NOTES:
Updated on April 10th : This is version 3 to prepare for Tally. Please read the update below for changes .
Join the Twitter space: "Arbitrum STIP-Bridge Tally proposal - open delegate call" on Thursday, April 10th at 5pm UTC. Set a Twitter reminder (or add to your calendar) here !

This proposal introduces the STIP Bridge, aiming to sustain and enhance Arbitrum’s market leadership by extending support to key protocols amidst intense competition from other Layer 2 solutions. It serves as a strategic interim solution, maintaining incentive alignment and ensuring continuous engagement of vital projects within the Arbitrum ecosystem until the Perpetual Incentives Program is initiated.
The Arbitrum ecosystem is currently facing unprecedented competitive pressures, with significant incentive programs launched by rival Layer 2 networks threatening to attract our established protocols away. The STIP Bridge is crucial for retaining these integral projects, ensuring they remain committed to Arbitrum by providing timely, targeted incentives. This initiative is essential to preserve network growth, user engagement, and overall ecosystem stability in a highly dynamic market environment.
Aligning with Arbitrum’s mission to support and nurture its development community, the STIP Bridge embodies our commitment to our builders and their contributions. It strategically addresses the imminent risk of losing key ecosystem participants to competitors by offering a seamless transition in incentive support. This approach not only retains critical projects and liquidity within Arbitrum but also sets a solid foundation for the impending comprehensive Perpetual Incentives Program, reinforcing our long-term vision of innovation and community empowerment.
Any protocol funded under STIP or the Backfund is eligible to apply for a bridge grant coinciding with the LTIPP distribution window.
This will allow Arbitrum to ensure protocols that had success during the STIP campaign can retain their users and continue to focus on building on Arbitrum.
Maximum funding requests under this bridge grant are capped based on a percentage of the prior funding received under STIP:
Greater than 500k ARB: may make a funding request of up to 50% of their prior funding.
Less than or equal to 500k ARB: may make funding requests up to 100% of their prior funding, capped at 250k ARB.
To give the community a better understanding of how protocols utilized their STIP grants, audits will be conducted.
OpenBlock Labs has been monitoring protocols included in STIP and reporting their data using dashboards.
OpenBlocks will be providing closing remarks on all protocols they have data for. These summaries will include:
The percentage of STIP allocation that recipients used
The amount of unused funds recipient protocols returned to the incentives multisig
Should be any remaining amount of full allocation
Success metrics compared to similar control protocols
Insights into oddities that occurred during the incentive period
Additional analysis opportunities:
Additionally, this proposal team has already asked the ARDC that once they are prepared to provide additional analysis and insights to prepare for LTIP.
This is also a great opportunity for Arbitrum community members to use the data that OpenBlocks has been sharing in their open-source dashboards to create their own analysis. Community-driven analysis of the success of STIP will bring many interpretations of the data and help delegates make the most informed decisions. This analysis could be compensated via a portion of the research bounty budget from LTIPP.
The advisors from the LTIPP (JoJo, SeedLatam, Castel Capital) proved to be a tremendous help to applicants as they ensured protocols received quality feedback, a better understanding of how much ARB they should request, and possible incentive mechanisms to use. Additionally, the Advisors stay on to support the protocols during the program allowing each team to better learn and iterate through testing.
The LTIPP advisors have agreed to assist similarly during the STIP bridge. Protocols applying to the bridge will have the opportunity to meet with an advisor. This will help them gain insights into their proposals. This not only helps guide applicants through the process but also ensures the DAO will have better proposals to review.
The advisors will hold office hours during the Addendum period to help answer questions protocols have, and to discuss with them through the Discord infrastructure already leveraged during LTIPP, in a way they could provide feedback on both previous results and/or new mechanisms to integrate.
The STIP Bridge will include a program manager to help ensure the program runs smoothly. As seen in other programs, a single manager is required to ensure efficient and effective operations and to deal with the unexpected situations that ultimately appear.
Project manager responsibilities:
Ensure Addendums are properly posted
Administer deadlines for various phases of the program
Handle COI with advisors
Help facilitate the posting of snapshots
Help coordinate with the multisig to ensure funds are properly distributed
Update grant recipients on program progress as streams start, run, and end
Matt Stein from StableLab will serve as the program manager.
Any STIP protocol wishing to apply will fill out the Addendum template
After filling out the Addendum, protocols will post it in the newly formed “STIP Bridge Addendum” section of the forum. These posts should be titled “[Protocol Name] STIP Addendum”
Applicants will be able to meet with an advisor during office hours to get feedback regarding their incentive plan and grant amount as protocols did with LTIPP.
Applicants will have around two weeks to submit their Addendums. Beginning when the Tally vote becomes active and ending when the tally vote ends.
Applicants can edit their Addendums as many times as they want until the deadline. Once the Tally vote ends Addendums are final and can no longer be modified.
During this time between the tally vote and the optimistic snapshots, delegates will have a week to review Addendums and prepare to post challenge snapshots for applicants they believe require a closer look.
Any delegate with at least 500K ARB delegated can put up a challenge snapshot using this challenge template.
An optimistic voting mechanism will be used to mitigate the potential for delegate fatigue from voting on 50+ proposals while still holding projects accountable for their overall performance within STIP and in general.
This optimistic model hopes to reduce the load on all delegates but ensure that the DAO’s full attention is placed on the more contentious proposals.
The Tally vote will earmark funds to allow the DAO to distribute up to the maximum permissible grants.
After applying with an Addendum, all properly submitted projects will be included in a single optimistic approval snapshot.
Should this snapshot pass, all included protocols not challenged by a separate challenge snapshot will be awarded their requested grant.
Any delegate with enough voting power to post to snapshot can put up a forum post and an associated snapshot proposal that will result in a full DAO vote for the individual grant streams for it to be approved.
Delegates may seek a full DAO vote at their own discretion if they believe that a project did:
(a) not fulfill their STIP requirements,
(b) failed to deliver tangible results during the STIP period or
(c) the amount sought in the bridge application would not result in an effective utilization of the DAO’s funds.
This will allow the DAO delegates to focus their available attention to more closely examine contested applications. To be accepted into the bridge program alongside the unchallenged proposals, the proposal to fund must receive a supermajority (66%) of votes in favor.
In case the full long-term incentives program gets delayed, this proposal will have a built-in extension method to prevent another gap between incentive programs.
If 4 weeks before the end of STIP Bridge incentives distribution, another incentive program has not passed a snapshot, then we will post another extension directly to Tally that extends funds for protocols that received funds from LTIPP and/or STIP Bridge.
Send funds to LTIP multisig
Have applicants post Addendums
Conduct Performance audits
Conduct Optimistic snapshot vote
Have DAO members challenge contested proposals on the forum
Conduct individual Snapshot votes for any challenged application
Have successful applicants complete compliance
Start streams along a similar timeline as LTIPP protocols
Monitored incentives throughout the program as done in STIP
This is a rough timeline. We aim to start the STIP Bridge around the same time as LTIPP.
Event
Dates
Summary
Tally Proposal
April 12th - April 28th
The proposal is voted on in Tally.
Audits conducted
Present - April 28th
OBL and any other interested members of the community will analyze and report the success of protocols in past STIP performance
Addendum & Advisor Feedback Period
April 13th - April 28th
Applicants will post their addendums. Applicants can work with the advisors and edit their applications until the deadline when the addendums will lock
Challenge and Review Period
April 29th - May 6th
Gives delegates a week to review each protocol and decide if a challenge snapshot in necessary
Optimistic Snapshot
May 6th - May 13th
A single snapshot will be posted to optimistically approve funding for all protocols that correctly submitted an addendum
Challenge Snapshots
May 6th - May 13th
Individual snapshots are posted by delegates for applicants who are deemed to need a closer look.
Incentives
12 weeks
Incentives are streamed to applicants from the multisig
See estimated amounts here
A maximum of 100K ARB will be used for the operational budget. This could be used to cover the costs of the advisors, pm, multisig signers, additional audits, and or any other expenses that come up while operating the proposal. A separate snapshot will be published to allow the DAO to decide how these funds will be spent.
Addendum template for protocols
NOTES:
Updated on April 10th : This is version 3 to prepare for Tally. Please read the update below for changes .
Join the Twitter space: "Arbitrum STIP-Bridge Tally proposal - open delegate call" on Thursday, April 10th at 5pm UTC. Set a Twitter reminder (or add to your calendar) here !

This proposal introduces the STIP Bridge, aiming to sustain and enhance Arbitrum’s market leadership by extending support to key protocols amidst intense competition from other Layer 2 solutions. It serves as a strategic interim solution, maintaining incentive alignment and ensuring continuous engagement of vital projects within the Arbitrum ecosystem until the Perpetual Incentives Program is initiated.
The Arbitrum ecosystem is currently facing unprecedented competitive pressures, with significant incentive programs launched by rival Layer 2 networks threatening to attract our established protocols away. The STIP Bridge is crucial for retaining these integral projects, ensuring they remain committed to Arbitrum by providing timely, targeted incentives. This initiative is essential to preserve network growth, user engagement, and overall ecosystem stability in a highly dynamic market environment.
Aligning with Arbitrum’s mission to support and nurture its development community, the STIP Bridge embodies our commitment to our builders and their contributions. It strategically addresses the imminent risk of losing key ecosystem participants to competitors by offering a seamless transition in incentive support. This approach not only retains critical projects and liquidity within Arbitrum but also sets a solid foundation for the impending comprehensive Perpetual Incentives Program, reinforcing our long-term vision of innovation and community empowerment.
Any protocol funded under STIP or the Backfund is eligible to apply for a bridge grant coinciding with the LTIPP distribution window.
This will allow Arbitrum to ensure protocols that had success during the STIP campaign can retain their users and continue to focus on building on Arbitrum.
Maximum funding requests under this bridge grant are capped based on a percentage of the prior funding received under STIP:
Greater than 500k ARB: may make a funding request of up to 50% of their prior funding.
Less than or equal to 500k ARB: may make funding requests up to 100% of their prior funding, capped at 250k ARB.
To give the community a better understanding of how protocols utilized their STIP grants, audits will be conducted.
OpenBlock Labs has been monitoring protocols included in STIP and reporting their data using dashboards.
OpenBlocks will be providing closing remarks on all protocols they have data for. These summaries will include:
The percentage of STIP allocation that recipients used
The amount of unused funds recipient protocols returned to the incentives multisig
Should be any remaining amount of full allocation
Success metrics compared to similar control protocols
Insights into oddities that occurred during the incentive period
Additional analysis opportunities:
Additionally, this proposal team has already asked the ARDC that once they are prepared to provide additional analysis and insights to prepare for LTIP.
This is also a great opportunity for Arbitrum community members to use the data that OpenBlocks has been sharing in their open-source dashboards to create their own analysis. Community-driven analysis of the success of STIP will bring many interpretations of the data and help delegates make the most informed decisions. This analysis could be compensated via a portion of the research bounty budget from LTIPP.
The advisors from the LTIPP (JoJo, SeedLatam, Castel Capital) proved to be a tremendous help to applicants as they ensured protocols received quality feedback, a better understanding of how much ARB they should request, and possible incentive mechanisms to use. Additionally, the Advisors stay on to support the protocols during the program allowing each team to better learn and iterate through testing.
The LTIPP advisors have agreed to assist similarly during the STIP bridge. Protocols applying to the bridge will have the opportunity to meet with an advisor. This will help them gain insights into their proposals. This not only helps guide applicants through the process but also ensures the DAO will have better proposals to review.
The advisors will hold office hours during the Addendum period to help answer questions protocols have, and to discuss with them through the Discord infrastructure already leveraged during LTIPP, in a way they could provide feedback on both previous results and/or new mechanisms to integrate.
The STIP Bridge will include a program manager to help ensure the program runs smoothly. As seen in other programs, a single manager is required to ensure efficient and effective operations and to deal with the unexpected situations that ultimately appear.
Project manager responsibilities:
Ensure Addendums are properly posted
Administer deadlines for various phases of the program
Handle COI with advisors
Help facilitate the posting of snapshots
Help coordinate with the multisig to ensure funds are properly distributed
Update grant recipients on program progress as streams start, run, and end
Matt Stein from StableLab will serve as the program manager.
Any STIP protocol wishing to apply will fill out the Addendum template
After filling out the Addendum, protocols will post it in the newly formed “STIP Bridge Addendum” section of the forum. These posts should be titled “[Protocol Name] STIP Addendum”
Applicants will be able to meet with an advisor during office hours to get feedback regarding their incentive plan and grant amount as protocols did with LTIPP.
Applicants will have around two weeks to submit their Addendums. Beginning when the Tally vote becomes active and ending when the tally vote ends.
Applicants can edit their Addendums as many times as they want until the deadline. Once the Tally vote ends Addendums are final and can no longer be modified.
During this time between the tally vote and the optimistic snapshots, delegates will have a week to review Addendums and prepare to post challenge snapshots for applicants they believe require a closer look.
Any delegate with at least 500K ARB delegated can put up a challenge snapshot using this challenge template.
An optimistic voting mechanism will be used to mitigate the potential for delegate fatigue from voting on 50+ proposals while still holding projects accountable for their overall performance within STIP and in general.
This optimistic model hopes to reduce the load on all delegates but ensure that the DAO’s full attention is placed on the more contentious proposals.
The Tally vote will earmark funds to allow the DAO to distribute up to the maximum permissible grants.
After applying with an Addendum, all properly submitted projects will be included in a single optimistic approval snapshot.
Should this snapshot pass, all included protocols not challenged by a separate challenge snapshot will be awarded their requested grant.
Any delegate with enough voting power to post to snapshot can put up a forum post and an associated snapshot proposal that will result in a full DAO vote for the individual grant streams for it to be approved.
Delegates may seek a full DAO vote at their own discretion if they believe that a project did:
(a) not fulfill their STIP requirements,
(b) failed to deliver tangible results during the STIP period or
(c) the amount sought in the bridge application would not result in an effective utilization of the DAO’s funds.
This will allow the DAO delegates to focus their available attention to more closely examine contested applications. To be accepted into the bridge program alongside the unchallenged proposals, the proposal to fund must receive a supermajority (66%) of votes in favor.
In case the full long-term incentives program gets delayed, this proposal will have a built-in extension method to prevent another gap between incentive programs.
If 4 weeks before the end of STIP Bridge incentives distribution, another incentive program has not passed a snapshot, then we will post another extension directly to Tally that extends funds for protocols that received funds from LTIPP and/or STIP Bridge.
Send funds to LTIP multisig
Have applicants post Addendums
Conduct Performance audits
Conduct Optimistic snapshot vote
Have DAO members challenge contested proposals on the forum
Conduct individual Snapshot votes for any challenged application
Have successful applicants complete compliance
Start streams along a similar timeline as LTIPP protocols
Monitored incentives throughout the program as done in STIP
This is a rough timeline. We aim to start the STIP Bridge around the same time as LTIPP.
Event
Dates
Summary
Tally Proposal
April 12th - April 28th
The proposal is voted on in Tally.
Audits conducted
Present - April 28th
OBL and any other interested members of the community will analyze and report the success of protocols in past STIP performance
Addendum & Advisor Feedback Period
April 13th - April 28th
Applicants will post their addendums. Applicants can work with the advisors and edit their applications until the deadline when the addendums will lock
Challenge and Review Period
April 29th - May 6th
Gives delegates a week to review each protocol and decide if a challenge snapshot in necessary
Optimistic Snapshot
May 6th - May 13th
A single snapshot will be posted to optimistically approve funding for all protocols that correctly submitted an addendum
Challenge Snapshots
May 6th - May 13th
Individual snapshots are posted by delegates for applicants who are deemed to need a closer look.
Incentives
12 weeks
Incentives are streamed to applicants from the multisig
See estimated amounts here
A maximum of 100K ARB will be used for the operational budget. This could be used to cover the costs of the advisors, pm, multisig signers, additional audits, and or any other expenses that come up while operating the proposal. A separate snapshot will be published to allow the DAO to decide how these funds will be spent.
Addendum template for protocols
I'm against additional grants at this pace. More: forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/66
Some concerns stated during the temp check wasn't addressed so we are voting against this proposal
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/93?u=griff
I'm against additional grants at this pace. More: forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/66
Some concerns stated during the temp check wasn't addressed so we are voting against this proposal
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/93?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/91
I value the willingness of the DAO to try things and allocate capital, voting yes to continue the experiment
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/90?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/82?u=princetonblockchain
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/81?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/79
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/78?u=ocandocrypto
StableLab supports the bridge as we feel it is important to keep this group of protocols committed to Arbitrum and provide those that used their STIP grants effectively incentives before the LTIP is in place. We also think this sets the DAO up nicely as it puts everyone on the same schedule and aligns the DAO with the Goal of launching the LTIP in July
Confirming my Snapshot vote: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/35?u=jojo
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/77?u=mcfly
The original STIP was both a success and a great way to gather data on how incentivising different protocols in the ecosystem benefits Arbitrum. It's time to double down.
STIP通过提供及时、有针对性的激励,确保它们始终致力于Arbitrum。这一举措对于保持网络增长、用户参与和整体生态系统的稳定在一个高度动态的市场环境中至关重要。我个人是非常早期的支持ARB生态,深知生态协议的重要性,我非常赞同这个提案
We consider the decision to make double payments without taking into account the results to be incorrect.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/68?u=princetonblockchain
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-9: https://eventhorizon.vote/vote/active/ehARB-9
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/61?u=krst
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/59?u=blockworksresearch
The timing and eligibility criteria are not palatable. We can revisit after LTIPP
This is just too soon, let's wait a couple months and then I will fully support another round.
In the short term, it should be more market-driven. Too much of the amount of action instead of interfering with the operation of the market
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/51?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/50?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/49?u=maxlomu
This proposal does not correspond to the interests of the DAO and simply abuses the treasury
Voting following SPELL holders decision. Abracadabra Money stands strong behind the Doubling Down.
It is needed and they put in the effort to make it fair
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/91
I value the willingness of the DAO to try things and allocate capital, voting yes to continue the experiment
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/90?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/82?u=princetonblockchain
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/81?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/79
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/78?u=ocandocrypto
StableLab supports the bridge as we feel it is important to keep this group of protocols committed to Arbitrum and provide those that used their STIP grants effectively incentives before the LTIP is in place. We also think this sets the DAO up nicely as it puts everyone on the same schedule and aligns the DAO with the Goal of launching the LTIP in July
Confirming my Snapshot vote: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/35?u=jojo
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/77?u=mcfly
The original STIP was both a success and a great way to gather data on how incentivising different protocols in the ecosystem benefits Arbitrum. It's time to double down.
STIP通过提供及时、有针对性的激励,确保它们始终致力于Arbitrum。这一举措对于保持网络增长、用户参与和整体生态系统的稳定在一个高度动态的市场环境中至关重要。我个人是非常早期的支持ARB生态,深知生态协议的重要性,我非常赞同这个提案
We consider the decision to make double payments without taking into account the results to be incorrect.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/68?u=princetonblockchain
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-9: https://eventhorizon.vote/vote/active/ehARB-9
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/61?u=krst
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/59?u=blockworksresearch
The timing and eligibility criteria are not palatable. We can revisit after LTIPP
This is just too soon, let's wait a couple months and then I will fully support another round.
In the short term, it should be more market-driven. Too much of the amount of action instead of interfering with the operation of the market
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/51?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/50?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/double-down-on-stip-successes-stip-bridge/22353/49?u=maxlomu
This proposal does not correspond to the interests of the DAO and simply abuses the treasury
Voting following SPELL holders decision. Abracadabra Money stands strong behind the Doubling Down.
It is needed and they put in the effort to make it fair
Thanks for the update @raam ! We based the reporting on the original STIP Bridge proposal (Tally Link), which included an allocation budget. Once all funding has been distributed we will do a final recon - the initial proposal allocated funding to 56 protocols so we have used that as the starting point. We will compare that to the actual number of protocols that receive funding once the program is finished but thanks for spotting that!
Hi all. In preparation for r3gen's upcoming Token Flow Report, which is set to be released early next week, we're sharing excerpts related to each section directly in the corresponding forum thread. Below are the extracts from our report concerning all STIP programs
Feel free to contact @Jono_Gibbs on Telegram if you would like to discuss anything further - alternatively, reach out to the r3gen team.
Thanks for the update @raam ! We based the reporting on the original STIP Bridge proposal (Tally Link), which included an allocation budget. Once all funding has been distributed we will do a final recon - the initial proposal allocated funding to 56 protocols so we have used that as the starting point. We will compare that to the actual number of protocols that receive funding once the program is finished but thanks for spotting that!
Hi all. In preparation for r3gen's upcoming Token Flow Report, which is set to be released early next week, we're sharing excerpts related to each section directly in the corresponding forum thread. Below are the extracts from our report concerning all STIP programs
Feel free to contact @Jono_Gibbs on Telegram if you would like to discuss anything further - alternatively, reach out to the r3gen team.

