Evolving Arbitrum's Transaction Ordering Policy: From Timeboost to a More Open and Competitive Sequencing Market
Update June 11 2026: This AIP and the proposal to transition Arbitrum One to use priority fees for transaction ordering does not introduce new forms of MEV or create MEV. Just like it always has been, Arbitrum One will continue to have a private mempool at the sequencer. This means that the order of transactions are published only after the transactions have already been sequenced by the sequencer. Additionally, the ordering of transactions cannot be manipulated to extract MEV after the sequence has been published publicly. This subtle but important detail means that MEV-related sandwich attacks and frontrunning were not and are not possible on Arbitrum One.
This Constitutional AIP proposes to disable Timeboost on Arbitrum One and replace it with a Priority Gas Auction (PGA) mechanism, an ordering policy that's more familiar for actors who are willing to pay for transaction priority, allowing more market participants to be a part of Arbitrum's next phase of growth. In addition, it would sunset Timeboost on Arbitrum Nova.
Timeboost was the first foray into experimenting with MEV via an express lane auction mechanism on Arbitrum One. Deploying a new transaction ordering policy (PGA) represents the next step in the journey to position Arbitrum as the premier platform for the programmable economy.
This version of a PGA-based ordering policy will first sort transactions based on priority fee in 125ms PGA rounds before publishing a block at 250ms. There will also be an anti-starvation mechanism which works as a primitive form of inclusion guarantee to help ensure that transactions that didn't get included in a round because of a low or null priority fee can be included within a couple of blocks, with the exact number determined by the number of PGA rounds.
If approved, this AIP would:
Explicitly, this AIP only proposes sunsetting Timeboost on Arbitrum Nova; it does not propose adopting PGA as an ordering policy for Nova, in line with the Nova Minimization AIP https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-aip-minimize-arbitrum-nova/30880
Timeboost was launched on Arbitrum One in April 2025, a novel transaction ordering policy designed to put user fairness and spam reduction at the forefront while, for the first time, creating additional revenue to the ArbitrumDAO via Timeboost auction fees. While Timeboost has delivered meaningful benefits including user fairness, and a new revenue stream for the DAO, some structural considerations have also come to light that are worth addressing:
A fundamentally different model is needed and the more familiar ordering policy: Priority Gas Auctions (PGA) stands out as a clear option. PGA addresses the challenges above by making ordering determined by per-transaction priorityFeePerGas bids rather than a periodic, ahead-of-time express lane auction:
While ArbOS 60 Elara introduced the capability for Arbitrum chains to collect priority fees (via the maxPriorityFeePerGas field in EIP-1559 type 2 transactions), it deliberately did not enable this feature on Arbitrum One or Nova. It was clearly noted that enablement would require a separate Constitutional DAO vote. This proposal would enable the collection of priority fees.
A new transaction ordering policy offers the ArbitrumDAO an opportunity to continue to capture additional revenue that should not come at the expense of users, with the introduction of an anti-starvation mechanism that helps facilitate transactions with 0 priority fees or low priority fees get included. Transactions remain subject to paying the latest base fees.
Rather than capturing arbitrage opportunities by having the fastest hardware or bidding ahead-of-time, participants can win these opportunities by bidding in a just-in-time auction to gain priority ordering.
The priority auction is permissionless and participation is open to everyone, where transactions with the highest bids get included first within a 125ms PGA round, and ties are broken by arrival timestamp.
The Arbitrum DAO can configure all aspects of PGA, including enabling or disabling it, the auction's design, and how to handle proceeds.
Priority Fees: are user-defined incentives paid in addition to the network's base transaction fee. Priority fees are denominated in the Arbitrum's native gas unit and are paid directly to the Arbitrum DAO Treasury.
Priority Gas Auction: an auction in which multiple participants simultaneously submit transactions with their specified priority fees in order to secure preferential ordering by the sequencer.
