Non Constitutional
Proposal Writers: Event Horizon 404DAO Matt Fiebach Jengajojo (DAOplomats) This proposal has taken influence from a proposal created by Stable Lab in Uniswap DAO and we thank them for their inspiration.
This proposal seeks to increase participation in the DAO by empowering underrepresented delegates who, despite active participation in governance, do not have sufficient voting power to have their ideas seriously considered. Since greater voting power often correlates with heightened attention by the DAO’s key stakeholders, we propose creating a DAO-controlled Franchiser contract and distributing 1M in ARB each of up to 10 delegates who 1) currently have between 50,000 and 1,000,000 in voting power, 2) have shown an onchain voting participation rate >80% in the last 3 months and 3) have been chosen as the top 10 delegates of these candidates by the DAO voted on in a Snapshot poll.
We ask the DAO to run a 1-year trial program that delegates $ARB to Active Delegates who are underrepresented in governance. If this proposal passes, the foundation will create a Franchiser contract to technically allow for this process. The DAO will maintain control of all $ARB allocated to the program, and have the ability to clawback delegations through an onchain proposal at any time. The contract is owned by the DAO and the tokens are delegated, not granted, but never leave the contract or DAO treasury in practice. Rather, they are stored in a new DAO-owned address.
By allocating 1M $ARB each to up to 10 delegates with between 50k-1m $ARB who have voted on >80% of onchain proposals in the last 3 months, the DAO will empower more meaningful voices in its proposals. A quarterly Active Delegate refresh is encouraged to maintain accountability of those who have been allocated delegation and give newly qualified delegates a chance to participate. The proposal will also give more delegates the ability to propose Snapshot votes and further diversify the makeup of the DAO. Snapshots have a threshold of 500K ARB and onchain proposals 1M to propose.
During Arbitrum’s GovHack hackathon, the challenge statement of "Delegation proportionate to participation" emerged as a key challenge for the DAO. Furthermore, the community has sought creative ways to leverage delegation, rather than grants, to boost voter participation and encourage meaningful contributions (see this, this, and this).
Currently, there are a group of delegates who have demonstrated a commitment to governance through consistent participation in on-chain governance. However, despite their active involvement, they are significantly marginalized in terms of voting power. Since greater voting power often correlates with heightened attention from delegates and the community, we believe that boosting the voting power of these delegates will enable them to have their ideas seriously considered, creating a more robust idea generation and iteration pipeline. Within the DAO, a higher allocation of voting power not only empowers individuals to propose initiatives but also garners increased attention from active delegates and community members.
Many of Arbitrum’s key delegates holding substantial voting rights participate in fewer votes than smaller delegate counterparts. This is evidenced by the observation that many recipients of sizable delegations have shown minimal participation in governance activities. In an effective DAO, engaged delegates play a critical role by exercising their substantial voting rights. Giving smaller delegates who have shown rigor in their activity a more meaningful voice and voting power in the DAO will help toward this overarching goal.
Active delegate voters with the following qualifications can be considered for the program:
Data
Over the last 3 months there have been 6 onchain proposals that count and a delegate must have voted on at least 5 in order to qualify. 25 addresses currently qualify.
| Delegate Name | Address | Voting % |
|---|---|---|
| Coinruay.eth | 0x054becf10c79afa4e60f75b187837be9fb83867d | 100.00% |
| powerkee.eth | 0x400e3ab48b2ccd2420ec04ba0ee9c94bb54a0b1c | 100.00% |
| bristolblockchain | 0x43d3938ebd74106e2d177f9a304c1e9f914f2b52 | 100.00% |
| zkmehdi.eth | 0x5f367bf126fda56d88ba88a8978d5496c66b3569 | 100.00% |
| Larvandweb3.eth | 0x5f38bb373dccb91ad9fd3727c2b9baf6df9332d3 | 100.00% |
| Cp0x | 0x6f9bb7e454f5b3eb2310343f0e99269dc2bb8a1d | 100.00% |
| Bruce1 | 0x88bd639d6b029596b029c61490f29f57b0bf4a3f | 100.00% |
| ermia.eth | 0x8e22a4c2901da99777d76f80f29640fc81ae96bb | 100.00% |
| tosdis.eth | 0xaafdd78af4f90ab649b94e5ef8430d27174a084c | 100.00% |
| 0xmcfly.eth | 0xafd5f60aa8eb4f488eaa0ef98c1c5b0645d9a0a0 | 100.00% |
| ruslaslinko.eth | 0xc3e8ac233f02d13c1e299e47ae230c205e0177ed | 100.00% |
| basve.eth | 0xc560d89d663b31110e164354c6377d8845ed4db3 | 100.00% |
| cryptospb.eth | 0xde96e75c7160d70a447a72afdb75ddfa1455c808 | 100.00% |
| 404 DAO | 0xe93d59cc0bcecfd4ac204827ef67c5266079e2b5 | 100.00% |
| lucky-s.eth | 0xf0ea58b65c82c48ce69f0abd68d178e7764c4ba2 | 100.00% |
| kuiquan.eth | 0xf3fe8c6c75be4afb2f8200fc77339abe4d7cff33 | 100.00% |
| penn blockchain | 0x070341aa5ed571f0fb2c4a5641409b1a46b4961b | 83.33% |
| hiringdevs.eth | 0x22aa1f4173b826451763ebfce22cf54a0603163c | 83.33% |
| alpha insiders | 0x3d1846ea60001a3bc21438d76f3958422fe89adb | 83.33% |
| ocandcrypto.eth | 0xa19a11cb5928bf07b5b6aba256f63142343a59bc | 83.33% |
| Limes | 0xa7860e99e3ce0752d1ac53b974e309fff80277c6 | 83.33% |
| Djinn | 0xbf122ac9ee2cdd537fe404ade218159051ba9455 | 83.33% |
| DAOplomats | 0xd4879f876ee383067f80acadbe283b93141908e9 | 83.33% |
| stablelab | 0xea172676e4105e92cc52dbf45fd93b274ec96676 | 83.33% |
| Nathanvdh.eth | 0xf9551c66995ed3ff9bb05c9fd7ff148bd75dc99a | 83.33% |
Qualified applicants must self nominate themselves to be considered.
Following self-nomination to receive delegation, a Snapshot vote will go live so that the DAO may decide which delegates (up to 10) should be included in the program.
In order to implement this proposal, it is required that we create a Franchiser contract. The contract would allow the DAO the power to delegate and undelegate tokens that it sends from the treasury to the Franchiser. We suggest that the Foundation aids in the creation of this contract in order to create an official and safe implementation, though we can likely fork the Trail of Bits audited Uniswap Labs implementation [github] of the same concept. If this proposal passes Snapshot, we request that the Foundation take the time to fork the contract and hire an auditor to check the implementation.
The contract has simple functions:
-Fund: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate to a single address
-FundMany: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate any amount to multiple addresses
-Recall: allows DAO to pull back funds from Franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from a single delegate.
-RecallMany: allows DAO to pull back funds from franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from multiple delegates.
It is worth noting that all tokens sent to the Franchiser will remain a part of the DAO’s balance sheet as it has full-control over the tokens and ability to pull them back at any time. No other entity has control of these tokens. The delegated tokens never leave the DAO’s ownership.
This working group will project admin this program. The specific deliverables include:
Note: This is not a position of power, just a project management work which is limited to the above executables
We will create a 3 of 4 multi-sig governed by the proposers if the proposal passes Snapshot voting.
Signers:
-Jengajojo (DAOStewards) -404 DAO -Event Horizon -Matt Fiebach
Non Constitutional
Proposal Writers: Event Horizon 404DAO Matt Fiebach Jengajojo (DAOplomats) This proposal has taken influence from a proposal created by Stable Lab in Uniswap DAO and we thank them for their inspiration.
This proposal seeks to increase participation in the DAO by empowering underrepresented delegates who, despite active participation in governance, do not have sufficient voting power to have their ideas seriously considered. Since greater voting power often correlates with heightened attention by the DAO’s key stakeholders, we propose creating a DAO-controlled Franchiser contract and distributing 1M in ARB each of up to 10 delegates who 1) currently have between 50,000 and 1,000,000 in voting power, 2) have shown an onchain voting participation rate >80% in the last 3 months and 3) have been chosen as the top 10 delegates of these candidates by the DAO voted on in a Snapshot poll.