They voted their proposal in favor :D Maybe good signaling is not tolerated here who knows

They voted their proposal in favor :D Maybe good signaling is not tolerated here who knows
Less than or equal to 500k ARB: may make funding requests up to 100% of their prior funding, capped at 250k ARB.
Less than or equal to 500k ARB: may make funding requests up to 100% of their prior funding, capped at 250k ARB.
Not sure if anyone has called this out already, but this wording is kind of nonsense, no? If anything <= 500k can only get a request up to 250k, then they are not eligible for 100% of their prior funding. It's really that anything <= 250k is eligible for 100% of their prior funding, everyone else is eligible for 50% unless you are between 250k and 500k. It's kind of a convoluted rule to apply, but the wording certainly doesn't help.
A few questions:
On behalf of Stella protcol, I support the proposal, and think it is a strong effort in maintaining Arbitrum's lead amidst strong competition from upcoming L2s.
Also support the thought of minimzing the overhead and fatigue on delegates of going through the application process all over again. The good work done by the Openblocks team can be used as a yardstick in judging the performance of protocols.
think the best solution put forth here is to instead of just back funding proposals, allow protocols to apply to the LTIPP - or we could even call its Round 2 as was done during the STIP. Proposals can be critiqued by council members and also be adjusted down to a budget that they deem appropriate - we are happy to write a new proposal with clear milestone goals in mind.
This isn't meant as a dig at Premia or anything but from the screenshot @dk3 attached to their message, it seems that their TVL is sinking as users are jumping ship to the next incentivized protocol. I don't think that this is what was envisioned for the result of STIP; to have users temporarily come as tourists to enjoy the incentivized on-chain activity and then go back to the dApps and chains from which they came.
I think it's easy for protocols to hop in this forum and support this proposal to continue to boost the KPIs that STIP has allowed them to. However, do we have any solid data to give us a reason to believe that STIP materially increased these KPIs in the long term and is going to allow these protocols to retain users?
I think that having STIP rounds 1, 2, and the pilot program for LTIP will give us the data we need to properly assess the proposals for the LTIP. I imagine that any interim funding will smooth out the data we're looking to collect and snub us of the insight we're looking to attain from running this program in the first place.
Less than or equal to 500k ARB: may make funding requests up to 100% of their prior funding, capped at 250k ARB.
Less than or equal to 500k ARB: may make funding requests up to 100% of their prior funding, capped at 250k ARB.
Not sure if anyone has called this out already, but this wording is kind of nonsense, no? If anything <= 500k can only get a request up to 250k, then they are not eligible for 100% of their prior funding. It's really that anything <= 250k is eligible for 100% of their prior funding, everyone else is eligible for 50% unless you are between 250k and 500k. It's kind of a convoluted rule to apply, but the wording certainly doesn't help.
A few questions:
On behalf of Stella protcol, I support the proposal, and think it is a strong effort in maintaining Arbitrum's lead amidst strong competition from upcoming L2s.
Also support the thought of minimzing the overhead and fatigue on delegates of going through the application process all over again. The good work done by the Openblocks team can be used as a yardstick in judging the performance of protocols.
think the best solution put forth here is to instead of just back funding proposals, allow protocols to apply to the LTIPP - or we could even call its Round 2 as was done during the STIP. Proposals can be critiqued by council members and also be adjusted down to a budget that they deem appropriate - we are happy to write a new proposal with clear milestone goals in mind.
This isn't meant as a dig at Premia or anything but from the screenshot @dk3 attached to their message, it seems that their TVL is sinking as users are jumping ship to the next incentivized protocol. I don't think that this is what was envisioned for the result of STIP; to have users temporarily come as tourists to enjoy the incentivized on-chain activity and then go back to the dApps and chains from which they came.
I think it's easy for protocols to hop in this forum and support this proposal to continue to boost the KPIs that STIP has allowed them to. However, do we have any solid data to give us a reason to believe that STIP materially increased these KPIs in the long term and is going to allow these protocols to retain users?
I think that having STIP rounds 1, 2, and the pilot program for LTIP will give us the data we need to properly assess the proposals for the LTIP. I imagine that any interim funding will smooth out the data we're looking to collect and snub us of the insight we're looking to attain from running this program in the first place.
think the best solution put forth here is to instead of just back funding proposals, allow protocols to apply to the LTIPP - or we could even call its Round 2 as was done during the STIP. Proposals can be critiqued by council members and also be adjusted down to a budget that they deem appropriate - we are happy to write a new proposal with clear milestone goals in mind.
D2 Finance fully supports this approach.
We believe there's no need for a lengthy application process. Instead, protocols should back up their requests with data and conduct a quick vote.
As traders deeply involved in the ecosystem and positioned to assess opportunities in various DeFi protocols for our vault allocations ( see Dune below), we also have an additional suggestion for the metric to consider.
In addition to data like the Sybil analysis from forum.arbitrum.foundation (e.g., "OpenBlock Labs STIP Efficacy Sybil Analysis"), to also consider token price as a metric.
https://dune.com/d2_finance/d2-finance-analytics

This is by no means a perfect metric, but it's less susceptible to manipulation compared to TVL and volumes. Ultimately, the token price signals the market's confidence in a protocol. If it suffers significant losses, it's likely because users did not see the benefits ( maybe because was diverted by sybil) of the STIP and they "voted" already with their wallets.
I think the best solution put forth here is to instead of just back funding proposals, allow protocols to apply to the LTIPP - or we could even call its Round 2 as was done during the STIP. Proposals can be critiqued by council members and also be adjusted down to a budget that they deem appropriate - we are happy to write a new proposal with clear milestone goals in mind.
I like the idea of continuing good progress for STIP host protocols. Does perform well coincide with the metrics provided during the STIP proposal phase by each protocol or a separate set of metrics?
It would be expected that protocols see a downturn when STIP grant funds are depleted so retained growth would be a clear metric.
I like the idea of continuing good progress for STIP host protocols. Does perform well coincide with the metrics provided during the STIP proposal phase by each protocol or a separate set of metrics?
It would be expected that protocols see a downturn when STIP grant funds are depleted so retained growth would be a clear metric.
Also at this point it feels like the ask is quite high with LTIP progressing and also balancing treasury funds. This is not withstanding further incentivisation whilst a number of viable L2's are developing a robust user base
*Important: this opinion is solely my own
@pedrob has pretty much summed up my thoughts regarding this proposal.
*Important: this opinion is solely my own
@pedrob has pretty much summed up my thoughts regarding this proposal.
i understand we are still in growth stage, with massive treasury to fund initiatives, but i'm personally uncomfortable with two main developments. First is pushing forward very similar proposals with no clear explanation on their value-add vs the existing / in-progress ones. It's important to look at proposals in tandem with DAO's efforts as a whole vs. in a stand-alone, piecemeal fashion. Second is lack of follow-up to assess the supposed success of previous proposals before commencing with an extension.
On a related note, I don't think there's much debate that most of the capital (in DeFi in general) is mercenary and this cycle's meta is not DeFi so we're fighting an upward battle here. Measures like fund/user stickiness would be interesting to look at.
The ARB token had 42% (of existing circulating supply) unlock couple of days ago, and we're already seeing movements to offboard the risks. With continued selling pressure of the token, perhaps it's also a time to take care of our treasury.
This is a good initiative due to the wild market, but we should really encourage the DAO to analyze STIP and LTIPP performance so we can actually learn from the insights instead of throwing spaghetti against the wall.
In support of this proposal
Recent L2 launches have been heavily incentivised and / or offered leading yields on blue-chips and stables to attract and retain users.
I think Arbitrum needs to stay competitive with these incentives especially with the current rise of Base / OP and the behemoth funding of Coinbase behind them.
I'd vote to proceed with the proposal.
Very well written - looking at competition in the space and how that is working for growth is a great idea.
Mantle has successfully onboarded 100k+ meth to their L2 through clever usage of incentives (and yield subsidization). There's no reason arbitrum can't mimic that model, altering it to incentivize what we deem important.
The dForce DAO supports the proposal!
The STIP initiatives encourage developers to introduce promising advancements and create interconnected value across the Arbitrum ecosystem, establishing a robust ecosystem where users find compelling reasons to remain engaged. This strategy not only attract new users but also guarantees that current users consistently discover value, solidifying their commitment to Arbitrum over the long term, With the help of STIP initiatives, Arbitrum can further secure its expansion and lasting success amidst the dynamic blockchain environment.
The Lodestar DAO supports the proposal to extend the STIP incentive program.
Since its inception, the STIP program has proven its success across every measurable aspect within the Arbitrum ecosystem. It has not only catalyzed Total Value Locked (TVL) and user growth but has also fostered an environment ripe for partnerships and collaboration among its grantees.
The Lodestar DAO supports the proposal to extend the STIP incentive program.
Since its inception, the STIP program has proven its success across every measurable aspect within the Arbitrum ecosystem. It has not only catalyzed Total Value Locked (TVL) and user growth but has also fostered an environment ripe for partnerships and collaboration among its grantees.
In the wake of the launch of numerous new Layer 2 solutions in the upcoming months, the extension of the STIP program is not merely beneficial— it is also strategic: We firmly believe that this move is pivotal for Arbitrum to maintain and solidify its leadership in the Layer 2 space.
On behalf of the Trader Joe Governance Council, we believe Arbitrums actions now are paramount to retaining its significant edge in the L2 space. Removing support for a large number of protocols, including many flagship protocols, would be at some detriment to the ecosystem and give users greater reason to start discovering newer ecosystems that are launching and competing. The next months are key.
OpenBlocks have shared enough data for what is a value return and what necessarily 'isnt' a good value return: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/openblock-labs-stip-efficacy-sybil-analysis-2-24/21441
On behalf of the Silo Finance team, we cast our full support for the proposal. The STIP program has proved significant success for the entire ecosystem. For the lending vertical, its efficacy cannot be overstated. The STI-Bridge will enable Arbitrum projects to remain competitive relative to the larger DeFi ecosystem.
think the best solution put forth here is to instead of just back funding proposals, allow protocols to apply to the LTIPP - or we could even call its Round 2 as was done during the STIP. Proposals can be critiqued by council members and also be adjusted down to a budget that they deem appropriate - we are happy to write a new proposal with clear milestone goals in mind.
D2 Finance fully supports this approach.
We believe there's no need for a lengthy application process. Instead, protocols should back up their requests with data and conduct a quick vote.
As traders deeply involved in the ecosystem and positioned to assess opportunities in various DeFi protocols for our vault allocations ( see Dune below), we also have an additional suggestion for the metric to consider.
In addition to data like the Sybil analysis from forum.arbitrum.foundation (e.g., "OpenBlock Labs STIP Efficacy Sybil Analysis"), to also consider token price as a metric.
https://dune.com/d2_finance/d2-finance-analytics

This is by no means a perfect metric, but it's less susceptible to manipulation compared to TVL and volumes. Ultimately, the token price signals the market's confidence in a protocol. If it suffers significant losses, it's likely because users did not see the benefits ( maybe because was diverted by sybil) of the STIP and they "voted" already with their wallets.
I think the best solution put forth here is to instead of just back funding proposals, allow protocols to apply to the LTIPP - or we could even call its Round 2 as was done during the STIP. Proposals can be critiqued by council members and also be adjusted down to a budget that they deem appropriate - we are happy to write a new proposal with clear milestone goals in mind.
I like the idea of continuing good progress for STIP host protocols. Does perform well coincide with the metrics provided during the STIP proposal phase by each protocol or a separate set of metrics?
It would be expected that protocols see a downturn when STIP grant funds are depleted so retained growth would be a clear metric.
I like the idea of continuing good progress for STIP host protocols. Does perform well coincide with the metrics provided during the STIP proposal phase by each protocol or a separate set of metrics?
It would be expected that protocols see a downturn when STIP grant funds are depleted so retained growth would be a clear metric.
Also at this point it feels like the ask is quite high with LTIP progressing and also balancing treasury funds. This is not withstanding further incentivisation whilst a number of viable L2's are developing a robust user base
*Important: this opinion is solely my own
@pedrob has pretty much summed up my thoughts regarding this proposal.
*Important: this opinion is solely my own
@pedrob has pretty much summed up my thoughts regarding this proposal.
i understand we are still in growth stage, with massive treasury to fund initiatives, but i'm personally uncomfortable with two main developments. First is pushing forward very similar proposals with no clear explanation on their value-add vs the existing / in-progress ones. It's important to look at proposals in tandem with DAO's efforts as a whole vs. in a stand-alone, piecemeal fashion. Second is lack of follow-up to assess the supposed success of previous proposals before commencing with an extension.
On a related note, I don't think there's much debate that most of the capital (in DeFi in general) is mercenary and this cycle's meta is not DeFi so we're fighting an upward battle here. Measures like fund/user stickiness would be interesting to look at.
The ARB token had 42% (of existing circulating supply) unlock couple of days ago, and we're already seeing movements to offboard the risks. With continued selling pressure of the token, perhaps it's also a time to take care of our treasury.
This is a good initiative due to the wild market, but we should really encourage the DAO to analyze STIP and LTIPP performance so we can actually learn from the insights instead of throwing spaghetti against the wall.
In support of this proposal
Recent L2 launches have been heavily incentivised and / or offered leading yields on blue-chips and stables to attract and retain users.
I think Arbitrum needs to stay competitive with these incentives especially with the current rise of Base / OP and the behemoth funding of Coinbase behind them.
I'd vote to proceed with the proposal.
Very well written - looking at competition in the space and how that is working for growth is a great idea.
Mantle has successfully onboarded 100k+ meth to their L2 through clever usage of incentives (and yield subsidization). There's no reason arbitrum can't mimic that model, altering it to incentivize what we deem important.
The dForce DAO supports the proposal!
The STIP initiatives encourage developers to introduce promising advancements and create interconnected value across the Arbitrum ecosystem, establishing a robust ecosystem where users find compelling reasons to remain engaged. This strategy not only attract new users but also guarantees that current users consistently discover value, solidifying their commitment to Arbitrum over the long term, With the help of STIP initiatives, Arbitrum can further secure its expansion and lasting success amidst the dynamic blockchain environment.
The Lodestar DAO supports the proposal to extend the STIP incentive program.
Since its inception, the STIP program has proven its success across every measurable aspect within the Arbitrum ecosystem. It has not only catalyzed Total Value Locked (TVL) and user growth but has also fostered an environment ripe for partnerships and collaboration among its grantees.
The Lodestar DAO supports the proposal to extend the STIP incentive program.
Since its inception, the STIP program has proven its success across every measurable aspect within the Arbitrum ecosystem. It has not only catalyzed Total Value Locked (TVL) and user growth but has also fostered an environment ripe for partnerships and collaboration among its grantees.
In the wake of the launch of numerous new Layer 2 solutions in the upcoming months, the extension of the STIP program is not merely beneficial— it is also strategic: We firmly believe that this move is pivotal for Arbitrum to maintain and solidify its leadership in the Layer 2 space.
On behalf of the Trader Joe Governance Council, we believe Arbitrums actions now are paramount to retaining its significant edge in the L2 space. Removing support for a large number of protocols, including many flagship protocols, would be at some detriment to the ecosystem and give users greater reason to start discovering newer ecosystems that are launching and competing. The next months are key.
OpenBlocks have shared enough data for what is a value return and what necessarily 'isnt' a good value return: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/openblock-labs-stip-efficacy-sybil-analysis-2-24/21441
On behalf of the Silo Finance team, we cast our full support for the proposal. The STIP program has proved significant success for the entire ecosystem. For the lending vertical, its efficacy cannot be overstated. The STI-Bridge will enable Arbitrum projects to remain competitive relative to the larger DeFi ecosystem.
On behalf of the Trader Joe Governance Council, we believe Arbitrums actions now are paramount to retaining its significant edge in the L2 space. Removing support for a large number of protocols, including many flagship protocols, would be at some detriment to the ecosystem and give users greater reason to start discovering newer ecosystems that are launching and competing. The next months are key.
OpenBlocks have shared enough data for what is a value return and what necessarily 'isnt' a good value return: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/openblock-labs-stip-efficacy-sybil-analysis-2-24/21441
Support this proposal and move it forward.
Coming from Silo - we would of course support this.
Giving a proportionally smaller grant would help to ween off markets from incentives and probably provide some good insights that data providers like Openblock could study to determine efficiency of the STIP rather than a cold turkey cut into a different program. As things are the LTIPP will 100% promote capital flight from STIP protocols, since you are starting incentives in one place and cutting them off elsewhere. Although we have already planned for this it would be fantastic to get a smaller supplemental version of the STIP to help 'bridge' the gap to the LTIP.
Coming from Silo - we would of course support this.
Giving a proportionally smaller grant would help to ween off markets from incentives and probably provide some good insights that data providers like Openblock could study to determine efficiency of the STIP rather than a cold turkey cut into a different program. As things are the LTIPP will 100% promote capital flight from STIP protocols, since you are starting incentives in one place and cutting them off elsewhere. Although we have already planned for this it would be fantastic to get a smaller supplemental version of the STIP to help 'bridge' the gap to the LTIP.
Nothing against using KPIs either to gauge placement if that's something the DAO should want although I will say what a KPI is varies greatly by protocol and I'm afraid people would basically default to TVL since there isn't a great grading rubric in place for vertical specific metrics. (I am saying this even though Silo is particularly strong in basically all metrics because it isn't fair to protocols with different focus.)
I also strongly resent the hate towards Dolomite here - they are by no means an AAVE/Compound fork and indicating they are shows a lack of knowledge and disregard for the tremendous work behind building a lending protocol from scratch and securing it.
Dolomite hasn't pocketed any spreads between borrowing and lending despite the admin fees being accrued. They're sitting in the smart contract until we transition to a DAO and the DAO decides what to do with them.
Moreover, AAVE didn't follows the rules for the grant submission process and their application was rejected because of that. Them not receiving a grant did not come at the expense of Dolomite getting one.
Dolomite hasn't pocketed any spreads between borrowing and lending despite the admin fees being accrued. They're sitting in the smart contract until we transition to a DAO and the DAO decides what to do with them.
Moreover, AAVE didn't follows the rules for the grant submission process and their application was rejected because of that. Them not receiving a grant did not come at the expense of Dolomite getting one.
It sounds to me like you enjoy the status quo and "kingmaking" AAVE instead of trying to push the industry forward or enable competition. Dolomite offers several novel features that AAVE doesn't have and can't support unless they release a new version entirely. Dolomite is the only Arbitrum-native lending protocol that hasn't suffered a security incident since our launch in October of 2022. Dolomite also fulfills a specific role in the market by offering long-tail asset support you can't find elsewhere, mixed with returning DeFi-native rights to users.
You should look more closely at the facts and usage patterns of our protocol before grandstanding about things you have no idea about. What exactly have you built or done to contribute to Arbitrum aside from complaining?
As a matter of fact, most of your points revolving around grifting just describe the practices any for-profit DeFi protocol utilizes to earn revenue and literally pay to keep the lights on. Should GMX turn off fee accrual because they subsidize trade fees with ARB? Give me a break.
Dolomite doesn't have a native token. We have no "bags" to unload
Dolomite is not an AAVE nor Compound fork. We made everything ourselves and experienced considerable growth that is sticky because of the composition of oARB users
Please create an original argument that doesn't look like a Chat-GPT-originated post
Pointing fingers aside, Dolomite would love to support this STIP-Bridge proposal to keep our lending rates more competitive with rates on other networks.
Dolomite doesn't have a native token. We have no "bags" to unload
Dolomite is not an AAVE nor Compound fork. We made everything ourselves and experienced considerable growth that is sticky because of the composition of oARB users
Please create an original argument that doesn't look like a Chat-GPT-originated post
Pointing fingers aside, Dolomite would love to support this STIP-Bridge proposal to keep our lending rates more competitive with rates on other networks.
I think the approach to take with STIP-Bridge is to look at what it takes to remain competitive with other networks that are distributing points or native token rewards. Speaking for Arbitrum as a whole, we should try to stay "on par" with competing networks so there isn't a strong reason to see liquidity flow to other networks once STIP is over.
I strongly agree with this.
Many protocols have successfully executed their STIp KPI, and they need and would gain tremendous advantages from prolonging this STIP program.
Number and sizes also seem extremely coherent with what I would expect protocols to receive. Very bullish on this.
I strongly agree with this.
Many protocols have successfully executed their STIp KPI, and they need and would gain tremendous advantages from prolonging this STIP program.
Number and sizes also seem extremely coherent with what I would expect protocols to receive. Very bullish on this.
I took the liberty to already create an RFC on the Abracadabra Forum to allow users to educate themselves on it and cast their vote. It can be found here.
hey @r3gen_Finance , I dont think 56 protocols were allocated STIP bridge.
See this list of protocols that are part of the STIP bridge Start of STIP.B Streams and Timeline of Incentives
On behalf of the Trader Joe Governance Council, we believe Arbitrums actions now are paramount to retaining its significant edge in the L2 space. Removing support for a large number of protocols, including many flagship protocols, would be at some detriment to the ecosystem and give users greater reason to start discovering newer ecosystems that are launching and competing. The next months are key.