We are formally introducing our Priority Gas Auction design, which will enable Arbitrum One users to affect their transaction ordering within a block by specifying a maxPriorityFeePerGas in each transaction. We added some modifications in the ordering mechanism to help facilitate valid transactions with low or null priority fees are included in a timely manner, by adding a anti-starvation boost to all transactions that remain in the mempool after a PGA round.
p equal to its priorityFeePerGas bid, and (b) a fine-grained arrival timestamp (at the sequencer) in milliseconds for tie-breaking.priorityFeePerGas, with ties broken by earliest arrival timestamp.
priorityFeePerGas is calculated as follows: priority_fee_per_gas = min(transaction.max_priority_fee_per_gas, transaction.max_fee_per_gas - block.base_fee_per_gas)This mechanism helps facilitate that transactions with null or low priority fees will get included within a reasonable time. The mechanism works as follows:
p / (2K) to all waiting transactions in the mempool, where p is the priority of the last transaction included in the previous PGA round, and K is the number of rounds per block.| Parameter | Default (Arb One) | Configurable By | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| K (rounds per block) | 2 -> 125ms rounds | Chain Operator, with permission from the DAO | Higher K = faster rounds up to a limit. Otherwise it becomes FIFO |
| Anti-starvation boost divisor | 2K | Implicitly set via K | Lower K = faster anti-starvation |
This AIP proposes granting the current sequencer operator the below rights to make the following adjustments from time to time for a period of two (2) years. The rights described below are expected to only be exercised in circumstances where doing so would enhance PGA's long-term stability, preserve or improve the user experience for those using Arbitrum One, increase the security posture, resiliency, or stability of the chain, and/or otherwise help increase revenue for the ArbitrumDAO:
K round parameter, a value which determines the number of rounds per block. The starting default is 2 but adjustments could be to any value between [1 & 10], inclusive.Upon passage of this AIP the following steps will be applied to both Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova:
The following implementation sequence is proposed:
The ArbitrumDAO has full control over how to spend the proceeds from the PGA auction, with 3% of auction proceeds to be set aside for the Arbitrum Developer Guild, which helps fund core Arbitrum development.
This proposal comes at no additional development cost to the ArbitrumDAO given it is already covered by an OCL and AF contract through January 2027. The engineering work will be owned by Offchain Labs in its capacity as an Arbitrum Aligned Entity.
Evolving Arbitrum's Transaction Ordering Policy: From Timeboost to a More Open and Competitive Sequencing Market
Update June 11 2026: This AIP and the proposal to transition Arbitrum One to use priority fees for transaction ordering does not introduce new forms of MEV or create MEV. Just like it always has been, Arbitrum One will continue to have a private mempool at the sequencer. This means that the order of transactions are published only after the transactions have already been sequenced by the sequencer. Additionally, the ordering of transactions cannot be manipulated to extract MEV after the sequence has been published publicly. This subtle but important detail means that MEV-related sandwich attacks and frontrunning were not and are not possible on Arbitrum One.
This Constitutional AIP proposes to disable Timeboost on Arbitrum One and replace it with a Priority Gas Auction (PGA) mechanism, an ordering policy that's more familiar for actors who are willing to pay for transaction priority, allowing more market participants to be a part of Arbitrum's next phase of growth. In addition, it would sunset Timeboost on Arbitrum Nova.
Timeboost was the first foray into experimenting with MEV via an express lane auction mechanism on Arbitrum One. Deploying a new transaction ordering policy (PGA) represents the next step in the journey to position Arbitrum as the premier platform for the programmable economy.
This version of a PGA-based ordering policy will first sort transactions based on priority fee in 125ms PGA rounds before publishing a block at 250ms. There will also be an anti-starvation mechanism which works as a primitive form of inclusion guarantee to help ensure that transactions that didn't get included in a round because of a low or null priority fee can be included within a couple of blocks, with the exact number determined by the number of PGA rounds.