We ask the DAO to run a 1-year trial program that delegates $ARB to Active Delegates who are underrepresented in governance. If this proposal passes, the foundation will create a Franchiser contract to technically allow for this process. The DAO will maintain control of all $ARB allocated to the program, and have the ability to clawback delegations through an onchain proposal at any time. The contract is owned by the DAO and the tokens are delegated, not granted, but never leave the contract or DAO treasury in practice. Rather, they are stored in a new DAO-owned address.
By allocating 1M $ARB each to up to 10 delegates with between 50k-1m $ARB who have voted on >80% of onchain proposals in the last 3 months, the DAO will empower more meaningful voices in its proposals. A quarterly Active Delegate refresh is encouraged to maintain accountability of those who have been allocated delegation and give newly qualified delegates a chance to participate. The proposal will also give more delegates the ability to propose Snapshot votes and further diversify the makeup of the DAO. Snapshots have a threshold of 500K ARB and onchain proposals 1M to propose.
During Arbitrum’s GovHack hackathon, the challenge statement of "Delegation proportionate to participation" emerged as a key challenge for the DAO. Furthermore, the community has sought creative ways to leverage delegation, rather than grants, to boost voter participation and encourage meaningful contributions (see this, this, and this).
Currently, there are a group of delegates who have demonstrated a commitment to governance through consistent participation in on-chain governance. However, despite their active involvement, they are significantly marginalized in terms of voting power. Since greater voting power often correlates with heightened attention from delegates and the community, we believe that boosting the voting power of these delegates will enable them to have their ideas seriously considered, creating a more robust idea generation and iteration pipeline. Within the DAO, a higher allocation of voting power not only empowers individuals to propose initiatives but also garners increased attention from active delegates and community members.
Many of Arbitrum’s key delegates holding substantial voting rights participate in fewer votes than smaller delegate counterparts. This is evidenced by the observation that many recipients of sizable delegations have shown minimal participation in governance activities. In an effective DAO, engaged delegates play a critical role by exercising their substantial voting rights. Giving smaller delegates who have shown rigor in their activity a more meaningful voice and voting power in the DAO will help toward this overarching goal.
Active delegate voters with the following qualifications can be considered for the program:
Data
Over the last 3 months there have been 6 onchain proposals that count and a delegate must have voted on at least 5 in order to qualify. 25 addresses currently qualify.
| Delegate Name | Address | Voting % |
|---|---|---|
| Coinruay.eth | 0x054becf10c79afa4e60f75b187837be9fb83867d | 100.00% |
| powerkee.eth | 0x400e3ab48b2ccd2420ec04ba0ee9c94bb54a0b1c | 100.00% |
| bristolblockchain | 0x43d3938ebd74106e2d177f9a304c1e9f914f2b52 | 100.00% |
| zkmehdi.eth | 0x5f367bf126fda56d88ba88a8978d5496c66b3569 | 100.00% |
| Larvandweb3.eth | 0x5f38bb373dccb91ad9fd3727c2b9baf6df9332d3 | 100.00% |
| Cp0x | 0x6f9bb7e454f5b3eb2310343f0e99269dc2bb8a1d | 100.00% |
| Bruce1 | 0x88bd639d6b029596b029c61490f29f57b0bf4a3f | 100.00% |
| ermia.eth | 0x8e22a4c2901da99777d76f80f29640fc81ae96bb | 100.00% |
| tosdis.eth | 0xaafdd78af4f90ab649b94e5ef8430d27174a084c | 100.00% |
| 0xmcfly.eth | 0xafd5f60aa8eb4f488eaa0ef98c1c5b0645d9a0a0 | 100.00% |
| ruslaslinko.eth | 0xc3e8ac233f02d13c1e299e47ae230c205e0177ed | 100.00% |
| basve.eth | 0xc560d89d663b31110e164354c6377d8845ed4db3 | 100.00% |
| cryptospb.eth | 0xde96e75c7160d70a447a72afdb75ddfa1455c808 | 100.00% |
| 404 DAO | 0xe93d59cc0bcecfd4ac204827ef67c5266079e2b5 | 100.00% |
| lucky-s.eth | 0xf0ea58b65c82c48ce69f0abd68d178e7764c4ba2 | 100.00% |
| kuiquan.eth | 0xf3fe8c6c75be4afb2f8200fc77339abe4d7cff33 | 100.00% |
| penn blockchain | 0x070341aa5ed571f0fb2c4a5641409b1a46b4961b | 83.33% |
| hiringdevs.eth | 0x22aa1f4173b826451763ebfce22cf54a0603163c | 83.33% |
| alpha insiders | 0x3d1846ea60001a3bc21438d76f3958422fe89adb | 83.33% |
| ocandcrypto.eth | 0xa19a11cb5928bf07b5b6aba256f63142343a59bc | 83.33% |
| Limes | 0xa7860e99e3ce0752d1ac53b974e309fff80277c6 | 83.33% |
| Djinn | 0xbf122ac9ee2cdd537fe404ade218159051ba9455 | 83.33% |
| DAOplomats | 0xd4879f876ee383067f80acadbe283b93141908e9 | 83.33% |
| stablelab | 0xea172676e4105e92cc52dbf45fd93b274ec96676 | 83.33% |
| Nathanvdh.eth | 0xf9551c66995ed3ff9bb05c9fd7ff148bd75dc99a | 83.33% |
Qualified applicants must self nominate themselves to be considered.
Following self-nomination to receive delegation, a Snapshot vote will go live so that the DAO may decide which delegates (up to 10) should be included in the program.
In order to implement this proposal, it is required that we create a Franchiser contract. The contract would allow the DAO the power to delegate and undelegate tokens that it sends from the treasury to the Franchiser. We suggest that the Foundation aids in the creation of this contract in order to create an official and safe implementation, though we can likely fork the Trail of Bits audited Uniswap Labs implementation [github] of the same concept. If this proposal passes Snapshot, we request that the Foundation take the time to fork the contract and hire an auditor to check the implementation.
The contract has simple functions:
-Fund: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate to a single address
-FundMany: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate any amount to multiple addresses
-Recall: allows DAO to pull back funds from Franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from a single delegate.
-RecallMany: allows DAO to pull back funds from franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from multiple delegates.
It is worth noting that all tokens sent to the Franchiser will remain a part of the DAO’s balance sheet as it has full-control over the tokens and ability to pull them back at any time. No other entity has control of these tokens. The delegated tokens never leave the DAO’s ownership.
This working group will project admin this program. The specific deliverables include:
Note: This is not a position of power, just a project management work which is limited to the above executables
We will create a 3 of 4 multi-sig governed by the proposers if the proposal passes Snapshot voting.
Signers:
-Jengajojo (DAOStewards) -404 DAO -Event Horizon -Matt Fiebach
I'd love to see how this would work in a flow. I'm working on an on-chain reputation protocol aimed at growing the voting power of underrepresented members, and this topic really interests me. Let me know if you'd like to discuss it; we can find ways to 'coexist more amiably' with plutocracy or in a decentralized environment where efforts are more recognized.
I'd love to see how this would work in a flow. I'm working on an on-chain reputation protocol aimed at growing the voting power of underrepresented members, and this topic really interests me. Let me know if you'd like to discuss it; we can find ways to 'coexist more amiably' with plutocracy or in a decentralized environment where efforts are more recognized.
Same question here, thanks @ruslanklinkov for bringing it up.
Qualified delegates to nominate themselves on post within 7-days.
Will we need to provide additional information about ourselves? If so, what is the right way to do it?
we do not believe delegating treasury ARB is an ideal solution given that ARB governance power is one of the core value propositions of holding ARB today. We hope to return value to token holders in the future, but we want to ensure the voter base that shapes our path to value accrual has “skin in the game” rather than receiving delegation with no monetary stake.
Same question here, thanks @ruslanklinkov for bringing it up.
Qualified delegates to nominate themselves on post within 7-days.