OpenBlocks have shared enough data for what is a value return and what necessarily 'isnt' a good value return: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/openblock-labs-stip-efficacy-sybil-analysis-2-24/21441
Support this proposal and move it forward.
Coming from Silo - we would of course support this.
Giving a proportionally smaller grant would help to ween off markets from incentives and probably provide some good insights that data providers like Openblock could study to determine efficiency of the STIP rather than a cold turkey cut into a different program. As things are the LTIPP will 100% promote capital flight from STIP protocols, since you are starting incentives in one place and cutting them off elsewhere. Although we have already planned for this it would be fantastic to get a smaller supplemental version of the STIP to help 'bridge' the gap to the LTIP.
Coming from Silo - we would of course support this.
Giving a proportionally smaller grant would help to ween off markets from incentives and probably provide some good insights that data providers like Openblock could study to determine efficiency of the STIP rather than a cold turkey cut into a different program. As things are the LTIPP will 100% promote capital flight from STIP protocols, since you are starting incentives in one place and cutting them off elsewhere. Although we have already planned for this it would be fantastic to get a smaller supplemental version of the STIP to help 'bridge' the gap to the LTIP.
Nothing against using KPIs either to gauge placement if that's something the DAO should want although I will say what a KPI is varies greatly by protocol and I'm afraid people would basically default to TVL since there isn't a great grading rubric in place for vertical specific metrics. (I am saying this even though Silo is particularly strong in basically all metrics because it isn't fair to protocols with different focus.)
I also strongly resent the hate towards Dolomite here - they are by no means an AAVE/Compound fork and indicating they are shows a lack of knowledge and disregard for the tremendous work behind building a lending protocol from scratch and securing it.
Dolomite hasn't pocketed any spreads between borrowing and lending despite the admin fees being accrued. They're sitting in the smart contract until we transition to a DAO and the DAO decides what to do with them.
Moreover, AAVE didn't follows the rules for the grant submission process and their application was rejected because of that. Them not receiving a grant did not come at the expense of Dolomite getting one.
Dolomite hasn't pocketed any spreads between borrowing and lending despite the admin fees being accrued. They're sitting in the smart contract until we transition to a DAO and the DAO decides what to do with them.
Moreover, AAVE didn't follows the rules for the grant submission process and their application was rejected because of that. Them not receiving a grant did not come at the expense of Dolomite getting one.
It sounds to me like you enjoy the status quo and "kingmaking" AAVE instead of trying to push the industry forward or enable competition. Dolomite offers several novel features that AAVE doesn't have and can't support unless they release a new version entirely. Dolomite is the only Arbitrum-native lending protocol that hasn't suffered a security incident since our launch in October of 2022. Dolomite also fulfills a specific role in the market by offering long-tail asset support you can't find elsewhere, mixed with returning DeFi-native rights to users.
You should look more closely at the facts and usage patterns of our protocol before grandstanding about things you have no idea about. What exactly have you built or done to contribute to Arbitrum aside from complaining?
As a matter of fact, most of your points revolving around grifting just describe the practices any for-profit DeFi protocol utilizes to earn revenue and literally pay to keep the lights on. Should GMX turn off fee accrual because they subsidize trade fees with ARB? Give me a break.
Dolomite doesn't have a native token. We have no "bags" to unload
Dolomite is not an AAVE nor Compound fork. We made everything ourselves and experienced considerable growth that is sticky because of the composition of oARB users
Please create an original argument that doesn't look like a Chat-GPT-originated post
Pointing fingers aside, Dolomite would love to support this STIP-Bridge proposal to keep our lending rates more competitive with rates on other networks.
Dolomite doesn't have a native token. We have no "bags" to unload
Dolomite is not an AAVE nor Compound fork. We made everything ourselves and experienced considerable growth that is sticky because of the composition of oARB users
Please create an original argument that doesn't look like a Chat-GPT-originated post
Pointing fingers aside, Dolomite would love to support this STIP-Bridge proposal to keep our lending rates more competitive with rates on other networks.
I think the approach to take with STIP-Bridge is to look at what it takes to remain competitive with other networks that are distributing points or native token rewards. Speaking for Arbitrum as a whole, we should try to stay "on par" with competing networks so there isn't a strong reason to see liquidity flow to other networks once STIP is over.
I strongly agree with this.
Many protocols have successfully executed their STIp KPI, and they need and would gain tremendous advantages from prolonging this STIP program.
Number and sizes also seem extremely coherent with what I would expect protocols to receive. Very bullish on this.
I strongly agree with this.
Many protocols have successfully executed their STIp KPI, and they need and would gain tremendous advantages from prolonging this STIP program.
Number and sizes also seem extremely coherent with what I would expect protocols to receive. Very bullish on this.
I took the liberty to already create an RFC on the Abracadabra Forum to allow users to educate themselves on it and cast their vote. It can be found here.
hey @r3gen_Finance , I dont think 56 protocols were allocated STIP bridge.
See this list of protocols that are part of the STIP bridge Start of STIP.B Streams and Timeline of Incentives
It’s rather disappointing that you miss that the much bigger problem here is that this proposal only goes through because of the vote of people who will financially directly benefit from it. It’s frankly baffling that people seem to be ok with this. For anyone caring about arbitrum, it should be the top concern
It’s rather disappointing that you miss that the much bigger problem here is that this proposal only goes through because of the vote of people who will financially directly benefit from it. It’s frankly baffling that people seem to be ok with this. For anyone caring about arbitrum, it should be the top concern
So at the moment we have FOR winning the snapshot solely due to STIP recipents voting to double-dip on their grant.... If this goes through, it's time to stop for a moment and seriously question the benefits of the existence of this DAO as it is.
So at the moment we have FOR winning the snapshot solely due to STIP recipents voting to double-dip on their grant.... If this goes through, it's time to stop for a moment and seriously question the benefits of the existence of this DAO as it is.
Thanks for the answer, It doesn't remove my concerns about what is happening here but It helps understand the process.
@cattin May I asked what compelled you to push the snapshot vote in such urgency while many where calling for time and moderation? You don't see any conflict of interest in having STIP grantees vote for this proposal ? Does it seem to you that it's a functioning governance process ?
The distribution of common goods should always be accompanied by an expectation of transparency and a quantitative framework to measure its effectiveness. There is nothing more important than this, and no greater goal that supersedes it. Otherwise, we enter a situation where the grantees become both judge and jury which is the very definition of a corrupted governance. After all, if it makes sense to distribute another round of grants, why shall we not double the grants or even triple them, this would surely bring even more success to arbitrum?
I am not suggesting that everyone involved in this decision is morally corrupt on an individual level. However, I firmly believe that the facts surrounding the current state of things are absolutely morally corrupt. I am sure that as individuals, you all look at public corruption with disgust. Therefore, I am calling upon this part of your conscience to reflect on what is happening here and how wrong it is to shove this STIP extension without a due process to evaluate the grants effectiveness. No L2 competitiveness will ever undo the damage that you are currently doing to Arbitrum public image if this goes through.
The distribution of common goods should always be accompanied by an expectation of transparency and a quantitative framework to measure its effectiveness. There is nothing more important than this, and no greater goal that supersedes it. Otherwise, we enter a situation where the grantees become both judge and jury which is the very definition of a corrupted governance. After all, if it makes sense to distribute another round of grants, why shall we not double the grants or even triple them, this would surely bring even more success to arbitrum?
I am not suggesting that everyone involved in this decision is morally corrupt on an individual level. However, I firmly believe that the facts surrounding the current state of things are absolutely morally corrupt. I am sure that as individuals, you all look at public corruption with disgust. Therefore, I am calling upon this part of your conscience to reflect on what is happening here and how wrong it is to shove this STIP extension without a due process to evaluate the grants effectiveness. No L2 competitiveness will ever undo the damage that you are currently doing to Arbitrum public image if this goes through.
I'll also add that Base is doing extremely well right now in drawing attention, and they use zero incentives. Why can't we? Why can't we rely on the quality of projects rather than on the distribution of token which has so many bad externalities for the ecosystem?
The fact that this is already pushed to a vote when everyone sensible in the comments asked for time and moderation shows how corrupted things has become. When you love Arbitrum, It's truly disheartening to see the platform eaten from the inside. After double-down, will come triple-down and quadruple-down, you can be sure of it. Each time with great enthusiasm from the same projects praising each other on how great they are and how necessary this is. Each time sensible people will tell that this has to stop but each each time the vote will go through....
Vertex would support this proposal, but we agree with @tnorm and @Bobbay’s comments that these programs can only succeed with true measures of success, without which the DAO can easily burn through millions of dollars without seeing the impact it desires. At the same time, @tnorm is also correct that it would be unfair to protocols to retroactively judge them on conditions that are set now. Therefore, we would support the current ask of 37.5M ARB but would also caution that, barring across the board success, this style of distribution may not be sustainable.
However, we also believe that there are tangible measures that can be used to better understand the incentive programs the DAO is running, and most effectively distribute funds going forward. OpenBlock’s work is a start on these measures. We believe that unique users, volume, and sequencer revenue especially reflect measurements that support long term growth on Arbitrum and would welcome more discussion on what other measures could be included here.
Thanks for the answer, It doesn't remove my concerns about what is happening here but It helps understand the process.
@cattin May I asked what compelled you to push the snapshot vote in such urgency while many where calling for time and moderation? You don't see any conflict of interest in having STIP grantees vote for this proposal ? Does it seem to you that it's a functioning governance process ?
The distribution of common goods should always be accompanied by an expectation of transparency and a quantitative framework to measure its effectiveness. There is nothing more important than this, and no greater goal that supersedes it. Otherwise, we enter a situation where the grantees become both judge and jury which is the very definition of a corrupted governance. After all, if it makes sense to distribute another round of grants, why shall we not double the grants or even triple them, this would surely bring even more success to arbitrum?
I am not suggesting that everyone involved in this decision is morally corrupt on an individual level. However, I firmly believe that the facts surrounding the current state of things are absolutely morally corrupt. I am sure that as individuals, you all look at public corruption with disgust. Therefore, I am calling upon this part of your conscience to reflect on what is happening here and how wrong it is to shove this STIP extension without a due process to evaluate the grants effectiveness. No L2 competitiveness will ever undo the damage that you are currently doing to Arbitrum public image if this goes through.
The distribution of common goods should always be accompanied by an expectation of transparency and a quantitative framework to measure its effectiveness. There is nothing more important than this, and no greater goal that supersedes it. Otherwise, we enter a situation where the grantees become both judge and jury which is the very definition of a corrupted governance. After all, if it makes sense to distribute another round of grants, why shall we not double the grants or even triple them, this would surely bring even more success to arbitrum?
I am not suggesting that everyone involved in this decision is morally corrupt on an individual level. However, I firmly believe that the facts surrounding the current state of things are absolutely morally corrupt. I am sure that as individuals, you all look at public corruption with disgust. Therefore, I am calling upon this part of your conscience to reflect on what is happening here and how wrong it is to shove this STIP extension without a due process to evaluate the grants effectiveness. No L2 competitiveness will ever undo the damage that you are currently doing to Arbitrum public image if this goes through.
I'll also add that Base is doing extremely well right now in drawing attention, and they use zero incentives. Why can't we? Why can't we rely on the quality of projects rather than on the distribution of token which has so many bad externalities for the ecosystem?
The fact that this is already pushed to a vote when everyone sensible in the comments asked for time and moderation shows how corrupted things has become. When you love Arbitrum, It's truly disheartening to see the platform eaten from the inside. After double-down, will come triple-down and quadruple-down, you can be sure of it. Each time with great enthusiasm from the same projects praising each other on how great they are and how necessary this is. Each time sensible people will tell that this has to stop but each each time the vote will go through....
Vertex would support this proposal, but we agree with @tnorm and @Bobbay’s comments that these programs can only succeed with true measures of success, without which the DAO can easily burn through millions of dollars without seeing the impact it desires. At the same time, @tnorm is also correct that it would be unfair to protocols to retroactively judge them on conditions that are set now. Therefore, we would support the current ask of 37.5M ARB but would also caution that, barring across the board success, this style of distribution may not be sustainable.
However, we also believe that there are tangible measures that can be used to better understand the incentive programs the DAO is running, and most effectively distribute funds going forward. OpenBlock’s work is a start on these measures. We believe that unique users, volume, and sequencer revenue especially reflect measurements that support long term growth on Arbitrum and would welcome more discussion on what other measures could be included here.
I will do my best to be agnostic as a STIP vet who’s historically taken to dismantling, critiquing, and calling on the DAO to improve upon the program. I will also disclose that now as a part of Boost Studios, I am likely a benefactor of this proposal.
After reflecting...a few (redundant) thoughts:
STIP - Defining Success
I will do my best to be agnostic as a STIP vet who’s historically taken to dismantling, critiquing, and calling on the DAO to improve upon the program. I will also disclose that now as a part of Boost Studios, I am likely a benefactor of this proposal.
After reflecting...a few (redundant) thoughts:
STIP - Defining Success
The primary friction with this proposal is the fact that delegates will be asked to vote on whether programs were “successful”. As mentioned ad nauseam, because STIP didn’t define applicant success, every analysis conducted on grantee success is inherently subjective and (to no one’s fault) destined to fail in understanding the nuances of any one application.
Nothing against using KPIs either to gauge placement if that’s something the DAO should want although I will say what a KPI is varies greatly by protocol
To Tenzent’s point, it's difficult to retroactively measure success based on “win conditions” that were never provided up-front. Any extension of the STIP program inherits this critical flaw and, unless amended, will further perpetuate it.
L2 Competition - Competitor’s Defining Success The proposal also cites L2 competition as a key rationale. While the intent to support the Arbitrum ecosystem immediately is commendable, and arguably critical, I urge delegates to not blindly emulate the actions of other ecosystems, and rather understand both competitor positioning and Arbitrum’s own objectives.
Other Layer 2 and EVM chain ecosystems like Mantle, Blast, and Optimism have defined specific visions for success with a clear focus on optimizing for onchain metrics such as TVL, transaction volume, strategic assets, protocol traction, delegation, and integration/alignment. For example:
Moreover, many new ecosystems have innovated at the chain level, funneling sequencer revenue back into network-aligned behavior, potentially providing more sustainable incentives than short-term token grants. Perpetual incentives grants from the treasury may actually not compete here, and a direct strategy would likely require greater innovation than just extending STIP-style grants.
Objective and Metric Based Grants - Building Programs that Define Success Upon completion of incentive campaigns, most would want to evaluate the campaign, take a measured understanding of lessons learned, and re-establish their definition of success to inform the next iteration. Ecosystem grants are a bit like airdrops, they tend to reward and direct behavior. You should set the goals you want to see, and reward those who can best achieve them.
Arbitrum's ecosystem success hinges on a data-driven, strategic approach to incentives. The DAO must design incentive programs that achieve measurable success, and draw from strategies across project-centric, metric-centric, and objective-centric grants.
I understand the sentiment for protocol support, that teams are challenged to appease both venture and liquidity demands in a competitive environment, but I don’t think this style of program is sustainable without greater alignment on metrics and objectives to guide protocol’s toward verifiable, and sustainable growth.
Conclusion If the DAO proceeds, I'd encourage it to define onchain metrics for important verticals to the DAO (TVL, transaction fees, segmented users, DAUs, strategic assets, etc.) and aim to amend previous errors by setting the stage to reward projects who perform positively. Without a definition of success for STIP projects, there isn't an obvious path to success for STIP proposals.
"Providing long-tail asset support" has been an excuse to spin-up low effort lending protocols since 2021: cream, scream , agora, apple, the list is endless. They all have something in common, they disappear as soon as the token subsidies stop. Doing it in 2021 when we were all discovering defi was understandable but it is not in 2024. Arbitrum is a fantastic platform, it deserves much better than the list of low effort projects that are leeching its treasury. You all thought that we'd get a token bonanza like last cycle and it did not happen because the floor quality to make it has increased 10 fold. So now you're switching to treasury raiding.
The only thing I am doing for the arbitrum is calling out the token squandering. It's extremely unlikely to be effective though, I'll give you that, since most of the delegates have their hands involved in the grift. All I'm hoping is that if people keep calling it out, one day offchain labs will wake up and say something.
You don't need a token to grift. Dolomite is pocketing the spread between Borrow and lending rate as well as penalty fees so dolomite has every interest into entering the game of pat in the back with Jonesdao, dopex and co to pump their numbers. The truth is that, if you remove incentives absolutely noone would choose to use dolomite over aave and face terrible UI + high smart contract risk. But in the end the arbitrum DAO decides to shower dolomite with token not aave, despite it being vastly more inefficient in ARB spent per $ of TVL brought. All this because this grant program has become a shameless game of grift from top to bottom.
Let the treasury raiding continue!
How was STIP a success exactly? In my world, ARB has been the worst performer of the large tokens while arbitrum marketshare has remained stagnant since the beginning of the program. But you're right let's double down, what arbitrum really really needs at this point is another round of incentives for:
Let the treasury raiding continue!
How was STIP a success exactly? In my world, ARB has been the worst performer of the large tokens while arbitrum marketshare has remained stagnant since the beginning of the program. But you're right let's double down, what arbitrum really really needs at this point is another round of incentives for:
The endemic corruption in the arbitrum ecosystem has become a running joke in the blockchain world. Shame on the delegate that let this happen and shame on Offchain Labs for letting this situation worsen by the day. The explosion of activity that happened on Solana should have happened on Arbitrum, the UX is just as good. Instead we made sure that the dolomites of this world get showered with token while everyone looks elsewhere.
I will do my best to be agnostic as a STIP vet who’s historically taken to dismantling, critiquing, and calling on the DAO to improve upon the program. I will also disclose that now as a part of Boost Studios, I am likely a benefactor of this proposal.
After reflecting...a few (redundant) thoughts:
STIP - Defining Success
I will do my best to be agnostic as a STIP vet who’s historically taken to dismantling, critiquing, and calling on the DAO to improve upon the program. I will also disclose that now as a part of Boost Studios, I am likely a benefactor of this proposal.
After reflecting...a few (redundant) thoughts:
STIP - Defining Success
The primary friction with this proposal is the fact that delegates will be asked to vote on whether programs were “successful”. As mentioned ad nauseam, because STIP didn’t define applicant success, every analysis conducted on grantee success is inherently subjective and (to no one’s fault) destined to fail in understanding the nuances of any one application.
Nothing against using KPIs either to gauge placement if that’s something the DAO should want although I will say what a KPI is varies greatly by protocol
To Tenzent’s point, it's difficult to retroactively measure success based on “win conditions” that were never provided up-front. Any extension of the STIP program inherits this critical flaw and, unless amended, will further perpetuate it.
L2 Competition - Competitor’s Defining Success The proposal also cites L2 competition as a key rationale. While the intent to support the Arbitrum ecosystem immediately is commendable, and arguably critical, I urge delegates to not blindly emulate the actions of other ecosystems, and rather understand both competitor positioning and Arbitrum’s own objectives.
Other Layer 2 and EVM chain ecosystems like Mantle, Blast, and Optimism have defined specific visions for success with a clear focus on optimizing for onchain metrics such as TVL, transaction volume, strategic assets, protocol traction, delegation, and integration/alignment. For example:
Moreover, many new ecosystems have innovated at the chain level, funneling sequencer revenue back into network-aligned behavior, potentially providing more sustainable incentives than short-term token grants. Perpetual incentives grants from the treasury may actually not compete here, and a direct strategy would likely require greater innovation than just extending STIP-style grants.
Objective and Metric Based Grants - Building Programs that Define Success Upon completion of incentive campaigns, most would want to evaluate the campaign, take a measured understanding of lessons learned, and re-establish their definition of success to inform the next iteration. Ecosystem grants are a bit like airdrops, they tend to reward and direct behavior. You should set the goals you want to see, and reward those who can best achieve them.
Arbitrum's ecosystem success hinges on a data-driven, strategic approach to incentives. The DAO must design incentive programs that achieve measurable success, and draw from strategies across project-centric, metric-centric, and objective-centric grants.
I understand the sentiment for protocol support, that teams are challenged to appease both venture and liquidity demands in a competitive environment, but I don’t think this style of program is sustainable without greater alignment on metrics and objectives to guide protocol’s toward verifiable, and sustainable growth.
Conclusion If the DAO proceeds, I'd encourage it to define onchain metrics for important verticals to the DAO (TVL, transaction fees, segmented users, DAUs, strategic assets, etc.) and aim to amend previous errors by setting the stage to reward projects who perform positively. Without a definition of success for STIP projects, there isn't an obvious path to success for STIP proposals.
"Providing long-tail asset support" has been an excuse to spin-up low effort lending protocols since 2021: cream, scream , agora, apple, the list is endless. They all have something in common, they disappear as soon as the token subsidies stop. Doing it in 2021 when we were all discovering defi was understandable but it is not in 2024. Arbitrum is a fantastic platform, it deserves much better than the list of low effort projects that are leeching its treasury. You all thought that we'd get a token bonanza like last cycle and it did not happen because the floor quality to make it has increased 10 fold. So now you're switching to treasury raiding.
