Following the passing of the Unifying Arbitrum’s Mission, Vision, Purpose (MVP) proposal, we’re moving to the next step in aligning the Arbitrum DAO on its end-state goals and the more granular strategies through which these will be reached. Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) is an initiative through which DAO members will be able to propose and vote on a cohesive set of short- to mid-term objectives in a collective, inclusive, and adaptable way.
Through the SOS, any contributor can submit a set of short-term (1-year) and mid-term (2-year) objectives and related tangible key results for the DAO. The set of objectives should directly drive the DAO closer to reaching its vision, and align with the mission and purpose, as listed in the MVP proposal. The DAO will then vote on the proposed sets of objectives to select a single collection for implementation.
Every 12 months, the chosen objective set will be reviewed and, if needed, revised based on changing market conditions, the competitive environment, progress made in the past year, etc. In order to keep the DAO up to date with the progress towards each strategic objective, we suggest the research member of the ARDC be tasked with providing quarterly reports assessing how the DAO has improved through proposals and initiatives as well as suggesting what areas require more attention while recommending solutions to address these areas.
Once a set of objectives and related key results has been approved, Entropy will strive to build a budgeting framework where each high-level objective is allocated a certain amount of capital on a yearly basis, with interested contributors having the ability to request a share of this capital through a standardized structure. It’s important to note that contributors will still maintain the ability to post standalone proposals outside of this structure and are not forced to tie their initiative to the MVP/SOS/budget framework. Having said that, as the established objectives should be regarded as one of the DAO’s highest priorities, contributors should expect more friction when it comes to passing a proposal that doesn’t reasonably demonstrate that it fits within the established short- to medium-term objectives. In other words, while the freedom to make proposals that fall outside the SOS will not cease to exist, we expect that the DAO will discourage it via the creation of a social contract among delegates.
Diversity is undeniably one of Arbitrum DAO’s strengths. We have hundreds of delegates from all around the world with varying perspectives, cultural behaviors, interests, incentives, etc. This is a double-edged sword, however, as it makes it more demanding to converge on unified goals and interim focus areas. The absence of concrete and agreed-upon goals today makes it challenging for the DAO to review progress and facilitate accountability, while it may be unclear to contributors what deliverables they should be prioritizing. Similar to the MVP proposal, the SOS takes inspiration from Lido’s approach to materializing short- and medium-term objectives for the DAO.
By establishing clear short- and mid-term strategic objectives and key results, the outcome of the SOS will serve as a roadmap that will bring cohesion and direction to the DAO’s activities. This structured approach will enable the DAO to move beyond reactive governance and toward proactive strategic development. Having well-defined objectives allows the DAO to measure progress better, identify operational gaps, and adjust course when needed.
These objectives will create a shared foundation for evaluating opportunities across the DAO’s diverse contributor base. When assessing new initiatives or responding to market developments, delegates and contributors will have tangible criteria to inform their choices. This alignment will help prevent the dilution of efforts that can occur in DAOs, ensuring collective resources and energy are directed towards Arbitrum’s most important goals. A regular review cycle ensures the DAO’s objectives remain responsive to changing conditions while maintaining momentum toward the mission, vision, and purpose. If the MVP helps to define the DAO’s long-term vision, then the SOS allows Arbitrum DAO to chart the course to get there.
This proposal can be considered to have two distinct phases. The first phase comprises a ~14-day forum review, feedback, and edit period after which the SOS framework will move to the 7-day offchain voting period. If passed, Entropy will consider the structure of the SOS accepted by the DAO, and the second phase will be initiated. In phase two, contributors will submit their strategic objectives matrices with one matrix finally chosen through a Snapshot vote. The periods making up the second phase are described below.
At the beginning of the 14-day notice period, announcements will be made on the forum and all the other relevant communication channels (e.g., Twitter, Telegram, etc.), giving delegates and contributors enough time to prepare for the upcoming submission period. This announcement will include:
Entropy Advisors will facilitate the end-to-end process in cooperation with the Arbitrum Foundation and any other relevant parties.
This submission period lasts 30 days, during which delegates and contributors are invited to make their submissions. Those interested in participating will have to create a forum post under a designated Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) subcategory. The goal-setting methodology utilized will be the Objectives and Key Results framework, where each objective (high-level, inspirational goal) is accompanied by key results (specific, measurable outcomes) that once reached, represent an objective having been completed. As a reminder, these objectives should indisputably align with the DAO’s mission, vision, and purpose. At a minimum, a valid submission must include the following information:
The format for a SOS submission post on the forum is as follows (note, while the Title and headers should follow the below format, the information under each header is up to the author; this is a non-exhaustive list):
Title
Summary
Rationale
1-Year Strategic Objectives & Key Results
2-Year Strategic Objectives & Key Results
Further Details
Objective: Arbitrum becomes the indisputable leader within a selection of onchain finance-related verticals: stablecoins, RWAs, and lending.
Alignment with the MVP: As onchain finance-related verticals continue to grow in usage, importance, and impact, it is imperative for Arbitrum to achieve a market-leading position in a certain set of these sectors. Doing so ensures that the ecosystem stays aligned with its vision of being the home for the universal shift onchain, with Arbitrum rollups as the first stop in crypto for users and the default platform for developers.
Key Result 1: Arbitrum One becomes the second largest blockchain in terms of stablecoin volume traded on onchain exchanges.
Key Result 2: RWAs (excluding stablecoins) held within the Arbitrum ecosystem grow by 20x from when the DAO chooses its set of objectives.
Key Result 3: The Arbitrum ecosystem reaches a 30% market share of all outstanding onchain loans.
While the number of strategic objectives in a matrix is not limited, proposers should consider the DAO’s capacity to effectively focus on multiple areas simultaneously. Moreover, while the objectives should be aspirational, they must also be attainable. When providing feedback or choosing a specific objective matrix, we encourage delegates to evaluate their feasibility critically. Implementing unrealistic objectives and key results would most likely result in wasted efforts and be counterproductive.
A given year’s objectives are expected to be limited to a specific focus area and not to overlap with each other. As such, we recommend submitters refrain from proposing objectives that are too high level since the potential for overlap increases. Having said that, the sets of 1- and 2-year objectives can be the same as long as key results across years are different.
See this example from Hasu’s proposed goals for Lido. When objectives form a cohesive, well-documented strategy, it is more likely to gain support from delegates. Just giving the DAO a list of objectives likely will not be sufficient; the expectation is for the objectives to make up a holistic strategy with a well-reasoned rationale.
Once the submission period is over, no new objective matrices can be put forward. The submission period is followed by a 21-day feedback period. During this time, submitters are prohibited from making changes to their submissions to allow delegates to examine each submission, provide feedback, and propose edits. This period ensures that all delegates have ample time to familiarize themselves with each submission and that everyone is commenting on the same submission versions.
During the revision period, submitters may amend their objective matrices based on community feedback if they wish to do so. Apart from making edits, this period enables submitters to merge their proposals with others, mixing and matching objectives across submissions (note that a given year’s objectives should still have no overlap). If two or more proposals are merged, proposers should post the final version as a new submission in the SOS subcategory and modify the original submissions’ titles to indicate that they have been merged as well as include a link to the merged version at the top of the original submissions. If a proposer feels as though their objectives and key results are already adequately covered by another submission, they are also free to withdraw their submission during the revision period. At the end of the revision period, submissions will be locked and considered as the final versions, which will be the ones put up for a Snapshot vote to choose the DAO’s strategic objectives matrix.
Finally, the voting period. Entropy will be in charge of creating a Snapshot vote with a list containing all finalized strategic objective matrices in a single proposal, with delegates voting on which matrix they are the most aligned with and see as optimal. The Snapshot will utilize single-choice voting with an option to abstain. Quorum is reached when at least 3% of all votable tokens have participated in the Snapshot, with the option that has received the most votes being implemented. A strategic objectives matrix proposer is free to vote on their own submission.
For the avoidance of doubt, delegates will vote on standalone matrices formed by sets of 1- and 2-year objectives and key results. Please note that if there is a vast amount of submissions going to a Snapshot vote, Entropy reserves the right to postpone the initiation of the vote following the revision period to ensure that delegates are given some additional time to examine the final versions of submissions. If there is any confusion in navigating the forum throughout this process, e.g., where to post, how to title posts, how to merge proposals with another author/similar proposal, etc., Entropy Advisors will be available to answer any questions from the community.
After the initial strategic objectives matrices are defined and one has been chosen, the DAO is encouraged to review the chosen matrix on a yearly basis. This ensures the objectives and their key results remain relevant and aligned with the DAO’s evolving needs and the overall market dynamics. The process is similar to the second phase described earlier, but delegates can propose to modify existing objectives/key results, add new ones, or remove those that are no longer relevant.
A review phase should be initiated 12 months after the previous voting period has ended. Ideally, OpCo has already been operationalized by then, meaning that the DAO can instruct the entity to manage the review phase. As stated earlier, we propose that the research member of the ARDC is initially tasked with providing quarterly reports assessing how the DAO has progressed with respect to its strategic objectives. Once OpCo is operationalized, this responsibility could also be transferred to the entity if the DAO chooses to do so.
The review phase is initiated by passing a Snapshot vote. In the proposal, the proposer must define who is in charge of managing the review phase. Given the review phase Snapshot vote passes, there will be a 14-day notice period. This will consist of a forum post updating delegates on the current state of the strategic objectives and informing them on what this review phase consists of. Among other things, this forum post should include:
After the notice period, delegates are invited to submit amendments to the initially chosen strategic objectives matrix during a 30-day submission period. Amendments are not limited to simply modifying strategic objectives and key results. They can also involve removing, adding, or replacing specific objectives and associated key results.
Once the submission period ends, amendment submissions go through a 21-day feedback period during which no changes can be made to the submissions. Finally, a 14-day revision period will take place during which proposers can make edits to their proposed matrices and merge them with other proposed matrices before being locked and put up for a Snapshot vote to choose the new objective matrix. If no amendment submissions are made, there is no need to move to the feedback, revision, or voting periods, and the old objectives matrix will remain effective.
Note that the review phase timeline given above can be modified at the discretion of the review phase proposer depending on the number of submissions made.
As mentioned earlier, the SOS review phase should be conducted annually, with each cycle beginning 12 months after the conclusion of the previous voting period. However, if there's a pressing need to review the strategic objectives due to, e.g., changes in the market environment, competitive space, or the DAO’s financials, a delegate can create a forum post outlining extensive reasoning for ad hoc adjustments accompanied by the proposed strategic objectives and related key results. Allowing for at least one week for discussion, the forum post will then be put up for a Snapshot vote utilizing single-choice voting with the options of adopting the proposed objectives and key results, initiating a fast-tracked review phase with a similar structure as described above (again, the proposer has to define who is managing this phase), and leaving the current objectives and key results unchanged.
It’s important to note that a well-structured strategy objectives matrix should not be expected to be changed frequently. As such, a proposed ad hoc adjustment must be extremely rigorously argumented and only take place if most of the previous strategic objectives have been reached or given unprecedented/emergency circumstances. Moreover, delegates ought to be highly critical when such adjustments are proposed. For example, the proposer simply stating that they disagree with the current objectives should not be a strong enough reason to modify the objectives.
If an objectives matrix is changed on an ad hoc basis, the originally scheduled review phase will be pushed back. This phase should only be initiated once 12 months have elapsed since the previous vote to change the DAO’s strategic objectives and related key results has passed.
Additionally, the DAO’s strategic objectives and related key results can be removed by creating a forum post explaining the reasoning to do so. Allowing for at least one week for discussion, the post will be moved to a single-choice Snapshot vote with the voting options “For”, “Against”, and “Abstain”, requiring a simple majority with at least 3% of all votable tokens voting either “For” or “Abstain” for the proposal to pass.
Previously chosen, not yet achieved objectives and related key results will remain active during a Review/Ad Hoc Strategic Objective Adjustments Phase to ensure the continuity of the DAO's strategic direction, replaced only once a new objectives matrix has been selected through a dedicated voting process. I.e., unless the DAO votes to remove its objectives, the continuity of the SOS is ensured.
Note that any of the time periods in the first and second phases can be shortened/extended at Entropy’s discretion depending on the number of submissions received.
Following the passing of the Unifying Arbitrum’s Mission, Vision, Purpose (MVP) proposal, we’re moving to the next step in aligning the Arbitrum DAO on its end-state goals and the more granular strategies through which these will be reached. Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) is an initiative through which DAO members will be able to propose and vote on a cohesive set of short- to mid-term objectives in a collective, inclusive, and adaptable way.
Through the SOS, any contributor can submit a set of short-term (1-year) and mid-term (2-year) objectives and related tangible key results for the DAO. The set of objectives should directly drive the DAO closer to reaching its vision, and align with the mission and purpose, as listed in the MVP proposal. The DAO will then vote on the proposed sets of objectives to select a single collection for implementation.
Every 12 months, the chosen objective set will be reviewed and, if needed, revised based on changing market conditions, the competitive environment, progress made in the past year, etc. In order to keep the DAO up to date with the progress towards each strategic objective, we suggest the research member of the ARDC be tasked with providing quarterly reports assessing how the DAO has improved through proposals and initiatives as well as suggesting what areas require more attention while recommending solutions to address these areas.
Once a set of objectives and related key results has been approved, Entropy will strive to build a budgeting framework where each high-level objective is allocated a certain amount of capital on a yearly basis, with interested contributors having the ability to request a share of this capital through a standardized structure. It’s important to note that contributors will still maintain the ability to post standalone proposals outside of this structure and are not forced to tie their initiative to the MVP/SOS/budget framework. Having said that, as the established objectives should be regarded as one of the DAO’s highest priorities, contributors should expect more friction when it comes to passing a proposal that doesn’t reasonably demonstrate that it fits within the established short- to medium-term objectives. In other words, while the freedom to make proposals that fall outside the SOS will not cease to exist, we expect that the DAO will discourage it via the creation of a social contract among delegates.
Diversity is undeniably one of Arbitrum DAO’s strengths. We have hundreds of delegates from all around the world with varying perspectives, cultural behaviors, interests, incentives, etc. This is a double-edged sword, however, as it makes it more demanding to converge on unified goals and interim focus areas. The absence of concrete and agreed-upon goals today makes it challenging for the DAO to review progress and facilitate accountability, while it may be unclear to contributors what deliverables they should be prioritizing. Similar to the MVP proposal, the SOS takes inspiration from Lido’s approach to materializing short- and medium-term objectives for the DAO.
By establishing clear short- and mid-term strategic objectives and key results, the outcome of the SOS will serve as a roadmap that will bring cohesion and direction to the DAO’s activities. This structured approach will enable the DAO to move beyond reactive governance and toward proactive strategic development. Having well-defined objectives allows the DAO to measure progress better, identify operational gaps, and adjust course when needed.
These objectives will create a shared foundation for evaluating opportunities across the DAO’s diverse contributor base. When assessing new initiatives or responding to market developments, delegates and contributors will have tangible criteria to inform their choices. This alignment will help prevent the dilution of efforts that can occur in DAOs, ensuring collective resources and energy are directed towards Arbitrum’s most important goals. A regular review cycle ensures the DAO’s objectives remain responsive to changing conditions while maintaining momentum toward the mission, vision, and purpose. If the MVP helps to define the DAO’s long-term vision, then the SOS allows Arbitrum DAO to chart the course to get there.
This proposal can be considered to have two distinct phases. The first phase comprises a ~14-day forum review, feedback, and edit period after which the SOS framework will move to the 7-day offchain voting period. If passed, Entropy will consider the structure of the SOS accepted by the DAO, and the second phase will be initiated. In phase two, contributors will submit their strategic objectives matrices with one matrix finally chosen through a Snapshot vote. The periods making up the second phase are described below.
At the beginning of the 14-day notice period, announcements will be made on the forum and all the other relevant communication channels (e.g., Twitter, Telegram, etc.), giving delegates and contributors enough time to prepare for the upcoming submission period. This announcement will include:
Entropy Advisors will facilitate the end-to-end process in cooperation with the Arbitrum Foundation and any other relevant parties.
This submission period lasts 30 days, during which delegates and contributors are invited to make their submissions. Those interested in participating will have to create a forum post under a designated Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) subcategory. The goal-setting methodology utilized will be the Objectives and Key Results framework, where each objective (high-level, inspirational goal) is accompanied by key results (specific, measurable outcomes) that once reached, represent an objective having been completed. As a reminder, these objectives should indisputably align with the DAO’s mission, vision, and purpose. At a minimum, a valid submission must include the following information:
The format for a SOS submission post on the forum is as follows (note, while the Title and headers should follow the below format, the information under each header is up to the author; this is a non-exhaustive list):
Title
Summary
Rationale
1-Year Strategic Objectives & Key Results
2-Year Strategic Objectives & Key Results
Further Details
Objective: Arbitrum becomes the indisputable leader within a selection of onchain finance-related verticals: stablecoins, RWAs, and lending.
Alignment with the MVP: As onchain finance-related verticals continue to grow in usage, importance, and impact, it is imperative for Arbitrum to achieve a market-leading position in a certain set of these sectors. Doing so ensures that the ecosystem stays aligned with its vision of being the home for the universal shift onchain, with Arbitrum rollups as the first stop in crypto for users and the default platform for developers.
Key Result 1: Arbitrum One becomes the second largest blockchain in terms of stablecoin volume traded on onchain exchanges.
Key Result 2: RWAs (excluding stablecoins) held within the Arbitrum ecosystem grow by 20x from when the DAO chooses its set of objectives.
Key Result 3: The Arbitrum ecosystem reaches a 30% market share of all outstanding onchain loans.
While the number of strategic objectives in a matrix is not limited, proposers should consider the DAO’s capacity to effectively focus on multiple areas simultaneously. Moreover, while the objectives should be aspirational, they must also be attainable. When providing feedback or choosing a specific objective matrix, we encourage delegates to evaluate their feasibility critically. Implementing unrealistic objectives and key results would most likely result in wasted efforts and be counterproductive.
A given year’s objectives are expected to be limited to a specific focus area and not to overlap with each other. As such, we recommend submitters refrain from proposing objectives that are too high level since the potential for overlap increases. Having said that, the sets of 1- and 2-year objectives can be the same as long as key results across years are different.
See this example from Hasu’s proposed goals for Lido. When objectives form a cohesive, well-documented strategy, it is more likely to gain support from delegates. Just giving the DAO a list of objectives likely will not be sufficient; the expectation is for the objectives to make up a holistic strategy with a well-reasoned rationale.
Once the submission period is over, no new objective matrices can be put forward. The submission period is followed by a 21-day feedback period. During this time, submitters are prohibited from making changes to their submissions to allow delegates to examine each submission, provide feedback, and propose edits. This period ensures that all delegates have ample time to familiarize themselves with each submission and that everyone is commenting on the same submission versions.
During the revision period, submitters may amend their objective matrices based on community feedback if they wish to do so. Apart from making edits, this period enables submitters to merge their proposals with others, mixing and matching objectives across submissions (note that a given year’s objectives should still have no overlap). If two or more proposals are merged, proposers should post the final version as a new submission in the SOS subcategory and modify the original submissions’ titles to indicate that they have been merged as well as include a link to the merged version at the top of the original submissions. If a proposer feels as though their objectives and key results are already adequately covered by another submission, they are also free to withdraw their submission during the revision period. At the end of the revision period, submissions will be locked and considered as the final versions, which will be the ones put up for a Snapshot vote to choose the DAO’s strategic objectives matrix.
Finally, the voting period. Entropy will be in charge of creating a Snapshot vote with a list containing all finalized strategic objective matrices in a single proposal, with delegates voting on which matrix they are the most aligned with and see as optimal. The Snapshot will utilize single-choice voting with an option to abstain. Quorum is reached when at least 3% of all votable tokens have participated in the Snapshot, with the option that has received the most votes being implemented. A strategic objectives matrix proposer is free to vote on their own submission.
For the avoidance of doubt, delegates will vote on standalone matrices formed by sets of 1- and 2-year objectives and key results. Please note that if there is a vast amount of submissions going to a Snapshot vote, Entropy reserves the right to postpone the initiation of the vote following the revision period to ensure that delegates are given some additional time to examine the final versions of submissions. If there is any confusion in navigating the forum throughout this process, e.g., where to post, how to title posts, how to merge proposals with another author/similar proposal, etc., Entropy Advisors will be available to answer any questions from the community.
After the initial strategic objectives matrices are defined and one has been chosen, the DAO is encouraged to review the chosen matrix on a yearly basis. This ensures the objectives and their key results remain relevant and aligned with the DAO’s evolving needs and the overall market dynamics. The process is similar to the second phase described earlier, but delegates can propose to modify existing objectives/key results, add new ones, or remove those that are no longer relevant.
A review phase should be initiated 12 months after the previous voting period has ended. Ideally, OpCo has already been operationalized by then, meaning that the DAO can instruct the entity to manage the review phase. As stated earlier, we propose that the research member of the ARDC is initially tasked with providing quarterly reports assessing how the DAO has progressed with respect to its strategic objectives. Once OpCo is operationalized, this responsibility could also be transferred to the entity if the DAO chooses to do so.
The review phase is initiated by passing a Snapshot vote. In the proposal, the proposer must define who is in charge of managing the review phase. Given the review phase Snapshot vote passes, there will be a 14-day notice period. This will consist of a forum post updating delegates on the current state of the strategic objectives and informing them on what this review phase consists of. Among other things, this forum post should include:
After the notice period, delegates are invited to submit amendments to the initially chosen strategic objectives matrix during a 30-day submission period. Amendments are not limited to simply modifying strategic objectives and key results. They can also involve removing, adding, or replacing specific objectives and associated key results.
Once the submission period ends, amendment submissions go through a 21-day feedback period during which no changes can be made to the submissions. Finally, a 14-day revision period will take place during which proposers can make edits to their proposed matrices and merge them with other proposed matrices before being locked and put up for a Snapshot vote to choose the new objective matrix. If no amendment submissions are made, there is no need to move to the feedback, revision, or voting periods, and the old objectives matrix will remain effective.
Note that the review phase timeline given above can be modified at the discretion of the review phase proposer depending on the number of submissions made.
As mentioned earlier, the SOS review phase should be conducted annually, with each cycle beginning 12 months after the conclusion of the previous voting period. However, if there's a pressing need to review the strategic objectives due to, e.g., changes in the market environment, competitive space, or the DAO’s financials, a delegate can create a forum post outlining extensive reasoning for ad hoc adjustments accompanied by the proposed strategic objectives and related key results. Allowing for at least one week for discussion, the forum post will then be put up for a Snapshot vote utilizing single-choice voting with the options of adopting the proposed objectives and key results, initiating a fast-tracked review phase with a similar structure as described above (again, the proposer has to define who is managing this phase), and leaving the current objectives and key results unchanged.
It’s important to note that a well-structured strategy objectives matrix should not be expected to be changed frequently. As such, a proposed ad hoc adjustment must be extremely rigorously argumented and only take place if most of the previous strategic objectives have been reached or given unprecedented/emergency circumstances. Moreover, delegates ought to be highly critical when such adjustments are proposed. For example, the proposer simply stating that they disagree with the current objectives should not be a strong enough reason to modify the objectives.
If an objectives matrix is changed on an ad hoc basis, the originally scheduled review phase will be pushed back. This phase should only be initiated once 12 months have elapsed since the previous vote to change the DAO’s strategic objectives and related key results has passed.
Additionally, the DAO’s strategic objectives and related key results can be removed by creating a forum post explaining the reasoning to do so. Allowing for at least one week for discussion, the post will be moved to a single-choice Snapshot vote with the voting options “For”, “Against”, and “Abstain”, requiring a simple majority with at least 3% of all votable tokens voting either “For” or “Abstain” for the proposal to pass.