Will we need to provide additional information about ourselves? If so, what is the right way to do it?
we do not believe delegating treasury ARB is an ideal solution given that ARB governance power is one of the core value propositions of holding ARB today. We hope to return value to token holders in the future, but we want to ensure the voter base that shapes our path to value accrual has “skin in the game” rather than receiving delegation with no monetary stake.
we do not believe delegating treasury ARB is an ideal solution given that ARB governance power is one of the core value propositions of holding ARB today. We hope to return value to token holders in the future, but we want to ensure the voter base that shapes our path to value accrual has “skin in the game” rather than receiving delegation with no monetary stake.
it's crazy how much of a difference a year makes... GG @Entropy
Hi @juanbug, yes, that's generally correct although there are a few more details. Here's what we outlined in the proposal for Next Steps.
Something like this was recently implemented at Uniswap. It would be good to hear from Uniswap community members on how that has gone before ossifying technical implementation or candidates.
Not quite the same, but Optimism also has an Anticapture Commission, which is basically an msig with 10m votes that is controlled by ~25 delegates.
I plan to vote AGAINST this proposal if it moves to snapshot
I do not think delegating ARB instead of awarding it is a good idea. It creates misaligned incentives where delegates make money off their increased importance in governance rather than their $ARB bags going up
I plan to vote AGAINST this proposal if it moves to snapshot
I do not think delegating ARB instead of awarding it is a good idea. It creates misaligned incentives where delegates make money off their increased importance in governance rather than their $ARB bags going up
Not much can be changed in this proposals current form to address this issue, so i will vote against. I much prefer @SEEDGov proposal flat out giving arb to active delegates
Yes, it appears that way.
This proposal makes a lot of sense, targeting active voting users like us with weighted empowerment
What will the process be like for moving this forward? Snapshot vote to determine if this is something we want, and then another snapshot vote to determine which delegates get delegation and then a third final on chain vote to confirm?
Is there any specific case you can refer to?
We definitely plan to pull some more data to validate the claim.
You’re going to have a couple dozen or so large delegates picking and choosing which 10 medium sized delegates can get a boosted closer to their level. I’m not claiming anyone would… but it feels like a scenario ripe for “I’ll vote for you, but you have to support my goals in the future” type of thing.
This perspective can apply to any proposal put forward by anyone. Naturally, delegates who vote for specific underrepresented delegates are expressing their support for their future aspirations.
You’re going to have a couple dozen or so large delegates picking and choosing which 10 medium sized delegates can get a boosted closer to their level. I’m not claiming anyone would… but it feels like a scenario ripe for “I’ll vote for you, but you have to support my goals in the future” type of thing.
This perspective can apply to any proposal put forward by anyone. Naturally, delegates who vote for specific underrepresented delegates are expressing their support for their future aspirations.
Giving 10 delegates a flat 1M ARB creates a proportionality issue given the wide range of voting power. i.e., a 50,000 candidate now is 20x as powerful where as a 1M candidate is only 2x as powerful. There should be a more equitable solution to this IMO. (Do we target a number that gets all 10 candidates to the same voting power? Do we maybe find a formula that 50,000 candidates are only getting boosted, say, 4x instead of 20x?)
As mentioned in a previous reply, we will revise this proposal to “top-up” delegates to 1M voting power rather than allocate a flat 1M to each delegate.
Somewhat related to this, I’m not sure it’s fair someone who has maybe 1.1M ARB tokens delegated to them is now going to be jumped in line by 10 people due to a cutoff. I know that’s sort of the nature of this - there has to be a number somewhere, but a flat 1M is going to create this scenario for a lot of people and a formula that takes this into account may alleviate some of that.
Addressed in the previous response.
I think there should be expectation that these delegates are also commenting on the forums.
As mentioned in a previous reply, tracking communication is outside the scope of this pilot program as we do not want to conflate the mission and objectives of this initiative with the mission and objectives of the Delegate Incentive System. With that said, in the future, we do want to explore ways to measure constructive feedback.
I think falling below 80% should just be automatic revoke, if possible
We will take this into consideration.
I'm sorry for being persistent, but I asked this not just for no reason. I remember how we voted for this proposal, but it never appeared on Tally. https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xf22530295daee96dffd7f70854475c06216a4d3594929672f71c12bf638bb0c8 That's why I decided to clarify this information with you in order to track the timing and regularity of proposals appearing on Snapshot. Once again, I apologize for going off-topic.
Voting power is given to those who earn it, they shouldn’t just receive it from the DAO because of some criteria.
Please reference our reply to @pedrob
There is a difference between a passive and active delegate. Does a delegate just vote? Do they contribute to Discourse and author proposals? Is the voting power representative of that?
- The $ARB in the DAO’s treasury is not issued. Although it is technically available, implementing this proposal would mean increasing the supply without enhancing liquidity. Even though it’s not a significant amount on the total circulating supply, this would dilute the price and lock up ARB which might be needed for other purposes in the future.
This proposal does not increase the circulating supply of $ARB. $ARB will be moved to the Franchiser contract but will remain under the DAO’s control and will only be delegated to approved candidates. As such, no $ARB will enter the circulating supply.
Depending on feedback, probably in the next few weeks.
Active delegate voters with the following qualifications can be considered for the program:
@RikaGoldberg Do you plan to exclude program administrators from the list in the first instance?
The new program, spearheaded by the SEED Latam team, focuses on compensating delegates monetarily, rather than amplifying delegates’ voices. That being said, we are considering two options to enhance the accessibility of our proposed program: either reducing the minimum voting requirement to 10,000 ARB or eliminating it entirely. Originally, we implemented a lower bound to mitigate the risk of spam. However, we now believe that maintaining an 80% voter participation rate, combined with a DAO election process, will effectively address this concern.
When will this proposal approximately appear on Snapshot?
Continuing these responses on behalf of @RikaGoldberg
The top 50 delegates incentive program has just begun. It may give us such results that we will need to come up with other solutions. I think this initiative is a little premature.
Instead of giving 1M tokens to the top 10, I think it is better to put a VP cap, so that everyone has the same VP. To avoid giving more VP to the one who has more. For example, everyone on the list should have 1M VP and based on that distribute the 10M.
After consideration, we agree with your suggestion on topping up VP to 1M rather than delegating 1M to each. We will add this revision to the draft.
we do not believe delegating treasury ARB is an ideal solution given that ARB governance power is one of the core value propositions of holding ARB today. We hope to return value to token holders in the future, but we want to ensure the voter base that shapes our path to value accrual has “skin in the game” rather than receiving delegation with no monetary stake.
it's crazy how much of a difference a year makes... GG @Entropy
Hi @juanbug, yes, that's generally correct although there are a few more details. Here's what we outlined in the proposal for Next Steps.
Something like this was recently implemented at Uniswap. It would be good to hear from Uniswap community members on how that has gone before ossifying technical implementation or candidates.
Not quite the same, but Optimism also has an Anticapture Commission, which is basically an msig with 10m votes that is controlled by ~25 delegates.
I plan to vote AGAINST this proposal if it moves to snapshot
I do not think delegating ARB instead of awarding it is a good idea. It creates misaligned incentives where delegates make money off their increased importance in governance rather than their $ARB bags going up
I plan to vote AGAINST this proposal if it moves to snapshot
I do not think delegating ARB instead of awarding it is a good idea. It creates misaligned incentives where delegates make money off their increased importance in governance rather than their $ARB bags going up
Not much can be changed in this proposals current form to address this issue, so i will vote against. I much prefer @SEEDGov proposal flat out giving arb to active delegates
Yes, it appears that way.
This proposal makes a lot of sense, targeting active voting users like us with weighted empowerment
What will the process be like for moving this forward? Snapshot vote to determine if this is something we want, and then another snapshot vote to determine which delegates get delegation and then a third final on chain vote to confirm?
Is there any specific case you can refer to?
We definitely plan to pull some more data to validate the claim.
You’re going to have a couple dozen or so large delegates picking and choosing which 10 medium sized delegates can get a boosted closer to their level. I’m not claiming anyone would… but it feels like a scenario ripe for “I’ll vote for you, but you have to support my goals in the future” type of thing.
This perspective can apply to any proposal put forward by anyone. Naturally, delegates who vote for specific underrepresented delegates are expressing their support for their future aspirations.
You’re going to have a couple dozen or so large delegates picking and choosing which 10 medium sized delegates can get a boosted closer to their level. I’m not claiming anyone would… but it feels like a scenario ripe for “I’ll vote for you, but you have to support my goals in the future” type of thing.
