With the aim of enfranchising the tens of thousands of small voters, this proposal suggests we delegate (not grant) 5,000,000 ARB to a public access-voter block subject to meeting emission timelines as well as participation/output-based KPIs outlined below and a clawback after 1 year if the DAO votes to do so. Arbitrum community members may mint a free, soul-bound Voter Pass which allows them to take part in mobilizing this voter pool. As detailed further below, this model:
To support this initiative, the Event Horizon team has offered a $3,000 ETH grant to reimburse the gas cost Arbitrum community members spend to mint voter access passes to a public good voter pool.
5,000,000 ARB would place Event Horizon community as the 21st largest delegate. We think this places a fair amount of power into the 3rd pillar of governance, namely retail (the other two being team and individual delegates).
This proposal reflects two of Arbitrum's core mission values:
Socially Inclusive: By constructing a dedicated block of governance authority with lower capital barriers, our community greatly expands who gets a seat at the table.
Neutral and Open: By making the thoughts and ideas of this broader swath of individuals heard, we further broaden the spectrum of possibilities for the evolution of our ecosystem.
Today, with only 7 of the top 15 top delegates, any proposal can be passed on chain. However, there are over thousands of individual voters who participate in each vote despite having effectively no meaningful say. This should be rewarded. Moreover, there are likely tens of thousands more incredibly talented community members who are very capable of adding to the collective cognition of the ecosystem, but simply lack the capital means to have a voice and are left discouraged from voting at all. Not voting when you only have $500 worth of ARB is a drop in the bucket. Sitting out governance proposals is unfortunately the rational decision, but collectively makes everyone worse off.
Event Horizon is a public good. It is a public-access meta-governance block.
DAOs today rely exclusively on individuals and company entities to serve as network delegates. However, this isn't the only option. While individual delegates certainly add incredible value to the Arbitrum Ecosystem, so would a governance allotment dedicated to the greater body of smaller retail participants.
In this regard, Event Horizon slots into the Arbitrum ecosystem in a similar fashion to a standard delegate, however, rather than the block voting based on the decision of one individual, it votes with the collective cognition of hundreds of individual voter pass holders.
This serves two functions:
It provides a clear and designated voice for smaller, retail voters.
It drives participation through a game-theoretic process called Implicit Delegation. One of the greatest barriers to participation is a lack of voice due to lack of capital. Implicit delegation and public access governance changes this.
Implicit Delegation is a model by which the full public governance block mobilizes in favor of the consensus of those who do vote, thereby implicitly delegating the authority of those who don’t vote.
When participation is low… each voter receives a larger slice of the public access pie. This means the fewer people there are voting, the more incentive there is for someone new to come and participate.
When participation is high… there are more voters splitting the same pie, however, retail participation is high, which is a win for the ecosystem.
Implicit Delegation represents an effort to offer a new paradigm around means of influence. A shift from today’s entirely capital-centric to a more retail-friendly participation-centric model.
Where Direct Governance allocates influence along the lines of capital, and Explicit Delegation allocates influence along the lines of popularity (which often reflects capital), Implicit Delegation allocates influence to those who care most: people showing up to vote. Because the carrot is influence, it attracts governance-interested retail, not capital-interested retail, more on that below.
Because the entirety of the block is always mobilized, those who are most vested are rewarded for their participation by having a larger share of the voting pie. In this regard, EventHorizon’s model leans into a systemic lack of participation to create a solution.
While token rewards for participation hold legitimate merit and are an intuitive remedy for low turnout, it has limitations.
Added Thought Capital: in line with the notion above, there are likely thousands, of community members each holding both strong ideas and valuable contributions for the ecosystem, but simply lack enough voice to justify participation. Through Implicit Delegation, any community member of the Arbitrum ecosystem has an opportunity to have their voice heard, bringing thousands more minds and ideas to the surface.
Inflationary: While token rewards drive participation at the expense of inflation, Implicit delegation simply leverages its game theory model to increase incentive to vote in the form of a greater voting share. This does not cost the token any inflation, nor the treasury any ARB.
Non-scalable: Token-based rewards are finite and require a constant drain of ARB funds to continue driving participation. As the ecosystem scales, and more participants join, greater and greater sums of ARB will be needed to continue fueling growth. Implicit delegation has no cost, and its balanced game theory functions with no burn. As more retail voters join, more Arb could be delegated to the community block, however, again, this is not a cost as the ARB tokens are still retained by the treasury.
Past Performance:
The above is not just theory. The Event Horizon community is already active on Ethereum mainnet meta-governing Uniswap, AAVE, Compound, ShapeShift, and of course, Arbitrum. In fact, in 2 of the 3 latest Uniswap votes, the Event Horizon community was the 11th largest voter in the Uniswap Ecosystem, 18th in the other vote. Event Horizon has also recently voted as the XXth largest delegate in recent Aave votes. While there is still quite a gap between Event Horizon and 10th place, interestingly enough this position serves as a sort of DMZ between individual delegates above, and retail below. This dynamic does, however, highlight an issue we are addressing. Raise the long tail a bit. Individual, organization AND retail delegation are all valuable and mutually inclusive, three symbiotic pillars for a strong ecosystem.
Since its inception just a few months ago, the Event Horizon protocol has processed nearly 100 metagovernance proposals and placed over $5,000,000 of governance authority and enfranchisement directly into the hands of the retail voter, a feat not seen anywhere else in the DAO space. Across all proposals for which the Event Horizon Community has participated, the community’s cumulative voter footprint is on pace to exceed $10,000,000. Some more metrics worth highlighting:
Number of Meta-Proposals Passed >150 Our community members have participated in and passed over 100 meta-governance proposals, each corresponding to Uniswap or AAVE base layer proposals.
Voter Participation: >30% Over thirty percent of our community members have participated in our meta-governance proposals. Some participants have voted as many as 63 times in under 5 months. Check out the latest info on our leaderboard: EventHorizon.vote/leaderboard
Average Authority Mobilized per Participating Passholder: >$100,000 (and counting) For the cost of $3 in gas, each participating passholder has mobilized an average of just over $100,000 in Uniswap and AAVE authority governance authority across all meta-governance proposals passed.
Average Authority Mobilized Multiple: 33,333x (and growing) The average pass holder minted their voter pass for ~$3 in gas. When compared to the $100,000 in average authority mobilized, each member has mobilized over 33,333x their gas cost of admission in blue-chip governance authority.
Notable metagovernance proposals:
1. Duplication: Event Horizon Automatically copies proposals published on the Snapshot of included DAOs, in this case Arbitrum, into its simplified UI meta-governance dashboard:
The primary step to implementation would be the delegation of ARB to the EventHorizonCommunity.eth (0xabc…). From there, Event Horizon will facilitate the processing of metagovernance proposals as it has been for many other DAOs.
Again, this would not be a grant and funds would remain in the DAO-controlled wallet. Consider us a delegate like any of the other talented delegates currently supporting the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Delegation would occur according to the following KPIs and timelines:
The earliest date and three of the four benchmark thresholds would have to be met before the vesting of a given ARB allotment.
The Arbitrum Event Horizon Oversight Committee: A committee of 5 existing, notable delegates will be voted on by the Arbitrum community to be given the ability to guide the Event Horizon voting pool on matters of Arbitrum meta-governance. A simple 3/5 majority would allow this committee to veto the decisions of the voter pool within the 24 hours between the closing of the Event Horizon proposal, and the underlying DAO’s proposal.
Sybil Considerations: it is important to note that the delegated ARB is by a large margin a minority voter amount. Any potential risk of Sybil influence over the public-access block would under almost all conditions not amount to a sum of authority that would be capable of passing a vote absent incredibly significant broader support from other delegates and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem participants. E.g. a rogue vote is virtually impossible.
That being said, we are open to heightening anti-sybil measures with Gitcoin Passport requirements for Arbitrum meta-governance.
Gitcoin Passports allow for the customization and weighting of proof-of-humanity criteria including:
Civic Uniqueness (https://support.civic.com/hc/en-us/articles/6855280050839-What-is-Civic-Uniqueness-Pass-)
A bonding mechanism may be implemented to increase the voter pool size from delegates and the broader community thereby allowing small retail and delegates to pool their voting power together to compete with larger delegates. The specific details of this implementation will be ironed out in conversation with various delegates and DAO stakeholders.
With the aim of enfranchising the tens of thousands of small voters, this proposal suggests we delegate (not grant) 5,000,000 ARB to a public access-voter block subject to meeting emission timelines as well as participation/output-based KPIs outlined below and a clawback after 1 year if the DAO votes to do so. Arbitrum community members may mint a free, soul-bound Voter Pass which allows them to take part in mobilizing this voter pool. As detailed further below, this model:
To support this initiative, the Event Horizon team has offered a $3,000 ETH grant to reimburse the gas cost Arbitrum community members spend to mint voter access passes to a public good voter pool.
5,000,000 ARB would place Event Horizon community as the 21st largest delegate. We think this places a fair amount of power into the 3rd pillar of governance, namely retail (the other two being team and individual delegates).
This proposal reflects two of Arbitrum's core mission values:
Socially Inclusive: By constructing a dedicated block of governance authority with lower capital barriers, our community greatly expands who gets a seat at the table.
Neutral and Open: By making the thoughts and ideas of this broader swath of individuals heard, we further broaden the spectrum of possibilities for the evolution of our ecosystem.
Today, with only 7 of the top 15 top delegates, any proposal can be passed on chain. However, there are over thousands of individual voters who participate in each vote despite having effectively no meaningful say. This should be rewarded. Moreover, there are likely tens of thousands more incredibly talented community members who are very capable of adding to the collective cognition of the ecosystem, but simply lack the capital means to have a voice and are left discouraged from voting at all. Not voting when you only have $500 worth of ARB is a drop in the bucket. Sitting out governance proposals is unfortunately the rational decision, but collectively makes everyone worse off.
Event Horizon is a public good. It is a public-access meta-governance block.
DAOs today rely exclusively on individuals and company entities to serve as network delegates. However, this isn't the only option. While individual delegates certainly add incredible value to the Arbitrum Ecosystem, so would a governance allotment dedicated to the greater body of smaller retail participants.
In this regard, Event Horizon slots into the Arbitrum ecosystem in a similar fashion to a standard delegate, however, rather than the block voting based on the decision of one individual, it votes with the collective cognition of hundreds of individual voter pass holders.
This serves two functions:
It provides a clear and designated voice for smaller, retail voters.
It drives participation through a game-theoretic process called Implicit Delegation. One of the greatest barriers to participation is a lack of voice due to lack of capital. Implicit delegation and public access governance changes this.
Implicit Delegation is a model by which the full public governance block mobilizes in favor of the consensus of those who do vote, thereby implicitly delegating the authority of those who don’t vote.
When participation is low… each voter receives a larger slice of the public access pie. This means the fewer people there are voting, the more incentive there is for someone new to come and participate.
When participation is high… there are more voters splitting the same pie, however, retail participation is high, which is a win for the ecosystem.
Implicit Delegation represents an effort to offer a new paradigm around means of influence. A shift from today’s entirely capital-centric to a more retail-friendly participation-centric model.
Where Direct Governance allocates influence along the lines of capital, and Explicit Delegation allocates influence along the lines of popularity (which often reflects capital), Implicit Delegation allocates influence to those who care most: people showing up to vote. Because the carrot is influence, it attracts governance-interested retail, not capital-interested retail, more on that below.
Because the entirety of the block is always mobilized, those who are most vested are rewarded for their participation by having a larger share of the voting pie. In this regard, EventHorizon’s model leans into a systemic lack of participation to create a solution.
While token rewards for participation hold legitimate merit and are an intuitive remedy for low turnout, it has limitations.
Added Thought Capital: in line with the notion above, there are likely thousands, of community members each holding both strong ideas and valuable contributions for the ecosystem, but simply lack enough voice to justify participation. Through Implicit Delegation, any community member of the Arbitrum ecosystem has an opportunity to have their voice heard, bringing thousands more minds and ideas to the surface.
Inflationary: While token rewards drive participation at the expense of inflation, Implicit delegation simply leverages its game theory model to increase incentive to vote in the form of a greater voting share. This does not cost the token any inflation, nor the treasury any ARB.
Non-scalable: Token-based rewards are finite and require a constant drain of ARB funds to continue driving participation. As the ecosystem scales, and more participants join, greater and greater sums of ARB will be needed to continue fueling growth. Implicit delegation has no cost, and its balanced game theory functions with no burn. As more retail voters join, more Arb could be delegated to the community block, however, again, this is not a cost as the ARB tokens are still retained by the treasury.
Past Performance:
The above is not just theory. The Event Horizon community is already active on Ethereum mainnet meta-governing Uniswap, AAVE, Compound, ShapeShift, and of course, Arbitrum. In fact, in 2 of the 3 latest Uniswap votes, the Event Horizon community was the 11th largest voter in the Uniswap Ecosystem, 18th in the other vote. Event Horizon has also recently voted as the XXth largest delegate in recent Aave votes. While there is still quite a gap between Event Horizon and 10th place, interestingly enough this position serves as a sort of DMZ between individual delegates above, and retail below. This dynamic does, however, highlight an issue we are addressing. Raise the long tail a bit. Individual, organization AND retail delegation are all valuable and mutually inclusive, three symbiotic pillars for a strong ecosystem.
Since its inception just a few months ago, the Event Horizon protocol has processed nearly 100 metagovernance proposals and placed over $5,000,000 of governance authority and enfranchisement directly into the hands of the retail voter, a feat not seen anywhere else in the DAO space. Across all proposals for which the Event Horizon Community has participated, the community’s cumulative voter footprint is on pace to exceed $10,000,000. Some more metrics worth highlighting:
Number of Meta-Proposals Passed >150 Our community members have participated in and passed over 100 meta-governance proposals, each corresponding to Uniswap or AAVE base layer proposals.
Voter Participation: >30% Over thirty percent of our community members have participated in our meta-governance proposals. Some participants have voted as many as 63 times in under 5 months. Check out the latest info on our leaderboard: EventHorizon.vote/leaderboard
Average Authority Mobilized per Participating Passholder: >$100,000 (and counting) For the cost of $3 in gas, each participating passholder has mobilized an average of just over $100,000 in Uniswap and AAVE authority governance authority across all meta-governance proposals passed.
Average Authority Mobilized Multiple: 33,333x (and growing) The average pass holder minted their voter pass for ~$3 in gas. When compared to the $100,000 in average authority mobilized, each member has mobilized over 33,333x their gas cost of admission in blue-chip governance authority.
Notable metagovernance proposals:
1. Duplication: Event Horizon Automatically copies proposals published on the Snapshot of included DAOs, in this case Arbitrum, into its simplified UI meta-governance dashboard:
The primary step to implementation would be the delegation of ARB to the EventHorizonCommunity.eth (0xabc…). From there, Event Horizon will facilitate the processing of metagovernance proposals as it has been for many other DAOs.
Again, this would not be a grant and funds would remain in the DAO-controlled wallet. Consider us a delegate like any of the other talented delegates currently supporting the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Delegation would occur according to the following KPIs and timelines:
The earliest date and three of the four benchmark thresholds would have to be met before the vesting of a given ARB allotment.
The Arbitrum Event Horizon Oversight Committee: A committee of 5 existing, notable delegates will be voted on by the Arbitrum community to be given the ability to guide the Event Horizon voting pool on matters of Arbitrum meta-governance. A simple 3/5 majority would allow this committee to veto the decisions of the voter pool within the 24 hours between the closing of the Event Horizon proposal, and the underlying DAO’s proposal.
Sybil Considerations: it is important to note that the delegated ARB is by a large margin a minority voter amount. Any potential risk of Sybil influence over the public-access block would under almost all conditions not amount to a sum of authority that would be capable of passing a vote absent incredibly significant broader support from other delegates and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem participants. E.g. a rogue vote is virtually impossible.
That being said, we are open to heightening anti-sybil measures with Gitcoin Passport requirements for Arbitrum meta-governance.
Gitcoin Passports allow for the customization and weighting of proof-of-humanity criteria including:
Civic Uniqueness (https://support.civic.com/hc/en-us/articles/6855280050839-What-is-Civic-Uniqueness-Pass-)
A bonding mechanism may be implemented to increase the voter pool size from delegates and the broader community thereby allowing small retail and delegates to pool their voting power together to compete with larger delegates. The specific details of this implementation will be ironed out in conversation with various delegates and DAO stakeholders.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/123
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
I believe we should continue to experiment with ways to decentrilize the protocol, avoid voting concentration but in this case i think the amount of tokens given the current limited number of people involved in sub-voting around this feels mismatched for a pilot. Summary open to the idea, we should keep experimenting but this should have scaled up in size based on results.
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-20: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-20
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/123
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
I believe we should continue to experiment with ways to decentrilize the protocol, avoid voting concentration but in this case i think the amount of tokens given the current limited number of people involved in sub-voting around this feels mismatched for a pilot. Summary open to the idea, we should keep experimenting but this should have scaled up in size based on results.
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-20: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-20
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/117?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/114?u=dianedai
See Delegate Thread: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/113?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/99?u=winverse
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/107?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/seed-latam-delegate-communication-thread/13895/47
Event Horizon has minimal user base, so this isn’t going to do much to democratize Arbitrum governance. It’s also unreasonable to expect Arbitrum governance to pay 200k ARB for the privilege to do this. We would be supportive of a smaller amount of votes and a smaller price tag.
We are not in favor of the overall proposal, but should it pass, this change is an obvious improvement.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/101?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/102
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/99?u=wi
this was cancelled so voting against
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/98?u=ocandocrypto
I’m voting against this because the vote was canceled so better to ensure it doesn’t pass accidentally.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/98?u=oc
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/seed-latam-delegate-communication-thread/13895/47?u=seedgov
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/93?u=eu
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/92?u=br
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/48
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/48
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/81?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/ultra-delegate-communication-thread/24425/49?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/ultra-delegate-communication-thread/24425/48?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/68?u=ezr3al
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/84
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/29?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/29?u=griff
Event Horizon has been doing a great job pioneering game theoretical mechanisms to enhance the access to Governance for small voters. We strongly support this initiative and look forward to seeing the outcome resulting from this pilot.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/81?u=bl
In event horizon's proposal, I don't see how their proposal would improve the vote, MSS replaces, supports 。
I don't think this is a good way to go about it, it's not at all necessary for commissioning users to only commission from you, it's fine to give it directly to other representatives of the community if they wish to be involved in commissioning governance and it's a stretch for you to have to apply for a separate fee when the arb itself has already withdrawn from the commissioning governance scheme
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/74?u=jojo
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/74
Event Horizon is final here. Tens of thousands of small voters can therefore be more incentive to express their voices.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/73?u=0x
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/73?u=0xdonpepe
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/72
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/69?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/68?u=ez
https://reurl.cc/Orj5Rg
Cancelled vote, I'm voting against to avoid that this passes by accident.
Cancelled Vote by L2BEAT. Voted against so it can't pass.
The proposal was cancelled though. But didn't see the positive effect this would have had on governing the ecology
Voting against as the vote was cancel and abstain vote counts towards quorum, so want to make sure it does not pass by accident.
By delegating 7,000,000 ARB to Event Horizon, we can empower underrepresented citizens in the Arbitrum ecosystem and encourage more meaningful participation from a diverse group of stakeholders. This innovative approach to governance, through the use of Voter Passes and Gitcoin Passes, not only amplifies the voices of those with less capital but also strengthens the overall decision-making process. Furthermore, the requested grant and the establishment of an Oversight Committee ensure transparency, alignment, and ongoing commitment to maintaining this public good. This proposal is a step forward in making DAO governance more equitable and effective.
See reasoning here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-h
This is a welcome experiment. We do think that 7M is too little to move the needle but will love to see how said little voters feel about it
(The forum link is too long, but our full justification is in the thread)
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/55?u=bl
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/52?u=kr
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/50?u=0x
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/49?u=oc
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/48
提议将7,000,000 ARB委托给一个公共访问的投票者池。这种委托将由Voter Pass和Gitcoin Pass持有者动员，为代表性较少的公民提供了倍增的投票权。该举措解决了小额ARB持有者低投票参与率的问题，为他们提供了有意义的发言权并激励了参与。非常好的提议
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/42?u=40
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/41
We consider it unfair to give more voting rights to those who have invested less money and efforts in the ecosystem
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/30?u=mc
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/117?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/114?u=dianedai
See Delegate Thread: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/113?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/99?u=winverse
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/107?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/seed-latam-delegate-communication-thread/13895/47
Event Horizon has minimal user base, so this isn’t going to do much to democratize Arbitrum governance. It’s also unreasonable to expect Arbitrum governance to pay 200k ARB for the privilege to do this. We would be supportive of a smaller amount of votes and a smaller price tag.