Previously chosen, not yet achieved objectives and related key results will remain active during a Review/Ad Hoc Strategic Objective Adjustments Phase to ensure the continuity of the DAO's strategic direction, replaced only once a new objectives matrix has been selected through a dedicated voting process. I.e., unless the DAO votes to remove its objectives, the continuity of the SOS is ensured.
Note that any of the time periods in the first and second phases can be shortened/extended at Entropy’s discretion depending on the number of submissions received.
I voted FOR the Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) proposal because I believe it provides a necessary structure for our growth. The definition of review and feedback periods is a step in the right direction. This will enable us to keep our goals aligned with the changing market. However, it is crucial that these reviews are conducted in a rigorous process, filtering out what has worked and learning from what has not been effective. This strategy will be beneficial in the long term if implemented properly, but only time will tell if it actually achieves its objectives.
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
I think it is always helpful for a DAO to try to formalize objectives (despite most of the time the effort being a waste of time for everybody involved) and this proposal puts forward a good overall methodology to do that in a DAO context. However, I don't like the fact that @Entropy would also be submitting their own submission to their own framework, since it breaks the neutrality of the intent of authoring and pushing this SOS proposal forward. So I would recommend for Entropy to be the very last one to submit their proposal, so as not to dissuade participation from other participants. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/66?u=paulofonseca
I voted FOR the Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) proposal because I believe it provides a necessary structure for our growth. The definition of review and feedback periods is a step in the right direction. This will enable us to keep our goals aligned with the changing market. However, it is crucial that these reviews are conducted in a rigorous process, filtering out what has worked and learning from what has not been effective. This strategy will be beneficial in the long term if implemented properly, but only time will tell if it actually achieves its objectives.
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
I think it is always helpful for a DAO to try to formalize objectives (despite most of the time the effort being a waste of time for everybody involved) and this proposal puts forward a good overall methodology to do that in a DAO context. However, I don't like the fact that @Entropy would also be submitting their own submission to their own framework, since it breaks the neutrality of the intent of authoring and pushing this SOS proposal forward. So I would recommend for Entropy to be the very last one to submit their proposal, so as not to dissuade participation from other participants. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/66?u=paulofonseca
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/65?u=maxlomu
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/64
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/63?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/62?u=ocandocrypto
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-78: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-78
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-78: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-78
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/61?u=winverse
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/61?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/juanrah-delegate-communication-thread/27395/22?u=juanrah
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/58?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/56?u=0xtalvo.eth_mty
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/54
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/55?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/53?u=bruce
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/52?u=0xdonpepe
i think this is safe to try and a long time coming!
I am voting for this proposal because it gives the Arbitrum DAO clear goals and a plan to measure progress. This will help everyone work together better and focus on important priorities. The regular reviews will also keep the DAO flexible and ready for changes.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/21?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/47?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/46?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/45?u=todayindefi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/44?u=gabriel
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/41?u=amira
I believe voting FOR the Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) proposal is a step toward strengthening the DAO's governance framework. It introduces a structured and inclusive process for defining short- and mid-term objectives, ensuring alignment with the mission, vision, and purpose outlined in the MVP proposal. By establishing measurable goals and key results, the SOS empowers contributors to work cohesively and prioritize initiatives that truly drive the DAO forward. It also promotes transparency and accountability with quarterly progress updates and annual reviews, allowing us to adapt to changing market conditions. This proactive approach will transition the DAO from reactive decision-making to strategic planning, which is essential for Arbitrum's long-term success. Ultimately, the SOS ensures that our resources, time, and energy are focused on initiatives that align with the collective goals of the DAO, making this a meaningful and forward-thinking proposal to support.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/38?u=kuiclub
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/37?u=pedrob
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/agnes-delegation-communication-thread/28220/2?u=agneslfg
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/8?u=tempetechie
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/34?u=duokongcrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/33?u=ezr3al
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476/115?u=larva
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/31?u=chamadao
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/65?u=maxlomu
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/64
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/63?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/62?u=ocandocrypto
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-78: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-78
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-78: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-78
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/61?u=winverse
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/61?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/juanrah-delegate-communication-thread/27395/22?u=juanrah
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/58?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/56?u=0xtalvo.eth_mty
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/54
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/55?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/53?u=bruce
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/52?u=0xdonpepe
i think this is safe to try and a long time coming!
I am voting for this proposal because it gives the Arbitrum DAO clear goals and a plan to measure progress. This will help everyone work together better and focus on important priorities. The regular reviews will also keep the DAO flexible and ready for changes.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/21?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/47?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/46?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/45?u=todayindefi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/44?u=gabriel
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/41?u=amira
I believe voting FOR the Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) proposal is a step toward strengthening the DAO's governance framework. It introduces a structured and inclusive process for defining short- and mid-term objectives, ensuring alignment with the mission, vision, and purpose outlined in the MVP proposal. By establishing measurable goals and key results, the SOS empowers contributors to work cohesively and prioritize initiatives that truly drive the DAO forward. It also promotes transparency and accountability with quarterly progress updates and annual reviews, allowing us to adapt to changing market conditions. This proactive approach will transition the DAO from reactive decision-making to strategic planning, which is essential for Arbitrum's long-term success. Ultimately, the SOS ensures that our resources, time, and energy are focused on initiatives that align with the collective goals of the DAO, making this a meaningful and forward-thinking proposal to support.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/38?u=kuiclub
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/37?u=pedrob
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/agnes-delegation-communication-thread/28220/2?u=agneslfg
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/8?u=tempetechie
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/34?u=duokongcrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/33?u=ezr3al
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476/115?u=larva
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/31?u=chamadao
we’re shaping the future of Arbitrum DAO. I’m proud to support this initiative and encourage others to do the same. Let’s build together.
1/ The Arbitrum DAO needs direction. Diversity is our strength, but without clear objectives, it becomes challenging to focus our energy and resources. The SOS initiative is exactly what we need to unite the DAO behind short- and mid-term goals that align with our mission, vision, and purpose. ✅
2/ Proactive over reactive governance. Right now, DAO decision-making often feels reactive. SOS allows us to move beyond that by setting a proactive roadmap with measurable objectives. It’s time to stop guessing and start building with purpose. 🚀
1/ The Arbitrum DAO needs direction. Diversity is our strength, but without clear objectives, it becomes challenging to focus our energy and resources. The SOS initiative is exactly what we need to unite the DAO behind short- and mid-term goals that align with our mission, vision, and purpose. ✅
2/ Proactive over reactive governance. Right now, DAO decision-making often feels reactive. SOS allows us to move beyond that by setting a proactive roadmap with measurable objectives. It’s time to stop guessing and start building with purpose. 🚀
3/ Accountability and transparency. Quarterly progress reports from the ARDC research team will keep us informed, ensuring we stay on track. This level of transparency is crucial for trust and alignment within the DAO. 📝
4/ Efficient resource allocation. With a structured budgeting framework tied to strategic objectives, the DAO can ensure that resources are directed toward initiatives with the highest impact. This makes our DAO more effective and focused. 💡
5/ Room for innovation. Although SOS prioritizes alignment with set objectives, contributors still have the freedom to propose standalone initiatives. It’s a balanced approach that encourages both structure and creativity. 🌟
6/ Learning from others. The SOS framework is inspired by proven strategies like Lido’s OKR system. By adopting these best practices, Arbitrum DAO can achieve better outcomes without reinventing the wheel. 🔄
7/ Regular reviews keep us agile. The annual review cycle ensures our objectives stay relevant to changing market conditions and opportunities. This adaptability is key for any DAO aiming for long-term success. 🌍
8/ My personal belief: I believe that a DAO as diverse and ambitious as Arbitrum needs a solid foundation to grow. SOS is more than a proposal—it’s a step toward becoming the most innovative, cohesive, and efficient DAO in the ecosystem. I want to be part of this change. 💙
9/ Closing thought: By voting FOR SOS, we’re not just setting objectives—we’re shaping the future of Arbitrum DAO. I’m proud to support this initiative and encourage others to do the same. Let’s build together. 💪
we’re shaping the future of Arbitrum DAO. I’m proud to support this initiative and encourage others to do the same. Let’s build together.
1/ The Arbitrum DAO needs direction. Diversity is our strength, but without clear objectives, it becomes challenging to focus our energy and resources. The SOS initiative is exactly what we need to unite the DAO behind short- and mid-term goals that align with our mission, vision, and purpose. ✅
2/ Proactive over reactive governance. Right now, DAO decision-making often feels reactive. SOS allows us to move beyond that by setting a proactive roadmap with measurable objectives. It’s time to stop guessing and start building with purpose. 🚀
1/ The Arbitrum DAO needs direction. Diversity is our strength, but without clear objectives, it becomes challenging to focus our energy and resources. The SOS initiative is exactly what we need to unite the DAO behind short- and mid-term goals that align with our mission, vision, and purpose. ✅
2/ Proactive over reactive governance. Right now, DAO decision-making often feels reactive. SOS allows us to move beyond that by setting a proactive roadmap with measurable objectives. It’s time to stop guessing and start building with purpose. 🚀
3/ Accountability and transparency. Quarterly progress reports from the ARDC research team will keep us informed, ensuring we stay on track. This level of transparency is crucial for trust and alignment within the DAO. 📝
4/ Efficient resource allocation. With a structured budgeting framework tied to strategic objectives, the DAO can ensure that resources are directed toward initiatives with the highest impact. This makes our DAO more effective and focused. 💡
5/ Room for innovation. Although SOS prioritizes alignment with set objectives, contributors still have the freedom to propose standalone initiatives. It’s a balanced approach that encourages both structure and creativity. 🌟
6/ Learning from others. The SOS framework is inspired by proven strategies like Lido’s OKR system. By adopting these best practices, Arbitrum DAO can achieve better outcomes without reinventing the wheel. 🔄
7/ Regular reviews keep us agile. The annual review cycle ensures our objectives stay relevant to changing market conditions and opportunities. This adaptability is key for any DAO aiming for long-term success. 🌍
8/ My personal belief: I believe that a DAO as diverse and ambitious as Arbitrum needs a solid foundation to grow. SOS is more than a proposal—it’s a step toward becoming the most innovative, cohesive, and efficient DAO in the ecosystem. I want to be part of this change. 💙
9/ Closing thought: By voting FOR SOS, we’re not just setting objectives—we’re shaping the future of Arbitrum DAO. I’m proud to support this initiative and encourage others to do the same. Let’s build together. 💪
Suggestion to Enhance OKR Gathering with Harmonica
Hi Entropy Team,
Suggestion to Enhance OKR Gathering with Harmonica
Hi Entropy Team,
We believe Harmonica could be a valuable addition to your OKR gathering process by helping you efficiently collect, structure, and analyze community input. Harmonica is an AI-powered sense-making tool designed to gather actionable objectives and measurable key results from participants in a transparent and inclusive way. Developed during the RnDAO CoLab Fellowship funded by the Arbitrum DAO earlier this year, Harmonica is tailored to support community-driven initiatives like yours.
To demonstrate its potential, we’ve set up an example Harmonica session tailored for the Arbitrum DAO’s OKR process, ready to use with your consent:
If this approach aligns with your needs, we’re happy to:
Since the Arbitrum DAO’s funding helped enable Harmonica’s development, it’s only fitting to see it contribute back to the community. If you think Harmonica could enhance your OKR gathering process, we’d love to collaborate. Please let us know your thoughts!
Best regards,
ChrisB
On behalf of the Harmonica Team
Suggestion to Enhance OKR Gathering with Harmonica
Hi Entropy Team,
Suggestion to Enhance OKR Gathering with Harmonica
Hi Entropy Team,
We believe Harmonica could be a valuable addition to your OKR gathering process by helping you efficiently collect, structure, and analyze community input. Harmonica is an AI-powered sense-making tool designed to gather actionable objectives and measurable key results from participants in a transparent and inclusive way. Developed during the RnDAO CoLab Fellowship funded by the Arbitrum DAO earlier this year, Harmonica is tailored to support community-driven initiatives like yours.
To demonstrate its potential, we’ve set up an example Harmonica session tailored for the Arbitrum DAO’s OKR process, ready to use with your consent:
If this approach aligns with your needs, we’re happy to:
Since the Arbitrum DAO’s funding helped enable Harmonica’s development, it’s only fitting to see it contribute back to the community. If you think Harmonica could enhance your OKR gathering process, we’d love to collaborate. Please let us know your thoughts!
Best regards,
ChrisB
On behalf of the Harmonica Team
Top 2 Response @paulofonseca
"voting For the current offchain proposal because I think it is always helpful for a DAO to try to formalize objectives (despite most of the time the effort being a waste of time for everybody involved) and this proposal puts forward a good overall methodology to do that in a DAO context. However, I don’t like the fact that @Entropy would also be submitting their own submission to their own framework, since it breaks the neutrality of the intent of authoring and pushing this SOS proposal forward. So I would recommend for Entropy to be the very last one to submit their proposal, so as not to dissuade participation from other participants."
Top 3 Response @0xTALVO.ETH_MTY
"I support the initiative because it provides a clear framework for setting interim goals, ensuring the Arbitrum DAO remains focused and aligned with its long-term vision. I also like to emphasized the need for measurable objectives and accountability, both of which are crucial for the DAO’s growth. I’ve voted in favor on Snapshot."
I support this SOS framework and appreciate @Entropy's work in designing it.
The combination of phased implementation, review cycles, and budgeting shows promise for moving Arbitrum from reactive to proactive governance.
A few suggestions to strengthen the framework if helpful:
I support this SOS framework and appreciate @Entropy's work in designing it.
The combination of phased implementation, review cycles, and budgeting shows promise for moving Arbitrum from reactive to proactive governance.
A few suggestions to strengthen the framework if helpful:
Looking forward to seeing this framework evolve and helping advance Arbitrum's strategic development.
Thanks again @Entropy for leading this initiative.
Top 1 Response - @Euphoria
"We are in favor of this proposal as it is a necessary step in turning the ideas from the MVP into real, actionable goals. The MVP gave the DAO a clear vision, but now it’s time to make that vision concrete by setting short and mid-term objectives that help us focus our efforts and measure our progress. This proposal provides a solid framework to align the DAO’s activities, ensuring that all contributors are working toward the same goals."
Here is the SimScore Priority Report of Responses during the SnapShot voting Period Jan 23-30, 2025
Top 2 Response @paulofonseca
"voting For the current offchain proposal because I think it is always helpful for a DAO to try to formalize objectives (despite most of the time the effort being a waste of time for everybody involved) and this proposal puts forward a good overall methodology to do that in a DAO context. However, I don’t like the fact that @Entropy would also be submitting their own submission to their own framework, since it breaks the neutrality of the intent of authoring and pushing this SOS proposal forward. So I would recommend for Entropy to be the very last one to submit their proposal, so as not to dissuade participation from other participants."
Top 3 Response @0xTALVO.ETH_MTY
"I support the initiative because it provides a clear framework for setting interim goals, ensuring the Arbitrum DAO remains focused and aligned with its long-term vision. I also like to emphasized the need for measurable objectives and accountability, both of which are crucial for the DAO’s growth. I’ve voted in favor on Snapshot."
I support this SOS framework and appreciate @Entropy's work in designing it.
The combination of phased implementation, review cycles, and budgeting shows promise for moving Arbitrum from reactive to proactive governance.
A few suggestions to strengthen the framework if helpful:
I support this SOS framework and appreciate @Entropy's work in designing it.
The combination of phased implementation, review cycles, and budgeting shows promise for moving Arbitrum from reactive to proactive governance.
A few suggestions to strengthen the framework if helpful:
Looking forward to seeing this framework evolve and helping advance Arbitrum's strategic development.
Thanks again @Entropy for leading this initiative.
Top 1 Response - @Euphoria
"We are in favor of this proposal as it is a necessary step in turning the ideas from the MVP into real, actionable goals. The MVP gave the DAO a clear vision, but now it’s time to make that vision concrete by setting short and mid-term objectives that help us focus our efforts and measure our progress. This proposal provides a solid framework to align the DAO’s activities, ensuring that all contributors are working toward the same goals."
Here is the SimScore Priority Report of Responses during the SnapShot voting Period Jan 23-30, 2025
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We strongly support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) framework as a decentralized and transparent approach to defining the DAO's interim goals. The framework aligns with the DAO’s mission, vision, and purpose by enabling broad community participation, fostering inclusivity, and maintaining adaptability through annual updates.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We strongly support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) framework as a decentralized and transparent approach to defining the DAO's interim goals. The framework aligns with the DAO’s mission, vision, and purpose by enabling broad community participation, fostering inclusivity, and maintaining adaptability through annual updates.
The two-phase implementation process—agreement on the framework (Phase 1) and submission of Strategic Objective Matrices (Phase 2)—is clear and well-structured. Additionally, its flexibility allows the DAO to evolve with market conditions and community needs, ensuring long-term sustainability.
We recommend establishing clear communication channels and accessible tools to encourage community participation and support the successful execution of the SOS framework.
The GMX Governance Committee strongly encourages the community to approve this proposal and looks forward to contributing to its next stages.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We strongly support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) framework as a decentralized and transparent approach to defining the DAO's interim goals. The framework aligns with the DAO’s mission, vision, and purpose by enabling broad community participation, fostering inclusivity, and maintaining adaptability through annual updates.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
We strongly support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) framework as a decentralized and transparent approach to defining the DAO's interim goals. The framework aligns with the DAO’s mission, vision, and purpose by enabling broad community participation, fostering inclusivity, and maintaining adaptability through annual updates.
The two-phase implementation process—agreement on the framework (Phase 1) and submission of Strategic Objective Matrices (Phase 2)—is clear and well-structured. Additionally, its flexibility allows the DAO to evolve with market conditions and community needs, ensuring long-term sustainability.
We recommend establishing clear communication channels and accessible tools to encourage community participation and support the successful execution of the SOS framework.
The GMX Governance Committee strongly encourages the community to approve this proposal and looks forward to contributing to its next stages.
Here is the latest SimScore report during the first revision interval.
https://rndadocs.notion.site/Arbitrum-SOS-Proposal-Revision-1-cc1cd2f037e8456f90458832dd872f15?pvs=4
Arbitrum SOS Proposal Revision 1 Jan 10-Jan 19, 2025
Here is the latest SimScore report during the first revision interval.
https://rndadocs.notion.site/Arbitrum-SOS-Proposal-Revision-1-cc1cd2f037e8456f90458832dd872f15?pvs=4
Arbitrum SOS Proposal Revision 1 Jan 10-Jan 19, 2025
Top 1 "This looks like a good process/protocol to define Arbitrum’s goals and objectives - and also to re-evaluate them every year. Based on these objectives, it will be easier for delegates to decide which governance proposals to support and which ones not (same goes for proposal authors)."
Top 2 "Ordinary users may not be skilled at crafting a complete proposal with detailed goals and key results. Could a simplified process be set up, allowing them to submit “goal ideas”? The community could then vote on which ideas are worth further exploration, better encouraging participation."
Top 3 "6. The proposal does not delve deeply into the execution process after goals are selected—for instance, who will be responsible for implementation, how the budget will be allocated, and how outcomes will be evaluated. I suggest supplementing a detailed implementation mechanism to ensure the goals not only remain at the strategic level but also effectively drive ecosystem growth. Additionally, the proposal does not address how to adjust if a goal fails to meet expectations. A dynamic adjustment mechanism, such as quarterly reports assessing the feasibility of goals and optimizing resource allocation, should be included."
Here is the latest SimScore report during the first revision interval.
https://rndadocs.notion.site/Arbitrum-SOS-Proposal-Revision-1-cc1cd2f037e8456f90458832dd872f15?pvs=4
Arbitrum SOS Proposal Revision 1 Jan 10-Jan 19, 2025
Here is the latest SimScore report during the first revision interval.
https://rndadocs.notion.site/Arbitrum-SOS-Proposal-Revision-1-cc1cd2f037e8456f90458832dd872f15?pvs=4
Arbitrum SOS Proposal Revision 1 Jan 10-Jan 19, 2025
Top 1 "This looks like a good process/protocol to define Arbitrum’s goals and objectives - and also to re-evaluate them every year. Based on these objectives, it will be easier for delegates to decide which governance proposals to support and which ones not (same goes for proposal authors)."
Top 2 "Ordinary users may not be skilled at crafting a complete proposal with detailed goals and key results. Could a simplified process be set up, allowing them to submit “goal ideas”? The community could then vote on which ideas are worth further exploration, better encouraging participation."
Top 3 "6. The proposal does not delve deeply into the execution process after goals are selected—for instance, who will be responsible for implementation, how the budget will be allocated, and how outcomes will be evaluated. I suggest supplementing a detailed implementation mechanism to ensure the goals not only remain at the strategic level but also effectively drive ecosystem growth. Additionally, the proposal does not address how to adjust if a goal fails to meet expectations. A dynamic adjustment mechanism, such as quarterly reports assessing the feasibility of goals and optimizing resource allocation, should be included."
Thank you to everyone who cast their vote on this proposal. The SOS passed on Snapshot, with ~100% of voters voting FOR. A few relevant updates we want to share here:
Thank you to everyone who cast their vote on this proposal. The SOS passed on Snapshot, with ~100% of voters voting FOR. A few relevant updates we want to share here:
We’re looking forward to everyone’s contributions to this process!
Thank you to everyone who cast their vote on this proposal. The SOS passed on Snapshot, with ~100% of voters voting FOR. A few relevant updates we want to share here:
Thank you to everyone who cast their vote on this proposal. The SOS passed on Snapshot, with ~100% of voters voting FOR. A few relevant updates we want to share here:
We’re looking forward to everyone’s contributions to this process!
LobbyFi voted in favor of the proposal since the "for" pool in the community auction overweighted the "against" pool.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We don’t have much to add, as we have already provided feedback on this framework twice (first and second comments). We are pleased with the final result and appreciate @Entropy for considering our suggestions. The framework is solid, includes necessary mechanisms for amendments, aligns with traditional governance standards, and, most importantly, allows for matrix unification. This is crucial, as it is unlikely that a single matrix would encompass all of the DAO’s key objectives.
We would like to retrospectively document our vote on this: LobbyFi voted in favor of the proposal since the 'for' pool got more ETH deposited from the community on LobbyFi.
I've voted FOR this proposal on Snapshot because I believe it makes sense to separate Objective and Budgeting. Creating clear and concise objectives is essential if you want an organization to be efficient.
Voted FOR this proposal in temp-check Snapshot. After also voting positively for the MVP proposal, I very much like this idea and where it's headed; having strategic objectives and KR presented clearly to the DAO will go a long way in expectations alignement between all dao involved parties. I also like that any contributor can propose these and they get weighted on. Voted FOR, monitoring additional feedback or implemented changes before Tally on-chain
We have voted in FAVOUR of the proposal on Snapshot. While there are areas that could be further refined, we believe the core framework is sound and should proceed through the governance process.
Our earlier feedback can be viewed at: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/21?u=castlecapital
I voted FOR the Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) proposal because I believe it provides a necessary structure for our growth. The definition of review and feedback periods is a step in the right direction. This will enable us to keep our goals aligned with the changing market. However, it is crucial that these reviews are conducted in a rigorous process, filtering out what has worked and learning from what has not been effective.
I also put in a For bid for the 92.358,45 ARB of voting power available in lobbyfi.xyz to vote For in this offchain proposal https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x7cb6ade75c9a8629f31ec81fe488fc7c87515dad91b03a02b511662c1a147263 This bid of mine was already outbid by another For bid.
We are the biggest supporters of taking a strategic approach to DAO governance and this proposal is a step in that direction. The proposed adoption of an OKR framework aligns with proven governance practices in other ecosystems (ex., SafeDAO’s OBRA). Based on our experience stewarding such strategic frameworks, we know it can be highly beneficial in streamlining focus for a DAO. Most importantly, it helps with efficient allocation of capital.