This perspective can apply to any proposal put forward by anyone. Naturally, delegates who vote for specific underrepresented delegates are expressing their support for their future aspirations.
Giving 10 delegates a flat 1M ARB creates a proportionality issue given the wide range of voting power. i.e., a 50,000 candidate now is 20x as powerful where as a 1M candidate is only 2x as powerful. There should be a more equitable solution to this IMO. (Do we target a number that gets all 10 candidates to the same voting power? Do we maybe find a formula that 50,000 candidates are only getting boosted, say, 4x instead of 20x?)
As mentioned in a previous reply, we will revise this proposal to “top-up” delegates to 1M voting power rather than allocate a flat 1M to each delegate.
Somewhat related to this, I’m not sure it’s fair someone who has maybe 1.1M ARB tokens delegated to them is now going to be jumped in line by 10 people due to a cutoff. I know that’s sort of the nature of this - there has to be a number somewhere, but a flat 1M is going to create this scenario for a lot of people and a formula that takes this into account may alleviate some of that.
Addressed in the previous response.
I think there should be expectation that these delegates are also commenting on the forums.
As mentioned in a previous reply, tracking communication is outside the scope of this pilot program as we do not want to conflate the mission and objectives of this initiative with the mission and objectives of the Delegate Incentive System. With that said, in the future, we do want to explore ways to measure constructive feedback.
I think falling below 80% should just be automatic revoke, if possible
We will take this into consideration.
I'm sorry for being persistent, but I asked this not just for no reason. I remember how we voted for this proposal, but it never appeared on Tally. https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xf22530295daee96dffd7f70854475c06216a4d3594929672f71c12bf638bb0c8 That's why I decided to clarify this information with you in order to track the timing and regularity of proposals appearing on Snapshot. Once again, I apologize for going off-topic.
Voting power is given to those who earn it, they shouldn’t just receive it from the DAO because of some criteria.
Please reference our reply to @pedrob
There is a difference between a passive and active delegate. Does a delegate just vote? Do they contribute to Discourse and author proposals? Is the voting power representative of that?
- The $ARB in the DAO’s treasury is not issued. Although it is technically available, implementing this proposal would mean increasing the supply without enhancing liquidity. Even though it’s not a significant amount on the total circulating supply, this would dilute the price and lock up ARB which might be needed for other purposes in the future.
This proposal does not increase the circulating supply of $ARB. $ARB will be moved to the Franchiser contract but will remain under the DAO’s control and will only be delegated to approved candidates. As such, no $ARB will enter the circulating supply.
Depending on feedback, probably in the next few weeks.
Active delegate voters with the following qualifications can be considered for the program:
@RikaGoldberg Do you plan to exclude program administrators from the list in the first instance?
The new program, spearheaded by the SEED Latam team, focuses on compensating delegates monetarily, rather than amplifying delegates’ voices. That being said, we are considering two options to enhance the accessibility of our proposed program: either reducing the minimum voting requirement to 10,000 ARB or eliminating it entirely. Originally, we implemented a lower bound to mitigate the risk of spam. However, we now believe that maintaining an 80% voter participation rate, combined with a DAO election process, will effectively address this concern.
When will this proposal approximately appear on Snapshot?
Continuing these responses on behalf of @RikaGoldberg
The top 50 delegates incentive program has just begun. It may give us such results that we will need to come up with other solutions. I think this initiative is a little premature.
Instead of giving 1M tokens to the top 10, I think it is better to put a VP cap, so that everyone has the same VP. To avoid giving more VP to the one who has more. For example, everyone on the list should have 1M VP and based on that distribute the 10M.
After consideration, we agree with your suggestion on topping up VP to 1M rather than delegating 1M to each. We will add this revision to the draft.
Voting power is given to those who earn it, they shouldn’t just receive it from the DAO because of some criteria.
Please reference our reply to @pedrob
There is a difference between a passive and active delegate. Does a delegate just vote? Do they contribute to Discourse and author proposals? Is the voting power representative of that?
We are specifically focusing on tokenholders who demonstrate their commitment by actively participating in voting on Tally proposals, a task that requires considerable effort. As mentioned in our previous responses, we intend to utilize metrics such as the overall participation rate from the delegate incentives program to monitor the effectiveness of this initiative. This approach will help ensure that delegates are held accountable and facilitate transparent reporting to the DAO.
Is the DAO not diverse enough that it warrants such a proposal?
We don’t believe so. To verify this quantitatively, we plan to pull more data.
Is the ask too large?
As the allocated $ARB for this program will be sourced from a Franchiser contract, which will remain under the DAO's control, and will not affect the circulating supply of $ARB, this initiative represents a cost-neutral method to enhance voting accessibility.
Have the authors analysed the voter participation, token voting participation and delegation rate? It would be interesting to see how diverse voting is within Arbitrum DAO before we make a decision.
As mentioned in the comment above, we plan to pull this data.
From the 25 eligible addresses, can you also include how much voting power they each have as 50,000-1,000,000 is a wide range.
Yes, we will.
As others have mentioned, why is the minimum 50,000 since the aim is to raise representation of underrepresented delegates. It feels unfair if someone has 30,000 VP and have been active in every single vote.
As mentioned in a previous reply, we are considering to either reduce the minimum voting requirement to 10,000 ARB or eliminate it entirely.
What would these quarterly reports include? Each voting address and their voting participation rate? What else? This could just use karma really and scope it down.
To streamline reporting, we plan to leverage the collected metrics from the Delegate Incentive System. For example, if delegates do not reach +60% TP they could lose the allocated voting power.
Is it when a delegate falls below 80% over the recent quarter right?
Yes, that’s correct.
Have you considered working with Tally @Frisson to run a delegation week event? DAO can sponsor this event so delegation is free too.
We love this idea and would love to showcase more talent from the smaller delegate pool.
- The $ARB in the DAO’s treasury is not issued. Although it is technically available, implementing this proposal would mean increasing the supply without enhancing liquidity. Even though it’s not a significant amount on the total circulating supply, this would dilute the price and lock up ARB which might be needed for other purposes in the future.
This proposal does not increase the circulating supply of $ARB. $ARB will be moved to the Franchiser contract but will remain under the DAO’s control and will only be delegated to approved candidates. As such, no $ARB will enter the circulating supply.
What is the fair limit? Why allocate 10M to the top 10 delegates between 50K and 1M? I’m not saying it’s wrong, but it’s difficult to establish an objective criterion given it has to be arbitrary.
1M $ARB is the minimum required delegation amount to be able to post to both Tally and Snapshot (500k for Snapshot, 1m for Tally).
Re: allocating 10M to the top 10 delegates, we will revise this proposal to “top-up” delegates to 1M rather than allocating a flat 1M ARB to each eligible delegate.
Re: why 10 delegates, we believe that 10 is a good place to start for a first run of this program. We can look to expand this number if this program proves successful.
The voting power currently held by delegates depends on the ARB holders. They are the ones who have decided whom to benefit with their voting power (VP), whether due to trust, their contributions, or simply because they like them. These are the rules of the game. A proposal like this does not respect that decision and arbitrarily dilutes the decision of the holders by taking away a percentage of VP from the current delegates.**
While delegation is a commendable start to representation and decentralization, it's important to recognize its imperfections. Occasionally, deserving delegates may not succeed in the popularity contest of delegation. As we aim to amplify the voices of these disenfranchised yet valuable delegates, we view this proposal as an initial step towards solving this disparity, given its zero cost to the DAO’s treasury in broadening voting participation. Moreover, $ARB token holders will wield their influence by voting on eligible applicants.
The new program, spearheaded by the SEED Latam team, focuses on compensating delegates monetarily, rather than amplifying delegates’ voices. That being said, we are considering two options to enhance the accessibility of our proposed program: either reducing the minimum voting requirement to 10,000 ARB or eliminating it entirely. Originally, we implemented a lower bound to mitigate the risk of spam. However, we now believe that maintaining an 80% voter participation rate, combined with a DAO election process, will effectively address this concern.
Note that as the development of the program progresses we will propose lower VP and PR revenue parameters. In this first iteration we have set the parameters moderately high to avoid "farming" or "spamming" the program, but this does not mean that the parameters are unchangeable. As we receive feedback, we will be adjusting the program.
