Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge) | proposals.app

posted 2 years ago

edited 2 years ago

The distribution of common goods should always be accompanied by an expectation of transparency and a quantitative framework to measure its effectiveness. There is nothing more important than this, and no greater goal that supersedes it. Otherwise, we enter a situation where the grantees become both judge and jury which is the very definition of a corrupted governance. After all, if it makes sense to distribute another round of grants, why shall we not double the grants or even triple them, this would surely bring even more success to arbitrum?

I am not suggesting that everyone involved in this decision is morally corrupt on an individual level. However, I firmly believe that the facts surrounding the current state of things are absolutely morally corrupt. I am sure that as individuals, you all look at public corruption with disgust. Therefore, I am calling upon this part of your conscience to reflect on what is happening here and how wrong it is to shove this STIP extension without a due process to evaluate the grants effectiveness. No L2 competitiveness will ever undo the damage that you are currently doing to Arbitrum public image if this goes through.

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I'll also add that Base is doing extremely well right now in drawing attention, and they use zero incentives. Why can't we? Why can't we rely on the quality of projects rather than on the distribution of token which has so many bad externalities for the ecosystem?

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brisket

posted 2 years ago

edited 2 years ago

106

tnorm

posted 2 years ago

edited 2 years ago

I will do my best to be agnostic as a STIP vet who’s historically taken to dismantling, critiquing, and calling on the DAO to improve upon the program. I will also disclose that now as a part of Boost Studios, I am likely a benefactor of this proposal.

After reflecting...a few (redundant) thoughts:

STIP - Defining Success

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After reflecting...a few (redundant) thoughts:

STIP - Defining Success

The primary friction with this proposal is the fact that delegates will be asked to vote on whether programs were “successful”. As mentioned ad nauseam, because STIP didn’t define applicant success, every analysis conducted on grantee success is inherently subjective and (to no one’s fault) destined to fail in understanding the nuances of any one application.

Quoted from Tenzent

Nothing against using KPIs either to gauge placement if that’s something the DAO should want although I will say what a KPI is varies greatly by protocol

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To Tenzent’s point, it's difficult to retroactively measure success based on “win conditions” that were never provided up-front. Any extension of the STIP program inherits this critical flaw and, unless amended, will further perpetuate it.

L2 Competition - Competitor’s Defining Success The proposal also cites L2 competition as a key rationale. While the intent to support the Arbitrum ecosystem immediately is commendable, and arguably critical, I urge delegates to not blindly emulate the actions of other ecosystems, and rather understand both competitor positioning and Arbitrum’s own objectives.

Other Layer 2 and EVM chain ecosystems like Mantle, Blast, and Optimism have defined specific visions for success with a clear focus on optimizing for onchain metrics such as TVL, transaction volume, strategic assets, protocol traction, delegation, and integration/alignment. For example:

Mantle Journey: Awards retroactive grants based on TVL and Transactions.
Blast Points: Are awarded for TVL in strategic assets (ETH, WETH, and USDB).
Blast Gold: Awards integration w/ Blast Points API and subjective-alignment with Blast.
Optimism RPGF: Is leaning into onchain results as guidance for RPGF following recent controversies.
Optimism Airdrops: Rewarded onchain actions in governance and creator economies.

Moreover, many new ecosystems have innovated at the chain level, funneling sequencer revenue back into network-aligned behavior, potentially providing more sustainable incentives than short-term token grants. Perpetual incentives grants from the treasury may actually not compete here, and a direct strategy would likely require greater innovation than just extending STIP-style grants.

Objective and Metric Based Grants - Building Programs that Define Success Upon completion of incentive campaigns, most would want to evaluate the campaign, take a measured understanding of lessons learned, and re-establish their definition of success to inform the next iteration. Ecosystem grants are a bit like airdrops, they tend to reward and direct behavior. You should set the goals you want to see, and reward those who can best achieve them.

Arbitrum's ecosystem success hinges on a data-driven, strategic approach to incentives. The DAO must design incentive programs that achieve measurable success, and draw from strategies across project-centric, metric-centric, and objective-centric grants.

I understand the sentiment for protocol support, that teams are challenged to appease both venture and liquidity demands in a competitive environment, but I don’t think this style of program is sustainable without greater alignment on metrics and objectives to guide protocol’s toward verifiable, and sustainable growth.

Conclusion If the DAO proceeds, I'd encourage it to define onchain metrics for important verticals to the DAO (TVL, transaction fees, segmented users, DAUs, strategic assets, etc.) and aim to amend previous errors by setting the stage to reward projects who perform positively. Without a definition of success for STIP projects, there isn't an obvious path to success for STIP proposals.

tnorm

posted 2 years ago

edited 2 years ago

After reflecting...a few (redundant) thoughts:

STIP - Defining Success

165

After reflecting...a few (redundant) thoughts:

STIP - Defining Success

Quoted from Tenzent

Nothing against using KPIs either to gauge placement if that’s something the DAO should want although I will say what a KPI is varies greatly by protocol

jump to post →

Mantle Journey: Awards retroactive grants based on TVL and Transactions.
Blast Points: Are awarded for TVL in strategic assets (ETH, WETH, and USDB).
Blast Gold: Awards integration w/ Blast Points API and subjective-alignment with Blast.
Optimism RPGF: Is leaning into onchain results as guidance for RPGF following recent controversies.
Optimism Airdrops: Rewarded onchain actions in governance and creator economies.

krst from delegate.l2beat.eth

10.0M TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

We have chosen to ABSTAIN from the on-chain vote.