One thing to note - while we appreciate the flexibility of allowing contributors to submit proposals outside the SOS framework, creating friction against such proposals might discourage potentially impactful ideas. To ensure that contributors are not disincentivized from pursuing valuable standalone initiatives, a potential solution might be to leave open a “wildcard” category that accepts otherwise impactful proposals that do not fit into any of the approved objectives.
voting For the current offchain proposal because I think it is always helpful for a DAO to try to formalize objectives (despite most of the time the effort being a waste of time for everybody involved) and this proposal puts forward a good overall methodology to do that in a DAO context. However, I don't like the fact that @Entropy would also be submitting their own submission to their own framework, since it breaks the neutrality of the intent of authoring and pushing this SOS proposal forward. So I would recommend for Entropy to be the very last one to submit their proposal, so as not to dissuade participation from other participants.
gm, I broadly support this initiative as previously explained, and voted for. I have one final suggestion:
We need a way to encourage merging the best objectives across different sets before the final vote.
gm, I broadly support this initiative as previously explained, and voted for. I have one final suggestion:
We need a way to encourage merging the best objectives across different sets before the final vote.
This could be done informally through forum discussions or other methods, but the goal is to avoid getting locked into rigid matrices and instead ideally cherry-pick the strongest objectives for maximum impact.
I would encourage anyone giving feedback on a specific matrix to indicate whether a key point is particularly relevant, so that proposers can embrace objectives from other people too.
Thanks
I will be voting "For". Honestly don't have much to say as I agree with the proposal and how it's structured. Cat herding is hard, so anything to make that easier is a win in my book. And we've committed to the "MVP" format in the past, so naturally no reason not to vote to have it continue.
As in @web3citizenxyz representation. Voting FOR in this proposal. Below the rationale:
Voted FOR this proposal see Voting Rationale: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147/50?u=alexlumley
Thank you @Entropy for the thoughtful proposal and for engaging with community feedback throughout the process. I support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) framework as a key step in improving alignment, coordination, and execution within the Arbitrum DAO.
LobbyFi voted in favor of the proposal since the "for" pool in the community auction overweighted the "against" pool.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We don’t have much to add, as we have already provided feedback on this framework twice (first and second comments). We are pleased with the final result and appreciate @Entropy for considering our suggestions. The framework is solid, includes necessary mechanisms for amendments, aligns with traditional governance standards, and, most importantly, allows for matrix unification. This is crucial, as it is unlikely that a single matrix would encompass all of the DAO’s key objectives.
We would like to retrospectively document our vote on this: LobbyFi voted in favor of the proposal since the 'for' pool got more ETH deposited from the community on LobbyFi.
I've voted FOR this proposal on Snapshot because I believe it makes sense to separate Objective and Budgeting. Creating clear and concise objectives is essential if you want an organization to be efficient.
Voted FOR this proposal in temp-check Snapshot. After also voting positively for the MVP proposal, I very much like this idea and where it's headed; having strategic objectives and KR presented clearly to the DAO will go a long way in expectations alignement between all dao involved parties. I also like that any contributor can propose these and they get weighted on. Voted FOR, monitoring additional feedback or implemented changes before Tally on-chain
We have voted in FAVOUR of the proposal on Snapshot. While there are areas that could be further refined, we believe the core framework is sound and should proceed through the governance process.
Our earlier feedback can be viewed at: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/21?u=castlecapital
I voted FOR the Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) proposal because I believe it provides a necessary structure for our growth. The definition of review and feedback periods is a step in the right direction. This will enable us to keep our goals aligned with the changing market. However, it is crucial that these reviews are conducted in a rigorous process, filtering out what has worked and learning from what has not been effective.
I also put in a For bid for the 92.358,45 ARB of voting power available in lobbyfi.xyz to vote For in this offchain proposal https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x7cb6ade75c9a8629f31ec81fe488fc7c87515dad91b03a02b511662c1a147263 This bid of mine was already outbid by another For bid.
We are the biggest supporters of taking a strategic approach to DAO governance and this proposal is a step in that direction. The proposed adoption of an OKR framework aligns with proven governance practices in other ecosystems (ex., SafeDAO’s OBRA). Based on our experience stewarding such strategic frameworks, we know it can be highly beneficial in streamlining focus for a DAO. Most importantly, it helps with efficient allocation of capital.
One thing to note - while we appreciate the flexibility of allowing contributors to submit proposals outside the SOS framework, creating friction against such proposals might discourage potentially impactful ideas. To ensure that contributors are not disincentivized from pursuing valuable standalone initiatives, a potential solution might be to leave open a “wildcard” category that accepts otherwise impactful proposals that do not fit into any of the approved objectives.
voting For the current offchain proposal because I think it is always helpful for a DAO to try to formalize objectives (despite most of the time the effort being a waste of time for everybody involved) and this proposal puts forward a good overall methodology to do that in a DAO context. However, I don't like the fact that @Entropy would also be submitting their own submission to their own framework, since it breaks the neutrality of the intent of authoring and pushing this SOS proposal forward. So I would recommend for Entropy to be the very last one to submit their proposal, so as not to dissuade participation from other participants.
gm, I broadly support this initiative as previously explained, and voted for. I have one final suggestion:
We need a way to encourage merging the best objectives across different sets before the final vote.
gm, I broadly support this initiative as previously explained, and voted for. I have one final suggestion:
We need a way to encourage merging the best objectives across different sets before the final vote.
This could be done informally through forum discussions or other methods, but the goal is to avoid getting locked into rigid matrices and instead ideally cherry-pick the strongest objectives for maximum impact.
I would encourage anyone giving feedback on a specific matrix to indicate whether a key point is particularly relevant, so that proposers can embrace objectives from other people too.
Thanks
I will be voting "For". Honestly don't have much to say as I agree with the proposal and how it's structured. Cat herding is hard, so anything to make that easier is a win in my book. And we've committed to the "MVP" format in the past, so naturally no reason not to vote to have it continue.
As in @web3citizenxyz representation. Voting FOR in this proposal. Below the rationale:
Voted FOR this proposal see Voting Rationale: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147/50?u=alexlumley
Thank you @Entropy for the thoughtful proposal and for engaging with community feedback throughout the process. I support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) framework as a key step in improving alignment, coordination, and execution within the Arbitrum DAO.
We have voted in FAVOUR of the proposal on Snapshot. While there are areas that could be further refined, we believe the core framework is sound and should proceed through the governance process.
Our earlier feedback can be viewed at: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/21?u=castlecapital
Thank you @Entropy, for addressing some of our concerns. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/29?u=castlecapital
We are the biggest supporters of taking a strategic approach to DAO governance and this proposal is a step in that direction. The proposed adoption of an OKR framework aligns with proven governance practices in other ecosystems (ex., SafeDAO’s OBRA). Based on our experience stewarding such strategic frameworks, we know it can be highly beneficial in streamlining focus for a DAO. Most importantly, it helps with efficient allocation of capital.
One thing to note - while we appreciate the flexibility of allowing contributors to submit proposals outside the SOS framework, creating friction against such proposals might discourage potentially impactful ideas. To ensure that contributors are not disincentivized from pursuing valuable standalone initiatives, a potential solution might be to leave open a “wildcard” category that accepts otherwise impactful proposals that do not fit into any of the approved objectives.
Feel free to reach out to us for sparring as we've been involved closely in rolling out the strategy framework at Safe and have seen all the learnings on the ground.
H/T to @EntropyAadvisors for the work on the proposal.
Voted FOR this proposal see Voting Rationale: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147/50?u=alexlumley
Thank you @Entropy for the thoughtful proposal and for engaging with community feedback throughout the process. I support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) framework as a key step in improving alignment, coordination, and execution within the Arbitrum DAO.
Overall, I'll note believe we should separate the "Agenda Setting" from the Planning and execution. SImilar to how in organizations there are different strategic and execution periods it is okay for the DAO to do the same.
The phased approach provides a structured yet flexible way for the DAO to set short- and mid-term objectives, ensuring governance decisions are more strategic and proactive. The focus on decentralization and open participation is valuable, allowing diverse contributors to engage in shaping the DAO’s direction.
A few areas to consider:
• Encouraging diverse participation: The submission process could benefit from mechanisms that support broader community engagement, ensuring input from a wide range of stakeholders.
• Refining the review and selection process: Providing clear pathways for merging and consolidating submissions would help surface the strongest strategic objectives without creating unnecessary redundancy.
• Financial sustainability : While budgeting is planned for a later phase, ensuring alignment between resource allocation and objectives early on will be important for long-term success.
Overall, this is a strong step toward structured DAO governance, and we look forward to seeing how it evolves.
Personally, I'm excited to work towards submitting some SOSes. (Is that a thing?).
DAOplomats is voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
Thank you Entropy for all the work done on this proposal. The framing and structure of this proposal is really flexible and open so we are happy to support during the temp check.
The timeline also has this sweet spot as we believe it is ample time for formulation and submission, and against prolonging for reasons you rightfully mentioned.
I will be voting YES on Snapshot. In line with my previous comment, I believe the way this process is set up will maintain flexibility for changes in the future while keeping structure to the planning process. For objectives to be kept relevant and actionable, the quarterly reports should help us adjust course.
I also believe delegate engagement is very important for the SOs to fully reflect the DAO's vision, so we must ensure the process is straightforward and welcoming for all delegates to contribute their perspectives.
We vote FOR the proposal on Snapshot.
First of all, we appreciate all the effort put in by @Entropy and the delegates who gave critical feedback to make the proposal better.
We vote FOR the proposal on Snapshot.
First of all, we appreciate all the effort put in by @Entropy and the delegates who gave critical feedback to make the proposal better.
Based on our first-hand experience in the Lido DAO, implementing the GOOSE (Guided Open Objective Setting Exercise) for the DAO to be aligned on what the DAO should focus on, we believe this is the right approach to make the DAO move into its execution mode after setting the MVP. We also appreciate the carefully structured process and an additional consideration to incorporate partial recommendations utilizing the appropriate tool (which was our concern in the GOOSE process)
As it's discussed by @404DAO, and its trade-off is recognized by others, incentivizing the submissions from a variety of delegates/contributors would be the key to receiving as many great proposals as possible, otherwise the objective setting process feels "centralized" in the end. It would be interesting to consider what non-financial benefits can be awarded for the submitters of the competitive SOSs.
We're voting in favor of the SOS framework because it solves a real problem we face with strategic coordination, without sacrificing the openness that makes our DAO work. The process might look complex on paper, but it's basically creating a shared roadmap while letting everyone keep their ability to propose new ideas. What we really like is how it builds in regular checkpoints to make sure we're on track, plus the flexibility to adapt if circumstances change. Given the strong support from other delegates and the clear benefits for project evaluation and resource allocation, this feels like a natural next step in our DAO's evolution.
Thanks for the well designed proposal @Entropy! I support the initiative because it provides a clear framework for setting interim goals, ensuring the Arbitrum DAO remains focused and aligned with its long-term vision. I also like to emphasized the need for measurable objectives and accountability, both of which are crucial for the DAO’s growth. I’ve voted in favor on Snapshot.
I like how thoughtful this proposal is to use separate divergent and convergent phases. I think it is safe to try considering how needed it has been since the start of the DAO.
Thanks, @Entropy , for this proposal. This sounds good. I'm just afraid that there can be too many submissions during the voting period. I hope all delegates will be have enough time for examineting and voting.
According to the proposal, once strategic objectives are set, the DAO will track their progress with key results to measure success. It’s mentioned that the ARDC research member will provide quarterly reports to assess how the DAO has progressed and what areas need attention.
Thanks, @Entropy , for this proposal. This sounds good. I'm just afraid that there can be too many submissions during the voting period. I hope all delegates will be have enough time for examineting and voting.
According to the proposal, once strategic objectives are set, the DAO will track their progress with key results to measure success. It’s mentioned that the ARDC research member will provide quarterly reports to assess how the DAO has progressed and what areas need attention.
Every 12 months, the chosen objective set will be reviewed and, if needed, revised based on changing market conditions, the competitive environment, progress made in the past year, etc. In order to keep the DAO up to date with the progress towards each strategic objective, we suggest the research member of the ARDC be tasked with providing quarterly reports assessing how the DAO has improved through proposals and initiatives as well as suggesting what areas require more attention while recommending solutions to address these areas.
How the research member of the ARDC will be chosen? Should he be given additional salary for his reports?
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
Having supported the MVP proposal, we see the SOS as the logical next step in narrowing down on a set of priorities that the DAO can focus on executing. The timeline and approach outlined for deciding on the set of objectives that the DAO will prioritize is sensible and takes into account the time needed throughout the different stages (e.g., submission, feedback and revision being separate).
We’d like to bring up three suggestions:
We support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) proposal as a structured approach for ArbitrumDAO to define its short- and mid-term goals. While a working group could improve coordination, we recognize the challenges of reaching a consensus and The feedback and revision periods offer a clear process for contributors to refine their ideas and collaborate where needed. We have no further concerns on this.
Thank you to @Entropy for the proposal. The SOS framework is essential, providing higher-level guidance for unifying and embracing the diversity in ecosystem development decision-making. It serves as an advanced command headquarters.
I'm voting 'FOR' this proposal on Snapshot. Setting up strategic objectives is the next logical step after we defined the MVP, this will connect our vision to defined actions. I'm particularly pleased with the framework defined with the use of OKRs + periodic reviews, as these will provide a clear direction ahead. Excited to see how it all plays out.
We’re voting FOR this proposal
Rationale
We’re voting FOR this proposal
Rationale
I voted for this proposal on Snapshot. I appreciate Entropy taking the initiative to wrangle a cohesive strategy and operational approach out of the chaos of DAO governance. As a organization, it's important that we say "no" to things which might be good ideas but are not top priorities, thus enabling us to focus on the most important initiatives. I'm hoping this SOS framework will give us the tools to focus on the most important items for the DAO to tackle.
Thank you @Entropy for putting together this comprehensive and structured SOS framework to help Arbitrum achieve its end-state goals.
We would like to make one suggestion, specifically around incentivizing SOS submissions. This was also brought up by @CastleCapital in their comment:
Thank you @Entropy for putting together this comprehensive and structured SOS framework to help Arbitrum achieve its end-state goals.
We would like to make one suggestion, specifically around incentivizing SOS submissions. This was also brought up by @CastleCapital in their comment:
We have participated in previous attempts by the DAO to set similar strategic objectives. Unfortunately, these prior efforts fell short. One reason is that strategic objective setting is time-intensive, and to be effective requires proper incentives.
With that said, what if we consider integrating Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) exercises into delegate rewards to encourage greater engagement?
Some suggestions:
This will help align incentives and ensure meaningful participation from delegates who can contribute valuable insights to the important process of SOS submissions.
I really appreciate the motivation behind this proposal, so I cast a “Yes” vote on Snapshot. After having a grand and clear vision, we also need concrete plan that can be implemented effectively. This proposal provides a clear framework to systematize short- and mid-term objectives, which will help the DAO Allocate resources more efficiently, focus on core tasks, and avoid issues like scattered goals and inefficiencies····
At the same time, I have a few suggestions: I hope we can enhance the participation opportunities for regular members in submitting proposals, such as creating a dedicated channel to amplify community voices. Additionally, the budget allocation process could be made more transparent by clarifying the priorities and details of fund usage. This would make the process fairer and more convincing for everyone involved.
Establish minimum participation requirements in strategic discussions as part of delegate eligibility
I am fully aligned with this. To the extent possible, we should align incentives with the needs of the DAO.
@pedrob @404DAO while I totally see where you are coming from on this, we really risk to create a truckload of useless noise because every delegate will be compelled in creating goals that, most likely, either overlap a lot or are not complete. No strong opinion to be totally honest, only the fear of having everybody raising their hand and talking about goals that might just be not realistic nor useful. Also maybe worth moving the convo in the DIP discussion.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot voting.
Thank you @Entropy for bringing in the proposal.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot voting.
Thank you @Entropy for bringing in the proposal.
We are in favor of this proposal as it is a necessary step in turning the ideas from the MVP into real, actionable goals. The MVP gave the DAO a clear vision, but now it’s time to make that vision concrete by setting short and mid-term objectives that help us focus our efforts and measure our progress. This proposal provides a solid framework to align the DAO’s activities, ensuring that all contributors are working toward the same goals.
We appreciate that it includes regular reviews and progress updates, which will keep the DAO accountable and adaptable as the ecosystem evolves. We also value how this process invites input from everyone and is not just limited to Entropy, allowing for diverse ideas and collaboration to create meaningful goals.
One area we strongly echo with other delegates is the need to find ways to increase participation in these strategic discussions. With that in mind, we look forward to seeing the submissions and are excited to see how this framework helps the DAO and the ecosystem grow.
I decided to vote in favor of this proposal. I agree with the ratification of the SOS Framework, allowing us to move forward with the broader goal of the MVP proposal. I believe that moving to the next step will finally bring us closer to tangible results
Voted For: I think this is a great example of why we voted in a firm like Entropy to the ArbitrumDAO. To have a team to tackle issues like this. I believe having frameworks like this will help in making our DAO more transparent, easy to understand, and well-driven since the processes are well defined. Many times we hear feedback that DAOs are very complicated and hard to understand for new people to join. I believe this proposal is a step in the right direction to tackle these issues.
We have voted in FAVOUR of the proposal on Snapshot. While there are areas that could be further refined, we believe the core framework is sound and should proceed through the governance process.
Our earlier feedback can be viewed at: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/21?u=castlecapital
Thank you @Entropy, for addressing some of our concerns. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-strategic-objective-setting-sos-defining-the-dao-s-interim-goals/28102/29?u=castlecapital
We are the biggest supporters of taking a strategic approach to DAO governance and this proposal is a step in that direction. The proposed adoption of an OKR framework aligns with proven governance practices in other ecosystems (ex., SafeDAO’s OBRA). Based on our experience stewarding such strategic frameworks, we know it can be highly beneficial in streamlining focus for a DAO. Most importantly, it helps with efficient allocation of capital.
One thing to note - while we appreciate the flexibility of allowing contributors to submit proposals outside the SOS framework, creating friction against such proposals might discourage potentially impactful ideas. To ensure that contributors are not disincentivized from pursuing valuable standalone initiatives, a potential solution might be to leave open a “wildcard” category that accepts otherwise impactful proposals that do not fit into any of the approved objectives.
Feel free to reach out to us for sparring as we've been involved closely in rolling out the strategy framework at Safe and have seen all the learnings on the ground.
H/T to @EntropyAadvisors for the work on the proposal.
Voted FOR this proposal see Voting Rationale: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147/50?u=alexlumley
Thank you @Entropy for the thoughtful proposal and for engaging with community feedback throughout the process. I support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) framework as a key step in improving alignment, coordination, and execution within the Arbitrum DAO.
Overall, I'll note believe we should separate the "Agenda Setting" from the Planning and execution. SImilar to how in organizations there are different strategic and execution periods it is okay for the DAO to do the same.
The phased approach provides a structured yet flexible way for the DAO to set short- and mid-term objectives, ensuring governance decisions are more strategic and proactive. The focus on decentralization and open participation is valuable, allowing diverse contributors to engage in shaping the DAO’s direction.
A few areas to consider:
• Encouraging diverse participation: The submission process could benefit from mechanisms that support broader community engagement, ensuring input from a wide range of stakeholders.
• Refining the review and selection process: Providing clear pathways for merging and consolidating submissions would help surface the strongest strategic objectives without creating unnecessary redundancy.
• Financial sustainability : While budgeting is planned for a later phase, ensuring alignment between resource allocation and objectives early on will be important for long-term success.
Overall, this is a strong step toward structured DAO governance, and we look forward to seeing how it evolves.
Personally, I'm excited to work towards submitting some SOSes. (Is that a thing?).
DAOplomats is voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
Thank you Entropy for all the work done on this proposal. The framing and structure of this proposal is really flexible and open so we are happy to support during the temp check.
The timeline also has this sweet spot as we believe it is ample time for formulation and submission, and against prolonging for reasons you rightfully mentioned.
I will be voting YES on Snapshot. In line with my previous comment, I believe the way this process is set up will maintain flexibility for changes in the future while keeping structure to the planning process. For objectives to be kept relevant and actionable, the quarterly reports should help us adjust course.
I also believe delegate engagement is very important for the SOs to fully reflect the DAO's vision, so we must ensure the process is straightforward and welcoming for all delegates to contribute their perspectives.
We vote FOR the proposal on Snapshot.
First of all, we appreciate all the effort put in by @Entropy and the delegates who gave critical feedback to make the proposal better.
We vote FOR the proposal on Snapshot.
First of all, we appreciate all the effort put in by @Entropy and the delegates who gave critical feedback to make the proposal better.
Based on our first-hand experience in the Lido DAO, implementing the GOOSE (Guided Open Objective Setting Exercise) for the DAO to be aligned on what the DAO should focus on, we believe this is the right approach to make the DAO move into its execution mode after setting the MVP. We also appreciate the carefully structured process and an additional consideration to incorporate partial recommendations utilizing the appropriate tool (which was our concern in the GOOSE process)
As it's discussed by @404DAO, and its trade-off is recognized by others, incentivizing the submissions from a variety of delegates/contributors would be the key to receiving as many great proposals as possible, otherwise the objective setting process feels "centralized" in the end. It would be interesting to consider what non-financial benefits can be awarded for the submitters of the competitive SOSs.
We're voting in favor of the SOS framework because it solves a real problem we face with strategic coordination, without sacrificing the openness that makes our DAO work. The process might look complex on paper, but it's basically creating a shared roadmap while letting everyone keep their ability to propose new ideas. What we really like is how it builds in regular checkpoints to make sure we're on track, plus the flexibility to adapt if circumstances change. Given the strong support from other delegates and the clear benefits for project evaluation and resource allocation, this feels like a natural next step in our DAO's evolution.
Thanks for the well designed proposal @Entropy! I support the initiative because it provides a clear framework for setting interim goals, ensuring the Arbitrum DAO remains focused and aligned with its long-term vision. I also like to emphasized the need for measurable objectives and accountability, both of which are crucial for the DAO’s growth. I’ve voted in favor on Snapshot.
I like how thoughtful this proposal is to use separate divergent and convergent phases. I think it is safe to try considering how needed it has been since the start of the DAO.
Thanks, @Entropy , for this proposal. This sounds good. I'm just afraid that there can be too many submissions during the voting period. I hope all delegates will be have enough time for examineting and voting.
According to the proposal, once strategic objectives are set, the DAO will track their progress with key results to measure success. It’s mentioned that the ARDC research member will provide quarterly reports to assess how the DAO has progressed and what areas need attention.
Thanks, @Entropy , for this proposal. This sounds good. I'm just afraid that there can be too many submissions during the voting period. I hope all delegates will be have enough time for examineting and voting.
According to the proposal, once strategic objectives are set, the DAO will track their progress with key results to measure success. It’s mentioned that the ARDC research member will provide quarterly reports to assess how the DAO has progressed and what areas need attention.
Every 12 months, the chosen objective set will be reviewed and, if needed, revised based on changing market conditions, the competitive environment, progress made in the past year, etc. In order to keep the DAO up to date with the progress towards each strategic objective, we suggest the research member of the ARDC be tasked with providing quarterly reports assessing how the DAO has improved through proposals and initiatives as well as suggesting what areas require more attention while recommending solutions to address these areas.
How the research member of the ARDC will be chosen? Should he be given additional salary for his reports?
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
Having supported the MVP proposal, we see the SOS as the logical next step in narrowing down on a set of priorities that the DAO can focus on executing. The timeline and approach outlined for deciding on the set of objectives that the DAO will prioritize is sensible and takes into account the time needed throughout the different stages (e.g., submission, feedback and revision being separate).
We’d like to bring up three suggestions:
We support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) proposal as a structured approach for ArbitrumDAO to define its short- and mid-term goals. While a working group could improve coordination, we recognize the challenges of reaching a consensus and The feedback and revision periods offer a clear process for contributors to refine their ideas and collaborate where needed. We have no further concerns on this.
