund will likely deteriorate the previous vote for STIP integrity.
Hey everyone, a reminder to please keep comments and replies respectful, professional, and constructive to this proposal. I had to delete some comments which undermined the integrity and/or character of individuals and/or teams.
Name-calling, personal attacks, and comments which challenged the integrity of individuals and/or teams will not be tolerated as per the community guidelines.
Hey everyone, a reminder to please keep comments and replies respectful, professional, and constructive to this proposal. I had to delete some comments which undermined the integrity and/or character of individuals and/or teams.
Name-calling, personal attacks, and comments which challenged the integrity of individuals and/or teams will not be tolerated as per the community guidelines.
Remember, the purpose of this forum is to foster productive and respectful discussions related to governance. We encourage everyone to contribute their ideas and perspectives in a respectful and constructive way, and to learn from each other.
To be candid, I feel neither shame nor the need to defend myself against the finer points of message here.
I hope Alex and the team behind this backfund prop would state that I've been nothing but supportive of their intent to create this proposal including helping them use the working group as a platform in its early weeks, providing feedback, and not gatekeeping or pushing the political games that you seem to think occur.
To be candid, I feel neither shame nor the need to defend myself against the finer points of message here.
I hope Alex and the team behind this backfund prop would state that I've been nothing but supportive of their intent to create this proposal including helping them use the working group as a platform in its early weeks, providing feedback, and not gatekeeping or pushing the political games that you seem to think occur.
My comments clearly addressed a specific tactic that I do not support, which is the (sometimes sublte, sometimes blatant) perpetuation of narratives that are manipulative and often take statements out of context. These narratives are being used to inflame divisions in the community and target some of the most important stakeholders and contributors at Arbitrum.
As to @Djinn's points, the point is that to spin the WG as being designed by big protocols for big protocols is simply not reflective of the spirit of the proposal, which was literally borne to ensure that both large proposals and smaller proposals, could be passed simultaneously so that not just massive protocols got incentives for the fall/winter. Many of the protocols who knew they would likely ask for large grants actually lobbied quite hard for a 75M ARB cap for the very reason of including more smaller protocols, which you can also track in the original proposal thread.
The fact that ~90 protocols only engaged with the DAO once the grants program had launched was unfortunate and unexpected. I simply can't stand by quietly and watch those who were not present (and apparently do not care to read) to claim any original contributor's intent, especially for the sake of trying to pass a proposal.
As for alleging that gaming was not considered, that's simply false and was addressed throughout the original STIP comments, as we purposefully made the tier recommendations "guidelines" rather than "rules" to allow them to participate: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/66?u=tnorm
The WG calls actively tried to address gaming both pre-STIP and post, but there has been little to none engagement from any gaming representatives thus far.
Would just like to say as someone who supports this proposal, @coinflip has been nothing but supportive to the ArbitrumDAO by showing up consistently to the community calls and voicing his opinion on multiple proposals. There's no reason to be calling him a grifter, and we need to do better than namecalling on governance forums and instead respect delegates who put the time in to vote and express their reasoning thoughtfully.
My main bone to pick is that the first STIP round 1 working group did not include a diverse selection of working group members:
My main bone to pick is that the first STIP round 1 working group did not include a diverse selection of working group members:
I've largely sat on the sidelines of these conversations but I'm a bit tired of language being taken out of context and being used to support individual goals.
I've previously brought up similar incidents with folks misinterpreting text from the Treasury WG.
To clarify:
STIP's mention of potential backfunding or support for future rounds is very clearly presented as a possibility for consideration, it is also clearly NOT an endorsement of (any) specific action.
The only characteristic that can be used to define each member of the first STIP working group is that they were active in the DAO community BEFORE the STIP madness and were willing to sacrifice their time and energy to contribute towards a short-term solution on behalf of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
It's almost impossible to communicate where the community was pre-STIP. The perception that this was somehow a safeguarded, elite group with special interests is absurd and inaccurate. In fact, if you follow the conversations in the original proposal multiple alterations were made throughout the process to make it MORE inclusive.
I will refrain from providing any judgement on this proposal's merits or quality, but I will continue to object to the manipulation of historical facts or language to bolster personal arguments.
Hey everyone, a reminder to please keep comments and replies respectful, professional, and constructive to this proposal. I had to delete some comments which undermined the integrity and/or character of individuals and/or teams.
Name-calling, personal attacks, and comments which challenged the integrity of individuals and/or teams will not be tolerated as per the community guidelines.
Hey everyone, a reminder to please keep comments and replies respectful, professional, and constructive to this proposal. I had to delete some comments which undermined the integrity and/or character of individuals and/or teams.
Name-calling, personal attacks, and comments which challenged the integrity of individuals and/or teams will not be tolerated as per the community guidelines.
Remember, the purpose of this forum is to foster productive and respectful discussions related to governance. We encourage everyone to contribute their ideas and perspectives in a respectful and constructive way, and to learn from each other.
To be candid, I feel neither shame nor the need to defend myself against the finer points of message here.
I hope Alex and the team behind this backfund prop would state that I've been nothing but supportive of their intent to create this proposal including helping them use the working group as a platform in its early weeks, providing feedback, and not gatekeeping or pushing the political games that you seem to think occur.
To be candid, I feel neither shame nor the need to defend myself against the finer points of message here.
I hope Alex and the team behind this backfund prop would state that I've been nothing but supportive of their intent to create this proposal including helping them use the working group as a platform in its early weeks, providing feedback, and not gatekeeping or pushing the political games that you seem to think occur.
My comments clearly addressed a specific tactic that I do not support, which is the (sometimes sublte, sometimes blatant) perpetuation of narratives that are manipulative and often take statements out of context. These narratives are being used to inflame divisions in the community and target some of the most important stakeholders and contributors at Arbitrum.
As to @Djinn's points, the point is that to spin the WG as being designed by big protocols for big protocols is simply not reflective of the spirit of the proposal, which was literally borne to ensure that both large proposals and smaller proposals, could be passed simultaneously so that not just massive protocols got incentives for the fall/winter. Many of the protocols who knew they would likely ask for large grants actually lobbied quite hard for a 75M ARB cap for the very reason of including more smaller protocols, which you can also track in the original proposal thread.
The fact that ~90 protocols only engaged with the DAO once the grants program had launched was unfortunate and unexpected. I simply can't stand by quietly and watch those who were not present (and apparently do not care to read) to claim any original contributor's intent, especially for the sake of trying to pass a proposal.
As for alleging that gaming was not considered, that's simply false and was addressed throughout the original STIP comments, as we purposefully made the tier recommendations "guidelines" rather than "rules" to allow them to participate: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/66?u=tnorm
The WG calls actively tried to address gaming both pre-STIP and post, but there has been little to none engagement from any gaming representatives thus far.
Would just like to say as someone who supports this proposal, @coinflip has been nothing but supportive to the ArbitrumDAO by showing up consistently to the community calls and voicing his opinion on multiple proposals. There's no reason to be calling him a grifter, and we need to do better than namecalling on governance forums and instead respect delegates who put the time in to vote and express their reasoning thoughtfully.
My main bone to pick is that the first STIP round 1 working group did not include a diverse selection of working group members:
My main bone to pick is that the first STIP round 1 working group did not include a diverse selection of working group members:
I've largely sat on the sidelines of these conversations but I'm a bit tired of language being taken out of context and being used to support individual goals.
I've previously brought up similar incidents with folks misinterpreting text from the Treasury WG.
To clarify:
STIP's mention of potential backfunding or support for future rounds is very clearly presented as a possibility for consideration, it is also clearly NOT an endorsement of (any) specific action.
The only characteristic that can be used to define each member of the first STIP working group is that they were active in the DAO community BEFORE the STIP madness and were willing to sacrifice their time and energy to contribute towards a short-term solution on behalf of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
It's almost impossible to communicate where the community was pre-STIP. The perception that this was somehow a safeguarded, elite group with special interests is absurd and inaccurate. In fact, if you follow the conversations in the original proposal multiple alterations were made throughout the process to make it MORE inclusive.
I will refrain from providing any judgement on this proposal's merits or quality, but I will continue to object to the manipulation of historical facts or language to bolster personal arguments.
+1 on backfunding successful STIPs.
Having 20 additional projects receive funding will bring for a much more diverse Arbitrum ecosystem, and we'll get much more data here. Delegates have not had an enjoyable experience in Round 1, and so will want to make sure they can judge proposals properly.
+1 on backfunding successful STIPs.
Having 20 additional projects receive funding will bring for a much more diverse Arbitrum ecosystem, and we'll get much more data here. Delegates have not had an enjoyable experience in Round 1, and so will want to make sure they can judge proposals properly.
We should give the chance for Round 2 proposals once we have more data in place from Round 1 and can make lives easier for delegates to properly assess proposals.
Hey, i'll move this to the Proposal category as it is requesting funds from the DAO treasury.
+1 on backfunding successful STIPs.
Having 20 additional projects receive funding will bring for a much more diverse Arbitrum ecosystem, and we'll get much more data here. Delegates have not had an enjoyable experience in Round 1, and so will want to make sure they can judge proposals properly.
+1 on backfunding successful STIPs.
Having 20 additional projects receive funding will bring for a much more diverse Arbitrum ecosystem, and we'll get much more data here. Delegates have not had an enjoyable experience in Round 1, and so will want to make sure they can judge proposals properly.
We should give the chance for Round 2 proposals once we have more data in place from Round 1 and can make lives easier for delegates to properly assess proposals.
Hey, i'll move this to the Proposal category as it is requesting funds from the DAO treasury.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
As we explained during temp-check, we were originally hesitant with the proposal, but most of our concerns have been addressed since. Given that nothing changed to the extent that it would cause us to have new concerns, and since the team behind the proposal has been very actively working on pushing forward a STIP Round 2, we’ll be voting in favour of the proposal in the on-chain vote as well.
Plutus has decided to vote against the proposed backfunding approach. We acknowledge the good intentions behind this proposal but believe there are more effective strategies to consider.