We are not in favor of the overall proposal, but should it pass, this change is an obvious improvement.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/101?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/102
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/99?u=wi
this was cancelled so voting against
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/98?u=ocandocrypto
I’m voting against this because the vote was canceled so better to ensure it doesn’t pass accidentally.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/98?u=oc
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/seed-latam-delegate-communication-thread/13895/47?u=seedgov
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/93?u=eu
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/92?u=br
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/48
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/48
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/81?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/ultra-delegate-communication-thread/24425/49?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/ultra-delegate-communication-thread/24425/48?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/68?u=ezr3al
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/84
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/29?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/29?u=griff
Event Horizon has been doing a great job pioneering game theoretical mechanisms to enhance the access to Governance for small voters. We strongly support this initiative and look forward to seeing the outcome resulting from this pilot.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/81?u=bl
In event horizon's proposal, I don't see how their proposal would improve the vote, MSS replaces, supports 。
I don't think this is a good way to go about it, it's not at all necessary for commissioning users to only commission from you, it's fine to give it directly to other representatives of the community if they wish to be involved in commissioning governance and it's a stretch for you to have to apply for a separate fee when the arb itself has already withdrawn from the commissioning governance scheme
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/74?u=jojo
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/74
Event Horizon is final here. Tens of thousands of small voters can therefore be more incentive to express their voices.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/73?u=0x
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/73?u=0xdonpepe
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/72
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/69?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/68?u=ez
https://reurl.cc/Orj5Rg
Cancelled vote, I'm voting against to avoid that this passes by accident.
Cancelled Vote by L2BEAT. Voted against so it can't pass.
The proposal was cancelled though. But didn't see the positive effect this would have had on governing the ecology
Voting against as the vote was cancel and abstain vote counts towards quorum, so want to make sure it does not pass by accident.
By delegating 7,000,000 ARB to Event Horizon, we can empower underrepresented citizens in the Arbitrum ecosystem and encourage more meaningful participation from a diverse group of stakeholders. This innovative approach to governance, through the use of Voter Passes and Gitcoin Passes, not only amplifies the voices of those with less capital but also strengthens the overall decision-making process. Furthermore, the requested grant and the establishment of an Oversight Committee ensure transparency, alignment, and ongoing commitment to maintaining this public good. This proposal is a step forward in making DAO governance more equitable and effective.
See reasoning here: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-h
This is a welcome experiment. We do think that 7M is too little to move the needle but will love to see how said little voters feel about it
(The forum link is too long, but our full justification is in the thread)
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/55?u=bl
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/52?u=kr
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/50?u=0x
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/49?u=oc
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/48
提议将7,000,000 ARB委托给一个公共访问的投票者池。这种委托将由Voter Pass和Gitcoin Pass持有者动员，为代表性较少的公民提供了倍增的投票权。该举措解决了小额ARB持有者低投票参与率的问题，为他们提供了有意义的发言权并激励了参与。非常好的提议
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/42?u=40
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/41
We consider it unfair to give more voting rights to those who have invested less money and efforts in the ecosystem
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/delegate-to-a-public-access-public-good-citizen-enfranchisement-pool-through-event-horizon/21523/30?u=mc
We went through the process and find that users dont need to have any $ARB in wallet to mint the pass. My concern is that the balance between governance rights and economic stake is crucial. ARB holders have a direct financial investment and risk in the Arbitrum ecosystem, which legitimizes their role in governance. Allowing non-ARB holders to vote disrupts this balance, diluting the influence of those who are genuinely invested in the long-term success of the ecosystem. This shift is unfair to ARB holders who have a vested interest in the platform’s future.
The Treasure ARC voted in favor of MSS amendment to the Event Horizon proposal. It is a good use of the MSS, cuts down double handling and saves costs.
We went through the process and find that users dont need to have any $ARB in wallet to mint the pass. My concern is that the balance between governance rights and economic stake is crucial. ARB holders have a direct financial investment and risk in the Arbitrum ecosystem, which legitimizes their role in governance. Allowing non-ARB holders to vote disrupts this balance, diluting the influence of those who are genuinely invested in the long-term success of the ecosystem. This shift is unfair to ARB holders who have a vested interest in the platform’s future.
The Treasure ARC voted in favor of MSS amendment to the Event Horizon proposal. It is a good use of the MSS, cuts down double handling and saves costs.
As a follow-up to our prior proposal review, OpenZeppelin has conducted an audit of the the Franchiser contracts provided by Event Horizon on behalf of the ARDC. These contracts will allow the Arbitrum DAO to transfer a token through the FranchiserFactory to a Franchiser contract which will delegate its voting power to Event Horizon, allowing them to vote on proposals.
In short, we found no security issues with the contracts and our notes contain only recommendations for coding practices as well as a consideration for removing an unnecessary feature for additional token subdelegation. We invite the community review the full details of our audit and conclusion here:
As a follow-up to our prior proposal review, OpenZeppelin has conducted an audit of the the Franchiser contracts provided by Event Horizon on behalf of the ARDC. These contracts will allow the Arbitrum DAO to transfer a token through the FranchiserFactory to a Franchiser contract which will delegate its voting power to Event Horizon, allowing them to vote on proposals.
In short, we found no security issues with the contracts and our notes contain only recommendations for coding practices as well as a consideration for removing an unnecessary feature for additional token subdelegation. We invite the community review the full details of our audit and conclusion here:
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/event-horizon-franchiser-contract-for-arbitrum-audit/25738
OpenZeppelin, as the Security Member of the ARDC, was asked to review the draft proposal for Event Horizon to assess the security implications of its implementation. We began our investigation following DefiSafety’s documentation checklist and then branched out to track down other questions we had.
Edit: After initial publication, we received additional feedback from the Event Horizon team that we're going to re-assess before continuing to share the publication.
OpenZeppelin's final ARDC report is now available to review here.
In the report, we’ve provided several important security recommendations that we've encouraged the Event Horizon team to implement in their system to enhance the system’s transparency and security before deploying any contracts to be used for ARB delegations. We have also highlighted several risks and concerns that Arbitrum delegators should consider in their decisions regarding the Event Horizon proposal as well as highlighting the importance of the Oversight Committee selection. We are happy to engage in further discussion and questions in the forum.
As a follow-up to our prior proposal review, OpenZeppelin has conducted an audit of the the Franchiser contracts provided by Event Horizon on behalf of the ARDC. These contracts will allow the Arbitrum DAO to transfer a token through the FranchiserFactory to a Franchiser contract which will delegate its voting power to Event Horizon, allowing them to vote on proposals.
In short, we found no security issues with the contracts and our notes contain only recommendations for coding practices as well as a consideration for removing an unnecessary feature for additional token subdelegation. We invite the community review the full details of our audit and conclusion here:
As a follow-up to our prior proposal review, OpenZeppelin has conducted an audit of the the Franchiser contracts provided by Event Horizon on behalf of the ARDC. These contracts will allow the Arbitrum DAO to transfer a token through the FranchiserFactory to a Franchiser contract which will delegate its voting power to Event Horizon, allowing them to vote on proposals.
In short, we found no security issues with the contracts and our notes contain only recommendations for coding practices as well as a consideration for removing an unnecessary feature for additional token subdelegation. We invite the community review the full details of our audit and conclusion here:
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/event-horizon-franchiser-contract-for-arbitrum-audit/25738
OpenZeppelin, as the Security Member of the ARDC, was asked to review the draft proposal for Event Horizon to assess the security implications of its implementation. We began our investigation following DefiSafety’s documentation checklist and then branched out to track down other questions we had.
Edit: After initial publication, we received additional feedback from the Event Horizon team that we're going to re-assess before continuing to share the publication.
OpenZeppelin's final ARDC report is now available to review here.
In the report, we’ve provided several important security recommendations that we've encouraged the Event Horizon team to implement in their system to enhance the system’s transparency and security before deploying any contracts to be used for ARB delegations. We have also highlighted several risks and concerns that Arbitrum delegators should consider in their decisions regarding the Event Horizon proposal as well as highlighting the importance of the Oversight Committee selection. We are happy to engage in further discussion and questions in the forum.
Thanks for the detailed proposal, at first I was kinda confused on why we would try this approach when the delegation model seems to work just fine.
My biggest concern is the timeline from vote passing to audit/fork the code for this to work.
Can you confirm wherever the grant size would be used for audit purposes?
Thanks for the detailed proposal, at first I was kinda confused on why we would try this approach when the delegation model seems to work just fine.
My biggest concern is the timeline from vote passing to audit/fork the code for this to work.
Can you confirm wherever the grant size would be used for audit purposes?
thanks for clarifying. We are voting For on the snapshot proposal
thanks for clarifying. We are voting For on the snapshot proposal
*As a delegate of Event Horizon, I am thrilled that the project has received attention from big names in the industry.
*I have participated in many DAOs myself, but it wasn't until I came across Event Horizon's implicit delegation model that I truly witnessed the effectiveness of this model.
*As a delegate of Event Horizon, I am thrilled that the project has received attention from big names in the industry.
*I have participated in many DAOs myself, but it wasn't until I came across Event Horizon's implicit delegation model that I truly witnessed the effectiveness of this model.
Posting for my support of this proposal. By using Event Horizon's model to raise the voices of retail voters (and with high voter participation, >30%), I believe this proposal represents a step towards democratizing governance within the Arbitrum ecosystem. Personally, the important incentivization is through the idea of governance authority over financial rewards, which seem to introduce a novel approach to participation-centric governance. Also, this initiative has the potential to improve the collective decision-making process, and incorporates the larger spectrum of perspectives relative to the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Hey Arb frens 💙
I am writing this response on behalf of the Serious People team; and we're super excited about this public access voter block proposal! We've been digging into the details, and honestly, it feels like a game-changer for getting everyone involved in the governance game, no matter the size of their stake.
Hey Arb frens 💙
I am writing this response on behalf of the Serious People team; and we're super excited about this public access voter block proposal! We've been digging into the details, and honestly, it feels like a game-changer for getting everyone involved in the governance game, no matter the size of their stake.
We're backing this proposal 100%. It's not just about giving everyone a seat at the table; it's about making sure every voice can genuinely make an impact. Let's rally behind this, get those Voter Passes minted, and show the world of DAOs what a truly democratic and inclusive ecosystem looks like.
Can't wait to see where we go with this. Let's make it happen, Arbitrum!
Cheers,
Team Serious People
the first proposal draft noted unconditional revocability. The intent is to ensure that delegation is only afforded so much as it is considered valuable by the broader community.
the first proposal draft noted unconditional revocability. The intent is to ensure that delegation is only afforded so much as it is considered valuable by the broader community.
With further consideration in mind, we are willing to include a vesting schedule over and above the revocation clause. However, we would highlight that any tiered delegation model does add additional administrative friction and consideration which we would want to confirm is within the foundation's abilities and willingness.
We will amend the proposal to include the following criteria:
The earliest date and three of the four benchmark thresholds would have to be met before the vesting of a given ARB allotment.
we would highlight that the allocated sum of delegated ARB is intentionally a minority voter amount by a significant margin. Any potential risk of Sybil influence over the public-access block would under almost all conditions not amount to a sum of authority that would be capable of passing a vote absent incredibly significant broader support from other delegates and ecosystem participants. E.g. a rogue vote is virtually impossible.
That being said, we would be willing to heighten anti-sybil measures with Gitcoin Passport requirements for Arbitrum meta-governance. Gitcoin Passports allow for the customization and weighting of proof-of-humanity criteria including:
We would recommend a slight customization of standard weighting as to emphasize non-ETH-balance pertaining benchmarks such as linked social media accounts, wallet age, gas used, civic uniqueness, and ENS. We are very open to community discussion on this approach vs standard Gitcoin Passport weighting.
we believe this is a particularly difficult concept to quantify objectively. There are certain assurances the team can provide at the protocol and base mechanics level, such as being fully doxxed, legally incorporated, and well-known by various individuals within the community.
However, it is important to highlight that the public authority block is not a delegation to the Event Horizon team members. In fact, the team will not be voting with voter passes and will remain as neutral an impact as possible.
Rather, this proposal seeks to delegate ARB to a group of retail voters (Voter Pass holders). So it is very difficult to objectively determine if the decisions of a large swath of previously disenfranchised individuals are ‘responsible’ or not. We also see risk in becoming a gatekeeper for who can and cannot participate in this open public good voter block. We don’t want the power to deem a voter worthy of this public good, as that opens up potential avenues for abuse and proposal attack. Instead, we stand by the notion that unconditional revocation is a greater catchall to halting irresponsible action in a more democratic fashion.
I'm in favor of this proposal. Event Horizon is innovating in the DAO voting realm and most likely has a bright future ahead.
I am very excited that EventHorizon is expanding its model on the Arbitrum ecosystem. This will be a major milestone not only for EventHorizon but also for Arbitrum voters. Together, we will upgrade Dao to a new level, overcoming the limitations of the conventional Dao mechanism.
Event Horizon will save the bear market
Do your DAO thing dear DAO; delegate some tokens to them
Posting for my support of this proposal. By using Event Horizon's model to raise the voices of retail voters (and with high voter participation, >30%), I believe this proposal represents a step towards democratizing governance within the Arbitrum ecosystem. Personally, the important incentivization is through the idea of governance authority over financial rewards, which seem to introduce a novel approach to participation-centric governance. Also, this initiative has the potential to improve the collective decision-making process, and incorporates the larger spectrum of perspectives relative to the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Hey Arb frens 💙
I am writing this response on behalf of the Serious People team; and we're super excited about this public access voter block proposal! We've been digging into the details, and honestly, it feels like a game-changer for getting everyone involved in the governance game, no matter the size of their stake.
Hey Arb frens 💙
I am writing this response on behalf of the Serious People team; and we're super excited about this public access voter block proposal! We've been digging into the details, and honestly, it feels like a game-changer for getting everyone involved in the governance game, no matter the size of their stake.
We're backing this proposal 100%. It's not just about giving everyone a seat at the table; it's about making sure every voice can genuinely make an impact. Let's rally behind this, get those Voter Passes minted, and show the world of DAOs what a truly democratic and inclusive ecosystem looks like.
Can't wait to see where we go with this. Let's make it happen, Arbitrum!
Cheers,
Team Serious People
the first proposal draft noted unconditional revocability. The intent is to ensure that delegation is only afforded so much as it is considered valuable by the broader community.
the first proposal draft noted unconditional revocability. The intent is to ensure that delegation is only afforded so much as it is considered valuable by the broader community.
With further consideration in mind, we are willing to include a vesting schedule over and above the revocation clause. However, we would highlight that any tiered delegation model does add additional administrative friction and consideration which we would want to confirm is within the foundation's abilities and willingness.
We will amend the proposal to include the following criteria:
The earliest date and three of the four benchmark thresholds would have to be met before the vesting of a given ARB allotment.
we would highlight that the allocated sum of delegated ARB is intentionally a minority voter amount by a significant margin. Any potential risk of Sybil influence over the public-access block would under almost all conditions not amount to a sum of authority that would be capable of passing a vote absent incredibly significant broader support from other delegates and ecosystem participants. E.g. a rogue vote is virtually impossible.
That being said, we would be willing to heighten anti-sybil measures with Gitcoin Passport requirements for Arbitrum meta-governance. Gitcoin Passports allow for the customization and weighting of proof-of-humanity criteria including:
We would recommend a slight customization of standard weighting as to emphasize non-ETH-balance pertaining benchmarks such as linked social media accounts, wallet age, gas used, civic uniqueness, and ENS. We are very open to community discussion on this approach vs standard Gitcoin Passport weighting.
we believe this is a particularly difficult concept to quantify objectively. There are certain assurances the team can provide at the protocol and base mechanics level, such as being fully doxxed, legally incorporated, and well-known by various individuals within the community.
However, it is important to highlight that the public authority block is not a delegation to the Event Horizon team members. In fact, the team will not be voting with voter passes and will remain as neutral an impact as possible.
Rather, this proposal seeks to delegate ARB to a group of retail voters (Voter Pass holders). So it is very difficult to objectively determine if the decisions of a large swath of previously disenfranchised individuals are ‘responsible’ or not. We also see risk in becoming a gatekeeper for who can and cannot participate in this open public good voter block. We don’t want the power to deem a voter worthy of this public good, as that opens up potential avenues for abuse and proposal attack. Instead, we stand by the notion that unconditional revocation is a greater catchall to halting irresponsible action in a more democratic fashion.
I'm in favor of this proposal. Event Horizon is innovating in the DAO voting realm and most likely has a bright future ahead.
I am very excited that EventHorizon is expanding its model on the Arbitrum ecosystem. This will be a major milestone not only for EventHorizon but also for Arbitrum voters. Together, we will upgrade Dao to a new level, overcoming the limitations of the conventional Dao mechanism.
Event Horizon will save the bear market
Do your DAO thing dear DAO; delegate some tokens to them
The results are in for the Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon on-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1125
The results are in for the Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon on-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1125
The results are in for the [Replace Oversight Committee with MSS] Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon off-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1128
The results are in for the [Replace Oversight Committee with MSS] Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon off-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1128
Hey @EventHorizonDAO , thanks for providing the latest updates. I have a few comments:
The initial forum post mentions that "Event Horizon Automatically copies proposals published on the Snapshot of included DAOs, in this case Arbitrum, into its simplified UI meta-governance dashboard". This does not explicitly mention that the Voter Enfranchisement Pool will be able to vote on Tally proposals. So to confirm, will the Voter Enfranchisement Pool be able to vote on on-chain Tally proposals too?
Could you provide more insight into what the ‘Snapshot subscription’ will be used for?
The Tally proposal states that "Per the recommendation of the Arbitrum Foundation, the proposal will forego the Franchiser contract approach in favor of a multi-signature wallet structure". I don't think that's entirely true - The Foundation provided objective feedback that it would not be possible for the Franchiser contract to have approval to directly spend ARB from the DAO treasury (as initially proposed), because the treasury ARB is held in FixedDelegateErc20Wallet which doesn't support calling the approve method. Accordingly, we suggested that there would either need to be a multi-sig or a custom contract sitting between the treasury and the Franchiser contract, in order to move the ARB out of the treasury and into a separate contract or multi-sig that could also do the approval operation.
Hey @EventHorizonDAO , thanks for providing the latest updates. I have a few comments:
The initial forum post mentions that "Event Horizon Automatically copies proposals published on the Snapshot of included DAOs, in this case Arbitrum, into its simplified UI meta-governance dashboard". This does not explicitly mention that the Voter Enfranchisement Pool will be able to vote on Tally proposals. So to confirm, will the Voter Enfranchisement Pool be able to vote on on-chain Tally proposals too?
Could you provide more insight into what the ‘Snapshot subscription’ will be used for?
The Tally proposal states that "Per the recommendation of the Arbitrum Foundation, the proposal will forego the Franchiser contract approach in favor of a multi-signature wallet structure". I don't think that's entirely true - The Foundation provided objective feedback that it would not be possible for the Franchiser contract to have approval to directly spend ARB from the DAO treasury (as initially proposed), because the treasury ARB is held in FixedDelegateErc20Wallet which doesn't support calling the approve method. Accordingly, we suggested that there would either need to be a multi-sig or a custom contract sitting between the treasury and the Franchiser contract, in order to move the ARB out of the treasury and into a separate contract or multi-sig that could also do the approval operation.
Tally vote: having already voted in favour in the Snapshot vote, I support this initiative. The ARB amount is not so high so as to have a decisive impact on itself, yet not so low to have no impact at all. Seems interesting to see how it works within the DAO.
Snapshot vote: (MSS<>Oversight Committee replacement) I also voted in favour. It makes sense from an organization standpoint to direct this to the MSS, it also makes it better to keep track of, and it cut costs.
Thank you to everyone who came out and supported the Public Access Voter Pool!
We'll be making a new forum post soon outlining what our next steps are. We'll also be setting up a community call so that our efforts in the coming year are executed with the feedback of the DAO in mind. Until then, please be sure to mint a pass. It's totally free and now will let you vote with some ARB voting power, especially if you're just getting started with governance.
We are in full support of the Event Horizon proposal. Empowering smaller ARB holders through collective voting is an innovative step towards increasing participation and fostering inclusivity in the Arbitrum DAO. The Voter Pass system, which enables individuals with lower capital to pool their voting power, aligns with the core values of decentralization and community engagement.
This proposal also addresses the critical issue of low voter turnout by introducing the Implicit Delegation model, which incentivizes governance participation based on commitment rather than capital. We believe this approach will bring more voices into the decision-making process, strengthening the DAO as a whole.
We are in full support of the Event Horizon proposal. Empowering smaller ARB holders through collective voting is an innovative step towards increasing participation and fostering inclusivity in the Arbitrum DAO. The Voter Pass system, which enables individuals with lower capital to pool their voting power, aligns with the core values of decentralization and community engagement.
This proposal also addresses the critical issue of low voter turnout by introducing the Implicit Delegation model, which incentivizes governance participation based on commitment rather than capital. We believe this approach will bring more voices into the decision-making process, strengthening the DAO as a whole.