Thank you to @Entropy for the proposal. The SOS framework is essential, providing higher-level guidance for unifying and embracing the diversity in ecosystem development decision-making. It serves as an advanced command headquarters.
I'm voting 'FOR' this proposal on Snapshot. Setting up strategic objectives is the next logical step after we defined the MVP, this will connect our vision to defined actions. I'm particularly pleased with the framework defined with the use of OKRs + periodic reviews, as these will provide a clear direction ahead. Excited to see how it all plays out.
We’re voting FOR this proposal
Rationale
We’re voting FOR this proposal
Rationale
I voted for this proposal on Snapshot. I appreciate Entropy taking the initiative to wrangle a cohesive strategy and operational approach out of the chaos of DAO governance. As a organization, it's important that we say "no" to things which might be good ideas but are not top priorities, thus enabling us to focus on the most important initiatives. I'm hoping this SOS framework will give us the tools to focus on the most important items for the DAO to tackle.
Thank you @Entropy for putting together this comprehensive and structured SOS framework to help Arbitrum achieve its end-state goals.
We would like to make one suggestion, specifically around incentivizing SOS submissions. This was also brought up by @CastleCapital in their comment:
Thank you @Entropy for putting together this comprehensive and structured SOS framework to help Arbitrum achieve its end-state goals.
We would like to make one suggestion, specifically around incentivizing SOS submissions. This was also brought up by @CastleCapital in their comment:
We have participated in previous attempts by the DAO to set similar strategic objectives. Unfortunately, these prior efforts fell short. One reason is that strategic objective setting is time-intensive, and to be effective requires proper incentives.
With that said, what if we consider integrating Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) exercises into delegate rewards to encourage greater engagement?
Some suggestions:
This will help align incentives and ensure meaningful participation from delegates who can contribute valuable insights to the important process of SOS submissions.
I really appreciate the motivation behind this proposal, so I cast a “Yes” vote on Snapshot. After having a grand and clear vision, we also need concrete plan that can be implemented effectively. This proposal provides a clear framework to systematize short- and mid-term objectives, which will help the DAO Allocate resources more efficiently, focus on core tasks, and avoid issues like scattered goals and inefficiencies····
At the same time, I have a few suggestions: I hope we can enhance the participation opportunities for regular members in submitting proposals, such as creating a dedicated channel to amplify community voices. Additionally, the budget allocation process could be made more transparent by clarifying the priorities and details of fund usage. This would make the process fairer and more convincing for everyone involved.
Establish minimum participation requirements in strategic discussions as part of delegate eligibility
I am fully aligned with this. To the extent possible, we should align incentives with the needs of the DAO.
@pedrob @404DAO while I totally see where you are coming from on this, we really risk to create a truckload of useless noise because every delegate will be compelled in creating goals that, most likely, either overlap a lot or are not complete. No strong opinion to be totally honest, only the fear of having everybody raising their hand and talking about goals that might just be not realistic nor useful. Also maybe worth moving the convo in the DIP discussion.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot voting.
Thank you @Entropy for bringing in the proposal.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot voting.
Thank you @Entropy for bringing in the proposal.
We are in favor of this proposal as it is a necessary step in turning the ideas from the MVP into real, actionable goals. The MVP gave the DAO a clear vision, but now it’s time to make that vision concrete by setting short and mid-term objectives that help us focus our efforts and measure our progress. This proposal provides a solid framework to align the DAO’s activities, ensuring that all contributors are working toward the same goals.
We appreciate that it includes regular reviews and progress updates, which will keep the DAO accountable and adaptable as the ecosystem evolves. We also value how this process invites input from everyone and is not just limited to Entropy, allowing for diverse ideas and collaboration to create meaningful goals.
One area we strongly echo with other delegates is the need to find ways to increase participation in these strategic discussions. With that in mind, we look forward to seeing the submissions and are excited to see how this framework helps the DAO and the ecosystem grow.
I decided to vote in favor of this proposal. I agree with the ratification of the SOS Framework, allowing us to move forward with the broader goal of the MVP proposal. I believe that moving to the next step will finally bring us closer to tangible results
Voted For: I think this is a great example of why we voted in a firm like Entropy to the ArbitrumDAO. To have a team to tackle issues like this. I believe having frameworks like this will help in making our DAO more transparent, easy to understand, and well-driven since the processes are well defined. Many times we hear feedback that DAOs are very complicated and hard to understand for new people to join. I believe this proposal is a step in the right direction to tackle these issues.
I’m voting FOR this proposal because it ensures inclusivity by giving power back to the community rather than relying solely on a central entity. The proposal is well-written, with no gaps or room for misinterpretation, making the process clear and transparent. It’s a strong step forward!
I will vote in favor of this proposal during the Temp Check. I am highly aligned with the framework developed to discuss and establish the short- and medium-term goals of the DAO with a view towards the MVP. Thank you for this.
I will vote in favor of this proposal during the Temp Check. I am highly aligned with the framework developed to discuss and establish the short- and medium-term goals of the DAO with a view towards the MVP. Thank you for this.
Here, we are not taking a stance on whether the DAO has recently overspent, but would like to point out that even given the treasury data brought up by @pedrob, we know that many delegates would still argue that capital usage has recently been appropriate due to, e.g., Arbitrum being in a “growth stage”.
That said, I want to reiterate my concern regarding the treasury—not just from the perspective of the percentage of spending relative to the total available, as I can understand (though subjective) the interpretation tied to the "growth phase" that Arbitrum is currently undergoing.
It’s worth noting that 2025 will once again be a year of massive ARB unlocks.
As Arbitrum grows, the incentives to attack it also increase. Continuously dumping ARB to fund initiatives without a proper plan to minimize its impact on the token's price only heightens the risk of such attacks becoming feasible.
For example, although it acknowledges the issue—which I think is appropriate—the OpCo does not outline a specific plan to mitigate that impact.
Of the remaining 26M ARB, tokens will be liquidated until $12M worth of cash equivalents has been attained. At ARB’s price of $0.68 as of January 21, this would require roughly 18M ARB. The liquidation will occur over up to 3 months immediately following this proposal passing Tally at the discretion of the liquidating party (the Arbitrum Foundation together with a provider of their choice for asset liquidation) with a mandate to minimize price impact.
The approved STEP 2 the same:
The foundation will at their discretion liquidate the ARB and once complete, announce the average conversion price on the forum
This year, three initiatives have already been approved to dump 80M ARB for stables (OpcCo, STEP, and Treasury Management v2), with more to come.
If we are going to continue pricing incentives/payments in USD instead of ARB as if they were equivalent, and covering everything with ARB, we need a plan to mitigate the price impact asap
With that in mind, I will refer to the principles outlined in the Constitution.
This is why I believe initiatives like ARB staking with a lock-up period and yield that makes holding ARB attractive, or proposals to deepen ARB liquidity, should be a priority before allocating and executing additional budgets for other initiatives.
I understand that discussing the budget alongside initiatives is more complex, but I believe it is the right approach to mitigate security risks.
Voted in Favour
Rationale:
Although the proposal could have some improvements around the facilitation format, it’s better to move ahead than not as the DAO urgently needs strategic clarity.
Voted in Favour
Rationale:
Although the proposal could have some improvements around the facilitation format, it’s better to move ahead than not as the DAO urgently needs strategic clarity.
This could be partially solved by having epochs long 4/6 months in which
This could be partially solved by having epochs long 4/6 months in which
This was something we thought about adding when we drafted the proposal. However, there are quite a few frictions we foresaw with this approach. For example, it’s well-known that DAOs often move slowly, inherent to their decentralized nature, meaning that, e.g., 6 months might not be enough time for the objectives’ “correctness” to materialize. This means that delegates may be more inclined to vote for a change prematurely, especially given delegates voting for a change can’t be obligated to create a submission. Compare this to the current structure, where ad hoc objective adjustments can be proposed by anyone at any time, but this requires them to post reasoning for the change together with adjusted objectives and key results. As such, objectives could still be changed 2/4/6/etc. months after their implementation, but the proposer must be able to clearly justify the reasoning and exert effort in creating an adjusted objectives matrix. This ensures that proposals for change are tied to accountability and require proposers to deeply think about the current objectives as well as what should be changed and why. The proposal also suggests instructing the research member of the ARDC to create quarterly reports on how the DAO is doing against its objectives, meaning that active delegates will receive timely updates on any potential changes that might be needed.
I think this is fair. I totally understand how a quarter or 6 months might just not be enough to evaluate the mid term status of a goal, I did personally face the same thoughts on the D.A.O. program. The proposed solution is good enough then (having the entity responsible for that goal being able to steer it if deemed necessary + quarterly report from ARDC on metrics), because yes DAOs are slow.
Thank you for addressing my concerns here, I am in generally voting in favor and would have had despite the clarification above, because we need to make concrete what we started with MVP and we need to move from a high level vision to more tangible goals. It's a long process but I bet will bring a new level of maturity in our DAO.
I voted in favor on Snapshot. The entire process, from the proposal’s initial drafting to the feedback and revisions, was exceptionally well-executed. Thank you for your dedication and effort. This proposal provides a more systematic and actionable approach to achieving the MVP, clarifying governance while improving its efficiency. The periodic review mechanism and the allowance for interim adjustments ensure that objectives can dynamically adapt to changes in market conditions and the competitive landscape, offering both long-term vision and flexibility.
Im voting for this, even though i have my remarks, I do think @Entropy is aware of those and will find a fitting solution. If not, we should adjust accordingly to get the best possible solution in the end.
See here for my comments
Thank you, @Entropy, for the proposal. It feels like we are moving in the right direction in defining strategy in a landscape that is becoming more and more competitive, so I’m voting "For" in the Snapshot tempcheck.
I’m a little late to the conversation, but I want to echo some of @CastleCapital and @404DAO comments on how we can incentivize delegates to spend the necessary time brainstorming to come up with the highest quality submissions and help move this forward into the next phase successfully, without creating the perverse incentives you already mentioned. As you noted, many delegates are already receiving incentives, but how can we ensure that we will have a solid number of quality submissions? Is there anyway we can incentivise delegates in a non monetary way.
Thank you, @Entropy, for the proposal. It feels like we are moving in the right direction in defining strategy in a landscape that is becoming more and more competitive, so I’m voting "For" in the Snapshot tempcheck.
I’m a little late to the conversation, but I want to echo some of @CastleCapital and @404DAO comments on how we can incentivize delegates to spend the necessary time brainstorming to come up with the highest quality submissions and help move this forward into the next phase successfully, without creating the perverse incentives you already mentioned. As you noted, many delegates are already receiving incentives, but how can we ensure that we will have a solid number of quality submissions? Is there anyway we can incentivise delegates in a non monetary way.
I'd like to add that, from my perspective, the timeline feels well-constructed and more than enough for people to brainstorm, create, submit, and get feedback on the submissions.
Thank you for the SOS. I like this proposal, I think is very well written and thank you for your time working on this; The presentation, the feedback, the revision and the voting period seems quite right and I agree with maintaining objectives with a timeline of 1-2 years. Im voting FOR on Snapshot
I voted FOR, as it is a needed step to turn MVP into actionable items.
Hello @Entropy!
First, we would like to mention that the framework looks solid. While analyzing the initiative, we noticed similarities with how legislative bodies formulate governmental budgets today, even though, in this instance, we are not discussing financial allocations (which will come later with the budgeting framework).
Hello @Entropy!
First, we would like to mention that the framework looks solid. While analyzing the initiative, we noticed similarities with how legislative bodies formulate governmental budgets today, even though, in this instance, we are not discussing financial allocations (which will come later with the budgeting framework).
Both in IRL governance and the digital era, budgeting is an extensive and complex process when we talk about covering countless activities, each potentially very different from the other.
First Phase (Ratification of the SOS Framework):
Review, Feedback, & Edit Period: January 10th - January 23rd
Snapshot Period: January 23rd - January 30th
Second Phase (Ratification of a Strategic Objectives Matrix):
Notice Period: 14 days (note that this period’s initiation might be pushed back slightly such that submitters will have more time to include possible takeaways from ETHDenver into their matrices during the Submission Period)
Submission Period: 30 days
Feedback Period: 21 days
Revision Period: 14 days
Voting Period: 7 days
Review Phase (Potential Amendments to the Strategic Objectives Matrix): Initiated 12 months after the previous voting period has ended or as a result of an ad hoc adjustments proposal as described above.
After the initial strategic objectives matrices are defined and one has been chosen, the DAO is encouraged to review the chosen matrix on a yearly basis. This ensures the objectives and their key results remain relevant and aligned with the DAO’s evolving needs and the overall market dynamics. The process is similar to the second phase described earlier, but delegates can propose to modify existing objectives/key results, add new ones, or remove those that are no longer relevant.
A review phase should be initiated 12 months after the previous voting period has ended. Ideally, OpCo has already been operationalized by then, meaning that the DAO can instruct the entity to manage the review phase. As stated earlier, we propose that the research member of the ARDC is initially tasked with providing quarterly reports assessing how the DAO has progressed with respect to its strategic objectives. Once OpCo is operationalized, this responsibility could also be transferred to the entity if the DAO chooses to do so.
The review phase is initiated by passing a Snapshot vote. In the proposal, the proposer must define who is in charge of managing the review phase. Given the review phase Snapshot vote passes, there will be a 14-day notice period. This will consist of a forum post updating delegates on the current state of the strategic objectives and informing them on what this review phase consists of. Among other things, this forum post should include:
A summary of the strategic objectives and how successful the DAO has been with respect to fulfilling them.
The expected start and end dates of all the subsequent periods.
Guidelines on how to submit an amendment.
Link to a FAQ forum thread where delegates can submit questions about the program.
After the notice period, delegates are invited to submit amendments to the initially chosen strategic objectives matrix during a 30-day submission period. Amendments are not limited to simply modifying strategic objectives and key results. They can also involve removing, adding, or replacing specific objectives and associated key results.
Once the submission period ends, amendment submissions go through a 21-day feedback period during which no changes can be made to the submissions. Finally, a 14-day revision period will take place during which proposers can make edits to their proposed matrices and merge them with other proposed matrices before being locked and put up for a Snapshot vote to choose the new objective matrix. If no amendment submissions are made, there is no need to move to the feedback, revision, or voting periods, and the old objectives matrix will remain effective.
From what we understand so far, aside from the ratification process of this very framework, the rest is repeated annually. This leaves us with 86 days from the start of the Notice Period to approval (both for the initial SOS strategy and for the amendments in subsequent years), except for ad hoc adjustments, which remain at the proposer’s discretion.
That’s almost three months (which is standard for traditional governance, although, in this case, it doesn’t include the fund allocation process). This raises some items for consideration:
1. Maintaining continuity during the review phase:
While the review process does not coincide with the final three months of each year (something understandable in this case, unlike traditional governance mechanisms, which are more refined), safeguards must be considered to ensure the continuity of the SOS.
During the review phase, the parameters from the previous year should remain in effect. This makes sense knowing that the plan will have a Year 1 and Year 2 each time it’s renewed. However, we wanted to emphasize this point, as it will be important to consider when defining the budgeting framework. In traditional governance, when a new financial allocation isn’t approved for the following year, mechanisms usually “renew” the previous year’s allocation automatically. This would be a reasonable option for the three months (proportionally) during which the review and budgeting framework phases are executed. Note: We are assuming the budget for each objective will also undergo an annual review.
The goal of ensuring continuity is to keep a framework in place during the three months of review that encourages "having a north" so there isn’t a gap in both social agreements and budget allocations.
2. Optimizing timelines in the future:
On the other hand, we had previously provided some key points for the elaboration of the SOS that we would like to share again:
From our perspective, the verticals mentioned by @krst in his comment provide a good starting point for debating the structure of a proposal that would likely establish the DAO’s objectives for the next 12–24 months. We’d like to add a few thoughts:
It’s been mentioned that the DAO needs to work on generating additional revenue streams to support long-term sustainability and provide value to the token. There’s also an RFC under discussion: [Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2. However, we want to emphasize that the DAO needs to standardize how it utilizes and manages its treasury.
Currently, each initiative handles its own treasury management in isolation: for ARDC v2, an AERA Vault is proposed; for other initiatives, funds are transferred to the AF for conversion to stables; some initiatives are paid in ARB via MSS; and others have sold ARB directly on the market. Similarly, even the use of stream applications lacks a standard framework, with no set guidelines to determine whether Sablier, Hedgey, Superfluid, or Llamapay should be used.
While we understand that different initiatives may occasionally require distinct procedures, we believe a well-designed, flexible framework could cover most cases in the future, especially if the OpCo proceeds successfully.
There have also been many discussions and proposals related to treasury diversification (including the above-mentioned proposal), but three fundamental questions remain unresolved:
What should the asset mix in the treasury be?
How much immediate liquidity does the DAO need?
How much immediate liquidity does the DAO want? (Enough to cover budgetary obligations for a few years? Some extra for potential changes to our plans? Do we need a contingency fund?)
To clarify, when referring to “immediate liquidity,” we mean stablecoins or highly liquid assets with minimal selling effort (we’re excluding ARB, as its liquidity depth limits short-term sell capacity).
As a final note, it’s important to mention that these last two points largely depend on the DAO’s ability to establish an annual budget—another aspect currently unresolved.
For the DAO to be more resilient to capture, genuinely decentralized in decision-making, and benefit from higher-quality proposals, it must focus on onboarding new stakeholders. This means that while growth programs aimed at expanding to new markets (i.e., new builders and users) are important, equal emphasis should be placed on encouraging DAO participation to grow and diversify alongside the ecosystem. As a community, we should be equipped to face new challenges that arise as a result of growth.
In this regard, both the Staking and DIP proposals are key to aligning the Arbitrum ecosystem with its DAO.
Considering the rapid evolution of the crypto ecosystem, even if the SOS program were created solely for the next 12 months, priorities could shift at any moment.
For example:
Even if this tweet is a mere rumor, imagine for a moment what would happen if ETH Mainnet no longer required rollups for scaling…the MVP outlined in this RFC would already be obsolete. The Arbitrum ecosystem does not rely exclusively on endogenous factors, so the DAO must be capable of quickly pivoting to a contingency plan if necessary until priorities can be redefined.
We believe that the flexibility aspect is particularly addressed by the potential ad-hoc modifications. As @JoJo rightly mentioned, crypto is a market that evolves faster than DAOs or plans can adapt, making it essential to have mechanisms that provide the necessary flexibility to adjust the plan or allocate new funds as needed.
In the case of a major event, such as the example JoJo provided regarding AI, where a strong narrative emerges that the DAO may find worth supporting, we trust that this ad-hoc adjustment mechanism will be useful for modifying the plan on the fly.
Allowing for a reasonable time for discussion, the forum post will then be put up for a Snapshot vote utilizing single-choice voting with the options of adopting the proposed objectives and key results
The only thing we are not sure about is whether to leave this the time of discussion so open, We think that a minimum amount is what is established in the Code of Conduct, and being something so important the reasonable should be higher than this, but we would at least change the wording to conform to the recently approved code:
In accordance with the Arbitrum Constitution, delegates should follow the recommendation that proposals be open to discussion on the forums for at least one week before being put to a vote. This is to allow delegates ample time to review and provide feedback.
The following minor edits were implemented on January 23rd:
Link to an open channel through which anyone can submit one-off objectives and related key results for consideration by those looking to develop a full-fledged objectives matrix submission.
Thank you for this initiative.
I'm a bit late to the party but honestly I do not have anything to add to this. I was under the impression that the trickle down of MVP would be done entirely by @Entropy but I love that they have made this inclusive by giving the power back to the community.
I think the proposal is very well written, it doesn't leave any gaps for misinterpretation of how the process will be. Having said that,
I'm a bit late to the party but honestly I do not have anything to add to this. I was under the impression that the trickle down of MVP would be done entirely by @Entropy but I love that they have made this inclusive by giving the power back to the community.
I think the proposal is very well written, it doesn't leave any gaps for misinterpretation of how the process will be. Having said that,
Oh, one more thing. Why don’t we call this proposal “OKRs setting” so we have less (unique) acronyms in Arbitrum
I agree with Daniel on this. We already have so many acronyms. It just makes new people more overwhelmed when they join. Let's keep things simple!
Lastly, I understand crafting these strategies takes time and effort. The DAO could consider offering incentives for proposals that make it to the final voting round to encourage participation.
This is another good point that we should consider. We have very talented people in the DAO but they can be discouraged by the load of work that this requires. We should incentivise final proposals to keep the members motivated!
I believe the SOS framework as presented is a necessary step for achieving strategic alignment of the DAO.
I understand what has been discussed about seasonality and the rapid changes we see in the ecosystem, and I agree with maintaining objectives with a timeline of 1-2 years. Having an adequate monitoring system in place will help to keep a mid-term structure. Besides, being able to adjust if necessary is a positive thing overall, even if for considering only emergency or not common situations. Stability in this regard is needed for a strategic map to be implemented and give time to initiatives to mature.
I believe the SOS framework as presented is a necessary step for achieving strategic alignment of the DAO.
I understand what has been discussed about seasonality and the rapid changes we see in the ecosystem, and I agree with maintaining objectives with a timeline of 1-2 years. Having an adequate monitoring system in place will help to keep a mid-term structure. Besides, being able to adjust if necessary is a positive thing overall, even if for considering only emergency or not common situations. Stability in this regard is needed for a strategic map to be implemented and give time to initiatives to mature.
Once the Strategic Objectives are set, they could help balance bottom-up innovation with strategic direction. This alignment is particularly valuable as it will directly address what has been criticized before about various grants and initiatives that, while interesting, don't always add inherent value to the ecosystem. It is important that we make sure that the SO framework keeps resources flowing toward initiatives that advance the collective goals of the DAO and at the same time maintain room for innovation.
There are valuable opportunities to enhance this foundation further down the line by incorporating indicators and metrics. I am unsure of the depth of the quarterly reports, but they could evolve into a comprehensive performance scorecard to provide early signals for strategic adjustments and enable cascading goals across initiatives and working groups.
Establishing clear strategic objectives will enhance decentralization only if they create transparent criteria for decision-making and enable more participants to contribute meaningfully. When community members understand the strategic direction and success metrics, they can more effectively propose and execute high-impact initiatives that advance our collective goals.
I appreciate how this proposal links vision and execution. The connection between the MVP, measurable objectives, and OpCo's execution activities should provide the infrastructure needed for effective strategy implementation. To keep decentralization in the community, it is important to maintain a structured approach to gathering and synthesizing the input of the DAO in all areas while also maintaining clear accountability mechanisms. The goal should be to amplify the DAO’s collective intelligence through better coordination.
This proposal is positive regarding Arbitrum's evolution, it could also serve as a blueprint for other DAOs to adapt their own strategic alignment.
We support the SOS proposal for its structured approach to setting strategic objectives that said, What do you think about establishing a working group for delegates to collaboratively brainstorm and develop strategic objectives? We’d love to hear your thoughts on this approach and understand why you believe empowering individual contributors to submit proposals might be more effective. While empowering individual contributors to propose objectives is valuable, it risks creating fragmentation across categories, leading to misaligned or siloed efforts. A working group composed of diverse stakeholders—such as delegates, developers, and researchers—could collect input from the community, synthesize insights, and propose a unified strategic objectives matrix. This would ensure objectives are cohesive, reflective of the DAO’s diverse expertise, and aligned with its overarching mission and vision. For example, the ARB Staking Working Group successfully brought community members together to collaboratively research on staking approach for Arbitrum, demonstrating how shared resources and collective efforts can achieve more effective outcome. Applying a similar approach to the SOS proposal would be highly beneficial, as it would allow everyone to pool their resources and work together toward a shared vision.
and one more question on the snapshot voting, to clarity how the snapshot stragy work, will us delegate pick the best one or divided in percent
We are voting FOR this proposal. The DAO needs strategic direction and hopefully this initiative can work to provide some of this for the community while streamlining operations.