To begin with, the initial voting decisions in Round 1 were based on specific rules that included the possibility of a Round 2 extension. Incorporating a backfunding approach at this stage might have influenced these decisions differently, potentially altering the outcomes significantly. Furthermore, numerous protocols tailored their proposals in response to the initial rules. Changing the approach now could render these adjustments ineffective.
Plutus has decided to vote against the proposed backfunding approach. We acknowledge the good intentions behind this proposal but believe there are more effective strategies to consider.
To begin with, the initial voting decisions in Round 1 were based on specific rules that included the possibility of a Round 2 extension. Incorporating a backfunding approach at this stage might have influenced these decisions differently, potentially altering the outcomes significantly. Furthermore, numerous protocols tailored their proposals in response to the initial rules. Changing the approach now could render these adjustments ineffective.
Additionally, we prefer to review a detailed proposal and subsequent discussion for Round 2 and its interplay with the backfunding approach before making any commitments with DAO funds. The backfunding proposal involves a substantial sum, over 20 million ARB, and there's a concern that these proposals might compete for the same resources.
Lastly, the backfunding approach aggregates incentives for several protocols, which might inadvertently exclude those anticipating a second round. We advocate for a system that emphasizes merit and inclusivity. This can be achieved through a distinct second STIP round, with its own set of transparent rules and individual voting for each proposal.
I don't understand what changed between temp check and snapshot.
Your proposal combined with your main integration partner's ask amounted to almost 50% of the total STIP ask.
Now we are hearing about issues with 'budget' when the majority of the STIP rd 1 budget was taken by 3-4 protocols.
Is there a reason why Blockworks did not vote in the temp check or engage in any of the conversations here on the forums or the myriad of other comms channels?
Pretty disappointing to see, but at least the community gets to see some rationale of your decision after your decision.
We are voting no to the STIP backfund. We would like the DAO to revisit the idea of another short term incentives program once the first round of applicants have spent the ARB already allocated. This way analysts can look at the data and evaluate how beneficial the STIPs actually were. In order to efficiently/effectively allocate ARB in the future, delegates need to if/know how much ARB incentives hurt the underlying price, how much TVL and fee revenue changes, whether or not new users are onboarded to Arbitrum, and other important metrics. We would also suggest capping the amount of ARB available to projects to ensure more protocols are included in the allocation next time. January 31st is only 2 months away and we do not believe the benefit of getting this done quickly outweighs the advantage of using data from STIP round 1 for future incentive endeavors.
UPDATE - we want to draw attention to a budget clarification that the total listed for Data and Monitoring for Plurality Labs (performed by OpenBlock Labs) is not 100K ARB but 149,500 ARB. The total ask of 21.52M remains unchanged. (also pinning this post)
Sharing this on the forum @North had asked for thoughts from the delegates who voted against.
Summarizing some of those thoughts:
Sharing this on the forum @North had asked for thoughts from the delegates who voted against.
Summarizing some of those thoughts:
For those who were not funded via round 1 and went to the foundation for a grant directly, some additional color would be helpful to ensure there is no double funding for the same initiative. In recent days I have seen social posts of community participants confusing these concepts as well.
Some that voted against are doing so because STIP extension is making assumptions that they do not believe to be true (that if the funding was 75mm or 100mm, the voting results would be the same). Some delegates that have commented they would have voted against instead of abstaining if this were to be the case in Round 1.
Some that voted against think that the appetite for a Round 2 greatly diminishes if STIP Extension were to be funded.
Groups that were funded in round 1 made alterations, considerations, and compromises (prior to and after the initial submission) to help their application get the support needed and increase the chances of being included within the cutoff. This puts these groups at a disadvantage now because if they didn't compromise, maybe they would have gotten what they wanted anyway or a participation award at minimum, and this sets an unwanted precedent.
I don’t think many are sensitive to the amount, but I do think saying its nil impact compared to the 1bn in unlocks this year is a cop-out; the DAO is not a charity or welfare/entitlements program, not saying the extension implies this per se, just being mindful of the narrative and attraction that it may bring.
Most of this feedback is just a consolidation of what is already on this thread.
Thinking out of the box, if a proposal were to evolve to package the STIP Extension with Round 2 Funding, I think generally most parties would be happy with that outcome.
Discussions on Round 2 for reference: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/v2-incentives-program-working-group-stip-round-2/19516
Michigan Blockchain is voting FOR this proposal to Backfund Successful STIP Proposals. The first round of STIP distribution was an unprecedented process for DAO governance that reached a scale and level of DAO participation that the Arbitrum DAO should be proud to have accomplished. The initial proposal by the working group asked for 75MM $ARB tokens and the DAO decided to allocate 50MM. Having no previous experience with such a process, it is understandable that we were unable to anticipate the number of applicants, amounts requested, and quantity of successful proposals determined by the Arbitrum DAO.
While the success of this process is something for the DAO to be proud of, it should also be recognized that the level of effort and commitment that was required of DAO participants in the span of a couple of weeks was greater than any similar span for our delegations from other protocols. Therefore, the best next step is to compensate all of the successful applicants and move forward with analyzing the success and effectiveness of the current STIP rather than conducting an additional round of applications and voting. Additionally, this proposal will fund a greater number of up-and-coming protocols that succeeded in receiving support during the STIP, but not to the same extent as others possibly due to simple lack of recognition by voters compared to the large well-known projects.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
As we explained during temp-check, we were originally hesitant with the proposal, but most of our concerns have been addressed since. Given that nothing changed to the extent that it would cause us to have new concerns, and since the team behind the proposal has been very actively working on pushing forward a STIP Round 2, we’ll be voting in favour of the proposal in the on-chain vote as well.
Plutus has decided to vote against the proposed backfunding approach. We acknowledge the good intentions behind this proposal but believe there are more effective strategies to consider.
To begin with, the initial voting decisions in Round 1 were based on specific rules that included the possibility of a Round 2 extension. Incorporating a backfunding approach at this stage might have influenced these decisions differently, potentially altering the outcomes significantly. Furthermore, numerous protocols tailored their proposals in response to the initial rules. Changing the approach now could render these adjustments ineffective.
Plutus has decided to vote against the proposed backfunding approach. We acknowledge the good intentions behind this proposal but believe there are more effective strategies to consider.
To begin with, the initial voting decisions in Round 1 were based on specific rules that included the possibility of a Round 2 extension. Incorporating a backfunding approach at this stage might have influenced these decisions differently, potentially altering the outcomes significantly. Furthermore, numerous protocols tailored their proposals in response to the initial rules. Changing the approach now could render these adjustments ineffective.
Additionally, we prefer to review a detailed proposal and subsequent discussion for Round 2 and its interplay with the backfunding approach before making any commitments with DAO funds. The backfunding proposal involves a substantial sum, over 20 million ARB, and there's a concern that these proposals might compete for the same resources.
Lastly, the backfunding approach aggregates incentives for several protocols, which might inadvertently exclude those anticipating a second round. We advocate for a system that emphasizes merit and inclusivity. This can be achieved through a distinct second STIP round, with its own set of transparent rules and individual voting for each proposal.
I don't understand what changed between temp check and snapshot.
Your proposal combined with your main integration partner's ask amounted to almost 50% of the total STIP ask.
Now we are hearing about issues with 'budget' when the majority of the STIP rd 1 budget was taken by 3-4 protocols.
Is there a reason why Blockworks did not vote in the temp check or engage in any of the conversations here on the forums or the myriad of other comms channels?
Pretty disappointing to see, but at least the community gets to see some rationale of your decision after your decision.
We are voting no to the STIP backfund. We would like the DAO to revisit the idea of another short term incentives program once the first round of applicants have spent the ARB already allocated. This way analysts can look at the data and evaluate how beneficial the STIPs actually were. In order to efficiently/effectively allocate ARB in the future, delegates need to if/know how much ARB incentives hurt the underlying price, how much TVL and fee revenue changes, whether or not new users are onboarded to Arbitrum, and other important metrics. We would also suggest capping the amount of ARB available to projects to ensure more protocols are included in the allocation next time. January 31st is only 2 months away and we do not believe the benefit of getting this done quickly outweighs the advantage of using data from STIP round 1 for future incentive endeavors.
UPDATE - we want to draw attention to a budget clarification that the total listed for Data and Monitoring for Plurality Labs (performed by OpenBlock Labs) is not 100K ARB but 149,500 ARB. The total ask of 21.52M remains unchanged. (also pinning this post)
Sharing this on the forum @North had asked for thoughts from the delegates who voted against.
Summarizing some of those thoughts:
Sharing this on the forum @North had asked for thoughts from the delegates who voted against.
Summarizing some of those thoughts:
For those who were not funded via round 1 and went to the foundation for a grant directly, some additional color would be helpful to ensure there is no double funding for the same initiative. In recent days I have seen social posts of community participants confusing these concepts as well.
Some that voted against are doing so because STIP extension is making assumptions that they do not believe to be true (that if the funding was 75mm or 100mm, the voting results would be the same). Some delegates that have commented they would have voted against instead of abstaining if this were to be the case in Round 1.
Some that voted against think that the appetite for a Round 2 greatly diminishes if STIP Extension were to be funded.
Groups that were funded in round 1 made alterations, considerations, and compromises (prior to and after the initial submission) to help their application get the support needed and increase the chances of being included within the cutoff. This puts these groups at a disadvantage now because if they didn't compromise, maybe they would have gotten what they wanted anyway or a participation award at minimum, and this sets an unwanted precedent.
I don’t think many are sensitive to the amount, but I do think saying its nil impact compared to the 1bn in unlocks this year is a cop-out; the DAO is not a charity or welfare/entitlements program, not saying the extension implies this per se, just being mindful of the narrative and attraction that it may bring.
Most of this feedback is just a consolidation of what is already on this thread.
Thinking out of the box, if a proposal were to evolve to package the STIP Extension with Round 2 Funding, I think generally most parties would be happy with that outcome.