If approved, this AIP would:
Explicitly, this AIP only proposes sunsetting Timeboost on Arbitrum Nova; it does not propose adopting PGA as an ordering policy for Nova, in line with the Nova Minimization AIP https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-aip-minimize-arbitrum-nova/30880
Timeboost was launched on Arbitrum One in April 2025, a novel transaction ordering policy designed to put user fairness and spam reduction at the forefront while, for the first time, creating additional revenue to the ArbitrumDAO via Timeboost auction fees. While Timeboost has delivered meaningful benefits including user fairness, and a new revenue stream for the DAO, some structural considerations have also come to light that are worth addressing:
A fundamentally different model is needed and the more familiar ordering policy: Priority Gas Auctions (PGA) stands out as a clear option. PGA addresses the challenges above by making ordering determined by per-transaction priorityFeePerGas bids rather than a periodic, ahead-of-time express lane auction:
While ArbOS 60 Elara introduced the capability for Arbitrum chains to collect priority fees (via the maxPriorityFeePerGas field in EIP-1559 type 2 transactions), it deliberately did not enable this feature on Arbitrum One or Nova. It was clearly noted that enablement would require a separate Constitutional DAO vote. This proposal would enable the collection of priority fees.
A new transaction ordering policy offers the ArbitrumDAO an opportunity to continue to capture additional revenue that should not come at the expense of users, with the introduction of an anti-starvation mechanism that helps facilitate transactions with 0 priority fees or low priority fees get included. Transactions remain subject to paying the latest base fees.
Rather than capturing arbitrage opportunities by having the fastest hardware or bidding ahead-of-time, participants can win these opportunities by bidding in a just-in-time auction to gain priority ordering.
The priority auction is permissionless and participation is open to everyone, where transactions with the highest bids get included first within a 125ms PGA round, and ties are broken by arrival timestamp.
The Arbitrum DAO can configure all aspects of PGA, including enabling or disabling it, the auction's design, and how to handle proceeds.
Priority Fees: are user-defined incentives paid in addition to the network's base transaction fee. Priority fees are denominated in the Arbitrum's native gas unit and are paid directly to the Arbitrum DAO Treasury.
Priority Gas Auction: an auction in which multiple participants simultaneously submit transactions with their specified priority fees in order to secure preferential ordering by the sequencer.
We are formally introducing our Priority Gas Auction design, which will enable Arbitrum One users to affect their transaction ordering within a block by specifying a maxPriorityFeePerGas in each transaction. We added some modifications in the ordering mechanism to help facilitate valid transactions with low or null priority fees are included in a timely manner, by adding a anti-starvation boost to all transactions that remain in the mempool after a PGA round.
p equal to its priorityFeePerGas bid, and (b) a fine-grained arrival timestamp (at the sequencer) in milliseconds for tie-breaking.priorityFeePerGas, with ties broken by earliest arrival timestamp.
priorityFeePerGas is calculated as follows: priority_fee_per_gas = min(transaction.max_priority_fee_per_gas, transaction.max_fee_per_gas - block.base_fee_per_gas)This mechanism helps facilitate that transactions with null or low priority fees will get included within a reasonable time. The mechanism works as follows:
p / (2K) to all waiting transactions in the mempool, where p is the priority of the last transaction included in the previous PGA round, and K is the number of rounds per block.| Parameter | Default (Arb One) | Configurable By | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| K (rounds per block) | 2 -> 125ms rounds | Chain Operator, with permission from the DAO | Higher K = faster rounds up to a limit. Otherwise it becomes FIFO |
| Anti-starvation boost divisor | 2K | Implicitly set via K | Lower K = faster anti-starvation |
This AIP proposes granting the current sequencer operator the below rights to make the following adjustments from time to time for a period of two (2) years. The rights described below are expected to only be exercised in circumstances where doing so would enhance PGA's long-term stability, preserve or improve the user experience for those using Arbitrum One, increase the security posture, resiliency, or stability of the chain, and/or otherwise help increase revenue for the ArbitrumDAO:
K round parameter, a value which determines the number of rounds per block. The starting default is 2 but adjustments could be to any value between [1 & 10], inclusive.Upon passage of this AIP the following steps will be applied to both Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova:
The following implementation sequence is proposed:
The ArbitrumDAO has full control over how to spend the proceeds from the PGA auction, with 3% of auction proceeds to be set aside for the Arbitrum Developer Guild, which helps fund core Arbitrum development.
This proposal comes at no additional development cost to the ArbitrumDAO given it is already covered by an OCL and AF contract through January 2027. The engineering work will be owned by Offchain Labs in its capacity as an Arbitrum Aligned Entity.