We strongly recommend that a focus be put on how best to allocate resources and diminish spending. We will continue to push this agenda in our voting and communications.
The idea is that anyone can create a proposal that would push the DAO toward reaching one/several of the chosen objectives. In other words, the process would work in the same way as before, but it’ll hopefully orient contributors to produce synergistic proposals that form a cohesive structure while making it easier for delegates to judge whether a proposal is high value-add or not.
Thank you @Entropy for your well thought-out proposal and all the comments you have made to the feedback so far. Apologies for us coming in a bit late to discussion period here.
We at Castle Labs strongly support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) framework and view it as a pivotal step toward empowering the Arbitrum DAO to operate with a structured, proactive, and decentralized governance process.
Thank you @Entropy for your well thought-out proposal and all the comments you have made to the feedback so far. Apologies for us coming in a bit late to discussion period here.
We at Castle Labs strongly support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) framework and view it as a pivotal step toward empowering the Arbitrum DAO to operate with a structured, proactive, and decentralized governance process.
Below, we outline our general position on the SOS pathway:
Alignment with MVP: The SOS proposal inherently aligns with the DAO's mission, vision, and purpose by establishing a decentralized, community-driven framework for defining and achieving strategic objectives. We are confident this approach will help the DAO transition from reactive governance to a more strategic and cohesive development model.
Implementation Framework: The phased approach outlined in the proposal—Phase 1 for agreeing to the SOS framework and Phase 2 for submitting strategic objective matrices—is clear and pragmatic. The inclusion of measurable key results and a standardized submission process ensures a structured mechanism for participation. We commend this clarity and look forward to engaging in the process.
Decentralization and Inclusivity: The proposal’s open submission format encourages broad participation and upholds the principles of decentralization. Anyone in the community can propose strategic objectives, fostering inclusivity. However, we suggest exploring additional mechanisms to ensure underrepresented voices in the community feel empowered to contribute.
Flexibility and Adaptability: The annual review and update of objectives and key results ensure flexibility and responsiveness to changing conditions. This adaptability is crucial for the DAO’s long-term success and aligns with our belief in iterative progress.
Key Considerations
While we support the proposal’s direction, we would like to highlight a few additional points for discussion:
Incentivizing Submissions:
Volume and Quality of Submissions:
Encouraging Broader Participation:
Overall, we are excited about the opportunities this framework presents and look forward to participating in Phase 2 submissions. The SOS represents a significant step forward for the Arbitrum DAO, and we are eager to see how it drives the ecosystem toward greater cohesion, transparency, and sustainable development.
gm, thanks for sharing this comprehensive proposal. I like the direction after the MVP, and how this forces the DAO to shift the mindset into structured proactivity. We can have a cohesive direction for the next 12 and 24 months
Yes, as many have highlighted there is the risk that we miss on critical trends, but the lack of direction would be as dramatically damaging for Arbitrum. As suggested in the proposal, new proposals that are outside of the core priorities can be submitted (for example, adding a new priority) in case a new area is identified as critical.
Thanks to everyone who has shown interest in the SOS proposal!
We’ve made the following edits on January 20th:
I’m voting FOR this proposal because it ensures inclusivity by giving power back to the community rather than relying solely on a central entity. The proposal is well-written, with no gaps or room for misinterpretation, making the process clear and transparent. It’s a strong step forward!
I will vote in favor of this proposal during the Temp Check. I am highly aligned with the framework developed to discuss and establish the short- and medium-term goals of the DAO with a view towards the MVP. Thank you for this.
I will vote in favor of this proposal during the Temp Check. I am highly aligned with the framework developed to discuss and establish the short- and medium-term goals of the DAO with a view towards the MVP. Thank you for this.
Here, we are not taking a stance on whether the DAO has recently overspent, but would like to point out that even given the treasury data brought up by @pedrob, we know that many delegates would still argue that capital usage has recently been appropriate due to, e.g., Arbitrum being in a “growth stage”.
That said, I want to reiterate my concern regarding the treasury—not just from the perspective of the percentage of spending relative to the total available, as I can understand (though subjective) the interpretation tied to the "growth phase" that Arbitrum is currently undergoing.
It’s worth noting that 2025 will once again be a year of massive ARB unlocks.
As Arbitrum grows, the incentives to attack it also increase. Continuously dumping ARB to fund initiatives without a proper plan to minimize its impact on the token's price only heightens the risk of such attacks becoming feasible.
For example, although it acknowledges the issue—which I think is appropriate—the OpCo does not outline a specific plan to mitigate that impact.
Of the remaining 26M ARB, tokens will be liquidated until $12M worth of cash equivalents has been attained. At ARB’s price of $0.68 as of January 21, this would require roughly 18M ARB. The liquidation will occur over up to 3 months immediately following this proposal passing Tally at the discretion of the liquidating party (the Arbitrum Foundation together with a provider of their choice for asset liquidation) with a mandate to minimize price impact.
The approved STEP 2 the same:
The foundation will at their discretion liquidate the ARB and once complete, announce the average conversion price on the forum
This year, three initiatives have already been approved to dump 80M ARB for stables (OpcCo, STEP, and Treasury Management v2), with more to come.
If we are going to continue pricing incentives/payments in USD instead of ARB as if they were equivalent, and covering everything with ARB, we need a plan to mitigate the price impact asap
With that in mind, I will refer to the principles outlined in the Constitution.
This is why I believe initiatives like ARB staking with a lock-up period and yield that makes holding ARB attractive, or proposals to deepen ARB liquidity, should be a priority before allocating and executing additional budgets for other initiatives.
I understand that discussing the budget alongside initiatives is more complex, but I believe it is the right approach to mitigate security risks.
Voted in Favour
Rationale:
Although the proposal could have some improvements around the facilitation format, it’s better to move ahead than not as the DAO urgently needs strategic clarity.
Voted in Favour
Rationale:
Although the proposal could have some improvements around the facilitation format, it’s better to move ahead than not as the DAO urgently needs strategic clarity.
This could be partially solved by having epochs long 4/6 months in which
This could be partially solved by having epochs long 4/6 months in which
This was something we thought about adding when we drafted the proposal. However, there are quite a few frictions we foresaw with this approach. For example, it’s well-known that DAOs often move slowly, inherent to their decentralized nature, meaning that, e.g., 6 months might not be enough time for the objectives’ “correctness” to materialize. This means that delegates may be more inclined to vote for a change prematurely, especially given delegates voting for a change can’t be obligated to create a submission. Compare this to the current structure, where ad hoc objective adjustments can be proposed by anyone at any time, but this requires them to post reasoning for the change together with adjusted objectives and key results. As such, objectives could still be changed 2/4/6/etc. months after their implementation, but the proposer must be able to clearly justify the reasoning and exert effort in creating an adjusted objectives matrix. This ensures that proposals for change are tied to accountability and require proposers to deeply think about the current objectives as well as what should be changed and why. The proposal also suggests instructing the research member of the ARDC to create quarterly reports on how the DAO is doing against its objectives, meaning that active delegates will receive timely updates on any potential changes that might be needed.
I think this is fair. I totally understand how a quarter or 6 months might just not be enough to evaluate the mid term status of a goal, I did personally face the same thoughts on the D.A.O. program. The proposed solution is good enough then (having the entity responsible for that goal being able to steer it if deemed necessary + quarterly report from ARDC on metrics), because yes DAOs are slow.
Thank you for addressing my concerns here, I am in generally voting in favor and would have had despite the clarification above, because we need to make concrete what we started with MVP and we need to move from a high level vision to more tangible goals. It's a long process but I bet will bring a new level of maturity in our DAO.
I voted in favor on Snapshot. The entire process, from the proposal’s initial drafting to the feedback and revisions, was exceptionally well-executed. Thank you for your dedication and effort. This proposal provides a more systematic and actionable approach to achieving the MVP, clarifying governance while improving its efficiency. The periodic review mechanism and the allowance for interim adjustments ensure that objectives can dynamically adapt to changes in market conditions and the competitive landscape, offering both long-term vision and flexibility.
Im voting for this, even though i have my remarks, I do think @Entropy is aware of those and will find a fitting solution. If not, we should adjust accordingly to get the best possible solution in the end.
See here for my comments
Thank you, @Entropy, for the proposal. It feels like we are moving in the right direction in defining strategy in a landscape that is becoming more and more competitive, so I’m voting "For" in the Snapshot tempcheck.
I’m a little late to the conversation, but I want to echo some of @CastleCapital and @404DAO comments on how we can incentivize delegates to spend the necessary time brainstorming to come up with the highest quality submissions and help move this forward into the next phase successfully, without creating the perverse incentives you already mentioned. As you noted, many delegates are already receiving incentives, but how can we ensure that we will have a solid number of quality submissions? Is there anyway we can incentivise delegates in a non monetary way.
Thank you, @Entropy, for the proposal. It feels like we are moving in the right direction in defining strategy in a landscape that is becoming more and more competitive, so I’m voting "For" in the Snapshot tempcheck.
I’m a little late to the conversation, but I want to echo some of @CastleCapital and @404DAO comments on how we can incentivize delegates to spend the necessary time brainstorming to come up with the highest quality submissions and help move this forward into the next phase successfully, without creating the perverse incentives you already mentioned. As you noted, many delegates are already receiving incentives, but how can we ensure that we will have a solid number of quality submissions? Is there anyway we can incentivise delegates in a non monetary way.
I'd like to add that, from my perspective, the timeline feels well-constructed and more than enough for people to brainstorm, create, submit, and get feedback on the submissions.
Thank you for the SOS. I like this proposal, I think is very well written and thank you for your time working on this; The presentation, the feedback, the revision and the voting period seems quite right and I agree with maintaining objectives with a timeline of 1-2 years. Im voting FOR on Snapshot
I voted FOR, as it is a needed step to turn MVP into actionable items.
Hello @Entropy!
First, we would like to mention that the framework looks solid. While analyzing the initiative, we noticed similarities with how legislative bodies formulate governmental budgets today, even though, in this instance, we are not discussing financial allocations (which will come later with the budgeting framework).
Hello @Entropy!
First, we would like to mention that the framework looks solid. While analyzing the initiative, we noticed similarities with how legislative bodies formulate governmental budgets today, even though, in this instance, we are not discussing financial allocations (which will come later with the budgeting framework).
Both in IRL governance and the digital era, budgeting is an extensive and complex process when we talk about covering countless activities, each potentially very different from the other.
First Phase (Ratification of the SOS Framework):
Review, Feedback, & Edit Period: January 10th - January 23rd
Snapshot Period: January 23rd - January 30th
Second Phase (Ratification of a Strategic Objectives Matrix):
Notice Period: 14 days (note that this period’s initiation might be pushed back slightly such that submitters will have more time to include possible takeaways from ETHDenver into their matrices during the Submission Period)
Submission Period: 30 days
Feedback Period: 21 days
Revision Period: 14 days
Voting Period: 7 days
Review Phase (Potential Amendments to the Strategic Objectives Matrix): Initiated 12 months after the previous voting period has ended or as a result of an ad hoc adjustments proposal as described above.
After the initial strategic objectives matrices are defined and one has been chosen, the DAO is encouraged to review the chosen matrix on a yearly basis. This ensures the objectives and their key results remain relevant and aligned with the DAO’s evolving needs and the overall market dynamics. The process is similar to the second phase described earlier, but delegates can propose to modify existing objectives/key results, add new ones, or remove those that are no longer relevant.
A review phase should be initiated 12 months after the previous voting period has ended. Ideally, OpCo has already been operationalized by then, meaning that the DAO can instruct the entity to manage the review phase. As stated earlier, we propose that the research member of the ARDC is initially tasked with providing quarterly reports assessing how the DAO has progressed with respect to its strategic objectives. Once OpCo is operationalized, this responsibility could also be transferred to the entity if the DAO chooses to do so.
The review phase is initiated by passing a Snapshot vote. In the proposal, the proposer must define who is in charge of managing the review phase. Given the review phase Snapshot vote passes, there will be a 14-day notice period. This will consist of a forum post updating delegates on the current state of the strategic objectives and informing them on what this review phase consists of. Among other things, this forum post should include:
A summary of the strategic objectives and how successful the DAO has been with respect to fulfilling them.
The expected start and end dates of all the subsequent periods.
Guidelines on how to submit an amendment.
Link to a FAQ forum thread where delegates can submit questions about the program.
After the notice period, delegates are invited to submit amendments to the initially chosen strategic objectives matrix during a 30-day submission period. Amendments are not limited to simply modifying strategic objectives and key results. They can also involve removing, adding, or replacing specific objectives and associated key results.
Once the submission period ends, amendment submissions go through a 21-day feedback period during which no changes can be made to the submissions. Finally, a 14-day revision period will take place during which proposers can make edits to their proposed matrices and merge them with other proposed matrices before being locked and put up for a Snapshot vote to choose the new objective matrix. If no amendment submissions are made, there is no need to move to the feedback, revision, or voting periods, and the old objectives matrix will remain effective.
From what we understand so far, aside from the ratification process of this very framework, the rest is repeated annually. This leaves us with 86 days from the start of the Notice Period to approval (both for the initial SOS strategy and for the amendments in subsequent years), except for ad hoc adjustments, which remain at the proposer’s discretion.
That’s almost three months (which is standard for traditional governance, although, in this case, it doesn’t include the fund allocation process). This raises some items for consideration:
1. Maintaining continuity during the review phase:
While the review process does not coincide with the final three months of each year (something understandable in this case, unlike traditional governance mechanisms, which are more refined), safeguards must be considered to ensure the continuity of the SOS.
During the review phase, the parameters from the previous year should remain in effect. This makes sense knowing that the plan will have a Year 1 and Year 2 each time it’s renewed. However, we wanted to emphasize this point, as it will be important to consider when defining the budgeting framework. In traditional governance, when a new financial allocation isn’t approved for the following year, mechanisms usually “renew” the previous year’s allocation automatically. This would be a reasonable option for the three months (proportionally) during which the review and budgeting framework phases are executed. Note: We are assuming the budget for each objective will also undergo an annual review.
The goal of ensuring continuity is to keep a framework in place during the three months of review that encourages "having a north" so there isn’t a gap in both social agreements and budget allocations.
2. Optimizing timelines in the future:
On the other hand, we had previously provided some key points for the elaboration of the SOS that we would like to share again:
From our perspective, the verticals mentioned by @krst in his comment provide a good starting point for debating the structure of a proposal that would likely establish the DAO’s objectives for the next 12–24 months. We’d like to add a few thoughts:
It’s been mentioned that the DAO needs to work on generating additional revenue streams to support long-term sustainability and provide value to the token. There’s also an RFC under discussion: [Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2. However, we want to emphasize that the DAO needs to standardize how it utilizes and manages its treasury.
Currently, each initiative handles its own treasury management in isolation: for ARDC v2, an AERA Vault is proposed; for other initiatives, funds are transferred to the AF for conversion to stables; some initiatives are paid in ARB via MSS; and others have sold ARB directly on the market. Similarly, even the use of stream applications lacks a standard framework, with no set guidelines to determine whether Sablier, Hedgey, Superfluid, or Llamapay should be used.
While we understand that different initiatives may occasionally require distinct procedures, we believe a well-designed, flexible framework could cover most cases in the future, especially if the OpCo proceeds successfully.
There have also been many discussions and proposals related to treasury diversification (including the above-mentioned proposal), but three fundamental questions remain unresolved:
What should the asset mix in the treasury be?
How much immediate liquidity does the DAO need?
How much immediate liquidity does the DAO want? (Enough to cover budgetary obligations for a few years? Some extra for potential changes to our plans? Do we need a contingency fund?)
To clarify, when referring to “immediate liquidity,” we mean stablecoins or highly liquid assets with minimal selling effort (we’re excluding ARB, as its liquidity depth limits short-term sell capacity).
As a final note, it’s important to mention that these last two points largely depend on the DAO’s ability to establish an annual budget—another aspect currently unresolved.
For the DAO to be more resilient to capture, genuinely decentralized in decision-making, and benefit from higher-quality proposals, it must focus on onboarding new stakeholders. This means that while growth programs aimed at expanding to new markets (i.e., new builders and users) are important, equal emphasis should be placed on encouraging DAO participation to grow and diversify alongside the ecosystem. As a community, we should be equipped to face new challenges that arise as a result of growth.
In this regard, both the Staking and DIP proposals are key to aligning the Arbitrum ecosystem with its DAO.
Considering the rapid evolution of the crypto ecosystem, even if the SOS program were created solely for the next 12 months, priorities could shift at any moment.
For example:
Even if this tweet is a mere rumor, imagine for a moment what would happen if ETH Mainnet no longer required rollups for scaling…the MVP outlined in this RFC would already be obsolete. The Arbitrum ecosystem does not rely exclusively on endogenous factors, so the DAO must be capable of quickly pivoting to a contingency plan if necessary until priorities can be redefined.
We believe that the flexibility aspect is particularly addressed by the potential ad-hoc modifications. As @JoJo rightly mentioned, crypto is a market that evolves faster than DAOs or plans can adapt, making it essential to have mechanisms that provide the necessary flexibility to adjust the plan or allocate new funds as needed.
In the case of a major event, such as the example JoJo provided regarding AI, where a strong narrative emerges that the DAO may find worth supporting, we trust that this ad-hoc adjustment mechanism will be useful for modifying the plan on the fly.
Allowing for a reasonable time for discussion, the forum post will then be put up for a Snapshot vote utilizing single-choice voting with the options of adopting the proposed objectives and key results
The only thing we are not sure about is whether to leave this the time of discussion so open, We think that a minimum amount is what is established in the Code of Conduct, and being something so important the reasonable should be higher than this, but we would at least change the wording to conform to the recently approved code:
In accordance with the Arbitrum Constitution, delegates should follow the recommendation that proposals be open to discussion on the forums for at least one week before being put to a vote. This is to allow delegates ample time to review and provide feedback.
The following minor edits were implemented on January 23rd:
Link to an open channel through which anyone can submit one-off objectives and related key results for consideration by those looking to develop a full-fledged objectives matrix submission.
Thank you for this initiative.
I'm a bit late to the party but honestly I do not have anything to add to this. I was under the impression that the trickle down of MVP would be done entirely by @Entropy but I love that they have made this inclusive by giving the power back to the community.
I think the proposal is very well written, it doesn't leave any gaps for misinterpretation of how the process will be. Having said that,
I'm a bit late to the party but honestly I do not have anything to add to this. I was under the impression that the trickle down of MVP would be done entirely by @Entropy but I love that they have made this inclusive by giving the power back to the community.
I think the proposal is very well written, it doesn't leave any gaps for misinterpretation of how the process will be. Having said that,
Oh, one more thing. Why don’t we call this proposal “OKRs setting” so we have less (unique) acronyms in Arbitrum
I agree with Daniel on this. We already have so many acronyms. It just makes new people more overwhelmed when they join. Let's keep things simple!
Lastly, I understand crafting these strategies takes time and effort. The DAO could consider offering incentives for proposals that make it to the final voting round to encourage participation.
This is another good point that we should consider. We have very talented people in the DAO but they can be discouraged by the load of work that this requires. We should incentivise final proposals to keep the members motivated!
I believe the SOS framework as presented is a necessary step for achieving strategic alignment of the DAO.
I understand what has been discussed about seasonality and the rapid changes we see in the ecosystem, and I agree with maintaining objectives with a timeline of 1-2 years. Having an adequate monitoring system in place will help to keep a mid-term structure. Besides, being able to adjust if necessary is a positive thing overall, even if for considering only emergency or not common situations. Stability in this regard is needed for a strategic map to be implemented and give time to initiatives to mature.
I believe the SOS framework as presented is a necessary step for achieving strategic alignment of the DAO.
I understand what has been discussed about seasonality and the rapid changes we see in the ecosystem, and I agree with maintaining objectives with a timeline of 1-2 years. Having an adequate monitoring system in place will help to keep a mid-term structure. Besides, being able to adjust if necessary is a positive thing overall, even if for considering only emergency or not common situations. Stability in this regard is needed for a strategic map to be implemented and give time to initiatives to mature.
Once the Strategic Objectives are set, they could help balance bottom-up innovation with strategic direction. This alignment is particularly valuable as it will directly address what has been criticized before about various grants and initiatives that, while interesting, don't always add inherent value to the ecosystem. It is important that we make sure that the SO framework keeps resources flowing toward initiatives that advance the collective goals of the DAO and at the same time maintain room for innovation.
There are valuable opportunities to enhance this foundation further down the line by incorporating indicators and metrics. I am unsure of the depth of the quarterly reports, but they could evolve into a comprehensive performance scorecard to provide early signals for strategic adjustments and enable cascading goals across initiatives and working groups.
Establishing clear strategic objectives will enhance decentralization only if they create transparent criteria for decision-making and enable more participants to contribute meaningfully. When community members understand the strategic direction and success metrics, they can more effectively propose and execute high-impact initiatives that advance our collective goals.
I appreciate how this proposal links vision and execution. The connection between the MVP, measurable objectives, and OpCo's execution activities should provide the infrastructure needed for effective strategy implementation. To keep decentralization in the community, it is important to maintain a structured approach to gathering and synthesizing the input of the DAO in all areas while also maintaining clear accountability mechanisms. The goal should be to amplify the DAO’s collective intelligence through better coordination.
This proposal is positive regarding Arbitrum's evolution, it could also serve as a blueprint for other DAOs to adapt their own strategic alignment.
We support the SOS proposal for its structured approach to setting strategic objectives that said, What do you think about establishing a working group for delegates to collaboratively brainstorm and develop strategic objectives? We’d love to hear your thoughts on this approach and understand why you believe empowering individual contributors to submit proposals might be more effective. While empowering individual contributors to propose objectives is valuable, it risks creating fragmentation across categories, leading to misaligned or siloed efforts. A working group composed of diverse stakeholders—such as delegates, developers, and researchers—could collect input from the community, synthesize insights, and propose a unified strategic objectives matrix. This would ensure objectives are cohesive, reflective of the DAO’s diverse expertise, and aligned with its overarching mission and vision. For example, the ARB Staking Working Group successfully brought community members together to collaboratively research on staking approach for Arbitrum, demonstrating how shared resources and collective efforts can achieve more effective outcome. Applying a similar approach to the SOS proposal would be highly beneficial, as it would allow everyone to pool their resources and work together toward a shared vision.
and one more question on the snapshot voting, to clarity how the snapshot stragy work, will us delegate pick the best one or divided in percent
We are voting FOR this proposal. The DAO needs strategic direction and hopefully this initiative can work to provide some of this for the community while streamlining operations.
We strongly recommend that a focus be put on how best to allocate resources and diminish spending. We will continue to push this agenda in our voting and communications.
The idea is that anyone can create a proposal that would push the DAO toward reaching one/several of the chosen objectives. In other words, the process would work in the same way as before, but it’ll hopefully orient contributors to produce synergistic proposals that form a cohesive structure while making it easier for delegates to judge whether a proposal is high value-add or not.
Thank you @Entropy for your well thought-out proposal and all the comments you have made to the feedback so far. Apologies for us coming in a bit late to discussion period here.
We at Castle Labs strongly support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) framework and view it as a pivotal step toward empowering the Arbitrum DAO to operate with a structured, proactive, and decentralized governance process.
Thank you @Entropy for your well thought-out proposal and all the comments you have made to the feedback so far. Apologies for us coming in a bit late to discussion period here.
We at Castle Labs strongly support the Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) framework and view it as a pivotal step toward empowering the Arbitrum DAO to operate with a structured, proactive, and decentralized governance process.
Below, we outline our general position on the SOS pathway:
Alignment with MVP: The SOS proposal inherently aligns with the DAO's mission, vision, and purpose by establishing a decentralized, community-driven framework for defining and achieving strategic objectives. We are confident this approach will help the DAO transition from reactive governance to a more strategic and cohesive development model.