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

We have chosen to ABSTAIN from the on-chain vote.

We originally voted in favor of the proposal during temp-check in an attempt to not block the momentum and instead help move things forward as we’re overall supportive of programs that help the ecosystem grow and thrive.

After careful consideration we voted abstain because although we see the value in the incentive program, we felt there weren’t enough convincing arguments to vote in favor of the proposal that basically seeks to extend the STIP, without however making any structural changes based on solid data or on the lessons learned so far.

One of the free-floating arguments for the need to run incentives programs, even if imperfect, is that the “war of L2s” for both mind and market-share makes it difficult to stop and assess as that would necessarily also mean falling behind. However, we haven’t seen any concrete examples of that being the case. We’re not questioning this argument as such, but we believe that at this point, after three different incentive programs already voted in, we should have a better understanding of what exactly we are fighting against.

During the temp-check both us and other delegates raised concerns around the lack of data on the efficacy of STIP/Backfund/LTIPP. We believe that those concerns haven’t been adequately addressed yet. Although the proposal suggests that performance audits will take place, we haven’t seen the results of these audits anywhere. The ARDC is working on a review of the STIP, but it’s not yet complete so we cannot use it to inform our decision. We’re also not sure if both of the aforementioned data sources will be complete by the time the challenge period ends to inform us on the need to potentially challenge protocols’ requests.

As it stands, there simply isn’t enough actionable information to evaluate, let alone justify, an extension of the STIP. Therefore, we cannot in good conscience vote in the proposal’s favor at this time.

As the DAO Advocate for the ARDC, but also in our capacity as delegates, we will follow up with a deep dive on the data from the STIP which can help all of us understand whether protocols are meeting the expectations set forward by both the program itself, and also by their applications.

To conclude, we wish that we don’t, as a DAO, have to vote for another similar proposal to extend an existing program and funnel more money into it without properly evaluating its performance and, if needed, making the appropriate changes. We plan on getting engaged in the near future into a final, long term incentive program framework, that will address all those concerns.

krst from delegate.l2beat.eth

10.0M TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

We have chosen to ABSTAIN from the on-chain vote.

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

We have chosen to ABSTAIN from the on-chain vote.

Blockworks Research will vote AGAINST this proposal on Tally.

First of all, we appreciate the updates made to the proposal posted onchain. Having said that, as many have pointed out, there are still several concerns that haven’t been addressed adequately. From the point of view of growing the Arbitrum ecosystem, we feel that there is no robust argument for running an additional incentive program on top of the LTIPP. As such, our opinion is that the currently optimal action for the DAO is to better understand past incentive programs to create an even better framework, which can be implemented once the LTIPP has ended. To be clear, we fully support incentive programs, but they have to be implemented in a manner that balances growth with sustainability.

More specifically, in addition to the points raised in our previous comment, some of our main concerns comprise:

Almost no STIP applicant rigorously justified the number of tokens requested, with the STIP-Bridge building on this arguably somewhat arbitrary allocation. We’ve screened several STIP addendums, and no applicant has quantifiably validated their grant request.
The optimistic voting structure is interesting but should be accompanied by a council (similar to what was utilized in the LTIPP), at minimum. As no in-depth research covering the performance of all STIP recipients has yet been published, community members would be forced to conduct due diligence on each applicant’s performance themselves, in addition to assessing all STIP addendum structures. The aforementioned, combined with an extremely short challenge and review period, means that several undeserving protocols and incentive mechanisms are likely to pass.
We’re especially concerned about the possibility of an extension that is included in the STIP-Bridge proposal. It’s clear that it isn’t sustainable for the DAO to indefinitely hand out incentive allocations, and since the extension will be posted directly to Tally, it’s unclear how framework improvements would be added to this extension and who would be responsible for deciding the next incentive program’s structure.
The longer-term sustainability and user retention of the STIP are not yet understood, and running an extension of the aforementioned incentive program renders it impossible to research these factors.

Blockworks Research will vote AGAINST this proposal on Tally.

More specifically, in addition to the points raised in our previous comment, some of our main concerns comprise:

Almost no STIP applicant rigorously justified the number of tokens requested, with the STIP-Bridge building on this arguably somewhat arbitrary allocation. We’ve screened several STIP addendums, and no applicant has quantifiably validated their grant request.
The optimistic voting structure is interesting but should be accompanied by a council (similar to what was utilized in the LTIPP), at minimum. As no in-depth research covering the performance of all STIP recipients has yet been published, community members would be forced to conduct due diligence on each applicant’s performance themselves, in addition to assessing all STIP addendum structures. The aforementioned, combined with an extremely short challenge and review period, means that several undeserving protocols and incentive mechanisms are likely to pass.
We’re especially concerned about the possibility of an extension that is included in the STIP-Bridge proposal. It’s clear that it isn’t sustainable for the DAO to indefinitely hand out incentive allocations, and since the extension will be posted directly to Tally, it’s unclear how framework improvements would be added to this extension and who would be responsible for deciding the next incentive program’s structure.
The longer-term sustainability and user retention of the STIP are not yet understood, and running an extension of the aforementioned incentive program renders it impossible to research these factors.