Continuing these responses on behalf of @RikaGoldberg
The top 50 delegates incentive program has just begun. It may give us such results that we will need to come up with other solutions. I think this initiative is a little premature.
Let’s honestly say that a delegate who has 1,000,000 delegated tokens will not be very happy if another gets 950,000 votes for free. Previously, he had more weight and also actively took part in voting.
Instead of giving 1M tokens to the top 10, I think it is better to put a VP cap, so that everyone has the same VP. To avoid giving more VP to the one who has more. For example, everyone on the list should have 1M VP and based on that distribute the 10M.
After consideration, we agree with your suggestion on topping up VP to 1M rather than delegating 1M to each. We will add this revision to the draft.
Secondly, when it comes to assigning VP to each one and given that they have to have a minimum activity, which coincides with the delegate incentive program, I think that in order not to duplicate expenses in the reports, the metrics of the delegate program could be used. For example, if delegates do not reach +60% TP they could lose the assigned VP. This would not require additional reporting as they would be sent by the delegate incentive program and all the information would be in one place.
We agree that leveraging the ongoing delegate incentive program to the fullest extent possible is advisable. We are still finalizing KPIs but we intend to utilize the metrics of the delegate incentive program, such as delegate total participation (TP) requirements, to track the program's success and hold program participants accountable. We also aim to provide transparent reporting to the DAO.
Voting power is given to those who earn it, they shouldn’t just receive it from the DAO because of some criteria.
Please reference our reply to @pedrob
There is a difference between a passive and active delegate. Does a delegate just vote? Do they contribute to Discourse and author proposals? Is the voting power representative of that?
We are specifically focusing on tokenholders who demonstrate their commitment by actively participating in voting on Tally proposals, a task that requires considerable effort. As mentioned in our previous responses, we intend to utilize metrics such as the overall participation rate from the delegate incentives program to monitor the effectiveness of this initiative. This approach will help ensure that delegates are held accountable and facilitate transparent reporting to the DAO.
Is the DAO not diverse enough that it warrants such a proposal?
We don’t believe so. To verify this quantitatively, we plan to pull more data.
Is the ask too large?
As the allocated $ARB for this program will be sourced from a Franchiser contract, which will remain under the DAO's control, and will not affect the circulating supply of $ARB, this initiative represents a cost-neutral method to enhance voting accessibility.
Have the authors analysed the voter participation, token voting participation and delegation rate? It would be interesting to see how diverse voting is within Arbitrum DAO before we make a decision.
As mentioned in the comment above, we plan to pull this data.
From the 25 eligible addresses, can you also include how much voting power they each have as 50,000-1,000,000 is a wide range.
Yes, we will.
As others have mentioned, why is the minimum 50,000 since the aim is to raise representation of underrepresented delegates. It feels unfair if someone has 30,000 VP and have been active in every single vote.
As mentioned in a previous reply, we are considering to either reduce the minimum voting requirement to 10,000 ARB or eliminate it entirely.
What would these quarterly reports include? Each voting address and their voting participation rate? What else? This could just use karma really and scope it down.
To streamline reporting, we plan to leverage the collected metrics from the Delegate Incentive System. For example, if delegates do not reach +60% TP they could lose the allocated voting power.
Is it when a delegate falls below 80% over the recent quarter right?
Yes, that’s correct.
Have you considered working with Tally @Frisson to run a delegation week event? DAO can sponsor this event so delegation is free too.
We love this idea and would love to showcase more talent from the smaller delegate pool.
- The $ARB in the DAO’s treasury is not issued. Although it is technically available, implementing this proposal would mean increasing the supply without enhancing liquidity. Even though it’s not a significant amount on the total circulating supply, this would dilute the price and lock up ARB which might be needed for other purposes in the future.
This proposal does not increase the circulating supply of $ARB. $ARB will be moved to the Franchiser contract but will remain under the DAO’s control and will only be delegated to approved candidates. As such, no $ARB will enter the circulating supply.
What is the fair limit? Why allocate 10M to the top 10 delegates between 50K and 1M? I’m not saying it’s wrong, but it’s difficult to establish an objective criterion given it has to be arbitrary.
1M $ARB is the minimum required delegation amount to be able to post to both Tally and Snapshot (500k for Snapshot, 1m for Tally).
Re: allocating 10M to the top 10 delegates, we will revise this proposal to “top-up” delegates to 1M rather than allocating a flat 1M ARB to each eligible delegate.
Re: why 10 delegates, we believe that 10 is a good place to start for a first run of this program. We can look to expand this number if this program proves successful.
The voting power currently held by delegates depends on the ARB holders. They are the ones who have decided whom to benefit with their voting power (VP), whether due to trust, their contributions, or simply because they like them. These are the rules of the game. A proposal like this does not respect that decision and arbitrarily dilutes the decision of the holders by taking away a percentage of VP from the current delegates.**
While delegation is a commendable start to representation and decentralization, it's important to recognize its imperfections. Occasionally, deserving delegates may not succeed in the popularity contest of delegation. As we aim to amplify the voices of these disenfranchised yet valuable delegates, we view this proposal as an initial step towards solving this disparity, given its zero cost to the DAO’s treasury in broadening voting participation. Moreover, $ARB token holders will wield their influence by voting on eligible applicants.
The new program, spearheaded by the SEED Latam team, focuses on compensating delegates monetarily, rather than amplifying delegates’ voices. That being said, we are considering two options to enhance the accessibility of our proposed program: either reducing the minimum voting requirement to 10,000 ARB or eliminating it entirely. Originally, we implemented a lower bound to mitigate the risk of spam. However, we now believe that maintaining an 80% voter participation rate, combined with a DAO election process, will effectively address this concern.
Note that as the development of the program progresses we will propose lower VP and PR revenue parameters. In this first iteration we have set the parameters moderately high to avoid "farming" or "spamming" the program, but this does not mean that the parameters are unchangeable. As we receive feedback, we will be adjusting the program.
Continuing these responses on behalf of @RikaGoldberg
The top 50 delegates incentive program has just begun. It may give us such results that we will need to come up with other solutions. I think this initiative is a little premature.
Let’s honestly say that a delegate who has 1,000,000 delegated tokens will not be very happy if another gets 950,000 votes for free. Previously, he had more weight and also actively took part in voting.
Instead of giving 1M tokens to the top 10, I think it is better to put a VP cap, so that everyone has the same VP. To avoid giving more VP to the one who has more. For example, everyone on the list should have 1M VP and based on that distribute the 10M.
After consideration, we agree with your suggestion on topping up VP to 1M rather than delegating 1M to each. We will add this revision to the draft.
Secondly, when it comes to assigning VP to each one and given that they have to have a minimum activity, which coincides with the delegate incentive program, I think that in order not to duplicate expenses in the reports, the metrics of the delegate program could be used. For example, if delegates do not reach +60% TP they could lose the assigned VP. This would not require additional reporting as they would be sent by the delegate incentive program and all the information would be in one place.
We agree that leveraging the ongoing delegate incentive program to the fullest extent possible is advisable. We are still finalizing KPIs but we intend to utilize the metrics of the delegate incentive program, such as delegate total participation (TP) requirements, to track the program's success and hold program participants accountable. We also aim to provide transparent reporting to the DAO.
Thank you to everyone who took the time to write thoughtful responses to this RFC. We appreciate your patience as we have been synthesizing our replies. @Tane @axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth @ruslanklinkov @cp0x @pedrob @Bobbay @Bob-Rossi @maxlomu @juanbug
I will reply to each of your comments on behalf of the RFC's authors.
We will continue to monitor this thread before posting a Snapshot vote.
We already told some members in your team, but we believe that lowering the minimum voting power to be qualified for the program would suit the purpose of the proposal: “empowering under-represented delegates” since the delegates with over 50k VP will be incentivized by the new program led by SEED Latam team. This program should also work as a bridge for active and serious delegates without enough voting power to be incentivized to make more impacts to the DAO governance as important actors.
The new program, spearheaded by the SEED Latam team, focuses on compensating delegates monetarily, rather than amplifying delegates' voices. That being said, we are considering two options to enhance the accessibility of our proposed program: either reducing the minimum voting requirement to 10,000 ARB or eliminating it entirely. Originally, we implemented a lower bound to mitigate the risk of spam. However, we now believe that maintaining an 80% voter participation rate, combined with a DAO election process, will effectively address this concern.