Implementation Framework: The phased approach outlined in the proposal—Phase 1 for agreeing to the SOS framework and Phase 2 for submitting strategic objective matrices—is clear and pragmatic. The inclusion of measurable key results and a standardized submission process ensures a structured mechanism for participation. We commend this clarity and look forward to engaging in the process.
Decentralization and Inclusivity: The proposal’s open submission format encourages broad participation and upholds the principles of decentralization. Anyone in the community can propose strategic objectives, fostering inclusivity. However, we suggest exploring additional mechanisms to ensure underrepresented voices in the community feel empowered to contribute.
Flexibility and Adaptability: The annual review and update of objectives and key results ensure flexibility and responsiveness to changing conditions. This adaptability is crucial for the DAO’s long-term success and aligns with our belief in iterative progress.
Key Considerations
While we support the proposal’s direction, we would like to highlight a few additional points for discussion:
Incentivizing Submissions:
Volume and Quality of Submissions:
Encouraging Broader Participation:
Overall, we are excited about the opportunities this framework presents and look forward to participating in Phase 2 submissions. The SOS represents a significant step forward for the Arbitrum DAO, and we are eager to see how it drives the ecosystem toward greater cohesion, transparency, and sustainable development.
gm, thanks for sharing this comprehensive proposal. I like the direction after the MVP, and how this forces the DAO to shift the mindset into structured proactivity. We can have a cohesive direction for the next 12 and 24 months
Yes, as many have highlighted there is the risk that we miss on critical trends, but the lack of direction would be as dramatically damaging for Arbitrum. As suggested in the proposal, new proposals that are outside of the core priorities can be submitted (for example, adding a new priority) in case a new area is identified as critical.
Thanks to everyone who has shown interest in the SOS proposal!
We’ve made the following edits on January 20th:
The following minor edits were implemented on January 23rd:
Link to an open channel through which anyone can submit one-off objectives and related key results for consideration by those looking to develop a full-fledged objectives matrix submission.
Below are replies to the most recent comments and feedback.
Because otherwise we will end up in thousands of possible categories and it may happen that some submissions may be similar but the topic is different, as anyone can decide it on his own behalf.
One could similarly argue that even with predefined categories, there could be variance in how objectives are categorized since some might not fit nicely within one single predefined category. However, we don’t foresee this or the case you describe being a problem—as long as submitters read each other’s submissions/delegates scan through submissions, it should be clear when two submissions have overlapping objectives. The objectives and associated key results statements shouldn’t be that extensive, meaning that understanding a submission’s key takeaways, what it strives for, and how it might overlap with other submissions wouldn’t be a time-consuming task.
Incentivizing Submissions:
Encouraging Broader Participation:
How can the DAO engage parties who may not feel equipped to create a full submission but still have valuable insights?
Would a pre-review feedback period allow for these contributions to be captured and incorporated into the process?
Some exercises, such as the suggested OKR Gathering from @ChrisB, may be helpful here.
This is another good point that we should consider. We have very talented people in the DAO but they can be discouraged by the load of work that this requires. We should incentivise final proposals to keep the members motivated!
Regarding incentivizing submissions, we’ve touched on this point earlier here:
We are afraid that such a structure could lead to unintended consequences, with proposers creating submissions that are the most likely to pass instead of optimal for the ecosystem. Ideally, proposers would be naturally encouraged to produce optimal submissions by being intrinsically aligned with the ecosystem and having skin in the game, such as being ARB tokenholders. Additionally, many delegates are already receiving incentives to participate in governance processes through the Delegate Incentive Program.
When it comes to individuals lacking time to create a submission, forming the base for a short- to medium-term strategy for a blockchain ecosystem is naturally not an easy task and something that will inevitably be time-consuming. We’ve tried our best to make the process as inclusive as possible, which is why the length of Phase 2 is quite extensive. We’re currently looking into the best way to enable anyone to submit one-off OKRs in a structured way during the Notice Period for consideration by any submitter during the Submission Period.
Volume and Quality of Submissions:
What is the expected number and quality of submissions during Phase 2?
How will the DAO manage potential “copycat” submissions that offer minor tweaks to existing proposals?
A consolidation mechanism of some sort could be helpful here.
As the process is open to anyone but no single party is forced to create a submission, it likely isn’t feasible to estimate the number of upcoming submissions. However, we hope to see as many participants as possible. Given the importance of objectives and key results for Arbitrum, we expect submissions to be of extremely high quality. Having said that, there are no “quality criteria” that a submission must fulfill (partly because some aspects of assessing a submission are subjective). As long as a submission meets the minimum information inclusion requirements given in this proposal, it will be considered through the framework.
Since full-fledged submissions also have to include information such as a view of Arbitrum’s current state and what its strengths/weaknesses are as well as the rationale explaining how the objectives align with Arbitrum’s MVP and why the objectives were chosen given Arbitrum’s current state, someone copying another proposer’s submission and making minor tweaks to it should be easily recognizable. We expect that such behavior would be criticized by delegates, creating notable badwill for the copying party at minimum. Ideally, any obvious copycat submitters would be pressured to withdraw their submissions, but if not, we anticipate that delegates would naturally refrain from voting on such submissions. If two or more independently created submissions happen to have similar OKRs, submitters can consolidate their submissions during the Revision Period, but this is not a requirement.
Are we sure we want to move forward with designing objectives without allocating a budget?
Clearly, we understand that this is the beginning, and as we learn how this framework works in practice, adjustments to the timelines can be made (by both Entropy, DAO, and also OpCo in the future).
Within this process of timeline optimization, integrating budget allocations into the review phase could help avoid extending the process unnecessarily in the future.
The ideal scenario would likely be for the DAO to decide on the objectives and an associated budget simultaneously, but we foresee that the process might stall completely if we go this route as there are too many variables over which the diverse delegate base could disagree. Here, we are not taking a stance on whether the DAO has recently overspent, but would like to point out that even given the treasury data brought up by @pedrob, we know that many delegates would still argue that capital usage has recently been appropriate due to, e.g., Arbitrum being in a “growth stage”.
By splitting the objectives and budgeting decisions into two separate parts, we increase the likelihood of the process moving forward and thus that the DAO reaches clearer strategic alignment. If the DAO progresses to the budgeting framework stage, Entropy will strive to present adequate data and engage with the correct parties such that delegates can make a well-informed decision based on objective factors. If both the initial SOS and budgeting processes finalize smoothly, we agree that it might make sense to combine them into one in the future, for example, such that a budget is reformulated simultaneously with a Review/Ad Hoc Strategic Objective Adjustments Period instead of it being done subsequently.
What do you think about establishing a working group for delegates to collaboratively brainstorm and develop strategic objectives? We’d love to hear your thoughts on this approach and understand why you believe empowering individual contributors to submit proposals might be more effective. While empowering individual contributors to propose objectives is valuable, it risks creating fragmentation across categories, leading to misaligned or siloed efforts.
We’d argue that if the actual submission isn’t led by a single person (or a small group of people) who decides what to include/exclude, chances are that a working group will not come to a consensus on what objectives to propose. An example of this would be the incentives working group, where although conversations have been extremely valuable and ongoing for several months now, there are still several factors over which there seems to be disagreement.
We fully agree that an objectives matrix submission should be based on a broad set of perspectives deriving from a diverse set of stakeholders, and encourage submitters to gather as much information as possible on this front. We’ll also ensure that contributors who only want to bring forward a one-off objective and related key results for the consideration of those who submit complete matrices can do so with low friction. The Feedback and Revision Periods are in place for submitters to gain an understanding of any shortcomings their matrices might have while ensuring that efforts aren’t siloed as matrices can be consolidated in situations where it is synergistic to do so.
and one more question on the snapshot voting, to clarity how the snapshot stragy work, will us delegate pick the best one or divided in percent
Delegates will vote on one matrix (or abstain). For a further explanation of how single-choice voting works, please refer to this documentation.
I would like to propose extending the deadline for sending proposals from delegates.
The thing is that when some idea appears, it is often developed for many weeks or months before it gets to the forum for discussion, much less to the Snapshot.
But you are proposing that everyone get it done in 2 weeks.
Delegates will have at least 44 days to formulate and submit objectives matrices (14 days Notice Period + 30 days Submission Period). In addition, the SOS process isn’t initiated abruptly. This initial, ongoing process began ~14 days ago, and it’ll take at least 7 more days until the Notice Period begins as the proposal still has to go through Snapshot. Similarly, the initiation of a Review Phase/Ad Hoc Strategic Objective Adjustments in the future requires at least 14 days (7 days for discussion and 7 days for Snapshot voting), As the Review Phase should begin 12 months after the previous Voting Period has ended, delegates have visibility into when to start preparing for this event. We feel as though ~60 days should be enough for most delegates to formulate a submission, and we are hesitant to stretch out the timeline further as the total process is already quite prolonged.
What happens if someone has a great idea in a month? I think setting a goal for a year or more is good, but you can’t limit yourself to just these goals. If something good appears, you shouldn’t wait a whole year to accept it.
We’ve covered this in our previous answer here:
Compare this to the current structure, where ad hoc objective adjustments can be proposed by anyone at any time, but this requires them to post reasoning for the change together with adjusted objectives and key results. As such, objectives could still be changed 2/4/6/etc. months after their implementation, but the proposer must be able to clearly justify the reasoning and exert effort in creating an adjusted objectives matrix. This ensures that proposals for change are tied to accountability and require proposers to deeply think about the current objectives as well as what should be changed and why. The proposal also suggests instructing the research member of the ARDC to create quarterly reports on how the DAO is doing against its objectives, meaning that active delegates will receive timely updates on any potential changes that might be needed.
————————————————————
We’ve added clarifying language that previously chosen, not yet achieved objectives will stay in place even during a Review/Ad Hoc Strategic Objective Adjustments Phase to ensure continuity. When it comes to the budgeting framework for objectives, we will similarly establish a structure that maintains continuity on this front.
Note: We are assuming the budget for each objective will also undergo an annual review.
Yes, your assumption is correct—we’ve planned to have a yearly cycle for capital allocated to each objective as well.
The only thing we are not sure about is whether to leave this the time of discussion so open, We think that a minimum amount is what is established in the Code of Conduct, and being something so important the reasonable should be higher than this, but we would at least change the wording to conform to the recently approved code:
The wording has been changed to be in line with the minimum discussion period mentioned in the DAO’s standardized operations.
Thank you for this initiative.
I would really like you to accept initiatives at any time
The idea is that anyone can create a proposal that would push the DAO toward reaching one/several of the chosen objectives. In other words, the process would work in the same way as before, but it’ll hopefully orient contributors to produce synergistic proposals that form a cohesive structure while making it easier for delegates to judge whether a proposal is high value-add or not.
Ok, the SOS will create guidelines for the DAO and especially for delegates and contributors to create proposals that fits our collective goals and also give vote indications based on consistency with these goals. Thanks for clarifying.
gm, thanks for sharing this comprehensive proposal. I like the direction after the MVP, and how this forces the DAO to shift the mindset into structured proactivity. We can have a cohesive direction for the next 12 and 24 months
Yes, as many have highlighted there is the risk that we miss on critical trends, but the lack of direction would be as dramatically damaging for Arbitrum. As suggested in the proposal, new proposals that are outside of the core priorities can be submitted (for example, adding a new priority) in case a new area is identified as critical.
A couple of questions that would help clarify the implementation:
Does submitting a matrix imply that the submitter has somehow a form of accountability towards the objective? Or a right to lead that initiative? Or does that happen subsequently with specific initiatives that fall into that matrix?
How many objectives do we expect/strive for (3/10/30)? Having an idea could help to identify how broad the objectives should be.
Thanks
Thanks to everyone who has shown interest in the SOS proposal!
We’ve made the following edits on January 20th:
Barring additional notable edits, this proposal will move to Snapshot on January 23rd.
Responses to comments and feedback below:
I wonder if it would be beneficial to define some indicative categories for these objectives. This could prevent certain areas from being overlooked while also helping proposers efficiently identify similar proposals and foster collaboration.
We feel as though this might influence/restrict the proposers unnecessarily. The framework’s idea is to foster collaboration between proposers and the community while producing several options to vote across, with people finally converging on an objectives matrix that they are the most aligned with and covers all the necessary strategic points. We expect that most, if not all, submissions will cover objectives across several different categories or verticals. As stated in the proposal, submitters are encouraged to include the main area each of their proposed objectives is focused on. This should help a reviewer understand what a submission might be missing in their opinion as well as what parts of a submission they should be reviewing based on their specialization.
My understanding is that the 1-year goals are effectively proposals/initiatives to achieve the 2-year objective (the beginning of the “how” to achieve the key results).
This doesn’t necessarily have to be the case. If a proposer wanted to, they could submit 2-year objectives that are unrelated to the 1-year objectives. We don’t want to restrict proposers with respect to how they structure their objectives (as long as there is no overlap across objectives within a specific year). Having said that, it’s worth reiterating that delegates should be critical when it comes to judging the feasibility of laid-out objectives—adopting a matrix that is unrealistic with a vast number of different objectives is likely to be counterproductive.
• This proposal is quite macro in its approach, but which areas will be prioritized for short- and medium-term goals? For example, will the focus continue on stablecoins and RWA for stability, or will new fields like gaming and NFTs be explored? How will these priorities be ranked?
The DAO’s short- and medium-term priorities will be decided by the objectives chosen through this framework, with submitters being responsible for crafting the actual focus areas. When it comes to the objectives, we don’t think they require a ranking since a well-constructed matrix will have a proper number of objectives such that the DAO can work on most/all of them in tandem (another reason why a specific year’s objectives shouldn’t have any overlap).
• Entropy’s role seems critical, as it is responsible for driving processes, managing goal evaluations, and handling voting stages. Could this lead to excessive centralization of power? For instance, if the community disagrees with Entropy’s recommendations, how will that be addressed?
I’m a bit unsure about the evaluation process. Since Entropy is deeply involved in collecting and assessing submissions (along with DAO members, yes), could this lead to bias when they are also a submitter?
—> My suggestion: Create a clear evaluation framework and involve multiple stakeholders to ensure transparency and fairness.
To be clear, Entropy would not manage goal evaluation. As described in the proposal, we suggest this be handled by the research member of the ARDC through quarterly updates. All matrix submissions will be posted directly to the forum, the process is open to anyone, Entropy isn’t in a position to withhold any information, and our capacity to assess submissions will be similar to any other delegate. That is, providing feedback to submitters during the feedback period and voting on the matrix we’re most aligned with during the voting period.
Simply put, we’d make sure that during the initial SOS process, all the required announcements are posted, periods in phase two begin and end at the correct time, and the Snapshot vote comprising all proposed matrices is submitted correctly. Ideally, when the time comes to initiate the review phase, OpCo has already been set up, and the DAO could instruct the entity to manage the process. Moreover, OpCo could take over the objectives evaluation task from the research member if the DAO so chooses.
• The proposal mentions detailed processes like submission, feedback, and revision periods. However, has it considered whether the participation threshold for ordinary community members might be too high? For example, if someone submits just one goal, will it be sufficiently considered, or might incomplete proposals be ignored?
We strived to make the process as inclusive as possible. Having said that, objective setting for a blockchain ecosystem isn’t an easy task, which inevitably requires a notable time commitment as well as effort to get right. We expect that one-goal matrix submissions wouldn’t be considered seriously. However, we at Entropy will make a submission through the framework, and encourage anyone who has one-off objectives in mind but doesn’t want to create a full-fledged submission to send them our way, which we’ll consider for our submission. We might also utilize Harmonica to collect one-off objectives and associated key results submissions during the Notice Period such that anyone can incorporate the information in their matrix submission if they so choose.
6 months continue/change decision:
OKRs are often setup poorly the first time. EVen when teams had already setup OKRs before there’s a lot of organisational learning that happens. As way to mitigate this I’d suggest a 6-months confirmation vote. If the vote is favourable, the OKRs are kept for six more emonths. If the vote is negative, the whole process starts again.
This could be partially solved by having epochs long 4/6 months in which
This was something we thought about adding when we drafted the proposal. However, there are quite a few frictions we foresaw with this approach. For example, it’s well-known that DAOs often move slowly, inherent to their decentralized nature, meaning that, e.g., 6 months might not be enough time for the objectives’ “correctness” to materialize. This means that delegates may be more inclined to vote for a change prematurely, especially given delegates voting for a change can’t be obligated to create a submission. Compare this to the current structure, where ad hoc objective adjustments can be proposed by anyone at any time, but this requires them to post reasoning for the change together with adjusted objectives and key results. As such, objectives could still be changed 2/4/6/etc. months after their implementation, but the proposer must be able to clearly justify the reasoning and exert effort in creating an adjusted objectives matrix. This ensures that proposals for change are tied to accountability and require proposers to deeply think about the current objectives as well as what should be changed and why. The proposal also suggests instructing the research member of the ARDC to create quarterly reports on how the DAO is doing against its objectives, meaning that active delegates will receive timely updates on any potential changes that might be needed.
Phase to improve the selected block of objectives (aka refine the selected Matrix)
Another structure we considered, but decided to drop due to excessive complexity for decentralized decision-making, unreasonable strain exerted on delegates, as well as the high risk of creating a matrix that is, for example, bloated and/or has objectives with overlap. If delegates feel as though none of the submitted matrices are adequate, they can abstain during the voting period. It’s also worth noting that the barrier to proposing a single objective is much lower, meaning that this could lead to a situation where a vast amount of not-so-well-thought-out objectives are proposed.
I suggest introducing a rapid decision-making mechanism for urgent goals to shorten the process duration.
We agree that the second phase is lengthy, but this is a tradeoff required to ensure decision-making is done in a decentralized manner. Shortening the timeline would likely exclude many delegates from participating or require a more centralized approach such as having a single submission made through a committee of only a few contributors. In our opinion, both of these options are far suboptimal compared to a long process.
Lastly, I understand crafting these strategies takes time and effort. The DAO could consider offering incentives for proposals that make it to the final voting round to encourage participation.
We are afraid that such a structure could lead to unintended consequences, with proposers creating submissions that are the most likely to pass instead of optimal for the ecosystem. Ideally, proposers would be naturally encouraged to produce optimal submissions by being intrinsically aligned with the ecosystem and having skin in the game, such as being ARB tokenholders. Additionally, many delegates are already receiving incentives to participate in governance processes through the Delegate Incentive Program.
I have a question: when someone will provide a goal and this goal approved, alongside a budget, how will this be executed? Through dao delegates, opco, or whoever wants to fill the role? Because we might be in a situation in which we are short of people executing in case of a lot of submissions.
What is the total budget allocated to achieve the objectives?
Will this budget be approved through a vote?
Why isn’t the budget allocation included in the proposal?
I have one question though - Will the budget for each objective be defined in a separate proposal (after the SOS objectives are selected via Snapshot vote)?
Does submitting a matrix imply that the submitter has somehow a form of accountability towards the objective? Or a right to lead that initiative? Or does that happen subsequently with specific initiatives that fall into that matrix?
Hey @ChrisB! Thanks for the overview of Harmonica—the solution looks interesting. We could potentially utilize Harmonica during the Notice Period to gather objectives and key results from community members who don’t want to create a full-fledged submission. This information could then be considered by anyone who wants to submit a complete objectives matrix during the Submission Period.
We’ll contact you async to explore the feasibility of implementing the solution in more detail!
How many objectives do we expect/strive for (3/10/30)? Having an idea could help to identify how broad the objectives should be.
Submitters are free to include as many objectives as they want. However, as mentioned earlier, we think that including a vast number of objectives is likely to be counterproductive. Even 10 objectives might be unrealistic for the DAO to focus on simultaneously, at least in the beginning, but this is just our opinion.
Love the thought and effort put into this so thank you Entropy for the proposal.
We were looking at this portion of the proposal and are concerned that this statement is quite vague.
Love the thought and effort put into this so thank you Entropy for the proposal.
We were looking at this portion of the proposal and are concerned that this statement is quite vague.
However, if there’s a pressing need to review the strategic objectives due to, e.g., changes in the market environment, competitive space, or the DAO’s financials, a delegate can create a forum post outlining extensive reasoning for ad hoc adjustments accompanied by the proposed strategic objectives and related key results.
Rather than leaving this to the delegates, we believe this as well could fall into OpCo's jurisdiction once they are operationalized. This way, we are sure someone is always on top of these ad hoc changes and how they affect the DAO's objectives.
Oh, one more thing. Why don't we call this proposal "OKRs setting" so we have less (unique) acronyms in Arbitrum
Plus, if too many proposals are submitted, voting might get tough and divide the community. Maybe we could gather ideas first and have groups combine similar ones before the voting stage.
Plus, if too many proposals are submitted, voting might get tough and divide the community. Maybe we could gather ideas first and have groups combine similar ones before the voting stage.
It's meant to be used to converge before there are proposals being voted upon. So that leads to less proposal and stronger proposals. The alternative is less democratic and less effective backchanneling and private convos.
The core of this proposal is to establish clear short- and mid-term goals for the DAO, providing the community with a focused direction and avoiding resource dispersion. This approach is commendable, particularly with its periodic reviews and adjustments, making it more practical. However, the second phase of the process (from announcement to final voting) spans three months, and the entire procedure, including announcement, submission, feedback, revision, and voting, totals approximately three months. This lengthy cycle might not be favorable for the DAO’s decision-making efficiency, especially in a fast-changing market environment, potentially causing missed opportunities. I suggest introducing a rapid decision-making mechanism for urgent goals to shorten the process duration. 2. Although the proposal emphasizes measurable results for objectives, how can we ensure the feasibility of the submitted goals? I propose incorporating an initial screening stage involving experts or community technical members to make the objectives more grounded. If feasible, perhaps a discussion on the necessity of feasibility analysis and execution details is warranted. 3. Submitting and evaluating objectives might demand considerable time and effort. How can more people be encouraged to participate? For instance, offering rewards to contributors who propose excellent goals could be a motivating factor. I think it must be incentivised, to give incentives can't fail people, it can be incentivised on a linear release basis 4. The role of Entropy in this proposal is pivotal. While I highly value their work—they have demonstrated their competence in many key proposals and are an outstanding team worthy of respect 🫡—I wonder if this might overly centralize the process within a single team. Personally, I recommend involving more community representatives in the formulation and evaluation of SOS. 5. I’ve noticed many proposals mentioning RWA. Personally, I think it’s better to start with a pilot in a specific subfield, such as DeFi - RWA, gain experience, and then expand to a full-scale strategic objective framework for the DAO. 6. The proposal does not delve deeply into the execution process after goals are selected—for instance, who will be responsible for implementation, how the budget will be allocated, and how outcomes will be evaluated. I suggest supplementing a detailed implementation mechanism to ensure the goals not only remain at the strategic level but also effectively drive ecosystem growth. Additionally, the proposal does not address how to adjust if a goal fails to meet expectations. A dynamic adjustment mechanism, such as quarterly reports assessing the feasibility of goals and optimizing resource allocation, should be included.
In summary, a strategic framework of this significance, which involves the overarching design of the DAO, requires a clear strategic direction, making it essential.
Of course, a big protocol like Arbitrum needs a clear roadmap for short, medium, and long-term strategies to improve community engagement and help grow the ecosystem :)
I really appreciate allowing delegates and community members to submit their strategic objective matrices, to makes Arbitrum more decentralized, transparent, and democratic.
Of course, a big protocol like Arbitrum needs a clear roadmap for short, medium, and long-term strategies to improve community engagement and help grow the ecosystem :)
I really appreciate allowing delegates and community members to submit their strategic objective matrices, to makes Arbitrum more decentralized, transparent, and democratic.
That said, while Entropy has provided a solid timeline and process, I’m a bit unsure about the evaluation process. Since Entropy is deeply involved in collecting and assessing submissions (along with DAO members, yes), could this lead to bias when they are also a submitter? —> My suggestion: Create a clear evaluation framework and involve multiple stakeholders to ensure transparency and fairness.