We look forward to seeing how Event Horizon enhances governance within the Arbitrum ecosystem and provides long-term value to the community.
I voted FOR this proposal, as stated previously I think this is a worthwhile experiment.
I was a bit surprised by the additional costs brought up in Tally, I believe there are ways we could have optimized them - hopefully we'll be able to assess and adjust after the first trial period.
Thanks
That's an old proposal that contained errors. The one that's currently live can be found here.
I vote against this proposal on Tally. I believe it makes no sense to delegate direct voting power from the DAOs treasury to a pool of voters who will have no incentive and will not be aligned with the DAO's interests.
The fact that governance tokens hold economic value aligns holders with their governance duties (if I vote poorly, the token loses value). This proposal undermines that alignment.
I vote against this proposal on Tally. I believe it makes no sense to delegate direct voting power from the DAOs treasury to a pool of voters who will have no incentive and will not be aligned with the DAO's interests.
The fact that governance tokens hold economic value aligns holders with their governance duties (if I vote poorly, the token loses value). This proposal undermines that alignment.
Moreover, I don't understand the 325K paid to maintain this system. I believe those funds would be much better utilized if they were used, for example, to fund marketing campaigns like 'Re-delegation Week,' explaining to ARB holders why it is important to delegate their vote or by creating incentives to do so.
I appreciate Event Horizon for the proposal and the interest in experimenting. I just believe this is not the best mechanism
This has been addressed multiple times now. Reposting the latest response just a few posts above:
Vote: FOR
Type: Snapshot
Proposal link: [Replace Oversight Committee with MSS] Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon
Voting Rationale Link: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147/10
=== COMMENTING ON PROPOSAL: ===
Worked with @EventHorizon and the MSS Chairs to push for this change based on @krst 's instigating.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
We supported the proposal during the temp check because we saw it as an interesting experiment that could help drive more activity toward governance. While we were against the introduction of an oversight committee that would add 125,000 ARB worth of costs to the proposal, this was ultimately addressed.
In the discussion above, there have been concerns about low participation in the votes that aim to mobilize Event Horizon’s voting block. We also want to raise this point and make it clear that if it turns out after few months that the voting block is only steered by a handful of ‘random’ voters who are not participating in the DAO in any way other than mobilizing that block, we’ll be initiating a vote to clawback the delegated voting power.
Our expectation is that Event Horizon will help nurture this voting block and make it a powerhouse from which fruitful activities can spread. Those activities shouldn't be confined to voting, regardless of how thoughtful it might be, but should also include the creation of proposals, participation in DAO working groups, and other initiatives. Our thought process here is that this voting block will enable participants in Event Horizon’s initiative to actively participate in governance while having a meaningful voice and platform to do so.
Given the opportunity, we want to renew our request that Event Horizon set up a monthly call to update delegates on the experiment's progress and initiatives coming from the voting block. If no initiatives are kickstarted in a reasonable timeframe, we’ll be looking to wind down the experiment.
@EventHorizonDAO why was this onchain proposal withdrawn on Tally?
and why does it's title now has the [CANCELLED] prefix?
It’s great to see this experiment in expanded participation taking root - happy to see the proposal progressing here, and congratulations on your success in the Compound delegate race!
Voted FOR the change on Snapshot as it seems a clear and commonsense update.
It’s great to see this experiment in expanded participation taking root - happy to see the proposal progressing here, and congratulations on your success in the Compound delegate race!
Voted FOR the change on Snapshot as it seems a clear and commonsense update.
For the Tally vote, I will be voting FOR in the spirit of further decentralization. The experiment has the potential to deliver perspective and other benefits beyond voting (for both Arbitrum and for EventHorizon) - ideally we’d see things like a clearer path for onboarding retail participants come out of this, as well as broader participation and deliberation, whether here or on the EH discord. Those seem like fair expectations given the level of trust involved in making EH a top-15 delegate for the coming year.
Thank you for your response. I did read the arguments and the discussion, which are valuable and interesting. However, none of them convinced me that the DAO should remove ARB from the treasury, send it to a multisig whose custody poses risks, and fund this experiment.
On the other hand, I also disagree that having the MSS control your voting direction (meaning "ensure alignment") is a good idea. What exactly would you need to do for the MSS to effectively exercise its veto right in practice? In any case, what you´re really doing is limiting your voting power to what the group of delegates within the MSS deems appropriate. And this, at some point, restricts the plurality that this proposal aims to achieve. For what it's worth, I apologize for not joining that discussion in a timely manner.
I voted For. The proposal seems like a step in the right direction. The goal of our DAO (or any DAO) should be to get as many active people involved in delegation and governance as possible. Many times, we see similar profiles of people being more involved in this type of governance. Maybe this proposal could bring in more diverse-minded people. I believe we would all benefit from it in the long term. I am excited about this program and look forward to the results/report after some months in action.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
We think this proposal is a good move for the DAO. It aims to get more people actively involved in delegation and governance, which should be a key goal for us. We support the idea of making the DAO more inclusive and decentralized.
This proposal helps solve a big problem in that it gives a voice to people who are very interested in the community but don't have enough funds to make a difference in voting. By removing this money barrier, we can tap into the ideas and energy of many more community members.
To make this even better, we suggest creating a simple, easy-to-use interface. This would make it easier for users to vote and stay active, removing any technical obstacles that might stop people from participating.
Overall, we believe this proposal can help make our DAO stronger and more representative of our whole community.
@pedrob much of this has been discussed in the forum already, feel free to give it a read.
The pool has many guard rails to ensure alignment, such as the MSS multi-sig. Additionally, the worry about "skin in the game" applies equally to all existing delegates already. Event Horizon is no different, but has the added benefit of onboarding new voters and eventually delegates, further decentralizing Arbitrum while also expanding the idea generation pipeline of the DAO.
@pedrob much of this has been discussed in the forum already, feel free to give it a read.
The pool has many guard rails to ensure alignment, such as the MSS multi-sig. Additionally, the worry about "skin in the game" applies equally to all existing delegates already. Event Horizon is no different, but has the added benefit of onboarding new voters and eventually delegates, further decentralizing Arbitrum while also expanding the idea generation pipeline of the DAO.
In any case, we appreciate your concerns and hope to iterate this pipeline together over the coming year.
Tally vote: having already voted in favour in the Snapshot vote, I support this initiative. The ARB amount is not so high so as to have a decisive impact on itself, yet not so low to have no impact at all. Seems interesting to see how it works within the DAO.
Snapshot vote: (MSS<>Oversight Committee replacement) I also voted in favour. It makes sense from an organization standpoint to direct this to the MSS, it also makes it better to keep track of, and it cut costs.
Thank you to everyone who came out and supported the Public Access Voter Pool!
We'll be making a new forum post soon outlining what our next steps are. We'll also be setting up a community call so that our efforts in the coming year are executed with the feedback of the DAO in mind. Until then, please be sure to mint a pass. It's totally free and now will let you vote with some ARB voting power, especially if you're just getting started with governance.
We are in full support of the Event Horizon proposal. Empowering smaller ARB holders through collective voting is an innovative step towards increasing participation and fostering inclusivity in the Arbitrum DAO. The Voter Pass system, which enables individuals with lower capital to pool their voting power, aligns with the core values of decentralization and community engagement.
This proposal also addresses the critical issue of low voter turnout by introducing the Implicit Delegation model, which incentivizes governance participation based on commitment rather than capital. We believe this approach will bring more voices into the decision-making process, strengthening the DAO as a whole.
We are in full support of the Event Horizon proposal. Empowering smaller ARB holders through collective voting is an innovative step towards increasing participation and fostering inclusivity in the Arbitrum DAO. The Voter Pass system, which enables individuals with lower capital to pool their voting power, aligns with the core values of decentralization and community engagement.
This proposal also addresses the critical issue of low voter turnout by introducing the Implicit Delegation model, which incentivizes governance participation based on commitment rather than capital. We believe this approach will bring more voices into the decision-making process, strengthening the DAO as a whole.
We look forward to seeing how Event Horizon enhances governance within the Arbitrum ecosystem and provides long-term value to the community.
I voted FOR this proposal, as stated previously I think this is a worthwhile experiment.
I was a bit surprised by the additional costs brought up in Tally, I believe there are ways we could have optimized them - hopefully we'll be able to assess and adjust after the first trial period.
Thanks
That's an old proposal that contained errors. The one that's currently live can be found here.
I vote against this proposal on Tally. I believe it makes no sense to delegate direct voting power from the DAOs treasury to a pool of voters who will have no incentive and will not be aligned with the DAO's interests.
The fact that governance tokens hold economic value aligns holders with their governance duties (if I vote poorly, the token loses value). This proposal undermines that alignment.
I vote against this proposal on Tally. I believe it makes no sense to delegate direct voting power from the DAOs treasury to a pool of voters who will have no incentive and will not be aligned with the DAO's interests.
The fact that governance tokens hold economic value aligns holders with their governance duties (if I vote poorly, the token loses value). This proposal undermines that alignment.
Moreover, I don't understand the 325K paid to maintain this system. I believe those funds would be much better utilized if they were used, for example, to fund marketing campaigns like 'Re-delegation Week,' explaining to ARB holders why it is important to delegate their vote or by creating incentives to do so.
I appreciate Event Horizon for the proposal and the interest in experimenting. I just believe this is not the best mechanism
This has been addressed multiple times now. Reposting the latest response just a few posts above:
Vote: FOR
Type: Snapshot
Proposal link: [Replace Oversight Committee with MSS] Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon
Voting Rationale Link: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147/10
=== COMMENTING ON PROPOSAL: ===
Worked with @EventHorizon and the MSS Chairs to push for this change based on @krst 's instigating.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
We supported the proposal during the temp check because we saw it as an interesting experiment that could help drive more activity toward governance. While we were against the introduction of an oversight committee that would add 125,000 ARB worth of costs to the proposal, this was ultimately addressed.
In the discussion above, there have been concerns about low participation in the votes that aim to mobilize Event Horizon’s voting block. We also want to raise this point and make it clear that if it turns out after few months that the voting block is only steered by a handful of ‘random’ voters who are not participating in the DAO in any way other than mobilizing that block, we’ll be initiating a vote to clawback the delegated voting power.
Our expectation is that Event Horizon will help nurture this voting block and make it a powerhouse from which fruitful activities can spread. Those activities shouldn't be confined to voting, regardless of how thoughtful it might be, but should also include the creation of proposals, participation in DAO working groups, and other initiatives. Our thought process here is that this voting block will enable participants in Event Horizon’s initiative to actively participate in governance while having a meaningful voice and platform to do so.
Given the opportunity, we want to renew our request that Event Horizon set up a monthly call to update delegates on the experiment's progress and initiatives coming from the voting block. If no initiatives are kickstarted in a reasonable timeframe, we’ll be looking to wind down the experiment.
@EventHorizonDAO why was this onchain proposal withdrawn on Tally?
and why does it's title now has the [CANCELLED] prefix?
It’s great to see this experiment in expanded participation taking root - happy to see the proposal progressing here, and congratulations on your success in the Compound delegate race!
Voted FOR the change on Snapshot as it seems a clear and commonsense update.
It’s great to see this experiment in expanded participation taking root - happy to see the proposal progressing here, and congratulations on your success in the Compound delegate race!
Voted FOR the change on Snapshot as it seems a clear and commonsense update.
For the Tally vote, I will be voting FOR in the spirit of further decentralization. The experiment has the potential to deliver perspective and other benefits beyond voting (for both Arbitrum and for EventHorizon) - ideally we’d see things like a clearer path for onboarding retail participants come out of this, as well as broader participation and deliberation, whether here or on the EH discord. Those seem like fair expectations given the level of trust involved in making EH a top-15 delegate for the coming year.
Thank you for your response. I did read the arguments and the discussion, which are valuable and interesting. However, none of them convinced me that the DAO should remove ARB from the treasury, send it to a multisig whose custody poses risks, and fund this experiment.
On the other hand, I also disagree that having the MSS control your voting direction (meaning "ensure alignment") is a good idea. What exactly would you need to do for the MSS to effectively exercise its veto right in practice? In any case, what you´re really doing is limiting your voting power to what the group of delegates within the MSS deems appropriate. And this, at some point, restricts the plurality that this proposal aims to achieve. For what it's worth, I apologize for not joining that discussion in a timely manner.
I voted For. The proposal seems like a step in the right direction. The goal of our DAO (or any DAO) should be to get as many active people involved in delegation and governance as possible. Many times, we see similar profiles of people being more involved in this type of governance. Maybe this proposal could bring in more diverse-minded people. I believe we would all benefit from it in the long term. I am excited about this program and look forward to the results/report after some months in action.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
We think this proposal is a good move for the DAO. It aims to get more people actively involved in delegation and governance, which should be a key goal for us. We support the idea of making the DAO more inclusive and decentralized.
This proposal helps solve a big problem in that it gives a voice to people who are very interested in the community but don't have enough funds to make a difference in voting. By removing this money barrier, we can tap into the ideas and energy of many more community members.
To make this even better, we suggest creating a simple, easy-to-use interface. This would make it easier for users to vote and stay active, removing any technical obstacles that might stop people from participating.
Overall, we believe this proposal can help make our DAO stronger and more representative of our whole community.
@pedrob much of this has been discussed in the forum already, feel free to give it a read.
The pool has many guard rails to ensure alignment, such as the MSS multi-sig. Additionally, the worry about "skin in the game" applies equally to all existing delegates already. Event Horizon is no different, but has the added benefit of onboarding new voters and eventually delegates, further decentralizing Arbitrum while also expanding the idea generation pipeline of the DAO.
@pedrob much of this has been discussed in the forum already, feel free to give it a read.
The pool has many guard rails to ensure alignment, such as the MSS multi-sig. Additionally, the worry about "skin in the game" applies equally to all existing delegates already. Event Horizon is no different, but has the added benefit of onboarding new voters and eventually delegates, further decentralizing Arbitrum while also expanding the idea generation pipeline of the DAO.
In any case, we appreciate your concerns and hope to iterate this pipeline together over the coming year.
This has been addressed multiple times now. Reposting the latest response just a few posts above:
The pool has many guard rails to ensure alignment, such as the MSS multi-sig. Additionally, the worry about “skin in the game” applies equally to all existing delegates already. Event Horizon is no different, but has the added benefit of onboarding new voters and eventually delegates, further decentralizing Arbitrum while also expanding the idea generation pipeline of the DAO.
In any case, we appreciate your concerns and hope to iterate this pipeline together over the coming year.
Vote: FOR
Type: Snapshot
Proposal link: [Replace Oversight Committee with MSS] Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon
Voting Rationale Link: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147/10
=== COMMENTING ON PROPOSAL: ===
Worked with @EventHorizon and the MSS Chairs to push for this change based on @krst 's instigating.
This is a great example of the DAO moving quickly to improve processes for the future.
Just because blockchain is immutable doesn't mean we can't be agile.
In the future, I'd like more teams to leverage the MSS custody wallet rather than having to spin up their own wallet and oversight committee.
DAOplomats voted FOR this proposal during the onchain vote.
We are supportive of this proposal and would love to see the results of this initiative.
We voted FOR the proposal for the MSS amendment to the original proposal and the main onchain proposal on Tally.
We believe this is an interesting experiment to encourage small size token holders to get involved in the governance in a meaningful way and a good way of utilizing the treasury to contribute to the voting situations. Delegating the operations to the Arbitrum MSS also makes sense.
We support this proposal and really like what Event Horizon is doing.
Voter empowerment and participation is definitely something we should encourage
One major change we would like to see in Event Horizon in the future though is a requirement from participants to hold some tokens of the DAO they are voting for.
We support this proposal and really like what Event Horizon is doing.
Voter empowerment and participation is definitely something we should encourage
One major change we would like to see in Event Horizon in the future though is a requirement from participants to hold some tokens of the DAO they are voting for.
Its great to have a meta governance block vote, but the voters do need to have skin in the game as mentioned by many others here.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally vote.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally vote.
Although we are maintaining our favorable vote on this occasion and had already provided a rationale for our vote in Snapshot, considering the time gap between one vote and another, we felt it was worthwhile to reaffirm our position on this proposal.
Since the amount to be delegated barely represents 7% of the quorum needed for an on-chain proposal and there are oversight mechanisms in place by the DAO (the MSS), we see the proposal as a controlled experiment.
On the other hand, in the early stages of SEEDLatam (now SEEDGov) we ran a similar experiment with delegations over a year and a half, (which you can view here) making it particularly interesting for us to observe the outcome of this initiative.
DAOplomats is voting in favor of this proposal.
The MSS was created for moments such as this, so we would love to see the replacement of the oversight committee to the MSS happen and the associated funds for the OC returned to the DAO's treasury.
I voted FOR this proposal on tally and also agree with the upgrade to MSS to manage this initiative.
I don’t see any risks; rather, I see benefits for increased security while still allowing for experimentation.
Identify.Identify.Identify. Since the proposal is controversial, it would be better to wait until there are specific optimisations before making a proposal, and transferring the rights to MSS is a very appropriate proposal
In full support of the Event Horizon proposal.
Adding more information here after the GRC call with them.
In full support of the Event Horizon proposal.
Adding more information here after the GRC call with them.
One thing I'd like to see from this proposal is a KPI or objective of onboarding new delegates to the DAO and working to create a pathway for delegate contributors. EventHorizon has the opportunity to teach individuals how to participate in governance as a voter and can further decentralize some of our voting.
We are in full support of the Event Horizon proposal. Empowering smaller ARB holders through collective voting is an innovative step towards increasing participation and fostering inclusivity in the Arbitrum DAO. The Voter Pass system, which enables individuals with lower capital to pool their voting power, aligns with the core values of decentralization and community engagement.
This proposal also addresses the critical issue of low voter turnout by introducing the Implicit Delegation model, which incentivizes governance participation based on commitment rather than capital. We believe this approach will bring more voices into the decision-making process, strengthening the DAO as a whole.
We are in full support of the Event Horizon proposal. Empowering smaller ARB holders through collective voting is an innovative step towards increasing participation and fostering inclusivity in the Arbitrum DAO. The Voter Pass system, which enables individuals with lower capital to pool their voting power, aligns with the core values of decentralization and community engagement.
This proposal also addresses the critical issue of low voter turnout by introducing the Implicit Delegation model, which incentivizes governance participation based on commitment rather than capital. We believe this approach will bring more voices into the decision-making process, strengthening the DAO as a whole.
We look forward to seeing how Event Horizon enhances governance within the Arbitrum ecosystem and provides long-term value to the community.
Thanks for your support! Also be sure to vote on the main Tally proposal which is also concurrently live and which will use this MSS amendment you voted for.
I am always in favor of this kind improvement—involve more of small voters into governance, especially the Event Horizon community is already proven effective on various protocols. Also anti-sybil is necessary, but I still worries the requirement of Gitcoin Passport will block part of the small even tiny voters out of the governance.
On behalf of the UADP, we are fully in favor of this change. There seems to be no negatives in this new change as the MSS and funds are already set up and directly decreases the funds needed to execute this proposal.
Although we were asked to be members of the original multisig, we are in favor of changing the operations to the MSS now that they have accepted this initiative under their umbrella. This should cut costs for the DAO and set a good precedent for future programs to follow.
Additionally, we are still in favor of this initiative as a whole as an easy way for new members to get involved in the space and collectively have some substantial input.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
The FranklinDAO/Penn Blockchain Team voted FOR this proposal on Tally. We appreciate the work done by Event Horizon in giving retail voters meaningful influence in Arbitrum governance. We believe delegating 7m ARB to Event Horizon and placing them as the 15th largest delegate is reasonable, and so is their proposed compensation. We plan on supporting Event Horizon in their efforts in increasing retail voting power and participation in other DAOs as well.
I voted FOR this change. It is good to leverage existent structures within the DAO.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
We’re voting FOR this change to the original proposal in the Snapshot temperature check.
We support MSS taking over the responsibilities from the Oversight Committee.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
We’re voting FOR this change to the original proposal in the Snapshot temperature check.
We support MSS taking over the responsibilities from the Oversight Committee.
This does not yet support the main proposal for which the on-chain voting is in the process; we will consider our vote on that one separately and post our thoughts here later.
Aligned with our previous perspective at Snapshot we will be voting FOR this proposal at Tally.
TreasureDAO will be voting FOR this proposal.
I support this proposal on Snapshot because I believe the DAO could benefit from it. Getting more people involved in DAO has always been a goal of mine and this proposal is set to doing exactly that. I voted FOR.
We support this snapshot because the MSS improves security by requiring multiple approvals for actions, ensuring more decentralized control and including more participants in the process. It also allows for funds to be returned to the treasury if necessary.
However, we are curious why the snapshot started before the Tally vote concluded. Is there a reason for this? Thank you.