I have my doubts about the effectiveness of this initiative. On the one hand, as an interested party I should be in favor of this proposal, but let's consider the pros and cons
I have my doubts about the effectiveness of this initiative. On the one hand, as an interested party I should be in favor of this proposal, but let's consider the pros and cons
In addition, I would like to say that I have put forward a proposal that may partially overlap with this in terms of adjusting the delegation contract. Check it out https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/accounting-for-votes-arb-that-locked-in-various-projects/22454
Thanks for taking the initiative, I like this idea, it has a positive impact to promote the idea of decentralized governance. I think we should consider this proposal.
Hi, I have some comments on the proposal.
Instead of giving 1M tokens to the top 10, I think it is better to put a VP cap, so that everyone has the same VP. To avoid giving more VP to the one who has more. For example, everyone on the list should have 1M VP and based on that distribute the 10M.
Hi, I have some comments on the proposal.
Instead of giving 1M tokens to the top 10, I think it is better to put a VP cap, so that everyone has the same VP. To avoid giving more VP to the one who has more. For example, everyone on the list should have 1M VP and based on that distribute the 10M.
Over the last 3 months there have been 6 onchain proposals that count and a delegate must have voted on at least 5 in order to qualify. 25 addresses currently qualify.
| Delegate Name | Address | Voting % |
|---|---|---|
| Coinruay.eth | 0x054becf10c79afa4e60f75b187837be9fb83867d | 100.00% |
| powerkee.eth | 0x400e3ab48b2ccd2420ec04ba0ee9c94bb54a0b1c | 100.00% |
| bristolblockchain | 0x43d3938ebd74106e2d177f9a304c1e9f914f2b52 | 100.00% |
| zkmehdi.eth | 0x5f367bf126fda56d88ba88a8978d5496c66b3569 | 100.00% |
| Larvandweb3.eth | 0x5f38bb373dccb91ad9fd3727c2b9baf6df9332d3 | 100.00% |
| Cp0x | 0x6f9bb7e454f5b3eb2310343f0e99269dc2bb8a1d | 100.00% |
| Bruce1 | 0x88bd639d6b029596b029c61490f29f57b0bf4a3f | 100.00% |
| ermia.eth | 0x8e22a4c2901da99777d76f80f29640fc81ae96bb | 100.00% |
| tosdis.eth | 0xaafdd78af4f90ab649b94e5ef8430d27174a084c | 100.00% |
| 0xmcfly.eth | 0xafd5f60aa8eb4f488eaa0ef98c1c5b0645d9a0a0 | 100.00% |
| ruslaslinko.eth | 0xc3e8ac233f02d13c1e299e47ae230c205e0177ed | 100.00% |
| basve.eth | 0xc560d89d663b31110e164354c6377d8845ed4db3 | 100.00% |
| cryptospb.eth | 0xde96e75c7160d70a447a72afdb75ddfa1455c808 | 100.00% |
| 404 DAO | 0xe93d59cc0bcecfd4ac204827ef67c5266079e2b5 | 100.00% |
| lucky-s.eth | 0xf0ea58b65c82c48ce69f0abd68d178e7764c4ba2 | 100.00% |
| kuiquan.eth | 0xf3fe8c6c75be4afb2f8200fc77339abe4d7cff33 | 100.00% |
| penn blockchain | 0x070341aa5ed571f0fb2c4a5641409b1a46b4961b | 83.33% |
| hiringdevs.eth | 0x22aa1f4173b826451763ebfce22cf54a0603163c | 83.33% |
| alpha insiders | 0x3d1846ea60001a3bc21438d76f3958422fe89adb | 83.33% |
| ocandcrypto.eth | 0xa19a11cb5928bf07b5b6aba256f63142343a59bc | 83.33% |
| Limes | 0xa7860e99e3ce0752d1ac53b974e309fff80277c6 | 83.33% |
| Djinn | 0xbf122ac9ee2cdd537fe404ade218159051ba9455 | 83.33% |
| DAOplomats | 0xd4879f876ee383067f80acadbe283b93141908e9 | 83.33% |
| stablelab | 0xea172676e4105e92cc52dbf45fd93b274ec96676 | 83.33% |
| Nathanvdh.eth | 0xf9551c66995ed3ff9bb05c9fd7ff148bd75dc99a | 83.33% |
Qualified applicants must self nominate themselves to be considered.
Secondly, when it comes to assigning VP to each one and given that they have to have a minimum activity, which coincides with the delegate incentive program, I think that in order not to duplicate expenses in the reports, the metrics of the delegate program could be used. For example if delegates do not reach +60% TP they could lose the assigned VP. This would not require additional reporting as they would be sent by the delegate incentive program and all the information would be in one place.
$15,000 in ARB for program management and reporting for 1 year
Finally, I think there should be some mechanisms to prevent possible micromanagement of delegates, i.e. over 10M vp.
Note: I am not saying that admins want to micromanage, but I think it is a point to consider.
Agree that more data on all parts would be very helpful. Particularly the data on currently delegation size for these entities. Bring that 1 million to 50k is such a wide range, feel like the fairest way to do this is delegate votes up to 1 million or else issues arise for those near the 1 million range as it incentivizes people to stop looking for natural delegation and therefore lose out on a million more through this program.
I agree with @Bob-Rossi and @Bobbay - I'd like to see their questions answered before forming a final opinion.
empowering underrepresented delegates who, despite active participation in governance, do not have sufficient voting power to have their ideas seriously considered
To be honest, I'm lukewarm on the idea. I do really strongly support creating an active and diverse delegate group, but I have to think on this one... there are some drawbacks to something like this from an 'ideological' standpoint, a big one being if this skews the actual wishes of ARB holders. As, in theory, everyone who has delegates does so because their views align with their delegate. So how do we determine if people only have 50k delegated because of the stickiness of delegated tokens, or they have 50k delegated because their views are unpopular? I'd imagine it's more a stickiness issue, but its something to think about.
Also, I think the DAO voting is probably the best way to make this fair, I'm just not sure if that is really a good thing to subject the DAO too? I don't really have a good way to explain it, nor any alternative... but it just feels off and subject to political drama in practice. As you're going to have a couple dozen or so large delegates picking and choosing which 10 medium sized delegates can get a boosted closer to their level. I'm not claiming anyone would... but it feels like a scenario ripe for "I'll vote for you, but you have to support my goals in the future" type of thing.
Thank you very much for the proposal.
I agree with its spirit, understanding that the goal is desirable, and I appreciate the introduction of mechanisms to encourage participation and decentralization.
That said, I have reservations about the proposed execution.
I raise some points/concerns for which I don't have answers. Perhaps you do, and they can be addressed:
Hi @MattOnChain , I'm also working on a similar proposal and was wondering if we could chat on Telegram. I'd like to discuss how we might collaborate to refine and improve this proposal.
A really interesting proposal!
As mentioned, this proposal is inspired by Uniswap proposal. A similar proposal was posted by DAOplaomats on Aave that wasn’t received as well as Uniswaps version. I think its important to consider why Aave received this proposal in a different way and highlight some of these points:
Thank you to everyone who took the time to write thoughtful responses to this RFC. We appreciate your patience as we have been synthesizing our replies. @Tane @axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth @ruslanklinkov @cp0x @pedrob @Bobbay @Bob-Rossi @maxlomu @juanbug
I will reply to each of your comments on behalf of the RFC's authors.
We will continue to monitor this thread before posting a Snapshot vote.
We already told some members in your team, but we believe that lowering the minimum voting power to be qualified for the program would suit the purpose of the proposal: “empowering under-represented delegates” since the delegates with over 50k VP will be incentivized by the new program led by SEED Latam team. This program should also work as a bridge for active and serious delegates without enough voting power to be incentivized to make more impacts to the DAO governance as important actors.
The new program, spearheaded by the SEED Latam team, focuses on compensating delegates monetarily, rather than amplifying delegates' voices. That being said, we are considering two options to enhance the accessibility of our proposed program: either reducing the minimum voting requirement to 10,000 ARB or eliminating it entirely. Originally, we implemented a lower bound to mitigate the risk of spam. However, we now believe that maintaining an 80% voter participation rate, combined with a DAO election process, will effectively address this concern.