Plus, if too many proposals are submitted, voting might get tough and divide the community. Maybe we could gather ideas first and have groups combine similar ones before the voting stage.
Lastly, I understand crafting these strategies takes time and effort. The DAO could consider offering incentives for proposals that make it to the final voting round to encourage participation.
We might need a more detailed roadmap for how the matrices will be implemented. But for now, I fully support the formation of the SOS 🙂
This seems like a pretty good start. A few suggestions having setup OKRs a couple of times:
6 months continue/change decision: OKRs are often setup poorly the first time. EVen when teams had already setup OKRs before there's a lot of organisational learning that happens. As way to mitigate this I'd suggest a 6-months confirmation vote. If the vote is favourable, the OKRs are kept for six more emonths. If the vote is negative, the whole process starts again.
This seems like a pretty good start. A few suggestions having setup OKRs a couple of times:
6 months continue/change decision: OKRs are often setup poorly the first time. EVen when teams had already setup OKRs before there's a lot of organisational learning that happens. As way to mitigate this I'd suggest a 6-months confirmation vote. If the vote is favourable, the OKRs are kept for six more emonths. If the vote is negative, the whole process starts again.
Phase to improve the selected block of objectives (aka refine the selected Matrix) I understand the rationale for having blocks of objectives proposed together is coherence. That being said, we could gain much through cross-pollination and the current process, although doesn't prohibit this, doesn't enable it well. Having people read each other objectives and then decide what to add to their proposed block is not the same as enabling the DAO to decide together on what should be exactly included in a block. And yet we need some opinionated take to set a direction! Are we between a rock and a hard place? A solution is that after the initial block is selected, another 7 days period opens to propose "additional objectives" and then a multi-select vote is done where each objective (the ones from the selected block plus additional ones proposed after the block was selected) are either kept or not. This ensures the block acts as a directional force for coherence, but we don't leave out (or in) the wrong objectives. If needed, the initial submission period could be reduced to 3 weeks as it's now less definitive.
I understand these suggestions add a bit of extra work, but they're both aimed at ensuring we have the right objectives, as I've seen multiple organisations go into disaster when faith in the objectives dwindled and there was no efficient way to fix that. If the proposed additions are found to be unnecessary after testing, they can be removed for the next cycle without much loss. On the other hand, if they were necessary and missing, it would take 12 months of having the wrong objectives (and potential DAO chaos or paralysis due to lack of alignment) as a result. So low-cost add-ons for the proposal but mitigating big risks.
Thank you very much for the SOS. I believe it’s crucial to outline the short- and medium-term objectives for the DAO.
I’m largely aligned with the proposal and don’t have much to add, as the delegates have already shared their thoughts and anticipated my own.
That said, I want to revisit a question that was raised and answered as follows:
Thank you very much for the SOS. I believe it’s crucial to outline the short- and medium-term objectives for the DAO.
I’m largely aligned with the proposal and don’t have much to add, as the delegates have already shared their thoughts and anticipated my own.
That said, I want to revisit a question that was raised and answered as follows:
Budget: The total budget would only be decided in the next and final step of this overarching initiative (MVP → SOS → budgeting framework) and would require another vote to be approved. We think bundling the objective-setting exercise with budgeting introduces too many variables for possible disagreement, which could restrict the process from moving forward. Moreover, in the case that a vast amount of objectives matrices are submitted, delegates will already be put under quite a lot of strain to evaluate all submissions. Adding a budgeting decision to the mix would be impractical and unreasonable for delegates.
Are we sure we want to move forward with designing objectives without allocating a budget?
Currently, the DAO’s treasury holds 2.85 billion ARB.
According to Token Flow’s December report:
"Over the period from June 2023, when the first Tally proposal was approved, to December 2024, the DAO approved 745M ARB worth of spending outlined in various proposals. This represents 21% of the DAO's initial treasury balance of 3.6B ARB."
Just one year ago, when the first sustainability report was released, only 5% of the treasury had been allocated to initiatives. This means that, over the past year, the DAO allocated an additional 16% of its treasury to various initiatives.
At that time, the report predicted that: "Based on current trends, the DAO's expenditure is expected to account for roughly 10 to 15% of the treasury by the end of the ARB vesting period in March 2027."
Well, a year later, the DAO has already allocated 21% of the treasury to initiatives—significantly ahead of what that report projected.
I’m aware that a treasury management initiative and STEP 2 were recently approved, which is a step in the right direction for generating revenue for the DAO.
However, I believe that if we do not plan carefully, we risk depleting our resources in the short-er than expected- term. With that in mind, and understanding that you don’t wish to define the budget for SOS initiatives at this stage, I propose assigning a budget for @karpatkey and/or @Aera , and/or Avant Garde to produce a new report on the treasury and its sustainability.
This report should take into account the projections made a year ago, the actual developments since then, the current state of the treasury, and the new initiatives aimed at generating revenue.
This looks like a good process/protocol to define Arbitrum's goals and objectives - and also to re-evaluate them every year. Based on these objectives, it will be easier for delegates to decide which governance proposals to support and which ones not (same goes for proposal authors).
I have one question though - Will the budget for each objective be defined in a separate proposal (after the SOS objectives are selected via Snapshot vote)?
Hi @Entropy and thanks for creating this proposal. As most questions have already been asked and I totally agree with most of them I would like to add that the "main focus area" should be a fixed and defined list.
Why? Because otherwise we will end up in thousands of possible categories and it may happen that some submissions may be similar but the topic is different, as anyone can decide it on his own behalf.
Hi @Entropy and thanks for creating this proposal. As most questions have already been asked and I totally agree with most of them I would like to add that the "main focus area" should be a fixed and defined list.
Why? Because otherwise we will end up in thousands of possible categories and it may happen that some submissions may be similar but the topic is different, as anyone can decide it on his own behalf.
I would rather like to see them defined by the DAO upfront so we can focus on a few selected ones for this year for example. I know that in the end everything is possible and there could be the argument that we would limit the DAO or Devs, but I also think that sometimes limiting the scope is better to achieve a goal fast rather than giving the opportunity to have an endless selection.
Thank you for the proposal. Our team has some questions regarding the budget that will be used.
Once a set of objectives and related key results has been approved, Entropy will strive to build a budgeting framework where each high-level objective is allocated a certain amount of capital on a yearly basis, with interested contributors having the ability to request a share of this capital through a standardized structure.
Thank you for the proposal. Our team has some questions regarding the budget that will be used.
Once a set of objectives and related key results has been approved, Entropy will strive to build a budgeting framework where each high-level objective is allocated a certain amount of capital on a yearly basis, with interested contributors having the ability to request a share of this capital through a standardized structure.
We are not sure we fully understand how the process will proceed after the objectives set are approved. Thank you.
I highly agree with the motivation behind this proposal: the current DAO lacks clear objectives, leading to scattered resources and difficulties in accountability. Establishing a unified goal matrix can enhance the sense of direction, improve resource allocation efficiency, and provide contributors with a clear priority framework.
After reading the full report, I have some questions I’d like to consult:
Thanks for your proposal!
Regarding the proposal submission minimum items, I would like to suggest an addition.
This is a great continuation to MVP! From high level goals, to this, to then budget, was the proposed path and also the right one, to go to something tangible.
I have a question: when someone will provide a goal and this goal approved, alongside a budget, how will this be executed? Through dao delegates, opco, or whoever wants to fill the role? Because we might be in a situation in which we are short of people executing in case of a lot of submissions.
A bit hard to add anything to this. The proposal is effectively a transition from mvp (abstract) to tangible strategies, policies and initiatives for the DAO. Execution will be key, meaning
Thank you for this proposal. It’s a long-anticipated initiative and will undoubtedly be a massive undertaking. I wonder if it would be beneficial to define some indicative categories for these objectives. This could prevent certain areas from being overlooked while also helping proposers efficiently identify similar proposals and foster collaboration.
What I mean is that we could predefine some categories within this proposal, such as governance, DeFi, grants, etc. This way, proposers could focus on reviewing proposals within their respective fields, reducing redundancy. Of course, this wouldn’t restrict proposers from suggesting objectives in new categories—they could simply be classified as "others."
The following minor edits were implemented on January 23rd:
Link to an open channel through which anyone can submit one-off objectives and related key results for consideration by those looking to develop a full-fledged objectives matrix submission.
Below are replies to the most recent comments and feedback.
Because otherwise we will end up in thousands of possible categories and it may happen that some submissions may be similar but the topic is different, as anyone can decide it on his own behalf.
One could similarly argue that even with predefined categories, there could be variance in how objectives are categorized since some might not fit nicely within one single predefined category. However, we don’t foresee this or the case you describe being a problem—as long as submitters read each other’s submissions/delegates scan through submissions, it should be clear when two submissions have overlapping objectives. The objectives and associated key results statements shouldn’t be that extensive, meaning that understanding a submission’s key takeaways, what it strives for, and how it might overlap with other submissions wouldn’t be a time-consuming task.
Incentivizing Submissions:
Encouraging Broader Participation:
How can the DAO engage parties who may not feel equipped to create a full submission but still have valuable insights?
Would a pre-review feedback period allow for these contributions to be captured and incorporated into the process?
Some exercises, such as the suggested OKR Gathering from @ChrisB, may be helpful here.
This is another good point that we should consider. We have very talented people in the DAO but they can be discouraged by the load of work that this requires. We should incentivise final proposals to keep the members motivated!
Regarding incentivizing submissions, we’ve touched on this point earlier here:
We are afraid that such a structure could lead to unintended consequences, with proposers creating submissions that are the most likely to pass instead of optimal for the ecosystem. Ideally, proposers would be naturally encouraged to produce optimal submissions by being intrinsically aligned with the ecosystem and having skin in the game, such as being ARB tokenholders. Additionally, many delegates are already receiving incentives to participate in governance processes through the Delegate Incentive Program.
When it comes to individuals lacking time to create a submission, forming the base for a short- to medium-term strategy for a blockchain ecosystem is naturally not an easy task and something that will inevitably be time-consuming. We’ve tried our best to make the process as inclusive as possible, which is why the length of Phase 2 is quite extensive. We’re currently looking into the best way to enable anyone to submit one-off OKRs in a structured way during the Notice Period for consideration by any submitter during the Submission Period.
Volume and Quality of Submissions:
What is the expected number and quality of submissions during Phase 2?
How will the DAO manage potential “copycat” submissions that offer minor tweaks to existing proposals?
A consolidation mechanism of some sort could be helpful here.
As the process is open to anyone but no single party is forced to create a submission, it likely isn’t feasible to estimate the number of upcoming submissions. However, we hope to see as many participants as possible. Given the importance of objectives and key results for Arbitrum, we expect submissions to be of extremely high quality. Having said that, there are no “quality criteria” that a submission must fulfill (partly because some aspects of assessing a submission are subjective). As long as a submission meets the minimum information inclusion requirements given in this proposal, it will be considered through the framework.
Since full-fledged submissions also have to include information such as a view of Arbitrum’s current state and what its strengths/weaknesses are as well as the rationale explaining how the objectives align with Arbitrum’s MVP and why the objectives were chosen given Arbitrum’s current state, someone copying another proposer’s submission and making minor tweaks to it should be easily recognizable. We expect that such behavior would be criticized by delegates, creating notable badwill for the copying party at minimum. Ideally, any obvious copycat submitters would be pressured to withdraw their submissions, but if not, we anticipate that delegates would naturally refrain from voting on such submissions. If two or more independently created submissions happen to have similar OKRs, submitters can consolidate their submissions during the Revision Period, but this is not a requirement.
Are we sure we want to move forward with designing objectives without allocating a budget?
Clearly, we understand that this is the beginning, and as we learn how this framework works in practice, adjustments to the timelines can be made (by both Entropy, DAO, and also OpCo in the future).
Within this process of timeline optimization, integrating budget allocations into the review phase could help avoid extending the process unnecessarily in the future.
The ideal scenario would likely be for the DAO to decide on the objectives and an associated budget simultaneously, but we foresee that the process might stall completely if we go this route as there are too many variables over which the diverse delegate base could disagree. Here, we are not taking a stance on whether the DAO has recently overspent, but would like to point out that even given the treasury data brought up by @pedrob, we know that many delegates would still argue that capital usage has recently been appropriate due to, e.g., Arbitrum being in a “growth stage”.
By splitting the objectives and budgeting decisions into two separate parts, we increase the likelihood of the process moving forward and thus that the DAO reaches clearer strategic alignment. If the DAO progresses to the budgeting framework stage, Entropy will strive to present adequate data and engage with the correct parties such that delegates can make a well-informed decision based on objective factors. If both the initial SOS and budgeting processes finalize smoothly, we agree that it might make sense to combine them into one in the future, for example, such that a budget is reformulated simultaneously with a Review/Ad Hoc Strategic Objective Adjustments Period instead of it being done subsequently.
What do you think about establishing a working group for delegates to collaboratively brainstorm and develop strategic objectives? We’d love to hear your thoughts on this approach and understand why you believe empowering individual contributors to submit proposals might be more effective. While empowering individual contributors to propose objectives is valuable, it risks creating fragmentation across categories, leading to misaligned or siloed efforts.
We’d argue that if the actual submission isn’t led by a single person (or a small group of people) who decides what to include/exclude, chances are that a working group will not come to a consensus on what objectives to propose. An example of this would be the incentives working group, where although conversations have been extremely valuable and ongoing for several months now, there are still several factors over which there seems to be disagreement.
We fully agree that an objectives matrix submission should be based on a broad set of perspectives deriving from a diverse set of stakeholders, and encourage submitters to gather as much information as possible on this front. We’ll also ensure that contributors who only want to bring forward a one-off objective and related key results for the consideration of those who submit complete matrices can do so with low friction. The Feedback and Revision Periods are in place for submitters to gain an understanding of any shortcomings their matrices might have while ensuring that efforts aren’t siloed as matrices can be consolidated in situations where it is synergistic to do so.
and one more question on the snapshot voting, to clarity how the snapshot stragy work, will us delegate pick the best one or divided in percent
Delegates will vote on one matrix (or abstain). For a further explanation of how single-choice voting works, please refer to this documentation.
I would like to propose extending the deadline for sending proposals from delegates.
The thing is that when some idea appears, it is often developed for many weeks or months before it gets to the forum for discussion, much less to the Snapshot.
But you are proposing that everyone get it done in 2 weeks.
Delegates will have at least 44 days to formulate and submit objectives matrices (14 days Notice Period + 30 days Submission Period). In addition, the SOS process isn’t initiated abruptly. This initial, ongoing process began ~14 days ago, and it’ll take at least 7 more days until the Notice Period begins as the proposal still has to go through Snapshot. Similarly, the initiation of a Review Phase/Ad Hoc Strategic Objective Adjustments in the future requires at least 14 days (7 days for discussion and 7 days for Snapshot voting), As the Review Phase should begin 12 months after the previous Voting Period has ended, delegates have visibility into when to start preparing for this event. We feel as though ~60 days should be enough for most delegates to formulate a submission, and we are hesitant to stretch out the timeline further as the total process is already quite prolonged.
What happens if someone has a great idea in a month? I think setting a goal for a year or more is good, but you can’t limit yourself to just these goals. If something good appears, you shouldn’t wait a whole year to accept it.
We’ve covered this in our previous answer here:
Compare this to the current structure, where ad hoc objective adjustments can be proposed by anyone at any time, but this requires them to post reasoning for the change together with adjusted objectives and key results. As such, objectives could still be changed 2/4/6/etc. months after their implementation, but the proposer must be able to clearly justify the reasoning and exert effort in creating an adjusted objectives matrix. This ensures that proposals for change are tied to accountability and require proposers to deeply think about the current objectives as well as what should be changed and why. The proposal also suggests instructing the research member of the ARDC to create quarterly reports on how the DAO is doing against its objectives, meaning that active delegates will receive timely updates on any potential changes that might be needed.
————————————————————
We’ve added clarifying language that previously chosen, not yet achieved objectives will stay in place even during a Review/Ad Hoc Strategic Objective Adjustments Phase to ensure continuity. When it comes to the budgeting framework for objectives, we will similarly establish a structure that maintains continuity on this front.
Note: We are assuming the budget for each objective will also undergo an annual review.
Yes, your assumption is correct—we’ve planned to have a yearly cycle for capital allocated to each objective as well.
The only thing we are not sure about is whether to leave this the time of discussion so open, We think that a minimum amount is what is established in the Code of Conduct, and being something so important the reasonable should be higher than this, but we would at least change the wording to conform to the recently approved code:
The wording has been changed to be in line with the minimum discussion period mentioned in the DAO’s standardized operations.
Thank you for this initiative.
I would really like you to accept initiatives at any time
The idea is that anyone can create a proposal that would push the DAO toward reaching one/several of the chosen objectives. In other words, the process would work in the same way as before, but it’ll hopefully orient contributors to produce synergistic proposals that form a cohesive structure while making it easier for delegates to judge whether a proposal is high value-add or not.
Ok, the SOS will create guidelines for the DAO and especially for delegates and contributors to create proposals that fits our collective goals and also give vote indications based on consistency with these goals. Thanks for clarifying.
gm, thanks for sharing this comprehensive proposal. I like the direction after the MVP, and how this forces the DAO to shift the mindset into structured proactivity. We can have a cohesive direction for the next 12 and 24 months
Yes, as many have highlighted there is the risk that we miss on critical trends, but the lack of direction would be as dramatically damaging for Arbitrum. As suggested in the proposal, new proposals that are outside of the core priorities can be submitted (for example, adding a new priority) in case a new area is identified as critical.
A couple of questions that would help clarify the implementation:
Does submitting a matrix imply that the submitter has somehow a form of accountability towards the objective? Or a right to lead that initiative? Or does that happen subsequently with specific initiatives that fall into that matrix?
How many objectives do we expect/strive for (3/10/30)? Having an idea could help to identify how broad the objectives should be.
Thanks
Thanks to everyone who has shown interest in the SOS proposal!
We’ve made the following edits on January 20th:
Barring additional notable edits, this proposal will move to Snapshot on January 23rd.
Responses to comments and feedback below:
I wonder if it would be beneficial to define some indicative categories for these objectives. This could prevent certain areas from being overlooked while also helping proposers efficiently identify similar proposals and foster collaboration.
We feel as though this might influence/restrict the proposers unnecessarily. The framework’s idea is to foster collaboration between proposers and the community while producing several options to vote across, with people finally converging on an objectives matrix that they are the most aligned with and covers all the necessary strategic points. We expect that most, if not all, submissions will cover objectives across several different categories or verticals. As stated in the proposal, submitters are encouraged to include the main area each of their proposed objectives is focused on. This should help a reviewer understand what a submission might be missing in their opinion as well as what parts of a submission they should be reviewing based on their specialization.
My understanding is that the 1-year goals are effectively proposals/initiatives to achieve the 2-year objective (the beginning of the “how” to achieve the key results).
This doesn’t necessarily have to be the case. If a proposer wanted to, they could submit 2-year objectives that are unrelated to the 1-year objectives. We don’t want to restrict proposers with respect to how they structure their objectives (as long as there is no overlap across objectives within a specific year). Having said that, it’s worth reiterating that delegates should be critical when it comes to judging the feasibility of laid-out objectives—adopting a matrix that is unrealistic with a vast number of different objectives is likely to be counterproductive.
• This proposal is quite macro in its approach, but which areas will be prioritized for short- and medium-term goals? For example, will the focus continue on stablecoins and RWA for stability, or will new fields like gaming and NFTs be explored? How will these priorities be ranked?
The DAO’s short- and medium-term priorities will be decided by the objectives chosen through this framework, with submitters being responsible for crafting the actual focus areas. When it comes to the objectives, we don’t think they require a ranking since a well-constructed matrix will have a proper number of objectives such that the DAO can work on most/all of them in tandem (another reason why a specific year’s objectives shouldn’t have any overlap).
• Entropy’s role seems critical, as it is responsible for driving processes, managing goal evaluations, and handling voting stages. Could this lead to excessive centralization of power? For instance, if the community disagrees with Entropy’s recommendations, how will that be addressed?
I’m a bit unsure about the evaluation process. Since Entropy is deeply involved in collecting and assessing submissions (along with DAO members, yes), could this lead to bias when they are also a submitter?
—> My suggestion: Create a clear evaluation framework and involve multiple stakeholders to ensure transparency and fairness.
To be clear, Entropy would not manage goal evaluation. As described in the proposal, we suggest this be handled by the research member of the ARDC through quarterly updates. All matrix submissions will be posted directly to the forum, the process is open to anyone, Entropy isn’t in a position to withhold any information, and our capacity to assess submissions will be similar to any other delegate. That is, providing feedback to submitters during the feedback period and voting on the matrix we’re most aligned with during the voting period.
Simply put, we’d make sure that during the initial SOS process, all the required announcements are posted, periods in phase two begin and end at the correct time, and the Snapshot vote comprising all proposed matrices is submitted correctly. Ideally, when the time comes to initiate the review phase, OpCo has already been set up, and the DAO could instruct the entity to manage the process. Moreover, OpCo could take over the objectives evaluation task from the research member if the DAO so chooses.
• The proposal mentions detailed processes like submission, feedback, and revision periods. However, has it considered whether the participation threshold for ordinary community members might be too high? For example, if someone submits just one goal, will it be sufficiently considered, or might incomplete proposals be ignored?
We strived to make the process as inclusive as possible. Having said that, objective setting for a blockchain ecosystem isn’t an easy task, which inevitably requires a notable time commitment as well as effort to get right. We expect that one-goal matrix submissions wouldn’t be considered seriously. However, we at Entropy will make a submission through the framework, and encourage anyone who has one-off objectives in mind but doesn’t want to create a full-fledged submission to send them our way, which we’ll consider for our submission. We might also utilize Harmonica to collect one-off objectives and associated key results submissions during the Notice Period such that anyone can incorporate the information in their matrix submission if they so choose.
6 months continue/change decision:
OKRs are often setup poorly the first time. EVen when teams had already setup OKRs before there’s a lot of organisational learning that happens. As way to mitigate this I’d suggest a 6-months confirmation vote. If the vote is favourable, the OKRs are kept for six more emonths. If the vote is negative, the whole process starts again.
This could be partially solved by having epochs long 4/6 months in which
This was something we thought about adding when we drafted the proposal. However, there are quite a few frictions we foresaw with this approach. For example, it’s well-known that DAOs often move slowly, inherent to their decentralized nature, meaning that, e.g., 6 months might not be enough time for the objectives’ “correctness” to materialize. This means that delegates may be more inclined to vote for a change prematurely, especially given delegates voting for a change can’t be obligated to create a submission. Compare this to the current structure, where ad hoc objective adjustments can be proposed by anyone at any time, but this requires them to post reasoning for the change together with adjusted objectives and key results. As such, objectives could still be changed 2/4/6/etc. months after their implementation, but the proposer must be able to clearly justify the reasoning and exert effort in creating an adjusted objectives matrix. This ensures that proposals for change are tied to accountability and require proposers to deeply think about the current objectives as well as what should be changed and why. The proposal also suggests instructing the research member of the ARDC to create quarterly reports on how the DAO is doing against its objectives, meaning that active delegates will receive timely updates on any potential changes that might be needed.
Phase to improve the selected block of objectives (aka refine the selected Matrix)
Another structure we considered, but decided to drop due to excessive complexity for decentralized decision-making, unreasonable strain exerted on delegates, as well as the high risk of creating a matrix that is, for example, bloated and/or has objectives with overlap. If delegates feel as though none of the submitted matrices are adequate, they can abstain during the voting period. It’s also worth noting that the barrier to proposing a single objective is much lower, meaning that this could lead to a situation where a vast amount of not-so-well-thought-out objectives are proposed.
I suggest introducing a rapid decision-making mechanism for urgent goals to shorten the process duration.