Bob-Rossi from bobrossi.eth

2.4M TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

I will be maintaining my "Against" vote for reasons notes above

While I am appreciative of some of the feedback being taken into consideration for Tally vote, I do not believe the core issue I have raised was addressed - why should we extend the STIP to run alongside the LTIPP when we can just roll these funds into a more comprehensive 2nd LTIPP round? Because of this my initial concerns still stand. The LTIPP has had some faults to learn from, but I believe it has largely been a step forward from the STIPP round and to just extend those who previously passed a STIP round (yes, I acknowledge subject to Snapshot vote) is a step back.

I will be maintaining my "Against" vote for reasons notes above

Two positive ideas I want to take from the proposal however, as I acknowledge there has been a lot of work and thought put into this proposal and there are good take aways here.

Optimistic voting: I'd be curious to see this in action for a future grant round. While 77 votes is still a lot, the council did reject a lot of applicants. So I think there was some success in that change to the process, but the Optimistic voting method probably would reduce the DAO Delegates voting responsibility even more. As I'd imagine you'd be looking at maybe only a handful of contested votes. In hindsight I think the LTIPP trial round would have been a good opportunity to test this.
Possibility of Extension: I think something like this is a little more palatable for myself then the current STIP-Bridge proposal. I would be more open to STIP/LTIP extension if there seems to be indication the next grant round is going to happen quickly in order to remain competitive in the space, and if this does end up being the case I would recommend putting forth this same proposal but inclusive to all the STIP / LTIPP rounds.

mcfly from 0xmcfly.eth

101.8K TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

I'll be voting against this proposal on behalf of the ARB holders who have delegated their voting power to me. After carefully reviewing the proposal and the community feedback provided, I have decided to vote against this proposal at the tally stage. My decision is based on the following key considerations:

Firstly, there appears to be a lack of comprehensive data and analysis on the actual impact and effectiveness of the previous STIP program. Without a thorough evaluation of the outcomes and learnings from the initial STIP, it is difficult to assess whether a similar approach is the best strategy going forward. A deeper analysis is needed to understand the true impact of the STIP program on the ecosystem's condition, both with and without incentives. This information would be crucial in determining the merits of the proposed approach.

Secondly, the upcoming LTIPP distribution of millions ARB in incentives raises questions about the necessity of this additional proposal. As a community member pointed out, the LTIPP is expected to address the concerns of competing against other L2s and retaining users. Disregarding the rationale behind the LTIPP and focusing solely on the fear of current STIP participants losing their user base may not be the most prudent approach.

Furthermore, the proposal appears to primarily benefit the protocols that previously participated in the STIP program, potentially limiting the inclusivity and overall effectiveness of the incentive strategy. A more inclusive approach that considers the needs and contributions of a broader range of ecosystem participants would be more aligned with the goal of sustainable growth.

Given the lack of comprehensive data on the STIP program's efficacy, the upcoming LTIPP distribution, and the concerns around the exclusivity of the proposed approach, I cannot support this proposal in its current form. I believe it is essential to prioritize a thorough evaluation of past incentive programs and align the proposed strategies with the broader goals and long-term sustainability of the ecosystem. Until these concerns are adequately addressed, I will be voting against this proposal at the tally stage.

krst from delegate.l2beat.eth

10.0M TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

After careful consideration, we’ve decided to vote in favor of the proposal during the temp-check, without however necessarily committing to supporting the proposal during the on-chain vote in its current form.

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The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

Our support should be treated as a signal of overall support for continuing incentive programs for the biggest protocols in the Arbitrum ecosystem, but we see the need for more debate and clarity around the results of the previous programs and the expected outcomes of this one.

As others have already pointed out, there’s a lack of information around the proposal, such as the efficacy of previous such initiatives (STEP, Backfund, LTIPP), and not enough overall discussion and involvement from delegates.

While reviewing the proposal, we realized that it’s basically a proposal coming from/involving some of the most prominent builders on Arbitrum. That was something that urged us to carefully review the implications that the outcome of the proposal was going to have in either case (passing or failing). Voting against the proposal during temp-check and effectively “killing it” doesn’t really provide the DAO with steps forward other than sitting on our hands until LTIPP concludes.

We’d much rather keep pushing forward and hold constructive discussions to figure out how to fill in the gaps and improve the proposal, especially based on the feedback of the people who are currently opposed to the proposal or abstaining from it than take steps backward.

With that in mind, we’re voting in favor of the proposal at the Snapshot vote so we can signal that we’d like to figure out how we can best improve the proposal before going to an on-chain vote.