Discussions on Round 2 for reference: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/v2-incentives-program-working-group-stip-round-2/19516
Michigan Blockchain is voting FOR this proposal to Backfund Successful STIP Proposals. The first round of STIP distribution was an unprecedented process for DAO governance that reached a scale and level of DAO participation that the Arbitrum DAO should be proud to have accomplished. The initial proposal by the working group asked for 75MM $ARB tokens and the DAO decided to allocate 50MM. Having no previous experience with such a process, it is understandable that we were unable to anticipate the number of applicants, amounts requested, and quantity of successful proposals determined by the Arbitrum DAO.
While the success of this process is something for the DAO to be proud of, it should also be recognized that the level of effort and commitment that was required of DAO participants in the span of a couple of weeks was greater than any similar span for our delegations from other protocols. Therefore, the best next step is to compensate all of the successful applicants and move forward with analyzing the success and effectiveness of the current STIP rather than conducting an additional round of applications and voting. Additionally, this proposal will fund a greater number of up-and-coming protocols that succeeded in receiving support during the STIP, but not to the same extent as others possibly due to simple lack of recognition by voters compared to the large well-known projects.
Michigan Blockchain is voting FOR this proposal to Backfund Successful STIP Proposals. The first round of STIP distribution was an unprecedented process for DAO governance that reached a scale and level of DAO participation that the Arbitrum DAO should be proud to have accomplished. The initial proposal by the working group asked for 75MM $ARB tokens and the DAO decided to allocate 50MM. Having no previous experience with such a process, it is understandable that we were unable to anticipate the number of applicants, amounts requested, and quantity of successful proposals determined by the Arbitrum DAO.
While the success of this process is something for the DAO to be proud of, it should also be recognized that the level of effort and commitment that was required of DAO participants in the span of a couple of weeks was greater than any similar span for our delegations from other protocols. Therefore, the best next step is to compensate all of the successful applicants and move forward with analyzing the success and effectiveness of the current STIP rather than conducting an additional round of applications and voting. Additionally, this proposal will fund a greater number of up-and-coming protocols that succeeded in receiving support during the STIP, but not to the same extent as others possibly due to simple lack of recognition by voters compared to the large well-known projects.
Given this, we are in favor of this proposal and look forward to supporting all successful, deserving applicants of this STIP round.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
L2BEAT is voting FOR STIP backfunding proposal in the temperature check vote.
At first we were hesitant regarding this proposal, for the reasons already mentioned by other delegates:
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
L2BEAT is voting FOR STIP backfunding proposal in the temperature check vote.
At first we were hesitant regarding this proposal, for the reasons already mentioned by other delegates:
Given the concerns mentioned above, we engaged in a discussion with the team behind the backfund proposal. We held discussions both during our Office Hours calls as well as during public Twitter spaces and in Telegram group chats. The team addressed most of our concerns and while they were not completely dispelled, we got convinced that this proposal is safe to pass and will not be a blocker for future rounds.
It is worth noting that the team behind this proposal was very active in assembling a dedicated team to work on Round 2 and pushing the needle forward with the work in that front. In addition, the team showed dedication and perseverance in pushing this proposal through the temperature check, making themselves available for any questions we had and willing to find ways to address concerns raised by us or other parties. This was, and still is, a very promising signal for the actual execution of the proposal.
In addition, since STIP was designed to be a short-term experiment, doubling the number of projects in the program, and ensuring the inclusion of smaller projects, will provide us with more data on how this program is performing and allow us to draw better conclusions and lessons for the long-term program.
Considering all this, but especially considering the dedication and openness of the team, we have decided to support this proposal for the temp check, and we will continue to support the team in the execution and validation of the results.
Camelot will be voting against that proposal.
We would like to start by saying we are very much in favour of the DAO finding a way to distribute STIP ARB to more protocols, given that many deserving projects failed to make the cut during round 1, or were waiting for a round 2. Camelot has been supportive of this since the very inception of the first STIP working groups.
Camelot will be voting against that proposal.
We would like to start by saying we are very much in favour of the DAO finding a way to distribute STIP ARB to more protocols, given that many deserving projects failed to make the cut during round 1, or were waiting for a round 2. Camelot has been supportive of this since the very inception of the first STIP working groups.
However, we see major flaws in this backfund proposal as it currently stands:
Several delegates have voted in the context of a 50m budget and the specific parameters known at the time. We believe that voting would have been significantly different if delegates knew in advance that their votes could be potentially carried forward into an entirely new situation. Votes were made under known parameters, and therefore taking them as valid into an entirely new circumstance sets a worrying precedent.
Several protocols (GMX, Radiant, Trader Joe...) consequently reduced the amounts requested in the first round so that more projects could be included in the STIP. Arbitrarily increasing the total amount afterwards - by including proposals with sometimes less reasonable asks - would simply mean that their proposals had been weakened for nothing. Again, this emphasises the point above that votes were cast under known parameters, and to take this as valid in a new context does not make sense.
Last but not least, we believe that the protocols that were waiting for a second round should be included in the same proposal. Although we are aware that a separate proposal is being drafted, we believe that the success of a round 2 is currently significantly limited in the context that the backfund proposal is passed.
We strongly support inclusion and a clear path forward for new entrants to the ecosystem - the most appropriate way to facilitate this would be a proposal that includes a round 2. A backfund would significantly limit inclusion because of the above mentioned reasons.
For example, an interesting potential alternative would be to set up a small committee with a voted budget (e.g. 20-30m) which could distribute it to all the protocols that weren’t included. This is just one possibility, but it shows that there are other quick and far more effective ways of remedying the situation.
Most importantly, in the scenario where a backfund passes we would expect all the included protocols to equally push for a further long-term framework and/or solution for round 2. We will continue to actively contribute throughout this process.
I will be voting --- somewhat reluctantly --- "For" this STIP Backfund. I think there is a lot to learn from the how this initial STIP proposal went, and for future STIP's I am hoping many of the issues are addressed. I also think approving this starts to set a precedent that grants can be retroactively altered, which is why I'm reluctant to vote for this...
As for cost, the initial STIP was 75 million, dropped to 50 million. This effectively brings it back to the originally proposed amount. Which I don't want to just dismiss that, I also think it's fair to say we could never reasonably predict the number of applicants. Dropping from 75 to 50 in a way felt like lowering the cap for the sake of feeling financially prudent, as I wonder if the original amount was 100 million the 75 may have passed due to the initial ask setting a target.
I will be voting --- somewhat reluctantly --- "For" this STIP Backfund. I think there is a lot to learn from the how this initial STIP proposal went, and for future STIP's I am hoping many of the issues are addressed. I also think approving this starts to set a precedent that grants can be retroactively altered, which is why I'm reluctant to vote for this...
As for cost, the initial STIP was 75 million, dropped to 50 million. This effectively brings it back to the originally proposed amount. Which I don't want to just dismiss that, I also think it's fair to say we could never reasonably predict the number of applicants. Dropping from 75 to 50 in a way felt like lowering the cap for the sake of feeling financially prudent, as I wonder if the original amount was 100 million the 75 may have passed due to the initial ask setting a target.
With that said, it's ultimately not really the fault of the projects in this proposal so no sense in punishing them for that. So my vote is one that aims to satisfy the 'spirit' of the initial STIP proposal, with a strong caveat that this will be a one time thing from me. As ultimately this looks to be the most effective 'fix' for the growing pains as a young DAO, but is not something we should look to do each round.
Thanks for the clarification.
Regarding your points:
Thanks for the clarification.
Regarding your points:
Yes you are correct, and the possibility is what we are presenting here in this proposal. Nowhere did I mention that this was the defacto option. It was ONE option.
This I have to push back on.
In the essence of speed, it makes sense how things turned out. Could more protocols have joined the working group calls and shaped the STIP to favor a wider variety of projects? Absolutely - that's an unfortunate lesson many teams are now just understanding. You can't just build and expect the DAO to work in your favor. You have to be part of shaping the DAO itself.
However, the working group structured the proposal with an unlimited pinnacle grant cap and left out considerations for verticals including gaming because of who just happened to be most involved.
This is not bashing the 'elite' but more acknowledging that the protocols that happened to be the most engaged in the original STIP shaped it to favor them.
Like I said, a very important lesson for projects. You have to make things happen and be engaged or be left with little control of the DAO's destiny.
Guys, let's put away the guns and sit back down lol.
I am as stressed as anyone else, it takes alot of work to get a proposal from draft to a completed vote.
This backfund is important because it solves multiple problems with some of the least drawbacks compared to other options.
Guys, let's put away the guns and sit back down lol.
I am as stressed as anyone else, it takes alot of work to get a proposal from draft to a completed vote.
This backfund is important because it solves multiple problems with some of the least drawbacks compared to other options.
The most common rebuttals have been around @abeltherebel 's comments, but I think we have shared enough context on why those drawbacks aren't necessarily waterproof:
50m was an arbitrarily selected budget with very little demand data to know if that was the correct amount to allocate AND the working group for STIP 1 acknowledged this flaw and had backup plans, INCLUDING A BACKFUND :slight_smile:
Backfunding does not mean that a round 2 does not happen. In fact, many members of STIP round 1 have been working really hard to make sure round 2 happens asap.
My main bone to pick is that the first STIP round 1 working group did not include a diverse selection of working group members:
We invite @stonecoldpat @cliffton.eth and other Arbitrum Foundation members to attend.
Notice the participants and how the STIP round 1 format and budgeting favored certain projects.
We are doing our best to ensure that round 2 will include more voices to structure the next STIP so that it is inclusive and fair.
BUT - in the meantime, let's get the projects who worked their ass off to reach quorum and have been waiting weeks now a solution.
Backfunding is an easy, less than perfect but better than alternatives, path that was already considered in the original STIP 1 proposal. Let's get it done.
Would hope good people of good nature can have an honest disagreement without resorting to name calling or attacking the messenger instead of the message.
Would hope good people of good nature can have an honest disagreement without resorting to name calling or attacking the messenger instead of the message.