We agree that the second phase is lengthy, but this is a tradeoff required to ensure decision-making is done in a decentralized manner. Shortening the timeline would likely exclude many delegates from participating or require a more centralized approach such as having a single submission made through a committee of only a few contributors. In our opinion, both of these options are far suboptimal compared to a long process.
Lastly, I understand crafting these strategies takes time and effort. The DAO could consider offering incentives for proposals that make it to the final voting round to encourage participation.
We are afraid that such a structure could lead to unintended consequences, with proposers creating submissions that are the most likely to pass instead of optimal for the ecosystem. Ideally, proposers would be naturally encouraged to produce optimal submissions by being intrinsically aligned with the ecosystem and having skin in the game, such as being ARB tokenholders. Additionally, many delegates are already receiving incentives to participate in governance processes through the Delegate Incentive Program.
I have a question: when someone will provide a goal and this goal approved, alongside a budget, how will this be executed? Through dao delegates, opco, or whoever wants to fill the role? Because we might be in a situation in which we are short of people executing in case of a lot of submissions.
What is the total budget allocated to achieve the objectives?
Will this budget be approved through a vote?
Why isn’t the budget allocation included in the proposal?
I have one question though - Will the budget for each objective be defined in a separate proposal (after the SOS objectives are selected via Snapshot vote)?
Does submitting a matrix imply that the submitter has somehow a form of accountability towards the objective? Or a right to lead that initiative? Or does that happen subsequently with specific initiatives that fall into that matrix?
Hey @ChrisB! Thanks for the overview of Harmonica—the solution looks interesting. We could potentially utilize Harmonica during the Notice Period to gather objectives and key results from community members who don’t want to create a full-fledged submission. This information could then be considered by anyone who wants to submit a complete objectives matrix during the Submission Period.
We’ll contact you async to explore the feasibility of implementing the solution in more detail!
How many objectives do we expect/strive for (3/10/30)? Having an idea could help to identify how broad the objectives should be.
Submitters are free to include as many objectives as they want. However, as mentioned earlier, we think that including a vast number of objectives is likely to be counterproductive. Even 10 objectives might be unrealistic for the DAO to focus on simultaneously, at least in the beginning, but this is just our opinion.
Love the thought and effort put into this so thank you Entropy for the proposal.
We were looking at this portion of the proposal and are concerned that this statement is quite vague.
Love the thought and effort put into this so thank you Entropy for the proposal.
We were looking at this portion of the proposal and are concerned that this statement is quite vague.
However, if there’s a pressing need to review the strategic objectives due to, e.g., changes in the market environment, competitive space, or the DAO’s financials, a delegate can create a forum post outlining extensive reasoning for ad hoc adjustments accompanied by the proposed strategic objectives and related key results.
Rather than leaving this to the delegates, we believe this as well could fall into OpCo's jurisdiction once they are operationalized. This way, we are sure someone is always on top of these ad hoc changes and how they affect the DAO's objectives.
Oh, one more thing. Why don't we call this proposal "OKRs setting" so we have less (unique) acronyms in Arbitrum
Plus, if too many proposals are submitted, voting might get tough and divide the community. Maybe we could gather ideas first and have groups combine similar ones before the voting stage.
Plus, if too many proposals are submitted, voting might get tough and divide the community. Maybe we could gather ideas first and have groups combine similar ones before the voting stage.
It's meant to be used to converge before there are proposals being voted upon. So that leads to less proposal and stronger proposals. The alternative is less democratic and less effective backchanneling and private convos.
The core of this proposal is to establish clear short- and mid-term goals for the DAO, providing the community with a focused direction and avoiding resource dispersion. This approach is commendable, particularly with its periodic reviews and adjustments, making it more practical. However, the second phase of the process (from announcement to final voting) spans three months, and the entire procedure, including announcement, submission, feedback, revision, and voting, totals approximately three months. This lengthy cycle might not be favorable for the DAO’s decision-making efficiency, especially in a fast-changing market environment, potentially causing missed opportunities. I suggest introducing a rapid decision-making mechanism for urgent goals to shorten the process duration. 2. Although the proposal emphasizes measurable results for objectives, how can we ensure the feasibility of the submitted goals? I propose incorporating an initial screening stage involving experts or community technical members to make the objectives more grounded. If feasible, perhaps a discussion on the necessity of feasibility analysis and execution details is warranted. 3. Submitting and evaluating objectives might demand considerable time and effort. How can more people be encouraged to participate? For instance, offering rewards to contributors who propose excellent goals could be a motivating factor. I think it must be incentivised, to give incentives can't fail people, it can be incentivised on a linear release basis 4. The role of Entropy in this proposal is pivotal. While I highly value their work—they have demonstrated their competence in many key proposals and are an outstanding team worthy of respect 🫡—I wonder if this might overly centralize the process within a single team. Personally, I recommend involving more community representatives in the formulation and evaluation of SOS. 5. I’ve noticed many proposals mentioning RWA. Personally, I think it’s better to start with a pilot in a specific subfield, such as DeFi - RWA, gain experience, and then expand to a full-scale strategic objective framework for the DAO. 6. The proposal does not delve deeply into the execution process after goals are selected—for instance, who will be responsible for implementation, how the budget will be allocated, and how outcomes will be evaluated. I suggest supplementing a detailed implementation mechanism to ensure the goals not only remain at the strategic level but also effectively drive ecosystem growth. Additionally, the proposal does not address how to adjust if a goal fails to meet expectations. A dynamic adjustment mechanism, such as quarterly reports assessing the feasibility of goals and optimizing resource allocation, should be included.
In summary, a strategic framework of this significance, which involves the overarching design of the DAO, requires a clear strategic direction, making it essential.
Of course, a big protocol like Arbitrum needs a clear roadmap for short, medium, and long-term strategies to improve community engagement and help grow the ecosystem :)
I really appreciate allowing delegates and community members to submit their strategic objective matrices, to makes Arbitrum more decentralized, transparent, and democratic.
Of course, a big protocol like Arbitrum needs a clear roadmap for short, medium, and long-term strategies to improve community engagement and help grow the ecosystem :)
I really appreciate allowing delegates and community members to submit their strategic objective matrices, to makes Arbitrum more decentralized, transparent, and democratic.
That said, while Entropy has provided a solid timeline and process, I’m a bit unsure about the evaluation process. Since Entropy is deeply involved in collecting and assessing submissions (along with DAO members, yes), could this lead to bias when they are also a submitter? —> My suggestion: Create a clear evaluation framework and involve multiple stakeholders to ensure transparency and fairness.
Plus, if too many proposals are submitted, voting might get tough and divide the community. Maybe we could gather ideas first and have groups combine similar ones before the voting stage.
Lastly, I understand crafting these strategies takes time and effort. The DAO could consider offering incentives for proposals that make it to the final voting round to encourage participation.
We might need a more detailed roadmap for how the matrices will be implemented. But for now, I fully support the formation of the SOS 🙂
This seems like a pretty good start. A few suggestions having setup OKRs a couple of times:
6 months continue/change decision: OKRs are often setup poorly the first time. EVen when teams had already setup OKRs before there's a lot of organisational learning that happens. As way to mitigate this I'd suggest a 6-months confirmation vote. If the vote is favourable, the OKRs are kept for six more emonths. If the vote is negative, the whole process starts again.
This seems like a pretty good start. A few suggestions having setup OKRs a couple of times:
6 months continue/change decision: OKRs are often setup poorly the first time. EVen when teams had already setup OKRs before there's a lot of organisational learning that happens. As way to mitigate this I'd suggest a 6-months confirmation vote. If the vote is favourable, the OKRs are kept for six more emonths. If the vote is negative, the whole process starts again.
Phase to improve the selected block of objectives (aka refine the selected Matrix) I understand the rationale for having blocks of objectives proposed together is coherence. That being said, we could gain much through cross-pollination and the current process, although doesn't prohibit this, doesn't enable it well. Having people read each other objectives and then decide what to add to their proposed block is not the same as enabling the DAO to decide together on what should be exactly included in a block. And yet we need some opinionated take to set a direction! Are we between a rock and a hard place? A solution is that after the initial block is selected, another 7 days period opens to propose "additional objectives" and then a multi-select vote is done where each objective (the ones from the selected block plus additional ones proposed after the block was selected) are either kept or not. This ensures the block acts as a directional force for coherence, but we don't leave out (or in) the wrong objectives. If needed, the initial submission period could be reduced to 3 weeks as it's now less definitive.
I understand these suggestions add a bit of extra work, but they're both aimed at ensuring we have the right objectives, as I've seen multiple organisations go into disaster when faith in the objectives dwindled and there was no efficient way to fix that. If the proposed additions are found to be unnecessary after testing, they can be removed for the next cycle without much loss. On the other hand, if they were necessary and missing, it would take 12 months of having the wrong objectives (and potential DAO chaos or paralysis due to lack of alignment) as a result. So low-cost add-ons for the proposal but mitigating big risks.
Thank you very much for the SOS. I believe it’s crucial to outline the short- and medium-term objectives for the DAO.
I’m largely aligned with the proposal and don’t have much to add, as the delegates have already shared their thoughts and anticipated my own.
That said, I want to revisit a question that was raised and answered as follows:
Thank you very much for the SOS. I believe it’s crucial to outline the short- and medium-term objectives for the DAO.
I’m largely aligned with the proposal and don’t have much to add, as the delegates have already shared their thoughts and anticipated my own.
That said, I want to revisit a question that was raised and answered as follows:
Budget: The total budget would only be decided in the next and final step of this overarching initiative (MVP → SOS → budgeting framework) and would require another vote to be approved. We think bundling the objective-setting exercise with budgeting introduces too many variables for possible disagreement, which could restrict the process from moving forward. Moreover, in the case that a vast amount of objectives matrices are submitted, delegates will already be put under quite a lot of strain to evaluate all submissions. Adding a budgeting decision to the mix would be impractical and unreasonable for delegates.
Are we sure we want to move forward with designing objectives without allocating a budget?
Currently, the DAO’s treasury holds 2.85 billion ARB.
According to Token Flow’s December report:
"Over the period from June 2023, when the first Tally proposal was approved, to December 2024, the DAO approved 745M ARB worth of spending outlined in various proposals. This represents 21% of the DAO's initial treasury balance of 3.6B ARB."
Just one year ago, when the first sustainability report was released, only 5% of the treasury had been allocated to initiatives. This means that, over the past year, the DAO allocated an additional 16% of its treasury to various initiatives.
At that time, the report predicted that: "Based on current trends, the DAO's expenditure is expected to account for roughly 10 to 15% of the treasury by the end of the ARB vesting period in March 2027."
Well, a year later, the DAO has already allocated 21% of the treasury to initiatives—significantly ahead of what that report projected.
I’m aware that a treasury management initiative and STEP 2 were recently approved, which is a step in the right direction for generating revenue for the DAO.
However, I believe that if we do not plan carefully, we risk depleting our resources in the short-er than expected- term. With that in mind, and understanding that you don’t wish to define the budget for SOS initiatives at this stage, I propose assigning a budget for @karpatkey and/or @Aera , and/or Avant Garde to produce a new report on the treasury and its sustainability.
This report should take into account the projections made a year ago, the actual developments since then, the current state of the treasury, and the new initiatives aimed at generating revenue.
This looks like a good process/protocol to define Arbitrum's goals and objectives - and also to re-evaluate them every year. Based on these objectives, it will be easier for delegates to decide which governance proposals to support and which ones not (same goes for proposal authors).
I have one question though - Will the budget for each objective be defined in a separate proposal (after the SOS objectives are selected via Snapshot vote)?
Hi @Entropy and thanks for creating this proposal. As most questions have already been asked and I totally agree with most of them I would like to add that the "main focus area" should be a fixed and defined list.
Why? Because otherwise we will end up in thousands of possible categories and it may happen that some submissions may be similar but the topic is different, as anyone can decide it on his own behalf.
Hi @Entropy and thanks for creating this proposal. As most questions have already been asked and I totally agree with most of them I would like to add that the "main focus area" should be a fixed and defined list.
Why? Because otherwise we will end up in thousands of possible categories and it may happen that some submissions may be similar but the topic is different, as anyone can decide it on his own behalf.
I would rather like to see them defined by the DAO upfront so we can focus on a few selected ones for this year for example. I know that in the end everything is possible and there could be the argument that we would limit the DAO or Devs, but I also think that sometimes limiting the scope is better to achieve a goal fast rather than giving the opportunity to have an endless selection.
Thank you for the proposal. Our team has some questions regarding the budget that will be used.
Once a set of objectives and related key results has been approved, Entropy will strive to build a budgeting framework where each high-level objective is allocated a certain amount of capital on a yearly basis, with interested contributors having the ability to request a share of this capital through a standardized structure.
Thank you for the proposal. Our team has some questions regarding the budget that will be used.
Once a set of objectives and related key results has been approved, Entropy will strive to build a budgeting framework where each high-level objective is allocated a certain amount of capital on a yearly basis, with interested contributors having the ability to request a share of this capital through a standardized structure.
We are not sure we fully understand how the process will proceed after the objectives set are approved. Thank you.
I highly agree with the motivation behind this proposal: the current DAO lacks clear objectives, leading to scattered resources and difficulties in accountability. Establishing a unified goal matrix can enhance the sense of direction, improve resource allocation efficiency, and provide contributors with a clear priority framework.
After reading the full report, I have some questions I’d like to consult:
Thanks for your proposal!
Regarding the proposal submission minimum items, I would like to suggest an addition.
This is a great continuation to MVP! From high level goals, to this, to then budget, was the proposed path and also the right one, to go to something tangible.
I have a question: when someone will provide a goal and this goal approved, alongside a budget, how will this be executed? Through dao delegates, opco, or whoever wants to fill the role? Because we might be in a situation in which we are short of people executing in case of a lot of submissions.
A bit hard to add anything to this. The proposal is effectively a transition from mvp (abstract) to tangible strategies, policies and initiatives for the DAO. Execution will be key, meaning
Thank you for this proposal. It’s a long-anticipated initiative and will undoubtedly be a massive undertaking. I wonder if it would be beneficial to define some indicative categories for these objectives. This could prevent certain areas from being overlooked while also helping proposers efficiently identify similar proposals and foster collaboration.
What I mean is that we could predefine some categories within this proposal, such as governance, DeFi, grants, etc. This way, proposers could focus on reviewing proposals within their respective fields, reducing redundancy. Of course, this wouldn’t restrict proposers from suggesting objectives in new categories—they could simply be classified as "others."
I highly agree with the motivation behind this proposal: the current DAO lacks clear objectives, leading to scattered resources and difficulties in accountability. Establishing a unified goal matrix can enhance the sense of direction, improve resource allocation efficiency, and provide contributors with a clear priority framework.
After reading the full report, I have some questions I’d like to consult:
• This proposal is quite macro in its approach, but which areas will be prioritized for short- and medium-term goals? For example, will the focus continue on stablecoins and RWA for stability, or will new fields like gaming and NFTs be explored? How will these priorities be ranked?
• If the proposal is not approved, what is the DAO’s current development direction? Will it affect existing projects?
• Entropy’s role seems critical, as it is responsible for driving processes, managing goal evaluations, and handling voting stages. Could this lead to excessive centralization of power? For instance, if the community disagrees with Entropy’s recommendations, how will that be addressed?
• The proposal mentions detailed processes like submission, feedback, and revision periods. However, has it considered whether the participation threshold for ordinary community members might be too high? For example, if someone submits just one goal, will it be sufficiently considered, or might incomplete proposals be ignored?
Suggestions
Since Entropy handles many critical aspects, could a third-party supervision mechanism be introduced? Additionally, the execution outcomes of each stage should be published on the forum to give the community greater say in the process.
Ordinary users may not be skilled at crafting a complete proposal with detailed goals and key results. Could a simplified process be set up, allowing them to submit “goal ideas”? The community could then vote on which ideas are worth further exploration, better encouraging participation.
Thanks for your proposal!
Regarding the proposal submission minimum items, I would like to suggest an addition.
View of Arbitrum’s current state and what its strengths/weaknesses are
Short-term objectives (1 year)
Mid-term objectives (2 years)
Key results, i.e., measurable success metrics, for all objectives
Risks connected to all objectives
Rationale explaining how the objectives align with Arbitrum’s MVP and why they were chosen given Arbitrum’s current state
Expected resources to be utilized.
In Lido's case, we are talking about objectives for one protocol. When thinking about Arbitrum, the spectrum is broader and, two objectives, while perfectly aligned with our MVP, may be competing for the same resources.
My understanding is that the 1-year goals are effectively proposals/initiatives to achieve the 2-year objective (the beginning of the "how" to achieve the key results). When we think about objectives, it is "mandatory" to have a rough idea of what is required (at least, in our point of view) to achieve that. For that reason, I advocate for this "resources" item, as that will helpfully turn them into more actionable items, as you guys requested in the quote below.
A given year’s objectives are expected to be limited to a specific focus area and not to overlap with each other. As such, we recommend submitters refrain from proposing objectives that are too high level since the potential for overlap increases. Having said that, the sets of 1- and 2-year objectives can be the same as long as key results across years are different.
When I mention resources, it is not limited to funding. Any coding, intervention of AF or OCL or manpower (in comittees or other structures), marketing or BD, etc. That would help a lot the delegates' analysis/feedback and would give the proposer another layer of reasoning when crafting their submissions.
As a final note, as we are talking about an estimative, it would be ok to have "around 3m ARB", "build a webpage with X, Z, Y features", "The AF will be required to perform the KYC for around 300 participants within 2 months", etc. "This will require ARB from the treasury" or "AF would be required to handle that" are not good examples.
My 2 cents in the matter.
A bit hard to add anything to this. The proposal is effectively a transition from mvp (abstract) to tangible strategies, policies and initiatives for the DAO. Execution will be key, meaning
I'll do an example even if it's about going a bit ahead.
One of the goals might be (and will likely be) arbitrum as the home of defi. Might be too generic, but is also extremely compatible with our ethos, history, and products. Is pretty clear now that AI is not only gonna play a role in crypto, but also in defi; on this, arbitrum is behind. So expressing arbitrum as home of defi, without having the end result of having a bucket to strongly finance ai developments natively in arbitrum would likely be a huge fumble.
All of the above are very general consideration, that don't really influence this proposal. But I have something that I think would be worth changing: while SOS sets short term (1y) and mid term (2y) goals, we should do it in 4/6 months epoch.
1 year, in crypto, is a lot. We didn't had AI in crypto 1 year ago. We barely had it 6 months ago. Is the predominant trend now. In an approach that is a bit monolithic, we risk to actualize the goals in a way that is backward looking. Few people are able to forecast future trends, and usually they don't get listened by the crowd.
This could be partially solved by having epochs long 4/6 months in which
Let me know if you think this makes sense. It is for sure more overhead, more time consuming, and requires more attention. I honestly think that we need some sort of agility and ability to adjust during the run. Maybe this was already backed in the proposal tho and I misunderstood it.
Main opposition on the above would be: daos are slow, our dao can be slow, is difficult to find consensus and after finding consensus going back to it to rewrite part of the thesis adds a lot of friction. I could accept this, because is true, but we should at least try to strive for the process that gives us the best possible outcome.
I highly agree with the motivation behind this proposal: the current DAO lacks clear objectives, leading to scattered resources and difficulties in accountability. Establishing a unified goal matrix can enhance the sense of direction, improve resource allocation efficiency, and provide contributors with a clear priority framework.
After reading the full report, I have some questions I’d like to consult:
• This proposal is quite macro in its approach, but which areas will be prioritized for short- and medium-term goals? For example, will the focus continue on stablecoins and RWA for stability, or will new fields like gaming and NFTs be explored? How will these priorities be ranked?
• If the proposal is not approved, what is the DAO’s current development direction? Will it affect existing projects?
• Entropy’s role seems critical, as it is responsible for driving processes, managing goal evaluations, and handling voting stages. Could this lead to excessive centralization of power? For instance, if the community disagrees with Entropy’s recommendations, how will that be addressed?
• The proposal mentions detailed processes like submission, feedback, and revision periods. However, has it considered whether the participation threshold for ordinary community members might be too high? For example, if someone submits just one goal, will it be sufficiently considered, or might incomplete proposals be ignored?
Suggestions
Since Entropy handles many critical aspects, could a third-party supervision mechanism be introduced? Additionally, the execution outcomes of each stage should be published on the forum to give the community greater say in the process.
Ordinary users may not be skilled at crafting a complete proposal with detailed goals and key results. Could a simplified process be set up, allowing them to submit “goal ideas”? The community could then vote on which ideas are worth further exploration, better encouraging participation.
Thanks for your proposal!
Regarding the proposal submission minimum items, I would like to suggest an addition.
View of Arbitrum’s current state and what its strengths/weaknesses are
Short-term objectives (1 year)
Mid-term objectives (2 years)
Key results, i.e., measurable success metrics, for all objectives
Risks connected to all objectives
Rationale explaining how the objectives align with Arbitrum’s MVP and why they were chosen given Arbitrum’s current state
Expected resources to be utilized.
In Lido's case, we are talking about objectives for one protocol. When thinking about Arbitrum, the spectrum is broader and, two objectives, while perfectly aligned with our MVP, may be competing for the same resources.
My understanding is that the 1-year goals are effectively proposals/initiatives to achieve the 2-year objective (the beginning of the "how" to achieve the key results). When we think about objectives, it is "mandatory" to have a rough idea of what is required (at least, in our point of view) to achieve that. For that reason, I advocate for this "resources" item, as that will helpfully turn them into more actionable items, as you guys requested in the quote below.
A given year’s objectives are expected to be limited to a specific focus area and not to overlap with each other. As such, we recommend submitters refrain from proposing objectives that are too high level since the potential for overlap increases. Having said that, the sets of 1- and 2-year objectives can be the same as long as key results across years are different.
When I mention resources, it is not limited to funding. Any coding, intervention of AF or OCL or manpower (in comittees or other structures), marketing or BD, etc. That would help a lot the delegates' analysis/feedback and would give the proposer another layer of reasoning when crafting their submissions.
As a final note, as we are talking about an estimative, it would be ok to have "around 3m ARB", "build a webpage with X, Z, Y features", "The AF will be required to perform the KYC for around 300 participants within 2 months", etc. "This will require ARB from the treasury" or "AF would be required to handle that" are not good examples.
My 2 cents in the matter.
A bit hard to add anything to this. The proposal is effectively a transition from mvp (abstract) to tangible strategies, policies and initiatives for the DAO. Execution will be key, meaning
I'll do an example even if it's about going a bit ahead.
One of the goals might be (and will likely be) arbitrum as the home of defi. Might be too generic, but is also extremely compatible with our ethos, history, and products. Is pretty clear now that AI is not only gonna play a role in crypto, but also in defi; on this, arbitrum is behind. So expressing arbitrum as home of defi, without having the end result of having a bucket to strongly finance ai developments natively in arbitrum would likely be a huge fumble.
All of the above are very general consideration, that don't really influence this proposal. But I have something that I think would be worth changing: while SOS sets short term (1y) and mid term (2y) goals, we should do it in 4/6 months epoch.
1 year, in crypto, is a lot. We didn't had AI in crypto 1 year ago. We barely had it 6 months ago. Is the predominant trend now. In an approach that is a bit monolithic, we risk to actualize the goals in a way that is backward looking. Few people are able to forecast future trends, and usually they don't get listened by the crowd.
This could be partially solved by having epochs long 4/6 months in which
Let me know if you think this makes sense. It is for sure more overhead, more time consuming, and requires more attention. I honestly think that we need some sort of agility and ability to adjust during the run. Maybe this was already backed in the proposal tho and I misunderstood it.
Main opposition on the above would be: daos are slow, our dao can be slow, is difficult to find consensus and after finding consensus going back to it to rewrite part of the thesis adds a lot of friction. I could accept this, because is true, but we should at least try to strive for the process that gives us the best possible outcome.