The only thing I am doing for the arbitrum is calling out the token squandering. It's extremely unlikely to be effective though, I'll give you that, since most of the delegates have their hands involved in the grift. All I'm hoping is that if people keep calling it out, one day offchain labs will wake up and say something.
You don't need a token to grift. Dolomite is pocketing the spread between Borrow and lending rate as well as penalty fees so dolomite has every interest into entering the game of pat in the back with Jonesdao, dopex and co to pump their numbers. The truth is that, if you remove incentives absolutely noone would choose to use dolomite over aave and face terrible UI + high smart contract risk. But in the end the arbitrum DAO decides to shower dolomite with token not aave, despite it being vastly more inefficient in ARB spent per $ of TVL brought. All this because this grant program has become a shameless game of grift from top to bottom.
Let the treasury raiding continue!
How was STIP a success exactly? In my world, ARB has been the worst performer of the large tokens while arbitrum marketshare has remained stagnant since the beginning of the program. But you're right let's double down, what arbitrum really really needs at this point is another round of incentives for:
Let the treasury raiding continue!
How was STIP a success exactly? In my world, ARB has been the worst performer of the large tokens while arbitrum marketshare has remained stagnant since the beginning of the program. But you're right let's double down, what arbitrum really really needs at this point is another round of incentives for:
The endemic corruption in the arbitrum ecosystem has become a running joke in the blockchain world. Shame on the delegate that let this happen and shame on Offchain Labs for letting this situation worsen by the day. The explosion of activity that happened on Solana should have happened on Arbitrum, the UX is just as good. Instead we made sure that the dolomites of this world get showered with token while everyone looks elsewhere.
Hey everyone,
We (Lampros Labs DAO) have created a live voting dashboard to track the voting of all protocols that are up for voting in the STIP-bridge program.
This dashboard provides information about all the protocols' snapshot voting links, forum proposal links, asks, and live voting statuses for each proposal, all in one accessible dashboard.
Hey everyone,
We (Lampros Labs DAO) have created a live voting dashboard to track the voting of all protocols that are up for voting in the STIP-bridge program.
This dashboard provides information about all the protocols' snapshot voting links, forum proposal links, asks, and live voting statuses for each proposal, all in one accessible dashboard.
Anyone can track the live voting of the protocols in the dashboard. There are 6 protocols that were submitted late and will go through the snapshot voting process, 12 protocols that were challenged by delegates, and the rest were optimistically funded as there were no challenge snapshots posted for these protocols.
Delegates can personalize the dashboard for themselves by creating a copy of the sheet, allowing them to update the status of voted proposals in the last column of the dashboard and see dynamic changes in cell background colours for the first four columns to track their own votes. (P.S. - Please note that while personal copies enable personalization, the sheet will not be updated for personal copies. The main public link remains active and is updated every 5 minutes for all community members.)
I would love to receive feedback, suggestions, or any changes you would like to see in this sheet.
Check out the dashboard from the below link and share your feedback.
Dashboard link -
STIP-Bridge_Voting Dashboard_Created by Members of Lampros Labs DAO - Google Sheets.
For completeness, Blockworks Research has posted qualitative data and a summary of findings on STIP-Bridge applicants who automatically require a challenge vote on Snapshot. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/stip-analysis-ardc-research-deliverables/23438/4?u=blockworksresearch
This was a bug on Tally's UI that has been fixed. Apologies for the confusion.
Blockworks Research has posted support material to help the community evaluate STIP-Bridge applicants who don't automatically require a challenge vote on Snapshot.
I was not able to save my reasoning on Tally, so I'm leaving it for recording keeping purposes:
I supported the proposal as I understood that the program, in general lines, was successful. It would be better to wait for a proper results sharing, with a deep analysis, but right now the competition between L2 is huge, and it is reasonable to grant this extension.
I was not able to save my reasoning on Tally, so I'm leaving it for recording keeping purposes:
I supported the proposal as I understood that the program, in general lines, was successful. It would be better to wait for a proper results sharing, with a deep analysis, but right now the competition between L2 is huge, and it is reasonable to grant this extension.
Moving forward, my hope is that we consolidate the grants programs under a comprehensive and ongoing one, so the rules, duration are unified.
I just saw on tally that this proposal is listed as "Defeated" but I'm a little confused as to why this is the case when the votes FOR are greater than AGAINST and ABSTAIN, and quorum has been met.
@Frisson do you know the reason for this?

I am choosing to abstain.
This has been a really tough vote for me.
I am choosing to abstain.
This has been a really tough vote for me.
I was originally pretty against the proposal. The timing for this is not ideal, part of the agreement for LTIPP would be that STIP applicants would be excluded from the first round. I would like to see the LTIPP projects have a chance to shine and giving the STIP Recipients overlapping incentive periods helps them retain the users they gained from STIP. I actually think it would be healthy for the ecosystem for users to have incentive to float between protocols. It creates healthy competition and the protocols with the best systems will retain more users when the incentives end.
However, I do agree with the point that we need to compete with the many up-and-coming L2s and believe incentivizing the STIP protocols will showcase many of Arbitrum's best home grown projects, which can attract and retain users for the ecosystem for the rest of the bull market. There is a good case to be made that the timing of all these incentives could line up well with the next push higher in the market which could be perfect for us to grab market share.
Personally, I would love to see the STIP-Bridge pass but be delayed 2 months.
I don't think this timing preference is enough to vote no for the proposal.... but I also don't really want to vote yes either. So I abstain.
I have voted against this proposal on Tally as, like many other delegates reported above, I don't feel the concerns have been fully resolved - Although I appreciate some progress has been made to streamline the process with a PM and the support of the LTIPP advisors.
As it looks like the program is going to pass, I want to reiterate the key requirement that I think all "optimistic proposals" should be centered on (I wish the template was more straightforward on this). What was the impact (not only the outcome!) of the grant you received?
Saw this too and don't think that should be the outcome given the votes. Could be a bug, the Defeated label was showing up intermittently last week.
Hey everyone,
We (Lampros Labs DAO) have created a live voting dashboard to track the voting of all protocols that are up for voting in the STIP-bridge program.
This dashboard provides information about all the protocols' snapshot voting links, forum proposal links, asks, and live voting statuses for each proposal, all in one accessible dashboard.
Hey everyone,
We (Lampros Labs DAO) have created a live voting dashboard to track the voting of all protocols that are up for voting in the STIP-bridge program.
This dashboard provides information about all the protocols' snapshot voting links, forum proposal links, asks, and live voting statuses for each proposal, all in one accessible dashboard.
Anyone can track the live voting of the protocols in the dashboard. There are 6 protocols that were submitted late and will go through the snapshot voting process, 12 protocols that were challenged by delegates, and the rest were optimistically funded as there were no challenge snapshots posted for these protocols.
Delegates can personalize the dashboard for themselves by creating a copy of the sheet, allowing them to update the status of voted proposals in the last column of the dashboard and see dynamic changes in cell background colours for the first four columns to track their own votes. (P.S. - Please note that while personal copies enable personalization, the sheet will not be updated for personal copies. The main public link remains active and is updated every 5 minutes for all community members.)
I would love to receive feedback, suggestions, or any changes you would like to see in this sheet.
Check out the dashboard from the below link and share your feedback.
Dashboard link -
STIP-Bridge_Voting Dashboard_Created by Members of Lampros Labs DAO - Google Sheets.
For completeness, Blockworks Research has posted qualitative data and a summary of findings on STIP-Bridge applicants who automatically require a challenge vote on Snapshot. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/stip-analysis-ardc-research-deliverables/23438/4?u=blockworksresearch
This was a bug on Tally's UI that has been fixed. Apologies for the confusion.
Blockworks Research has posted support material to help the community evaluate STIP-Bridge applicants who don't automatically require a challenge vote on Snapshot.
I was not able to save my reasoning on Tally, so I'm leaving it for recording keeping purposes:
I supported the proposal as I understood that the program, in general lines, was successful. It would be better to wait for a proper results sharing, with a deep analysis, but right now the competition between L2 is huge, and it is reasonable to grant this extension.
I was not able to save my reasoning on Tally, so I'm leaving it for recording keeping purposes:
I supported the proposal as I understood that the program, in general lines, was successful. It would be better to wait for a proper results sharing, with a deep analysis, but right now the competition between L2 is huge, and it is reasonable to grant this extension.
Moving forward, my hope is that we consolidate the grants programs under a comprehensive and ongoing one, so the rules, duration are unified.
I just saw on tally that this proposal is listed as "Defeated" but I'm a little confused as to why this is the case when the votes FOR are greater than AGAINST and ABSTAIN, and quorum has been met.
@Frisson do you know the reason for this?

I am choosing to abstain.
This has been a really tough vote for me.
I am choosing to abstain.
This has been a really tough vote for me.
I was originally pretty against the proposal. The timing for this is not ideal, part of the agreement for LTIPP would be that STIP applicants would be excluded from the first round. I would like to see the LTIPP projects have a chance to shine and giving the STIP Recipients overlapping incentive periods helps them retain the users they gained from STIP. I actually think it would be healthy for the ecosystem for users to have incentive to float between protocols. It creates healthy competition and the protocols with the best systems will retain more users when the incentives end.
However, I do agree with the point that we need to compete with the many up-and-coming L2s and believe incentivizing the STIP protocols will showcase many of Arbitrum's best home grown projects, which can attract and retain users for the ecosystem for the rest of the bull market. There is a good case to be made that the timing of all these incentives could line up well with the next push higher in the market which could be perfect for us to grab market share.
Personally, I would love to see the STIP-Bridge pass but be delayed 2 months.
I don't think this timing preference is enough to vote no for the proposal.... but I also don't really want to vote yes either. So I abstain.
I have voted against this proposal on Tally as, like many other delegates reported above, I don't feel the concerns have been fully resolved - Although I appreciate some progress has been made to streamline the process with a PM and the support of the LTIPP advisors.
As it looks like the program is going to pass, I want to reiterate the key requirement that I think all "optimistic proposals" should be centered on (I wish the template was more straightforward on this). What was the impact (not only the outcome!) of the grant you received?
Saw this too and don't think that should be the outcome given the votes. Could be a bug, the Defeated label was showing up intermittently last week.
I have voted against this proposal on Tally as, like many other delegates reported above, I don't feel the concerns have been fully resolved - Although I appreciate some progress has been made to streamline the process with a PM and the support of the LTIPP advisors.
As it looks like the program is going to pass, I want to reiterate the key requirement that I think all "optimistic proposals" should be centered on (I wish the template was more straightforward on this). What was the impact (not only the outcome!) of the grant you received?
Fair distribution of ARB is just the basic step to demonstrate that projects didn't commit any fraud. To earn the right for a STIP-Bridge, an actual positive impact should be demonstrated.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We have chosen to ABSTAIN from the on-chain vote.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We have chosen to ABSTAIN from the on-chain vote.
We originally voted in favor of the proposal during temp-check in an attempt to not block the momentum and instead help move things forward as we’re overall supportive of programs that help the ecosystem grow and thrive.
After careful consideration we voted abstain because although we see the value in the incentive program, we felt there weren’t enough convincing arguments to vote in favor of the proposal that basically seeks to extend the STIP, without however making any structural changes based on solid data or on the lessons learned so far.
One of the free-floating arguments for the need to run incentives programs, even if imperfect, is that the “war of L2s” for both mind and market-share makes it difficult to stop and assess as that would necessarily also mean falling behind. However, we haven’t seen any concrete examples of that being the case. We’re not questioning this argument as such, but we believe that at this point, after three different incentive programs already voted in, we should have a better understanding of what exactly we are fighting against.
During the temp-check both us and other delegates raised concerns around the lack of data on the efficacy of STIP/Backfund/LTIPP. We believe that those concerns haven’t been adequately addressed yet. Although the proposal suggests that performance audits will take place, we haven’t seen the results of these audits anywhere. The ARDC is working on a review of the STIP, but it’s not yet complete so we cannot use it to inform our decision. We’re also not sure if both of the aforementioned data sources will be complete by the time the challenge period ends to inform us on the need to potentially challenge protocols’ requests.
As it stands, there simply isn’t enough actionable information to evaluate, let alone justify, an extension of the STIP. Therefore, we cannot in good conscience vote in the proposal’s favor at this time.
As the DAO Advocate for the ARDC, but also in our capacity as delegates, we will follow up with a deep dive on the data from the STIP which can help all of us understand whether protocols are meeting the expectations set forward by both the program itself, and also by their applications.
To conclude, we wish that we don’t, as a DAO, have to vote for another similar proposal to extend an existing program and funnel more money into it without properly evaluating its performance and, if needed, making the appropriate changes. We plan on getting engaged in the near future into a final, long term incentive program framework, that will address all those concerns.
Blockworks Research will vote AGAINST this proposal on Tally.
First of all, we appreciate the updates made to the proposal posted onchain. Having said that, as many have pointed out, there are still several concerns that haven’t been addressed adequately. From the point of view of growing the Arbitrum ecosystem, we feel that there is no robust argument for running an additional incentive program on top of the LTIPP. As such, our opinion is that the currently optimal action for the DAO is to better understand past incentive programs to create an even better framework, which can be implemented once the LTIPP has ended. To be clear, we fully support incentive programs, but they have to be implemented in a manner that balances growth with sustainability.
Thanks for the clarification - this is a very correct setting to not sum up all the votes for a quorum.
As for Abstaining, it is simply necessary for all voters to know that in essence they are voting FOR in this case. It is better to make a specific decision, except for a conflict of interest
@cp0x - interesting take, I did some research, only vote types: For and Abstain aggregate to the total Quorum amount, not vote type Against.
The primary purpose of setting a quorum is to ensure that decisions are made with broad consensus and are not dictated by a small subset of the community, thereby reflecting the collective interest.
@cp0x - interesting take, I did some research, only vote types: For and Abstain aggregate to the total Quorum amount, not vote type Against.
The primary purpose of setting a quorum is to ensure that decisions are made with broad consensus and are not dictated by a small subset of the community, thereby reflecting the collective interest.
Setting the right threshold and using the right mechanism to arrive at that threshold is non-trivial.
3 excellent articles exploring quorums and voting mechanisms:
I asked some questions of Tally about our Quorum setup for Arbitrum.
This is defined as parameter in the Governor module per treasury, and for the Arbitrum Treasury it is as follows:

support=bravo&quorum=for,abstain string
https://arbiscan.io/address/0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4#readProxyContract
Right now vote type: against are not aggregated to count towards Quorum. This doesn’t need to be the case and can be changed but that’s how it’s been configured right now.
Going forward any changes would need consideration, dialogue and agreement to determine what’s an appropriate mechanism for Arbitrum. It should also have periodic review to determine if the threshold is set too loose or too tight given voter turnout and voting patterns.
Anyone who is against this proposal, please read it carefully. It is strategically better not to vote at all, let me explain: Now there are a lot of votes FOR, a significant part of which are from those projects that will receive additional funding and can be understood. But there is a quorum that could not be overcome without other votes. So the votes against are also now FOR this proposal. Wintermute and Treasure voted against it, but in doing so they helped the proposal move closer to the Quorum.
I have voted against this proposal on Tally as, like many other delegates reported above, I don't feel the concerns have been fully resolved - Although I appreciate some progress has been made to streamline the process with a PM and the support of the LTIPP advisors.
As it looks like the program is going to pass, I want to reiterate the key requirement that I think all "optimistic proposals" should be centered on (I wish the template was more straightforward on this). What was the impact (not only the outcome!) of the grant you received?
Fair distribution of ARB is just the basic step to demonstrate that projects didn't commit any fraud. To earn the right for a STIP-Bridge, an actual positive impact should be demonstrated.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We have chosen to ABSTAIN from the on-chain vote.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We have chosen to ABSTAIN from the on-chain vote.
We originally voted in favor of the proposal during temp-check in an attempt to not block the momentum and instead help move things forward as we’re overall supportive of programs that help the ecosystem grow and thrive.
After careful consideration we voted abstain because although we see the value in the incentive program, we felt there weren’t enough convincing arguments to vote in favor of the proposal that basically seeks to extend the STIP, without however making any structural changes based on solid data or on the lessons learned so far.
One of the free-floating arguments for the need to run incentives programs, even if imperfect, is that the “war of L2s” for both mind and market-share makes it difficult to stop and assess as that would necessarily also mean falling behind. However, we haven’t seen any concrete examples of that being the case. We’re not questioning this argument as such, but we believe that at this point, after three different incentive programs already voted in, we should have a better understanding of what exactly we are fighting against.
During the temp-check both us and other delegates raised concerns around the lack of data on the efficacy of STIP/Backfund/LTIPP. We believe that those concerns haven’t been adequately addressed yet. Although the proposal suggests that performance audits will take place, we haven’t seen the results of these audits anywhere. The ARDC is working on a review of the STIP, but it’s not yet complete so we cannot use it to inform our decision. We’re also not sure if both of the aforementioned data sources will be complete by the time the challenge period ends to inform us on the need to potentially challenge protocols’ requests.
As it stands, there simply isn’t enough actionable information to evaluate, let alone justify, an extension of the STIP. Therefore, we cannot in good conscience vote in the proposal’s favor at this time.
As the DAO Advocate for the ARDC, but also in our capacity as delegates, we will follow up with a deep dive on the data from the STIP which can help all of us understand whether protocols are meeting the expectations set forward by both the program itself, and also by their applications.
To conclude, we wish that we don’t, as a DAO, have to vote for another similar proposal to extend an existing program and funnel more money into it without properly evaluating its performance and, if needed, making the appropriate changes. We plan on getting engaged in the near future into a final, long term incentive program framework, that will address all those concerns.
Blockworks Research will vote AGAINST this proposal on Tally.
First of all, we appreciate the updates made to the proposal posted onchain. Having said that, as many have pointed out, there are still several concerns that haven’t been addressed adequately. From the point of view of growing the Arbitrum ecosystem, we feel that there is no robust argument for running an additional incentive program on top of the LTIPP. As such, our opinion is that the currently optimal action for the DAO is to better understand past incentive programs to create an even better framework, which can be implemented once the LTIPP has ended. To be clear, we fully support incentive programs, but they have to be implemented in a manner that balances growth with sustainability.
Thanks for the clarification - this is a very correct setting to not sum up all the votes for a quorum.
As for Abstaining, it is simply necessary for all voters to know that in essence they are voting FOR in this case. It is better to make a specific decision, except for a conflict of interest
@cp0x - interesting take, I did some research, only vote types: For and Abstain aggregate to the total Quorum amount, not vote type Against.
The primary purpose of setting a quorum is to ensure that decisions are made with broad consensus and are not dictated by a small subset of the community, thereby reflecting the collective interest.
@cp0x - interesting take, I did some research, only vote types: For and Abstain aggregate to the total Quorum amount, not vote type Against.
The primary purpose of setting a quorum is to ensure that decisions are made with broad consensus and are not dictated by a small subset of the community, thereby reflecting the collective interest.
Setting the right threshold and using the right mechanism to arrive at that threshold is non-trivial.
3 excellent articles exploring quorums and voting mechanisms:
I asked some questions of Tally about our Quorum setup for Arbitrum.
This is defined as parameter in the Governor module per treasury, and for the Arbitrum Treasury it is as follows:

support=bravo&quorum=for,abstain string
https://arbiscan.io/address/0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4#readProxyContract
Right now vote type: against are not aggregated to count towards Quorum. This doesn’t need to be the case and can be changed but that’s how it’s been configured right now.
Going forward any changes would need consideration, dialogue and agreement to determine what’s an appropriate mechanism for Arbitrum. It should also have periodic review to determine if the threshold is set too loose or too tight given voter turnout and voting patterns.
Anyone who is against this proposal, please read it carefully. It is strategically better not to vote at all, let me explain: Now there are a lot of votes FOR, a significant part of which are from those projects that will receive additional funding and can be understood. But there is a quorum that could not be overcome without other votes. So the votes against are also now FOR this proposal. Wintermute and Treasure voted against it, but in doing so they helped the proposal move closer to the Quorum.
Blockworks Research will vote AGAINST this proposal on Tally.
First of all, we appreciate the updates made to the proposal posted onchain. Having said that, as many have pointed out, there are still several concerns that haven’t been addressed adequately. From the point of view of growing the Arbitrum ecosystem, we feel that there is no robust argument for running an additional incentive program on top of the LTIPP. As such, our opinion is that the currently optimal action for the DAO is to better understand past incentive programs to create an even better framework, which can be implemented once the LTIPP has ended. To be clear, we fully support incentive programs, but they have to be implemented in a manner that balances growth with sustainability.
More specifically, in addition to the points raised in our previous comment, some of our main concerns comprise:
Blockworks Research will vote AGAINST this proposal on Tally.