This is a valid point, although I do hope you will address the substance of the message. Bigger protocols like yours & @Camelot have eaten the lion's share of STIP money and are now voting against its extension to smaller projects in a timeframe where they can compete with you. This is terrible optics (esp when most of the smaller voters have supported the backfill).
I did have some problems with STIP in the 1st place as they act like government subsidies. What's even worse than that is when those receiving this subsidy are now using their market power to prevent smaller competitors from enjoying the same benefit
I appeal to bigger delegates to vote FOR, even if they planned not to, just for counteracting the votes of dapps like GMX & Camelot that are abusing their market power to stifle competition
Good thoughts. Sharing my responses below to your two points against backfunding:
Good thoughts. Sharing my responses below to your two points against backfunding:
@tnorm and other working group members for the original STIP acknowledged that there needed to be options if the funding limit was exceeded because of unknown demand. This information was directly in the official STIP proposal. We can make things right!
Having projects that reached quorum successfully but didn't get funded because of budgetary issues receive a more immediate funding is not unfair imo. These projects worked their ass off already to get delegate votes and structure a proposal that is relevant for now vs later.
We can backfund AND make a concerted effort to push forward an equitable round 2 structure ASAP.
Check out the Sushiswap V2 STIP working group proposal: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/v2-incentives-program-working-group-stip-round-2/19516/2
Grifter is definitely not something i was expecting to be called when I woke up today, probably any day prior to that either.
I'm sorry that you believe my concerns are disingenuous or that I'm seeking to punch down on protocols that was not the intent. Have tried at a personal level to be an advocate for builders in this space, and ensuring that Arbitrum is a welcoming environment especially as new protocols choose their home.
Grifter is definitely not something i was expecting to be called when I woke up today, probably any day prior to that either.
I'm sorry that you believe my concerns are disingenuous or that I'm seeking to punch down on protocols that was not the intent. Have tried at a personal level to be an advocate for builders in this space, and ensuring that Arbitrum is a welcoming environment especially as new protocols choose their home.
Would hope good people of good nature can have an honest disagreement without resorting to name calling or attacking the messenger instead of the message.
:blue_heart:
100% agreed on the importance of this proposal and the positive impact for the Arbitrum Ecosystem that the protocols, builders and communities already approved in STIP R1 should get funding.
I support the possibility to continue to fund the ecosystem communities through the protocols outlined here, even more considering that they had already reached approval individually in the Round 1 temperature check. However, my vote in this case is Against due to the fact that (i) we already had voted for a budget, and amongst the three options, 50M was the one that prevailed and it has already been depleted; (ii) the demand in STIP far exceeded the offer, and, as such, Round 2 ended up not being possible. Backfunding protocols that did not make it in Round 1 without considering the possibility of new entrants that were unable to meet the (rather slim) deadlines of the STIP for a potential Round 2 does not look like the ideal path.
Since a few posters have drawn inference to GMX with regards to my post and vote.
Wanted to clarify that while I am a contributor to GMX, my vote as a delegate is strictly my own although do adhere to a conflict of interest policy where possible avoiding voting on proposals specific to a GMX competitor and disclose when there is a relationship with a protocol. I do not consider a grant or funding proposal of this nature to apply to such a COI policy as it is general.
Since a few posters have drawn inference to GMX with regards to my post and vote.
Wanted to clarify that while I am a contributor to GMX, my vote as a delegate is strictly my own although do adhere to a conflict of interest policy where possible avoiding voting on proposals specific to a GMX competitor and disclose when there is a relationship with a protocol. I do not consider a grant or funding proposal of this nature to apply to such a COI policy as it is general.
Have not consulted with others involved with GMX in deciding this vote, and some may even take the view that this vote is not in the protocols interest as multiple integrations and partners would get funded.
In the end my concerns come down to it being poor governance and how I think this proposal could crowd out other efforts to support incentives on the DAO.
To those who claim i'm hoping to see a less inclusive environment, monopolization, a walled garden, understand your motivation and can just let me words and future actions stand for themselves. I believe Arbitrum will thrive with competition and I hope we robustly support new protocols coming to the ecosystem and create not just financial incentives but a strong ecosystem that will be the biggest attraction to build here.
Firstly, thank you for your proposal and keen interest in the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Firstly, thank you for your proposal and keen interest in the Arbitrum ecosystem.
The proposal's primary objective is to backfund all "approved but not funded" projects from the first Arbitrum STIP round. This initiative, involving the distribution of over 21.4 million ARB, is said to be crucial for fostering diversity and supporting emerging builders, aligning well with Arbitrum's inclusivity goals. It addresses the weaknesses of the original STIP structure and aims to create a more inclusive environment for new projects, using the same tracking systems as STIP 1 for monitoring progress.
While we appreciate the focus on diversity, the proposal seems to prioritize this over assessing the potential impact on the ecosystem of each project. Nevertheless, while we do not necessarily agree with the narrative of avoiding punishing smaller protocols, we believe that there are great positives available to the ecosystem in funding these additional projects.
A couple of points we believe are worth keeping in mind moving forward:
We support this proposal for its alignment with the core values of Arbitrum and its potential to enrich the ecosystem's attractiveness to both protocols and users whilst driving the growth of the chain. The operational ease for delegates and the reasonable request for ARB funds make it a valuable opportunity for the DAO. Our support is predicated on the understanding that this initiative will serve as a learning curve for refining future incentive frameworks within the Arbitrum community.
We hope that our feedback is received as a constructive contribution, aiding the further enhancement and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Will be voting Against this proposal in temperature check, but open to voting in the subsequent round depending on how this proposal interacts with a possible Round Two for STIP.
As we consider allocating over 20 million ARB to a specific set of proposals, I express concern. This significant approval differs from enabling frameworks or reviewing grant applications individually through delegates, committees or grant programs. This new proposal removes the nuance of any review and asks us to simply fund all of them in full on the basis of a backfill.
Curia will support the Arbitrum STIP Backfund Proposal, recognizing its potential benefits while also acknowledging certain concerns.
The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check.
Below is the perspective of the Uniswap DAO’s Arbitrum governance team, composed of @juanbug and @AbdullahUmar:
Michigan Blockchain is voting FOR this proposal to Backfund Successful STIP Proposals. The first round of STIP distribution was an unprecedented process for DAO governance that reached a scale and level of DAO participation that the Arbitrum DAO should be proud to have accomplished. The initial proposal by the working group asked for 75MM $ARB tokens and the DAO decided to allocate 50MM. Having no previous experience with such a process, it is understandable that we were unable to anticipate the number of applicants, amounts requested, and quantity of successful proposals determined by the Arbitrum DAO.
While the success of this process is something for the DAO to be proud of, it should also be recognized that the level of effort and commitment that was required of DAO participants in the span of a couple of weeks was greater than any similar span for our delegations from other protocols. Therefore, the best next step is to compensate all of the successful applicants and move forward with analyzing the success and effectiveness of the current STIP rather than conducting an additional round of applications and voting. Additionally, this proposal will fund a greater number of up-and-coming protocols that succeeded in receiving support during the STIP, but not to the same extent as others possibly due to simple lack of recognition by voters compared to the large well-known projects.
Given this, we are in favor of this proposal and look forward to supporting all successful, deserving applicants of this STIP round.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
L2BEAT is voting FOR STIP backfunding proposal in the temperature check vote.
At first we were hesitant regarding this proposal, for the reasons already mentioned by other delegates:
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.
L2BEAT is voting FOR STIP backfunding proposal in the temperature check vote.
At first we were hesitant regarding this proposal, for the reasons already mentioned by other delegates:
Given the concerns mentioned above, we engaged in a discussion with the team behind the backfund proposal. We held discussions both during our Office Hours calls as well as during public Twitter spaces and in Telegram group chats. The team addressed most of our concerns and while they were not completely dispelled, we got convinced that this proposal is safe to pass and will not be a blocker for future rounds.
It is worth noting that the team behind this proposal was very active in assembling a dedicated team to work on Round 2 and pushing the needle forward with the work in that front. In addition, the team showed dedication and perseverance in pushing this proposal through the temperature check, making themselves available for any questions we had and willing to find ways to address concerns raised by us or other parties. This was, and still is, a very promising signal for the actual execution of the proposal.
In addition, since STIP was designed to be a short-term experiment, doubling the number of projects in the program, and ensuring the inclusion of smaller projects, will provide us with more data on how this program is performing and allow us to draw better conclusions and lessons for the long-term program.
Considering all this, but especially considering the dedication and openness of the team, we have decided to support this proposal for the temp check, and we will continue to support the team in the execution and validation of the results.
Camelot will be voting against that proposal.
We would like to start by saying we are very much in favour of the DAO finding a way to distribute STIP ARB to more protocols, given that many deserving projects failed to make the cut during round 1, or were waiting for a round 2. Camelot has been supportive of this since the very inception of the first STIP working groups.
Camelot will be voting against that proposal.
We would like to start by saying we are very much in favour of the DAO finding a way to distribute STIP ARB to more protocols, given that many deserving projects failed to make the cut during round 1, or were waiting for a round 2. Camelot has been supportive of this since the very inception of the first STIP working groups.
However, we see major flaws in this backfund proposal as it currently stands:
Several delegates have voted in the context of a 50m budget and the specific parameters known at the time. We believe that voting would have been significantly different if delegates knew in advance that their votes could be potentially carried forward into an entirely new situation. Votes were made under known parameters, and therefore taking them as valid into an entirely new circumstance sets a worrying precedent.
Several protocols (GMX, Radiant, Trader Joe...) consequently reduced the amounts requested in the first round so that more projects could be included in the STIP. Arbitrarily increasing the total amount afterwards - by including proposals with sometimes less reasonable asks - would simply mean that their proposals had been weakened for nothing. Again, this emphasises the point above that votes were cast under known parameters, and to take this as valid in a new context does not make sense.
Last but not least, we believe that the protocols that were waiting for a second round should be included in the same proposal. Although we are aware that a separate proposal is being drafted, we believe that the success of a round 2 is currently significantly limited in the context that the backfund proposal is passed.
