Changes made on February 18, 2025:
Added more detail on the implementation and smart contract changes this upgrade entails, notably section 3.1.4.
Added link to the temperature check vote in the Abstract section.
Non-material revisions to ArbitrumDAO Constitution Adjustments for clarity and to fix minor typos.
Other minor edits to proposal text as it moves from a temperature check to an on-chain vote.
The ArbitrumDAO recently expressed strong interest in moving towards a delegated voting power (DVP)-based quorum model with the parameters now finalized in an offchain vote. Consequently, this upgrade, if implemented, will define quorum as:
Quorum = min{max quorum, max{ɑ*DVP, baseline quorum}}
where ɑ, baseline quorum, and max quorum are constants.
Updates to the quorum computation model will also be reflected in the ArbitrumDAO Constitution - executing this proposal will update the on-chain constitution hash given the adjusted text.
As it stands, ArbitrumDAO's quorum is computed based on the total voteable supply, which has no relationship to the tokens registered to vote. This proposal introduces a better approach by basing quorum on delegated voting power (DVP) - a metric that more directly represents the amount of ARB participating in governance and available for voting.
All of the relevant context and motivation may be found in the previously published posts on this topic. The first report focuses on the rationale for the change, the historical performance of quorum, and the security implications of this upgrade. The second report is a comparative analysis of quorum across other large DAOs, as well as shareholder voting in public companies, aimed at presenting insights into ArbitrumDAO’s position relative to comparable systems. The motivation around this update is captured in the initial temperature check.
This AIP proposes upgrading to the following quorum computation logic:
Quorum = min{max quorum, max{ɑ*DVP, baseline quorum}}
where ɑ, baseline quorum, and max quorum are constants.
The proposed formula works as follows:
In short, baseline quorum and max quorum form fixed lower and upper bounds for quorum.
We suggest the following parameters:
For constitutional proposals:
For non-constitutional proposals:
A Trail of Bits audit of the proposed changes can be found here.
This upgrade will introduce the following changes to the ARB token contract and the governor contracts:
The ARB token contract will be upgraded to keep a running total of DVP, updated upon each delegation change and token transfer.
Total DVP = sum of balances of all accounts with a non-zero delegation at a given block.
To initialize the running total, an estimate of the total DVP must be provided as part of the upgrade proposal. A followup proposal can correct any error in the initial DVP estimate if needed. This doesn’t change user balances or individual delegate voting power, only the aggregate DVP.
getTotalDelegation() to obtain the latest value.
getTotalDelegationAt(uint256 blockNumber) to obtain historical value at a snapshot block.
For non-constitutional proposals, our recommendation of ɑ = 0.4 ensures continuity with the current non-constitutional quorum. At the current DVP of 348.61m ARB, non-constitutional quorum will equate to 139.4m ARB, which is very close to its current value of 145.56m ARB.
For constitutional proposals, our recommendation for an ɑ value of 0.5 aims at creating a safer buffer between voter turnout and quorum while retaining a high voter turnout. Most large DAOs operate with quorum thresholds well below fifty percent of delegated voting power, and corporate and legislative systems rarely employ supermajority quorum requirements. As concluded by research report #2, when quorum is expressed as a percentage of DVP, its value at ArbitrumDAO (~62% of DVP) is roughly double that of the next highest DAO benchmarked. Even after the proposed upgrade, ArbitrumDAO’s quorum would remain higher than all comparable DAOs reviewed by the report.
Historical participation data of ArbitrumDAO provides strong support for the baseline quorum values proposed. Over the last two years, the average quorum for non-constitutional proposals amounted to ~104m ARB, which motivates our recommendation of a 100m ARB baseline for non-constitutional proposals. For constitutional proposals, the average quorum, excluding periods in which quorum was structurally difficult to reach, falls around 156m ARB, motivating our recommendation of a 150m ARB baseline. These values preserve continuity with observed voting behavior while creating a sufficiently large lower bound for quorum.
Note that baseline quorum values will not apply until DVP drops below a certain threshold. For the constitutional baseline quorum to apply, DVP would need to drop below 300m ARB. At all values of delegation below this threshold, a constitutional proposal will require a quorum of 150m ARB. For the non-constitutional baseline quorum to apply, DVP would need to drop below 250m ARB.
The implementation also includes an explicit smart contract setting to configure a maximum value of constitutional and non-constitutional quorum. This is a static parameter that can be updated through a DAO vote if needed. A maximum quorum of 450m ARB for constitutional proposals and 300m ARB for non-constitutional proposals are proposed. These values are fully consistent with the current maximum quorum values (where they are defined as 3% and 4.5% of the maximum voteable token supply) and as such aim to retain the status quo on the upper bound. For additional context, DVP would need to go over 750m ARB for the non-constitutional max quorum to be triggered and to over 900m ARB for the constitutional max quorum to be triggered.
Going forward, these thresholds may further act as checkpoints for the DAO to reconsider the DVP-quorum model’s performance in a high-DVP scenario.
Due to the upgrade’s nature, the following updates will be made to the Definitions and DAO Proposals and Voting Procedures sections of the ArbitrumDAO Constitution, in order to reflect the new way quorum is calculated.
Definitions:
- AIP: An Arbitrum Improvement Proposal
- ArbitrumDAO-governed chains: The Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova chains and any additional chains authorized by the ArbitrumDAO
- DAO Treasury: All $ARB tokens held in a governance smart contract governed directly by the ArbitrumDAO and/or the Security Council of The Arbitrum Foundation via on-chain voting mechanisms.
- Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are governed by the $ARB token
- Non-Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are not governed by the $ARB token
- Votable Tokens: All $ARB tokens in existence, excluding any tokens held by The Arbitrum Foundation and any unclaimed airdrops
Definitions:
- AIP: An Arbitrum Improvement Proposal
- ArbitrumDAO-governed chains: The Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova chains and any additional chains authorized by the ArbitrumDAO
- DAO Treasury: All $ARB tokens held in a governance smart contract governed directly by the ArbitrumDAO and/or the Security Council of The Arbitrum Foundation via on-chain voting mechanisms
- Delegated Votable Tokens: The number of all Votable Tokens that have been delegated and eligible to vote on AIPs
- Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are governed by the $ARB token
- Non-Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are not governed by the $ARB token
- Votable Tokens: All $ARB tokens in existence, excluding any tokens held by The Arbitrum Foundation and any unclaimed airdrops
Phase 3: DAO votes on AIP, on Arbitrum One (14–16 days): During this Phase 3, the ArbitrumDAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP.
An AIP passes if the following 2 conditions are met:
a. More Votable Tokens have casted votes "in favor" than have casted votes "against" ("Threshold 1"); and b. In the case of a:
- Constitutional AIP, at least 4.5% of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either "in favor" or "abstain"; or
- Non-Constitutional AIP, at least 3% of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either "in favor" or "abstain" (collectively, "Threshold 2").
Phase 3: DAO votes on AIP, on Arbitrum One (14–16 days): During this Phase 3, the ArbitrumDAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP.
An AIP passes if the following 2 conditions are met:
a. More Votable Tokens have cast votes "in favor" than have cast votes "against" ("Threshold 1"); and b. ("Threshold 2") In the case of a:
- Constitutional AIP, at least a number of all Delegated Votable Tokens have cast votes either "in favor" or "abstain", determined in accordance with the below formula: i. If the product of 0.5 and the Delegated Votable Tokens ("Preliminary Constitutional Quorum Value") is less than 150,000,000, then 150,000,000 applies; or ii. If the Preliminary Constitutional Quorum Value is greater than 150,000,000, but less than 450,000,000, then the Preliminary Constitutional Quorum Value applies; or iii. If the Preliminary Constitutional Quorum Value is greater than 450,000,000, then 450,000,000 applies.
- Non-Constitutional AIP, at least a number of all Delegated Votable Tokens have cast votes either "in favor" or "abstain", determined in accordance with the below formula: i. If the product of 0.4 and the Delegated Votable Tokens ("Preliminary Non-Constitutional Quorum Value") is less than 100,000,000, then 100,000,000 applies; or ii. If the Preliminary Non-Constitutional Quorum Value is greater than 100,000,000, but less than 300,000,000, then the Preliminary Non-Constitutional Quorum Value applies; or iii. If the Preliminary Non-Constitutional Quorum Value is greater than 300,000,000, then 300,000,000 applies.
A Non-Constitutional AIP is one that is not considered a "Constitutional AIP" including:
- Funding: Requests funds/grants or otherwise propose how to spend or allocate funds from the DAO Treasury and, so long as The Arbitrum Foundation exists, the Administrative Budget Wallet as defined in the The Arbitrum Foundation’s Amended & Restated Bylaws
A Non-Constitutional AIP is one that is not considered a "Constitutional AIP" including:
- Funding: Requests funds/grants or otherwise propose how to spend or allocate funds from the DAO Treasury and, so long as The Arbitrum Foundation exists, the Administrative Budget Wallet as defined in The Arbitrum Foundation’s Amended & Restated Bylaws
Security Council members may only be removed prior to the end of their terms under two conditions: 1. At least 10% of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either "in favor" of removal or "abstain", and at least 5/6 (83.33%) of all casted votes are "in favor" of removal; or
Security Council members may only be removed prior to the end of their terms under two conditions: 1. At least 10% of all Votable Tokens have cast votes either "in favor" of removal or "abstain", and at least 5/6 (83.33%) of all cast votes are "in favor" of removal; or
This on-chain proposal will include the following voting options:
We aim to take this proposal to an on-chain vote starting 26/02/2025.
Changes made on February 18, 2025:
Added more detail on the implementation and smart contract changes this upgrade entails, notably section 3.1.4.
Added link to the temperature check vote in the Abstract section.
Non-material revisions to ArbitrumDAO Constitution Adjustments for clarity and to fix minor typos.
Other minor edits to proposal text as it moves from a temperature check to an on-chain vote.
The ArbitrumDAO recently expressed strong interest in moving towards a delegated voting power (DVP)-based quorum model with the parameters now finalized in an offchain vote. Consequently, this upgrade, if implemented, will define quorum as:
Quorum = min{max quorum, max{ɑ*DVP, baseline quorum}}
where ɑ, baseline quorum, and max quorum are constants.
Updates to the quorum computation model will also be reflected in the ArbitrumDAO Constitution - executing this proposal will update the on-chain constitution hash given the adjusted text.
As it stands, ArbitrumDAO's quorum is computed based on the total voteable supply, which has no relationship to the tokens registered to vote. This proposal introduces a better approach by basing quorum on delegated voting power (DVP) - a metric that more directly represents the amount of ARB participating in governance and available for voting.
All of the relevant context and motivation may be found in the previously published posts on this topic. The first report focuses on the rationale for the change, the historical performance of quorum, and the security implications of this upgrade. The second report is a comparative analysis of quorum across other large DAOs, as well as shareholder voting in public companies, aimed at presenting insights into ArbitrumDAO’s position relative to comparable systems. The motivation around this update is captured in the initial temperature check.
This AIP proposes upgrading to the following quorum computation logic:
Quorum = min{max quorum, max{ɑ*DVP, baseline quorum}}
where ɑ, baseline quorum, and max quorum are constants.
The proposed formula works as follows:
In short, baseline quorum and max quorum form fixed lower and upper bounds for quorum.
We suggest the following parameters:
For constitutional proposals:
For non-constitutional proposals:
A Trail of Bits audit of the proposed changes can be found here.
This upgrade will introduce the following changes to the ARB token contract and the governor contracts:
The ARB token contract will be upgraded to keep a running total of DVP, updated upon each delegation change and token transfer.
Total DVP = sum of balances of all accounts with a non-zero delegation at a given block.
To initialize the running total, an estimate of the total DVP must be provided as part of the upgrade proposal. A followup proposal can correct any error in the initial DVP estimate if needed. This doesn’t change user balances or individual delegate voting power, only the aggregate DVP.
getTotalDelegation() to obtain the latest value.
getTotalDelegationAt(uint256 blockNumber) to obtain historical value at a snapshot block.
For non-constitutional proposals, our recommendation of ɑ = 0.4 ensures continuity with the current non-constitutional quorum. At the current DVP of 348.61m ARB, non-constitutional quorum will equate to 139.4m ARB, which is very close to its current value of 145.56m ARB.
For constitutional proposals, our recommendation for an ɑ value of 0.5 aims at creating a safer buffer between voter turnout and quorum while retaining a high voter turnout. Most large DAOs operate with quorum thresholds well below fifty percent of delegated voting power, and corporate and legislative systems rarely employ supermajority quorum requirements. As concluded by research report #2, when quorum is expressed as a percentage of DVP, its value at ArbitrumDAO (~62% of DVP) is roughly double that of the next highest DAO benchmarked. Even after the proposed upgrade, ArbitrumDAO’s quorum would remain higher than all comparable DAOs reviewed by the report.
Historical participation data of ArbitrumDAO provides strong support for the baseline quorum values proposed. Over the last two years, the average quorum for non-constitutional proposals amounted to ~104m ARB, which motivates our recommendation of a 100m ARB baseline for non-constitutional proposals. For constitutional proposals, the average quorum, excluding periods in which quorum was structurally difficult to reach, falls around 156m ARB, motivating our recommendation of a 150m ARB baseline. These values preserve continuity with observed voting behavior while creating a sufficiently large lower bound for quorum.
Note that baseline quorum values will not apply until DVP drops below a certain threshold. For the constitutional baseline quorum to apply, DVP would need to drop below 300m ARB. At all values of delegation below this threshold, a constitutional proposal will require a quorum of 150m ARB. For the non-constitutional baseline quorum to apply, DVP would need to drop below 250m ARB.
The implementation also includes an explicit smart contract setting to configure a maximum value of constitutional and non-constitutional quorum. This is a static parameter that can be updated through a DAO vote if needed. A maximum quorum of 450m ARB for constitutional proposals and 300m ARB for non-constitutional proposals are proposed. These values are fully consistent with the current maximum quorum values (where they are defined as 3% and 4.5% of the maximum voteable token supply) and as such aim to retain the status quo on the upper bound. For additional context, DVP would need to go over 750m ARB for the non-constitutional max quorum to be triggered and to over 900m ARB for the constitutional max quorum to be triggered.
Going forward, these thresholds may further act as checkpoints for the DAO to reconsider the DVP-quorum model’s performance in a high-DVP scenario.
Due to the upgrade’s nature, the following updates will be made to the Definitions and DAO Proposals and Voting Procedures sections of the ArbitrumDAO Constitution, in order to reflect the new way quorum is calculated.
Definitions:
- AIP: An Arbitrum Improvement Proposal
- ArbitrumDAO-governed chains: The Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova chains and any additional chains authorized by the ArbitrumDAO
- DAO Treasury: All $ARB tokens held in a governance smart contract governed directly by the ArbitrumDAO and/or the Security Council of The Arbitrum Foundation via on-chain voting mechanisms.
- Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are governed by the $ARB token
- Non-Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are not governed by the $ARB token
- Votable Tokens: All $ARB tokens in existence, excluding any tokens held by The Arbitrum Foundation and any unclaimed airdrops
Definitions:
- AIP: An Arbitrum Improvement Proposal
- ArbitrumDAO-governed chains: The Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova chains and any additional chains authorized by the ArbitrumDAO
- DAO Treasury: All $ARB tokens held in a governance smart contract governed directly by the ArbitrumDAO and/or the Security Council of The Arbitrum Foundation via on-chain voting mechanisms
- Delegated Votable Tokens: The number of all Votable Tokens that have been delegated and eligible to vote on AIPs
- Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are governed by the $ARB token
- Non-Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are not governed by the $ARB token
- Votable Tokens: All $ARB tokens in existence, excluding any tokens held by The Arbitrum Foundation and any unclaimed airdrops
Phase 3: DAO votes on AIP, on Arbitrum One (14–16 days): During this Phase 3, the ArbitrumDAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP.
An AIP passes if the following 2 conditions are met:
a. More Votable Tokens have casted votes "in favor" than have casted votes "against" ("Threshold 1"); and b. In the case of a:
- Constitutional AIP, at least 4.5% of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either "in favor" or "abstain"; or
- Non-Constitutional AIP, at least 3% of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either "in favor" or "abstain" (collectively, "Threshold 2").
Phase 3: DAO votes on AIP, on Arbitrum One (14–16 days): During this Phase 3, the ArbitrumDAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP.