Bob-Rossi from bobrossi.eth

2.4M TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

I will be maintaining my "Against" vote for reasons notes above

Two positive ideas I want to take from the proposal however, as I acknowledge there has been a lot of work and thought put into this proposal and there are good take aways here.

Optimistic voting: I'd be curious to see this in action for a future grant round. While 77 votes is still a lot, the council did reject a lot of applicants. So I think there was some success in that change to the process, but the Optimistic voting method probably would reduce the DAO Delegates voting responsibility even more. As I'd imagine you'd be looking at maybe only a handful of contested votes. In hindsight I think the LTIPP trial round would have been a good opportunity to test this.
Possibility of Extension: I think something like this is a little more palatable for myself then the current STIP-Bridge proposal. I would be more open to STIP/LTIP extension if there seems to be indication the next grant round is going to happen quickly in order to remain competitive in the space, and if this does end up being the case I would recommend putting forth this same proposal but inclusive to all the STIP / LTIPP rounds.

mcfly from 0xmcfly.eth

101.8K TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

krst from delegate.l2beat.eth

10.0M TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

105

The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

With that in mind, we’re voting in favor of the proposal at the Snapshot vote so we can signal that we’d like to figure out how we can best improve the proposal before going to an on-chain vote.

UPDATES FOR TALLY PROPOSAL (notes on updates made April 10th):

Feedback from successful Snapshot vote and how it was addressed in the updated proposal.

Concern 1)

We don’t yet have an understanding of which protocols were and were not successful in STIP

Updated Solution

To address this, performance audits have been integrated into the proposal. These audits, conducted by OpenBlock Labs, will provide transparent insights into how effectively protocols utilized their STIP grants.

Concern 2)

The proposed format is too passive and may lead to indiscriminate fund distribution. We need more infrastructure and quality checks.

Updated Solution

We have updated the proposal to include a much more robust infrastructure. First OBL will be providing audits. Second, the advisors from the LTIPP program will be available to work with protocols to improve their incentive mechanisms and determine appropriate amounts of ARB to request from the DAO. Finally, a PM role has been created to help facilitate the program and provide a point of connection between the delegates, advisors, protocol, foundation, and data providers.

Concern 3)

This is the same as STIP we didn't use what we learned the first time.

Updated solution

This proposal has a few notable differences compared to STIP.

First, this pool of protocols has already been somewhat vetted by the community as they were selected initially. However, they now have had the opportunity to showcase how effectively they can use incentives. The OBL audits along with the data the community will provide will give us more insights into which protocols can successfully use incentives making it easier for delegates to choose which protocols to extend.

Second, STIP was the first time protocols applied for funding and there were strict rules for what they could use the ARB for. This led to many applicants having poor incentive mechanisms as they were unsure how to apply to one of these programs. Now, they will have the opportunity to work with the advisors who helped the LTIPP come up with exciting new incentive ideas. This will help the STIP protocols put forward better applications.

Finally, this program trials optimistic funding. Even with the council in LTIPP, there are still 77 snapshot votes. This is not sustainable for the DAO. This bridge allows us to test an optimistic approach in a more controlled environment to see if it is something we should explore using in the full long-term program

All Updates to the Proposal

Performance audits have been included to give the community a better understanding of how protocols utilized their STIP grants.
The advisors from LTIPP will be assisting Bridge protocols to help answer questions and improve their applications
A program manager has been added.
A small operational budget has been included to onboard the advisors and pm as well as cover any unforeseen costs such as additional audits. As this budget was not included in the original Bridge Snapshot vote, we will not use any of these funds until an additional snapshot is passed that determines how these funds should be used.
More clarity has been added regarding the posting of Addendums
More clarity has been provided on the challenge process and optimistic process
The timeline has been updated
The possibility of extension in case of a delay to the full long-term program

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Frisson from 0xfrisson.eth

12.8M TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

After careful consideration, I voted abstain on this proposal.

Things I like about this proposal

After careful consideration, I voted abstain on this proposal.

Things I like about this proposal

It continues to invest in the growth of leading projects on Arbitrum, many of whom were successful pre-STIP (and therefore have demonstrated product-market fit)
STIP projects are excluded from LTIPP. In retrospect, I think it's weird that we exclude specific protocols from incentive programs and think I should have pushed back harder on this aspect of LTIPP. This creates an environment where the excluded protocols are incentivized (no pun intended) to create their own program. I like that this proposal allow projects excluded from LTIPP to be eligible for incentives. Going forward, I don't think specific projects should be excluded from incentive programs.

Things I don't like about this proposal

This proposal does not attempt to learn from the results of STIP. I would like to see some analysis of the successes/failures baked into future incentives strategies.
I suspect there was a significant gap in effectiveness among STIP projects. I'd like to see a plan to surface some analytics around this to help delegates with the optimistic voting process.

A note about Tally specifically:

We (Tally) were able to successfully deploy 100k ARB of our 200k ARB STIP grant to onchain DAOs that deployed on Arbitrum. We earmarked the last 100k for distribution to GMX, who is launching their DAO on Arbitrum shortly. However, we technically are not able to deploy it because the GMX DAO will not exist onchain until (shortly) after the STIP period is officially over. This proposal would allow us to technically follow the procedures of STIP by sending back the 100k we earmarked for GMX and then applying for it again during the STIP bridge period. With that said, if this proposal does not pass, we would very much like to be able to deploy the 100k from the original STIP period to GMX after the STIP period is technically closed.