We strongly support inclusion and a clear path forward for new entrants to the ecosystem - the most appropriate way to facilitate this would be a proposal that includes a round 2. A backfund would significantly limit inclusion because of the above mentioned reasons.
For example, an interesting potential alternative would be to set up a small committee with a voted budget (e.g. 20-30m) which could distribute it to all the protocols that weren’t included. This is just one possibility, but it shows that there are other quick and far more effective ways of remedying the situation.
Most importantly, in the scenario where a backfund passes we would expect all the included protocols to equally push for a further long-term framework and/or solution for round 2. We will continue to actively contribute throughout this process.
I will be voting --- somewhat reluctantly --- "For" this STIP Backfund. I think there is a lot to learn from the how this initial STIP proposal went, and for future STIP's I am hoping many of the issues are addressed. I also think approving this starts to set a precedent that grants can be retroactively altered, which is why I'm reluctant to vote for this...
As for cost, the initial STIP was 75 million, dropped to 50 million. This effectively brings it back to the originally proposed amount. Which I don't want to just dismiss that, I also think it's fair to say we could never reasonably predict the number of applicants. Dropping from 75 to 50 in a way felt like lowering the cap for the sake of feeling financially prudent, as I wonder if the original amount was 100 million the 75 may have passed due to the initial ask setting a target.
I will be voting --- somewhat reluctantly --- "For" this STIP Backfund. I think there is a lot to learn from the how this initial STIP proposal went, and for future STIP's I am hoping many of the issues are addressed. I also think approving this starts to set a precedent that grants can be retroactively altered, which is why I'm reluctant to vote for this...
As for cost, the initial STIP was 75 million, dropped to 50 million. This effectively brings it back to the originally proposed amount. Which I don't want to just dismiss that, I also think it's fair to say we could never reasonably predict the number of applicants. Dropping from 75 to 50 in a way felt like lowering the cap for the sake of feeling financially prudent, as I wonder if the original amount was 100 million the 75 may have passed due to the initial ask setting a target.
With that said, it's ultimately not really the fault of the projects in this proposal so no sense in punishing them for that. So my vote is one that aims to satisfy the 'spirit' of the initial STIP proposal, with a strong caveat that this will be a one time thing from me. As ultimately this looks to be the most effective 'fix' for the growing pains as a young DAO, but is not something we should look to do each round.
Thanks for the clarification.
Regarding your points:
Thanks for the clarification.
Regarding your points:
Yes you are correct, and the possibility is what we are presenting here in this proposal. Nowhere did I mention that this was the defacto option. It was ONE option.
This I have to push back on.
In the essence of speed, it makes sense how things turned out. Could more protocols have joined the working group calls and shaped the STIP to favor a wider variety of projects? Absolutely - that's an unfortunate lesson many teams are now just understanding. You can't just build and expect the DAO to work in your favor. You have to be part of shaping the DAO itself.
However, the working group structured the proposal with an unlimited pinnacle grant cap and left out considerations for verticals including gaming because of who just happened to be most involved.
This is not bashing the 'elite' but more acknowledging that the protocols that happened to be the most engaged in the original STIP shaped it to favor them.
Like I said, a very important lesson for projects. You have to make things happen and be engaged or be left with little control of the DAO's destiny.
Guys, let's put away the guns and sit back down lol.
I am as stressed as anyone else, it takes alot of work to get a proposal from draft to a completed vote.
This backfund is important because it solves multiple problems with some of the least drawbacks compared to other options.
Guys, let's put away the guns and sit back down lol.
I am as stressed as anyone else, it takes alot of work to get a proposal from draft to a completed vote.
This backfund is important because it solves multiple problems with some of the least drawbacks compared to other options.
The most common rebuttals have been around @abeltherebel 's comments, but I think we have shared enough context on why those drawbacks aren't necessarily waterproof:
50m was an arbitrarily selected budget with very little demand data to know if that was the correct amount to allocate AND the working group for STIP 1 acknowledged this flaw and had backup plans, INCLUDING A BACKFUND :slight_smile:
Backfunding does not mean that a round 2 does not happen. In fact, many members of STIP round 1 have been working really hard to make sure round 2 happens asap.
My main bone to pick is that the first STIP round 1 working group did not include a diverse selection of working group members:
We invite @stonecoldpat @cliffton.eth and other Arbitrum Foundation members to attend.
Notice the participants and how the STIP round 1 format and budgeting favored certain projects.
We are doing our best to ensure that round 2 will include more voices to structure the next STIP so that it is inclusive and fair.
BUT - in the meantime, let's get the projects who worked their ass off to reach quorum and have been waiting weeks now a solution.
Backfunding is an easy, less than perfect but better than alternatives, path that was already considered in the original STIP 1 proposal. Let's get it done.
Would hope good people of good nature can have an honest disagreement without resorting to name calling or attacking the messenger instead of the message.
Would hope good people of good nature can have an honest disagreement without resorting to name calling or attacking the messenger instead of the message.
This is a valid point, although I do hope you will address the substance of the message. Bigger protocols like yours & @Camelot have eaten the lion's share of STIP money and are now voting against its extension to smaller projects in a timeframe where they can compete with you. This is terrible optics (esp when most of the smaller voters have supported the backfill).
I did have some problems with STIP in the 1st place as they act like government subsidies. What's even worse than that is when those receiving this subsidy are now using their market power to prevent smaller competitors from enjoying the same benefit
I appeal to bigger delegates to vote FOR, even if they planned not to, just for counteracting the votes of dapps like GMX & Camelot that are abusing their market power to stifle competition
Good thoughts. Sharing my responses below to your two points against backfunding:
Good thoughts. Sharing my responses below to your two points against backfunding:
@tnorm and other working group members for the original STIP acknowledged that there needed to be options if the funding limit was exceeded because of unknown demand. This information was directly in the official STIP proposal. We can make things right!
Having projects that reached quorum successfully but didn't get funded because of budgetary issues receive a more immediate funding is not unfair imo. These projects worked their ass off already to get delegate votes and structure a proposal that is relevant for now vs later.
We can backfund AND make a concerted effort to push forward an equitable round 2 structure ASAP.
Check out the Sushiswap V2 STIP working group proposal: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/v2-incentives-program-working-group-stip-round-2/19516/2
Grifter is definitely not something i was expecting to be called when I woke up today, probably any day prior to that either.
I'm sorry that you believe my concerns are disingenuous or that I'm seeking to punch down on protocols that was not the intent. Have tried at a personal level to be an advocate for builders in this space, and ensuring that Arbitrum is a welcoming environment especially as new protocols choose their home.
Grifter is definitely not something i was expecting to be called when I woke up today, probably any day prior to that either.
I'm sorry that you believe my concerns are disingenuous or that I'm seeking to punch down on protocols that was not the intent. Have tried at a personal level to be an advocate for builders in this space, and ensuring that Arbitrum is a welcoming environment especially as new protocols choose their home.
Would hope good people of good nature can have an honest disagreement without resorting to name calling or attacking the messenger instead of the message.
:blue_heart:
100% agreed on the importance of this proposal and the positive impact for the Arbitrum Ecosystem that the protocols, builders and communities already approved in STIP R1 should get funding.
I support the possibility to continue to fund the ecosystem communities through the protocols outlined here, even more considering that they had already reached approval individually in the Round 1 temperature check. However, my vote in this case is Against due to the fact that (i) we already had voted for a budget, and amongst the three options, 50M was the one that prevailed and it has already been depleted; (ii) the demand in STIP far exceeded the offer, and, as such, Round 2 ended up not being possible. Backfunding protocols that did not make it in Round 1 without considering the possibility of new entrants that were unable to meet the (rather slim) deadlines of the STIP for a potential Round 2 does not look like the ideal path.
Since a few posters have drawn inference to GMX with regards to my post and vote.
Wanted to clarify that while I am a contributor to GMX, my vote as a delegate is strictly my own although do adhere to a conflict of interest policy where possible avoiding voting on proposals specific to a GMX competitor and disclose when there is a relationship with a protocol. I do not consider a grant or funding proposal of this nature to apply to such a COI policy as it is general.
Since a few posters have drawn inference to GMX with regards to my post and vote.
Wanted to clarify that while I am a contributor to GMX, my vote as a delegate is strictly my own although do adhere to a conflict of interest policy where possible avoiding voting on proposals specific to a GMX competitor and disclose when there is a relationship with a protocol. I do not consider a grant or funding proposal of this nature to apply to such a COI policy as it is general.
Have not consulted with others involved with GMX in deciding this vote, and some may even take the view that this vote is not in the protocols interest as multiple integrations and partners would get funded.
In the end my concerns come down to it being poor governance and how I think this proposal could crowd out other efforts to support incentives on the DAO.
To those who claim i'm hoping to see a less inclusive environment, monopolization, a walled garden, understand your motivation and can just let me words and future actions stand for themselves. I believe Arbitrum will thrive with competition and I hope we robustly support new protocols coming to the ecosystem and create not just financial incentives but a strong ecosystem that will be the biggest attraction to build here.
Firstly, thank you for your proposal and keen interest in the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Firstly, thank you for your proposal and keen interest in the Arbitrum ecosystem.
The proposal's primary objective is to backfund all "approved but not funded" projects from the first Arbitrum STIP round. This initiative, involving the distribution of over 21.4 million ARB, is said to be crucial for fostering diversity and supporting emerging builders, aligning well with Arbitrum's inclusivity goals. It addresses the weaknesses of the original STIP structure and aims to create a more inclusive environment for new projects, using the same tracking systems as STIP 1 for monitoring progress.
While we appreciate the focus on diversity, the proposal seems to prioritize this over assessing the potential impact on the ecosystem of each project. Nevertheless, while we do not necessarily agree with the narrative of avoiding punishing smaller protocols, we believe that there are great positives available to the ecosystem in funding these additional projects.