There will be an open call to discuss this proposal. Details below:
Thursday 11 Jun · 15:00 – 15:45 UTC Video call link: https://meet.google.com/ayd-mrub-emr
There will be an open call to discuss this proposal. Details below:
Thursday 11 Jun · 15:00 – 15:45 UTC Video call link: https://meet.google.com/ayd-mrub-emr
Thanks for your feedback and questions @MconnectDAO and @nir - we have added an update at the top of this post that we hope clarifies your questions.
I'm totally all for this, it's great news!
I said long ago that Timeboost would ultimately be used by only a tiny handful of whales, making Arbitrum even more centralized, and yet it took you two years to believe it. There were clearly many mature and simple alternatives. Yes, I am the one who was driven out of the Arbitrum ecosystem by the Timeboost whales. I will try to come back if this AIP effective https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-aip-proposal-to-adopt-timeboost-a-new-transaction-ordering-policy/25167/105?u=leyiang
Thanks for your feedback and questions @MconnectDAO and @nir - we have added an update at the top of this post that we hope clarifies your questions.
I'm totally all for this, it's great news!
I said long ago that Timeboost would ultimately be used by only a tiny handful of whales, making Arbitrum even more centralized, and yet it took you two years to believe it. There were clearly many mature and simple alternatives. Yes, I am the one who was driven out of the Arbitrum ecosystem by the Timeboost whales. I will try to come back if this AIP effective https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-aip-proposal-to-adopt-timeboost-a-new-transaction-ordering-policy/25167/105?u=leyiang
Risk Management Gaps in the PGA Transition
Thank you to Offchain Labs for this detailed proposal. As a DAO governance researcher, I'd like to raise a few concerns regarding risk management that I believe should be addressed before this moves to Snapshot.
Risk Management Gaps in the PGA Transition
Thank you to Offchain Labs for this detailed proposal. As a DAO governance researcher, I'd like to raise a few concerns regarding risk management that I believe should be addressed before this moves to Snapshot.
Suggested mitigations to consider:
Optional private mempool / MEV Blocker integration for DeFi users
On-chain MEV monitoring post-launch
Clear user-facing documentation on MEV risks
K Parameter --- Unchecked Centralization The proposal grants the chain operator authority to modify K (rounds per block) between 1--10 for 2 years without DAO vote. While bounded, this still allows significant unilateral control over ordering behavior. A transparency mechanism (e.g., mandatory on-chain announcement before K changes) would strengthen governance oversight.
Anti-Starvation ≠ Anti-MEV The anti-starvation mechanism protects low-fee transactions from exclusion but it does not protect against ordering manipulation. These are two separate problems and the proposal conflates them in its risk section.
I support the intent of this proposal and the revenue routing to the DAO Treasury. However, I'd request Offchain Labs to respond to the MEV vulnerability question before this proceeds to an onchain vote.
Wouldn't this open the possibility for users to be frontruned and sandwiched?
Risk Management Gaps in the PGA Transition
Thank you to Offchain Labs for this detailed proposal. As a DAO governance researcher, I'd like to raise a few concerns regarding risk management that I believe should be addressed before this moves to Snapshot.
Risk Management Gaps in the PGA Transition
Thank you to Offchain Labs for this detailed proposal. As a DAO governance researcher, I'd like to raise a few concerns regarding risk management that I believe should be addressed before this moves to Snapshot.
Suggested mitigations to consider:
Optional private mempool / MEV Blocker integration for DeFi users
On-chain MEV monitoring post-launch
Clear user-facing documentation on MEV risks
K Parameter --- Unchecked Centralization The proposal grants the chain operator authority to modify K (rounds per block) between 1--10 for 2 years without DAO vote. While bounded, this still allows significant unilateral control over ordering behavior. A transparency mechanism (e.g., mandatory on-chain announcement before K changes) would strengthen governance oversight.
Anti-Starvation ≠ Anti-MEV The anti-starvation mechanism protects low-fee transactions from exclusion but it does not protect against ordering manipulation. These are two separate problems and the proposal conflates them in its risk section.
I support the intent of this proposal and the revenue routing to the DAO Treasury. However, I'd request Offchain Labs to respond to the MEV vulnerability question before this proceeds to an onchain vote.
Wouldn't this open the possibility for users to be frontruned and sandwiched?