BlockworksResearch from blockworksresearch.eth

2.00 TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

Blockworks Research will vote against this proposal.

While it is clear that a vast amount of onchain activity across ecosystems is currently inorganic, and Arbitrum needs to maintain its competitiveness, we feel the distribution of incentives should be done on a more granular level. Moreover, in a hypothetical situation where Arbitrum doesn’t distribute incentives at all, users/capital that opt to leave the ecosystem completely aren’t valuable for Arbitrum in the long term in the first place, as these users/capital are likely to be purely extractive.

Blockworks Research will vote against this proposal.

As has been mentioned across several sources, the original STIP process had many nuances that could be improved on, implying that the selection of protocols could have been more effective. Arbitrum is rightly in a growth mode, but distributing incentives in a semi-automatic way will—in the long term—likely lead to a situation akin to the problem known as Zombie Financing in corporate finance.

Due to the aforementioned reasons, we suggest that previous STIPs as well as the upcoming LTIPP be studied more closely through quantifiable KPIs and with a focus on customer retention. Furthermore, we think that a detailed execution plan for the usage of Arbitrum’s balance sheet should be considered to ensure the ecosystem’s long-term success. This will be especially important once market conditions worsen, and, in our opinion, is something that the DAO should start preparing for.

We consider this proposal to be structurally incomplete in its current form, and thus, vote against it.

AbdullahUmar from uniswap-dao.eth

1.3M TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

Below is feedback from the UADP (we abstained):

Our team is generally in favor of supporting incentive programs. We voted FOR the previous STIP initiatives, as well as the LTIPP. This proposal, however, caused us to pause. There’s a degree of ambiguity present that leaves too many questions unanswered, and we are unsure if further incentivizing these protocols is the best use of treasury funds. There needs to be a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of the STIPs–hard numbers and data.

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Below is feedback from the UADP (we abstained):

It seems many are beginning to justify large incentive spending as a way to compete with other L2s. Vampire attacks become especially rampant during bull markets, with new protocols offering exorbitant APRs. We’re of the opinion that enough incentives should be paid out to worthy protocols–and those incentives must be coupled with products that have market fit. If STIP incentives for a protocol don’t work, the cop out cannot simply be “there are higher yields elsewhere”. We have to consider if the products we are incentivizing actually have merit. Sure, capital chases yields, but consumers chase good products. Before providing STIP projects with more incentives, the DAO should conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the failures and successes of the already deployed incentives.

Furthermore, capital inflows shouldn’t be the only metric for judging the success of the incentives. Stickiness of capital and users is perhaps a better measure for sustainability. It’s great that these incentive programs have increased Arbitrum TVL. And we get that there’s a desire to grip onto that capital, making sure it stays in the ecosystem. But we should also consider the lasting impact of these incentives. A good way of putting it perhaps–the current TVL is like pouring water into a glass…but that glass has a hole in the bottom. Instead of continually filling up the glass with incentives, maybe we should figure out how to patch the hole.

The UADP will abstain from voting for this proposal. We hope that the authors take the DAO’s constructive feedback and provide delegates with more substantive reasoning behind why this proposal is worthwhile. If the provided reasoning is sufficient, we may alter our vote to FOR later on either during a new snapshot or the onchain vote.

Curia from curia-delegates.eth

74.7K TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

After carefully considering the feedback from various members of our community regarding the proposed approach to incentives, we still have many concern, including unsufficient data from the previous STIP round. As a result, we have decided to vote against the proposal. Our decision is grounded in several key concerns and rationales, as outlined below:

Lack of Comprehensive Data on STIP Program Efficacy:

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Lack of Comprehensive Data on STIP Program Efficacy:

We are seeking more detailed information on the impact of the STIP program, specifically regarding the ecosystem's condition without any incentives versus with the STIP program in place. A deeper analysis is necessary to understand the true impact and effectiveness of STIP. The goal of STIP is to iterate on the results and findings from the initial program.

LTIPP is Coming and Questioning the Necessity of Doubling Down.

@pedro raised a good point of view, we also agreed on the distrubtion of LTIPP is coming soon and should be able to achived the intented goals of this proposal.

Quoted from pedrob

This should address one of the concerns of this proposal: the competition against other L2s. This program is about 1 month away from distributing 45M ARB in incentives to users, which is attractive enough to:

a. keep the current users engaged, and

b. bring in new ones, as there have already been proposals presented with interesting mechanisms to incentivize bridging and volume towards Arbitrum.

Disregarding through this proposal the consensus rationale behind the LTIPP makes it look like all relies on the fear of the protocols that benefited from the STIP of losing the users they gained through those incentives. Nothing against that nor is something wrong, but it has nothing to do with competing against other chains, which is a clear and stated objective of current LTIPP.