An AIP passes if the following 2 conditions are met:
a. More Votable Tokens have cast votes "in favor" than have cast votes "against" ("Threshold 1"); and b. ("Threshold 2") In the case of a:
- Constitutional AIP, at least a number of all Delegated Votable Tokens have cast votes either "in favor" or "abstain", determined in accordance with the below formula: i. If the product of 0.5 and the Delegated Votable Tokens ("Preliminary Constitutional Quorum Value") is less than 150,000,000, then 150,000,000 applies; or ii. If the Preliminary Constitutional Quorum Value is greater than 150,000,000, but less than 450,000,000, then the Preliminary Constitutional Quorum Value applies; or iii. If the Preliminary Constitutional Quorum Value is greater than 450,000,000, then 450,000,000 applies.
- Non-Constitutional AIP, at least a number of all Delegated Votable Tokens have cast votes either "in favor" or "abstain", determined in accordance with the below formula: i. If the product of 0.4 and the Delegated Votable Tokens ("Preliminary Non-Constitutional Quorum Value") is less than 100,000,000, then 100,000,000 applies; or ii. If the Preliminary Non-Constitutional Quorum Value is greater than 100,000,000, but less than 300,000,000, then the Preliminary Non-Constitutional Quorum Value applies; or iii. If the Preliminary Non-Constitutional Quorum Value is greater than 300,000,000, then 300,000,000 applies.
A Non-Constitutional AIP is one that is not considered a "Constitutional AIP" including:
- Funding: Requests funds/grants or otherwise propose how to spend or allocate funds from the DAO Treasury and, so long as The Arbitrum Foundation exists, the Administrative Budget Wallet as defined in the The Arbitrum Foundation’s Amended & Restated Bylaws
A Non-Constitutional AIP is one that is not considered a "Constitutional AIP" including:
- Funding: Requests funds/grants or otherwise propose how to spend or allocate funds from the DAO Treasury and, so long as The Arbitrum Foundation exists, the Administrative Budget Wallet as defined in The Arbitrum Foundation’s Amended & Restated Bylaws
Security Council members may only be removed prior to the end of their terms under two conditions: 1. At least 10% of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either "in favor" of removal or "abstain", and at least 5/6 (83.33%) of all casted votes are "in favor" of removal; or
Security Council members may only be removed prior to the end of their terms under two conditions: 1. At least 10% of all Votable Tokens have cast votes either "in favor" of removal or "abstain", and at least 5/6 (83.33%) of all cast votes are "in favor" of removal; or
This on-chain proposal will include the following voting options:
We aim to take this proposal to an on-chain vote starting 26/02/2025.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/48?u=cornellbc.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/47
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/48?u=cornellbc.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/47
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/31
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/41?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/19?u=blockful
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/15?u=pedrob
I’m voting in favor because quorum should reflect the tokens that are actually participating in governance, not the total supply. In my view, that just makes more sense and better reflects reality. Overall, it’s a straightforward update that makes the system more accurate and fair.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/27
The Event Horizon Community voted AGAINST on this proposal (ehARB-145): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-145
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/19?u=blockful
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/sov-delegate-communication-thread/30257/5?u=sov
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/21?u=euphoria
Reverie is voting FOR this proposal The DVP model makes a lot of sense because delegated ARB tokens much more closely represent the active voting power than voteable token supply. Since the voteable token supply is increasing rapidly while delegated ARB tokens remain the same, there are likely to be continuity issues under the current model. The baseline recommendations of 100m ARB for non-constitutional proposals and 150m ARB for constitutional proposals make sense given the historic averages of ~104m and ~156m ARB respectively.
The problem is real. Quorum keeps rising because it is tied to total supply, not actual delegated participation. That creates a liveness risk and gives a few large delegates effective veto power. DVP-based quorum fixes the core issue by linking thresholds to real governance activity. So the direction is correct. The trade-offs are understood. We should implement it, but stay aware of the risks and be ready to adjust parameters if needed.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/17?u=griff
makes a lot of sense and will help ARB DAO function properly as more ARB comes to market.
parameters should be 0.5 for Non-constitutional proposals, as in, they need majority participation of FOR + ABSTAIN of all delegated voting power to be approved and execute, and 0.67 for Constitutional proposals, as in, they need super majority of participation of FOR + ABSTAIN of all delegated voting power to be approved and executed. As of now, these proposed parameter values are arbitrary and cherry picked to make it easier to pass constitutional proposals breaking the precedent of the current values and current governance hardness in Arbitrum DAO.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/31
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/41?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/19?u=blockful
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/15?u=pedrob
I’m voting in favor because quorum should reflect the tokens that are actually participating in governance, not the total supply. In my view, that just makes more sense and better reflects reality. Overall, it’s a straightforward update that makes the system more accurate and fair.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/27
The Event Horizon Community voted AGAINST on this proposal (ehARB-145): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-145
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/19?u=blockful
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/sov-delegate-communication-thread/30257/5?u=sov
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/21?u=euphoria
Reverie is voting FOR this proposal The DVP model makes a lot of sense because delegated ARB tokens much more closely represent the active voting power than voteable token supply. Since the voteable token supply is increasing rapidly while delegated ARB tokens remain the same, there are likely to be continuity issues under the current model. The baseline recommendations of 100m ARB for non-constitutional proposals and 150m ARB for constitutional proposals make sense given the historic averages of ~104m and ~156m ARB respectively.
The problem is real. Quorum keeps rising because it is tied to total supply, not actual delegated participation. That creates a liveness risk and gives a few large delegates effective veto power. DVP-based quorum fixes the core issue by linking thresholds to real governance activity. So the direction is correct. The trade-offs are understood. We should implement it, but stay aware of the risks and be ready to adjust parameters if needed.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao-implementation-parameters/30484/17?u=griff
makes a lot of sense and will help ARB DAO function properly as more ARB comes to market.
parameters should be 0.5 for Non-constitutional proposals, as in, they need majority participation of FOR + ABSTAIN of all delegated voting power to be approved and execute, and 0.67 for Constitutional proposals, as in, they need super majority of participation of FOR + ABSTAIN of all delegated voting power to be approved and executed. As of now, these proposed parameter values are arbitrary and cherry picked to make it easier to pass constitutional proposals breaking the precedent of the current values and current governance hardness in Arbitrum DAO.
The DVP-quorum approach is interesting as a mechanism for reducing governance capture risk without raising participation requirements (which tend to entrench large holders who can afford to vote on every proposal).
One concern worth surfacing: if the quorum threshold is set relative to participating delegates rather than total token supply, you get a smaller reference frame --- which makes it easier to reach quorum with a coordinated minority. The classic attack is a proposer who times their vote when large "good-faith" delegates are inactive (conference weeks, holidays, etc.).
The DVP-quorum approach is interesting as a mechanism for reducing governance capture risk without raising participation requirements (which tend to entrench large holders who can afford to vote on every proposal).
One concern worth surfacing: if the quorum threshold is set relative to participating delegates rather than total token supply, you get a smaller reference frame --- which makes it easier to reach quorum with a coordinated minority. The classic attack is a proposer who times their vote when large "good-faith" delegates are inactive (conference weeks, holidays, etc.).
Has the proposal modeled this against Arbitrum's historical delegate participation patterns? Knowing the variance in participation rate across the last 12 months would help calibrate the right threshold. Low-variance systems can set tighter quorums safely; high-variance systems need buffers.
The DVP-quorum approach is interesting as a mechanism for reducing governance capture risk without raising participation requirements (which tend to entrench large holders who can afford to vote on every proposal).
One concern worth surfacing: if the quorum threshold is set relative to participating delegates rather than total token supply, you get a smaller reference frame --- which makes it easier to reach quorum with a coordinated minority. The classic attack is a proposer who times their vote when large "good-faith" delegates are inactive (conference weeks, holidays, etc.).
The DVP-quorum approach is interesting as a mechanism for reducing governance capture risk without raising participation requirements (which tend to entrench large holders who can afford to vote on every proposal).
One concern worth surfacing: if the quorum threshold is set relative to participating delegates rather than total token supply, you get a smaller reference frame --- which makes it easier to reach quorum with a coordinated minority. The classic attack is a proposer who times their vote when large "good-faith" delegates are inactive (conference weeks, holidays, etc.).
Has the proposal modeled this against Arbitrum's historical delegate participation patterns? Knowing the variance in participation rate across the last 12 months would help calibrate the right threshold. Low-variance systems can set tighter quorums safely; high-variance systems need buffers.
I’ve been looking through the technical spec for this, and honestly, basing quorum on total supply never made sense, it’s like measuring voter turnout by including people who aren’t even registered to vote. Moving to a DVP-based model is the right move for the DAO’s long-term efficiency because the switch to getTotalDelegation() finally tracks “active” voting power in real time. By using OpenZeppelin Checkpoints, we stop the participation hurdle from moving up just because more tokens are circulating, which has been a major pain point. Regarding the parameters, setting the Alpha (ɑ) at 0.5 for constitutional votes is a solid safeguard; it’s high enough to prevent “ghost” votes but low enough to keep governance moving given our current participation rates. I’m also a big fan of the 150m ARB Floor, it’s a necessary fail-safe that protects us from a “low participation” attack if delegation numbers ever crash suddenly. After checking the Trail of Bits audit, the initialization logic for the running total seems solid and the gas overhead for these storage updates should be negligible for users. I’m voting FOR this because it’s time our math caught up with the reality of how this DAO actually functions.
I’ve been looking through the technical spec for this, and honestly, basing quorum on total supply never made sense, it’s like measuring voter turnout by including people who aren’t even registered to vote. Moving to a DVP-based model is the right move for the DAO’s long-term efficiency because the switch to getTotalDelegation() finally tracks “active” voting power in real time. By using OpenZeppelin Checkpoints, we stop the participation hurdle from moving up just because more tokens are circulating, which has been a major pain point. Regarding the parameters, setting the Alpha (ɑ) at 0.5 for constitutional votes is a solid safeguard; it’s high enough to prevent “ghost” votes but low enough to keep governance moving given our current participation rates. I’m also a big fan of the 150m ARB Floor, it’s a necessary fail-safe that protects us from a “low participation” attack if delegation numbers ever crash suddenly. After checking the Trail of Bits audit, the initialization logic for the running total seems solid and the gas overhead for these storage updates should be negligible for users. I’m voting FOR this because it’s time our math caught up with the reality of how this DAO actually functions.
The DAO should be asking how to increase participation to meet quorum, not how to lower the bar. Lowering the bar leads to an accelerating consolidation of power, smaller delegates exiting once they see their influence is being diluted, continued Arbitrum’s token price downturn, and a governance structure that serves insiders far more.
That’s a fair challenge, and I definitely agree that we shouldn’t ignore the root cause of voter apathy or the token's primary utility. However, from a technical and operational standpoint, the current system is creating a different kind of risk: Liveness Risk. Right now, as the ARB supply grows but stays in 'idle' wallets (like CEXs or cold storage), the 'total supply' math makes the quorum hurdle move higher while the active voting pool stays the same. If we don't adjust this, we eventually hit a 'governance gridlock' where even simple, necessary security upgrades can't pass because the math is literally impossible to reach.
I see the DVP-based model not as 'lowering the bar,' but as re-calibrating the scale to measure the people actually in the room. You're right that we need more utility and participation and programs like RAD are a great start for that but we shouldn't let the DAO's operational security be held hostage by 'zombie' tokens while we wait for those utility cases to arrive.
Ensuring that the baseline quorum (the 150m floor) remains high is our best defense against the consolidation of power you mentioned. It ensures that even with a dynamic quorum, a small group of insiders still can't bypass the community's check-and-balance.
We initially voted NO for concerns of governance attack if the larger delegates are getting too much control. However are satisfied by the responses brought up by the Arbitrum team. With that we always agreed with the idea of the scaling the quorum with the # of delegated votes compared to total votable supply of arb, we just were concerned about implementation. Additionally, this proposal does appear to be the strongest proposal yet to address the issue.
We also think the on-chain proposal cancellation is very intuitive and have no objections.
We initially voted NO for concerns of governance attack if the larger delegates are getting too much control. However are satisfied by the responses brought up by the Arbitrum team. With that we always agreed with the idea of the scaling the quorum with the # of delegated votes compared to total votable supply of arb, we just were concerned about implementation. Additionally, this proposal does appear to be the strongest proposal yet to address the issue.
We also think the on-chain proposal cancellation is very intuitive and have no objections.
Therefore, we will be voting YES.
While I agree with your comments and understand the challenge with quorum, I do want to highlight that the ARB token’s ONLY UTILITY is governance. If there was any other utility for the token, I can see the rationale of changing the quorum to only active voting power given the multiple utility cases. By changing quorum, there is no motivation from the DAO or the Arbitrum Aligned Entities to find ways to increase governance participation because there wouldn't be a need. Additionally, there is still new supply of ARB being unlocked that is clearly not being used for governance purposes (they are being sold) which is creating sell pressure. Medium and small delegates will just leave the DAO if price keeps going down.
The DAO should be asking how to increase participation to meet quorum, not how to lower the bar. Lowering the bar leads to an accelerating consolidation of power, smaller delegates exiting once they see their influence is being diluted, continued Arbitrum's token price downturn, and a governance structure that serves insiders far more.
I’ve been looking through the technical spec for this, and honestly, basing quorum on total supply never made sense, it’s like measuring voter turnout by including people who aren't even registered to vote. Moving to a DVP-based model is the right move for the DAO's long-term efficiency because the switch to getTotalDelegation() finally tracks "active" voting power in real time. By using OpenZeppelin Checkpoints, we stop the participation hurdle from moving up just because more tokens are circulating, which has been a major pain point. Regarding the parameters, setting the Alpha (ɑ) at 0.5 for constitutional votes is a solid safeguard; it’s high enough to prevent "ghost" votes but low enough to keep governance moving given our current participation rates. I’m also a big fan of the 150m ARB Floor, it's a necessary fail-safe that protects us from a "low participation" attack if delegation numbers ever crash suddenly. After checking the Trail of Bits audit, the initialization logic for the running total seems solid and the gas overhead for these storage updates should be negligible for users. I’m voting FOR this because it’s time our math caught up with the reality of how this DAO actually functions.
I've been reviewing recent governance proposals and drafted a structured summary of the DVP Quorum & Proposal Cancellation proposal to help delegates evaluate tradeoffs. I may be a little late for this one, but I'm sharing in case it's helpful.
Governance Brief
Proposal: Delegated Voting Power (DVP) Quorum Model + Proposal Cancellation
DAO: Arbitrum DAO
Decision Snapshot:
I've been reviewing recent governance proposals and drafted a structured summary of the DVP Quorum & Proposal Cancellation proposal to help delegates evaluate tradeoffs. I may be a little late for this one, but I'm sharing in case it's helpful.
Governance Brief
Proposal: Delegated Voting Power (DVP) Quorum Model + Proposal Cancellation
DAO: Arbitrum DAO
Decision Snapshot:
Proposal Type: Governance infrastructure upgrade
Core Change: Quorum will be calculated using Delegated Voting Power (DVP) instead of total votable token supply.
Key Mechanism: Quorum becomes a dynamic threshold tied to delegated tokens, with minimum and maximum bounds.
Additional Upgrade: Adds on-chain proposal cancellation, allowing proposers to withdraw proposals during the 3-day pending window before voting starts.
Governance Impact: Aligns quorum with actual voting participation rather than inactive token supply.
Primary Risk: Greater reliance on delegated voting power may increase governance influence of large delegates.
Plain-Language Summary
Under the current system, quorum is based on total token supply, regardless of whether those tokens are actively delegated. This proposal changes quorum to reflect tokens actually delegated to vote.
How the new system works: If delegation is low, quorum defaults to a minimum floor. If delegation increases, quorum scales proportionally. If delegation becomes very large, quorum stops increasing at a defined maximum.
The proposal also adds a governance improvement: proposal creators can cancel their own proposal during the 3-day pending period, allowing errors or outdated parameters to be corrected without requiring the DAO to vote the proposal down.
Key Risks & Open Questions:
Delegation Concentration: Because quorum is based on delegated tokens, governance influence may become more concentrated among large delegates.
Delegation Volatility: Changes in delegation levels could alter quorum thresholds over time, potentially affecting proposal outcomes.
Initialization Estimate: The upgrade requires an initial estimate of total delegated voting power; if inaccurate, a follow-up governance proposal may be needed to correct it.