This has been addressed multiple times now. Reposting the latest response just a few posts above:
The pool has many guard rails to ensure alignment, such as the MSS multi-sig. Additionally, the worry about “skin in the game” applies equally to all existing delegates already. Event Horizon is no different, but has the added benefit of onboarding new voters and eventually delegates, further decentralizing Arbitrum while also expanding the idea generation pipeline of the DAO.
In any case, we appreciate your concerns and hope to iterate this pipeline together over the coming year.
Vote: FOR
Type: Snapshot
Proposal link: [Replace Oversight Committee with MSS] Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon
Voting Rationale Link: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147/10
=== COMMENTING ON PROPOSAL: ===
Worked with @EventHorizon and the MSS Chairs to push for this change based on @krst 's instigating.
This is a great example of the DAO moving quickly to improve processes for the future.
Just because blockchain is immutable doesn't mean we can't be agile.
In the future, I'd like more teams to leverage the MSS custody wallet rather than having to spin up their own wallet and oversight committee.
DAOplomats voted FOR this proposal during the onchain vote.
We are supportive of this proposal and would love to see the results of this initiative.
We voted FOR the proposal for the MSS amendment to the original proposal and the main onchain proposal on Tally.
We believe this is an interesting experiment to encourage small size token holders to get involved in the governance in a meaningful way and a good way of utilizing the treasury to contribute to the voting situations. Delegating the operations to the Arbitrum MSS also makes sense.
We support this proposal and really like what Event Horizon is doing.
Voter empowerment and participation is definitely something we should encourage
One major change we would like to see in Event Horizon in the future though is a requirement from participants to hold some tokens of the DAO they are voting for.
We support this proposal and really like what Event Horizon is doing.
Voter empowerment and participation is definitely something we should encourage
One major change we would like to see in Event Horizon in the future though is a requirement from participants to hold some tokens of the DAO they are voting for.
Its great to have a meta governance block vote, but the voters do need to have skin in the game as mentioned by many others here.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally vote.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally vote.
Although we are maintaining our favorable vote on this occasion and had already provided a rationale for our vote in Snapshot, considering the time gap between one vote and another, we felt it was worthwhile to reaffirm our position on this proposal.
Since the amount to be delegated barely represents 7% of the quorum needed for an on-chain proposal and there are oversight mechanisms in place by the DAO (the MSS), we see the proposal as a controlled experiment.
On the other hand, in the early stages of SEEDLatam (now SEEDGov) we ran a similar experiment with delegations over a year and a half, (which you can view here) making it particularly interesting for us to observe the outcome of this initiative.
DAOplomats is voting in favor of this proposal.
The MSS was created for moments such as this, so we would love to see the replacement of the oversight committee to the MSS happen and the associated funds for the OC returned to the DAO's treasury.
I voted FOR this proposal on tally and also agree with the upgrade to MSS to manage this initiative.
I don’t see any risks; rather, I see benefits for increased security while still allowing for experimentation.
Identify.Identify.Identify. Since the proposal is controversial, it would be better to wait until there are specific optimisations before making a proposal, and transferring the rights to MSS is a very appropriate proposal
In full support of the Event Horizon proposal.
Adding more information here after the GRC call with them.
In full support of the Event Horizon proposal.
Adding more information here after the GRC call with them.
One thing I'd like to see from this proposal is a KPI or objective of onboarding new delegates to the DAO and working to create a pathway for delegate contributors. EventHorizon has the opportunity to teach individuals how to participate in governance as a voter and can further decentralize some of our voting.
We are in full support of the Event Horizon proposal. Empowering smaller ARB holders through collective voting is an innovative step towards increasing participation and fostering inclusivity in the Arbitrum DAO. The Voter Pass system, which enables individuals with lower capital to pool their voting power, aligns with the core values of decentralization and community engagement.
This proposal also addresses the critical issue of low voter turnout by introducing the Implicit Delegation model, which incentivizes governance participation based on commitment rather than capital. We believe this approach will bring more voices into the decision-making process, strengthening the DAO as a whole.
We are in full support of the Event Horizon proposal. Empowering smaller ARB holders through collective voting is an innovative step towards increasing participation and fostering inclusivity in the Arbitrum DAO. The Voter Pass system, which enables individuals with lower capital to pool their voting power, aligns with the core values of decentralization and community engagement.
This proposal also addresses the critical issue of low voter turnout by introducing the Implicit Delegation model, which incentivizes governance participation based on commitment rather than capital. We believe this approach will bring more voices into the decision-making process, strengthening the DAO as a whole.
We look forward to seeing how Event Horizon enhances governance within the Arbitrum ecosystem and provides long-term value to the community.
Thanks for your support! Also be sure to vote on the main Tally proposal which is also concurrently live and which will use this MSS amendment you voted for.
I am always in favor of this kind improvement—involve more of small voters into governance, especially the Event Horizon community is already proven effective on various protocols. Also anti-sybil is necessary, but I still worries the requirement of Gitcoin Passport will block part of the small even tiny voters out of the governance.
On behalf of the UADP, we are fully in favor of this change. There seems to be no negatives in this new change as the MSS and funds are already set up and directly decreases the funds needed to execute this proposal.
Although we were asked to be members of the original multisig, we are in favor of changing the operations to the MSS now that they have accepted this initiative under their umbrella. This should cut costs for the DAO and set a good precedent for future programs to follow.
Additionally, we are still in favor of this initiative as a whole as an easy way for new members to get involved in the space and collectively have some substantial input.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
The FranklinDAO/Penn Blockchain Team voted FOR this proposal on Tally. We appreciate the work done by Event Horizon in giving retail voters meaningful influence in Arbitrum governance. We believe delegating 7m ARB to Event Horizon and placing them as the 15th largest delegate is reasonable, and so is their proposed compensation. We plan on supporting Event Horizon in their efforts in increasing retail voting power and participation in other DAOs as well.
I voted FOR this change. It is good to leverage existent structures within the DAO.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
We’re voting FOR this change to the original proposal in the Snapshot temperature check.
We support MSS taking over the responsibilities from the Oversight Committee.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and @Nyx, based on our combined research, analysis and ideation.
We’re voting FOR this change to the original proposal in the Snapshot temperature check.
We support MSS taking over the responsibilities from the Oversight Committee.
This does not yet support the main proposal for which the on-chain voting is in the process; we will consider our vote on that one separately and post our thoughts here later.
Aligned with our previous perspective at Snapshot we will be voting FOR this proposal at Tally.
TreasureDAO will be voting FOR this proposal.
I support this proposal on Snapshot because I believe the DAO could benefit from it. Getting more people involved in DAO has always been a goal of mine and this proposal is set to doing exactly that. I voted FOR.
We support this snapshot because the MSS improves security by requiring multiple approvals for actions, ensuring more decentralized control and including more participants in the process. It also allows for funds to be returned to the treasury if necessary.
However, we are curious why the snapshot started before the Tally vote concluded. Is there a reason for this? Thank you.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Regardless of the outcome at Tally, it seems reasonable for the control of the ARBs to transfer to the MSS, as was agreed upon at its formation. Additionally, this transfer would result in significant savings in administrative costs.
Aligned with our previous perspective at Snapshot we will be voting FOR this proposal at Tally.
TreasureDAO will be voting FOR this proposal.
The primary reason being this is a great experiment to run and focuses on decentralizing governance and allowing retail to participate (if they are so inclined). It will give us good insights into how many of the community members will truly take the time to participate in governance activities.
The changes between Snapshot and Tally are well-reasoned and align with the core ethos of our DAO. We believe this process is a valuable experiment worth pursuing. Effective decision-making is key to a successful organization, and any innovation in this area is highly desirable.
I voted for the onchain proposal on Tally to Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool and for the temp check on Snapshot to have the Arbitrum MSS manage the delegation process.
I think this proposal is a valuable experiment in distributing voting power that was previously locked in the DAO treasury to a unique set of delegates. The distribution of voting power in the Arbitrum DAO has become stagnant. It has proven difficult to get existing token holders to re-delegate and to get new token holders to delegate. I think this initiative fits in nicely alongside ARB Staking and the Delegate Incentives Program to help solve for voting power stagnation.
@EventHorizonDAO I will answer on the merits:
cp0x is not part of the SpiralDAO team, but we are indeed a multisig signer responsible for the safety of users' funds. We are part of this multisig because we have a long-standing positive reputation in crypto. Also, being in the ArbitrumDAO multisig does not mean that you are part of the ArbitrumDAO team - you are just a trusted signer.
The claims against us that SpiralDAO (of which we are not a part) uses non-public good practices are unclear. Firstly, what exactly these practices are? - I do not know anything about this. Secondly, as I said earlier - we are not part of the team.
You are getting personal in matters concerning the allocation of 7 million ARB to you, and cp0x does not ask anything from ArbitrumDAO. All we are saying is that many delegates have spent a lot of money and effort to have a voice in ArbitrumDAO, and you, with your proposal, will be able to nullify their efforts.
Making it easier for someone to start their journey in governance with some form of initial voice does not change the structure that in order to grow as a delegate, continued work is necessary.
Making it easier for someone to start their journey in governance with some form of initial voice does not change the structure that in order to grow as a delegate, continued work is necessary.
But, the goal of the DAO should not be to push away new entrants and create a walled garden ecosystem with difficulties to entry. It should be easy, and incentivized for new delegates to begin their involvement
Event Horizon doesn’t prevent delegates from voting with their 100 ARB and posting in the forum. However, Event Horizon does provide people an additional non-monetary incentive to those who are unmotivated by their drop in the bucket vote of 100 ARB to begin participating in the first place.
And, we would refrain from conflating quality of contribution and blind willingness and time to grind. Just because one person with 100 ARB has the time and compunction to spend months lobbying without any meaningful say, that does not mean that necessarily have better ideas to contribute than someone who was discouraged from participating due to their lack of voice (or vice versa). So you’re creating a filter based on time and willingness to grind and are certainly filtering out many otherwise great contributors in the process.
Thank you for your detailed response. Your proposal presents an interesting challenge to traditional notions of earned influence in DAOs. While increasing participation is valuable, I'm curious about how we balance this with ensuring high-quality contributions.
To better understand Event Horizon's real-world impact, could you provide some additional data?
This information would help us evaluate the potential impact on Arbitrum's governance and assess how Event Horizon balances increased participation with maintaining the quality of governance decisions.
I appreciate your work in tackling these complex governance challenges and look forward to your insights.
t would provide a path by which retail voters can gain exposure and perhaps use their experience as a springboard to track their voting records, have their voice heard, and begin to establish their own personally accrued delegation base, as you have.
We appreciate the support!
If the Arbitrum DAO would like, and votes to run, a delegate incentive campaign similar to Uniswap's delegate rewards program to encourage greater retail participation, EH would be willing to facilitate this in the future. Similarly if the community pool meets the requirements of a future incentive program, we would seek a community approved model of distribution to the retail voters.
We appreciate the support!
If the Arbitrum DAO would like, and votes to run, a delegate incentive campaign similar to Uniswap's delegate rewards program to encourage greater retail participation, EH would be willing to facilitate this in the future. Similarly if the community pool meets the requirements of a future incentive program, we would seek a community approved model of distribution to the retail voters.
The EH team is very interested in working with Blockworks Research to continue innovation in governance. At present we use our novel construct, Implicit Delegation which has similar functionalities to ranked choice with regards to ensuring constant productivity of tokens. Rather than a sorted list it delegates back to the community itself though. We'll reach out to chat with you all on future collaboration.
@Cp0x, thank you for acknowledging your potential conflict of interest.
You’ve voiced your lack of support half a dozen or so times. It’s been noted and each time we’ve attempted to explain the proposal to you. There isn’t much more we can offer you other than the fact that providing a voice to those who don’t have one is a) good b) not taking a voice away from anyone else especially given it’s a public good available to everyone.
@Cp0x, thank you for acknowledging your potential conflict of interest.
You’ve voiced your lack of support half a dozen or so times. It’s been noted and each time we’ve attempted to explain the proposal to you. There isn’t much more we can offer you other than the fact that providing a voice to those who don’t have one is a) good b) not taking a voice away from anyone else especially given it’s a public good available to everyone.
@mcfly
Your proposal presents an interesting challenge to traditional notions of earned influence in DAOs.
Thank you!
Prior to the proposal we ran a very small test case at no cost to the DAO. With $40K in delegation we see about 30 voters per proposal showing ~$1,333 in individual voice incentives participation. This was all with a very small delegation to offer. Assuming similar conversion the public pool could attract, onboard and retain ~2625 individual retail voters (importantly, each with meaningful say). Total votes is cumulative as detailed in the proposal. But importantly, should this proposal garner the same level of support as the Snapshot, this would mark a clear before and after, as such extrapolating from prior data is likely not prudent nor the mark of good epistemics. This is why this proposal is set for a 1 year experiment.
Once more, cp0x and McFly your jointly shared and voiced opinion has been noted. In the interest of avoiding running in more circles via text, we will be hosting a public call in September.
@mcfly writes:
What prevents beginner voters from establishing their own delegation base through the current system? ... If someone wants to gain influence in the DAO, they should invest the time, energy, and resources to earn that power
@mcfly writes:
What prevents beginner voters from establishing their own delegation base through the current system? ... If someone wants to gain influence in the DAO, they should invest the time, energy, and resources to earn that power
The general notion is that even by your preference for meritocracy (which you’re defining as willingness to spend hours/days lobbying without any true voice), arbitrary barriers to entry do not enforce better meritocracy (such as an inability to have any effective voice what so ever). They add friction to the vast majority and disincentive participation altogether.
Making it easier for someone to start their journey in governance with some form of initial voice does not change the structure that in order to grow as a delegate, continued work is necessary.
But, the goal of the DAO should not be to push away new entrants and create a walled garden ecosystem with difficulties to entry. It should be easy, and incentivized for new delegates to begin their involvement
Event Horizon doesn't prevent delegates from voting with their 100 ARB and posting in the forum. However, Event Horizon does provide people an additional non-monetary incentive to those who are unmotivated by their drop in the bucket vote of 100 ARB to begin participating in the first place.
And, we would refrain from conflating quality of contribution and blind willingness and time to grind. Just because one person with 100 ARB has the time and compunction to spend months lobbying without any meaningful say, that does not mean that necessarily have better ideas to contribute than someone who was discouraged from participating due to their lack of voice (or vice versa). So you’re creating a filter based on time and willingness to grind and are certainly filtering out many otherwise great contributors in the process.
@cp0x It’s an amendment to an active proposal. We discussed this approach with many delegates and this was their suggestion, not ours. Again, Cp0x as mentioned previously we believe you have several conflicts of interest which we would rather you disclose along side your opinions in the interest of responsible governance. To reiterate:
It’s worth noting that cp0x is a signer for SpiralDAO, which has historically referenced metagovernance (albeit through very different , non-public good, practices). One might view this as a potential conflict of interests.
I think this Snapshot vote is premature.
Yes, the very fact of this proposal has a positive result, but in order to change something, you need to either recall the current vote, or wait until it ends and act on the results of the vote.
Therefore, it is completely unimportant how everyone votes for this part with the transfer of multisig to MSS.
As mentioned above, we worked with several delegates on best approach. Ultimately, we felt it was right to pass an amendment to an active proposal so voters have complete clarity on what they are voting on and to ensure that this security change is implemented prior to tally closure so there is no chance it isn’t in place if needed. We saw no benefit in waiting until after Tally as, of course, the passing of the Tally is still required for the broader proposal to pass at all. Thanks for the support!
@Tekr0x.eth @BlockworksResearch Thank you both for the support! Don’t forget to also vote on the live Tally proposal.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Regardless of the outcome at Tally, it seems reasonable for the control of the ARBs to transfer to the MSS, as was agreed upon at its formation. Additionally, this transfer would result in significant savings in administrative costs.
Aligned with our previous perspective at Snapshot we will be voting FOR this proposal at Tally.
TreasureDAO will be voting FOR this proposal.
The primary reason being this is a great experiment to run and focuses on decentralizing governance and allowing retail to participate (if they are so inclined). It will give us good insights into how many of the community members will truly take the time to participate in governance activities.
The changes between Snapshot and Tally are well-reasoned and align with the core ethos of our DAO. We believe this process is a valuable experiment worth pursuing. Effective decision-making is key to a successful organization, and any innovation in this area is highly desirable.
I voted for the onchain proposal on Tally to Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool and for the temp check on Snapshot to have the Arbitrum MSS manage the delegation process.
I think this proposal is a valuable experiment in distributing voting power that was previously locked in the DAO treasury to a unique set of delegates. The distribution of voting power in the Arbitrum DAO has become stagnant. It has proven difficult to get existing token holders to re-delegate and to get new token holders to delegate. I think this initiative fits in nicely alongside ARB Staking and the Delegate Incentives Program to help solve for voting power stagnation.
@EventHorizonDAO I will answer on the merits:
cp0x is not part of the SpiralDAO team, but we are indeed a multisig signer responsible for the safety of users' funds. We are part of this multisig because we have a long-standing positive reputation in crypto. Also, being in the ArbitrumDAO multisig does not mean that you are part of the ArbitrumDAO team - you are just a trusted signer.
The claims against us that SpiralDAO (of which we are not a part) uses non-public good practices are unclear. Firstly, what exactly these practices are? - I do not know anything about this. Secondly, as I said earlier - we are not part of the team.
You are getting personal in matters concerning the allocation of 7 million ARB to you, and cp0x does not ask anything from ArbitrumDAO. All we are saying is that many delegates have spent a lot of money and effort to have a voice in ArbitrumDAO, and you, with your proposal, will be able to nullify their efforts.
Making it easier for someone to start their journey in governance with some form of initial voice does not change the structure that in order to grow as a delegate, continued work is necessary.
Making it easier for someone to start their journey in governance with some form of initial voice does not change the structure that in order to grow as a delegate, continued work is necessary.
But, the goal of the DAO should not be to push away new entrants and create a walled garden ecosystem with difficulties to entry. It should be easy, and incentivized for new delegates to begin their involvement
Event Horizon doesn’t prevent delegates from voting with their 100 ARB and posting in the forum. However, Event Horizon does provide people an additional non-monetary incentive to those who are unmotivated by their drop in the bucket vote of 100 ARB to begin participating in the first place.
And, we would refrain from conflating quality of contribution and blind willingness and time to grind. Just because one person with 100 ARB has the time and compunction to spend months lobbying without any meaningful say, that does not mean that necessarily have better ideas to contribute than someone who was discouraged from participating due to their lack of voice (or vice versa). So you’re creating a filter based on time and willingness to grind and are certainly filtering out many otherwise great contributors in the process.
Thank you for your detailed response. Your proposal presents an interesting challenge to traditional notions of earned influence in DAOs. While increasing participation is valuable, I'm curious about how we balance this with ensuring high-quality contributions.
To better understand Event Horizon's real-world impact, could you provide some additional data?
This information would help us evaluate the potential impact on Arbitrum's governance and assess how Event Horizon balances increased participation with maintaining the quality of governance decisions.
I appreciate your work in tackling these complex governance challenges and look forward to your insights.
t would provide a path by which retail voters can gain exposure and perhaps use their experience as a springboard to track their voting records, have their voice heard, and begin to establish their own personally accrued delegation base, as you have.
We appreciate the support!
If the Arbitrum DAO would like, and votes to run, a delegate incentive campaign similar to Uniswap's delegate rewards program to encourage greater retail participation, EH would be willing to facilitate this in the future. Similarly if the community pool meets the requirements of a future incentive program, we would seek a community approved model of distribution to the retail voters.
We appreciate the support!
If the Arbitrum DAO would like, and votes to run, a delegate incentive campaign similar to Uniswap's delegate rewards program to encourage greater retail participation, EH would be willing to facilitate this in the future. Similarly if the community pool meets the requirements of a future incentive program, we would seek a community approved model of distribution to the retail voters.
The EH team is very interested in working with Blockworks Research to continue innovation in governance. At present we use our novel construct, Implicit Delegation which has similar functionalities to ranked choice with regards to ensuring constant productivity of tokens. Rather than a sorted list it delegates back to the community itself though. We'll reach out to chat with you all on future collaboration.
@Cp0x, thank you for acknowledging your potential conflict of interest.
You’ve voiced your lack of support half a dozen or so times. It’s been noted and each time we’ve attempted to explain the proposal to you. There isn’t much more we can offer you other than the fact that providing a voice to those who don’t have one is a) good b) not taking a voice away from anyone else especially given it’s a public good available to everyone.
@Cp0x, thank you for acknowledging your potential conflict of interest.
You’ve voiced your lack of support half a dozen or so times. It’s been noted and each time we’ve attempted to explain the proposal to you. There isn’t much more we can offer you other than the fact that providing a voice to those who don’t have one is a) good b) not taking a voice away from anyone else especially given it’s a public good available to everyone.