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Exclusivity to STIP Participants:

The proposal appears to benefit only those protocols that previously participated in the STIP, which may limit the inclusivity and overall effectiveness of the incentive strategy.

Bob-Rossi from bobrossi.eth

2.4M TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

edited 2 years ago

I will be voting "Against" this proposal.

As I noted above, I believe the time and funds would be better spent using what was learned from the prior 2 STIPs, as well as the current LTIP, to move forward with one large round that any project (regardless of prior funding in either of those rounds) can participate in after the 12 week LTIP is completed.

I will be voting "Against" this proposal.

The STIP voting was flawed, and the LTIP trial run has (so far) seemingly remedied a lot of the prior issues. While I still see room for improvement with the LTIP, automatically re-upping prior STIP winners based on no real framework is a big step backwards in our process. Especially given the timeframe, there is no reasonable way to review all the proposals for who is actually deserving of additional funds. We do not have time to setup a committee to determine who was successful and who was not, nor do delegates have the time to assess 100 proposals again (which will be double duty considering the LTIPP needs approval by delegates as well).

Others have echoed similar concerns about the proposal. While I understand the urgency to post to snapshot given the timelines, it further concerns me that I have not seen any response to any opposing comments over the last few weeks - ample time to flesh out a discussion. Plus, I'll also add that some of this urgency is self-inflicted, as the LTIPP Tally vote was 2 months ago.

Simply put - I do not agree with the proposal as stands and do not believe there has been enough discussion on this. With the vote ending within 48 hours I have decided to move forward with my against vote as I do not anticipate concerns will be adequately addressed before the poll is closed.

UPDATES FOR TALLY PROPOSAL (notes on updates made April 10th):

Feedback from successful Snapshot vote and how it was addressed in the updated proposal.

Concern 1)

We don’t yet have an understanding of which protocols were and were not successful in STIP

Updated Solution

Concern 2)

The proposed format is too passive and may lead to indiscriminate fund distribution. We need more infrastructure and quality checks.

Updated Solution

Concern 3)

This is the same as STIP we didn't use what we learned the first time.

Updated solution

This proposal has a few notable differences compared to STIP.

All Updates to the Proposal

Performance audits have been included to give the community a better understanding of how protocols utilized their STIP grants.
The advisors from LTIPP will be assisting Bridge protocols to help answer questions and improve their applications
A program manager has been added.
A small operational budget has been included to onboard the advisors and pm as well as cover any unforeseen costs such as additional audits. As this budget was not included in the original Bridge Snapshot vote, we will not use any of these funds until an additional snapshot is passed that determines how these funds should be used.
More clarity has been added regarding the posting of Addendums
More clarity has been provided on the challenge process and optimistic process
The timeline has been updated
The possibility of extension in case of a delay to the full long-term program

104

Frisson from 0xfrisson.eth

12.8M TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

After careful consideration, I voted abstain on this proposal.

Things I like about this proposal

After careful consideration, I voted abstain on this proposal.

Things I like about this proposal

It continues to invest in the growth of leading projects on Arbitrum, many of whom were successful pre-STIP (and therefore have demonstrated product-market fit)
STIP projects are excluded from LTIPP. In retrospect, I think it's weird that we exclude specific protocols from incentive programs and think I should have pushed back harder on this aspect of LTIPP. This creates an environment where the excluded protocols are incentivized (no pun intended) to create their own program. I like that this proposal allow projects excluded from LTIPP to be eligible for incentives. Going forward, I don't think specific projects should be excluded from incentive programs.

Things I don't like about this proposal

This proposal does not attempt to learn from the results of STIP. I would like to see some analysis of the successes/failures baked into future incentives strategies.
I suspect there was a significant gap in effectiveness among STIP projects. I'd like to see a plan to surface some analytics around this to help delegates with the optimistic voting process.

A note about Tally specifically:

We (Tally) were able to successfully deploy 100k ARB of our 200k ARB STIP grant to onchain DAOs that deployed on Arbitrum. We earmarked the last 100k for distribution to GMX, who is launching their DAO on Arbitrum shortly. However, we technically are not able to deploy it because the GMX DAO will not exist onchain until (shortly) after the STIP period is officially over. This proposal would allow us to technically follow the procedures of STIP by sending back the 100k we earmarked for GMX and then applying for it again during the STIP bridge period. With that said, if this proposal does not pass, we would very much like to be able to deploy the 100k from the original STIP period to GMX after the STIP period is technically closed.

BlockworksResearch from blockworksresearch.eth

2.00 TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

Blockworks Research will vote against this proposal.

We consider this proposal to be structurally incomplete in its current form, and thus, vote against it.

AbdullahUmar from uniswap-dao.eth

1.3M TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

Below is feedback from the UADP (we abstained):

107

Below is feedback from the UADP (we abstained):

Curia from curia-delegates.eth

74.7K TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

Lack of Comprehensive Data on STIP Program Efficacy:

100

Lack of Comprehensive Data on STIP Program Efficacy:

LTIPP is Coming and Questioning the Necessity of Doubling Down.

@pedro raised a good point of view, we also agreed on the distrubtion of LTIPP is coming soon and should be able to achived the intented goals of this proposal.