Governance Complexity: The dynamic quorum formula may be harder for casual participants to understand compared to the current fixed-percentage system.
Governance Accessibility Impact
This change makes governance more aligned with real participation but not necessarily easier to understand. By basing quorum on delegated voting power, the system reflects who is actually engaged in governance rather than relying on inactive token supply. However, the dynamic formula introduces additional complexity that most token holders are unlikely to track without summaries or analysis. As a result, the people who understand this formula will shape governance. Everyone else will need someone to translate it for them, or they'll continue standing on the sidelines.
Protocol Analyst (PGI)
MUX will vote for.
At its core, it adjusts quorum to reflect the tokens actually eligible to vote, rather than the total token supply. That approach makes sense. As delegated voting power (DVP) grows, the quorum requirement rises proportionally.
MUX will vote for.
At its core, it adjusts quorum to reflect the tokens actually eligible to vote, rather than the total token supply. That approach makes sense. As delegated voting power (DVP) grows, the quorum requirement rises proportionally.
The proposed thresholds also strike a reasonable balance: a 40% DVP requirement for non-constitutional proposals and a majority (over 50%) for constitutional changes.
Vote: FOR
Quorum should reflect the voting power that actually participates in governance. Moving to a delegated voting power-based quorum better aligns quorum with real participation levels and reduces the risk of governance gridlock as token supply grows.
Vote: FOR
Quorum should reflect the voting power that actually participates in governance. Moving to a delegated voting power-based quorum better aligns quorum with real participation levels and reduces the risk of governance gridlock as token supply grows.
I also support allowing proposal cancellation during the pending period, which avoids unnecessary governance cycles if issues are identified before voting starts.
I’ve been looking through the technical spec for this, and honestly, basing quorum on total supply never made sense, it’s like measuring voter turnout by including people who aren’t even registered to vote. Moving to a DVP-based model is the right move for the DAO’s long-term efficiency because the switch to getTotalDelegation() finally tracks “active” voting power in real time. By using OpenZeppelin Checkpoints, we stop the participation hurdle from moving up just because more tokens are circulating, which has been a major pain point. Regarding the parameters, setting the Alpha (ɑ) at 0.5 for constitutional votes is a solid safeguard; it’s high enough to prevent “ghost” votes but low enough to keep governance moving given our current participation rates. I’m also a big fan of the 150m ARB Floor, it’s a necessary fail-safe that protects us from a “low participation” attack if delegation numbers ever crash suddenly. After checking the Trail of Bits audit, the initialization logic for the running total seems solid and the gas overhead for these storage updates should be negligible for users. I’m voting FOR this because it’s time our math caught up with the reality of how this DAO actually functions.
I’ve been looking through the technical spec for this, and honestly, basing quorum on total supply never made sense, it’s like measuring voter turnout by including people who aren’t even registered to vote. Moving to a DVP-based model is the right move for the DAO’s long-term efficiency because the switch to getTotalDelegation() finally tracks “active” voting power in real time. By using OpenZeppelin Checkpoints, we stop the participation hurdle from moving up just because more tokens are circulating, which has been a major pain point. Regarding the parameters, setting the Alpha (ɑ) at 0.5 for constitutional votes is a solid safeguard; it’s high enough to prevent “ghost” votes but low enough to keep governance moving given our current participation rates. I’m also a big fan of the 150m ARB Floor, it’s a necessary fail-safe that protects us from a “low participation” attack if delegation numbers ever crash suddenly. After checking the Trail of Bits audit, the initialization logic for the running total seems solid and the gas overhead for these storage updates should be negligible for users. I’m voting FOR this because it’s time our math caught up with the reality of how this DAO actually functions.
The DAO should be asking how to increase participation to meet quorum, not how to lower the bar. Lowering the bar leads to an accelerating consolidation of power, smaller delegates exiting once they see their influence is being diluted, continued Arbitrum’s token price downturn, and a governance structure that serves insiders far more.
That’s a fair challenge, and I definitely agree that we shouldn’t ignore the root cause of voter apathy or the token's primary utility. However, from a technical and operational standpoint, the current system is creating a different kind of risk: Liveness Risk. Right now, as the ARB supply grows but stays in 'idle' wallets (like CEXs or cold storage), the 'total supply' math makes the quorum hurdle move higher while the active voting pool stays the same. If we don't adjust this, we eventually hit a 'governance gridlock' where even simple, necessary security upgrades can't pass because the math is literally impossible to reach.
I see the DVP-based model not as 'lowering the bar,' but as re-calibrating the scale to measure the people actually in the room. You're right that we need more utility and participation and programs like RAD are a great start for that but we shouldn't let the DAO's operational security be held hostage by 'zombie' tokens while we wait for those utility cases to arrive.
Ensuring that the baseline quorum (the 150m floor) remains high is our best defense against the consolidation of power you mentioned. It ensures that even with a dynamic quorum, a small group of insiders still can't bypass the community's check-and-balance.
We initially voted NO for concerns of governance attack if the larger delegates are getting too much control. However are satisfied by the responses brought up by the Arbitrum team. With that we always agreed with the idea of the scaling the quorum with the # of delegated votes compared to total votable supply of arb, we just were concerned about implementation. Additionally, this proposal does appear to be the strongest proposal yet to address the issue.
We also think the on-chain proposal cancellation is very intuitive and have no objections.
We initially voted NO for concerns of governance attack if the larger delegates are getting too much control. However are satisfied by the responses brought up by the Arbitrum team. With that we always agreed with the idea of the scaling the quorum with the # of delegated votes compared to total votable supply of arb, we just were concerned about implementation. Additionally, this proposal does appear to be the strongest proposal yet to address the issue.
We also think the on-chain proposal cancellation is very intuitive and have no objections.
Therefore, we will be voting YES.
While I agree with your comments and understand the challenge with quorum, I do want to highlight that the ARB token’s ONLY UTILITY is governance. If there was any other utility for the token, I can see the rationale of changing the quorum to only active voting power given the multiple utility cases. By changing quorum, there is no motivation from the DAO or the Arbitrum Aligned Entities to find ways to increase governance participation because there wouldn't be a need. Additionally, there is still new supply of ARB being unlocked that is clearly not being used for governance purposes (they are being sold) which is creating sell pressure. Medium and small delegates will just leave the DAO if price keeps going down.
The DAO should be asking how to increase participation to meet quorum, not how to lower the bar. Lowering the bar leads to an accelerating consolidation of power, smaller delegates exiting once they see their influence is being diluted, continued Arbitrum's token price downturn, and a governance structure that serves insiders far more.
I’ve been looking through the technical spec for this, and honestly, basing quorum on total supply never made sense, it’s like measuring voter turnout by including people who aren't even registered to vote. Moving to a DVP-based model is the right move for the DAO's long-term efficiency because the switch to getTotalDelegation() finally tracks "active" voting power in real time. By using OpenZeppelin Checkpoints, we stop the participation hurdle from moving up just because more tokens are circulating, which has been a major pain point. Regarding the parameters, setting the Alpha (ɑ) at 0.5 for constitutional votes is a solid safeguard; it’s high enough to prevent "ghost" votes but low enough to keep governance moving given our current participation rates. I’m also a big fan of the 150m ARB Floor, it's a necessary fail-safe that protects us from a "low participation" attack if delegation numbers ever crash suddenly. After checking the Trail of Bits audit, the initialization logic for the running total seems solid and the gas overhead for these storage updates should be negligible for users. I’m voting FOR this because it’s time our math caught up with the reality of how this DAO actually functions.
I've been reviewing recent governance proposals and drafted a structured summary of the DVP Quorum & Proposal Cancellation proposal to help delegates evaluate tradeoffs. I may be a little late for this one, but I'm sharing in case it's helpful.
Governance Brief
Proposal: Delegated Voting Power (DVP) Quorum Model + Proposal Cancellation
DAO: Arbitrum DAO
Decision Snapshot:
I've been reviewing recent governance proposals and drafted a structured summary of the DVP Quorum & Proposal Cancellation proposal to help delegates evaluate tradeoffs. I may be a little late for this one, but I'm sharing in case it's helpful.
Governance Brief
Proposal: Delegated Voting Power (DVP) Quorum Model + Proposal Cancellation
DAO: Arbitrum DAO
Decision Snapshot:
Proposal Type: Governance infrastructure upgrade
Core Change: Quorum will be calculated using Delegated Voting Power (DVP) instead of total votable token supply.
Key Mechanism: Quorum becomes a dynamic threshold tied to delegated tokens, with minimum and maximum bounds.
Additional Upgrade: Adds on-chain proposal cancellation, allowing proposers to withdraw proposals during the 3-day pending window before voting starts.
Governance Impact: Aligns quorum with actual voting participation rather than inactive token supply.
Primary Risk: Greater reliance on delegated voting power may increase governance influence of large delegates.
Plain-Language Summary
Under the current system, quorum is based on total token supply, regardless of whether those tokens are actively delegated. This proposal changes quorum to reflect tokens actually delegated to vote.
How the new system works: If delegation is low, quorum defaults to a minimum floor. If delegation increases, quorum scales proportionally. If delegation becomes very large, quorum stops increasing at a defined maximum.
The proposal also adds a governance improvement: proposal creators can cancel their own proposal during the 3-day pending period, allowing errors or outdated parameters to be corrected without requiring the DAO to vote the proposal down.
Key Risks & Open Questions:
Delegation Concentration: Because quorum is based on delegated tokens, governance influence may become more concentrated among large delegates.
Delegation Volatility: Changes in delegation levels could alter quorum thresholds over time, potentially affecting proposal outcomes.
Initialization Estimate: The upgrade requires an initial estimate of total delegated voting power; if inaccurate, a follow-up governance proposal may be needed to correct it.
Governance Complexity: The dynamic quorum formula may be harder for casual participants to understand compared to the current fixed-percentage system.
Governance Accessibility Impact
This change makes governance more aligned with real participation but not necessarily easier to understand. By basing quorum on delegated voting power, the system reflects who is actually engaged in governance rather than relying on inactive token supply. However, the dynamic formula introduces additional complexity that most token holders are unlikely to track without summaries or analysis. As a result, the people who understand this formula will shape governance. Everyone else will need someone to translate it for them, or they'll continue standing on the sidelines.
Protocol Analyst (PGI)
MUX will vote for.
At its core, it adjusts quorum to reflect the tokens actually eligible to vote, rather than the total token supply. That approach makes sense. As delegated voting power (DVP) grows, the quorum requirement rises proportionally.
MUX will vote for.
At its core, it adjusts quorum to reflect the tokens actually eligible to vote, rather than the total token supply. That approach makes sense. As delegated voting power (DVP) grows, the quorum requirement rises proportionally.
The proposed thresholds also strike a reasonable balance: a 40% DVP requirement for non-constitutional proposals and a majority (over 50%) for constitutional changes.
Vote: FOR
Quorum should reflect the voting power that actually participates in governance. Moving to a delegated voting power-based quorum better aligns quorum with real participation levels and reduces the risk of governance gridlock as token supply grows.
Vote: FOR
Quorum should reflect the voting power that actually participates in governance. Moving to a delegated voting power-based quorum better aligns quorum with real participation levels and reduces the risk of governance gridlock as token supply grows.
I also support allowing proposal cancellation during the pending period, which avoids unnecessary governance cycles if issues are identified before voting starts.
I am also voting FOR.
The problem is real. Quorum keeps rising because it is tied to total supply, not actual delegated participation. That creates a liveness risk and gives a few large delegates effective veto power. DVP-based quorum fixes the core issue by linking thresholds to real governance activity.
I am also voting FOR.
The problem is real. Quorum keeps rising because it is tied to total supply, not actual delegated participation. That creates a liveness risk and gives a few large delegates effective veto power. DVP-based quorum fixes the core issue by linking thresholds to real governance activity.
So the direction is correct. The trade-offs are understood. We should implement it, but stay aware of the risks and be ready to adjust parameters if needed.
The ArbitrumDAO recently expressed strong interest in moving towards a delegated voting power (DVP)-based quorum model. Consequently, this upgrade, if implemented, will define quorum as:
The ArbitrumDAO recently expressed strong interest in moving towards a delegated voting power (DVP)-based quorum model. Consequently, this upgrade, if implemented, will define quorum as:
Quorum = min{max quorum, max{ɑ*DVP, baseline quorum}}
where ɑ, baseline quorum, and max quorum are constants.
This proposal aims to finalize the implementation and accompanying parameters of this upgrade - ɑ, baseline quorum, and maximum quorum. If this temperature check is successful, the proposal will move towards an on-chain vote in February.
As it stands, ArbitrumDAO’s quorum is computed based on the total voteable supply, which has no relationship to the tokens registered to vote. This proposal introduces a better approach by basing quorum on delegated voting power (DVP) - a metric that more directly represents the amount of ARB participating in governance and available for voting.
All of the relevant context and motivation may be found in the previously published posts on this topic. The first report focuses on the rationale for the change, the historical performance of quorum, and the security implications of this upgrade. The second report is a comparative analysis of quorum across other large DAOs, as well as shareholder voting in public companies, aimed at presenting insights into ArbitrumDAO’s position relative to comparable systems. The motivation around this update is captured in the initial temperature check.
This AIP proposes upgrading to the following quorum computation logic:
Quorum = min{max quorum, max{ɑ*DVP, baseline quorum}}
where ɑ, baseline quorum, and max quorum are constants.
The proposed formula works as follows:
In short, baseline quorum and max quorum form fixed lower and upper bounds for quorum.
We suggest the following parameters:
For constitutional proposals:
For non-constitutional proposals:
A Trail of Bits audit of the proposed changes can be found here. Note that to initialize the running total, an estimate of the total DVP must be provided as part of the upgrade proposal. A followup proposal can correct any error in the initial DVP estimate, if needed.
For non-constitutional proposals, our recommendation of ɑ = 0.4 ensures continuity with the current non-constitutional quorum. At the current DVP of 348.61m ARB, non-constitutional quorum will equate to 139.4m ARB, which is very close to its current value of 145.56m ARB.
For constitutional proposals, our recommendation for an ɑ value of 0.5 aims at creating a safer buffer between voter turnout and quorum while retaining a high voter turnout. Most large DAOs operate with quorum thresholds well below fifty percent of delegated voting power, and corporate and legislative systems rarely employ supermajority quorum requirements. As concluded by research report #2, when quorum is expressed as a percentage of DVP, its value at ArbitrumDAO (~62% of DVP) is roughly double that of the next highest DAO benchmarked. Even after the proposed upgrade, ArbitrumDAO’s quorum would remain higher than all comparable DAOs reviewed by the report.
Historical participation data of ArbitrumDAO provides strong support for the baseline quorum values proposed. Over the last two years, the average quorum for non-constitutional proposals amounted to ~104m ARB, which motivates our recommendation of a 100m ARB baseline for non-constitutional proposals. For constitutional proposals, the average quorum, excluding periods in which quorum was structurally difficult to reach, falls around 156m ARB, motivating our recommendation of a 150m ARB baseline. These values preserve continuity with observed voting behavior while creating a sufficiently large lower bound for quorum.
Note that baseline quorum values will not apply until DVP drops below a certain threshold. For the constitutional baseline quorum to apply, DVP would need to drop below 300m ARB. At all values of delegation below this threshold, a constitutional proposal will require a quorum of 150m ARB. For the non-constitutional baseline quorum to apply, DVP would need to drop below 250m ARB.
The implementation also includes an explicit smart contract setting to configure a maximum value of constitutional and non-constitutional quorum. This is a static parameter that can be updated through a DAO vote if needed. A maximum quorum of 450m ARB for constitutional proposals and 300m ARB for non-constitutional proposals are proposed. These values are fully consistent with the current maximum quorum values (where they are defined as 3% and 4.5% of the maximum voteable token supply) and as such aim to retain the status quo on the upper bound. For additional context, DVP would need to go over 750m ARB for the non-constitutional max quorum to be triggered and to over 900m ARB for the constitutional max quorum to be triggered.
Going forward, these thresholds may further act as checkpoints for the DAO to reconsider the DVP-quorum model’s performance in a high-DVP scenario.
Due to the upgrade’s nature, the following updates will be made to the Definitions and DAO Proposals and Voting Procedures sections of the ArbitrumDAO Constitution, in order to reflect the new way quorum is calculated.