@mcfly
Your proposal presents an interesting challenge to traditional notions of earned influence in DAOs.
Thank you!
Prior to the proposal we ran a very small test case at no cost to the DAO. With $40K in delegation we see about 30 voters per proposal showing ~$1,333 in individual voice incentives participation. This was all with a very small delegation to offer. Assuming similar conversion the public pool could attract, onboard and retain ~2625 individual retail voters (importantly, each with meaningful say). Total votes is cumulative as detailed in the proposal. But importantly, should this proposal garner the same level of support as the Snapshot, this would mark a clear before and after, as such extrapolating from prior data is likely not prudent nor the mark of good epistemics. This is why this proposal is set for a 1 year experiment.
Once more, cp0x and McFly your jointly shared and voiced opinion has been noted. In the interest of avoiding running in more circles via text, we will be hosting a public call in September.
@mcfly writes:
What prevents beginner voters from establishing their own delegation base through the current system? ... If someone wants to gain influence in the DAO, they should invest the time, energy, and resources to earn that power
@mcfly writes:
What prevents beginner voters from establishing their own delegation base through the current system? ... If someone wants to gain influence in the DAO, they should invest the time, energy, and resources to earn that power
The general notion is that even by your preference for meritocracy (which you’re defining as willingness to spend hours/days lobbying without any true voice), arbitrary barriers to entry do not enforce better meritocracy (such as an inability to have any effective voice what so ever). They add friction to the vast majority and disincentive participation altogether.
Making it easier for someone to start their journey in governance with some form of initial voice does not change the structure that in order to grow as a delegate, continued work is necessary.
But, the goal of the DAO should not be to push away new entrants and create a walled garden ecosystem with difficulties to entry. It should be easy, and incentivized for new delegates to begin their involvement
Event Horizon doesn't prevent delegates from voting with their 100 ARB and posting in the forum. However, Event Horizon does provide people an additional non-monetary incentive to those who are unmotivated by their drop in the bucket vote of 100 ARB to begin participating in the first place.
And, we would refrain from conflating quality of contribution and blind willingness and time to grind. Just because one person with 100 ARB has the time and compunction to spend months lobbying without any meaningful say, that does not mean that necessarily have better ideas to contribute than someone who was discouraged from participating due to their lack of voice (or vice versa). So you’re creating a filter based on time and willingness to grind and are certainly filtering out many otherwise great contributors in the process.
@cp0x It’s an amendment to an active proposal. We discussed this approach with many delegates and this was their suggestion, not ours. Again, Cp0x as mentioned previously we believe you have several conflicts of interest which we would rather you disclose along side your opinions in the interest of responsible governance. To reiterate:
It’s worth noting that cp0x is a signer for SpiralDAO, which has historically referenced metagovernance (albeit through very different , non-public good, practices). One might view this as a potential conflict of interests.
I think this Snapshot vote is premature.
Yes, the very fact of this proposal has a positive result, but in order to change something, you need to either recall the current vote, or wait until it ends and act on the results of the vote.
Therefore, it is completely unimportant how everyone votes for this part with the transfer of multisig to MSS.
As mentioned above, we worked with several delegates on best approach. Ultimately, we felt it was right to pass an amendment to an active proposal so voters have complete clarity on what they are voting on and to ensure that this security change is implemented prior to tally closure so there is no chance it isn’t in place if needed. We saw no benefit in waiting until after Tally as, of course, the passing of the Tally is still required for the broader proposal to pass at all. Thanks for the support!
@Tekr0x.eth @BlockworksResearch Thank you both for the support! Don’t forget to also vote on the live Tally proposal.
This will be further ratified via a snapshot vote.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR this change to the original proposal in the Snapshot temperature check.
We have discussed this change extensively with the Event Horizon team, and we argued for using the MSS for the oversight committee after Event Horizon received some pushback for using the franchiser contract. Therefore we are fully supportive of this move and think this change will benefit the DAO.
We would like to note though that this is not yet a support for the main proposal in question, we will consider our vote on that one separately and will provide our rationale here as well.
We are in favor of a proposal like this as it provides a possible onboarding pathway to new users in the Arbitrum ecosystem. DAOs typically have users that bootstrap their own voting power over time, but we need to ask ourselves how sustainable of a process this is/if it truly contributes to decentralization. While Arbitrum DAO is certainly one of the most active DAOs with the most participants, it also suffers from an onboarding problem. Our only question for this proposal is if this will affect delegate incentives in some manner/will these individuals in the voter enfranchisement pool be eligible for delegate incentives.
On a side note, we are curious to know if Event Horizon has thought of a future with Ranked Choice Delegations. During SBC, there was talk in the meta-governance community about having a pool of tokens or a wallet that delegates their votes to an ordered list of candidates, where if a candidate does not use their delegated voting power, then their power is redistributed across the delegation list to keep participation high.
Echoing some active delegates here, we're voting AGAINST this proposal, reversing our precedent stance on this matter. While the intent to increase retail participation is commendable, granting a large voting block to a single entity undermines the core principle of decentralized governance. It creates an artificial power imbalance, potentially marginalizing individual delegates who've earned their influence through dedicated participation. This approach risks centralizing decision-making and could lead to unintended consequences in the ecosystem's governance structure. Instead, we should focus on improving existing mechanisms to naturally encourage broader retail engagement without compromising the integrity of the current delegate system.
Voting against this. I think every delegate should receive his/her vorting power by individuals and not by getting token from a treasury or another DAO controlled source.
Seems really straight forward - Voted FOR as the MSS set up makes sense to onboard the Event Horizon initiative.
After further discussion with the Foundation and the MSS Committee, we have secured MSS support for the Voter Enfranchisement Pool Proposal.
The MSS will replace the Oversight Committee entirely for all related capacities and responsibilities. The MSS will…
After further discussion with the Foundation and the MSS Committee, we have secured MSS support for the Voter Enfranchisement Pool Proposal.
The MSS will replace the Oversight Committee entirely for all related capacities and responsibilities. The MSS will…
To make this improvement possible, the current Oversight Committee and Event Horizon are committed to, and will carry out, the following the closure of the current state proposal:
This will be further ratified via a snapshot vote.
1.We have decided to support the Event Horizon proposal on tally due to its potential to enhance inclusivity within the ArbitrumDAO.
Although our concerns align with those expressed by 404DAO, we wanted to focus particularly on the participation rate within the voter pool. It is crucial to ensure the engagement level is high and based on informed decision rather than noise for the purpose of incentives. The decision-making processes of these voter pass holders should as well align with Arbitrum’s core values. Hence, we believe it is important to closely monitoring how this initiative evolves and impacts our ecosystem.
1.We have decided to support the Event Horizon proposal on tally due to its potential to enhance inclusivity within the ArbitrumDAO.
Although our concerns align with those expressed by 404DAO, we wanted to focus particularly on the participation rate within the voter pool. It is crucial to ensure the engagement level is high and based on informed decision rather than noise for the purpose of incentives. The decision-making processes of these voter pass holders should as well align with Arbitrum’s core values. Hence, we believe it is important to closely monitoring how this initiative evolves and impacts our ecosystem.
Overall we are excited about the idea of empowering underrepresented voices within the DAO. With the new adjustment on benchmark thresholds that would have to be met before the vesting of a given ARB allotment, we believe that this is a good starting point for the initiative.
2.We support the proposal to replace the Oversight Committee with the MSS, as it will enhance security, and avoid redundancy, leading to a more streamlined and efficient governance process.
Hey! The benefits of Event Horizon’s Voter Enfranchisement Pools and the rationale for the grant size are all listed in the proposal. And, remember the 7m ARB is a delegation, not a grant.
With so many small retail investors entrusted to you, I'm curious to understand how to ensure that it's going to cost so much money for you to get this right, and what the real core strengths are.
I will be voting in favor of this proposal because it empowers smaller voters and because Implicit Delegation has already proven to be effective in other DAOs. The cost of this proposal is minimal compared to the significant benefits it offers. I'm eager to see how this experiment unfolds, and I'm confident that the Gitcoin Passport requirements will help maintain the public voter block as a genuine and decentralized force.
Edit: I'm also voting 'FOR' replacing the OC with the MSS for all capacities and responsibilities mainly because this avoids redundancy.
@EzR3aL We understand you’ve done quite well as a solo delegate in AAVE. We commend your success, and understand it was likely a difficult achievement. However, we would implore you to explore the idea that while there has historically been a large barrier to entry for the average person to enter governance (yourself being an exception) that doesnt mean it should always be difficult.
Event Horizon isn’t a delegate in the relevant sense here. In actuality, the voting power that is delegated to Event Horizon is moved by small retail holders. This is all with the ultimate aim of bringing in more voices off the sideline via a non-monetary incentive (a vote multiple) to cut their teeth on voting in a DAO. It would not afford any individual a truly large delegation but it would provide a path by which retail voters can gain exposure and perhaps use their experience as a springboard to track their voting records, have their voice heard, and begin to establish their own personally accrued delegation base, as you have.
Posting on behalf of the Treasure ARC.
TreasureDAO will be voting FOR this proposal.
The primary reason being this is a great experiment to run and focuses on decentralizing governance and allowing retail to participate (if they are so inclined). It will give us good insights into how many of the community members will truly take the time to participate in governance activities.
Posting on behalf of the Treasure ARC.
TreasureDAO will be voting FOR this proposal.
The primary reason being this is a great experiment to run and focuses on decentralizing governance and allowing retail to participate (if they are so inclined). It will give us good insights into how many of the community members will truly take the time to participate in governance activities.
Thank you, The Treasure ARC
This is a very interesting proposal. I see a lot of arguments. In fact, I think this proposal can be implemented without much cost after it is passed, so it is possible to conduct an experiment, continue if the effect is good, and stop if the effect is not good. I will support it.
I voted FOR in this proposal. I very much like the idea of increasing participation within the DAO, in general. I also support ratifying at the end of the period instead of automatically renewing, although it signifies some more DAO work as it has to go through a vote again, since it's a trial that should be the more conservative approach.
Anti Sybil approach makes sense - before on-chain vote goes live, is it possible that you share more in-depth details about the Gitcoin Passport implementation? For example:
Blockworks Research will be voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
We really like the idea of empowering long-tail voters to have a more substantial influence in governance, and this seems to be a great potential avenue for further experimentation. The 50K ARB grant allocation also seems sensible.
DAOplomats voted in favor of this proposal.
This is a welcome experiment. We do think that 7M would very likely not move the needle in most proposals, however, we would love to see what effect creating this pool will bring and how it might affect future proposals. Hopefully, we begin to see said contributors not only participate by voting across the pool but also communicate their rationales here in Forum.
We appreciate the support and the willingness to experiment. A few others have asked us for more frequent check ins and we agree. A monthly call is a great idea not only to keep the DAO in the loop, but also to continually iterate and adjust course as we continue building out this voter and contributor onboarding pipeline.
@JoJo
We appreciate the support and the willingness to experiment. A few others have asked us for more frequent check ins and we agree. A monthly call is a great idea not only to keep the DAO in the loop, but also to continually iterate and adjust course as we continue building out this voter and contributor onboarding pipeline.
@JoJo
we suggested (and 404DAO shared the concern) not having the delegation be optimistically extended past the proposed timeline and instead holding another vote to decide whether to continue or not
Since receiving that feedback, we've agreed to make this non-optimistic. Rereading the proposal, it seems we could have done a better job of making that clearer when we wrote:
this proposal suggests we delegate (not grant) 7,000,000 ARB to a public access-voter block subject to a 1 year renewal
This is ambiguous and in the on-chain vote we will rephrase this as:
this proposal suggests we delegate (not grant) 7,000,000 ARB to a public access-voter block subject to a non-optimistic 1 year renewal**
Finally,
we’ll be assigning the security member of the ARDC to review and assess the possible technical risks associated with implementing the proposal before it moves to an on-chain vote.
This is helpful as we need to fork and audit the Franchiser contract prior to going to the on-chain vote anyways, so we'll be in touch with respect to this as well given that you are the ARDC rep.
Lastly, in a previous comment, we suggested (and 404DAO shared the concern) not having the delegation be optimistically extended past the proposed timeline and instead holding another vote to decide whether to continue or not. While we understand Event Horizon’s hesitation to go through the entire governance process to continue the delegation, we believe it’s important for the DAO to ratify or veto the continuation formally. That’s why we’re declaring already that we’ll put up a snapshot vote at the end of the proposed timeline to ratify the continuation of this program.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We value the enthusiastic approach Event Horizon has towards governance experimentation with novel approaches. While we’re not entirely sure of the impact such an experiment is going to have, we’ll be voting in favor of the proposal during the temp check because we’re interested in seeing its potential.
SEED Latam's delegation decided to vote FOR this proposal. Even though we're still not sure how evident the impact of this proposal could be toward improving Arbitrum's governance, we're interested in seeing how it plays out. However, given the experimental nature of this proposal, I think we should reduce the total ask to 4-5M ARB and run it for 6 months instead of 1 year.
This will be further ratified via a snapshot vote.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR this change to the original proposal in the Snapshot temperature check.
We have discussed this change extensively with the Event Horizon team, and we argued for using the MSS for the oversight committee after Event Horizon received some pushback for using the franchiser contract. Therefore we are fully supportive of this move and think this change will benefit the DAO.
We would like to note though that this is not yet a support for the main proposal in question, we will consider our vote on that one separately and will provide our rationale here as well.
We are in favor of a proposal like this as it provides a possible onboarding pathway to new users in the Arbitrum ecosystem. DAOs typically have users that bootstrap their own voting power over time, but we need to ask ourselves how sustainable of a process this is/if it truly contributes to decentralization. While Arbitrum DAO is certainly one of the most active DAOs with the most participants, it also suffers from an onboarding problem. Our only question for this proposal is if this will affect delegate incentives in some manner/will these individuals in the voter enfranchisement pool be eligible for delegate incentives.
On a side note, we are curious to know if Event Horizon has thought of a future with Ranked Choice Delegations. During SBC, there was talk in the meta-governance community about having a pool of tokens or a wallet that delegates their votes to an ordered list of candidates, where if a candidate does not use their delegated voting power, then their power is redistributed across the delegation list to keep participation high.
Echoing some active delegates here, we're voting AGAINST this proposal, reversing our precedent stance on this matter. While the intent to increase retail participation is commendable, granting a large voting block to a single entity undermines the core principle of decentralized governance. It creates an artificial power imbalance, potentially marginalizing individual delegates who've earned their influence through dedicated participation. This approach risks centralizing decision-making and could lead to unintended consequences in the ecosystem's governance structure. Instead, we should focus on improving existing mechanisms to naturally encourage broader retail engagement without compromising the integrity of the current delegate system.
Voting against this. I think every delegate should receive his/her vorting power by individuals and not by getting token from a treasury or another DAO controlled source.
Seems really straight forward - Voted FOR as the MSS set up makes sense to onboard the Event Horizon initiative.
After further discussion with the Foundation and the MSS Committee, we have secured MSS support for the Voter Enfranchisement Pool Proposal.
The MSS will replace the Oversight Committee entirely for all related capacities and responsibilities. The MSS will…
After further discussion with the Foundation and the MSS Committee, we have secured MSS support for the Voter Enfranchisement Pool Proposal.
The MSS will replace the Oversight Committee entirely for all related capacities and responsibilities. The MSS will…
To make this improvement possible, the current Oversight Committee and Event Horizon are committed to, and will carry out, the following the closure of the current state proposal:
This will be further ratified via a snapshot vote.
1.We have decided to support the Event Horizon proposal on tally due to its potential to enhance inclusivity within the ArbitrumDAO.
Although our concerns align with those expressed by 404DAO, we wanted to focus particularly on the participation rate within the voter pool. It is crucial to ensure the engagement level is high and based on informed decision rather than noise for the purpose of incentives. The decision-making processes of these voter pass holders should as well align with Arbitrum’s core values. Hence, we believe it is important to closely monitoring how this initiative evolves and impacts our ecosystem.
1.We have decided to support the Event Horizon proposal on tally due to its potential to enhance inclusivity within the ArbitrumDAO.
Although our concerns align with those expressed by 404DAO, we wanted to focus particularly on the participation rate within the voter pool. It is crucial to ensure the engagement level is high and based on informed decision rather than noise for the purpose of incentives. The decision-making processes of these voter pass holders should as well align with Arbitrum’s core values. Hence, we believe it is important to closely monitoring how this initiative evolves and impacts our ecosystem.
Overall we are excited about the idea of empowering underrepresented voices within the DAO. With the new adjustment on benchmark thresholds that would have to be met before the vesting of a given ARB allotment, we believe that this is a good starting point for the initiative.
2.We support the proposal to replace the Oversight Committee with the MSS, as it will enhance security, and avoid redundancy, leading to a more streamlined and efficient governance process.
Hey! The benefits of Event Horizon’s Voter Enfranchisement Pools and the rationale for the grant size are all listed in the proposal. And, remember the 7m ARB is a delegation, not a grant.
With so many small retail investors entrusted to you, I'm curious to understand how to ensure that it's going to cost so much money for you to get this right, and what the real core strengths are.
I will be voting in favor of this proposal because it empowers smaller voters and because Implicit Delegation has already proven to be effective in other DAOs. The cost of this proposal is minimal compared to the significant benefits it offers. I'm eager to see how this experiment unfolds, and I'm confident that the Gitcoin Passport requirements will help maintain the public voter block as a genuine and decentralized force.
Edit: I'm also voting 'FOR' replacing the OC with the MSS for all capacities and responsibilities mainly because this avoids redundancy.
@EzR3aL We understand you’ve done quite well as a solo delegate in AAVE. We commend your success, and understand it was likely a difficult achievement. However, we would implore you to explore the idea that while there has historically been a large barrier to entry for the average person to enter governance (yourself being an exception) that doesnt mean it should always be difficult.
Event Horizon isn’t a delegate in the relevant sense here. In actuality, the voting power that is delegated to Event Horizon is moved by small retail holders. This is all with the ultimate aim of bringing in more voices off the sideline via a non-monetary incentive (a vote multiple) to cut their teeth on voting in a DAO. It would not afford any individual a truly large delegation but it would provide a path by which retail voters can gain exposure and perhaps use their experience as a springboard to track their voting records, have their voice heard, and begin to establish their own personally accrued delegation base, as you have.
Posting on behalf of the Treasure ARC.
TreasureDAO will be voting FOR this proposal.
The primary reason being this is a great experiment to run and focuses on decentralizing governance and allowing retail to participate (if they are so inclined). It will give us good insights into how many of the community members will truly take the time to participate in governance activities.
Posting on behalf of the Treasure ARC.
TreasureDAO will be voting FOR this proposal.
The primary reason being this is a great experiment to run and focuses on decentralizing governance and allowing retail to participate (if they are so inclined). It will give us good insights into how many of the community members will truly take the time to participate in governance activities.
Thank you, The Treasure ARC
This is a very interesting proposal. I see a lot of arguments. In fact, I think this proposal can be implemented without much cost after it is passed, so it is possible to conduct an experiment, continue if the effect is good, and stop if the effect is not good. I will support it.
I voted FOR in this proposal. I very much like the idea of increasing participation within the DAO, in general. I also support ratifying at the end of the period instead of automatically renewing, although it signifies some more DAO work as it has to go through a vote again, since it's a trial that should be the more conservative approach.
Anti Sybil approach makes sense - before on-chain vote goes live, is it possible that you share more in-depth details about the Gitcoin Passport implementation? For example:
Blockworks Research will be voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
We really like the idea of empowering long-tail voters to have a more substantial influence in governance, and this seems to be a great potential avenue for further experimentation. The 50K ARB grant allocation also seems sensible.
DAOplomats voted in favor of this proposal.
This is a welcome experiment. We do think that 7M would very likely not move the needle in most proposals, however, we would love to see what effect creating this pool will bring and how it might affect future proposals. Hopefully, we begin to see said contributors not only participate by voting across the pool but also communicate their rationales here in Forum.
We appreciate the support and the willingness to experiment. A few others have asked us for more frequent check ins and we agree. A monthly call is a great idea not only to keep the DAO in the loop, but also to continually iterate and adjust course as we continue building out this voter and contributor onboarding pipeline.
@JoJo
We appreciate the support and the willingness to experiment. A few others have asked us for more frequent check ins and we agree. A monthly call is a great idea not only to keep the DAO in the loop, but also to continually iterate and adjust course as we continue building out this voter and contributor onboarding pipeline.
@JoJo
we suggested (and 404DAO shared the concern) not having the delegation be optimistically extended past the proposed timeline and instead holding another vote to decide whether to continue or not
Since receiving that feedback, we've agreed to make this non-optimistic. Rereading the proposal, it seems we could have done a better job of making that clearer when we wrote:
this proposal suggests we delegate (not grant) 7,000,000 ARB to a public access-voter block subject to a 1 year renewal
This is ambiguous and in the on-chain vote we will rephrase this as:
this proposal suggests we delegate (not grant) 7,000,000 ARB to a public access-voter block subject to a non-optimistic 1 year renewal**
Finally,
we’ll be assigning the security member of the ARDC to review and assess the possible technical risks associated with implementing the proposal before it moves to an on-chain vote.