Quoted from pedrob

a. keep the current users engaged, and

b. bring in new ones, as there have already been proposals presented with interesting mechanisms to incentivize bridging and volume towards Arbitrum.

jump to post →

Exclusivity to STIP Participants:

The proposal appears to benefit only those protocols that previously participated in the STIP, which may limit the inclusivity and overall effectiveness of the incentive strategy.

Bob-Rossi from bobrossi.eth

2.4M TOKEN

posted 2 years ago

edited 2 years ago

I will be voting "Against" this proposal.

Important: this opinion is solely my own and in no way reflects that of SEEDLatam or any of its members

gmgm.

Just a few comments from an LTIPP workforce member (Applicant Advisor).

Quoted from SavvyDAO

give delegates the ability to reinforce those that have performed well with grant extensions.

Firstly, what were the objectives of the STIP? Were they achieved? Do we have the necessary data to be convinced of this? Because when money is given away to users, the growth in TVL and volume is somewhat obvious. And it seems that this is the only thing highlighted by those who posted in favor of this proposal.

In this regard, I totally agree with @tnorm:

Quoted from tnorm

STIP - Defining Success

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But beyond that, the introduction of the Long Term Incentives Pilot Program (with "pilot" emphasized) highlighted a series of issues in the allocation of funds during the STIP:

First, what was the reasoning expressed by the DAO in approving that proposal?

Quoted from Matt_StableLab

The Pilot Program will replace a round 2 and will be funded with 25M-45M ARB to accommodate the large expected protocol demand we have already seen. This will complete the incentivizing of Arbitrum-based teams to create a holistic competitive edge not against each other but against other chains.

jump to post →

a. keep the current users engaged, and

b. bring in new ones, as there have already been proposals presented with interesting mechanisms to incentivize bridging and volume towards Arbitrum.

In this regard, I believe it is a great opportunity for the beneficiaries of the STIP to gather data on:

a. stickiness

b. performance without incentives (before and after STIP / BSTIP)

c. performance/stickiness without incentives in the context of incentivized competitors.

Quoted from Matt_StableLab

We have learned a lot from STIP and can use what went wrong in STIP and the Backfund to hypothesize what changes would create a better long-term framework. However, we have little evidence to prove these new ideas would be a better solution.

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Has that situation changed? Do we have evidence that the STIP worked better than the intended solution? (of course not, since LTIPP hasn’t started yet)

So, moving to the problems that the LTIPP proposal identified and is trying to solve:

Quoted from Matt_StableLab

Problem #1: Too large a burden placed on delegates

In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal.

jump to post →

This led to the introduction of the Council. Which is currently studying and evaluating 173 elegible applications.

Basically, this proposal suggests that we forget that this was a problem, asking the protocols that received STIP to come up with some justification for why they shouldn't lose funding, and asking the delegates to do all the work over again. This involves 65 possible proposals.

Moreover, all the work we've done over these two weeks as Advisors seems to have been for nothing:

Quoted from Matt_StableLab

Problem #2: Protocols did not receive adequate feedback on their proposals

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As Advisors, we worked extensively over the last weeks to help all protocols improve their applications. Only the other Advisors know the enormous amount of hours we dedicated to this.

But our efforts were not solely to assist those protocols that are less well-known or not as well-connected with the delegates in crafting competitive and appealing proposals. We also aimed to help everyone improve or modify their proposals for the benefit of the Arbitrum DAO, ensuring that the proposed incentive mechanisms are sustainable in the long term and aligned with the goals of the Arbitrum DAO.

This proposal overlooks the value of this function to the DAO and assumes that because they were approved in the past, the same proposals as they were originally designed would be approved today.

It also does not justify why 50% of the incentives received in the past are sufficient to achieve the same objectives that were set in the STIP for each applicant. In these past weeks, we have seen all kinds of applications and mechanisms, and the need for incentives varies greatly in each case and depends on (at least):

a. current metrics b. market conditions c. expected metrics.

None of these are the same today as before STIP. Why 50% of received incentives would help protocols to do the same? What are the objectives? And how do those objectives align with the DAO's objectives?

Quoted from Matt_StableLab

Problem #3: Strict Limitations on Incentives Mechanisms

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“Allowing protocols to innovate on incentive distribution mechanisms will allow Arbitrum protocols and community members to get a better idea of which designs work and which don’t work.”

Again, this proposal overlooks the objectives set out in the LTIPP. It was not just another round of STIP to continue throwing money into the network to incentivize users.

It is about experimenting with a new mechanism in search of perfecting a long-term plan, to address many of the deficiencies that this proposal suggests repeating without consideration.

The great thing is that the approved LTIPP proposal includes research bounties. Currently, the Council is working on defining the questions that must be answered. I take this opportunity to invite everyone here to post any questions that arose during STIP that would be valuable targets for research.

Conclusions

I apologize if anything I've said here comes across as aggressive or upsetting. We've put a lot of effort into these weeks to give the DAO the best possible applications. Seeing this proposal makes me feel as though all that effort was in vain, and that old grants can simply be renewed without even waiting for a general conclusion or analysis on the impact of the STIP and the future impact of the LTIPP.