First of all, we appreciate the updates made to the proposal posted onchain. Having said that, as many have pointed out, there are still several concerns that haven’t been addressed adequately. From the point of view of growing the Arbitrum ecosystem, we feel that there is no robust argument for running an additional incentive program on top of the LTIPP. As such, our opinion is that the currently optimal action for the DAO is to better understand past incentive programs to create an even better framework, which can be implemented once the LTIPP has ended. To be clear, we fully support incentive programs, but they have to be implemented in a manner that balances growth with sustainability.
More specifically, in addition to the points raised in our previous comment, some of our main concerns comprise:
I will explain why I started this conversation specifically on this vote.
There are too many interested projects here - 57, with a large share of votes. Of course they will vote to allocate money to themselves. However, I don't want to create a precedent where every week you can create such proposals and they will always pass easily FOR due to the large number of interested parties.
I will explain why I started this conversation specifically on this vote.
There are too many interested projects here - 57, with a large share of votes. Of course they will vote to allocate money to themselves. However, I don't want to create a precedent where every week you can create such proposals and they will always pass easily FOR due to the large number of interested parties.
This approach does not benefit the community, but I cannot condemn projects that vote for their own interests.
Since I am not associated with any of the projects, it is easier for me to take an objective position, as it seems to me
This Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR the STIP-Bridge on Tally.
Admittedly, we're still iffy on bridge proposal. Our concerns in the Snapshot vote were mostly addressed though. There's the OpenBlock Labs performance audits, and the PM role now, which hopefully reduces some wasteful grants.
This Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR the STIP-Bridge on Tally.
Admittedly, we're still iffy on bridge proposal. Our concerns in the Snapshot vote were mostly addressed though. There's the OpenBlock Labs performance audits, and the PM role now, which hopefully reduces some wasteful grants.
Having a trial for optimistic voting on a grants program is kinda nice. STIP and LTIPP-size votes are pretty grim to get through. Was easier in the LTIPP though due to the council screening / feedback, but was still massively time consuming.
I will be maintaining my "Against" vote for reasons notes above
While I am appreciative of some of the feedback being taken into consideration for Tally vote, I do not believe the core issue I have raised was addressed - why should we extend the STIP to run alongside the LTIPP when we can just roll these funds into a more comprehensive 2nd LTIPP round? Because of this my initial concerns still stand. The LTIPP has had some faults to learn from, but I believe it has largely been a step forward from the STIPP round and to just extend those who previously passed a STIP round (yes, I acknowledge subject to Snapshot vote) is a step back.
I will be maintaining my "Against" vote for reasons notes above
While I am appreciative of some of the feedback being taken into consideration for Tally vote, I do not believe the core issue I have raised was addressed - why should we extend the STIP to run alongside the LTIPP when we can just roll these funds into a more comprehensive 2nd LTIPP round? Because of this my initial concerns still stand. The LTIPP has had some faults to learn from, but I believe it has largely been a step forward from the STIPP round and to just extend those who previously passed a STIP round (yes, I acknowledge subject to Snapshot vote) is a step back.
Two positive ideas I want to take from the proposal however, as I acknowledge there has been a lot of work and thought put into this proposal and there are good take aways here.
Thanks @SavvyDAO for putting together the proposal and navigating through the discussions and feedback from the delegates.
We vote FOR the proposal on Tally because the proposal has been updated with additional commitments from the LTIPP advisors and promised program manager role as well as the data and audit reports by OBL for us to evaluate the results by the STIP and optimistically approve the additional fundings.
As the originators of the proposal, Savvy DAO has voted FOR this proposal.
Our reasoning is clearly stated above in the proposal.
See delegate thread here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/21266/21?u=savvydao
I have seen the commitment of the team behind the development of this proposal but also their commitment to generating adequate results for the ecosystem.
Yes, it is true that I agree with my colleagues above and some clarifications on the impact of STIP and direct connection (also based on the learnings from this) with LTIPP would have been ideal but at this crucial stage of the market it is important to continue promoting the protocols that impact directly to the ecosystem.
I have seen the commitment of the team behind the development of this proposal but also their commitment to generating adequate results for the ecosystem.
Yes, it is true that I agree with my colleagues above and some clarifications on the impact of STIP and direct connection (also based on the learnings from this) with LTIPP would have been ideal but at this crucial stage of the market it is important to continue promoting the protocols that impact directly to the ecosystem.
Now, it is ideal to see results, impact reports and clarity for future possible programs.
I vote FOR on this proposal.
I'll be voting against this proposal on behalf of the ARB holders who have delegated their voting power to me. After carefully reviewing the proposal and the community feedback provided, I have decided to vote against this proposal at the tally stage. My decision is based on the following key considerations:
Firstly, there appears to be a lack of comprehensive data and analysis on the actual impact and effectiveness of the previous STIP program. Without a thorough evaluation of the outcomes and learnings from the initial STIP, it is difficult to assess whether a similar approach is the best strategy going forward. A deeper analysis is needed to understand the true impact of the STIP program on the ecosystem's condition, both with and without incentives. This information would be crucial in determining the merits of the proposed approach.
I'll be voting against this proposal on behalf of the ARB holders who have delegated their voting power to me. After carefully reviewing the proposal and the community feedback provided, I have decided to vote against this proposal at the tally stage. My decision is based on the following key considerations:
Firstly, there appears to be a lack of comprehensive data and analysis on the actual impact and effectiveness of the previous STIP program. Without a thorough evaluation of the outcomes and learnings from the initial STIP, it is difficult to assess whether a similar approach is the best strategy going forward. A deeper analysis is needed to understand the true impact of the STIP program on the ecosystem's condition, both with and without incentives. This information would be crucial in determining the merits of the proposed approach.
Secondly, the upcoming LTIPP distribution of millions ARB in incentives raises questions about the necessity of this additional proposal. As a community member pointed out, the LTIPP is expected to address the concerns of competing against other L2s and retaining users. Disregarding the rationale behind the LTIPP and focusing solely on the fear of current STIP participants losing their user base may not be the most prudent approach.
Furthermore, the proposal appears to primarily benefit the protocols that previously participated in the STIP program, potentially limiting the inclusivity and overall effectiveness of the incentive strategy. A more inclusive approach that considers the needs and contributions of a broader range of ecosystem participants would be more aligned with the goal of sustainable growth.
Given the lack of comprehensive data on the STIP program's efficacy, the upcoming LTIPP distribution, and the concerns around the exclusivity of the proposed approach, I cannot support this proposal in its current form. I believe it is essential to prioritize a thorough evaluation of past incentive programs and align the proposed strategies with the broader goals and long-term sustainability of the ecosystem. Until these concerns are adequately addressed, I will be voting against this proposal at the tally stage.
Are all applications expected to be submitted in ARB and not in USD?
After careful consideration, I voted FOR this proposal on Tally. The concerns that led me to vote ABSTAIN at the temp check stage have largely been addressed via the addition of STIP performance audits, LTIP advisors, and the program manager role. I'm happy that protocols who qualified for STIP will have the opportunity to qualify for incentives again during this period.
UPDATES FOR TALLY PROPOSAL (notes on updates made April 10th):
We don’t yet have an understanding of which protocols were and were not successful in STIP
Thank you for highlighting the pressing need to address the unprecedented competitive pressures facing the Arbitrum ecosystem. The introduction of significant incentive programs by Layer 2 network competitors poses a real threat to our existing protocols.
To maintain our edge, it's crucial that we leverage operational data to inform targeted funding strategies. Allocating resources where they're most needed, based on specific user metrics and consumption patterns, will ensure that our projects remain committed to Arbitrum. This proactive approach is essential for sustaining network growth, user engagement, and overall ecosystem stability in such a dynamic market environment.
Our delegation voted AGAINST this proposal because, same as others, we're concerned about how rushed this was and the fact that it feels like taking one step back instead of building on what we could get from the LTIP. Personally, I think that by rushing an incentives program, we risk giving incentives to protocols that might not be used efficiently - this could end up harming innovation throughout the ecosystem, similar to what happens in nations that subsidize certain sectors heavily.
Also, on this:
The Arbitrum ecosystem is currently facing unprecedented competitive pressures
Seeing that the Snapshot vote is passing with success, we can refine the next steps for the STIP-Bridge.
one approach to avoid overburdening the delegates could involve using the LTIPP process, but with faster iterations where advisors can assist in refining proposals and filtering those that met the previous STIP criteria
Michigan blockchain voted against the proposal. We thought that the only major difference between this and the LTIPP was that the LTIPP would not be available to those who participated in the original STIP. The LTIPP does what this program intends to do, and it covers what we did poorly in the STIP. It sounds like we are throwing unnecessary money to keep the funded protocols afloat. Large spending isn’t justifiable only as a way to compete with other L2 protocols and move people to ARB.
The Princeton Blockchain Club will be abstaining from the STIP-Bridge vote at this time.
We've been mulling over this proposal for a while, and are split over the current implementation details.
The Princeton Blockchain Club will be abstaining from the STIP-Bridge vote at this time.
We've been mulling over this proposal for a while, and are split over the current implementation details.
The L2 environment continues to get more competitive by the day, so we've been voting in favor of funding previous grant and incentive programs. Supporting strong Arbitrum-native teams and incentivizing users to use top protocols on the chain is key.
However, we would like to see more analysis of STIP results before the onchain vote. We might be overspending significantly on ineffective uses of ARB, and would like to make informed decisions in the optimistic voting process.
I'm casting my vote against this proposal, expressing concern over the ongoing trend of DAO dependency. It's crucial for projects within our ecosystem to evolve organically and foster innovation independently. While moderate support is beneficial, the current model raises questions about sustainability and the over-reliance on grants. I encourage all independent delegates to consider the broader implications of such consistent, significant grants on both the ecosystem's growth and the ARB token's stability. It's essential to explore diverse growth strategies beyond grant dependency.
First of all thanks to SavvyDAO for the proposal. As ITU blockchain delegation committee we do not support this proposal. The reason for this is simply the same with @tnorm and @pedrob. The monitoring report of STIP has not been served yet. Also, LTIPP has not started. So this funding method's success is not proved yet. We also think SavvyDAO failed to adequately defend the proposal since not being responsive enough to previous discussions.
Because of these reasons, we propose an update on this proposal that would also include the other necessary additions based on the outcomes of the previous grant programs in the most optimum way possible. Until then, we are voting against this proposal.
Thinking quickly, one approach to avoid overburdening the delegates could involve using the LTIPP process, but with faster iterations where advisors can assist in refining proposals and filtering those that met the previous STIP criteria. Then, the council could have a selection phase, similar to the current one but with shorter timelines. In this scenario, protocols wouldn't need to submit a new proposal; they could use their previous submission and collaborate with advisors on the incentive distribution. The process should be short-lived.
This would be to merge the STIP with the LTIPP and avoid having 2 separate processes.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After careful consideration, we’ve decided to vote in favor of the proposal during the temp-check, without however necessarily committing to supporting the proposal during the on-chain vote in its current form.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After careful consideration, we’ve decided to vote in favor of the proposal during the temp-check, without however necessarily committing to supporting the proposal during the on-chain vote in its current form.
Our support should be treated as a signal of overall support for continuing incentive programs for the biggest protocols in the Arbitrum ecosystem, but we see the need for more debate and clarity around the results of the previous programs and the expected outcomes of this one.
As others have already pointed out, there’s a lack of information around the proposal, such as the efficacy of previous such initiatives (STEP, Backfund, LTIPP), and not enough overall discussion and involvement from delegates.
While reviewing the proposal, we realized that it’s basically a proposal coming from/involving some of the most prominent builders on Arbitrum. That was something that urged us to carefully review the implications that the outcome of the proposal was going to have in either case (passing or failing). Voting against the proposal during temp-check and effectively “killing it” doesn’t really provide the DAO with steps forward other than sitting on our hands until LTIPP concludes.
We’d much rather keep pushing forward and hold constructive discussions to figure out how to fill in the gaps and improve the proposal, especially based on the feedback of the people who are currently opposed to the proposal or abstaining from it than take steps backward.
With that in mind, we’re voting in favor of the proposal at the Snapshot vote so we can signal that we’d like to figure out how we can best improve the proposal before going to an on-chain vote.
I will explain why I started this conversation specifically on this vote.
There are too many interested projects here - 57, with a large share of votes. Of course they will vote to allocate money to themselves. However, I don't want to create a precedent where every week you can create such proposals and they will always pass easily FOR due to the large number of interested parties.
I will explain why I started this conversation specifically on this vote.
There are too many interested projects here - 57, with a large share of votes. Of course they will vote to allocate money to themselves. However, I don't want to create a precedent where every week you can create such proposals and they will always pass easily FOR due to the large number of interested parties.
This approach does not benefit the community, but I cannot condemn projects that vote for their own interests.
Since I am not associated with any of the projects, it is easier for me to take an objective position, as it seems to me
This Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR the STIP-Bridge on Tally.
Admittedly, we're still iffy on bridge proposal. Our concerns in the Snapshot vote were mostly addressed though. There's the OpenBlock Labs performance audits, and the PM role now, which hopefully reduces some wasteful grants.
This Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR the STIP-Bridge on Tally.
Admittedly, we're still iffy on bridge proposal. Our concerns in the Snapshot vote were mostly addressed though. There's the OpenBlock Labs performance audits, and the PM role now, which hopefully reduces some wasteful grants.
Having a trial for optimistic voting on a grants program is kinda nice. STIP and LTIPP-size votes are pretty grim to get through. Was easier in the LTIPP though due to the council screening / feedback, but was still massively time consuming.
I will be maintaining my "Against" vote for reasons notes above
While I am appreciative of some of the feedback being taken into consideration for Tally vote, I do not believe the core issue I have raised was addressed - why should we extend the STIP to run alongside the LTIPP when we can just roll these funds into a more comprehensive 2nd LTIPP round? Because of this my initial concerns still stand. The LTIPP has had some faults to learn from, but I believe it has largely been a step forward from the STIPP round and to just extend those who previously passed a STIP round (yes, I acknowledge subject to Snapshot vote) is a step back.
I will be maintaining my "Against" vote for reasons notes above
While I am appreciative of some of the feedback being taken into consideration for Tally vote, I do not believe the core issue I have raised was addressed - why should we extend the STIP to run alongside the LTIPP when we can just roll these funds into a more comprehensive 2nd LTIPP round? Because of this my initial concerns still stand. The LTIPP has had some faults to learn from, but I believe it has largely been a step forward from the STIPP round and to just extend those who previously passed a STIP round (yes, I acknowledge subject to Snapshot vote) is a step back.
Two positive ideas I want to take from the proposal however, as I acknowledge there has been a lot of work and thought put into this proposal and there are good take aways here.
Thanks @SavvyDAO for putting together the proposal and navigating through the discussions and feedback from the delegates.
We vote FOR the proposal on Tally because the proposal has been updated with additional commitments from the LTIPP advisors and promised program manager role as well as the data and audit reports by OBL for us to evaluate the results by the STIP and optimistically approve the additional fundings.
As the originators of the proposal, Savvy DAO has voted FOR this proposal.
Our reasoning is clearly stated above in the proposal.
See delegate thread here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/21266/21?u=savvydao
I have seen the commitment of the team behind the development of this proposal but also their commitment to generating adequate results for the ecosystem.
Yes, it is true that I agree with my colleagues above and some clarifications on the impact of STIP and direct connection (also based on the learnings from this) with LTIPP would have been ideal but at this crucial stage of the market it is important to continue promoting the protocols that impact directly to the ecosystem.
I have seen the commitment of the team behind the development of this proposal but also their commitment to generating adequate results for the ecosystem.
Yes, it is true that I agree with my colleagues above and some clarifications on the impact of STIP and direct connection (also based on the learnings from this) with LTIPP would have been ideal but at this crucial stage of the market it is important to continue promoting the protocols that impact directly to the ecosystem.
Now, it is ideal to see results, impact reports and clarity for future possible programs.
I vote FOR on this proposal.
I'll be voting against this proposal on behalf of the ARB holders who have delegated their voting power to me. After carefully reviewing the proposal and the community feedback provided, I have decided to vote against this proposal at the tally stage. My decision is based on the following key considerations:
Firstly, there appears to be a lack of comprehensive data and analysis on the actual impact and effectiveness of the previous STIP program. Without a thorough evaluation of the outcomes and learnings from the initial STIP, it is difficult to assess whether a similar approach is the best strategy going forward. A deeper analysis is needed to understand the true impact of the STIP program on the ecosystem's condition, both with and without incentives. This information would be crucial in determining the merits of the proposed approach.
I'll be voting against this proposal on behalf of the ARB holders who have delegated their voting power to me. After carefully reviewing the proposal and the community feedback provided, I have decided to vote against this proposal at the tally stage. My decision is based on the following key considerations:
Firstly, there appears to be a lack of comprehensive data and analysis on the actual impact and effectiveness of the previous STIP program. Without a thorough evaluation of the outcomes and learnings from the initial STIP, it is difficult to assess whether a similar approach is the best strategy going forward. A deeper analysis is needed to understand the true impact of the STIP program on the ecosystem's condition, both with and without incentives. This information would be crucial in determining the merits of the proposed approach.
Secondly, the upcoming LTIPP distribution of millions ARB in incentives raises questions about the necessity of this additional proposal. As a community member pointed out, the LTIPP is expected to address the concerns of competing against other L2s and retaining users. Disregarding the rationale behind the LTIPP and focusing solely on the fear of current STIP participants losing their user base may not be the most prudent approach.
Furthermore, the proposal appears to primarily benefit the protocols that previously participated in the STIP program, potentially limiting the inclusivity and overall effectiveness of the incentive strategy. A more inclusive approach that considers the needs and contributions of a broader range of ecosystem participants would be more aligned with the goal of sustainable growth.
Given the lack of comprehensive data on the STIP program's efficacy, the upcoming LTIPP distribution, and the concerns around the exclusivity of the proposed approach, I cannot support this proposal in its current form. I believe it is essential to prioritize a thorough evaluation of past incentive programs and align the proposed strategies with the broader goals and long-term sustainability of the ecosystem. Until these concerns are adequately addressed, I will be voting against this proposal at the tally stage.
Are all applications expected to be submitted in ARB and not in USD?
After careful consideration, I voted FOR this proposal on Tally. The concerns that led me to vote ABSTAIN at the temp check stage have largely been addressed via the addition of STIP performance audits, LTIP advisors, and the program manager role. I'm happy that protocols who qualified for STIP will have the opportunity to qualify for incentives again during this period.
UPDATES FOR TALLY PROPOSAL (notes on updates made April 10th):
We don’t yet have an understanding of which protocols were and were not successful in STIP
Thank you for highlighting the pressing need to address the unprecedented competitive pressures facing the Arbitrum ecosystem. The introduction of significant incentive programs by Layer 2 network competitors poses a real threat to our existing protocols.
To maintain our edge, it's crucial that we leverage operational data to inform targeted funding strategies. Allocating resources where they're most needed, based on specific user metrics and consumption patterns, will ensure that our projects remain committed to Arbitrum. This proactive approach is essential for sustaining network growth, user engagement, and overall ecosystem stability in such a dynamic market environment.
Our delegation voted AGAINST this proposal because, same as others, we're concerned about how rushed this was and the fact that it feels like taking one step back instead of building on what we could get from the LTIP. Personally, I think that by rushing an incentives program, we risk giving incentives to protocols that might not be used efficiently - this could end up harming innovation throughout the ecosystem, similar to what happens in nations that subsidize certain sectors heavily.
Also, on this:
The Arbitrum ecosystem is currently facing unprecedented competitive pressures
Seeing that the Snapshot vote is passing with success, we can refine the next steps for the STIP-Bridge.
one approach to avoid overburdening the delegates could involve using the LTIPP process, but with faster iterations where advisors can assist in refining proposals and filtering those that met the previous STIP criteria
Michigan blockchain voted against the proposal. We thought that the only major difference between this and the LTIPP was that the LTIPP would not be available to those who participated in the original STIP. The LTIPP does what this program intends to do, and it covers what we did poorly in the STIP. It sounds like we are throwing unnecessary money to keep the funded protocols afloat. Large spending isn’t justifiable only as a way to compete with other L2 protocols and move people to ARB.
The Princeton Blockchain Club will be abstaining from the STIP-Bridge vote at this time.
We've been mulling over this proposal for a while, and are split over the current implementation details.
The Princeton Blockchain Club will be abstaining from the STIP-Bridge vote at this time.
We've been mulling over this proposal for a while, and are split over the current implementation details.
The L2 environment continues to get more competitive by the day, so we've been voting in favor of funding previous grant and incentive programs. Supporting strong Arbitrum-native teams and incentivizing users to use top protocols on the chain is key.
However, we would like to see more analysis of STIP results before the onchain vote. We might be overspending significantly on ineffective uses of ARB, and would like to make informed decisions in the optimistic voting process.