I have my doubts about the effectiveness of this initiative. On the one hand, as an interested party I should be in favor of this proposal, but let's consider the pros and cons
I have my doubts about the effectiveness of this initiative. On the one hand, as an interested party I should be in favor of this proposal, but let's consider the pros and cons
In addition, I would like to say that I have put forward a proposal that may partially overlap with this in terms of adjusting the delegation contract. Check it out https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/accounting-for-votes-arb-that-locked-in-various-projects/22454
Thanks for taking the initiative, I like this idea, it has a positive impact to promote the idea of decentralized governance. I think we should consider this proposal.
Hi, I have some comments on the proposal.
Instead of giving 1M tokens to the top 10, I think it is better to put a VP cap, so that everyone has the same VP. To avoid giving more VP to the one who has more. For example, everyone on the list should have 1M VP and based on that distribute the 10M.
Hi, I have some comments on the proposal.
Instead of giving 1M tokens to the top 10, I think it is better to put a VP cap, so that everyone has the same VP. To avoid giving more VP to the one who has more. For example, everyone on the list should have 1M VP and based on that distribute the 10M.
Over the last 3 months there have been 6 onchain proposals that count and a delegate must have voted on at least 5 in order to qualify. 25 addresses currently qualify.
| Delegate Name | Address | Voting % |
|---|---|---|
| Coinruay.eth | 0x054becf10c79afa4e60f75b187837be9fb83867d | 100.00% |
| powerkee.eth | 0x400e3ab48b2ccd2420ec04ba0ee9c94bb54a0b1c | 100.00% |
| bristolblockchain | 0x43d3938ebd74106e2d177f9a304c1e9f914f2b52 | 100.00% |
| zkmehdi.eth | 0x5f367bf126fda56d88ba88a8978d5496c66b3569 | 100.00% |
| Larvandweb3.eth | 0x5f38bb373dccb91ad9fd3727c2b9baf6df9332d3 | 100.00% |
| Cp0x | 0x6f9bb7e454f5b3eb2310343f0e99269dc2bb8a1d | 100.00% |
| Bruce1 | 0x88bd639d6b029596b029c61490f29f57b0bf4a3f | 100.00% |
| ermia.eth | 0x8e22a4c2901da99777d76f80f29640fc81ae96bb | 100.00% |
| tosdis.eth | 0xaafdd78af4f90ab649b94e5ef8430d27174a084c | 100.00% |
| 0xmcfly.eth | 0xafd5f60aa8eb4f488eaa0ef98c1c5b0645d9a0a0 | 100.00% |
| ruslaslinko.eth | 0xc3e8ac233f02d13c1e299e47ae230c205e0177ed | 100.00% |
| basve.eth | 0xc560d89d663b31110e164354c6377d8845ed4db3 | 100.00% |
| cryptospb.eth | 0xde96e75c7160d70a447a72afdb75ddfa1455c808 | 100.00% |
| 404 DAO | 0xe93d59cc0bcecfd4ac204827ef67c5266079e2b5 | 100.00% |
| lucky-s.eth | 0xf0ea58b65c82c48ce69f0abd68d178e7764c4ba2 | 100.00% |
| kuiquan.eth | 0xf3fe8c6c75be4afb2f8200fc77339abe4d7cff33 | 100.00% |
| penn blockchain | 0x070341aa5ed571f0fb2c4a5641409b1a46b4961b | 83.33% |
| hiringdevs.eth | 0x22aa1f4173b826451763ebfce22cf54a0603163c | 83.33% |
| alpha insiders | 0x3d1846ea60001a3bc21438d76f3958422fe89adb | 83.33% |
| ocandcrypto.eth | 0xa19a11cb5928bf07b5b6aba256f63142343a59bc | 83.33% |
| Limes | 0xa7860e99e3ce0752d1ac53b974e309fff80277c6 | 83.33% |
| Djinn | 0xbf122ac9ee2cdd537fe404ade218159051ba9455 | 83.33% |
| DAOplomats | 0xd4879f876ee383067f80acadbe283b93141908e9 | 83.33% |
| stablelab | 0xea172676e4105e92cc52dbf45fd93b274ec96676 | 83.33% |
| Nathanvdh.eth | 0xf9551c66995ed3ff9bb05c9fd7ff148bd75dc99a | 83.33% |
Qualified applicants must self nominate themselves to be considered.
Secondly, when it comes to assigning VP to each one and given that they have to have a minimum activity, which coincides with the delegate incentive program, I think that in order not to duplicate expenses in the reports, the metrics of the delegate program could be used. For example if delegates do not reach +60% TP they could lose the assigned VP. This would not require additional reporting as they would be sent by the delegate incentive program and all the information would be in one place.
$15,000 in ARB for program management and reporting for 1 year
Finally, I think there should be some mechanisms to prevent possible micromanagement of delegates, i.e. over 10M vp.
Note: I am not saying that admins want to micromanage, but I think it is a point to consider.
Agree that more data on all parts would be very helpful. Particularly the data on currently delegation size for these entities. Bring that 1 million to 50k is such a wide range, feel like the fairest way to do this is delegate votes up to 1 million or else issues arise for those near the 1 million range as it incentivizes people to stop looking for natural delegation and therefore lose out on a million more through this program.
I agree with @Bob-Rossi and @Bobbay - I'd like to see their questions answered before forming a final opinion.
empowering underrepresented delegates who, despite active participation in governance, do not have sufficient voting power to have their ideas seriously considered
To be honest, I'm lukewarm on the idea. I do really strongly support creating an active and diverse delegate group, but I have to think on this one... there are some drawbacks to something like this from an 'ideological' standpoint, a big one being if this skews the actual wishes of ARB holders. As, in theory, everyone who has delegates does so because their views align with their delegate. So how do we determine if people only have 50k delegated because of the stickiness of delegated tokens, or they have 50k delegated because their views are unpopular? I'd imagine it's more a stickiness issue, but its something to think about.
Also, I think the DAO voting is probably the best way to make this fair, I'm just not sure if that is really a good thing to subject the DAO too? I don't really have a good way to explain it, nor any alternative... but it just feels off and subject to political drama in practice. As you're going to have a couple dozen or so large delegates picking and choosing which 10 medium sized delegates can get a boosted closer to their level. I'm not claiming anyone would... but it feels like a scenario ripe for "I'll vote for you, but you have to support my goals in the future" type of thing.
Thank you very much for the proposal.
I agree with its spirit, understanding that the goal is desirable, and I appreciate the introduction of mechanisms to encourage participation and decentralization.
That said, I have reservations about the proposed execution.
I raise some points/concerns for which I don't have answers. Perhaps you do, and they can be addressed:
Hi @MattOnChain , I'm also working on a similar proposal and was wondering if we could chat on Telegram. I'd like to discuss how we might collaborate to refine and improve this proposal.
A really interesting proposal!
As mentioned, this proposal is inspired by Uniswap proposal. A similar proposal was posted by DAOplaomats on Aave that wasn’t received as well as Uniswaps version. I think its important to consider why Aave received this proposal in a different way and highlight some of these points:
I agree with @Bob-Rossi and @Bobbay - I'd like to see their questions answered before forming a final opinion.
empowering underrepresented delegates who, despite active participation in governance, do not have sufficient voting power to have their ideas seriously considered
Is there any specific case you can refer to? It was my impression that as a DAO we have been so far open to new ideas, regardless on whether the proposer had any vote delegated. However, if there are some examples we can analyze better what didn't work.
To be honest, I'm lukewarm on the idea. I do really strongly support creating an active and diverse delegate group, but I have to think on this one... there are some drawbacks to something like this from an 'ideological' standpoint, a big one being if this skews the actual wishes of ARB holders. As, in theory, everyone who has delegates does so because their views align with their delegate. So how do we determine if people only have 50k delegated because of the stickiness of delegated tokens, or they have 50k delegated because their views are unpopular? I'd imagine it's more a stickiness issue, but its something to think about.