Change 1: Definitions
Definitions:
- AIP: An Arbitrum Improvement Proposal
- ArbitrumDAO-governed chains: The Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova chains and any additional chains authorized by the ArbitrumDAO
- DAO Treasury: All $ARB tokens held in a governance smart contract governed directly by the ArbitrumDAO and/or the Security Council of The Arbitrum Foundation via on-chain voting mechanisms.
- Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are governed by the $ARB token
- Non-Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are not governed by the $ARB token
- Votable Tokens: All $ARB tokens in existence, excluding any tokens held by The Arbitrum Foundation and any unclaimed airdrops
Definitions:
- AIP: An Arbitrum Improvement Proposal
- ArbitrumDAO-governed chains: The Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova chains and any additional chains authorized by the ArbitrumDAO
- DAO Treasury: All $ARB tokens held in a governance smart contract governed directly by the ArbitrumDAO and/or the Security Council of The Arbitrum Foundation via on-chain voting mechanisms.
- Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are governed by the $ARB token
- Non-Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are not governed by the $ARB token
- Votable Tokens: All $ARB tokens in existence, excluding any tokens held by The Arbitrum Foundation and any unclaimed airdrops
- Delegated Votable Tokens: The sum of Votable Tokens currently delegated and eligible for governance participation Change 2: DAO Proposals and Voting Procedures
Phase 3: DAO votes on AIP, on Arbitrum One (14–16 days): During this Phase 3, the ArbitrumDAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP.
An AIP passes if the following 2 conditions are met:
More Votable Tokens have cast votes “in favor” than have cast votes “against” (“Threshold 1”); and
In the case of a:
- Constitutional AIP, at least 4.5% of all Votable Tokens have cast votes either “in favor” or “abstain”; or
- Non-Constitutional AIP, at least 3% of all Votable Tokens have cast votes either “in favor” or “abstain” (collectively, “Threshold 2”).
Phase 3: DAO votes on AIP, on Arbitrum One (14–16 days): During this Phase 3, the ArbitrumDAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP.
An AIP passes if the following 2 conditions are met:
- More Votable Tokens have cast votes “in favor” than have cast votes “against” (“Threshold 1”); and
- In the case of a: 3.- Constitutional AIP, at least 50% of all Delegated Votable Tokens, as well as a minimum of 150 million $ARB and a maximum of 450 million $ARB, have cast votes either “in favor” or “abstain”; or** 4.- Non-Constitutional AIP, at least 40% of all Delegated Votable Tokens, as well as a minimum of 100 million $ARB and a maximum of 300 million $ARB, have cast votes either “in favor” or “abstain” (collectively, “Threshold 2”).**
This temperature check will include two voting options:
We aim to take this proposal to a temperature check vote starting 05/02/2025. Following a successful temperature check, the proposal will be put to an on-chain vote.
I’m voting FOR because quorum should reflect the tokens that are actually participating in governance, not the total supply. In my view, that just makes more sense and better reflects reality. Overall, it’s a straightforward update that makes the system more accurate and fair.
The total voteable token supply keeps growing while actual voter participation stays the same, making quorum artificially harder to reach.
The total voteable token supply keeps growing while actual voter participation stays the same, making quorum artificially harder to reach.
Switching to a delegated voting power model just measures the people who actually vote as opposed to tokens that never show up.
Reiterating my previous comments for this new vote.
We are voting against this proposal. We agree that the issue of rising Arbitrium supply and constant delegated votes is a crucial issue that needs to be resolved. It’s our firm belief that voter apathy is a concern that directly undemocratizes the DAO. We do not ignore the first issue and it’s an incredibly pressing priority for the DAO that many people have pointed out. That said, although this may solve the issue of not being able to pass proposals in the future due to fluctuations in delegated votes, our main concern is that this proposal does not make a targeted attempt at solving the voter apathy problem (the core issue), and the centralization tradeoffs as well as DAO attack risks seem to outweigh the benefits.
For us, removing an incentive for smaller or inactive voters to participate is more than a necessary tradeoff. We think anything that removes the urgency for smaller voters to vote is critically in the wrong direction. We’d prefer to see something that also takes a stab at improving voter turnout/engagement.
I voted FOR this proposal because the current quorum system is broken.
The total voteable token supply keeps growing while actual voter participation stays the same, making quorum artificially harder to reach.
Switching to a delegated voting power model just measures the people who actually vote as opposed to tokens that never show up.
Reverie is voting FOR this proposal
I am also voting FOR.
The problem is real. Quorum keeps rising because it is tied to total supply, not actual delegated participation. That creates a liveness risk and gives a few large delegates effective veto power. DVP-based quorum fixes the core issue by linking thresholds to real governance activity.
I am also voting FOR.
The problem is real. Quorum keeps rising because it is tied to total supply, not actual delegated participation. That creates a liveness risk and gives a few large delegates effective veto power. DVP-based quorum fixes the core issue by linking thresholds to real governance activity.
So the direction is correct. The trade-offs are understood. We should implement it, but stay aware of the risks and be ready to adjust parameters if needed.
The ArbitrumDAO recently expressed strong interest in moving towards a delegated voting power (DVP)-based quorum model. Consequently, this upgrade, if implemented, will define quorum as:
The ArbitrumDAO recently expressed strong interest in moving towards a delegated voting power (DVP)-based quorum model. Consequently, this upgrade, if implemented, will define quorum as:
Quorum = min{max quorum, max{ɑ*DVP, baseline quorum}}
where ɑ, baseline quorum, and max quorum are constants.
This proposal aims to finalize the implementation and accompanying parameters of this upgrade - ɑ, baseline quorum, and maximum quorum. If this temperature check is successful, the proposal will move towards an on-chain vote in February.
As it stands, ArbitrumDAO’s quorum is computed based on the total voteable supply, which has no relationship to the tokens registered to vote. This proposal introduces a better approach by basing quorum on delegated voting power (DVP) - a metric that more directly represents the amount of ARB participating in governance and available for voting.
All of the relevant context and motivation may be found in the previously published posts on this topic. The first report focuses on the rationale for the change, the historical performance of quorum, and the security implications of this upgrade. The second report is a comparative analysis of quorum across other large DAOs, as well as shareholder voting in public companies, aimed at presenting insights into ArbitrumDAO’s position relative to comparable systems. The motivation around this update is captured in the initial temperature check.
This AIP proposes upgrading to the following quorum computation logic:
Quorum = min{max quorum, max{ɑ*DVP, baseline quorum}}
where ɑ, baseline quorum, and max quorum are constants.
The proposed formula works as follows:
In short, baseline quorum and max quorum form fixed lower and upper bounds for quorum.
We suggest the following parameters:
For constitutional proposals:
For non-constitutional proposals:
A Trail of Bits audit of the proposed changes can be found here. Note that to initialize the running total, an estimate of the total DVP must be provided as part of the upgrade proposal. A followup proposal can correct any error in the initial DVP estimate, if needed.
For non-constitutional proposals, our recommendation of ɑ = 0.4 ensures continuity with the current non-constitutional quorum. At the current DVP of 348.61m ARB, non-constitutional quorum will equate to 139.4m ARB, which is very close to its current value of 145.56m ARB.
For constitutional proposals, our recommendation for an ɑ value of 0.5 aims at creating a safer buffer between voter turnout and quorum while retaining a high voter turnout. Most large DAOs operate with quorum thresholds well below fifty percent of delegated voting power, and corporate and legislative systems rarely employ supermajority quorum requirements. As concluded by research report #2, when quorum is expressed as a percentage of DVP, its value at ArbitrumDAO (~62% of DVP) is roughly double that of the next highest DAO benchmarked. Even after the proposed upgrade, ArbitrumDAO’s quorum would remain higher than all comparable DAOs reviewed by the report.
Historical participation data of ArbitrumDAO provides strong support for the baseline quorum values proposed. Over the last two years, the average quorum for non-constitutional proposals amounted to ~104m ARB, which motivates our recommendation of a 100m ARB baseline for non-constitutional proposals. For constitutional proposals, the average quorum, excluding periods in which quorum was structurally difficult to reach, falls around 156m ARB, motivating our recommendation of a 150m ARB baseline. These values preserve continuity with observed voting behavior while creating a sufficiently large lower bound for quorum.
Note that baseline quorum values will not apply until DVP drops below a certain threshold. For the constitutional baseline quorum to apply, DVP would need to drop below 300m ARB. At all values of delegation below this threshold, a constitutional proposal will require a quorum of 150m ARB. For the non-constitutional baseline quorum to apply, DVP would need to drop below 250m ARB.
The implementation also includes an explicit smart contract setting to configure a maximum value of constitutional and non-constitutional quorum. This is a static parameter that can be updated through a DAO vote if needed. A maximum quorum of 450m ARB for constitutional proposals and 300m ARB for non-constitutional proposals are proposed. These values are fully consistent with the current maximum quorum values (where they are defined as 3% and 4.5% of the maximum voteable token supply) and as such aim to retain the status quo on the upper bound. For additional context, DVP would need to go over 750m ARB for the non-constitutional max quorum to be triggered and to over 900m ARB for the constitutional max quorum to be triggered.
Going forward, these thresholds may further act as checkpoints for the DAO to reconsider the DVP-quorum model’s performance in a high-DVP scenario.
Due to the upgrade’s nature, the following updates will be made to the Definitions and DAO Proposals and Voting Procedures sections of the ArbitrumDAO Constitution, in order to reflect the new way quorum is calculated.
Change 1: Definitions
Definitions:
- AIP: An Arbitrum Improvement Proposal
- ArbitrumDAO-governed chains: The Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova chains and any additional chains authorized by the ArbitrumDAO
- DAO Treasury: All $ARB tokens held in a governance smart contract governed directly by the ArbitrumDAO and/or the Security Council of The Arbitrum Foundation via on-chain voting mechanisms.
- Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are governed by the $ARB token
- Non-Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are not governed by the $ARB token
- Votable Tokens: All $ARB tokens in existence, excluding any tokens held by The Arbitrum Foundation and any unclaimed airdrops
Definitions:
- AIP: An Arbitrum Improvement Proposal
- ArbitrumDAO-governed chains: The Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova chains and any additional chains authorized by the ArbitrumDAO
- DAO Treasury: All $ARB tokens held in a governance smart contract governed directly by the ArbitrumDAO and/or the Security Council of The Arbitrum Foundation via on-chain voting mechanisms.
- Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are governed by the $ARB token
- Non-Governed Chains: Any ArbitrumDAO-approved chains that are not governed by the $ARB token
- Votable Tokens: All $ARB tokens in existence, excluding any tokens held by The Arbitrum Foundation and any unclaimed airdrops
- Delegated Votable Tokens: The sum of Votable Tokens currently delegated and eligible for governance participation Change 2: DAO Proposals and Voting Procedures
Phase 3: DAO votes on AIP, on Arbitrum One (14–16 days): During this Phase 3, the ArbitrumDAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP.
An AIP passes if the following 2 conditions are met:
More Votable Tokens have cast votes “in favor” than have cast votes “against” (“Threshold 1”); and
In the case of a:
- Constitutional AIP, at least 4.5% of all Votable Tokens have cast votes either “in favor” or “abstain”; or
- Non-Constitutional AIP, at least 3% of all Votable Tokens have cast votes either “in favor” or “abstain” (collectively, “Threshold 2”).
Phase 3: DAO votes on AIP, on Arbitrum One (14–16 days): During this Phase 3, the ArbitrumDAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP.
An AIP passes if the following 2 conditions are met:
- More Votable Tokens have cast votes “in favor” than have cast votes “against” (“Threshold 1”); and
- In the case of a: 3.- Constitutional AIP, at least 50% of all Delegated Votable Tokens, as well as a minimum of 150 million $ARB and a maximum of 450 million $ARB, have cast votes either “in favor” or “abstain”; or** 4.- Non-Constitutional AIP, at least 40% of all Delegated Votable Tokens, as well as a minimum of 100 million $ARB and a maximum of 300 million $ARB, have cast votes either “in favor” or “abstain” (collectively, “Threshold 2”).**
This temperature check will include two voting options:
We aim to take this proposal to a temperature check vote starting 05/02/2025. Following a successful temperature check, the proposal will be put to an on-chain vote.
I’m voting FOR because quorum should reflect the tokens that are actually participating in governance, not the total supply. In my view, that just makes more sense and better reflects reality. Overall, it’s a straightforward update that makes the system more accurate and fair.
The total voteable token supply keeps growing while actual voter participation stays the same, making quorum artificially harder to reach.
The total voteable token supply keeps growing while actual voter participation stays the same, making quorum artificially harder to reach.
Switching to a delegated voting power model just measures the people who actually vote as opposed to tokens that never show up.
Reiterating my previous comments for this new vote.
We are voting against this proposal. We agree that the issue of rising Arbitrium supply and constant delegated votes is a crucial issue that needs to be resolved. It’s our firm belief that voter apathy is a concern that directly undemocratizes the DAO. We do not ignore the first issue and it’s an incredibly pressing priority for the DAO that many people have pointed out. That said, although this may solve the issue of not being able to pass proposals in the future due to fluctuations in delegated votes, our main concern is that this proposal does not make a targeted attempt at solving the voter apathy problem (the core issue), and the centralization tradeoffs as well as DAO attack risks seem to outweigh the benefits.
For us, removing an incentive for smaller or inactive voters to participate is more than a necessary tradeoff. We think anything that removes the urgency for smaller voters to vote is critically in the wrong direction. We’d prefer to see something that also takes a stab at improving voter turnout/engagement.
I voted FOR this proposal because the current quorum system is broken.
The total voteable token supply keeps growing while actual voter participation stays the same, making quorum artificially harder to reach.
Switching to a delegated voting power model just measures the people who actually vote as opposed to tokens that never show up.
Reverie is voting FOR this proposal
We are voting against this proposal. We agree that the issue of rising Arbitrium supply and constant delegated votes is a crucial issue that needs to be resolved. It’s our firm belief that voter apathy is a concern that directly undemocratizes the DAO. We do not ignore the first issue and it’s an incredibly pressing priority for the DAO that many people have pointed out. That said, although this may solve the issue of not being able to pass proposals in the future due to fluctuations in delegated votes, our main concern is that this proposal does not make a targeted attempt at solving the voter apathy problem (the core issue), and the centralization tradeoffs as well as DAO attack risks seem to outweigh the benefits.
For us, removing an incentive for smaller or inactive voters to participate is more than a necessary tradeoff. We think anything that removes the urgency for smaller voters to vote is critically in the wrong direction. We’d prefer to see something that also takes a stab at improving voter turnout/engagement.
We think this is a well thought out proposal and a great stab at the problem, but the tradeoffs seem too large and forced for us to comfortably agree. We think that there should be voting incentives directly embedded in the proposal, and that this is more important than increasing the ease of passing proposals.
We are voting against this proposal. We agree that the issue of rising Arbitrium supply and constant delegated votes is a crucial issue that needs to be resolved. It’s our firm belief that voter apathy is a concern that directly undemocratizes the DAO. We do not ignore the first issue and it’s an incredibly pressing priority for the DAO that many people have pointed out. That said, although this may solve the issue of not being able to pass proposals in the future due to fluctuations in delegated votes, our main concern is that this proposal does not make a targeted attempt at solving the voter apathy problem (the core issue), and the centralization tradeoffs as well as DAO attack risks seem to outweigh the benefits.
For us, removing an incentive for smaller or inactive voters to participate is more than a necessary tradeoff. We think anything that removes the urgency for smaller voters to vote is critically in the wrong direction. We’d prefer to see something that also takes a stab at improving voter turnout/engagement.
We think this is a well thought out proposal and a great stab at the problem, but the tradeoffs seem too large and forced for us to comfortably agree. We think that there should be voting incentives directly embedded in the proposal, and that this is more important than increasing the ease of passing proposals.
Interesting approach, clearer execution tooling is definitely an area the DAO can improve. Looking forward to seeing how this develops.
I support the proposal and the parameters as well.
I still find great incentives for smaller delegates to have influence, as voting against a proposal that already has reached quorum signals to the rest of the DAO that not everyone is in alignment, and bystanders/token holders might shift their delegation based on this.
@cp0x I agree with the points you’ve raised and alsoshare your concerns. Lowering the quorum to a level where 5 or 6 top delegates could effectively meet it on their own would undeniably diminish the influence of smaller delegates, who represent the majority of the voter base which will discourage participation and weaken the broader governance ecosystem
That said, this is roughly ten months too late since Arbitrum Foundation outlined its new strategic vision which explicitly shifts greater authority and operational control toward Arbitrum Aligned Entitiees (Offchain Labs, Entropy, Arbitrum Foundation, etc.). In that context, the proposed quorum change appears consistent with the broader direction they have already signaled: a more centralized governance structure anchored by those AAE.