I'm casting my vote against this proposal, expressing concern over the ongoing trend of DAO dependency. It's crucial for projects within our ecosystem to evolve organically and foster innovation independently. While moderate support is beneficial, the current model raises questions about sustainability and the over-reliance on grants. I encourage all independent delegates to consider the broader implications of such consistent, significant grants on both the ecosystem's growth and the ARB token's stability. It's essential to explore diverse growth strategies beyond grant dependency.
First of all thanks to SavvyDAO for the proposal. As ITU blockchain delegation committee we do not support this proposal. The reason for this is simply the same with @tnorm and @pedrob. The monitoring report of STIP has not been served yet. Also, LTIPP has not started. So this funding method's success is not proved yet. We also think SavvyDAO failed to adequately defend the proposal since not being responsive enough to previous discussions.
Because of these reasons, we propose an update on this proposal that would also include the other necessary additions based on the outcomes of the previous grant programs in the most optimum way possible. Until then, we are voting against this proposal.
Thinking quickly, one approach to avoid overburdening the delegates could involve using the LTIPP process, but with faster iterations where advisors can assist in refining proposals and filtering those that met the previous STIP criteria. Then, the council could have a selection phase, similar to the current one but with shorter timelines. In this scenario, protocols wouldn't need to submit a new proposal; they could use their previous submission and collaborate with advisors on the incentive distribution. The process should be short-lived.
This would be to merge the STIP with the LTIPP and avoid having 2 separate processes.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After careful consideration, we’ve decided to vote in favor of the proposal during the temp-check, without however necessarily committing to supporting the proposal during the on-chain vote in its current form.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After careful consideration, we’ve decided to vote in favor of the proposal during the temp-check, without however necessarily committing to supporting the proposal during the on-chain vote in its current form.
Our support should be treated as a signal of overall support for continuing incentive programs for the biggest protocols in the Arbitrum ecosystem, but we see the need for more debate and clarity around the results of the previous programs and the expected outcomes of this one.
As others have already pointed out, there’s a lack of information around the proposal, such as the efficacy of previous such initiatives (STEP, Backfund, LTIPP), and not enough overall discussion and involvement from delegates.
While reviewing the proposal, we realized that it’s basically a proposal coming from/involving some of the most prominent builders on Arbitrum. That was something that urged us to carefully review the implications that the outcome of the proposal was going to have in either case (passing or failing). Voting against the proposal during temp-check and effectively “killing it” doesn’t really provide the DAO with steps forward other than sitting on our hands until LTIPP concludes.
We’d much rather keep pushing forward and hold constructive discussions to figure out how to fill in the gaps and improve the proposal, especially based on the feedback of the people who are currently opposed to the proposal or abstaining from it than take steps backward.
With that in mind, we’re voting in favor of the proposal at the Snapshot vote so we can signal that we’d like to figure out how we can best improve the proposal before going to an on-chain vote.
UPDATES FOR TALLY PROPOSAL (notes on updates made April 10th):
We don’t yet have an understanding of which protocols were and were not successful in STIP
To address this, performance audits have been integrated into the proposal. These audits, conducted by OpenBlock Labs, will provide transparent insights into how effectively protocols utilized their STIP grants.
The proposed format is too passive and may lead to indiscriminate fund distribution. We need more infrastructure and quality checks.
We have updated the proposal to include a much more robust infrastructure. First OBL will be providing audits. Second, the advisors from the LTIPP program will be available to work with protocols to improve their incentive mechanisms and determine appropriate amounts of ARB to request from the DAO. Finally, a PM role has been created to help facilitate the program and provide a point of connection between the delegates, advisors, protocol, foundation, and data providers.
This is the same as STIP we didn't use what we learned the first time.
This proposal has a few notable differences compared to STIP.
First, this pool of protocols has already been somewhat vetted by the community as they were selected initially. However, they now have had the opportunity to showcase how effectively they can use incentives. The OBL audits along with the data the community will provide will give us more insights into which protocols can successfully use incentives making it easier for delegates to choose which protocols to extend.
Second, STIP was the first time protocols applied for funding and there were strict rules for what they could use the ARB for. This led to many applicants having poor incentive mechanisms as they were unsure how to apply to one of these programs. Now, they will have the opportunity to work with the advisors who helped the LTIPP come up with exciting new incentive ideas. This will help the STIP protocols put forward better applications.
Finally, this program trials optimistic funding. Even with the council in LTIPP, there are still 77 snapshot votes. This is not sustainable for the DAO. This bridge allows us to test an optimistic approach in a more controlled environment to see if it is something we should explore using in the full long-term program
Thank you for highlighting the pressing need to address the unprecedented competitive pressures facing the Arbitrum ecosystem. The introduction of significant incentive programs by Layer 2 network competitors poses a real threat to our existing protocols.
To maintain our edge, it's crucial that we leverage operational data to inform targeted funding strategies. Allocating resources where they're most needed, based on specific user metrics and consumption patterns, will ensure that our projects remain committed to Arbitrum. This proactive approach is essential for sustaining network growth, user engagement, and overall ecosystem stability in such a dynamic market environment.
Moreover, while STIP Bridge is instrumental in retaining these integral projects, it's essential to emphasize that the true value of Arbitrum isn't solely reflected in operational metrics or fund allocation. We must also focus on empowering the arb token and enhancing its utility to reinforce the network's position in the market.
Let's continue to monitor operational data closely and align funding initiatives with our strategic goals to ensure the continued success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Our delegation voted AGAINST this proposal because, same as others, we're concerned about how rushed this was and the fact that it feels like taking one step back instead of building on what we could get from the LTIP. Personally, I think that by rushing an incentives program, we risk giving incentives to protocols that might not be used efficiently - this could end up harming innovation throughout the ecosystem, similar to what happens in nations that subsidize certain sectors heavily.
Also, on this:
The Arbitrum ecosystem is currently facing unprecedented competitive pressures
Seeing that the Snapshot vote is passing with success, we can refine the next steps for the STIP-Bridge.
one approach to avoid overburdening the delegates could involve using the LTIPP process, but with faster iterations where advisors can assist in refining proposals and filtering those that met the previous STIP criteria
I believe this is a good idea, and it will allow to reduce the burden for delegates and add clarity to projects.
First thoughts on what I would like to see in the template:
Impact of the STIP: most reports I have seen focus on the outcome of the distribution "1000 $ARB distributed to 100 wallets". We should focus on a second layer: what were the consequences? What value was created? How much was retained after the incentives ran out?
Lessons learned: how would you run the program again? What would you change? How can you make it more efficient?
Sustainability: will you always need ARB incentives? At what point does your activity become self sustainable
Savvy DAO has voted FOR this proposal.
See or reasoning in the proposal above.
Delegate thread: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/21266/10?u=savvydao
After careful consideration, I voted abstain on this proposal.
Things I like about this proposal
After careful consideration, I voted abstain on this proposal.
Things I like about this proposal
Things I don't like about this proposal
A note about Tally specifically:
Blockworks Research will vote against this proposal.
While it is clear that a vast amount of onchain activity across ecosystems is currently inorganic, and Arbitrum needs to maintain its competitiveness, we feel the distribution of incentives should be done on a more granular level. Moreover, in a hypothetical situation where Arbitrum doesn’t distribute incentives at all, users/capital that opt to leave the ecosystem completely aren’t valuable for Arbitrum in the long term in the first place, as these users/capital are likely to be purely extractive.
Blockworks Research will vote against this proposal.
While it is clear that a vast amount of onchain activity across ecosystems is currently inorganic, and Arbitrum needs to maintain its competitiveness, we feel the distribution of incentives should be done on a more granular level. Moreover, in a hypothetical situation where Arbitrum doesn’t distribute incentives at all, users/capital that opt to leave the ecosystem completely aren’t valuable for Arbitrum in the long term in the first place, as these users/capital are likely to be purely extractive.
As has been mentioned across several sources, the original STIP process had many nuances that could be improved on, implying that the selection of protocols could have been more effective. Arbitrum is rightly in a growth mode, but distributing incentives in a semi-automatic way will—in the long term—likely lead to a situation akin to the problem known as Zombie Financing in corporate finance.
Due to the aforementioned reasons, we suggest that previous STIPs as well as the upcoming LTIPP be studied more closely through quantifiable KPIs and with a focus on customer retention. Furthermore, we think that a detailed execution plan for the usage of Arbitrum’s balance sheet should be considered to ensure the ecosystem’s long-term success. This will be especially important once market conditions worsen, and, in our opinion, is something that the DAO should start preparing for.
We consider this proposal to be structurally incomplete in its current form, and thus, vote against it.
DAOplomats (previous DAOStewards) voted against this proposal.
The Arbitrum ecosystem is currently facing unprecedented competitive pressures, with significant incentive programs launched by rival Layer 2 networks threatening to attract our established protocols away.
DAOplomats (previous DAOStewards) voted against this proposal.
The Arbitrum ecosystem is currently facing unprecedented competitive pressures, with significant incentive programs launched by rival Layer 2 networks threatening to attract our established protocols away.
First off, we believe this is a wrong motivation for this proposal to move forward. Giving out funding solely/majorly because we want to retain integral projects is not sustainable.
Also, echoing what a number of delegates have already said, the timing and eligibility criteria are not palatable. Let's see how LTIPP plays out then we can revisit these conversations.
I think this proposal is just a little bit too early.
Give it a few more months, and I would vote yes.
For now I have to vote against it.
cp0x voted against this proposal I have several complaints about this proposal:
cp0x voted against this proposal I have several complaints about this proposal:
I'm confused that the projects that are interested in this proposal have a large enough number of ARB to pass this vote
Below is feedback from the UADP (we abstained):
Our team is generally in favor of supporting incentive programs. We voted FOR the previous STIP initiatives, as well as the LTIPP. This proposal, however, caused us to pause. There’s a degree of ambiguity present that leaves too many questions unanswered, and we are unsure if further incentivizing these protocols is the best use of treasury funds. There needs to be a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of the STIPs–hard numbers and data.
Below is feedback from the UADP (we abstained):
Our team is generally in favor of supporting incentive programs. We voted FOR the previous STIP initiatives, as well as the LTIPP. This proposal, however, caused us to pause. There’s a degree of ambiguity present that leaves too many questions unanswered, and we are unsure if further incentivizing these protocols is the best use of treasury funds. There needs to be a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of the STIPs–hard numbers and data.
It seems many are beginning to justify large incentive spending as a way to compete with other L2s. Vampire attacks become especially rampant during bull markets, with new protocols offering exorbitant APRs. We’re of the opinion that enough incentives should be paid out to worthy protocols–and those incentives must be coupled with products that have market fit. If STIP incentives for a protocol don’t work, the cop out cannot simply be “there are higher yields elsewhere”. We have to consider if the products we are incentivizing actually have merit. Sure, capital chases yields, but consumers chase good products. Before providing STIP projects with more incentives, the DAO should conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the failures and successes of the already deployed incentives.
Furthermore, capital inflows shouldn’t be the only metric for judging the success of the incentives. Stickiness of capital and users is perhaps a better measure for sustainability. It’s great that these incentive programs have increased Arbitrum TVL. And we get that there’s a desire to grip onto that capital, making sure it stays in the ecosystem. But we should also consider the lasting impact of these incentives. A good way of putting it perhaps–the current TVL is like pouring water into a glass…but that glass has a hole in the bottom. Instead of continually filling up the glass with incentives, maybe we should figure out how to patch the hole.
The UADP will abstain from voting for this proposal. We hope that the authors take the DAO’s constructive feedback and provide delegates with more substantive reasoning behind why this proposal is worthwhile. If the provided reasoning is sufficient, we may alter our vote to FOR later on either during a new snapshot or the onchain vote.
After carefully considering the feedback from various members of our community regarding the proposed approach to incentives, we still have many concern, including unsufficient data from the previous STIP round. As a result, we have decided to vote against the proposal. Our decision is grounded in several key concerns and rationales, as outlined below:
After carefully considering the feedback from various members of our community regarding the proposed approach to incentives, we still have many concern, including unsufficient data from the previous STIP round. As a result, we have decided to vote against the proposal. Our decision is grounded in several key concerns and rationales, as outlined below:
We are seeking more detailed information on the impact of the STIP program, specifically regarding the ecosystem's condition without any incentives versus with the STIP program in place. A deeper analysis is necessary to understand the true impact and effectiveness of STIP. The goal of STIP is to iterate on the results and findings from the initial program.
@pedro raised a good point of view, we also agreed on the distrubtion of LTIPP is coming soon and should be able to achived the intented goals of this proposal.
This should address one of the concerns of this proposal: the competition against other L2s. This program is about 1 month away from distributing 45M ARB in incentives to users, which is attractive enough to:
a. keep the current users engaged, and
b. bring in new ones, as there have already been proposals presented with interesting mechanisms to incentivize bridging and volume towards Arbitrum.
Disregarding through this proposal the consensus rationale behind the LTIPP makes it look like all relies on the fear of the protocols that benefited from the STIP of losing the users they gained through those incentives. Nothing against that nor is something wrong, but it has nothing to do with competing against other chains, which is a clear and stated objective of current LTIPP.
The proposal appears to benefit only those protocols that previously participated in the STIP, which may limit the inclusivity and overall effectiveness of the incentive strategy.
I will be voting "Against" this proposal.
As I noted above, I believe the time and funds would be better spent using what was learned from the prior 2 STIPs, as well as the current LTIP, to move forward with one large round that any project (regardless of prior funding in either of those rounds) can participate in after the 12 week LTIP is completed.
I will be voting "Against" this proposal.
As I noted above, I believe the time and funds would be better spent using what was learned from the prior 2 STIPs, as well as the current LTIP, to move forward with one large round that any project (regardless of prior funding in either of those rounds) can participate in after the 12 week LTIP is completed.
The STIP voting was flawed, and the LTIP trial run has (so far) seemingly remedied a lot of the prior issues. While I still see room for improvement with the LTIP, automatically re-upping prior STIP winners based on no real framework is a big step backwards in our process. Especially given the timeframe, there is no reasonable way to review all the proposals for who is actually deserving of additional funds. We do not have time to setup a committee to determine who was successful and who was not, nor do delegates have the time to assess 100 proposals again (which will be double duty considering the LTIPP needs approval by delegates as well).
Others have echoed similar concerns about the proposal. While I understand the urgency to post to snapshot given the timelines, it further concerns me that I have not seen any response to any opposing comments over the last few weeks - ample time to flesh out a discussion. Plus, I'll also add that some of this urgency is self-inflicted, as the LTIPP Tally vote was 2 months ago.
Simply put - I do not agree with the proposal as stands and do not believe there has been enough discussion on this. With the vote ending within 48 hours I have decided to move forward with my against vote as I do not anticipate concerns will be adequately addressed before the poll is closed.
I'll be voting against this proposal on behalf of the ARB holders who have delegated their voting power to me. The proposal lacks a thorough analysis of the previous STIP incentives' impact and does not provide clear criteria for assessing the performance of past recipients. It's crucial to focus on sustainable growth rather than relying on continuous incentive distributions. The proposal also fails to demonstrate the anticipated return on investment and does not adequately address the retention of capital and users. Until more compelling arguments are presented, I cannot support this proposal in its current form.
gm all, voting AGAINST this proposal.
I am fully supportive of all projects that received the previous grants, and I want to see them succeed on Arbitrum.
At the same time, I don't think they are entitled to enter a special "whitelisted" category where they can just optimistically get money.
On the contrary, any recurring incentive (especially for a considerable amount of ARB) should focus on being:
Echoing many of the comments above, the team at FranklinDAO/Penn Blockchain is skeptical of this proposal for the 2nd STIP round. This proposal would distribute capital subject to a DAO wide vote without providing a clear criteria to judge past STIP recipients success or success of STIP program as a whole. In our view it's very important to prioritize sustainable and organic growth, rather than have protocols and activity be run on a flywheel of incentive handouts. We also believe that it may be better to isolate large funding rounds from one another, and hence focusing on LTIPP rather than this STIP round 2, so we can better assess the impacts of each funding round.
@axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth @tnorm @dk3 @Tenzent @pedrob @Bob-Rossi @maxlomu - I appreciate your feedback. I plan to respond to you soon.
:pray:
Thanks @pedrob and @cp0x @axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth for writing a very comprehensive answer, completely agree with your thoughts.
I think the LTIP is the way forward, and this should be the time to demonstrate the results, achievement of product-market fit, liquidity stickiness for projects that have already benefitted from ARB incentives.
Thanks @pedrob and @cp0x @axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth for writing a very comprehensive answer, completely agree with your thoughts.
I think the LTIP is the way forward, and this should be the time to demonstrate the results, achievement of product-market fit, liquidity stickiness for projects that have already benefitted from ARB incentives.
I don't think all projects were successful in their actions, so I don't believe all of them should be granted further incentives from the DAO. I won't be able to support this proposal until we have some clarity on this (and a sybyl report cannot be enough).
The incentives should be used to prove that a protocol can use a not-infinite amount of money to attract and retain value on Arbitrum. Reminder: there will always be a new L2 that can offer more shiny incentives.
Snapshot simply serves as a temperature check, it's not binding in any way. Those who drafted the proposal reached out to me so that I could send it to Snapshot since only delegates with more than 0.01% of votable tokens delegated can do this, and as a delegate I was happy to help with this. I have no relation to the proposal or decision making behind it, I simply assisted them with putting it up for temp check. I haven't even voted on this proposal yet or said anything about it.
If you have any questions about this, you should maybe ask those who drafted the proposal or are involved with it.
Thank you for your proposal. It is great that it is aimed at improving Arbitrum. But, I have reviewed the proposal and here are the weaknesses I see:
Unclear objectives and lack of specificity: Insufficient definition of specific goals and expected outcomes from implementing STIP. Failure to specify concrete steps or mechanisms that will be used for successful implementation of STIP. Unclear benefits: Need for a clearer description of the benefits and advantages that will be gained from using STIP. Insufficient risk assessment: Failure to mention potential risks or obstacles that may arise during the implementation of STIP, as well as plans to manage them. Financial aspects missing: Not addressing financial aspects such as implementation costs of STIP and assessing the return on investment. And one of the main points: Can we choose any STIP service provider from those that are already operational? Perhaps Wormhole, LayerZero, Axelar, etc.?
decentralization means also that whoever has enough voting power can post to snapshot this proposal, or any proposal for what it matters.
But I also understand your comment tho. Here the idea was, the way I understood it, to make a timeline that would match ltip.
decentralization means also that whoever has enough voting power can post to snapshot this proposal, or any proposal for what it matters.
But I also understand your comment tho. Here the idea was, the way I understood it, to make a timeline that would match ltip.
There has also been a few discussions about this in public governance calls, and several points raised by some delegates were also implemented in the proposal as well.
On the project praising themself: think about next iteration, in which you would have both protocols from stip, and also from ltip (which, latter, i think are double) going for this. I can't obviously know how is this going to go, but talking in arbitrum about "only the same projects" is likely not the right way to frame it seeing how the stip is evolving over time and how broad the particpation in last month ltip has been.
I am voting yes for this proposal. I wrote the reasoning publicly on twitter 10 days ago. This is what I firmly believe right now.
(from here)
Important: this opinion is solely my own and in no way reflects that of SEEDLatam or any of its members
gmgm.
Just a few comments from an LTIPP workforce member (Applicant Advisor).
give delegates the ability to reinforce those that have performed well with grant extensions.
Beside my personal considerations, I am a bit surprised that delegates are not engaging too much with this discussion, either in a positive or negative way. Interesting. Is it either apathy on giving grants, or it is just passive acceptance that as a DAO we need to keep the ball rolling to compete against other L2, or just people didn't had the time to read it because of many stuff happening at once? Not sure which one is the answer.
UPDATES FOR TALLY PROPOSAL (notes on updates made April 10th):
We don’t yet have an understanding of which protocols were and were not successful in STIP
To address this, performance audits have been integrated into the proposal. These audits, conducted by OpenBlock Labs, will provide transparent insights into how effectively protocols utilized their STIP grants.
The proposed format is too passive and may lead to indiscriminate fund distribution. We need more infrastructure and quality checks.
We have updated the proposal to include a much more robust infrastructure. First OBL will be providing audits. Second, the advisors from the LTIPP program will be available to work with protocols to improve their incentive mechanisms and determine appropriate amounts of ARB to request from the DAO. Finally, a PM role has been created to help facilitate the program and provide a point of connection between the delegates, advisors, protocol, foundation, and data providers.
This is the same as STIP we didn't use what we learned the first time.
This proposal has a few notable differences compared to STIP.
First, this pool of protocols has already been somewhat vetted by the community as they were selected initially. However, they now have had the opportunity to showcase how effectively they can use incentives. The OBL audits along with the data the community will provide will give us more insights into which protocols can successfully use incentives making it easier for delegates to choose which protocols to extend.
Second, STIP was the first time protocols applied for funding and there were strict rules for what they could use the ARB for. This led to many applicants having poor incentive mechanisms as they were unsure how to apply to one of these programs. Now, they will have the opportunity to work with the advisors who helped the LTIPP come up with exciting new incentive ideas. This will help the STIP protocols put forward better applications.