A couple of points we believe are worth keeping in mind moving forward:
We support this proposal for its alignment with the core values of Arbitrum and its potential to enrich the ecosystem's attractiveness to both protocols and users whilst driving the growth of the chain. The operational ease for delegates and the reasonable request for ARB funds make it a valuable opportunity for the DAO. Our support is predicated on the understanding that this initiative will serve as a learning curve for refining future incentive frameworks within the Arbitrum community.
We hope that our feedback is received as a constructive contribution, aiding the further enhancement and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Will be voting Against this proposal in temperature check, but open to voting in the subsequent round depending on how this proposal interacts with a possible Round Two for STIP.
As we consider allocating over 20 million ARB to a specific set of proposals, I express concern. This significant approval differs from enabling frameworks or reviewing grant applications individually through delegates, committees or grant programs. This new proposal removes the nuance of any review and asks us to simply fund all of them in full on the basis of a backfill.
Curia will support the Arbitrum STIP Backfund Proposal, recognizing its potential benefits while also acknowledging certain concerns.
The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check.
Below is the perspective of the Uniswap DAO’s Arbitrum governance team, composed of @juanbug and @AbdullahUmar:
100% agreed on the importance of this proposal and the positive impact for the Arbitrum Ecosystem that the protocols, builders and communities already approved in STIP R1 should get funding.
I support the possibility to continue to fund the ecosystem communities through the protocols outlined here, even more considering that they had already reached approval individually in the Round 1 temperature check. However, my vote in this case is Against due to the fact that (i) we already had voted for a budget, and amongst the three options, 50M was the one that prevailed and it has already been depleted; (ii) the demand in STIP far exceeded the offer, and, as such, Round 2 ended up not being possible. Backfunding protocols that did not make it in Round 1 without considering the possibility of new entrants that were unable to meet the (rather slim) deadlines of the STIP for a potential Round 2 does not look like the ideal path.
The remaining 26 protocols and builders outlined here that haven't had the chance to get funding through STIP R1 will most likely get it no matter if this specific proposal passes. As feedback may I suggest considering creating a new proposal that encompasses both protocols who were "approved but not funded" in R1 plus a window for new entrants that were going to apply in R2 and weren't able to make it since the budget was depleted. This seems the fairier approach enabling better distribution.
Will be voting Against this proposal in temperature check, but open to voting in the subsequent round depending on how this proposal interacts with a possible Round Two for STIP.
As we consider allocating over 20 million ARB to a specific set of proposals, I express concern. This significant approval differs from enabling frameworks or reviewing grant applications individually through delegates, committees or grant programs. This new proposal removes the nuance of any review and asks us to simply fund all of them in full on the basis of a backfill.
The majority of proposals approved in ST1P were smaller scale sized / newer protocols with grant requests of $1m or under. While I understand how it was difficult for smaller protocols to gain attention so did make their case successfully, many large established protocols (who had no shortage of attention) finally didn’t qualify IMHO partly over concerns on the grant applications (size, means of distribution, alignment with Arbitrum).
Knowing the DAOs appetite to fund grants has limits, extending grants to protocols that didn’t achieve the same level of consensus from the DAO in ST1P has the probable effect of limiting or eliminating a round two, which will result in exclusion not inclusion as this proposal presents. I respect that the backfill proponents have committed to support a Round 2, but this proposal isn’t contingent on the success of Round 2 passing, while practically making its passing more difficult by consuming resources that would have been dedicated towards it.
Considering the current landscape:
While I genuinely appreciate the effort and engagement behind the current proposal, admiration alone cannot justify such a significant spend. A Round 2 proposal, likely to surface in the coming days, holds the promise of supporting the strongest applicants from the current backfill proposal and numerous others.
Whether this proposal passes or not, I implore your support for the initiation of a Round 2, which is not a vote for specific proposals but for giving an opportunity to all projects. I and hope other delegates should weigh where we end up with both processes before pushing forward funding for either backfund or Round 2.
The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check.
According to the STIP proposal, only 50 million ARB was originally allocated to support various projects within the Arbitrum ecosystem. However, this fund was quickly exhausted due to the large number of proposals received in the forum (a total of 106). Unfortunately, only the initial 30 projects that gained community approval were able to secure the incentives, leaving several other projects, that were also approved by the community, without any financial funding.
Given this situation and motivated by the insights provided in tnorm's proposal, which highlights the DAO's capability to unlock additional funds to backfund successful proposals, we believe the action suggested by this proposal is reasonable.
We support this proposal because we acknowledge that this whole process was a bit experimental, and it only seems fair to support those projects that have already been approved by the DAO but can’t fit within the budget. Going forward, though, we want to emphasize that this type of extension shouldn’t be used for future STIPs and we should formulate a solution to prevent this from happening again.
Below is the perspective of the Uniswap DAO’s Arbitrum governance team, composed of @juanbug and @AbdullahUmar:
Vote: For
Distributing 50M worth of rewards for STIP round one was really based on arbitrary consensus by the DAO. Since nothing of this magnitude has previously been conducted across any DAO, it was difficult to decide how much capital should be allotted to this type of program. We, along with many others, were surprised by the number of proposals. One can argue that the 50M allotment was anticipated for a smaller number of participants, and now, back funding is our way to compensate for the unprecedented number of successful applications.
Another consideration is recognizing that the most well known protocols attracted the most voting power. This is in part due to heuristic voting–people just vote for entities that they’re familiar with. Another factor is network–larger protocols typically have more sway over the decision-making of delegates. Since not all delegates made it a priority to help fund up-and-coming protocols, back funding those smaller projects seems reasonable.
Plus, it’s too soon to conduct a round two of STIPs. The next best step would be to observe and analyze the efficacy of the current STIP round. We don’t want to go through another round of voting so soon for the protocols who didn’t make the cut. Back funding is the less operationally intensive alternative.
I think this makes a lot of sense - better for data/analysis too. Extend the deadlines for both STIP 1 funded and this backfund
Just to put my comment in a twitter space into the thread here...
I feel like the deadlines for STIP are just too tight :-/
Just to put my comment in a twitter space into the thread here...
I feel like the deadlines for STIP are just too tight :-/
It would be interesting IMO to extend the deadlines for STIP for this group AND the first group. The KYC process is taking longer than expected and it is NEVER a good idea to rush development in the web3 space. Honestly... I expect some groups to just extend past the given deadline anyway...
Is it possible to extend the deadline for distributing rewards to the end of February for these STIP projects AND the original STIP projects?
We feel that backfunding and a Round 2 are distinctly separate issues and the latter should not be very relevant to approval of backfunding.
Backfunding already-approved grants is a smart, defensive move that demonstrates Arbitrum can honor its commitments. This is very much like the US government's debt ceiling debates -- the grants were duly approved through Arbitrum governance and it is only because of a gap in approved funding that the grants were not dispersed.
We feel that backfunding and a Round 2 are distinctly separate issues and the latter should not be very relevant to approval of backfunding.
Backfunding already-approved grants is a smart, defensive move that demonstrates Arbitrum can honor its commitments. This is very much like the US government's debt ceiling debates -- the grants were duly approved through Arbitrum governance and it is only because of a gap in approved funding that the grants were not dispersed.
We are skeptical of increased spending until the market digests ARB from recently approved measures. Backfunding, however, simply provides funds for those grants that ARB voters already expressed support for. Notably, this was done in an environment where large projects could utilize previous grants and airdrops to ensure they were "head of the line" by strategically voting their own large blocs.
While we would not go so far as to say approval of backfunding pays Arbitrum's debts, it certainly signals that Arbitrum is a reliable funding partner. It would not be surprising to see a competitor such as Polygon or Optimism to choose to court these projects -- which are disproportionately smaller with higher growth potential -- by providing a grant to replace the one approved but never delivered by Arbitrum.
Hi @mint_cloud and @deBridge - appreciate you commenting.
STIP Backfund AND round 2 can and should exist, they are not mutually exclusive. In fact as @thedevanshmehta stated (see below) this backfund proposal is only 10% of the treasury budget for q4 - there is plenty of room for a round 2.
Hi @mint_cloud and @deBridge - appreciate you commenting.
STIP Backfund AND round 2 can and should exist, they are not mutually exclusive. In fact as @thedevanshmehta stated (see below) this backfund proposal is only 10% of the treasury budget for q4 - there is plenty of room for a round 2.
In fact, our STIP Inclusion working group is already working on a Round 2 proposal - the backfund proposal came out first because it is simpler. :slightly_smiling_face: The member that you quoted, @Viperr is a part of this work group and I have spoken with him several times!
Please reach out to me on TG Alexlumley - would love to add you to our work group and push forward a Round 2. :sunglasses:
The current proposal thus represents ~10% of our budget for this quarter and is a good utilisation of funds in my personal opinion.
The cutoff was based on the original STIP round 1 voting. Basically any team that was approved (reached % for and passed quorum) but was not funded due to the 50m funding cap is on the list.
BUT the important thing is that after this STIP process, the data will be used to create a much more equitable, well-structured grant proposal for projects across different verticals and sizes. So lots on the line here.
Gauntlet is generally supportive of this proposal. As part of the working group that put together the original STIP program, the total budget (and amounts proposed for selection) was not scientifically chosen - rather, a larger emphasis was put on speed in response to the Arbitrum ecosystem's desire to move quickly. With that in mind, it makes sense to extend the funding to projects that received the required support from delegates but didn't receive funds due to budgetary constraints. We view the Round 2 process as separate from this and believe the learnings from Round 1 will help ensure blindspots like this are sufficiently covered moving forward.
@padzank @Djinn @omw2kokomo - Appreciate your support. We actually have a working group and a draft that we are finalizing based on feedback from delegates. Should get posted soon. If you'd like to review the draft please dm me on TG @AlexLumley .
@omw2kokomo - There are at least 15 proposals waiting for round 2 (I imagine more would come out - https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/c/dao-grant-programs/incentive-framework-round-2/15). The feedback we have received is the simplest path is backfunding and then creating a separate proposal for round 2 - as they would require a very different amount of work.