Interesting approach, clearer execution tooling is definitely an area the DAO can improve. Looking forward to seeing how this develops.
I support the proposal and the parameters as well.
I still find great incentives for smaller delegates to have influence, as voting against a proposal that already has reached quorum signals to the rest of the DAO that not everyone is in alignment, and bystanders/token holders might shift their delegation based on this.
@cp0x I agree with the points you’ve raised and alsoshare your concerns. Lowering the quorum to a level where 5 or 6 top delegates could effectively meet it on their own would undeniably diminish the influence of smaller delegates, who represent the majority of the voter base which will discourage participation and weaken the broader governance ecosystem
That said, this is roughly ten months too late since Arbitrum Foundation outlined its new strategic vision which explicitly shifts greater authority and operational control toward Arbitrum Aligned Entitiees (Offchain Labs, Entropy, Arbitrum Foundation, etc.). In that context, the proposed quorum change appears consistent with the broader direction they have already signaled: a more centralized governance structure anchored by those AAE.
Please refer to the Changelog section for updates to the proposal text as the AIP moves from the temperature check to an on-chain vote.
Please refer to the Changelog section for updates to the proposal text as the AIP moves from the temperature check to an on-chain vote.
We want to thank everyone for voting in the temperature check and for all the comments and feedback on this topic. As the onchain vote on DVP quorum and proposal cancellation is starting tomorrow, we want to address some of the outstanding questions/feedback.
We want to thank everyone for voting in the temperature check and for all the comments and feedback on this topic. As the onchain vote on DVP quorum and proposal cancellation is starting tomorrow, we want to address some of the outstanding questions/feedback.
For us, removing an incentive for smaller or inactive voters to participate is more than a necessary tradeoff. We think anything that removes the urgency for smaller voters to vote is critically in the wrong direction. We’d prefer to see something that also takes a stab at improving voter turnout/engagement.
As concluded in research report 2, ArbitrumDAO boasts one of the highest participation rates in the ecosystem. At certain points in 2025, over 70% of delegated tokens were active in governance, while the second most active DAO by the same metric had a participation rate close to 30%. Over 10,000 wallets have voted in at least one onchain proposal in the last year, and close to 35% of the active wallets have voted in 50% of onchain proposals [data]. While there is room for participation to increase further, especially as a percentage of total supply, that should be pursued independent of this proposal, and there are existing efforts aiming to address this.
As it relates to your other points, please refer to discussions in previous posts, including on security/attack vectors here and here.
Even under the current configuration, it is extremely “cheap” to attack Arbitrum, given the DAO’s TVL and treasury. The cost to reach quorum has fallen by 67% since this proposal was first discussed, from $56M to $18.3M for constitutional proposals.
The more concerning issue is security. At current ARB prices, with the reduced quorum, roughly $17M worth of voting power would be enough to reach constitutional quorum and very likely determine the outcome of almost any proposal. Governance attacks become significantly cheaper.
Kindly refer to discussions on security in the previous posts, i.e., 1 and 2, as well as the responsibilities of the Security Council outlined in the DAO constitution. Importantly, the DAO has in place several security instruments to block adversarial takeover attempts irrespective of the dollar value of reaching quorum.
However, we want to reiterate that this change primarily alleviates symptoms rather than addressing the root cause of low delegation, which remains a structural concern. With only a small percentage of ARB holders participating and voting power already concentrated, this model may further reinforce the issues we are already observing in the governance.
We agree with the need to bring more DVP into the system. There are ongoing efforts across OpCo, AF, and OCL to get more tokenholders to delegate their ARB, which have already resulted in an increase of delegated voting power by ~50M in December 2025. We expect that the system will continue to gain more delegation in the months and years to come.
At low DVP values, the baseline quorum value will apply. In the edge case of DVP dropping even further, such that the baseline quorum value is no longer feasible (either active DVP < baseline quorum or DVP < baseline quorum), the DAO will need to reassess how to get more delegation into the system so that decisions are backed by a sufficient amount of ARB.
After the upgrade, the DAO will have a larger cushion between constitutional quorum requirement and participation. It’s also important to note that under the new model, it will be much costlier to pass a malicious proposal or to block a beneficial proposal by forming an abstaining coalition. Please also refer to the previous discussions under the initial research report on how the system adapts to delegate behavior changes.
Both the Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs will be monitoring the performance of the upgraded model, using metrics like voting trends across different voter sets and proposal types (including any DVP quorum impact), DVP and quorum adjustment over time, delegate influx and churn, etc.
Thanks for putting this together. Overall, I think the move to a DVP-based quorum is the right direction and long overdue. Tying quorum to the supply that actually shows up and participates makes far more sense than anchoring it to total voteable supply, which has always felt disconnected from reality.
The formula itself is clean and intuitive. Having both a baseline and a ceiling strikes a good balance between safety and flexibility. It protects the DAO in low-participation periods without letting quorum drift into unreachable territory as delegation grows.
Thanks for putting this together. Overall, I think the move to a DVP-based quorum is the right direction and long overdue. Tying quorum to the supply that actually shows up and participates makes far more sense than anchoring it to total voteable supply, which has always felt disconnected from reality.
The formula itself is clean and intuitive. Having both a baseline and a ceiling strikes a good balance between safety and flexibility. It protects the DAO in low-participation periods without letting quorum drift into unreachable territory as delegation grows.
On the parameters, the non-constitutional side feels well calibrated. Using α = 0.4 to preserve continuity with current quorum levels is sensible, and the baseline at 100m ARB lines up nicely with historical participation. This should make the transition feel smooth rather than disruptive.
For constitutional proposals, I agree with the reasoning behind a higher α. A stronger buffer here is justified given the stakes, and even at 0.5, Arbitrum remains stricter than most comparable DAOs. That said, I think it would be helpful to be explicit about how often the 150m baseline is expected to bind in practice and whether the DAO sees this as a long-term floor or something to revisit once delegation patterns mature further.
I also appreciate the inclusion of an explicit max quorum. Keeping the upper bound consistent with today’s effective limits avoids introducing new failure modes, and framing these thresholds as future checkpoints for review is the right mindset.
One small point I’d like clarity on is the initial DVP estimate used at deployment. While a follow-up correction is possible, it would be good to understand how sensitive quorum outcomes are to that starting value and what margin of error is considered acceptable.
Net-net, this proposal feels careful, data-backed, and pragmatic. It improves governance without over-optimizing or reinventing the system, which is exactly what a constitutional change should aim for. I’m supportive of moving this forward and would be interested in revisiting the parameters once we have real data from a few cycles under the new model
The computation in your post is a bit strange.
Why is it computing quorum based on 232.22m ARB? Quorum is computed as a percentage of the total delegated voting power which is 349m ARB.
This is ~139m (40%) and ~174m ARB (50%). Non-constitutional is quite close to current value of 145m.
The computation in your post is a bit strange.
Why is it computing quorum based on 232.22m ARB? Quorum is computed as a percentage of the total delegated voting power which is 349m ARB.
This is ~139m (40%) and ~174m ARB (50%). Non-constitutional is quite close to current value of 145m.
100m and 150m represent safety values for Quorum, and for it to reach that number, total delegated voting power will need to be reduced and that’ll likely impact the voting power of most delegates.
We want to thank everyone for voting in the temperature check and for all the comments and feedback on this topic. As the onchain vote on DVP quorum and proposal cancellation is starting tomorrow, we want to address some of the outstanding questions/feedback.
We want to thank everyone for voting in the temperature check and for all the comments and feedback on this topic. As the onchain vote on DVP quorum and proposal cancellation is starting tomorrow, we want to address some of the outstanding questions/feedback.
For us, removing an incentive for smaller or inactive voters to participate is more than a necessary tradeoff. We think anything that removes the urgency for smaller voters to vote is critically in the wrong direction. We’d prefer to see something that also takes a stab at improving voter turnout/engagement.
As concluded in research report 2, ArbitrumDAO boasts one of the highest participation rates in the ecosystem. At certain points in 2025, over 70% of delegated tokens were active in governance, while the second most active DAO by the same metric had a participation rate close to 30%. Over 10,000 wallets have voted in at least one onchain proposal in the last year, and close to 35% of the active wallets have voted in 50% of onchain proposals [data]. While there is room for participation to increase further, especially as a percentage of total supply, that should be pursued independent of this proposal, and there are existing efforts aiming to address this.
As it relates to your other points, please refer to discussions in previous posts, including on security/attack vectors here and here.
Even under the current configuration, it is extremely “cheap” to attack Arbitrum, given the DAO’s TVL and treasury. The cost to reach quorum has fallen by 67% since this proposal was first discussed, from $56M to $18.3M for constitutional proposals.
The more concerning issue is security. At current ARB prices, with the reduced quorum, roughly $17M worth of voting power would be enough to reach constitutional quorum and very likely determine the outcome of almost any proposal. Governance attacks become significantly cheaper.
Kindly refer to discussions on security in the previous posts, i.e., 1 and 2, as well as the responsibilities of the Security Council outlined in the DAO constitution. Importantly, the DAO has in place several security instruments to block adversarial takeover attempts irrespective of the dollar value of reaching quorum.
However, we want to reiterate that this change primarily alleviates symptoms rather than addressing the root cause of low delegation, which remains a structural concern. With only a small percentage of ARB holders participating and voting power already concentrated, this model may further reinforce the issues we are already observing in the governance.
We agree with the need to bring more DVP into the system. There are ongoing efforts across OpCo, AF, and OCL to get more tokenholders to delegate their ARB, which have already resulted in an increase of delegated voting power by ~50M in December 2025. We expect that the system will continue to gain more delegation in the months and years to come.
At low DVP values, the baseline quorum value will apply. In the edge case of DVP dropping even further, such that the baseline quorum value is no longer feasible (either active DVP < baseline quorum or DVP < baseline quorum), the DAO will need to reassess how to get more delegation into the system so that decisions are backed by a sufficient amount of ARB.
After the upgrade, the DAO will have a larger cushion between constitutional quorum requirement and participation. It’s also important to note that under the new model, it will be much costlier to pass a malicious proposal or to block a beneficial proposal by forming an abstaining coalition. Please also refer to the previous discussions under the initial research report on how the system adapts to delegate behavior changes.
Both the Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs will be monitoring the performance of the upgraded model, using metrics like voting trends across different voter sets and proposal types (including any DVP quorum impact), DVP and quorum adjustment over time, delegate influx and churn, etc.
Thanks for putting this together. Overall, I think the move to a DVP-based quorum is the right direction and long overdue. Tying quorum to the supply that actually shows up and participates makes far more sense than anchoring it to total voteable supply, which has always felt disconnected from reality.
The formula itself is clean and intuitive. Having both a baseline and a ceiling strikes a good balance between safety and flexibility. It protects the DAO in low-participation periods without letting quorum drift into unreachable territory as delegation grows.
Thanks for putting this together. Overall, I think the move to a DVP-based quorum is the right direction and long overdue. Tying quorum to the supply that actually shows up and participates makes far more sense than anchoring it to total voteable supply, which has always felt disconnected from reality.
The formula itself is clean and intuitive. Having both a baseline and a ceiling strikes a good balance between safety and flexibility. It protects the DAO in low-participation periods without letting quorum drift into unreachable territory as delegation grows.
On the parameters, the non-constitutional side feels well calibrated. Using α = 0.4 to preserve continuity with current quorum levels is sensible, and the baseline at 100m ARB lines up nicely with historical participation. This should make the transition feel smooth rather than disruptive.
For constitutional proposals, I agree with the reasoning behind a higher α. A stronger buffer here is justified given the stakes, and even at 0.5, Arbitrum remains stricter than most comparable DAOs. That said, I think it would be helpful to be explicit about how often the 150m baseline is expected to bind in practice and whether the DAO sees this as a long-term floor or something to revisit once delegation patterns mature further.
I also appreciate the inclusion of an explicit max quorum. Keeping the upper bound consistent with today’s effective limits avoids introducing new failure modes, and framing these thresholds as future checkpoints for review is the right mindset.
One small point I’d like clarity on is the initial DVP estimate used at deployment. While a follow-up correction is possible, it would be good to understand how sensitive quorum outcomes are to that starting value and what margin of error is considered acceptable.
Net-net, this proposal feels careful, data-backed, and pragmatic. It improves governance without over-optimizing or reinventing the system, which is exactly what a constitutional change should aim for. I’m supportive of moving this forward and would be interested in revisiting the parameters once we have real data from a few cycles under the new model
The computation in your post is a bit strange.
Why is it computing quorum based on 232.22m ARB? Quorum is computed as a percentage of the total delegated voting power which is 349m ARB.
This is ~139m (40%) and ~174m ARB (50%). Non-constitutional is quite close to current value of 145m.
The computation in your post is a bit strange.
Why is it computing quorum based on 232.22m ARB? Quorum is computed as a percentage of the total delegated voting power which is 349m ARB.
This is ~139m (40%) and ~174m ARB (50%). Non-constitutional is quite close to current value of 145m.
100m and 150m represent safety values for Quorum, and for it to reach that number, total delegated voting power will need to be reduced and that’ll likely impact the voting power of most delegates.
Appreciate @Arbitrum for putting together this AIP and the thorough research reports that preceded it. At Tally, we recognize the value of aligning quorum with actual governance participation rather than total voteable supply. A DVP-based model better reflects the reality of who's available to vote, and the proposed parameters strike a reasonable balance between accessibility and security.
Should this constitutional AIP pass down the line, we're committed to working closely with the Foundation to ensure the new quorum thresholds are clearly communicated from the governance application. This includes displaying the dynamic quorum calculations so delegates and token holders can easily understand what's required for proposals to pass under the new model.
Appreciate @Arbitrum for putting together this AIP and the thorough research reports that preceded it. At Tally, we recognize the value of aligning quorum with actual governance participation rather than total voteable supply. A DVP-based model better reflects the reality of who's available to vote, and the proposed parameters strike a reasonable balance between accessibility and security.
Should this constitutional AIP pass down the line, we're committed to working closely with the Foundation to ensure the new quorum thresholds are clearly communicated from the governance application. This includes displaying the dynamic quorum calculations so delegates and token holders can easily understand what's required for proposals to pass under the new model.
Looking forward to seeing this move to temperature check, and subsequently to an on-chain vote.
We will be hosting a governance call to discuss this proposal on Wednesday.
DVP Quorum for ArbitrumDAO: Implementation & Parameters (Open Discussion) Wednesday, February 4 · 15:30 – 16:30 Time zone: UTC Video call link: https://meet.google.com/djy-endq-gwq
Appreciate @Arbitrum for putting together this AIP and the thorough research reports that preceded it. At Tally, we recognize the value of aligning quorum with actual governance participation rather than total voteable supply. A DVP-based model better reflects the reality of who's available to vote, and the proposed parameters strike a reasonable balance between accessibility and security.
Should this constitutional AIP pass down the line, we're committed to working closely with the Foundation to ensure the new quorum thresholds are clearly communicated from the governance application. This includes displaying the dynamic quorum calculations so delegates and token holders can easily understand what's required for proposals to pass under the new model.
Appreciate @Arbitrum for putting together this AIP and the thorough research reports that preceded it. At Tally, we recognize the value of aligning quorum with actual governance participation rather than total voteable supply. A DVP-based model better reflects the reality of who's available to vote, and the proposed parameters strike a reasonable balance between accessibility and security.
Should this constitutional AIP pass down the line, we're committed to working closely with the Foundation to ensure the new quorum thresholds are clearly communicated from the governance application. This includes displaying the dynamic quorum calculations so delegates and token holders can easily understand what's required for proposals to pass under the new model.
Looking forward to seeing this move to temperature check, and subsequently to an on-chain vote.
We will be hosting a governance call to discuss this proposal on Wednesday.
DVP Quorum for ArbitrumDAO: Implementation & Parameters (Open Discussion) Wednesday, February 4 · 15:30 – 16:30 Time zone: UTC Video call link: https://meet.google.com/djy-endq-gwq
Still voting FOR. My stance hasn't changed, DVP makes sense, and the addition of proposal cancellation is a great quality of life update.
Still voting FOR. My stance hasn't changed, DVP makes sense, and the addition of proposal cancellation is a great quality of life update.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR in the onchain voting.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR in the onchain voting.