Also, I think the DAO voting is probably the best way to make this fair, I'm just not sure if that is really a good thing to subject the DAO too? I don't really have a good way to explain it, nor any alternative... but it just feels off and subject to political drama in practice. As you're going to have a couple dozen or so large delegates picking and choosing which 10 medium sized delegates can get a boosted closer to their level. I'm not claiming anyone would... but it feels like a scenario ripe for "I'll vote for you, but you have to support my goals in the future" type of thing.
That said, a few brain-stormy suggestions to make this more attractive:
Edit: A quick add... is there a reason it's picking 10 out of the 25? Why not just all who get >50% approval? If truly deserving, I'd rather just see all 25 people benefit then a select portion of them. That would be more in the spirit of this proposal and I think would resolve some of the issues I noted in my 1st two points above.
Thank you very much for the proposal.
I agree with its spirit, understanding that the goal is desirable, and I appreciate the introduction of mechanisms to encourage participation and decentralization.
That said, I have reservations about the proposed execution.
I raise some points/concerns for which I don't have answers. Perhaps you do, and they can be addressed:
The $ARB in the DAO's treasury is not issued. Although it is technically available, implementing this proposal would mean increasing the supply without enhancing liquidity. Even though it's not a significant amount on the total circulating supply, this would dilute the price and lock up ARB which might be needed for other purposes in the future.
What is the fair limit? Why allocate 10M to the top 10 delegates between 50K and 1M? I'm not saying it's wrong, but it's difficult to establish an objective criterion given it has to be arbitrary.
The voting power currently held by delegates depends on the ARB holders. They are the ones who have decided whom to benefit with their voting power (VP), whether due to trust, their contributions, or simply because they like them. These are the rules of the game. A proposal like this does not respect that decision and arbitrarily dilutes the decision of the holders by taking away a percentage of VP from the current delegates.
With this in mind, I believe mechanisms should be sought to encourage as many ARB holders as possible to delegate their voting power or actively participate in the DAO. Currently (and this will increase shortly), 1.5 billion ARB tokens are circulating, with only 356 million (about 20%) delegated. The power lies with the holders, and we must go after it.
Thank you for starting this discussion!
*This opinion is my own and does not reflect those of SEEDLatam
As mentioned, this proposal is inspired by Uniswap proposal. A similar proposal was posted by DAOplaomats on Aave that wasn’t received as well as Uniswaps version. I think its important to consider why Aave received this proposal in a different way and highlight some of these points:
As of now, I’m in the middle of whether this should move forward in its current stage since it is quite vague and doesn’t actually provide a data driven approach to distributing the voting power.
To be clear, I don’t think this is a considerable factor for delegation:
“The proposal will also give more delegates the ability to propose Snapshot votes and further diversify the makeup of the DAO. Snapshots have a threshold of 500K ARB and onchain proposals 1M to propose.”
There are enough delegates who reach that threshold and are reachable that are willing to help here. Regarding the onchain aspect, we could take inspiration from https://www.fish.vote/ if needed, but I don’t think there have been any issues regarding the proposal process.
Thanks @MattOnChain and all parties involved in this proposal. We've seen the preliminary proposal in the GovHack and expressed full support for the initiative as a whole.
As given in the original post, we have feedback on the qualification of the delegate's current voting power.
Thanks @MattOnChain and all parties involved in this proposal. We've seen the preliminary proposal in the GovHack and expressed full support for the initiative as a whole.
As given in the original post, we have feedback on the qualification of the delegate's current voting power.
We already told some members in your team, but we believe that lowering the minimum voting power to be qualified for the program would suit the purpose of the proposal: “empowering under-represented delegates” since the delegates with over 50k VP will be incentivized by the new program led by SEED Latam team. This program should also work as a bridge for active and serious delegates without enough voting power to be incentivized to make more impacts to the DAO governance as important actors.
I agree with @Bob-Rossi and @Bobbay - I'd like to see their questions answered before forming a final opinion.
empowering underrepresented delegates who, despite active participation in governance, do not have sufficient voting power to have their ideas seriously considered
Is there any specific case you can refer to? It was my impression that as a DAO we have been so far open to new ideas, regardless on whether the proposer had any vote delegated. However, if there are some examples we can analyze better what didn't work.
To be honest, I'm lukewarm on the idea. I do really strongly support creating an active and diverse delegate group, but I have to think on this one... there are some drawbacks to something like this from an 'ideological' standpoint, a big one being if this skews the actual wishes of ARB holders. As, in theory, everyone who has delegates does so because their views align with their delegate. So how do we determine if people only have 50k delegated because of the stickiness of delegated tokens, or they have 50k delegated because their views are unpopular? I'd imagine it's more a stickiness issue, but its something to think about.
Also, I think the DAO voting is probably the best way to make this fair, I'm just not sure if that is really a good thing to subject the DAO too? I don't really have a good way to explain it, nor any alternative... but it just feels off and subject to political drama in practice. As you're going to have a couple dozen or so large delegates picking and choosing which 10 medium sized delegates can get a boosted closer to their level. I'm not claiming anyone would... but it feels like a scenario ripe for "I'll vote for you, but you have to support my goals in the future" type of thing.
That said, a few brain-stormy suggestions to make this more attractive:
Edit: A quick add... is there a reason it's picking 10 out of the 25? Why not just all who get >50% approval? If truly deserving, I'd rather just see all 25 people benefit then a select portion of them. That would be more in the spirit of this proposal and I think would resolve some of the issues I noted in my 1st two points above.
Thank you very much for the proposal.
I agree with its spirit, understanding that the goal is desirable, and I appreciate the introduction of mechanisms to encourage participation and decentralization.
That said, I have reservations about the proposed execution.
I raise some points/concerns for which I don't have answers. Perhaps you do, and they can be addressed:
The $ARB in the DAO's treasury is not issued. Although it is technically available, implementing this proposal would mean increasing the supply without enhancing liquidity. Even though it's not a significant amount on the total circulating supply, this would dilute the price and lock up ARB which might be needed for other purposes in the future.
What is the fair limit? Why allocate 10M to the top 10 delegates between 50K and 1M? I'm not saying it's wrong, but it's difficult to establish an objective criterion given it has to be arbitrary.
The voting power currently held by delegates depends on the ARB holders. They are the ones who have decided whom to benefit with their voting power (VP), whether due to trust, their contributions, or simply because they like them. These are the rules of the game. A proposal like this does not respect that decision and arbitrarily dilutes the decision of the holders by taking away a percentage of VP from the current delegates.
With this in mind, I believe mechanisms should be sought to encourage as many ARB holders as possible to delegate their voting power or actively participate in the DAO. Currently (and this will increase shortly), 1.5 billion ARB tokens are circulating, with only 356 million (about 20%) delegated. The power lies with the holders, and we must go after it.
Thank you for starting this discussion!
*This opinion is my own and does not reflect those of SEEDLatam
As mentioned, this proposal is inspired by Uniswap proposal. A similar proposal was posted by DAOplaomats on Aave that wasn’t received as well as Uniswaps version. I think its important to consider why Aave received this proposal in a different way and highlight some of these points:
As of now, I’m in the middle of whether this should move forward in its current stage since it is quite vague and doesn’t actually provide a data driven approach to distributing the voting power.
To be clear, I don’t think this is a considerable factor for delegation:
“The proposal will also give more delegates the ability to propose Snapshot votes and further diversify the makeup of the DAO. Snapshots have a threshold of 500K ARB and onchain proposals 1M to propose.”
There are enough delegates who reach that threshold and are reachable that are willing to help here. Regarding the onchain aspect, we could take inspiration from https://www.fish.vote/ if needed, but I don’t think there have been any issues regarding the proposal process.
Thanks @MattOnChain and all parties involved in this proposal. We've seen the preliminary proposal in the GovHack and expressed full support for the initiative as a whole.
As given in the original post, we have feedback on the qualification of the delegate's current voting power.
Thanks @MattOnChain and all parties involved in this proposal. We've seen the preliminary proposal in the GovHack and expressed full support for the initiative as a whole.
As given in the original post, we have feedback on the qualification of the delegate's current voting power.
We already told some members in your team, but we believe that lowering the minimum voting power to be qualified for the program would suit the purpose of the proposal: “empowering under-represented delegates” since the delegates with over 50k VP will be incentivized by the new program led by SEED Latam team. This program should also work as a bridge for active and serious delegates without enough voting power to be incentivized to make more impacts to the DAO governance as important actors.