Finally, this program trials optimistic funding. Even with the council in LTIPP, there are still 77 snapshot votes. This is not sustainable for the DAO. This bridge allows us to test an optimistic approach in a more controlled environment to see if it is something we should explore using in the full long-term program
Thank you for highlighting the pressing need to address the unprecedented competitive pressures facing the Arbitrum ecosystem. The introduction of significant incentive programs by Layer 2 network competitors poses a real threat to our existing protocols.
To maintain our edge, it's crucial that we leverage operational data to inform targeted funding strategies. Allocating resources where they're most needed, based on specific user metrics and consumption patterns, will ensure that our projects remain committed to Arbitrum. This proactive approach is essential for sustaining network growth, user engagement, and overall ecosystem stability in such a dynamic market environment.
Moreover, while STIP Bridge is instrumental in retaining these integral projects, it's essential to emphasize that the true value of Arbitrum isn't solely reflected in operational metrics or fund allocation. We must also focus on empowering the arb token and enhancing its utility to reinforce the network's position in the market.
Let's continue to monitor operational data closely and align funding initiatives with our strategic goals to ensure the continued success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Our delegation voted AGAINST this proposal because, same as others, we're concerned about how rushed this was and the fact that it feels like taking one step back instead of building on what we could get from the LTIP. Personally, I think that by rushing an incentives program, we risk giving incentives to protocols that might not be used efficiently - this could end up harming innovation throughout the ecosystem, similar to what happens in nations that subsidize certain sectors heavily.
Also, on this:
The Arbitrum ecosystem is currently facing unprecedented competitive pressures
Seeing that the Snapshot vote is passing with success, we can refine the next steps for the STIP-Bridge.
one approach to avoid overburdening the delegates could involve using the LTIPP process, but with faster iterations where advisors can assist in refining proposals and filtering those that met the previous STIP criteria
I believe this is a good idea, and it will allow to reduce the burden for delegates and add clarity to projects.
First thoughts on what I would like to see in the template:
Impact of the STIP: most reports I have seen focus on the outcome of the distribution "1000 $ARB distributed to 100 wallets". We should focus on a second layer: what were the consequences? What value was created? How much was retained after the incentives ran out?
Lessons learned: how would you run the program again? What would you change? How can you make it more efficient?
Sustainability: will you always need ARB incentives? At what point does your activity become self sustainable
Savvy DAO has voted FOR this proposal.
See or reasoning in the proposal above.
Delegate thread: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/21266/10?u=savvydao
After careful consideration, I voted abstain on this proposal.
Things I like about this proposal
After careful consideration, I voted abstain on this proposal.
Things I like about this proposal
Things I don't like about this proposal
A note about Tally specifically:
Blockworks Research will vote against this proposal.
While it is clear that a vast amount of onchain activity across ecosystems is currently inorganic, and Arbitrum needs to maintain its competitiveness, we feel the distribution of incentives should be done on a more granular level. Moreover, in a hypothetical situation where Arbitrum doesn’t distribute incentives at all, users/capital that opt to leave the ecosystem completely aren’t valuable for Arbitrum in the long term in the first place, as these users/capital are likely to be purely extractive.
Blockworks Research will vote against this proposal.
While it is clear that a vast amount of onchain activity across ecosystems is currently inorganic, and Arbitrum needs to maintain its competitiveness, we feel the distribution of incentives should be done on a more granular level. Moreover, in a hypothetical situation where Arbitrum doesn’t distribute incentives at all, users/capital that opt to leave the ecosystem completely aren’t valuable for Arbitrum in the long term in the first place, as these users/capital are likely to be purely extractive.
As has been mentioned across several sources, the original STIP process had many nuances that could be improved on, implying that the selection of protocols could have been more effective. Arbitrum is rightly in a growth mode, but distributing incentives in a semi-automatic way will—in the long term—likely lead to a situation akin to the problem known as Zombie Financing in corporate finance.
Due to the aforementioned reasons, we suggest that previous STIPs as well as the upcoming LTIPP be studied more closely through quantifiable KPIs and with a focus on customer retention. Furthermore, we think that a detailed execution plan for the usage of Arbitrum’s balance sheet should be considered to ensure the ecosystem’s long-term success. This will be especially important once market conditions worsen, and, in our opinion, is something that the DAO should start preparing for.
We consider this proposal to be structurally incomplete in its current form, and thus, vote against it.
DAOplomats (previous DAOStewards) voted against this proposal.
The Arbitrum ecosystem is currently facing unprecedented competitive pressures, with significant incentive programs launched by rival Layer 2 networks threatening to attract our established protocols away.
DAOplomats (previous DAOStewards) voted against this proposal.
The Arbitrum ecosystem is currently facing unprecedented competitive pressures, with significant incentive programs launched by rival Layer 2 networks threatening to attract our established protocols away.
First off, we believe this is a wrong motivation for this proposal to move forward. Giving out funding solely/majorly because we want to retain integral projects is not sustainable.
Also, echoing what a number of delegates have already said, the timing and eligibility criteria are not palatable. Let's see how LTIPP plays out then we can revisit these conversations.
I think this proposal is just a little bit too early.
Give it a few more months, and I would vote yes.
For now I have to vote against it.
cp0x voted against this proposal I have several complaints about this proposal:
cp0x voted against this proposal I have several complaints about this proposal:
I'm confused that the projects that are interested in this proposal have a large enough number of ARB to pass this vote
Below is feedback from the UADP (we abstained):
Our team is generally in favor of supporting incentive programs. We voted FOR the previous STIP initiatives, as well as the LTIPP. This proposal, however, caused us to pause. There’s a degree of ambiguity present that leaves too many questions unanswered, and we are unsure if further incentivizing these protocols is the best use of treasury funds. There needs to be a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of the STIPs–hard numbers and data.
Below is feedback from the UADP (we abstained):
Our team is generally in favor of supporting incentive programs. We voted FOR the previous STIP initiatives, as well as the LTIPP. This proposal, however, caused us to pause. There’s a degree of ambiguity present that leaves too many questions unanswered, and we are unsure if further incentivizing these protocols is the best use of treasury funds. There needs to be a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of the STIPs–hard numbers and data.
It seems many are beginning to justify large incentive spending as a way to compete with other L2s. Vampire attacks become especially rampant during bull markets, with new protocols offering exorbitant APRs. We’re of the opinion that enough incentives should be paid out to worthy protocols–and those incentives must be coupled with products that have market fit. If STIP incentives for a protocol don’t work, the cop out cannot simply be “there are higher yields elsewhere”. We have to consider if the products we are incentivizing actually have merit. Sure, capital chases yields, but consumers chase good products. Before providing STIP projects with more incentives, the DAO should conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the failures and successes of the already deployed incentives.
Furthermore, capital inflows shouldn’t be the only metric for judging the success of the incentives. Stickiness of capital and users is perhaps a better measure for sustainability. It’s great that these incentive programs have increased Arbitrum TVL. And we get that there’s a desire to grip onto that capital, making sure it stays in the ecosystem. But we should also consider the lasting impact of these incentives. A good way of putting it perhaps–the current TVL is like pouring water into a glass…but that glass has a hole in the bottom. Instead of continually filling up the glass with incentives, maybe we should figure out how to patch the hole.
The UADP will abstain from voting for this proposal. We hope that the authors take the DAO’s constructive feedback and provide delegates with more substantive reasoning behind why this proposal is worthwhile. If the provided reasoning is sufficient, we may alter our vote to FOR later on either during a new snapshot or the onchain vote.
After carefully considering the feedback from various members of our community regarding the proposed approach to incentives, we still have many concern, including unsufficient data from the previous STIP round. As a result, we have decided to vote against the proposal. Our decision is grounded in several key concerns and rationales, as outlined below:
After carefully considering the feedback from various members of our community regarding the proposed approach to incentives, we still have many concern, including unsufficient data from the previous STIP round. As a result, we have decided to vote against the proposal. Our decision is grounded in several key concerns and rationales, as outlined below:
We are seeking more detailed information on the impact of the STIP program, specifically regarding the ecosystem's condition without any incentives versus with the STIP program in place. A deeper analysis is necessary to understand the true impact and effectiveness of STIP. The goal of STIP is to iterate on the results and findings from the initial program.
@pedro raised a good point of view, we also agreed on the distrubtion of LTIPP is coming soon and should be able to achived the intented goals of this proposal.
This should address one of the concerns of this proposal: the competition against other L2s. This program is about 1 month away from distributing 45M ARB in incentives to users, which is attractive enough to:
a. keep the current users engaged, and
b. bring in new ones, as there have already been proposals presented with interesting mechanisms to incentivize bridging and volume towards Arbitrum.
Disregarding through this proposal the consensus rationale behind the LTIPP makes it look like all relies on the fear of the protocols that benefited from the STIP of losing the users they gained through those incentives. Nothing against that nor is something wrong, but it has nothing to do with competing against other chains, which is a clear and stated objective of current LTIPP.
The proposal appears to benefit only those protocols that previously participated in the STIP, which may limit the inclusivity and overall effectiveness of the incentive strategy.
I will be voting "Against" this proposal.
As I noted above, I believe the time and funds would be better spent using what was learned from the prior 2 STIPs, as well as the current LTIP, to move forward with one large round that any project (regardless of prior funding in either of those rounds) can participate in after the 12 week LTIP is completed.
I will be voting "Against" this proposal.
As I noted above, I believe the time and funds would be better spent using what was learned from the prior 2 STIPs, as well as the current LTIP, to move forward with one large round that any project (regardless of prior funding in either of those rounds) can participate in after the 12 week LTIP is completed.
The STIP voting was flawed, and the LTIP trial run has (so far) seemingly remedied a lot of the prior issues. While I still see room for improvement with the LTIP, automatically re-upping prior STIP winners based on no real framework is a big step backwards in our process. Especially given the timeframe, there is no reasonable way to review all the proposals for who is actually deserving of additional funds. We do not have time to setup a committee to determine who was successful and who was not, nor do delegates have the time to assess 100 proposals again (which will be double duty considering the LTIPP needs approval by delegates as well).
Others have echoed similar concerns about the proposal. While I understand the urgency to post to snapshot given the timelines, it further concerns me that I have not seen any response to any opposing comments over the last few weeks - ample time to flesh out a discussion. Plus, I'll also add that some of this urgency is self-inflicted, as the LTIPP Tally vote was 2 months ago.
Simply put - I do not agree with the proposal as stands and do not believe there has been enough discussion on this. With the vote ending within 48 hours I have decided to move forward with my against vote as I do not anticipate concerns will be adequately addressed before the poll is closed.
I'll be voting against this proposal on behalf of the ARB holders who have delegated their voting power to me. The proposal lacks a thorough analysis of the previous STIP incentives' impact and does not provide clear criteria for assessing the performance of past recipients. It's crucial to focus on sustainable growth rather than relying on continuous incentive distributions. The proposal also fails to demonstrate the anticipated return on investment and does not adequately address the retention of capital and users. Until more compelling arguments are presented, I cannot support this proposal in its current form.
gm all, voting AGAINST this proposal.
I am fully supportive of all projects that received the previous grants, and I want to see them succeed on Arbitrum.
At the same time, I don't think they are entitled to enter a special "whitelisted" category where they can just optimistically get money.
On the contrary, any recurring incentive (especially for a considerable amount of ARB) should focus on being:
Echoing many of the comments above, the team at FranklinDAO/Penn Blockchain is skeptical of this proposal for the 2nd STIP round. This proposal would distribute capital subject to a DAO wide vote without providing a clear criteria to judge past STIP recipients success or success of STIP program as a whole. In our view it's very important to prioritize sustainable and organic growth, rather than have protocols and activity be run on a flywheel of incentive handouts. We also believe that it may be better to isolate large funding rounds from one another, and hence focusing on LTIPP rather than this STIP round 2, so we can better assess the impacts of each funding round.
@axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth @tnorm @dk3 @Tenzent @pedrob @Bob-Rossi @maxlomu - I appreciate your feedback. I plan to respond to you soon.
:pray:
Thanks @pedrob and @cp0x @axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth for writing a very comprehensive answer, completely agree with your thoughts.
I think the LTIP is the way forward, and this should be the time to demonstrate the results, achievement of product-market fit, liquidity stickiness for projects that have already benefitted from ARB incentives.
Thanks @pedrob and @cp0x @axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth for writing a very comprehensive answer, completely agree with your thoughts.
I think the LTIP is the way forward, and this should be the time to demonstrate the results, achievement of product-market fit, liquidity stickiness for projects that have already benefitted from ARB incentives.
I don't think all projects were successful in their actions, so I don't believe all of them should be granted further incentives from the DAO. I won't be able to support this proposal until we have some clarity on this (and a sybyl report cannot be enough).
The incentives should be used to prove that a protocol can use a not-infinite amount of money to attract and retain value on Arbitrum. Reminder: there will always be a new L2 that can offer more shiny incentives.
Snapshot simply serves as a temperature check, it's not binding in any way. Those who drafted the proposal reached out to me so that I could send it to Snapshot since only delegates with more than 0.01% of votable tokens delegated can do this, and as a delegate I was happy to help with this. I have no relation to the proposal or decision making behind it, I simply assisted them with putting it up for temp check. I haven't even voted on this proposal yet or said anything about it.
If you have any questions about this, you should maybe ask those who drafted the proposal or are involved with it.
Thank you for your proposal. It is great that it is aimed at improving Arbitrum. But, I have reviewed the proposal and here are the weaknesses I see:
Unclear objectives and lack of specificity: Insufficient definition of specific goals and expected outcomes from implementing STIP. Failure to specify concrete steps or mechanisms that will be used for successful implementation of STIP. Unclear benefits: Need for a clearer description of the benefits and advantages that will be gained from using STIP. Insufficient risk assessment: Failure to mention potential risks or obstacles that may arise during the implementation of STIP, as well as plans to manage them. Financial aspects missing: Not addressing financial aspects such as implementation costs of STIP and assessing the return on investment. And one of the main points: Can we choose any STIP service provider from those that are already operational? Perhaps Wormhole, LayerZero, Axelar, etc.?
decentralization means also that whoever has enough voting power can post to snapshot this proposal, or any proposal for what it matters.
But I also understand your comment tho. Here the idea was, the way I understood it, to make a timeline that would match ltip.
decentralization means also that whoever has enough voting power can post to snapshot this proposal, or any proposal for what it matters.
But I also understand your comment tho. Here the idea was, the way I understood it, to make a timeline that would match ltip.
There has also been a few discussions about this in public governance calls, and several points raised by some delegates were also implemented in the proposal as well.
On the project praising themself: think about next iteration, in which you would have both protocols from stip, and also from ltip (which, latter, i think are double) going for this. I can't obviously know how is this going to go, but talking in arbitrum about "only the same projects" is likely not the right way to frame it seeing how the stip is evolving over time and how broad the particpation in last month ltip has been.
I am voting yes for this proposal. I wrote the reasoning publicly on twitter 10 days ago. This is what I firmly believe right now.
(from here)
Important: this opinion is solely my own and in no way reflects that of SEEDLatam or any of its members
gmgm.
Just a few comments from an LTIPP workforce member (Applicant Advisor).
give delegates the ability to reinforce those that have performed well with grant extensions.
Beside my personal considerations, I am a bit surprised that delegates are not engaging too much with this discussion, either in a positive or negative way. Interesting. Is it either apathy on giving grants, or it is just passive acceptance that as a DAO we need to keep the ball rolling to compete against other L2, or just people didn't had the time to read it because of many stuff happening at once? Not sure which one is the answer.
gm all, voting AGAINST this proposal.
I am fully supportive of all projects that received the previous grants, and I want to see them succeed on Arbitrum.
At the same time, I don't think they are entitled to enter a special "whitelisted" category where they can just optimistically get money.
On the contrary, any recurring incentive (especially for a considerable amount of ARB) should focus on being:
Smart: demonstrate previous impact and expected ROI. Not every activity deserves to be rewarded. What was your most successful pool? Have the incentives created a sustainable flywheel? How can we replicate/increase its usage?
Meritrocatic: new and exciting builders should be incentivised to create innovative products with clear product market fit. Those that do will be rewarded. We shouldn't insist on failed experiments.
Sustainable: resources are not infinite, and spending anywhere has trade offs. Did we really need vaults with 50% APR fully paid in ARB? That's an easy game, but it can't go on forever. As there will always be another L2 trying to vampire attack Arbitrum, let's try to build a composable ecosystem that can be kickstarted by external ARB incentives, but doesn't rely on them for the long term.
Thank you for your proposal. It is great that it is aimed at improving Arbitrum. But, I have reviewed the proposal and here are the weaknesses I see:
Unclear objectives and lack of specificity: Insufficient definition of specific goals and expected outcomes from implementing STIP. Failure to specify concrete steps or mechanisms that will be used for successful implementation of STIP. Unclear benefits: Need for a clearer description of the benefits and advantages that will be gained from using STIP. Insufficient risk assessment: Failure to mention potential risks or obstacles that may arise during the implementation of STIP, as well as plans to manage them. Financial aspects missing: Not addressing financial aspects such as implementation costs of STIP and assessing the return on investment. And one of the main points: Can we choose any STIP service provider from those that are already operational? Perhaps Wormhole, LayerZero, Axelar, etc.?
To improve such a proposal for implementing STIP, it is recommended to:
These additions will make the proposal more informative, convincing, and understandable for those who will be voting on this proposal.
I am voting yes for this proposal. I wrote the reasoning publicly on twitter 10 days ago. This is what I firmly believe right now.
(from here)
I also understand the questions of some who are saying: why we should double down on stip if we can't measure it yet. Why don't we wait for the ltip to iterate on that. Etcetera. I get it. These are all valid concerns. But, to me, the above is valid: we can't stop right now. And also, if we REALLY want to know what success looks like, we would need to all sit down at a table, for a few days, and just discuss what we want to achieve in arbitrum in the next 6 months, 2 years, 5 years. Which is something realistically not doable in a DAO and that is usually what a board + a ceo do in the corporate world. What I mean is that while there is a merit in knowing what metric grew and what didn't, metrics are just that: metrics. They don't define necessarily on a 1:1 relationship success.
Lastly, i think that crypto AND the ethereum world AND the L2 world are in a specific phase (at least for another few years): growth. Which means, it could make sense to target generic metrics (users, tvl, volume) as proxy of a pathway to greatness, which is what we should generically pursue regardless of specifics.
NOTE: i obviously have also a biased interest here in voting yes, since i work for Jones DAO. For what it matters I would have voted yes even if i was working in a mc donald tho.
Important: this opinion is solely my own and in no way reflects that of SEEDLatam or any of its members
gmgm.
Just a few comments from an LTIPP workforce member (Applicant Advisor).
give delegates the ability to reinforce those that have performed well with grant extensions.
Firstly, what were the objectives of the STIP? Were they achieved? Do we have the necessary data to be convinced of this? Because when money is given away to users, the growth in TVL and volume is somewhat obvious. And it seems that this is the only thing highlighted by those who posted in favor of this proposal.
In this regard, I totally agree with @tnorm:
The primary friction with this proposal is the fact that delegates will be asked to vote on whether programs were “successful”. As mentioned ad nauseam, because STIP didn’t define applicant success, every analysis conducted on grantee success is inherently subjective and (to no one’s fault) destined to fail in understanding the nuances of any one application.
But beyond that, the introduction of the Long Term Incentives Pilot Program (with "pilot" emphasized) highlighted a series of issues in the allocation of funds during the STIP:
First, what was the reasoning expressed by the DAO in approving that proposal?
The Pilot Program will replace a round 2 and will be funded with 25M-45M ARB to accommodate the large expected protocol demand we have already seen. This will complete the incentivizing of Arbitrum-based teams to create a holistic competitive edge not against each other but against other chains.
This should address one of the concerns of this proposal: the competition against other L2s. This program is about 1 month away from distributing 45M ARB in incentives to users, which is attractive enough to:
a. keep the current users engaged, and
b. bring in new ones, as there have already been proposals presented with interesting mechanisms to incentivize bridging and volume towards Arbitrum.
Disregarding through this proposal the consensus rationale behind the LTIPP makes it look like all relies on the fear of the protocols that benefited from the STIP of losing the users they gained through those incentives. Nothing against that nor is something wrong, but it has nothing to do with competing against other chains, which is a clear and stated objective of current LTIPP.
In this regard, I believe it is a great opportunity for the beneficiaries of the STIP to gather data on:
a. stickiness
b. performance without incentives (before and after STIP / BSTIP)
c. performance/stickiness without incentives in the context of incentivized competitors.
We have learned a lot from STIP and can use what went wrong in STIP and the Backfund to hypothesize what changes would create a better long-term framework. However, we have little evidence to prove these new ideas would be a better solution.
Has that situation changed? Do we have evidence that the STIP worked better than the intended solution? (of course not, since LTIPP hasn’t started yet)
So, moving to the problems that the LTIPP proposal identified and is trying to solve:
In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal.