Despite our earlier reservations, we continue to support this upgrade as it moves on-chain. At the moment, there is no alternative proposal that meaningfully addresses ArbitrumDAO’s quorum challenges, and the DVP-based model remains the only concrete, technically viable adjustment to improve governance operability under current conditions.
We also support on-chain proposal cancellation. Allowing proposers to withdraw proposals during the pending period is a practical improvement that can reduce unnecessary governance friction when errors or revisions arise before voting begins.
The new approach gives flexibility to adjust the parameters and find the best anti-capture/effectiveness balance.
Voted FOR also for the onchain vote with the same rationale.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Tally voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Tally voting.
We supported the move to a delegated voting power (DVP) based quorum during the Snapshot vote and we continue to support it. Over time, quorum in the DAO has been tied to the total voteable supply, while actual participation depends on delegated voting power. As supply grows and delegation does not keep pace, this gap becomes more visible and reaching quorum becomes harder even when the same active delegates continue to participate.
Moving quorum to DVP makes the system more aligned with how governance actually functions. It does not change voting power or how votes are counted, but it measures quorum against the tokens that are actively delegated and participating in governance.
In addition, enabling onchain proposal cancellation allows proposers to withdraw proposals during the pending period if issues are discovered or parameters need revision after delegate feedback. In practice, this should help avoid unnecessary votes on proposals that the proposer no longer wishes to move forward. So we support it as well.
Ahead of future on-chain vote
By approving DTV quorum, we may be addressing the quorum issue, but we are overlooking another, potentially more serious one.
Ahead of future on-chain vote
By approving DTV quorum, we may be addressing the quorum issue, but we are overlooking another, potentially more serious one.
I’ve seen arguments claiming that as delegations grow, new delegates will naturally join and voter apathy won’t be a problem. That feels overly optimistic. What exactly would drive that?
The more concerning issue is security. At current ARB prices, with the reduced quorum, roughly $17M worth of voting power would be enough to reach constitutional quorum and very likely determine the outcome of almost any proposal. Governance attacks become significantly cheaper.
One might argue that the Security Council serves as a safeguard. But what prevents someone, at relatively low cost, from influencing the next cohort election and placing aligned candidates on the Council – individuals who may not block certain decisions when it matters most?
If quorum reform is pursued, it must go hand in hand with strengthened governance security. Reducing quorum without addressing attack vectors risks solving one problem while creating a much larger one.
Layer3 Voting Rationale: DVP-Based Quorum Model
Vote: FOR
Layer3 Voting Rationale: DVP-Based Quorum Model
Vote: FOR
Quorum should reflect active governance participation, not theoretical token supply. The current model creates unnecessary risk of proposals failing on turnout mechanics rather than merit. The proposed parameters are conservative, closely matching today's effective quorum levels while introducing structural resilience through floor and cap safeguards. Even post-upgrade, ArbitrumDAO's quorum remains higher than all comparable DAOs benchmarked. This is a sound governance improvement with minimal practical disruption. Layer3 supports it.
Voting yes. Quorum is currently based on total token supply, which keeps growing and has less to do with how many people are actually voting. Tying it to delegated voting power just makes more sense because it’s based on who’s actually here.
@cp0x makes a fair point that the top 6 delegates could clear the 100M ARB baseline alone. But those same delegates are already the ones getting us to quorum today. The only difference is that right now, if a few of them don’t show up, the whole DAO grinds to a halt. I’d rather see a vote pass with heavy delegate involvement than watch nothing happen at all. A passed vote can at least be challenged on-chain.
Voting yes. Quorum is currently based on total token supply, which keeps growing and has less to do with how many people are actually voting. Tying it to delegated voting power just makes more sense because it’s based on who’s actually here.
@cp0x makes a fair point that the top 6 delegates could clear the 100M ARB baseline alone. But those same delegates are already the ones getting us to quorum today. The only difference is that right now, if a few of them don’t show up, the whole DAO grinds to a halt. I’d rather see a vote pass with heavy delegate involvement than watch nothing happen at all. A passed vote can at least be challenged on-chain.
Also worth noting this doesn’t just permanently lower the bar. Quorum scales up as more tokens get delegated, so if participation grows, the threshold grows with it. That makes way more sense than a fixed number that gets harder and harder to hit.
Voting FOR (on Tally). Basing quorum on active delegates is a great way forward.
Also, a huge fan of getting the on-chain cancel button. Forcing the DAO to vote down a flawed proposal that even the creator wants to pull was always a massive waste of everyone's time.
Post submission review:
Used proposal decoder to find proposal actions: action contract for proxy upgrades and a call to the constitution hash contract (the latter is trivial).
Action contract proxy-upgrades and initializes the core governor and the treasury governor to the same new implementation, as well as the ARB token contract to its new implementation.
(Informal) Review:
Thanks for the links, but I've already read this information (as it answered my previous questions), and I'm also familiar with the Constitution and the Security Council's operating conditions.
The new DVP-based quorum model makes sense, it ties the quorum requirement to tokens that are actually delegated and participating in governance, rather than the total votable supply. Per the Arbitrum Foundation’s research, voteable token supply continues to increase, and constitutional quorum requirements rise along with it, while delegated ARB has stayed largely unchanged over the DAO’s lifetime. This change better captures real participation and reduces the risk of quorum becoming unreachable in the future.
The baseline values are reasonable and align with historical average participation, the maximum values match what the current system would require at high supply levels. This maintains a high threshold, especially for constitutional proposals. Even after the upgrade, Arbitrum’s quorum as a percentage of delegated voting power would remain stricter than most other large DAOs (as per the supporting research, which I took at its word). The Trail of Bits audit also gives confidence that the technical changes are secure and well-implemented.
Thank you for the proposal.
It is a very serious issue. Of course, there is a huge need for proposals not to fail because of a lack of votes. This aspect is enhanced a lot by the views of @Griff and @Entropy. I see their points, and up to a level, I do agree with them.
Thank you for the proposal.
It is a very serious issue. Of course, there is a huge need for proposals not to fail because of a lack of votes. This aspect is enhanced a lot by the views of @Griff and @Entropy. I see their points, and up to a level, I do agree with them.
On the other hand, I can understand opposing arguments like these stated by @cp0x. But the thing I align with the most is what @blockful said:
Therefore, while the change to the proposal is an improvement, we believe Arbitrum should be more concerned with the DAO’s economic security, not just with making proposals easier to pass.
So without wanting to add any noise in the conversation, I end up voting AGAINST. Not because it isn't important to have successful proposals, but unless having simultaneous ways of protecting the token's price and the treasury level, the way of deciding the quorum should include factors that would protect the DAO, even though the continuous reduction of the token's price.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
The GMX Governance Committee supports this proposal and will be voting in favour.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
The GMX Governance Committee supports this proposal and will be voting in favour.
We previously voted for the DVP model as a sensible evolution of Arbitrum's governance mechanism. The current quorum calculation based on total token supply creates unnecessary friction for constitutional proposals - requiring extraordinary coordination even when active delegates are engaged. Basing quorum on delegated voting power better aligns with actual participation.
The proposed parameters (0.4 and 0.5 ratios) have been calibrated to match current quorum levels. This maintains the existing threshold whilst implementing the new model.
Additional modelling would strengthen confidence in the parameter selection:
ARB price decline and large sales - If ARB price falls significantly and large holders sell, delegated voting power reduces. How does the model behave in this scenario?
Delegate concentration shifts - What happens if major delegates exit or change their delegation patterns?
Post-implementation monitoring - Validating the parameters perform as expected once live
These aren't blockers for our support. The parameters match current levels, which is a sensible baseline. If the Foundation can provide this analysis, now or post-implementation, it would benefit the DAO's understanding.
This proposal addresses a real governance challenge without compromising standards. The GMX Governance Committee votes for
gm, voted FOR.
The new approach gives flexibility to adjust the parameters and find the best anti-capture/effectiveness balance.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
Today, the quorum in the DAO is based on the total voteable supply, but proposals pass or fail based on delegated voting power. That gap has been growing over time, and it’s starting to show. Reaching quorum is becoming harder even when the same set of active delegates consistently participate.
Moving the quorum to delegated voting power is a more honest representation of how governance should actually work. It doesn’t change who has power or how votes are counted. It only changes what we measure quorum against.
We looked closely at the parameters. For non-constitutional proposals, the numbers are very close to where the quorum already sits today. For constitutional proposals, the bar remains high and is still stricter.
There are valid concerns about concentration, but the current system already allows a group of delegates to influence outcomes. From our view, a quorum model that reflects real participation is more robust than one tied to a supply number that rarely shows up.
Overall, this improves governance liveness without lowering standards. That’s why we’re in favour of the proposal.
We will vote "For" this proposal.
We support the shift to a DVP-based quorum model and believe aligning quorum with delegated voting power is a necessary improvement over the current supply-based system. This change better reflects real participation and helps address the growing liveness risk faced by the DAO.
We will vote "For" this proposal.
We support the shift to a DVP-based quorum model and believe aligning quorum with delegated voting power is a necessary improvement over the current supply-based system. This change better reflects real participation and helps address the growing liveness risk faced by the DAO.
Based on our prior analysis using historical participation data, percentage-based quorum thresholds in the proposed ranges strike a reasonable balance between governance liveness and meaningful participation. In particular, we found that ranges around 42–50% of DVP for non-constitutional proposals and 48–56% of DVP for constitutional proposals are broadly effective, and the Foundation’s proposed parameters are directionally aligned with these findings.
While we view the parameters as an initial configuration that should be revisited as delegation patterns evolve, we believe this proposal represents a constructive and necessary step forward for ArbitrumDAO’s governance.
To validate the proposed numbers suggested by the Foundation:
We backtested historical voting data against various DVP-based quorum thresholds. Our goal was to find a range that aligns with the historical average participation margin of 20-40% on different time periods (2023–2024, 2024–2025, 2025, and overall). We believed this margin to be a healthy balance, providing a meaningful hurdle for proposals without making them excessively difficult to pass.
Our analysis, which can be viewed in detail in this spreadsheet, yielded the following recommendations, using the 2025 data as our primary benchmark for its relevance to the current state of the DAO:
Based on this data, the Foundation’s proposed range is effective, and we would advocate for values at the lower end for non-constitutional and the higher end for constitutional proposals.
We understand the rationale for a fixed minimum quorum is to act as a safeguard against governance capture if DVP were to fall dramatically. That said, a static floor, while well-intentioned, introduces its own form of liveness risk. We raised this point during the DVP-Quorum for ArbitrumDAO: Open Discussion community call and wish to elaborate on it here for the broader community.
In a scenario where DVP drops significantly, the fixed lower bound could make it mathematically impossible to reach quorum, effectively freezing the DAO. The table below illustrates this using a 100M ARB lower bound for non-constitutional proposals:
| DVP (in millions) | Quorum (40% of DVP) | Effective Quorum (with Lower Bound) | Passable? |
|---|---|---|---|
| 300 | 120 M | 120 M | Yes |
| 250 | 100 M | 100 M | Yes |
| 249 | 99.6 M | 100 M | No |
| 80 | 32 M | 100 M | No |
While unlikely, this scenario would force the DAO into a difficult position, potentially requiring repeated governance actions to adjust the floor.
We suggest considering alternatives to a static minimum:
In an extreme edge case where DVP collapses, the Security Council could serve as the ultimate backstop to ensure the DAO remains functional.
We are voting AGAINST the proposal.
The triggers are a way to protect Arbitrum’s governance while also adapting it to a different scenario, namely, a decline in DVP. Setting both minimum and maximum bounds is also a good design choice.
However, in our view, using DVP Quorum is still a way of working around Arbitrum’s difficulty in reaching quorum by reducing the security of its governance.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and is based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and is based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
Despite our previous position on an earlier version of this proposal, we have decided to support it, as there is currently no alternative that meaningfully addresses Arbitrum’s quorum issues (or other issues mentioned in our post). While the DVP-based model introduces trade-offs, it is the only concrete, technically viable adjustment available at this time to improve governance operability under current conditions.
However, we want to reiterate that this change primarily alleviates symptoms rather than addressing the root cause of low delegation, which remains a structural concern. With only a small percentage of ARB holders participating and voting power already concentrated, this model may further reinforce the issues we are already observing in the governance.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR in the onchain voting.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR in the onchain voting.
Despite our earlier reservations, we continue to support this upgrade as it moves on-chain. At the moment, there is no alternative proposal that meaningfully addresses ArbitrumDAO’s quorum challenges, and the DVP-based model remains the only concrete, technically viable adjustment to improve governance operability under current conditions.
We also support on-chain proposal cancellation. Allowing proposers to withdraw proposals during the pending period is a practical improvement that can reduce unnecessary governance friction when errors or revisions arise before voting begins.
The new approach gives flexibility to adjust the parameters and find the best anti-capture/effectiveness balance.
Voted FOR also for the onchain vote with the same rationale.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Tally voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Tally voting.
We supported the move to a delegated voting power (DVP) based quorum during the Snapshot vote and we continue to support it. Over time, quorum in the DAO has been tied to the total voteable supply, while actual participation depends on delegated voting power. As supply grows and delegation does not keep pace, this gap becomes more visible and reaching quorum becomes harder even when the same active delegates continue to participate.
Moving quorum to DVP makes the system more aligned with how governance actually functions. It does not change voting power or how votes are counted, but it measures quorum against the tokens that are actively delegated and participating in governance.
In addition, enabling onchain proposal cancellation allows proposers to withdraw proposals during the pending period if issues are discovered or parameters need revision after delegate feedback. In practice, this should help avoid unnecessary votes on proposals that the proposer no longer wishes to move forward. So we support it as well.
Ahead of future on-chain vote
By approving DTV quorum, we may be addressing the quorum issue, but we are overlooking another, potentially more serious one.
Ahead of future on-chain vote
By approving DTV quorum, we may be addressing the quorum issue, but we are overlooking another, potentially more serious one.
I’ve seen arguments claiming that as delegations grow, new delegates will naturally join and voter apathy won’t be a problem. That feels overly optimistic. What exactly would drive that?
The more concerning issue is security. At current ARB prices, with the reduced quorum, roughly $17M worth of voting power would be enough to reach constitutional quorum and very likely determine the outcome of almost any proposal. Governance attacks become significantly cheaper.
One might argue that the Security Council serves as a safeguard. But what prevents someone, at relatively low cost, from influencing the next cohort election and placing aligned candidates on the Council – individuals who may not block certain decisions when it matters most?
If quorum reform is pursued, it must go hand in hand with strengthened governance security. Reducing quorum without addressing attack vectors risks solving one problem while creating a much larger one.
Layer3 Voting Rationale: DVP-Based Quorum Model
Vote: FOR
Layer3 Voting Rationale: DVP-Based Quorum Model
Vote: FOR
Quorum should reflect active governance participation, not theoretical token supply. The current model creates unnecessary risk of proposals failing on turnout mechanics rather than merit. The proposed parameters are conservative, closely matching today's effective quorum levels while introducing structural resilience through floor and cap safeguards. Even post-upgrade, ArbitrumDAO's quorum remains higher than all comparable DAOs benchmarked. This is a sound governance improvement with minimal practical disruption. Layer3 supports it.
Voting yes. Quorum is currently based on total token supply, which keeps growing and has less to do with how many people are actually voting. Tying it to delegated voting power just makes more sense because it’s based on who’s actually here.
@cp0x makes a fair point that the top 6 delegates could clear the 100M ARB baseline alone. But those same delegates are already the ones getting us to quorum today. The only difference is that right now, if a few of them don’t show up, the whole DAO grinds to a halt. I’d rather see a vote pass with heavy delegate involvement than watch nothing happen at all. A passed vote can at least be challenged on-chain.
Voting yes. Quorum is currently based on total token supply, which keeps growing and has less to do with how many people are actually voting. Tying it to delegated voting power just makes more sense because it’s based on who’s actually here.
@cp0x makes a fair point that the top 6 delegates could clear the 100M ARB baseline alone. But those same delegates are already the ones getting us to quorum today. The only difference is that right now, if a few of them don’t show up, the whole DAO grinds to a halt. I’d rather see a vote pass with heavy delegate involvement than watch nothing happen at all. A passed vote can at least be challenged on-chain.