I agree, we should get the ball rolling asap.
Do we need to kickoff a snapshot vote? Seems like @0xRamen has a similar proposal going.
As @Djinn said below any team that passed quorum AND had greater than 50% FOR vote is included. You can see the full list of "approved teams" here: https://www.raho.me/stip
The cutoff was based on the original STIP round 1 voting. Basically any team that was approved (reached % for and passed quorum) but was not funded due to the 50m funding cap is on the list.
Round 2 isn't off the table because of the backfund.
If anything, this will accelerate round 2 happening, as we will have way more data to build better followup STIPs.
Hello everyone,
I write as a member & on behalf of the Trader Joe Governance Council:
Hello everyone,
I write as a member & on behalf of the Trader Joe Governance Council:
Firstly, kudos to the STIP-Inclusion working group for spearheading this proposal and working tirelessly to make sure that the STIP is more inclusive in nature and serves to give smaller projects an opportunity to show what their products are capable of achieving. Lest we forget that these incentives will be distributed from protocols, by virtue of the respective protocol's functions, and thus this will naturally give some much needed exposure to various projects that are either taking their first steps within the Ecosystem, or are small/medium-sized in their current stage of progression.
Secondly, the Trader Joe Governance Council would like to express its support for the Backfunding proposal. The main reason for our support here lies in the fact that for just an additional 21.4 Million ARB, the Ecosystem will be funding an additional 26 projects that will increase the incentive-impact of the STIP to a total of 56 projects. Hence, for less than half of the originally funded STIP, the Ecosystem will be able to fund almost double the amount it would have with the initially concluded STIP round. We see this value-add to be substantial in nature and one which will naturally lead to the STIP achieving a far greater successful outcome & impact. In addition, one of the goals of the STIP was to attract new developers and projects to the Ecosystem. As a Phase 1 participant, Trader Joe truly appreciates the substantial efforts invested by all parties involved. Remarkable small and medium-sized projects and developers participated, and we firmly believe that funding these projects independently via backfunding will successfully fulfil one of the primary goals of the STIP.
At its current stage, the STIP has already provided a host of lessons that ought to be taken into account for the structuring of future incentive programs within the Ecosystems (most predominantly, the main lesson being the need for a more equitable disbursement of incentives so as to grant small/medium-sized projects a level playing-field for incentive competition).
We look forward to working with other Ecosystem partners and contributors so as to make sure that future incentive programs cater for the aforementioned project-class and thus, serve to attract prospective start-ups to the Arbitrum Ecosystem.
Kind regards, Immutable Lawyer Axis Advisory
Hello I am writing as lead of the Arbitrum Treasury and Sustainability working group to comment on the budgetary implications and price impact of passing this proposal
We recently concluded our analysis on ArbitrumDAO's suggested spending limit for Q4 2023. We project there to be minimal price impact if the DAO limits itself to a 135-210 million liquidation until December end (of which 80 million has been already allocated).
Correct me if I am wrong, but this is also assuming delegates would have voted similarly if, instead, the initial ask was for a larger allocation. As all delegates were aware that only the top FOR vote proposals would be included until the cutoff, I do not believe this to be true.
With my belief of this being the case, and that other projects elected to go in Round 2 to avoid competition with Round 1 applicants, I believe all projects that were not awarded in Round 1, Round 2 current applicants, and any applicants who have not yet applied should all be viable to apply for a complete new Round 2 to pickoff when Round 1 ends.
as I have mentioned my concerned on 0xRamen's proposal
100% agreed on the importance of this proposal and the positive impact for the Arbitrum Ecosystem that the protocols, builders and communities already approved in STIP R1 should get funding.
I support the possibility to continue to fund the ecosystem communities through the protocols outlined here, even more considering that they had already reached approval individually in the Round 1 temperature check. However, my vote in this case is Against due to the fact that (i) we already had voted for a budget, and amongst the three options, 50M was the one that prevailed and it has already been depleted; (ii) the demand in STIP far exceeded the offer, and, as such, Round 2 ended up not being possible. Backfunding protocols that did not make it in Round 1 without considering the possibility of new entrants that were unable to meet the (rather slim) deadlines of the STIP for a potential Round 2 does not look like the ideal path.
The remaining 26 protocols and builders outlined here that haven't had the chance to get funding through STIP R1 will most likely get it no matter if this specific proposal passes. As feedback may I suggest considering creating a new proposal that encompasses both protocols who were "approved but not funded" in R1 plus a window for new entrants that were going to apply in R2 and weren't able to make it since the budget was depleted. This seems the fairier approach enabling better distribution.
Will be voting Against this proposal in temperature check, but open to voting in the subsequent round depending on how this proposal interacts with a possible Round Two for STIP.
As we consider allocating over 20 million ARB to a specific set of proposals, I express concern. This significant approval differs from enabling frameworks or reviewing grant applications individually through delegates, committees or grant programs. This new proposal removes the nuance of any review and asks us to simply fund all of them in full on the basis of a backfill.
The majority of proposals approved in ST1P were smaller scale sized / newer protocols with grant requests of $1m or under. While I understand how it was difficult for smaller protocols to gain attention so did make their case successfully, many large established protocols (who had no shortage of attention) finally didn’t qualify IMHO partly over concerns on the grant applications (size, means of distribution, alignment with Arbitrum).
Knowing the DAOs appetite to fund grants has limits, extending grants to protocols that didn’t achieve the same level of consensus from the DAO in ST1P has the probable effect of limiting or eliminating a round two, which will result in exclusion not inclusion as this proposal presents. I respect that the backfill proponents have committed to support a Round 2, but this proposal isn’t contingent on the success of Round 2 passing, while practically making its passing more difficult by consuming resources that would have been dedicated towards it.
Considering the current landscape:
While I genuinely appreciate the effort and engagement behind the current proposal, admiration alone cannot justify such a significant spend. A Round 2 proposal, likely to surface in the coming days, holds the promise of supporting the strongest applicants from the current backfill proposal and numerous others.
Whether this proposal passes or not, I implore your support for the initiation of a Round 2, which is not a vote for specific proposals but for giving an opportunity to all projects. I and hope other delegates should weigh where we end up with both processes before pushing forward funding for either backfund or Round 2.
The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check.
According to the STIP proposal, only 50 million ARB was originally allocated to support various projects within the Arbitrum ecosystem. However, this fund was quickly exhausted due to the large number of proposals received in the forum (a total of 106). Unfortunately, only the initial 30 projects that gained community approval were able to secure the incentives, leaving several other projects, that were also approved by the community, without any financial funding.
Given this situation and motivated by the insights provided in tnorm's proposal, which highlights the DAO's capability to unlock additional funds to backfund successful proposals, we believe the action suggested by this proposal is reasonable.
We support this proposal because we acknowledge that this whole process was a bit experimental, and it only seems fair to support those projects that have already been approved by the DAO but can’t fit within the budget. Going forward, though, we want to emphasize that this type of extension shouldn’t be used for future STIPs and we should formulate a solution to prevent this from happening again.
Below is the perspective of the Uniswap DAO’s Arbitrum governance team, composed of @juanbug and @AbdullahUmar:
Vote: For
Distributing 50M worth of rewards for STIP round one was really based on arbitrary consensus by the DAO. Since nothing of this magnitude has previously been conducted across any DAO, it was difficult to decide how much capital should be allotted to this type of program. We, along with many others, were surprised by the number of proposals. One can argue that the 50M allotment was anticipated for a smaller number of participants, and now, back funding is our way to compensate for the unprecedented number of successful applications.
Another consideration is recognizing that the most well known protocols attracted the most voting power. This is in part due to heuristic voting–people just vote for entities that they’re familiar with. Another factor is network–larger protocols typically have more sway over the decision-making of delegates. Since not all delegates made it a priority to help fund up-and-coming protocols, back funding those smaller projects seems reasonable.
Plus, it’s too soon to conduct a round two of STIPs. The next best step would be to observe and analyze the efficacy of the current STIP round. We don’t want to go through another round of voting so soon for the protocols who didn’t make the cut. Back funding is the less operationally intensive alternative.
I think this makes a lot of sense - better for data/analysis too. Extend the deadlines for both STIP 1 funded and this backfund
Just to put my comment in a twitter space into the thread here...
I feel like the deadlines for STIP are just too tight :-/
Just to put my comment in a twitter space into the thread here...
I feel like the deadlines for STIP are just too tight :-/
It would be interesting IMO to extend the deadlines for STIP for this group AND the first group. The KYC process is taking longer than expected and it is NEVER a good idea to rush development in the web3 space. Honestly... I expect some groups to just extend past the given deadline anyway...
Is it possible to extend the deadline for distributing rewards to the end of February for these STIP projects AND the original STIP projects?
We feel that backfunding and a Round 2 are distinctly separate issues and the latter should not be very relevant to approval of backfunding.
Backfunding already-approved grants is a smart, defensive move that demonstrates Arbitrum can honor its commitments. This is very much like the US government's debt ceiling debates -- the grants were duly approved through Arbitrum governance and it is only because of a gap in approved funding that the grants were not dispersed.
We feel that backfunding and a Round 2 are distinctly separate issues and the latter should not be very relevant to approval of backfunding.
Backfunding already-approved grants is a smart, defensive move that demonstrates Arbitrum can honor its commitments. This is very much like the US government's debt ceiling debates -- the grants were duly approved through Arbitrum governance and it is only because of a gap in approved funding that the grants were not dispersed.
We are skeptical of increased spending until the market digests ARB from recently approved measures. Backfunding, however, simply provides funds for those grants that ARB voters already expressed support for. Notably, this was done in an environment where large projects could utilize previous grants and airdrops to ensure they were "head of the line" by strategically voting their own large blocs.
While we would not go so far as to say approval of backfunding pays Arbitrum's debts, it certainly signals that Arbitrum is a reliable funding partner. It would not be surprising to see a competitor such as Polygon or Optimism to choose to court these projects -- which are disproportionately smaller with higher growth potential -- by providing a grant to replace the one approved but never delivered by Arbitrum.