This led to the introduction of the Council. Which is currently studying and evaluating 173 elegible applications.
Basically, this proposal suggests that we forget that this was a problem, asking the protocols that received STIP to come up with some justification for why they shouldn't lose funding, and asking the delegates to do all the work over again. This involves 65 possible proposals.
Moreover, all the work we've done over these two weeks as Advisors seems to have been for nothing:
Problem #2: Protocols did not receive adequate feedback on their proposals
As Advisors, we worked extensively over the last weeks to help all protocols improve their applications. Only the other Advisors know the enormous amount of hours we dedicated to this.
But our efforts were not solely to assist those protocols that are less well-known or not as well-connected with the delegates in crafting competitive and appealing proposals. We also aimed to help everyone improve or modify their proposals for the benefit of the Arbitrum DAO, ensuring that the proposed incentive mechanisms are sustainable in the long term and aligned with the goals of the Arbitrum DAO.
This proposal overlooks the value of this function to the DAO and assumes that because they were approved in the past, the same proposals as they were originally designed would be approved today.
It also does not justify why 50% of the incentives received in the past are sufficient to achieve the same objectives that were set in the STIP for each applicant. In these past weeks, we have seen all kinds of applications and mechanisms, and the need for incentives varies greatly in each case and depends on (at least):
a. current metrics b. market conditions c. expected metrics.
None of these are the same today as before STIP. Why 50% of received incentives would help protocols to do the same? What are the objectives? And how do those objectives align with the DAO's objectives?
“Allowing protocols to innovate on incentive distribution mechanisms will allow Arbitrum protocols and community members to get a better idea of which designs work and which don’t work.”
Again, this proposal overlooks the objectives set out in the LTIPP. It was not just another round of STIP to continue throwing money into the network to incentivize users.
It is about experimenting with a new mechanism in search of perfecting a long-term plan, to address many of the deficiencies that this proposal suggests repeating without consideration.
The great thing is that the approved LTIPP proposal includes research bounties. Currently, the Council is working on defining the questions that must be answered. I take this opportunity to invite everyone here to post any questions that arose during STIP that would be valuable targets for research.
Conclusions
I apologize if anything I've said here comes across as aggressive or upsetting. We've put a lot of effort into these weeks to give the DAO the best possible applications. Seeing this proposal makes me feel as though all that effort was in vain, and that old grants can simply be renewed without even waiting for a general conclusion or analysis on the impact of the STIP and the future impact of the LTIPP.
With this, I support @Bob-Rossi proposal:
I think a better solution is just to take what has been learned through STIP rounds 1 & 2, as well as this LTIPP trail run, and have a true LTIPP that is open to all projects regardless of prior inclusion in either of those three funding runs. If we start planning for that now we have a good 3 month window to hit the ground running come July for a seamless transition into a true, all inclusive Long-Term grant program.
Thank you for initiating the debate, and again, apologies if anything was upsetting.
This is an interesting ask, and I can see the benefits of further supporting Arbitrum's flagship protocols. All STIP benefactors will clearly be in favor of this proposal as it benefits them, so I encourage delegates who aren’t associated with a protocol to share their opinion on this proposal from a neutral standpoint.
As it stands, I echo Tnorm sentiment especially around defining success. We all want to help Arbitrum protocols flourish, but in a sustainable manner, that considers the long term ecosystem of Arbitrum DAO and Arbitrum ecosystem.
This is an interesting ask, and I can see the benefits of further supporting Arbitrum's flagship protocols. All STIP benefactors will clearly be in favor of this proposal as it benefits them, so I encourage delegates who aren’t associated with a protocol to share their opinion on this proposal from a neutral standpoint.
As it stands, I echo Tnorm sentiment especially around defining success. We all want to help Arbitrum protocols flourish, but in a sustainable manner, that considers the long term ecosystem of Arbitrum DAO and Arbitrum ecosystem.
As of now, I see this proposal as the initial draft that needs further fleshing out around certain details before the DAO drops another 37.5M ARB. Specifically on the following:
P.S. As a multisig signer of LTIP, I’m not fussed about signing more for this, but this additional clicking via my ledger requires a grant of 42,690 Arb for physio. gotta avoid RSI somehow.
Agree with @cp0x I think we need to consider this proposal with a certain amount of criticism. Perhaps the projects need to be more proactive, to show a product first and preferably one that would surprise us. First the value and only then the reward and funding. Otherwise we can waste money and fund projects that are frankly bad. I propose to discuss this in more detail.
I don't really understand the meaning of this proposal. There are grants that are allocated to projects. These projects requested a certain amount for a certain period of time. Why, instead of analyzing the work of a specific project, we will give 50% of the grant without any verification. I believe that this proposal does not benefit the development of the ecosystem, but rather keeps projects afloat through grants. The point of grants is to give an impetus to good projects, and not to support bad decisions only at the expense of DAO funds - projects must learn to earn money themselves after receiving a grant. You can correct me if I'm wrong about something.
Maximum funding requests under this bridge grant are capped based on a percentage of the prior funding received under STIP:
With the metrics that the protocols uploaded, is there any general analysis of what worked and what didn't? who achieved the objectives? liquidity and user retention?
While I quite agree with the proposal, I think that keeping the incentives in place will not allow us to see the real results.Considering that the LTIPP is in the process of implementation, we should at least do an analysis with all the available STIP data.
Big fan of the optimistic approach. Reduces burden on delegates while allowing folks to flag projects as necessary based on their project reputation and STIP performance.
Not a huge proponent of extensions, but with the current market / network competition, we've got to put our best hitters forward.
While LTIPP and various other programs are driving towards a permanent incentive program, Arbitrum must aggressively compete NOW for network growth.
While LTIPP and various other programs are driving towards a permanent incentive program, Arbitrum must aggressively compete NOW for network growth.
The current iteration of the LTIPP is a 12 week trial run to gather data for a longer LTIPP framework. Anyone who got STIP funds cannot participate in the LTIPP. I understand the reasoning behind it, but lets call a spade a spade --- we've created a scenario where the 'Long-Term" Incentive Program is in actuality functioning as a 3rd round of the STIP. Which I'll emphasize is totally fine as the Arbitrum grants space takes its shape, but I think that context should be clear for my next point:
I think a better solution is just to take what has been learned through STIP rounds 1 & 2, as well as this LTIPP trail run, and have a true LTIPP that is open to all projects regardless of prior inclusion in either of those three funding runs. If we start planning for that now we have a good 3 month window to hit the ground running come July for a seamless transition into a true, all inclusive Long-Term grant program.
I agree with this as the 2024 meta thus far is follow the new hot thing with incentives/points. We (Premia) ended our STIP program on March 5th, and this is what we have seen, so I imagine many ecosystem projects will encounter similar patterns. (Luckily we invested in OB growth during the stip period, so we can maintain volumes without committed capital in vaults/aka tvl)

Will be interesting to see the projects that alter their spending allocation for the Bridge, or ones that were able to explore different strategies and can really show pound for pound impact of where the incentives are being utilized best. Nonetheless from a Project perspective we do find this helpful and supportive of developers so we can focus on building and growth going into summer when things really start to heat up :melting_face:
I agree with this as the 2024 meta thus far is follow the new hot thing with incentives/points. We (Premia) ended our STIP program on March 5th, and this is what we have seen, so I imagine many ecosystem projects will encounter similar patterns. (Luckily we invested in OB growth during the stip period, so we can maintain volumes without committed capital in vaults/aka tvl)

Will be interesting to see the projects that alter their spending allocation for the Bridge, or ones that were able to explore different strategies and can really show pound for pound impact of where the incentives are being utilized best. Nonetheless from a Project perspective we do find this helpful and supportive of developers so we can focus on building and growth going into summer when things really start to heat up :melting_face:
Let's do it.
Also @SavvyDAO the spreadsheet column "F" is missing some values btw
gm all, voting AGAINST this proposal.
I am fully supportive of all projects that received the previous grants, and I want to see them succeed on Arbitrum.
At the same time, I don't think they are entitled to enter a special "whitelisted" category where they can just optimistically get money.
On the contrary, any recurring incentive (especially for a considerable amount of ARB) should focus on being:
Smart: demonstrate previous impact and expected ROI. Not every activity deserves to be rewarded. What was your most successful pool? Have the incentives created a sustainable flywheel? How can we replicate/increase its usage?
Meritrocatic: new and exciting builders should be incentivised to create innovative products with clear product market fit. Those that do will be rewarded. We shouldn't insist on failed experiments.
Sustainable: resources are not infinite, and spending anywhere has trade offs. Did we really need vaults with 50% APR fully paid in ARB? That's an easy game, but it can't go on forever. As there will always be another L2 trying to vampire attack Arbitrum, let's try to build a composable ecosystem that can be kickstarted by external ARB incentives, but doesn't rely on them for the long term.
Thank you for your proposal. It is great that it is aimed at improving Arbitrum. But, I have reviewed the proposal and here are the weaknesses I see:
Unclear objectives and lack of specificity: Insufficient definition of specific goals and expected outcomes from implementing STIP. Failure to specify concrete steps or mechanisms that will be used for successful implementation of STIP. Unclear benefits: Need for a clearer description of the benefits and advantages that will be gained from using STIP. Insufficient risk assessment: Failure to mention potential risks or obstacles that may arise during the implementation of STIP, as well as plans to manage them. Financial aspects missing: Not addressing financial aspects such as implementation costs of STIP and assessing the return on investment. And one of the main points: Can we choose any STIP service provider from those that are already operational? Perhaps Wormhole, LayerZero, Axelar, etc.?
To improve such a proposal for implementing STIP, it is recommended to:
These additions will make the proposal more informative, convincing, and understandable for those who will be voting on this proposal.
I am voting yes for this proposal. I wrote the reasoning publicly on twitter 10 days ago. This is what I firmly believe right now.
(from here)
I also understand the questions of some who are saying: why we should double down on stip if we can't measure it yet. Why don't we wait for the ltip to iterate on that. Etcetera. I get it. These are all valid concerns. But, to me, the above is valid: we can't stop right now. And also, if we REALLY want to know what success looks like, we would need to all sit down at a table, for a few days, and just discuss what we want to achieve in arbitrum in the next 6 months, 2 years, 5 years. Which is something realistically not doable in a DAO and that is usually what a board + a ceo do in the corporate world. What I mean is that while there is a merit in knowing what metric grew and what didn't, metrics are just that: metrics. They don't define necessarily on a 1:1 relationship success.
Lastly, i think that crypto AND the ethereum world AND the L2 world are in a specific phase (at least for another few years): growth. Which means, it could make sense to target generic metrics (users, tvl, volume) as proxy of a pathway to greatness, which is what we should generically pursue regardless of specifics.
NOTE: i obviously have also a biased interest here in voting yes, since i work for Jones DAO. For what it matters I would have voted yes even if i was working in a mc donald tho.
Important: this opinion is solely my own and in no way reflects that of SEEDLatam or any of its members
gmgm.
Just a few comments from an LTIPP workforce member (Applicant Advisor).
give delegates the ability to reinforce those that have performed well with grant extensions.
Firstly, what were the objectives of the STIP? Were they achieved? Do we have the necessary data to be convinced of this? Because when money is given away to users, the growth in TVL and volume is somewhat obvious. And it seems that this is the only thing highlighted by those who posted in favor of this proposal.
In this regard, I totally agree with @tnorm:
The primary friction with this proposal is the fact that delegates will be asked to vote on whether programs were “successful”. As mentioned ad nauseam, because STIP didn’t define applicant success, every analysis conducted on grantee success is inherently subjective and (to no one’s fault) destined to fail in understanding the nuances of any one application.
But beyond that, the introduction of the Long Term Incentives Pilot Program (with "pilot" emphasized) highlighted a series of issues in the allocation of funds during the STIP:
First, what was the reasoning expressed by the DAO in approving that proposal?
The Pilot Program will replace a round 2 and will be funded with 25M-45M ARB to accommodate the large expected protocol demand we have already seen. This will complete the incentivizing of Arbitrum-based teams to create a holistic competitive edge not against each other but against other chains.
This should address one of the concerns of this proposal: the competition against other L2s. This program is about 1 month away from distributing 45M ARB in incentives to users, which is attractive enough to:
a. keep the current users engaged, and
b. bring in new ones, as there have already been proposals presented with interesting mechanisms to incentivize bridging and volume towards Arbitrum.
Disregarding through this proposal the consensus rationale behind the LTIPP makes it look like all relies on the fear of the protocols that benefited from the STIP of losing the users they gained through those incentives. Nothing against that nor is something wrong, but it has nothing to do with competing against other chains, which is a clear and stated objective of current LTIPP.
In this regard, I believe it is a great opportunity for the beneficiaries of the STIP to gather data on:
a. stickiness
b. performance without incentives (before and after STIP / BSTIP)
c. performance/stickiness without incentives in the context of incentivized competitors.
We have learned a lot from STIP and can use what went wrong in STIP and the Backfund to hypothesize what changes would create a better long-term framework. However, we have little evidence to prove these new ideas would be a better solution.
Has that situation changed? Do we have evidence that the STIP worked better than the intended solution? (of course not, since LTIPP hasn’t started yet)
So, moving to the problems that the LTIPP proposal identified and is trying to solve:
In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal.
This led to the introduction of the Council. Which is currently studying and evaluating 173 elegible applications.
Basically, this proposal suggests that we forget that this was a problem, asking the protocols that received STIP to come up with some justification for why they shouldn't lose funding, and asking the delegates to do all the work over again. This involves 65 possible proposals.
Moreover, all the work we've done over these two weeks as Advisors seems to have been for nothing:
Problem #2: Protocols did not receive adequate feedback on their proposals
As Advisors, we worked extensively over the last weeks to help all protocols improve their applications. Only the other Advisors know the enormous amount of hours we dedicated to this.
But our efforts were not solely to assist those protocols that are less well-known or not as well-connected with the delegates in crafting competitive and appealing proposals. We also aimed to help everyone improve or modify their proposals for the benefit of the Arbitrum DAO, ensuring that the proposed incentive mechanisms are sustainable in the long term and aligned with the goals of the Arbitrum DAO.
This proposal overlooks the value of this function to the DAO and assumes that because they were approved in the past, the same proposals as they were originally designed would be approved today.
It also does not justify why 50% of the incentives received in the past are sufficient to achieve the same objectives that were set in the STIP for each applicant. In these past weeks, we have seen all kinds of applications and mechanisms, and the need for incentives varies greatly in each case and depends on (at least):
a. current metrics b. market conditions c. expected metrics.
None of these are the same today as before STIP. Why 50% of received incentives would help protocols to do the same? What are the objectives? And how do those objectives align with the DAO's objectives?
“Allowing protocols to innovate on incentive distribution mechanisms will allow Arbitrum protocols and community members to get a better idea of which designs work and which don’t work.”
Again, this proposal overlooks the objectives set out in the LTIPP. It was not just another round of STIP to continue throwing money into the network to incentivize users.
It is about experimenting with a new mechanism in search of perfecting a long-term plan, to address many of the deficiencies that this proposal suggests repeating without consideration.
The great thing is that the approved LTIPP proposal includes research bounties. Currently, the Council is working on defining the questions that must be answered. I take this opportunity to invite everyone here to post any questions that arose during STIP that would be valuable targets for research.
Conclusions
I apologize if anything I've said here comes across as aggressive or upsetting. We've put a lot of effort into these weeks to give the DAO the best possible applications. Seeing this proposal makes me feel as though all that effort was in vain, and that old grants can simply be renewed without even waiting for a general conclusion or analysis on the impact of the STIP and the future impact of the LTIPP.
With this, I support @Bob-Rossi proposal:
I think a better solution is just to take what has been learned through STIP rounds 1 & 2, as well as this LTIPP trail run, and have a true LTIPP that is open to all projects regardless of prior inclusion in either of those three funding runs. If we start planning for that now we have a good 3 month window to hit the ground running come July for a seamless transition into a true, all inclusive Long-Term grant program.
Thank you for initiating the debate, and again, apologies if anything was upsetting.
This is an interesting ask, and I can see the benefits of further supporting Arbitrum's flagship protocols. All STIP benefactors will clearly be in favor of this proposal as it benefits them, so I encourage delegates who aren’t associated with a protocol to share their opinion on this proposal from a neutral standpoint.
As it stands, I echo Tnorm sentiment especially around defining success. We all want to help Arbitrum protocols flourish, but in a sustainable manner, that considers the long term ecosystem of Arbitrum DAO and Arbitrum ecosystem.
This is an interesting ask, and I can see the benefits of further supporting Arbitrum's flagship protocols. All STIP benefactors will clearly be in favor of this proposal as it benefits them, so I encourage delegates who aren’t associated with a protocol to share their opinion on this proposal from a neutral standpoint.
As it stands, I echo Tnorm sentiment especially around defining success. We all want to help Arbitrum protocols flourish, but in a sustainable manner, that considers the long term ecosystem of Arbitrum DAO and Arbitrum ecosystem.
As of now, I see this proposal as the initial draft that needs further fleshing out around certain details before the DAO drops another 37.5M ARB. Specifically on the following:
P.S. As a multisig signer of LTIP, I’m not fussed about signing more for this, but this additional clicking via my ledger requires a grant of 42,690 Arb for physio. gotta avoid RSI somehow.
Agree with @cp0x I think we need to consider this proposal with a certain amount of criticism. Perhaps the projects need to be more proactive, to show a product first and preferably one that would surprise us. First the value and only then the reward and funding. Otherwise we can waste money and fund projects that are frankly bad. I propose to discuss this in more detail.
I don't really understand the meaning of this proposal. There are grants that are allocated to projects. These projects requested a certain amount for a certain period of time. Why, instead of analyzing the work of a specific project, we will give 50% of the grant without any verification. I believe that this proposal does not benefit the development of the ecosystem, but rather keeps projects afloat through grants. The point of grants is to give an impetus to good projects, and not to support bad decisions only at the expense of DAO funds - projects must learn to earn money themselves after receiving a grant. You can correct me if I'm wrong about something.
Maximum funding requests under this bridge grant are capped based on a percentage of the prior funding received under STIP:
With the metrics that the protocols uploaded, is there any general analysis of what worked and what didn't? who achieved the objectives? liquidity and user retention?
While I quite agree with the proposal, I think that keeping the incentives in place will not allow us to see the real results.Considering that the LTIPP is in the process of implementation, we should at least do an analysis with all the available STIP data.
Big fan of the optimistic approach. Reduces burden on delegates while allowing folks to flag projects as necessary based on their project reputation and STIP performance.
Not a huge proponent of extensions, but with the current market / network competition, we've got to put our best hitters forward.
While LTIPP and various other programs are driving towards a permanent incentive program, Arbitrum must aggressively compete NOW for network growth.
While LTIPP and various other programs are driving towards a permanent incentive program, Arbitrum must aggressively compete NOW for network growth.
The current iteration of the LTIPP is a 12 week trial run to gather data for a longer LTIPP framework. Anyone who got STIP funds cannot participate in the LTIPP. I understand the reasoning behind it, but lets call a spade a spade --- we've created a scenario where the 'Long-Term" Incentive Program is in actuality functioning as a 3rd round of the STIP. Which I'll emphasize is totally fine as the Arbitrum grants space takes its shape, but I think that context should be clear for my next point:
I think a better solution is just to take what has been learned through STIP rounds 1 & 2, as well as this LTIPP trail run, and have a true LTIPP that is open to all projects regardless of prior inclusion in either of those three funding runs. If we start planning for that now we have a good 3 month window to hit the ground running come July for a seamless transition into a true, all inclusive Long-Term grant program.
I agree with this as the 2024 meta thus far is follow the new hot thing with incentives/points. We (Premia) ended our STIP program on March 5th, and this is what we have seen, so I imagine many ecosystem projects will encounter similar patterns. (Luckily we invested in OB growth during the stip period, so we can maintain volumes without committed capital in vaults/aka tvl)

Will be interesting to see the projects that alter their spending allocation for the Bridge, or ones that were able to explore different strategies and can really show pound for pound impact of where the incentives are being utilized best. Nonetheless from a Project perspective we do find this helpful and supportive of developers so we can focus on building and growth going into summer when things really start to heat up :melting_face:
I agree with this as the 2024 meta thus far is follow the new hot thing with incentives/points. We (Premia) ended our STIP program on March 5th, and this is what we have seen, so I imagine many ecosystem projects will encounter similar patterns. (Luckily we invested in OB growth during the stip period, so we can maintain volumes without committed capital in vaults/aka tvl)

Will be interesting to see the projects that alter their spending allocation for the Bridge, or ones that were able to explore different strategies and can really show pound for pound impact of where the incentives are being utilized best. Nonetheless from a Project perspective we do find this helpful and supportive of developers so we can focus on building and growth going into summer when things really start to heat up :melting_face:
Let's do it.
Also @SavvyDAO the spreadsheet column "F" is missing some values btw