Also worth noting this doesn’t just permanently lower the bar. Quorum scales up as more tokens get delegated, so if participation grows, the threshold grows with it. That makes way more sense than a fixed number that gets harder and harder to hit.
Voting FOR (on Tally). Basing quorum on active delegates is a great way forward.
Also, a huge fan of getting the on-chain cancel button. Forcing the DAO to vote down a flawed proposal that even the creator wants to pull was always a massive waste of everyone's time.
Post submission review:
Used proposal decoder to find proposal actions: action contract for proxy upgrades and a call to the constitution hash contract (the latter is trivial).
Action contract proxy-upgrades and initializes the core governor and the treasury governor to the same new implementation, as well as the ARB token contract to its new implementation.
(Informal) Review:
Thanks for the links, but I've already read this information (as it answered my previous questions), and I'm also familiar with the Constitution and the Security Council's operating conditions.
The new DVP-based quorum model makes sense, it ties the quorum requirement to tokens that are actually delegated and participating in governance, rather than the total votable supply. Per the Arbitrum Foundation’s research, voteable token supply continues to increase, and constitutional quorum requirements rise along with it, while delegated ARB has stayed largely unchanged over the DAO’s lifetime. This change better captures real participation and reduces the risk of quorum becoming unreachable in the future.
The baseline values are reasonable and align with historical average participation, the maximum values match what the current system would require at high supply levels. This maintains a high threshold, especially for constitutional proposals. Even after the upgrade, Arbitrum’s quorum as a percentage of delegated voting power would remain stricter than most other large DAOs (as per the supporting research, which I took at its word). The Trail of Bits audit also gives confidence that the technical changes are secure and well-implemented.
Thank you for the proposal.
It is a very serious issue. Of course, there is a huge need for proposals not to fail because of a lack of votes. This aspect is enhanced a lot by the views of @Griff and @Entropy. I see their points, and up to a level, I do agree with them.
Thank you for the proposal.
It is a very serious issue. Of course, there is a huge need for proposals not to fail because of a lack of votes. This aspect is enhanced a lot by the views of @Griff and @Entropy. I see their points, and up to a level, I do agree with them.
On the other hand, I can understand opposing arguments like these stated by @cp0x. But the thing I align with the most is what @blockful said:
Therefore, while the change to the proposal is an improvement, we believe Arbitrum should be more concerned with the DAO’s economic security, not just with making proposals easier to pass.
So without wanting to add any noise in the conversation, I end up voting AGAINST. Not because it isn't important to have successful proposals, but unless having simultaneous ways of protecting the token's price and the treasury level, the way of deciding the quorum should include factors that would protect the DAO, even though the continuous reduction of the token's price.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
The GMX Governance Committee supports this proposal and will be voting in favour.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
The GMX Governance Committee supports this proposal and will be voting in favour.
We previously voted for the DVP model as a sensible evolution of Arbitrum's governance mechanism. The current quorum calculation based on total token supply creates unnecessary friction for constitutional proposals - requiring extraordinary coordination even when active delegates are engaged. Basing quorum on delegated voting power better aligns with actual participation.
The proposed parameters (0.4 and 0.5 ratios) have been calibrated to match current quorum levels. This maintains the existing threshold whilst implementing the new model.
Additional modelling would strengthen confidence in the parameter selection:
ARB price decline and large sales - If ARB price falls significantly and large holders sell, delegated voting power reduces. How does the model behave in this scenario?
Delegate concentration shifts - What happens if major delegates exit or change their delegation patterns?
Post-implementation monitoring - Validating the parameters perform as expected once live
These aren't blockers for our support. The parameters match current levels, which is a sensible baseline. If the Foundation can provide this analysis, now or post-implementation, it would benefit the DAO's understanding.
This proposal addresses a real governance challenge without compromising standards. The GMX Governance Committee votes for
gm, voted FOR.
The new approach gives flexibility to adjust the parameters and find the best anti-capture/effectiveness balance.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
Today, the quorum in the DAO is based on the total voteable supply, but proposals pass or fail based on delegated voting power. That gap has been growing over time, and it’s starting to show. Reaching quorum is becoming harder even when the same set of active delegates consistently participate.
Moving the quorum to delegated voting power is a more honest representation of how governance should actually work. It doesn’t change who has power or how votes are counted. It only changes what we measure quorum against.
We looked closely at the parameters. For non-constitutional proposals, the numbers are very close to where the quorum already sits today. For constitutional proposals, the bar remains high and is still stricter.
There are valid concerns about concentration, but the current system already allows a group of delegates to influence outcomes. From our view, a quorum model that reflects real participation is more robust than one tied to a supply number that rarely shows up.
Overall, this improves governance liveness without lowering standards. That’s why we’re in favour of the proposal.
We will vote "For" this proposal.
We support the shift to a DVP-based quorum model and believe aligning quorum with delegated voting power is a necessary improvement over the current supply-based system. This change better reflects real participation and helps address the growing liveness risk faced by the DAO.
We will vote "For" this proposal.
We support the shift to a DVP-based quorum model and believe aligning quorum with delegated voting power is a necessary improvement over the current supply-based system. This change better reflects real participation and helps address the growing liveness risk faced by the DAO.
Based on our prior analysis using historical participation data, percentage-based quorum thresholds in the proposed ranges strike a reasonable balance between governance liveness and meaningful participation. In particular, we found that ranges around 42–50% of DVP for non-constitutional proposals and 48–56% of DVP for constitutional proposals are broadly effective, and the Foundation’s proposed parameters are directionally aligned with these findings.
While we view the parameters as an initial configuration that should be revisited as delegation patterns evolve, we believe this proposal represents a constructive and necessary step forward for ArbitrumDAO’s governance.
To validate the proposed numbers suggested by the Foundation:
We backtested historical voting data against various DVP-based quorum thresholds. Our goal was to find a range that aligns with the historical average participation margin of 20-40% on different time periods (2023–2024, 2024–2025, 2025, and overall). We believed this margin to be a healthy balance, providing a meaningful hurdle for proposals without making them excessively difficult to pass.
Our analysis, which can be viewed in detail in this spreadsheet, yielded the following recommendations, using the 2025 data as our primary benchmark for its relevance to the current state of the DAO:
Based on this data, the Foundation’s proposed range is effective, and we would advocate for values at the lower end for non-constitutional and the higher end for constitutional proposals.
We understand the rationale for a fixed minimum quorum is to act as a safeguard against governance capture if DVP were to fall dramatically. That said, a static floor, while well-intentioned, introduces its own form of liveness risk. We raised this point during the DVP-Quorum for ArbitrumDAO: Open Discussion community call and wish to elaborate on it here for the broader community.
In a scenario where DVP drops significantly, the fixed lower bound could make it mathematically impossible to reach quorum, effectively freezing the DAO. The table below illustrates this using a 100M ARB lower bound for non-constitutional proposals:
| DVP (in millions) | Quorum (40% of DVP) | Effective Quorum (with Lower Bound) | Passable? |
|---|---|---|---|
| 300 | 120 M | 120 M | Yes |
| 250 | 100 M | 100 M | Yes |
| 249 | 99.6 M | 100 M | No |
| 80 | 32 M | 100 M | No |
While unlikely, this scenario would force the DAO into a difficult position, potentially requiring repeated governance actions to adjust the floor.
We suggest considering alternatives to a static minimum:
In an extreme edge case where DVP collapses, the Security Council could serve as the ultimate backstop to ensure the DAO remains functional.
We are voting AGAINST the proposal.
The triggers are a way to protect Arbitrum’s governance while also adapting it to a different scenario, namely, a decline in DVP. Setting both minimum and maximum bounds is also a good design choice.
However, in our view, using DVP Quorum is still a way of working around Arbitrum’s difficulty in reaching quorum by reducing the security of its governance.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and is based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and is based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
Despite our previous position on an earlier version of this proposal, we have decided to support it, as there is currently no alternative that meaningfully addresses Arbitrum’s quorum issues (or other issues mentioned in our post). While the DVP-based model introduces trade-offs, it is the only concrete, technically viable adjustment available at this time to improve governance operability under current conditions.
However, we want to reiterate that this change primarily alleviates symptoms rather than addressing the root cause of low delegation, which remains a structural concern. With only a small percentage of ARB holders participating and voting power already concentrated, this model may further reinforce the issues we are already observing in the governance.
Post submission review:
Used proposal decoder to find proposal actions: action contract for proxy upgrades and a call to the constitution hash contract (the latter is trivial).
Action contract proxy-upgrades and initializes the core governor and the treasury governor to the same new implementation, as well as the ARB token contract to its new implementation.
(Informal) Review:
(Informal) Review:
Core Logic for DVP quorum calculation; quorum method now uses total delegated tokens to calculate quorum.
Tracks proposer submitters, and exposes cancel method (submitter can cancel).
Optional front-running protection against proposal id collisions when submitting a proposal by specifying proposal’s submitter address at end of description. (Note that while this looks good and sensible and seems tangentially related to cancellation, it isn’t AFAICT specifically mentioned in this proposal’s description.) ***(see edit below)
Initialized values (min/max quorums, baseline quorums) match those in the description.
LGTM, voting FOR.
***Edit: I get it now; “front-running” by submitting a proposal with the same ID was previously a non-issue since the proposal ID is deterministically generated from the proposal content and is thus equivalent to simply submitting it. With cancelation, one can grief the submitter by front-running with the equivalent proposal and then cancelling it. This feature is thus a direct implementation detail for cancelation 👍
Thanks for the links, but I've already read this information (as it answered my previous questions), and I'm also familiar with the Constitution and the Security Council's operating conditions.
I'll reiterate my concerns. If the Council has four members who collude, the Council won't be able to take any action to prevent the DAO takeover, as a 9/12 majority is required.
Electing four new members dependent on the attacker isn't a problem, given the low cost of the token (vote). The total votes in the previous round in September was about 100 million – just $10 million. If I'm misreading the Constitution or if there are other levers of influence to stop on-chain voting, please let me know. I honestly don't see any.
The new DVP-based quorum model makes sense, it ties the quorum requirement to tokens that are actually delegated and participating in governance, rather than the total votable supply. Per the Arbitrum Foundation’s research, voteable token supply continues to increase, and constitutional quorum requirements rise along with it, while delegated ARB has stayed largely unchanged over the DAO’s lifetime. This change better captures real participation and reduces the risk of quorum becoming unreachable in the future.
The baseline values are reasonable and align with historical average participation, the maximum values match what the current system would require at high supply levels. This maintains a high threshold, especially for constitutional proposals. Even after the upgrade, Arbitrum’s quorum as a percentage of delegated voting power would remain stricter than most other large DAOs (as per the supporting research, which I took at its word). The Trail of Bits audit also gives confidence that the technical changes are secure and well-implemented.
Trade-offs are acceptable. While the model may make quorum easier to reach in some cases, hitting quorum is only part of the equation. Passing a bad proposal still requires winning a majority against honest voters, and the Security Council provides an additional layer of protection. Concerns about fewer top delegates being needed (around 13 instead of 18 for constitutional under current estimates) are fair, but this is not unprecedented for the DAO and actually lowers boycott risk, since fewer abstentions can’t block everything. The max quorum cap helps contain risks from apathetic or malicious delegations as well.
Compared to the current path, where rising supply could eventually make governance very challenging, this seems reasonable. I have voted for.
We are voting AGAINST the proposal.
The triggers are a way to protect Arbitrum’s governance while also adapting it to a different scenario, namely, a decline in DVP. Setting both minimum and maximum bounds is also a good design choice.
However, in our view, using DVP Quorum is still a way of working around Arbitrum’s difficulty in reaching quorum by reducing the security of its governance.
In the original proposal, quorum was defined simply as 100M/150M (non-constitutional/constitutional). Now, the DVP needs to drop to lower levels (300M/250M) for the quorum to be reduced to those values.
Even under the current configuration, it is extremely “cheap” to attack Arbitrum, given the DAO’s TVL and treasury. The cost to reach quorum has fallen by 67% since this proposal was first discussed, from $56M to $18.3M for constitutional proposals.
Therefore, while the change to the proposal is an improvement, we believe Arbitrum should be more concerned with the DAO’s economic security, not just with making proposals easier to pass.
I’m voting FOR.
I’ve said this before during the initial discussions, delegated ARB = real votable supply, and that is what our quorum should be based on.
I’m voting FOR.
I’ve said this before during the initial discussions, delegated ARB = real votable supply, and that is what our quorum should be based on.
I see the concerns in the comments about the parameters (0.4 and 0.5) and the fears of centralization or "10 people deciding the fate of the DAO." I hear you. But honestly, apathy is a bigger threat, especially with the market crashing. If we set the bar so high that we can’t pass constitutional upgrades without a lot of effort every single time, we are wasting valuable people's time.
I am voting in favor of this proposal on Snapshot.
Essentially, it aligns the quorum with the pool of tokens eligible to vote rather than the total supply. I find it highly logical: as delegated voting power increases, the quorum requirement scales accordingly.
I am voting in favor of this proposal on Snapshot.
Essentially, it aligns the quorum with the pool of tokens eligible to vote rather than the total supply. I find it highly logical: as delegated voting power increases, the quorum requirement scales accordingly.
I also find the parameters to be reasonable, requiring a 40% DVP threshold for non-constitutional proposals and over 50% for constitutional ones.
Lastly, it is worth noting that this dynamic quorum proposal aligns with the OpCo team's efforts to expand the number of active stakeholders and significantly increase the total DVP within the DAO. In this regard, I disagree with the following statement:
If quorum can reliably be reached by 5 to 6 large delegates, the incentive for smaller delegates to participate decreases. Once quorum is clearly secured, marginal votes feel less impactful. This may increase voting apathy rather than reduce it.
Under the proposed system, the influx of new delegates with fresh voting power will increase the nominal value required to reach quorum (as the DVP expands). This, in turn, increases the theoretical number of delegates needed to achieve that quorum, hence increasing the relevance of so-called small delegates
Thanks for the correction - I agree with your calculations.
If we calculate based on your data, it turns out that 139 million ARB would be garnered by 9-10 delegates, and 174 million ARB would be garnered by 13 delegates.
Thanks for the correction - I agree with your calculations.
If we calculate based on your data, it turns out that 139 million ARB would be garnered by 9-10 delegates, and 174 million ARB would be garnered by 13 delegates.
This isn't significantly different from my initial calculations – we still see that just 10 delegates are enough to pass almost any positive decision, and even fewer are needed to block a decision.
I don't like the direction voting is taking, where 10 people will decide the fate of everyone else.
I am voting FOR this proposal.
It make sense to shift the quorum requirement to delegated supply, as this accommodates investors who wish to hold the token without actively engaging in governance.
I am voting FOR this proposal.
It make sense to shift the quorum requirement to delegated supply, as this accommodates investors who wish to hold the token without actively engaging in governance.
While I initially had concerns regarding the ceiling, I now recognize it's al protection mechanism. It ensures that outsiders with significant capital cannot freeze the DAO, which is essential in such a highly competitive environment.
I voted Against
As I mentioned earlier, I'm sure this decision will lead to:
I voted Against
As I mentioned earlier, I'm sure this decision will lead to:
voting Against on this offchain vote because parameters should be 0.5 for Non-constitutional proposals, as in, they need majority participation of FOR + ABSTAIN of all delegated voting power to be approved and execute, and 0.67 for Constitutional proposals, as in, they need super majority of participation of FOR + ABSTAIN of all delegated voting power to be approved and executed. As of now, these proposed parameter values are arbitrary and cherry picked to make it easier to pass constitutional proposals breaking the precedent of the current values and current governance hardness in Arbitrum DAO.
Decided to vote FOR (previously had tentatively indicated ABSTAIN). The max quorum & much of the published research assuages some of my previous concerns. Despite what quibbles I still have, I think “perfect = enemy of good” and top priority should be ensuring that the DAO doesn’t get stuck in a low-delegation standstill. Altho thought did go into the initial (and the current) quorum values, they are still in some sense arbitrary and shouldn’t be taken as sacrosanct. The DAO should respond to the reality of the delegation token distribution and this method of dynamically and continuously adjusting is a more-than-good-enough approach.
Entropy is supportive of transitioning to the DVP model for quorum calculations. As noted in the Arbitrum Foundation’s research, voteable token supply and therefore the constitutional quorum requirement is continuing to increase at a rapid rate, while the amount of delegated ARB has remained relatively flat over the DAO’s lifetime.