Hi @mint_cloud and @deBridge - appreciate you commenting.
STIP Backfund AND round 2 can and should exist, they are not mutually exclusive. In fact as @thedevanshmehta stated (see below) this backfund proposal is only 10% of the treasury budget for q4 - there is plenty of room for a round 2.
Hi @mint_cloud and @deBridge - appreciate you commenting.
STIP Backfund AND round 2 can and should exist, they are not mutually exclusive. In fact as @thedevanshmehta stated (see below) this backfund proposal is only 10% of the treasury budget for q4 - there is plenty of room for a round 2.
In fact, our STIP Inclusion working group is already working on a Round 2 proposal - the backfund proposal came out first because it is simpler. :slightly_smiling_face: The member that you quoted, @Viperr is a part of this work group and I have spoken with him several times!
Please reach out to me on TG Alexlumley - would love to add you to our work group and push forward a Round 2. :sunglasses:
The current proposal thus represents ~10% of our budget for this quarter and is a good utilisation of funds in my personal opinion.
The cutoff was based on the original STIP round 1 voting. Basically any team that was approved (reached % for and passed quorum) but was not funded due to the 50m funding cap is on the list.
BUT the important thing is that after this STIP process, the data will be used to create a much more equitable, well-structured grant proposal for projects across different verticals and sizes. So lots on the line here.
Gauntlet is generally supportive of this proposal. As part of the working group that put together the original STIP program, the total budget (and amounts proposed for selection) was not scientifically chosen - rather, a larger emphasis was put on speed in response to the Arbitrum ecosystem's desire to move quickly. With that in mind, it makes sense to extend the funding to projects that received the required support from delegates but didn't receive funds due to budgetary constraints. We view the Round 2 process as separate from this and believe the learnings from Round 1 will help ensure blindspots like this are sufficiently covered moving forward.
@padzank @Djinn @omw2kokomo - Appreciate your support. We actually have a working group and a draft that we are finalizing based on feedback from delegates. Should get posted soon. If you'd like to review the draft please dm me on TG @AlexLumley .
@omw2kokomo - There are at least 15 proposals waiting for round 2 (I imagine more would come out - https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/c/dao-grant-programs/incentive-framework-round-2/15). The feedback we have received is the simplest path is backfunding and then creating a separate proposal for round 2 - as they would require a very different amount of work.
I agree, we should get the ball rolling asap.
Do we need to kickoff a snapshot vote? Seems like @0xRamen has a similar proposal going.
As @Djinn said below any team that passed quorum AND had greater than 50% FOR vote is included. You can see the full list of "approved teams" here: https://www.raho.me/stip
The cutoff was based on the original STIP round 1 voting. Basically any team that was approved (reached % for and passed quorum) but was not funded due to the 50m funding cap is on the list.
Round 2 isn't off the table because of the backfund.
If anything, this will accelerate round 2 happening, as we will have way more data to build better followup STIPs.
Hello everyone,
I write as a member & on behalf of the Trader Joe Governance Council:
Hello everyone,
I write as a member & on behalf of the Trader Joe Governance Council:
Firstly, kudos to the STIP-Inclusion working group for spearheading this proposal and working tirelessly to make sure that the STIP is more inclusive in nature and serves to give smaller projects an opportunity to show what their products are capable of achieving. Lest we forget that these incentives will be distributed from protocols, by virtue of the respective protocol's functions, and thus this will naturally give some much needed exposure to various projects that are either taking their first steps within the Ecosystem, or are small/medium-sized in their current stage of progression.
Secondly, the Trader Joe Governance Council would like to express its support for the Backfunding proposal. The main reason for our support here lies in the fact that for just an additional 21.4 Million ARB, the Ecosystem will be funding an additional 26 projects that will increase the incentive-impact of the STIP to a total of 56 projects. Hence, for less than half of the originally funded STIP, the Ecosystem will be able to fund almost double the amount it would have with the initially concluded STIP round. We see this value-add to be substantial in nature and one which will naturally lead to the STIP achieving a far greater successful outcome & impact. In addition, one of the goals of the STIP was to attract new developers and projects to the Ecosystem. As a Phase 1 participant, Trader Joe truly appreciates the substantial efforts invested by all parties involved. Remarkable small and medium-sized projects and developers participated, and we firmly believe that funding these projects independently via backfunding will successfully fulfil one of the primary goals of the STIP.
At its current stage, the STIP has already provided a host of lessons that ought to be taken into account for the structuring of future incentive programs within the Ecosystems (most predominantly, the main lesson being the need for a more equitable disbursement of incentives so as to grant small/medium-sized projects a level playing-field for incentive competition).
We look forward to working with other Ecosystem partners and contributors so as to make sure that future incentive programs cater for the aforementioned project-class and thus, serve to attract prospective start-ups to the Arbitrum Ecosystem.
Kind regards, Immutable Lawyer Axis Advisory
Hello I am writing as lead of the Arbitrum Treasury and Sustainability working group to comment on the budgetary implications and price impact of passing this proposal
We recently concluded our analysis on ArbitrumDAO's suggested spending limit for Q4 2023. We project there to be minimal price impact if the DAO limits itself to a 135-210 million liquidation until December end (of which 80 million has been already allocated).
Correct me if I am wrong, but this is also assuming delegates would have voted similarly if, instead, the initial ask was for a larger allocation. As all delegates were aware that only the top FOR vote proposals would be included until the cutoff, I do not believe this to be true.
With my belief of this being the case, and that other projects elected to go in Round 2 to avoid competition with Round 1 applicants, I believe all projects that were not awarded in Round 1, Round 2 current applicants, and any applicants who have not yet applied should all be viable to apply for a complete new Round 2 to pickoff when Round 1 ends.
as I have mentioned my concerned on 0xRamen's proposal
As @Djinn said below any team that passed quorum AND had greater than 50% FOR vote is included. You can see the full list of "approved teams" here: https://www.raho.me/stip
The cutoff was based on the original STIP round 1 voting. Basically any team that was approved (reached % for and passed quorum) but was not funded due to the 50m funding cap is on the list.
BUT the important thing is that after this STIP process, the data will be used to create a much more equitable, well-structured grant proposal for projects across different verticals and sizes. So lots on the line here.
Hello I am writing as lead of the Arbitrum Treasury and Sustainability working group to comment on the budgetary implications and price impact of passing this proposal
We recently concluded our analysis on ArbitrumDAO's suggested spending limit for Q4 2023. We project there to be minimal price impact if the DAO limits itself to a 135-210 million liquidation until December end (of which 80 million has been already allocated).
The current proposal thus represents ~10% of our budget for this quarter and is a good utilisation of funds in my personal opinion.
as I have mentioned my concerned on 0xRamen's proposal
While I see the potential benefits of extending the grant for projects that missed out—undoubtedly, this would foster the growth of their ecosystems and attract a wider audience to Arbitrum—it's crucial to analyze the potential downsides. Extending the grant implies an additional 20M+ ARB entering the market. Based on my rough calculations regarding the emission rate per day, this could provide ample opportunity for ARB farmers to dump their holdings, which might exert significant downward pressure on the market.Balancing the need for ecosystem growth with market stability is essential.
From a detailed analysis, taking into account the cumulative grant requests and the proposed 3-month program timeline, I’ve deduced that we are potentially looking at an emission rate of approximately 802,783.82 ARB/day. This number, when translated to the current market value, amounts to a staggering $642,227.05 of ARB that could be introduced into the market on a daily basis. And 72,250,544 ARB ($5,7800,435.2) selling pressure in 3-month period
These are the things that I am concerned about.
Please feel free to give an opinion about this!
This is a fair point. We never know if delegates will vote exactly the same but we are also cognizant of the amount of work that delegates put in to the initial STIP 1.
I apologize for the my mistake, but the link in the Snapshot should have gone to JonesDAO instead of JoJo. The data was then corrected.
As @Djinn said below any team that passed quorum AND had greater than 50% FOR vote is included. You can see the full list of "approved teams" here: https://www.raho.me/stip
The cutoff was based on the original STIP round 1 voting. Basically any team that was approved (reached % for and passed quorum) but was not funded due to the 50m funding cap is on the list.
BUT the important thing is that after this STIP process, the data will be used to create a much more equitable, well-structured grant proposal for projects across different verticals and sizes. So lots on the line here.
Hello I am writing as lead of the Arbitrum Treasury and Sustainability working group to comment on the budgetary implications and price impact of passing this proposal
We recently concluded our analysis on ArbitrumDAO's suggested spending limit for Q4 2023. We project there to be minimal price impact if the DAO limits itself to a 135-210 million liquidation until December end (of which 80 million has been already allocated).
The current proposal thus represents ~10% of our budget for this quarter and is a good utilisation of funds in my personal opinion.
as I have mentioned my concerned on 0xRamen's proposal
While I see the potential benefits of extending the grant for projects that missed out—undoubtedly, this would foster the growth of their ecosystems and attract a wider audience to Arbitrum—it's crucial to analyze the potential downsides. Extending the grant implies an additional 20M+ ARB entering the market. Based on my rough calculations regarding the emission rate per day, this could provide ample opportunity for ARB farmers to dump their holdings, which might exert significant downward pressure on the market.Balancing the need for ecosystem growth with market stability is essential.
From a detailed analysis, taking into account the cumulative grant requests and the proposed 3-month program timeline, I’ve deduced that we are potentially looking at an emission rate of approximately 802,783.82 ARB/day. This number, when translated to the current market value, amounts to a staggering $642,227.05 of ARB that could be introduced into the market on a daily basis. And 72,250,544 ARB ($5,7800,435.2) selling pressure in 3-month period
These are the things that I am concerned about.
Please feel free to give an opinion about this!
This is a fair point. We never know if delegates will vote exactly the same but we are also cognizant of the amount of work that delegates put in to the initial STIP 1.
I apologize for the my mistake, but the link in the Snapshot should have gone to JonesDAO instead of JoJo. The data was then corrected.