With this, I support @Bob-Rossi proposal:

Quoted from Bob-Rossi

I think a better solution is just to take what has been learned through STIP rounds 1 & 2, as well as this LTIPP trail run, and have a true LTIPP that is open to all projects regardless of prior inclusion in either of those three funding runs. If we start planning for that now we have a good 3 month window to hit the ground running come July for a seamless transition into a true, all inclusive Long-Term grant program.

jump to post →

Thank you for initiating the debate, and again, apologies if anything was upsetting.

142

Important: this opinion is solely my own and in no way reflects that of SEEDLatam or any of its members

gmgm.

Just a few comments from an LTIPP workforce member (Applicant Advisor).

Quoted from SavvyDAO

give delegates the ability to reinforce those that have performed well with grant extensions.

In this regard, I totally agree with @tnorm:

Quoted from tnorm

STIP - Defining Success

jump to post →

But beyond that, the introduction of the Long Term Incentives Pilot Program (with "pilot" emphasized) highlighted a series of issues in the allocation of funds during the STIP:

First, what was the reasoning expressed by the DAO in approving that proposal?

Quoted from Matt_StableLab

jump to post →

a. keep the current users engaged, and

b. bring in new ones, as there have already been proposals presented with interesting mechanisms to incentivize bridging and volume towards Arbitrum.

In this regard, I believe it is a great opportunity for the beneficiaries of the STIP to gather data on:

a. stickiness

b. performance without incentives (before and after STIP / BSTIP)

c. performance/stickiness without incentives in the context of incentivized competitors.

Quoted from Matt_StableLab

jump to post →

Has that situation changed? Do we have evidence that the STIP worked better than the intended solution? (of course not, since LTIPP hasn’t started yet)

So, moving to the problems that the LTIPP proposal identified and is trying to solve:

Quoted from Matt_StableLab

Problem #1: Too large a burden placed on delegates

jump to post →

This led to the introduction of the Council. Which is currently studying and evaluating 173 elegible applications.

Moreover, all the work we've done over these two weeks as Advisors seems to have been for nothing:

Quoted from Matt_StableLab

Problem #2: Protocols did not receive adequate feedback on their proposals

jump to post →

As Advisors, we worked extensively over the last weeks to help all protocols improve their applications. Only the other Advisors know the enormous amount of hours we dedicated to this.

This proposal overlooks the value of this function to the DAO and assumes that because they were approved in the past, the same proposals as they were originally designed would be approved today.

a. current metrics b. market conditions c. expected metrics.

Quoted from Matt_StableLab

Problem #3: Strict Limitations on Incentives Mechanisms

jump to post →

“Allowing protocols to innovate on incentive distribution mechanisms will allow Arbitrum protocols and community members to get a better idea of which designs work and which don’t work.”

Again, this proposal overlooks the objectives set out in the LTIPP. It was not just another round of STIP to continue throwing money into the network to incentivize users.

It is about experimenting with a new mechanism in search of perfecting a long-term plan, to address many of the deficiencies that this proposal suggests repeating without consideration.

Conclusions

With this, I support @Bob-Rossi proposal:

Quoted from Bob-Rossi

jump to post →

Thank you for initiating the debate, and again, apologies if anything was upsetting.

142

Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

Abstract

Motivation

Rationale

Specifications

Eligibility

Maximum Funding Size:

STIP Performance Audits

Advisors Help

Program Manager Role

How To Apply - Addendum on STIP Forum post:

Challenge and Review Period

Voting and Approval Mechanism:

Optimistic Approach

Initial Voting Mechanism

Challenge Snapshot Process

Possibility of Extension

Steps to Implement

Timeline

Overall Cost: 37.6M ARB

Incentives Budget: 37,500,000 ARB

Operational Cost: 100K ARB

Additional Documents:

Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

Abstract

Motivation

Rationale

Specifications

Eligibility

Maximum Funding Size:

STIP Performance Audits

Advisors Help

Program Manager Role

How To Apply - Addendum on STIP Forum post:

Challenge and Review Period

Voting and Approval Mechanism:

Optimistic Approach

Initial Voting Mechanism

Challenge Snapshot Process

Possibility of Extension

Steps to Implement

Timeline

Overall Cost: 37.6M ARB

Incentives Budget: 37,500,000 ARB

Operational Cost: 100K ARB

Additional Documents:

Abstract

Motivation

Rationale

Specifications

Eligibility

Maximum Funding Size:

STIP Performance Audits

Advisors Help

Program Manager Role

How To Apply - Addendum on STIP Forum post:

Challenge and Review Period

Voting and Approval Mechanism:

Optimistic Approach

Initial Voting Mechanism

Challenge Snapshot Process

Possibility of Extension

Steps to Implement

Timeline

Overall Cost: 37.6M ARB

Incentives Budget: 37,500,000 ARB

Operational Cost: 100K ARB

Additional Documents:

Abstract

Motivation

Rationale

Specifications

Eligibility

Maximum Funding Size:

STIP Performance Audits

Advisors Help