This is helpful as we need to fork and audit the Franchiser contract prior to going to the on-chain vote anyways, so we'll be in touch with respect to this as well given that you are the ARDC rep.
Lastly, in a previous comment, we suggested (and 404DAO shared the concern) not having the delegation be optimistically extended past the proposed timeline and instead holding another vote to decide whether to continue or not. While we understand Event Horizon’s hesitation to go through the entire governance process to continue the delegation, we believe it’s important for the DAO to ratify or veto the continuation formally. That’s why we’re declaring already that we’ll put up a snapshot vote at the end of the proposed timeline to ratify the continuation of this program.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We value the enthusiastic approach Event Horizon has towards governance experimentation with novel approaches. While we’re not entirely sure of the impact such an experiment is going to have, we’ll be voting in favor of the proposal during the temp check because we’re interested in seeing its potential.
SEED Latam's delegation decided to vote FOR this proposal. Even though we're still not sure how evident the impact of this proposal could be toward improving Arbitrum's governance, we're interested in seeing how it plays out. However, given the experimental nature of this proposal, I think we should reduce the total ask to 4-5M ARB and run it for 6 months instead of 1 year.
@EzR3aL We understand you’ve done quite well as a solo delegate in AAVE. We commend your success, and understand it was likely a difficult achievement. However, we would implore you to explore the idea that while there has historically been a large barrier to entry for the average person to enter governance (yourself being an exception) that doesnt mean it should always be difficult.
Event Horizon isn’t a delegate in the relevant sense here. In actuality, the voting power that is delegated to Event Horizon is moved by small retail holders. This is all with the ultimate aim of bringing in more voices off the sideline via a non-monetary incentive (a vote multiple) to cut their teeth on voting in a DAO. It would not afford any individual a truly large delegation but it would provide a path by which retail voters can gain exposure and perhaps use their experience as a springboard to track their voting records, have their voice heard, and begin to establish their own personally accrued delegation base, as you have.
The crux here is whether one thinks the DAO should use treasury-owned delegation authority to help empower small Arbitrum DAO citizens ( all while retaining ownership of those funds via revocability). We think the answer to that question is ‘yes’. This is also a rapidly adopted precedent set by several DAOs including Compound and Uniswap which have both conducted treasury-supported underrepresent delegate programs.
@mcfly We would highlight that the delegation is not made to a single entity. The pool is a public-access resource available to everyone in the community. There is no imbalance, as marginalized individual delegates have equal access to the community pool as larger delegates. To give you an example:
If 100 people vote, each voter effectively mobilizes 70,000 ARB. This increase of 70,000 ARB for a small delegate previously wielding 700 ARB (100x multiple on voting power) is substantially more meaningful than for a delegate wielding 7,000,000 ARB (1% increase in VP). So anyone can access, but low capital means voters benefit the most.
By most definitions, this process is decentralized. While the total community vote is represented by a single wallet, the outcome of that single wallet’s vote is determined by many participants in a meta-level vote. We would content that one wallet representing 1,000 voices (each voting independently at the meta-level) is a greater state of decentralization than 10 wallets each representing one person.
Hey @raam
Yes, we can confirm that the pool will also (and currently does) vote on Tally proposals as well!
The Snapshot subscription increases the total number of concurrent proposals we can host on Snapshot at any given moment and on a monthly basis. This is important so that high proposal volume doesn’t prevent the public pool from participating in any votes during high volume days / weeks. Reliability under heavy load is critical.
This seems semantic, but the Foundation noted (perhaps we could call it a suggestion as you stated vs recommendation) to have a contract or multi-sig in-between the franchiser and treasury. We accepted the Foundation’s suggestion via a MS.
However, a MS would effectively directly control the franchiser, making the franchiser redundant. Therefore the natural landing point is MS alone. Which we agree is a good path forward and should be the MSS.
I voted FOR in this proposal. I very much like the idea of increasing participation within the DAO, in general. I also support ratifying at the end of the period instead of automatically renewing, although it signifies some more DAO work as it has to go through a vote again, since it's a trial that should be the more conservative approach.
Anti Sybil approach makes sense - before on-chain vote goes live, is it possible that you share more in-depth details about the Gitcoin Passport implementation? For example:
Blockworks Research will be voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
We really like the idea of empowering long-tail voters to have a more substantial influence in governance, and this seems to be a great potential avenue for further experimentation. The 50K ARB grant allocation also seems sensible.
Having said the above, we would appreciate clarification to a few questions, as well as prefer to see some additions to the proposal before voting on it on Tally:
Lastly, in a previous comment, we suggested (and 404DAO shared the concern) not having the delegation be optimistically extended past the proposed timeline and instead holding another vote to decide whether to continue or not. While we understand Event Horizon’s hesitation to go through the entire governance process to continue the delegation, we believe it’s important for the DAO to ratify or veto the continuation formally. That’s why we’re declaring already that we’ll put up a snapshot vote at the end of the proposed timeline to ratify the continuation of this program.
I support this, and had the same thought about what would happen at continuation and if it should be automatic or not, and likely the answer to me was no.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We value the enthusiastic approach Event Horizon has towards governance experimentation with novel approaches. While we’re not entirely sure of the impact such an experiment is going to have, we’ll be voting in favor of the proposal during the temp check because we’re interested in seeing its potential.
We see this whole proposal as an experiment and we want to treat it as such, both in theory and, more importantly, in practice. Instead of just implementing the proposal, letting it run its course, and then coming back to review what was done, we want the DAO to follow along and help Event Horizon iterate where and if needed.
While the people participating in the voter’s block are the ones who decide how the franchiser will vote, the DAO should be in charge of how the experiment is driven forward. To that end, we want to ask Event Horizon to set up a monthly call where they’ll provide a quick update on how the experiment is going and discuss with delegates on how the experiment should proceed.
On another note, as the DAO Advocate for the ARDC, we’ll be assigning the security member of the ARDC to review and assess the possible technical risks associated with implementing the proposal before it moves to an on-chain vote.
Lastly, in a previous comment, we suggested (and 404DAO shared the concern) not having the delegation be optimistically extended past the proposed timeline and instead holding another vote to decide whether to continue or not. While we understand Event Horizon’s hesitation to go through the entire governance process to continue the delegation, we believe it’s important for the DAO to ratify or veto the continuation formally. That's why we're declaring already that we'll put up a snapshot vote at the end of the proposed timeline to ratify the continuation of this program.
I decided to vote FOR this proposal in Snapshot.
Rationale:
I decided to vote FOR this proposal in Snapshot.
Rationale:
The issue being addressed here is essential; particularly in recent months, as someone progressing towards becoming a more effective delegate with limited voting power, I can attest to the validity of the arguments presented. Moreover, the proposed framework for implementation and the background provided, along with the contingency for ARB return to the treasury in case of unfavorable outcomes, represents sound risk management.
Comments:
I will vote in favor off-chain, yet I have some questions before the move to on-chain voting in Tally, where I will confirm my final decision:
I have voted FOR the proposal. I believe it introduces an innovative participation model, allowing small voters to get more involved. As many mentioned, this could expand our prospectives and help us develop and consolidate the ‘3rd pillar of governance’.
The proposal also seems like a safe enough experiment given that:
I have voted FOR the proposal. I believe it introduces an innovative participation model, allowing small voters to get more involved. As many mentioned, this could expand our prospectives and help us develop and consolidate the ‘3rd pillar of governance’.
The proposal also seems like a safe enough experiment given that:
Overall, this proposal can enhance the voting process and integrate new methods, and eventually bring benefits to Arbitrum’s governance as a whole.
Looking forward to seeing this go live!
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR Event Horizon's metagov pool at the Snapshot stage.
For what it's worth, we think that the Arbitrum has pretty solid activity and participation compared to a lot of other DAOs of our size. However, we should aim to keep increasing participation/decentralization, and this proposal could be pretty helpful in achieving this.
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR Event Horizon's metagov pool at the Snapshot stage.
For what it's worth, we think that the Arbitrum has pretty solid activity and participation compared to a lot of other DAOs of our size. However, we should aim to keep increasing participation/decentralization, and this proposal could be pretty helpful in achieving this.
After looking through this thread, we're much more comfortable voting for the prop now that the renewal is clearly non-optimistic. Makes it much better as an experiment - we want the DAO to do a final check in a year from now and make sure the broader goals are being met.
Seconding @BlockworksResearch and @cattin though - would like to see a stronger justification for the 7m ARB delegation, or a reduction of the current ask before the final vote
Part of this proposal is grant funding to deploy on Arbitrum as mainnet gas costs, while deterring Sybil attacks for the moment, are not the ideal state of affairs. And $6 is currently cheap! So yes, we're excited to deploy on Arbitrum where current gas costs are less than $0.01 (thank you EIP-4844)
I have voted "For" this proposal, as I welcome any (reasonable) attempts to boost governance participation. I think through the discussions above EventHorizaonDAO has shown a willingness to be openminded to feedback and their changes to the initial proposal are appreciated. They also have a history with other projects, so there is some experience here that hopefully smaller delegates who participate in this have a positive experience with it.
Bi-annual reporting including KPIs such as voters, participation rate, voters above key threshold amounts (say $1k worth of ARB), etc. – 5k ARB
I have voted "For" this proposal, as I welcome any (reasonable) attempts to boost governance participation. I think through the discussions above EventHorizaonDAO has shown a willingness to be openminded to feedback and their changes to the initial proposal are appreciated. They also have a history with other projects, so there is some experience here that hopefully smaller delegates who participate in this have a positive experience with it.
Bi-annual reporting including KPIs such as voters, participation rate, voters above key threshold amounts (say $1k worth of ARB), etc. – 5k ARB
A suggestion here, since this is the snapshot phase. I personally think quarterly reports would be better, if not monthly. Maybe a hybrid where the monthly reporting gets out some basic metrics and progress updates, then the bi-annual is more comprehensive. I know this type of thing is balancing act between time / reader apathy, but bi-annual reporting feels a little too infrequent to me. Quarterly is probably the sweet-spot.
The Arbitrum Event Horizon Oversight Committee: A committee of 5 existing, notable delegates will be voted on by the Arbitrum community to be given the ability to guide the Event Horizon voting pool on matters of Arbitrum meta-governance. A simple 3/5 majority would allow this committee to veto the decisions of the voter pool within the 24 hours between the closing of the Event Horizon proposal, and the underlying DAO’s proposal.
Is there a delegate size limit to who can apply for this? I ask because, in theory, if the top 5 delegates by size were on this council they could collude to exert extra influence in any no decision. Not saying anyone would, but something to think about.
Edit: To save space, confirming my opinion has not changed since for the Tally vote. I'lld add, I think the switchover the MSS will be a good addition for this project!
I just went to mint the pass but saw it is on mainnet only and costs me $6.
I just went to mint the pass but saw it is on mainnet only and costs me $6.
I think this would deter the majority of voters from availing EH, is there plans to deploy on Arbitrum so the cost of participation is lower?
I have serious concerns about enough people opting in if we expect them to make mainnet transactions, it was certainly enough to deter me
The mission of empowering smaller voters and users and give them a unified voice is a good mission. I guess there are multiple ways in which this can be realized, and this is likely just one of the many. Which means, there are both margin of improvements and also margin to iterate in different ways.
But the mission is nonetheless good. Voting "for".
Below are some comments from the UADP:
Our team has had communications in the past around increasing EH’s involvement in both Uniswap and Arbitrum. The general idea around providing “the little guy” with more say in voting decisions is well-founded–but we do have concerns regarding how legitimate this assumption is. Voter apathy often festers when a large group of people have a singular vote. One person begins to believe that their measly single vote will not materially change the direction of a proposal. As a result, that voter ceases voting. A domino effect of apathy leads to lackluster participation, and then we’re back to square one–this is one reason why single-vote NFT models may not be the strongest systems. Equalizing everyone’s voice reduces the marginal incentive to put effort into making informed decisions. This is a phenomenon we could see with EH. The remedy this proposal displays, however, is:
Below are some comments from the UADP:
Our team has had communications in the past around increasing EH’s involvement in both Uniswap and Arbitrum. The general idea around providing “the little guy” with more say in voting decisions is well-founded–but we do have concerns regarding how legitimate this assumption is. Voter apathy often festers when a large group of people have a singular vote. One person begins to believe that their measly single vote will not materially change the direction of a proposal. As a result, that voter ceases voting. A domino effect of apathy leads to lackluster participation, and then we’re back to square one–this is one reason why single-vote NFT models may not be the strongest systems. Equalizing everyone’s voice reduces the marginal incentive to put effort into making informed decisions. This is a phenomenon we could see with EH. The remedy this proposal displays, however, is:
We are very curious to see where the equilibrium point lies. At this point, each voter will likely perceive the cost of voting (which is just effort) to be less than the amount of voting power that they are mobilizing. The more people that vote, the less marginal voting power there is–and vice versa. Since we are also Uniswap stakeholders, seeing the results here will also help inform our decision making on the Uniswap front.
Another concern that we initially had was sybil. The EH team has addressed this well via incorporating the Gitcoin Pass. Generally speaking, the Gitcoin Passport setup isn’t perfect, but we feel that it provides a sufficient enough cost for a sybil attack to be thwarted. We also don’t see the appeal for a large sybil attack on 7M ARB worth of voting power–it’s not large enough in our eyes. The cost to sybil this system simply seems too high to be worth swaying a particular vote.
If I understand correctly, you want to delegate ARB to active voters to increase the number of verified participants and their quality. I really like this idea, it's what we need. However, I don't quite agree with the anti-sybil criteria.
DAO is a decentralized structure that goes beyond the usual web2 services. For example, I don't have a Facebook profile and do not use this social network. But, I can buy this account in a dark store. I don't have Coinbase verification. But, I can buy it to avoid being identified as a sybil. So these are inefficient criteria in my opinion.
I think important criteria for filtering out Sybils would be:
I will gladly vote FOR your proposal, it indeed will make a serious step towards improving the quality of the voting. But please consider my comments, and perhaps you'll manage to improve your proposal before it goes to Tally. Good luck!
I also wanted to add that I like the way you "packaged" this idea. It looks really decent, and I can see that you have enough experience to realize the idea. Thanks for your commitment to make Arbitrum DAO better.
404 DAO will be voting FOR this delegation to Event Horizon, as we see this proposal as a great opportunity to explore the "3rd pillar of governance" as outlined by EH:
3rd pillar of governance, namely citizens (the other two being organizational and individual delegations)
Thank you for your time and detailed answer. I remember your position in the first destination very well, but I am simply stating my position on which I voted down. We have already discussed this and I remained unconvinced even with the changes made. I understand that you sincerely believe in this public good and wish you luck in this experiment. However, I don't see how this experiment will improve the voting situation. The current way of distributing votes on ownership or delegation of an ARB token is rational until we see some other better way in action.
I voted for this proposal at the temp check stage. I believe this proposal addresses a legitimate opportunity/problem (retail participation in governance) with a safe and credible potential solution (creating a pool of governance power that retail is incentivized to use). Excited to observe the experiment!
Savvy DAO is voting FOR Event Horizon's metagov pool.
REASONING:
Savvy DAO is voting FOR Event Horizon's metagov pool.
REASONING:
These enhancements to the feedback highlight how the Event Horizon proposal not only broadens participation but also introduces a scalable and flexible model to adjust voting power, aligning with both immediate and long-term goals of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
See delegate thread
Great recommendation @thedevanshmehta to put the mint page in the proposal. The Snapshot proposal cannot be edited but we will be sure to include it in the Tally proposal.
For everyone else, please feel free to mint a free pass if you haven't already: https://eventhorizon.vote/mint
Appreciate the time you took to post.
We agree that delegation works well. At the same time, we think it's important to both enfranchise the 99% of sidelined retail voters while also boosting the top of funnel for Arbitrum voters and contributors. That's our primary aim with this public good.
Appreciate the time you took to post.
We agree that delegation works well. At the same time, we think it's important to both enfranchise the 99% of sidelined retail voters while also boosting the top of funnel for Arbitrum voters and contributors. That's our primary aim with this public good.
Re: Franchiser contract, as stated in the proposal, the Foundation would handle the forking and auditing (including costs) of the Franchiser contract. This is something we spoke with the Foundation about at the Arbitrum hackathon in person and they expressed they'd be happy to support should the DAO make the ask in the form of this proposal. We'll be sure to share any updates here in the forum post-Snapshot.
Hey @Curia, we appreciate the support. The proposal is actually hosted over at this forum post. If you could repost your feedback over there that would be greatly appreciated, thanks!
We have decided to support the Event Horizon proposal due to its potential to enhance inclusivity within the ArbitrumDAO.
Although our concerns align with those expressed by 404DAO, we wanted to focus particularly on the participation rate within the voter pool. It is crucial to ensure the engagement level is high and based on informed decision rather than noise for the purpose of incentives. The decision-making processes of these voter pass holders should as well align with Arbitrum's core values. Hence, we believe it is important to closely monitoring how this initiative evolves and impacts our ecosystem.
I have voted FOR the proposal, mainly because i like their framing of the three pillars of Arbitrum Governance.
We have the large delegates, the protocols that received the airdrop and small voters. This proposal props up the third pillar, which is currently too insignificant in raw voting power for it to even be considered a pillar.
I have voted FOR the proposal, mainly because i like their framing of the three pillars of Arbitrum Governance.
We have the large delegates, the protocols that received the airdrop and small voters. This proposal props up the third pillar, which is currently too insignificant in raw voting power for it to even be considered a pillar.
That said, i will be tracking the opt in numbers to determine its success. If many users decide to forego minting the pass and its a few people that capture the voting bloc, i will be the first to recommend revoking of the proposal.
Ahead of the onchain tally vote, i would greatly appreciate them making a drive to canvass small voters to mint so there is already a bloc ready to go. They should ideally include minting links in the snapshot and tally draft so that small voters can go and mint directly from there.
It’s worth noting that cp0x is a signer for SpiralDAO, which has historically referenced metagovernance (albeit through very different , non-public good, practices). One might view this as a potential conflict of interests.
@cp0x, as a delegate, it would have been useful and relevant for you to have disclosed this at any point.
In any case, the below points stand on their own merit:
@EzR3aL We understand you’ve done quite well as a solo delegate in AAVE. We commend your success, and understand it was likely a difficult achievement. However, we would implore you to explore the idea that while there has historically been a large barrier to entry for the average person to enter governance (yourself being an exception) that doesnt mean it should always be difficult.
Event Horizon isn’t a delegate in the relevant sense here. In actuality, the voting power that is delegated to Event Horizon is moved by small retail holders. This is all with the ultimate aim of bringing in more voices off the sideline via a non-monetary incentive (a vote multiple) to cut their teeth on voting in a DAO. It would not afford any individual a truly large delegation but it would provide a path by which retail voters can gain exposure and perhaps use their experience as a springboard to track their voting records, have their voice heard, and begin to establish their own personally accrued delegation base, as you have.
The crux here is whether one thinks the DAO should use treasury-owned delegation authority to help empower small Arbitrum DAO citizens ( all while retaining ownership of those funds via revocability). We think the answer to that question is ‘yes’. This is also a rapidly adopted precedent set by several DAOs including Compound and Uniswap which have both conducted treasury-supported underrepresent delegate programs.
@mcfly We would highlight that the delegation is not made to a single entity. The pool is a public-access resource available to everyone in the community. There is no imbalance, as marginalized individual delegates have equal access to the community pool as larger delegates. To give you an example:
If 100 people vote, each voter effectively mobilizes 70,000 ARB. This increase of 70,000 ARB for a small delegate previously wielding 700 ARB (100x multiple on voting power) is substantially more meaningful than for a delegate wielding 7,000,000 ARB (1% increase in VP). So anyone can access, but low capital means voters benefit the most.
By most definitions, this process is decentralized. While the total community vote is represented by a single wallet, the outcome of that single wallet’s vote is determined by many participants in a meta-level vote. We would content that one wallet representing 1,000 voices (each voting independently at the meta-level) is a greater state of decentralization than 10 wallets each representing one person.
Hey @raam
Yes, we can confirm that the pool will also (and currently does) vote on Tally proposals as well!
The Snapshot subscription increases the total number of concurrent proposals we can host on Snapshot at any given moment and on a monthly basis. This is important so that high proposal volume doesn’t prevent the public pool from participating in any votes during high volume days / weeks. Reliability under heavy load is critical.
This seems semantic, but the Foundation noted (perhaps we could call it a suggestion as you stated vs recommendation) to have a contract or multi-sig in-between the franchiser and treasury. We accepted the Foundation’s suggestion via a MS.