Entropy is supportive of transitioning to the DVP model for quorum calculations. As noted in the Arbitrum Foundation’s research, voteable token supply and therefore the constitutional quorum requirement is continuing to increase at a rapid rate, while the amount of delegated ARB has remained relatively flat over the DAO’s lifetime.
We see some delegates concerned about the reduction in the number of top delegates needed to reach constitutional quorum in the DVP system. With the current quorum calculation method, the 18 largest delegates are required to meet constitutional quorum and top 10 delegates for non-constitutional. While the DVP system will reduce the number of top delegates required to reach constitutional quorum to 13 based on current estimates, this is not an unprecedented level for the DAO and is roughly in line with how the delegate base was composed in its first year.
The continued rate of quorum increase not only risks placing the DAO in a position of not being able to pass important constitutional proposals, but it also places more power in the hands of top delegates. We are approaching a situation where only 2 or 3 of the top delegates can effectively block a proposal by not voting. So while based on the current composition of voting power, the number of top delegates needed to pass a constitutional proposal decreases, the DVP system reduces the boycott risk and therefore arguably makes the system more decentralized and robust than its current state.
Similar to @pedrob, our team also finds the initial parameters chosen by the Foundation to be reasonable. Constitutional quorum should be a threshold that requires broad consensus, but not something that is so challenging that it requires proposals to be essentially unanimous support. Additionally, while the DVP system does introduce different attack vectors or risks, such as apathetic delegator attack, we believe the maximum threshold helps limit this risk. While it is not entirely optimal that another constitutional proposal is required to change the parameters, Entropy reasoned that it is preferable to keep this power in the hands of token holders and governance rather than delegating the authority to the AF or OpCo.
To conclude, we view switching to a DVP quorum system helps align the threshold with actual governance engagement, ensures the system remains functional over time, and preserves the DAO’s ability to govern effectively.
I ran the numbers based on the current top delegates and their delegated voting power. The goal was to understand how many large delegates would realistically be needed to reach quorum under the proposed DVP quorum parameters.
Using the top20 delegates (total combined voting power ≈ 232.22M ARB - the data may differ slightly due to the constant movement of tokens, but this is not significant), we can understand that this is 95% of all the votes that usually vote.
I ran the numbers based on the current top delegates and their delegated voting power. The goal was to understand how many large delegates would realistically be needed to reach quorum under the proposed DVP quorum parameters.
Using the top20 delegates (total combined voting power ≈ 232.22M ARB - the data may differ slightly due to the constant movement of tokens, but this is not significant), we can understand that this is 95% of all the votes that usually vote.
So, we can use only these vote power to see the following: Non-constitutional proposals Quorum = min{max quorum, max{0.4 * DVP, 100M}} = max(0.4 × 232.22M = 92.89M, 100M) = 100M
Constitutional proposals Quorum = min{max quorum, max{0.5 * DVP, 150M}} = max(0.5 × 232.22M = 116.11M, 150M) = 150M
Cumulative totals show that quorum exceeds 100M after only 6 delegates and exceeds 150M after only 10 delegates
In my view, this creates a very low practical barrier.
One of the few structural mechanisms that gives smaller delegates meaningful influence is the difficulty of reaching quorum. Even if a delegate holds a modest amount of voting power, their participation can matter when quorum is not easily guaranteed.
If quorum can reliably be reached by 5 to 6 large delegates, the incentive for smaller delegates to participate decreases. Once quorum is clearly secured, marginal votes feel less impactful. This may increase voting apathy rather than reduce it.
Reaching quorum should not be trivial. It is supposed to require broad participation. That is part of what makes governance resilient and inclusive.
While I support the DVP model and it is conceptually simpler than the common proposal-based quorum model, the current parameterization may unintentionally centralize power and reduce the incentives for smaller delegates to participate.
Lowering quorum may solve one problem, but it may create another.
I would strongly encourage further discussion on whether the baseline thresholds are set at the right level - I think it should be increased.
I agree that this is consistent with what the Foundation wrote, but they unilaterally proposed it as a direction for DAO, among other things, and DAO didn't vote for this development. And I've consistently said that centralization is bad, and I've always voted against it – because any government strives to do good for itself. Therefore, DAO's power is beneficial for both the project and its users.
Post submission review:
Used proposal decoder to find proposal actions: action contract for proxy upgrades and a call to the constitution hash contract (the latter is trivial).
Action contract proxy-upgrades and initializes the core governor and the treasury governor to the same new implementation, as well as the ARB token contract to its new implementation.
(Informal) Review:
(Informal) Review:
Core Logic for DVP quorum calculation; quorum method now uses total delegated tokens to calculate quorum.
Tracks proposer submitters, and exposes cancel method (submitter can cancel).
Optional front-running protection against proposal id collisions when submitting a proposal by specifying proposal’s submitter address at end of description. (Note that while this looks good and sensible and seems tangentially related to cancellation, it isn’t AFAICT specifically mentioned in this proposal’s description.) ***(see edit below)
Initialized values (min/max quorums, baseline quorums) match those in the description.
LGTM, voting FOR.
***Edit: I get it now; “front-running” by submitting a proposal with the same ID was previously a non-issue since the proposal ID is deterministically generated from the proposal content and is thus equivalent to simply submitting it. With cancelation, one can grief the submitter by front-running with the equivalent proposal and then cancelling it. This feature is thus a direct implementation detail for cancelation 👍
Thanks for the links, but I've already read this information (as it answered my previous questions), and I'm also familiar with the Constitution and the Security Council's operating conditions.
I'll reiterate my concerns. If the Council has four members who collude, the Council won't be able to take any action to prevent the DAO takeover, as a 9/12 majority is required.
Electing four new members dependent on the attacker isn't a problem, given the low cost of the token (vote). The total votes in the previous round in September was about 100 million – just $10 million. If I'm misreading the Constitution or if there are other levers of influence to stop on-chain voting, please let me know. I honestly don't see any.
The new DVP-based quorum model makes sense, it ties the quorum requirement to tokens that are actually delegated and participating in governance, rather than the total votable supply. Per the Arbitrum Foundation’s research, voteable token supply continues to increase, and constitutional quorum requirements rise along with it, while delegated ARB has stayed largely unchanged over the DAO’s lifetime. This change better captures real participation and reduces the risk of quorum becoming unreachable in the future.
The baseline values are reasonable and align with historical average participation, the maximum values match what the current system would require at high supply levels. This maintains a high threshold, especially for constitutional proposals. Even after the upgrade, Arbitrum’s quorum as a percentage of delegated voting power would remain stricter than most other large DAOs (as per the supporting research, which I took at its word). The Trail of Bits audit also gives confidence that the technical changes are secure and well-implemented.
Trade-offs are acceptable. While the model may make quorum easier to reach in some cases, hitting quorum is only part of the equation. Passing a bad proposal still requires winning a majority against honest voters, and the Security Council provides an additional layer of protection. Concerns about fewer top delegates being needed (around 13 instead of 18 for constitutional under current estimates) are fair, but this is not unprecedented for the DAO and actually lowers boycott risk, since fewer abstentions can’t block everything. The max quorum cap helps contain risks from apathetic or malicious delegations as well.
Compared to the current path, where rising supply could eventually make governance very challenging, this seems reasonable. I have voted for.
We are voting AGAINST the proposal.
The triggers are a way to protect Arbitrum’s governance while also adapting it to a different scenario, namely, a decline in DVP. Setting both minimum and maximum bounds is also a good design choice.
However, in our view, using DVP Quorum is still a way of working around Arbitrum’s difficulty in reaching quorum by reducing the security of its governance.
In the original proposal, quorum was defined simply as 100M/150M (non-constitutional/constitutional). Now, the DVP needs to drop to lower levels (300M/250M) for the quorum to be reduced to those values.
Even under the current configuration, it is extremely “cheap” to attack Arbitrum, given the DAO’s TVL and treasury. The cost to reach quorum has fallen by 67% since this proposal was first discussed, from $56M to $18.3M for constitutional proposals.
Therefore, while the change to the proposal is an improvement, we believe Arbitrum should be more concerned with the DAO’s economic security, not just with making proposals easier to pass.
I’m voting FOR.
I’ve said this before during the initial discussions, delegated ARB = real votable supply, and that is what our quorum should be based on.
I’m voting FOR.
I’ve said this before during the initial discussions, delegated ARB = real votable supply, and that is what our quorum should be based on.
I see the concerns in the comments about the parameters (0.4 and 0.5) and the fears of centralization or "10 people deciding the fate of the DAO." I hear you. But honestly, apathy is a bigger threat, especially with the market crashing. If we set the bar so high that we can’t pass constitutional upgrades without a lot of effort every single time, we are wasting valuable people's time.
I am voting in favor of this proposal on Snapshot.
Essentially, it aligns the quorum with the pool of tokens eligible to vote rather than the total supply. I find it highly logical: as delegated voting power increases, the quorum requirement scales accordingly.
I am voting in favor of this proposal on Snapshot.
Essentially, it aligns the quorum with the pool of tokens eligible to vote rather than the total supply. I find it highly logical: as delegated voting power increases, the quorum requirement scales accordingly.
I also find the parameters to be reasonable, requiring a 40% DVP threshold for non-constitutional proposals and over 50% for constitutional ones.
Lastly, it is worth noting that this dynamic quorum proposal aligns with the OpCo team's efforts to expand the number of active stakeholders and significantly increase the total DVP within the DAO. In this regard, I disagree with the following statement:
If quorum can reliably be reached by 5 to 6 large delegates, the incentive for smaller delegates to participate decreases. Once quorum is clearly secured, marginal votes feel less impactful. This may increase voting apathy rather than reduce it.
Under the proposed system, the influx of new delegates with fresh voting power will increase the nominal value required to reach quorum (as the DVP expands). This, in turn, increases the theoretical number of delegates needed to achieve that quorum, hence increasing the relevance of so-called small delegates
Thanks for the correction - I agree with your calculations.
If we calculate based on your data, it turns out that 139 million ARB would be garnered by 9-10 delegates, and 174 million ARB would be garnered by 13 delegates.
Thanks for the correction - I agree with your calculations.
If we calculate based on your data, it turns out that 139 million ARB would be garnered by 9-10 delegates, and 174 million ARB would be garnered by 13 delegates.
This isn't significantly different from my initial calculations – we still see that just 10 delegates are enough to pass almost any positive decision, and even fewer are needed to block a decision.
I don't like the direction voting is taking, where 10 people will decide the fate of everyone else.
I am voting FOR this proposal.
It make sense to shift the quorum requirement to delegated supply, as this accommodates investors who wish to hold the token without actively engaging in governance.
I am voting FOR this proposal.
It make sense to shift the quorum requirement to delegated supply, as this accommodates investors who wish to hold the token without actively engaging in governance.
While I initially had concerns regarding the ceiling, I now recognize it's al protection mechanism. It ensures that outsiders with significant capital cannot freeze the DAO, which is essential in such a highly competitive environment.
I voted Against
As I mentioned earlier, I'm sure this decision will lead to:
I voted Against
As I mentioned earlier, I'm sure this decision will lead to:
voting Against on this offchain vote because parameters should be 0.5 for Non-constitutional proposals, as in, they need majority participation of FOR + ABSTAIN of all delegated voting power to be approved and execute, and 0.67 for Constitutional proposals, as in, they need super majority of participation of FOR + ABSTAIN of all delegated voting power to be approved and executed. As of now, these proposed parameter values are arbitrary and cherry picked to make it easier to pass constitutional proposals breaking the precedent of the current values and current governance hardness in Arbitrum DAO.
Decided to vote FOR (previously had tentatively indicated ABSTAIN). The max quorum & much of the published research assuages some of my previous concerns. Despite what quibbles I still have, I think “perfect = enemy of good” and top priority should be ensuring that the DAO doesn’t get stuck in a low-delegation standstill. Altho thought did go into the initial (and the current) quorum values, they are still in some sense arbitrary and shouldn’t be taken as sacrosanct. The DAO should respond to the reality of the delegation token distribution and this method of dynamically and continuously adjusting is a more-than-good-enough approach.
Entropy is supportive of transitioning to the DVP model for quorum calculations. As noted in the Arbitrum Foundation’s research, voteable token supply and therefore the constitutional quorum requirement is continuing to increase at a rapid rate, while the amount of delegated ARB has remained relatively flat over the DAO’s lifetime.
Entropy is supportive of transitioning to the DVP model for quorum calculations. As noted in the Arbitrum Foundation’s research, voteable token supply and therefore the constitutional quorum requirement is continuing to increase at a rapid rate, while the amount of delegated ARB has remained relatively flat over the DAO’s lifetime.
We see some delegates concerned about the reduction in the number of top delegates needed to reach constitutional quorum in the DVP system. With the current quorum calculation method, the 18 largest delegates are required to meet constitutional quorum and top 10 delegates for non-constitutional. While the DVP system will reduce the number of top delegates required to reach constitutional quorum to 13 based on current estimates, this is not an unprecedented level for the DAO and is roughly in line with how the delegate base was composed in its first year.
The continued rate of quorum increase not only risks placing the DAO in a position of not being able to pass important constitutional proposals, but it also places more power in the hands of top delegates. We are approaching a situation where only 2 or 3 of the top delegates can effectively block a proposal by not voting. So while based on the current composition of voting power, the number of top delegates needed to pass a constitutional proposal decreases, the DVP system reduces the boycott risk and therefore arguably makes the system more decentralized and robust than its current state.
Similar to @pedrob, our team also finds the initial parameters chosen by the Foundation to be reasonable. Constitutional quorum should be a threshold that requires broad consensus, but not something that is so challenging that it requires proposals to be essentially unanimous support. Additionally, while the DVP system does introduce different attack vectors or risks, such as apathetic delegator attack, we believe the maximum threshold helps limit this risk. While it is not entirely optimal that another constitutional proposal is required to change the parameters, Entropy reasoned that it is preferable to keep this power in the hands of token holders and governance rather than delegating the authority to the AF or OpCo.
To conclude, we view switching to a DVP quorum system helps align the threshold with actual governance engagement, ensures the system remains functional over time, and preserves the DAO’s ability to govern effectively.
I ran the numbers based on the current top delegates and their delegated voting power. The goal was to understand how many large delegates would realistically be needed to reach quorum under the proposed DVP quorum parameters.
Using the top20 delegates (total combined voting power ≈ 232.22M ARB - the data may differ slightly due to the constant movement of tokens, but this is not significant), we can understand that this is 95% of all the votes that usually vote.
I ran the numbers based on the current top delegates and their delegated voting power. The goal was to understand how many large delegates would realistically be needed to reach quorum under the proposed DVP quorum parameters.
Using the top20 delegates (total combined voting power ≈ 232.22M ARB - the data may differ slightly due to the constant movement of tokens, but this is not significant), we can understand that this is 95% of all the votes that usually vote.
So, we can use only these vote power to see the following: Non-constitutional proposals Quorum = min{max quorum, max{0.4 * DVP, 100M}} = max(0.4 × 232.22M = 92.89M, 100M) = 100M
Constitutional proposals Quorum = min{max quorum, max{0.5 * DVP, 150M}} = max(0.5 × 232.22M = 116.11M, 150M) = 150M
Cumulative totals show that quorum exceeds 100M after only 6 delegates and exceeds 150M after only 10 delegates
In my view, this creates a very low practical barrier.
One of the few structural mechanisms that gives smaller delegates meaningful influence is the difficulty of reaching quorum. Even if a delegate holds a modest amount of voting power, their participation can matter when quorum is not easily guaranteed.
If quorum can reliably be reached by 5 to 6 large delegates, the incentive for smaller delegates to participate decreases. Once quorum is clearly secured, marginal votes feel less impactful. This may increase voting apathy rather than reduce it.
Reaching quorum should not be trivial. It is supposed to require broad participation. That is part of what makes governance resilient and inclusive.
While I support the DVP model and it is conceptually simpler than the common proposal-based quorum model, the current parameterization may unintentionally centralize power and reduce the incentives for smaller delegates to participate.
Lowering quorum may solve one problem, but it may create another.
I would strongly encourage further discussion on whether the baseline thresholds are set at the right level - I think it should be increased.
I agree that this is consistent with what the Foundation wrote, but they unilaterally proposed it as a direction for DAO, among other things, and DAO didn't vote for this development. And I've consistently said that centralization is bad, and I've always voted against it – because any government strives to do good for itself. Therefore, DAO's power is beneficial for both the project and its users.