However, a MS would effectively directly control the franchiser, making the franchiser redundant. Therefore the natural landing point is MS alone. Which we agree is a good path forward and should be the MSS.
I voted FOR in this proposal. I very much like the idea of increasing participation within the DAO, in general. I also support ratifying at the end of the period instead of automatically renewing, although it signifies some more DAO work as it has to go through a vote again, since it's a trial that should be the more conservative approach.
Anti Sybil approach makes sense - before on-chain vote goes live, is it possible that you share more in-depth details about the Gitcoin Passport implementation? For example:
Blockworks Research will be voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
We really like the idea of empowering long-tail voters to have a more substantial influence in governance, and this seems to be a great potential avenue for further experimentation. The 50K ARB grant allocation also seems sensible.
Having said the above, we would appreciate clarification to a few questions, as well as prefer to see some additions to the proposal before voting on it on Tally:
Lastly, in a previous comment, we suggested (and 404DAO shared the concern) not having the delegation be optimistically extended past the proposed timeline and instead holding another vote to decide whether to continue or not. While we understand Event Horizon’s hesitation to go through the entire governance process to continue the delegation, we believe it’s important for the DAO to ratify or veto the continuation formally. That’s why we’re declaring already that we’ll put up a snapshot vote at the end of the proposed timeline to ratify the continuation of this program.
I support this, and had the same thought about what would happen at continuation and if it should be automatic or not, and likely the answer to me was no.
The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We value the enthusiastic approach Event Horizon has towards governance experimentation with novel approaches. While we’re not entirely sure of the impact such an experiment is going to have, we’ll be voting in favor of the proposal during the temp check because we’re interested in seeing its potential.
We see this whole proposal as an experiment and we want to treat it as such, both in theory and, more importantly, in practice. Instead of just implementing the proposal, letting it run its course, and then coming back to review what was done, we want the DAO to follow along and help Event Horizon iterate where and if needed.
While the people participating in the voter’s block are the ones who decide how the franchiser will vote, the DAO should be in charge of how the experiment is driven forward. To that end, we want to ask Event Horizon to set up a monthly call where they’ll provide a quick update on how the experiment is going and discuss with delegates on how the experiment should proceed.
On another note, as the DAO Advocate for the ARDC, we’ll be assigning the security member of the ARDC to review and assess the possible technical risks associated with implementing the proposal before it moves to an on-chain vote.
Lastly, in a previous comment, we suggested (and 404DAO shared the concern) not having the delegation be optimistically extended past the proposed timeline and instead holding another vote to decide whether to continue or not. While we understand Event Horizon’s hesitation to go through the entire governance process to continue the delegation, we believe it’s important for the DAO to ratify or veto the continuation formally. That's why we're declaring already that we'll put up a snapshot vote at the end of the proposed timeline to ratify the continuation of this program.
I decided to vote FOR this proposal in Snapshot.
Rationale:
I decided to vote FOR this proposal in Snapshot.
Rationale:
The issue being addressed here is essential; particularly in recent months, as someone progressing towards becoming a more effective delegate with limited voting power, I can attest to the validity of the arguments presented. Moreover, the proposed framework for implementation and the background provided, along with the contingency for ARB return to the treasury in case of unfavorable outcomes, represents sound risk management.
Comments:
I will vote in favor off-chain, yet I have some questions before the move to on-chain voting in Tally, where I will confirm my final decision:
I have voted FOR the proposal. I believe it introduces an innovative participation model, allowing small voters to get more involved. As many mentioned, this could expand our prospectives and help us develop and consolidate the ‘3rd pillar of governance’.
The proposal also seems like a safe enough experiment given that:
I have voted FOR the proposal. I believe it introduces an innovative participation model, allowing small voters to get more involved. As many mentioned, this could expand our prospectives and help us develop and consolidate the ‘3rd pillar of governance’.
The proposal also seems like a safe enough experiment given that:
Overall, this proposal can enhance the voting process and integrate new methods, and eventually bring benefits to Arbitrum’s governance as a whole.
Looking forward to seeing this go live!
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR Event Horizon's metagov pool at the Snapshot stage.
For what it's worth, we think that the Arbitrum has pretty solid activity and participation compared to a lot of other DAOs of our size. However, we should aim to keep increasing participation/decentralization, and this proposal could be pretty helpful in achieving this.
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR Event Horizon's metagov pool at the Snapshot stage.
For what it's worth, we think that the Arbitrum has pretty solid activity and participation compared to a lot of other DAOs of our size. However, we should aim to keep increasing participation/decentralization, and this proposal could be pretty helpful in achieving this.
After looking through this thread, we're much more comfortable voting for the prop now that the renewal is clearly non-optimistic. Makes it much better as an experiment - we want the DAO to do a final check in a year from now and make sure the broader goals are being met.
Seconding @BlockworksResearch and @cattin though - would like to see a stronger justification for the 7m ARB delegation, or a reduction of the current ask before the final vote
Part of this proposal is grant funding to deploy on Arbitrum as mainnet gas costs, while deterring Sybil attacks for the moment, are not the ideal state of affairs. And $6 is currently cheap! So yes, we're excited to deploy on Arbitrum where current gas costs are less than $0.01 (thank you EIP-4844)
I have voted "For" this proposal, as I welcome any (reasonable) attempts to boost governance participation. I think through the discussions above EventHorizaonDAO has shown a willingness to be openminded to feedback and their changes to the initial proposal are appreciated. They also have a history with other projects, so there is some experience here that hopefully smaller delegates who participate in this have a positive experience with it.
Bi-annual reporting including KPIs such as voters, participation rate, voters above key threshold amounts (say $1k worth of ARB), etc. – 5k ARB
I have voted "For" this proposal, as I welcome any (reasonable) attempts to boost governance participation. I think through the discussions above EventHorizaonDAO has shown a willingness to be openminded to feedback and their changes to the initial proposal are appreciated. They also have a history with other projects, so there is some experience here that hopefully smaller delegates who participate in this have a positive experience with it.
Bi-annual reporting including KPIs such as voters, participation rate, voters above key threshold amounts (say $1k worth of ARB), etc. – 5k ARB
A suggestion here, since this is the snapshot phase. I personally think quarterly reports would be better, if not monthly. Maybe a hybrid where the monthly reporting gets out some basic metrics and progress updates, then the bi-annual is more comprehensive. I know this type of thing is balancing act between time / reader apathy, but bi-annual reporting feels a little too infrequent to me. Quarterly is probably the sweet-spot.
The Arbitrum Event Horizon Oversight Committee: A committee of 5 existing, notable delegates will be voted on by the Arbitrum community to be given the ability to guide the Event Horizon voting pool on matters of Arbitrum meta-governance. A simple 3/5 majority would allow this committee to veto the decisions of the voter pool within the 24 hours between the closing of the Event Horizon proposal, and the underlying DAO’s proposal.
Is there a delegate size limit to who can apply for this? I ask because, in theory, if the top 5 delegates by size were on this council they could collude to exert extra influence in any no decision. Not saying anyone would, but something to think about.
Edit: To save space, confirming my opinion has not changed since for the Tally vote. I'lld add, I think the switchover the MSS will be a good addition for this project!
I just went to mint the pass but saw it is on mainnet only and costs me $6.
I just went to mint the pass but saw it is on mainnet only and costs me $6.
I think this would deter the majority of voters from availing EH, is there plans to deploy on Arbitrum so the cost of participation is lower?
I have serious concerns about enough people opting in if we expect them to make mainnet transactions, it was certainly enough to deter me
The mission of empowering smaller voters and users and give them a unified voice is a good mission. I guess there are multiple ways in which this can be realized, and this is likely just one of the many. Which means, there are both margin of improvements and also margin to iterate in different ways.
But the mission is nonetheless good. Voting "for".
Below are some comments from the UADP:
Our team has had communications in the past around increasing EH’s involvement in both Uniswap and Arbitrum. The general idea around providing “the little guy” with more say in voting decisions is well-founded–but we do have concerns regarding how legitimate this assumption is. Voter apathy often festers when a large group of people have a singular vote. One person begins to believe that their measly single vote will not materially change the direction of a proposal. As a result, that voter ceases voting. A domino effect of apathy leads to lackluster participation, and then we’re back to square one–this is one reason why single-vote NFT models may not be the strongest systems. Equalizing everyone’s voice reduces the marginal incentive to put effort into making informed decisions. This is a phenomenon we could see with EH. The remedy this proposal displays, however, is:
Below are some comments from the UADP:
Our team has had communications in the past around increasing EH’s involvement in both Uniswap and Arbitrum. The general idea around providing “the little guy” with more say in voting decisions is well-founded–but we do have concerns regarding how legitimate this assumption is. Voter apathy often festers when a large group of people have a singular vote. One person begins to believe that their measly single vote will not materially change the direction of a proposal. As a result, that voter ceases voting. A domino effect of apathy leads to lackluster participation, and then we’re back to square one–this is one reason why single-vote NFT models may not be the strongest systems. Equalizing everyone’s voice reduces the marginal incentive to put effort into making informed decisions. This is a phenomenon we could see with EH. The remedy this proposal displays, however, is:
We are very curious to see where the equilibrium point lies. At this point, each voter will likely perceive the cost of voting (which is just effort) to be less than the amount of voting power that they are mobilizing. The more people that vote, the less marginal voting power there is–and vice versa. Since we are also Uniswap stakeholders, seeing the results here will also help inform our decision making on the Uniswap front.
Another concern that we initially had was sybil. The EH team has addressed this well via incorporating the Gitcoin Pass. Generally speaking, the Gitcoin Passport setup isn’t perfect, but we feel that it provides a sufficient enough cost for a sybil attack to be thwarted. We also don’t see the appeal for a large sybil attack on 7M ARB worth of voting power–it’s not large enough in our eyes. The cost to sybil this system simply seems too high to be worth swaying a particular vote.
If I understand correctly, you want to delegate ARB to active voters to increase the number of verified participants and their quality. I really like this idea, it's what we need. However, I don't quite agree with the anti-sybil criteria.
DAO is a decentralized structure that goes beyond the usual web2 services. For example, I don't have a Facebook profile and do not use this social network. But, I can buy this account in a dark store. I don't have Coinbase verification. But, I can buy it to avoid being identified as a sybil. So these are inefficient criteria in my opinion.
I think important criteria for filtering out Sybils would be:
I will gladly vote FOR your proposal, it indeed will make a serious step towards improving the quality of the voting. But please consider my comments, and perhaps you'll manage to improve your proposal before it goes to Tally. Good luck!
I also wanted to add that I like the way you "packaged" this idea. It looks really decent, and I can see that you have enough experience to realize the idea. Thanks for your commitment to make Arbitrum DAO better.
404 DAO will be voting FOR this delegation to Event Horizon, as we see this proposal as a great opportunity to explore the "3rd pillar of governance" as outlined by EH:
3rd pillar of governance, namely citizens (the other two being organizational and individual delegations)
Thank you for your time and detailed answer. I remember your position in the first destination very well, but I am simply stating my position on which I voted down. We have already discussed this and I remained unconvinced even with the changes made. I understand that you sincerely believe in this public good and wish you luck in this experiment. However, I don't see how this experiment will improve the voting situation. The current way of distributing votes on ownership or delegation of an ARB token is rational until we see some other better way in action.
I voted for this proposal at the temp check stage. I believe this proposal addresses a legitimate opportunity/problem (retail participation in governance) with a safe and credible potential solution (creating a pool of governance power that retail is incentivized to use). Excited to observe the experiment!
Savvy DAO is voting FOR Event Horizon's metagov pool.
REASONING:
Savvy DAO is voting FOR Event Horizon's metagov pool.
REASONING:
These enhancements to the feedback highlight how the Event Horizon proposal not only broadens participation but also introduces a scalable and flexible model to adjust voting power, aligning with both immediate and long-term goals of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
See delegate thread
Great recommendation @thedevanshmehta to put the mint page in the proposal. The Snapshot proposal cannot be edited but we will be sure to include it in the Tally proposal.
For everyone else, please feel free to mint a free pass if you haven't already: https://eventhorizon.vote/mint
Appreciate the time you took to post.
We agree that delegation works well. At the same time, we think it's important to both enfranchise the 99% of sidelined retail voters while also boosting the top of funnel for Arbitrum voters and contributors. That's our primary aim with this public good.
Appreciate the time you took to post.
We agree that delegation works well. At the same time, we think it's important to both enfranchise the 99% of sidelined retail voters while also boosting the top of funnel for Arbitrum voters and contributors. That's our primary aim with this public good.
Re: Franchiser contract, as stated in the proposal, the Foundation would handle the forking and auditing (including costs) of the Franchiser contract. This is something we spoke with the Foundation about at the Arbitrum hackathon in person and they expressed they'd be happy to support should the DAO make the ask in the form of this proposal. We'll be sure to share any updates here in the forum post-Snapshot.
Hey @Curia, we appreciate the support. The proposal is actually hosted over at this forum post. If you could repost your feedback over there that would be greatly appreciated, thanks!
We have decided to support the Event Horizon proposal due to its potential to enhance inclusivity within the ArbitrumDAO.
Although our concerns align with those expressed by 404DAO, we wanted to focus particularly on the participation rate within the voter pool. It is crucial to ensure the engagement level is high and based on informed decision rather than noise for the purpose of incentives. The decision-making processes of these voter pass holders should as well align with Arbitrum's core values. Hence, we believe it is important to closely monitoring how this initiative evolves and impacts our ecosystem.
I have voted FOR the proposal, mainly because i like their framing of the three pillars of Arbitrum Governance.
We have the large delegates, the protocols that received the airdrop and small voters. This proposal props up the third pillar, which is currently too insignificant in raw voting power for it to even be considered a pillar.
I have voted FOR the proposal, mainly because i like their framing of the three pillars of Arbitrum Governance.
We have the large delegates, the protocols that received the airdrop and small voters. This proposal props up the third pillar, which is currently too insignificant in raw voting power for it to even be considered a pillar.
That said, i will be tracking the opt in numbers to determine its success. If many users decide to forego minting the pass and its a few people that capture the voting bloc, i will be the first to recommend revoking of the proposal.
Ahead of the onchain tally vote, i would greatly appreciate them making a drive to canvass small voters to mint so there is already a bloc ready to go. They should ideally include minting links in the snapshot and tally draft so that small voters can go and mint directly from there.
It’s worth noting that cp0x is a signer for SpiralDAO, which has historically referenced metagovernance (albeit through very different , non-public good, practices). One might view this as a potential conflict of interests.
@cp0x, as a delegate, it would have been useful and relevant for you to have disclosed this at any point.
In any case, the below points stand on their own merit:
404 DAO will be voting FOR this delegation to Event Horizon, as we see this proposal as a great opportunity to explore the "3rd pillar of governance" as outlined by EH:
3rd pillar of governance, namely citizens (the other two being organizational and individual delegations)
Additionally, @krst brought up several interesting ideas in his comment back in March, and while we echo that EH does not necessary need to follow those examples, we do agree that this could be the first step for more interesting ideas to be built.
We have decided to support the Event Horizon proposal due to its potential to enhance inclusivity within the ArbitrumDAO.
Although our concerns align with those expressed by 404DAO, we wanted to focus particularly on the participation rate within the voter pool. It is crucial to ensure the engagement level is high and based on informed decision rather than noise for the purpose of incentives. The decision-making processes of these voter pass holders should as well align with Arbitrum's core values. Hence, we believe it is important to closely monitoring how this initiative evolves and impacts our ecosystem.
Overall we are excited about the idea of empowering underrepresented voices within the DAO. With the new adjustment on benchmark thresholds that would have to be met before the vesting of a given ARB allotment, we believe that this is a good starting point for the initiative.
It’s worth noting that cp0x is a signer for SpiralDAO, which has historically referenced metagovernance (albeit through very different , non-public good, practices). One might view this as a potential conflict of interests.
@cp0x, as a delegate, it would have been useful and relevant for you to have disclosed this at any point.
In any case, the below points stand on their own merit:
@Cp0x we have addressed the first two points multiple times already and point 3 is flagrantly incorrect, not what the proposal states, and not how the protocol functions.
We addressed this in several of our responses to you including here:
This point applies equally to all delegates. Large delegates can have tens of millions of dollars of voting power while spending $0. But that’s okay, we want people who care a lot about the protocol to have influence. EH is no different than any other delegate, except we vote 100% of the time and have no voter fatigue. While a traditional delegate can’t read every proposal forever, the EH delegation votes 100% of the time. But those who determine how the EH voter enfranchisement pool votes change every time but are always self selected for being those voters most interested in that particular proposal.
You then agreed here (despite strange framing):
Hello! Thanks for the detailed answers. In many ways, I now support your desire to gain control in other ways.
but also in the questions we asked you (and continue to ask) in our very first response:
We encourage all to reflect on the following questions: Do you believe that the optimal baseline authority of 99% of Arbitrum users should be $0?...”
A notion that access should be 100% gated by capital is foundationally oppositional to the nature of public goods. Which cp0x supports according to your own website
Our commitment to public good values is proven by continued support from people to our grants from Gitcoin Grants 4 up to the present, as well as awards in the Retroactive Public Goods Funding from Optimism
The nature of many (most?) public goods is rooted in affording access to opportunities absent capital. We believe it is hardly unfair to afford a modest sum of governance to the citizens of the arbitrum community, especially given anyone (including yourself) would have equal access.
We’ve addressed the scoping of the proposal several times. Another note, this is in contradiction with your first point. it is impossible for the pool to be both so large it is unfair and so small it doesn’t matter.
That said, we agree that forum participation is the most important part of a DAO's deliberation process. That does not mean that voting is irrelevant or not useful in many other ways. Participation is a pipeline. Event Horizon serves as a new contributor top of funnel as it gives new users an easy and seamless way to vote with meaningful authority, all in a unified front end. Once users get used to voicing their opinion in the forum of a vote, they can feel more comfortable starting to express longer, more in-depth opinions on the forum. This is the first step to getting people to contribute to discussion on the forum. Voter enfranchisement and forum participation are not mutually exclusive, they are self-reaffirming.
This is a fundamental misunderstanding both of Event Horizon and of crypto in general. Voter Pass NFT mints and DAO voting is permissionless: anyone can vote. We do not and cannot control who mints or votes. And if there was any "funny business" going on, that's what the oversight committee is for, a committee which has full veto power hardcoded in the form of the multi-sig implementation.
A public good is accessible to everyone. This ‘problem’ is what equalizes your first ‘problem’ if everyone can vote with their own authority and the pool, existing voters who have paid for their ARB aren’t ‘losing’ anything. They are able to vote with their existing delegation + the pool. Those without existing ARB would only vote with the pool.
@cp0x we respect your decision to vote against and have provided as much context as we can for you at this point. Feel free to reflect on the proposal and discourse above or maintain your current perspective!
Voted FOR this proposal as previously explained .
I believe the Event Horizon proposal is worth supporting for a few key reasons:
First, it represents a genuine attempt to get more Arbitrum token holders actively participating in governance. The implicit delegation model leverages game theory to incentivize participation in an innovative way. If successful, it could uncover some best practices that benefit Arbitrum's governance long-term.
I believe the Event Horizon proposal is worth supporting for a few key reasons:
First, it represents a genuine attempt to get more Arbitrum token holders actively participating in governance. The implicit delegation model leverages game theory to incentivize participation in an innovative way. If successful, it could uncover some best practices that benefit Arbitrum's governance long-term.
Second, Event Horizon has already demonstrated with other major protocols that they can deliver strong engagement metrics like 30%+ voter participation. So while this would be a new experiment for our ecosystem, the team has a track record we can evaluate.
Third, the oversight committee provides a safeguard to veto any delegated votes if issues arise. This helps mitigate potential risks as we test out this new approach.
Some thoughtful suggestions have come in to clarify aspects of the proposal. The majority of those have been addressed, so I believe this experiment is worth pursuing. No governance system is perfect, and we should embrace opportunities to creatively evolve ours. A 1-year trial of this model could provide valuable insights.
For these reasons, on behalf of the ARB holders who delegated their voting power to me, I support this proposal at the Snapshot stage.
We believe that Event Horizon has sufficiently incorporated feedback and the most recent version of this proposal is ready to be put up on Snapshot to gather more opinions from delegates.
Voting is scheduled to start at 5pm EST (April 16th) and can be found here.
...no ser I am not tbh
I’m not really sure why I am getting summoned by you ser every time there is a discussion on compensation
you are the ArbitrumDao paymaster ser :laughing:
I’m not really sure why I am getting summoned by you ser every time there is a discussion on compensation
you are the ArbitrumDao paymaster ser :laughing:
In this case i summoned you for the role you've played with LTIPP and to see whether their baselining against it made sense. I like the suggestion you provide of just giving the breakdown as 1k ARB per FTE rather than a lumpsum benchmarked against LTIPP which is indeed harder to understand here
First, I’d like to note that this is my personal opinion and not L2BEAT’s governance team.
I've discussed this idea with Event Horizon on a number of occasions, and below is a summary of my thoughts on the matter, which I'd like to add to the discussion.
First, I’d like to note that this is my personal opinion and not L2BEAT’s governance team.
I've discussed this idea with Event Horizon on a number of occasions, and below is a summary of my thoughts on the matter, which I'd like to add to the discussion.
First of all, I like all experimentation with governance systems. I think one of the best things about crypto governance is that we can experiment with decision-making at a meaningful scale and with meaningful stake.
At the same time, I also have a strong opinion that voting itself is not the essence of this decision-making, but only one step of it, mostly optional. It is a much broader process consisting of idea generation, spreading awareness, stimulating debate, building consensus, etc. Voting itself in crypto is quite simple and frictionless, my personal thesis is that governance problems stem from deficiencies in these other aspects, not from so-called "voter apathy" itself.
That’s why I don’t think that simply “giving a voice to retail holders en masse” in itself is going to positively impact governance in a meaningful way. I’am fully open to be proven wrong though. :)
Having said that, I think that what Event Horizon is proposing could be a good foundation on which to build further governance experiments.
For example I can imagine this pool to be used only for voting early as a signal. 5M votes is not big enough to swing most votes, but it would be enough to signal support if those votes were cast early, for example in the first 48 hours after the proposal is published (and if some quorum is not reached in those 48hrs the pool abstains and the opportunity is lost) . It incentivizes the proposer to raise awareness of people participating in that pool early on, at the same time people participating in the pool have incentive to pay attention to what’s happening cause if they don’t vote early they can’t vote at all.
Another example is a very interesting concept already utilized in Starknet as a Builders Council (https://governance.starknet.io/councils/builders'_council). This is a pool with huge voting power given to the elected Builders representatives from Starknet ecosystem. I personally treat it as a kind of a Builders Union that can effectively veto governance decisions if strongly disagress with it. Similar concept is being explored by Optimism with their Anticapture Commision (https://gov.optimism.io/t/anticapture-commission/6889).
Obviously what I have given above are just examples of what is possible. I'm not suggesting that this particular proposal should follow any of these routes, I just wanted to demonstrate that this is a valid experiment that has been tried in one form or another in other ecosystems, so we should not be afraid of it, but rather try to experiment with it ourselves.
What's most important to me (and what I think is currently missing from this proposal) are mechanisms that will accompany this voting pool to ensure that the community behind it is actively and meaningfully involved in governance. But I think we can safely start by agreeing to set up the pool and let Event Horizon expand and experiment with these mechanics later.
On the technical side I have three suggestions:
I'm not really sure why I am getting summoned by you ser every time there is a discussion on compensation.
Anyway.
Gonna provide a feedback on comp part, will provide a feedback on the proposal itself if/when it will go to vote.
In here we have a cost of 50k arb that should cover
I'm not really sure why I am getting summoned by you ser every time there is a discussion on compensation.
Anyway.
Gonna provide a feedback on comp part, will provide a feedback on the proposal itself if/when it will go to vote.
In here we have a cost of 50k arb that should cover
Am I correct?
We are basically talking of 50k/4/12 = 1k arb per month per member more or less. Or 240 arb per week. Which effectively is 13 times less a council member of ltip. Seems fair at first glance I guess. (also tbh the work of council member is pratically way higher in time terms compared to the 7.5 weeks mentioned, but every role with high responsabilities usually carries more time commitment than what was planned, and this is true not only in our dao and in life as well).
If what i mentioned above is correct, could be worth to just mention the specific figures (aka say 50k for 1y for 4 fte which translates in a monthly payment of 1040 arb per person). So is easier at first glance to understand the costs.
The final version of the proposal is as follows:
The final version of the proposal is as follows:
Event Horizon is a public good. It is a public-access metagovernance block. With the aim of enfranchising the tens of thousands of small voters, this proposal suggests we delegate (not grant) 7,000,000 ARB to a public access-voter block subject to a 1 year renewal. This delegation gets mobilized by Voter Pass and Gitcoin Pass holders functionally giving underrepresented DAO citizens multiplied voting power and therefore more incentive to express their voices. The Gitcoin DAO has recently passed a proposal supporting Event Horizon, thereby making our Citizen Enfranchisement pool the #6 delegate on Gitcoin.
We also request a grant of 50k ARB to help the team maintain this public good across this 1 year experiment in addition to retroactively awarding the team for the fully-functional product thus far built out of pocket for the Arbitrum community over the past several months.
Today, typical Arbitrum voter participation rate floats in the low single digits. However, there are thousands of individual voters who participate in each vote despite having effectively no meaningful say. They should be rewarded with a voice. Moreover, there are likely tens of thousands more incredibly talented community members who are very capable of adding to the collective cognition of the ecosystem, but simply lack the capital means to have a voice and are left discouraged from voting at all. Not voting when you only have, say, $500 worth of ARB doesn’t make sense, it’s a drop in the bucket. Sitting out governance proposals is, unfortunately, the rational decision but collectively makes everyone worse off. The strength of the DAO is directly related to the number of participants having their voices heard by the community. The governance platform and vote multiple that Event Horizon gives to these citizens incentivizes greater participation: our average participation rate is 30%.
Arbitrum Citizens interested in governance may mint a free, soul-bound Voter Pass which allows them to take part in mobilizing this voter enfranchisement pool subject to an additional Gitcoin Pass requirement to prevent sybil attacks to be implemented soon after delegation. As detailed further below, this model:
DAOs today rely exclusively on individuals and company entities to serve as network delegates. However, this isn’t the only option. While individual delegates certainly add incredible value to the Arbitrum Ecosystem, so would a governance allotment dedicated to the greater body of smaller citizen participants.
In this regard, Event Horizon slots into the Arbitrum ecosystem in a similar fashion to a standard delegate. However, rather than the block voting based on the decision of one individual, it votes with the collective cognition of hundreds of individual voter pass holders.
This serves two functions:
One of the greatest barriers to participation is a lack of voice due to lack of capital. Implicit delegation and public access governance changes this. Implicit Delegation is a model by which the full public governance block mobilizes in favor of the consensus of those who do vote, thereby implicitly delegating the authority of those who don’t vote to those who do.
When participation is low… each voter receives a larger slice of the public access pie. This means the fewer people there are voting, the more incentive there is for someone new to come and participate.
When participation is high… there are more voters splitting the same pie, however, citizen participation is high, which is a win for the ecosystem.
Implicit Delegation represents an effort to offer a new paradigm around means of influence. A shift from today’s entirely capital-centric to a more citizen-friendly, participation-centric model.
Where Direct Governance allocates influence along the lines of capital, and Explicit Delegation allocates influence along the lines of popularity (which often reflects capital), Implicit Delegation allocates influence to those who care most: people showing up to vote. Because the carrot is governance voice itself, implicit delegation attracts governance-interested citizens, not capital-interested citizens; more on that below.
Because the entirety of the block is always mobilized, those who are most vested are rewarded for their participation by having a larger share of the voting pie. In this regard, Event Horizon’s model leans into a systemic lack of participation to create a solution.
Delegation rationale
7,000,000 ARB would place the Event Horizon community as the 15th largest delegate. Based upon significant dialogue with existing Arbitrum delegates and stakeholders, we think this places a fair amount of power into the 3rd pillar of governance, namely citizens (the other two being organizational and individual delegations) without being large enough to flip any typical proposal.
This proposal reflects two of Arbitrum’s core mission values:
Grant rationale
We propose 25K Arbitrum as an initial grant sum as retroactive support for the product having already been built and operated within the Arbitrum ecosystem. This includes pass minting, automated proposal duplication, automated proposal passing, as well as a fully functional metagovernance UI and dashboard and associated server costs.
We will also have to pay for a Snapshot subscription which is $6k / year which will come out of the retroactive part of this grant.
Moving forward the continued sum of 25K ARB would be streamed to the Event Horizon treasury through a Hedgey streaming contract that can be revoked at any time so as to maintain the incentive for continued support. The expectation would be that the Event Horizon Team
While token rewards for participation hold legitimate merit and are an intuitive remedy for low turnout, it has limitations.
Added Thought Capital: in line with the notion above, there are likely thousands, of community members each holding both strong ideas and valuable contributions for the ecosystem, but simply lack enough voice to justify participation. Through Implicit Delegation, any community member of the Arbitrum ecosystem has an opportunity to have their voice heard, bringing thousands more minds and ideas to the surface.
Past Performance
The above is not just theory. The Event Horizon community is already active on Ethereum providing meta-governing public goods to Uniswap, AAVE, Compound, ShapeShift, and of course, Arbitrum. In fact, in several recent Uniswap votes, the Event Horizon community was the 10th largest voter in the Uniswap Ecosystem. Event Horizon has also recently voted as the 8th largest delegate in recent Aave votes. Gitcoin DAO just voted to make Event Horizon the 6th largest delegate in the DAO via delegation.
While there is still quite a gap between Event Horizon and the larger delegates in the larger DAOs, interestingly enough this position serves as a line of demarcation between individual delegates above, and citizens below. This dynamic does, however, highlight a call to action. Raise the long tail a bit, and bring in more voices. Sure, voting isn’t the full picture of DAO decision making, but it’s a great place to start. Individual, organization AND citizen delegations are all valuable and mutually inclusive, three symbiotic pillars for a strong ecosystem.
Since its inception just a few months ago, the Event Horizon protocol has processed nearly 2500 metagovernance proposals and placed over $23,000,000 of governance authority and enfranchisement directly into the hands of the citizen voter, a feat not seen anywhere else in the DAO space. This is $23,000,000 of voice amplification for the low-capital, high-conviction citizen which would never have been possible prior to the Event Horizon's product. Across all proposals for which the Event Horizon Community has participated, the community’s cumulative voter footprint is on pace to exceed $50,000,000.
Some more metrics worth highlighting:
Number of Meta-Proposals Passed ~250 Our community members have participated in and passed over 200 meta-governance proposals, each corresponding to Arbitrum or other DAO proposals.
Voter Participation: >30% Over thirty percent of our community members have participated in our meta-governance proposals. Some participants have voted as many as 63 times in under 5 months. Check out the latest info on our leaderboard: EventHorizon.vote/leaderboard
Average Authority Mobilized per Participating Passholder: >$130,000 (and counting) For the cost of $3 in gas, each participating passholder has mobilized an average of just over $100,000 in Uniswap and AAVE authority governance authority across all meta-governance proposals passed.
Average Authority Mobilized Multiple: >44,000x (and growing) The average pass holder minted their voter pass for ~$3 in gas. When compared to the $130,000 in average authority mobilized, each member has mobilized over 40,000x their gas cost of admission in blue-chip governance authority.
| Step 1 – Duplication: Once a delegation is established, Event Horizon begins automatically duplicating all base DAO (in this case Arbitrum) proposals within its own voting portal.
| Step 2 – Metagovernance: Retail voters may mint a free voter pass and begin voting to decide how the retail enfranchisement pool is mobilized in the base DAO proposal.
| Step 3 – Base DAO Voting: 24 hours prior to the closure of the base DAO proposal, the Event Horizon metagovernance proposal closes. Event Horizon then automatically pushes the consensus decision established by the retail community during the metagovernance proposal into the base DAO proposal.
The primary step to implementation would be the delegation and grant of ARB to the EventHorizonArbitrum.eth. This will be a multi-sig SAFE to allow for future evolution and decentralization. The initial structure will be a 1 of 2 wallet with one signature being the Event Horizon team / protocol which will automatically vote in support of the passholder consensus and the other will be a ⅗ signature maintained by the oversight committee members which could be used to veto discretionarily. The delegation will use the Franchiser contract explained below. After initial delegation from the DAO Event Horizon handles everything from there. Event Horizon will facilitate and maintain all elements of the pool from pass minting to metagovernance. Again, this delegation would not be a grant and funds would remain in the DAO-controlled wallet. Consider us a delegate + service provider like any of the other talented delegates and service providers currently supporting the Arbitrum ecosystem.
In order to implement this proposal, it is required that we create a DAO-controlled Franchiser contract. The contract owner would be the DAO timelock and it would allow the DAO the power to delegate and undelegate tokens that it sends from the treasury to the Franchiser. We suggest that the Foundation aids in the creation of this contract in order to create an official and safe implementation, though we can likely fork the Trail of Bits audited Uniswap Labs implementation [github] of the same concept. If this proposal passes Snapshot, we request that the Foundation take the time to fork the contract and hire an auditor to check the implementation.
The contract has simple functions:
Fund: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate to a single address
FundMany: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate any amount to multiple addresses
Recall: allows DAO to pull back funds from Franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from a single delegate.
RecallMany: allows DAO to pull back funds from franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from multiple delegates.
It is worth noting that all tokens sent to the Franchiser will remain a part of the DAO’s balance sheet as it has full-control over the contract. The delegated tokens never leave the DAO’s ownership.
Forking and auditing this franchiser contract would be useful for Arbitrum’s version of retroactive delegation (updated version to be posted shortly). Crucially, we view both this proposal (delegating to EH’s citizen enfranchisement pool) and the above retroactive delegation proposal (boosting active delegates in the 10k-1m ARB range) as two sides of the same coin of the community’s call for creative ways to boost citizen participation and governance decision making processes.
The Arbitrum Event Horizon Oversight Committee: A committee of 5 existing, notable delegates will be voted on by the Arbitrum community to be given the ability to guide the Event Horizon voting pool on matters of Arbitrum meta-governance. A simple 3/5 majority would allow this committee to veto the decisions of the voter pool within the 24 hours between the closing of the Event Horizon proposal, and the underlying DAO’s proposal.
Sybil Considerations: it is important to note that the delegated ARB is by a large margin a minority voter amount. Any potential risk of Sybil influence over the public-access block would under almost all conditions not amount to a sum of authority that would be capable of passing a vote absent incredibly significant broader support from other delegates and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem participants. E.g. a rogue vote is virtually impossible.
That being said, we will be implementing Gitcoin Passport requirements for Arbitrum metagovernance shortly after initial delegation to mitigate this risk.
Yes
No
Abstain
Thank you for sharing the final version of the proposal! I particularly like the framing around this not giving increased governance power to a small cohort of people but instead propping up many individual voices, the third pillar of arbitrum governance after protocols and large delegates. Here are some initial questions I have;
Is there a cut-off in delegation size for voters to get the event horizon boost? Could even a delegate with 5-10 million ARB mint the pass and influence the pool? Does amount of ARB matter at all in how Event Horizon votes or is it number of users only?
My second question is on the pass itself - I feel it greatly weakens the proposal by making it opt-in, rather than by default getting the boost. Since it's a one year pilot, I would personally prefer taking a snapshot of all the already active but small wallets on ARB and by default including those in the Event Horizon pool. If a later wallet wants to become part of the pool, they can undergo the verification checks you describe. I would also recommend checking out the latest in identity systems that don't require any user interaction, such as Trusta Labs and Gitcoins new Collusion Detection Model.
Regarding the compensation for implementation, those look fine to me. It is likely that @JoJo and others like @coinflip who were actually involved in LTIPP may have an issue with you baselining your pay against LTIPP and would prefer a ground up calculation of projected costs.
It’s exciting to see this idea getting feedback from other delegates! 404 DAO has talked numerous times with the Event Horizon team and we are aligned with their mission to increase participation in governance across the industry. Our team has also worked with Event Horizon at GovHack on a similar governance participation experiment inspired by the program Stable Labs presented in the Uniswap DAO. It is now in the RFC stage.
Luckily, Arbitrum DAO benefits from a passionate community and it has numerous active delegates. But like @krst said, one of the best things about crypto is the ability to meaningfully experiment with governance and we think this proposal is a great way to start one of those experiments with Arbitrum.
It’s exciting to see this idea getting feedback from other delegates! 404 DAO has talked numerous times with the Event Horizon team and we are aligned with their mission to increase participation in governance across the industry. Our team has also worked with Event Horizon at GovHack on a similar governance participation experiment inspired by the program Stable Labs presented in the Uniswap DAO. It is now in the RFC stage.
Luckily, Arbitrum DAO benefits from a passionate community and it has numerous active delegates. But like @krst said, one of the best things about crypto is the ability to meaningfully experiment with governance and we think this proposal is a great way to start one of those experiments with Arbitrum.
Before seeing this go to a snapshot vote, we’d like to see a few clarification and edits made to the proposal:
It was mentioned in a response that the oversight committee only has the power to overrule and vote Abstain. We agree with this direction and it's an important detail that should be added to the proposal. As well as just clarifying that the committee’s scope and powers only pertain to Arbitrum DAO votes, since Event Horizon is involved in several DAOs. Other responsibilities that we’d propose is notifying the DAO in the event that the delegation should be revoked and monitoring for any sybil activity or potential capture. If there are any other responsibilities or powers of the oversight committee, these should be added as well.
We would like clarification on if Gitcoin Passport will be used. Currently, the proposal is quite vague on whether this will be implemented. With mint passes being subsidized we do think it's important to include and would like to see details on how long it would take the Event Horizon team to implement this in the case of a successful vote.
We agree with @krst that this experiment should not be optimistically approved after 1 year but rather should return to a DAO vote to be continued. If it is successful and proper reporting/documentation is provided to the DAO, we anticipate it being extended easily.
The technical requirements for the DAO to delegate to Event Horizon should also be included in the proposal. As well as costs, timeline, and actions required from the Foundation. Mentioned in this response:
In order to implement this proposal, it is required that we create a DAO-controlled Franchiser contract.
While we are normally very supportive of milestone based proposals and KPIs, we’d like to better understand how easy/difficult increasing the delegation amount over time is for the DAO. Is this something that will require a vote after each milestone? If that is the case we’d recommend just starting out with the 5m delegation.
Lastly, we would like to see a more detailed timeline of events & steps required to make this happen. For example, if the snapshot vote for this goes up on March 25th; when will elections for the oversight committee start and how long is the application period? If possible we'd like to see the committee chosen before the onchain vote so that those details can be included, or at a minimum, chosen before the actual delegation takes place. This would likely add an additional 2 weeks before the onchain vote even goes live, and then another ~17 days before the delegation is actually executed. Given this, we’d also like to see an updated timeline for the KPI’s presented (depending on answer to number 5).
Looking forward to hopefully seeing these updates and any other suggestions from delegates! We appreciate the time and thought the Event Horizon team has put into this idea.
@Krst and @404DAO thank you both for your support and thorough feedback.
@krst We strongly agree that this is the foundation for broader evolution. A process we’re excited to kick off and will tap into your opinions for as we proceed ( if you’re willing of course ). This is in line with Event Horizon’s mission to improve governance both through and beyond our core tech.
A couple of questions:
@Krst and @404DAO thank you both for your support and thorough feedback.
@krst We strongly agree that this is the foundation for broader evolution. A process we’re excited to kick off and will tap into your opinions for as we proceed ( if you’re willing of course ). This is in line with Event Horizon’s mission to improve governance both through and beyond our core tech.
A couple of questions:
I understand that the mechanism/protocol itself is supposed to be public good and is provided for free, but I want to make sure that there is an incentive for Event Horizon to keep working on it and experimenting with it on Arbitrum, so that it creates value for the DAO and does not just exist there.
While I’m not against larger pool size, I don’t think it’s necessary.
While we are normally very supportive of milestone based proposals and KPIs, we’d like to better understand how easy/difficult increasing the delegation amount over time is for the DAO. Is this something that will require a vote after each milestone? If that is the case we’d recommend just starting out with the 5m delegation.
I would prefer that this voting power not be optimistically extended beyond an initial period, at least not in the beginning. Rather, we should have a vote in a year from now if this experiment was meaningful.
We agree with @krst that this experiment should not be optimistically approved after 1 year but rather should return to a DAO vote to be continued. If it is successful and proper reporting/documentation is provided to the DAO, we anticipate it being extended easily.
@404DAO to address some of your additional comments not yet addressed in this post. Following your numbering of the comments:
Yes, flagging for revocation would be be a right of the council. While anyone could bring this up at any point in the DAO for a vote, it coming from the oversight committee would carry with it more social capital
Yes, we will add implementation specifics shortly. We are actively working with the Gitcoin team, so this is a confirmed consideration.
That can be added.
We would like the snapshot to pass first as it highlights to the candidates that this is a worthwhile proposal to submit their candidacy for. We believe that this election process could happen concurrently with the launch of the on-chain vote such that both are completed in roughly the same order, rather than staggered.
We appreciate the enthusiasm to think about every element of this proposal. We don't think this is the right place to discus the pros and cons of delegation as a governance mechanism in this and every DAO. We encourage you to start a new thread to get to unpack the best ways of thinking about delegation in general.
To answer your question as it pertains to Event Horizon: yes, the DAO can undelegate from us the same way any delegator can undelegate to an delegatee.
Thanks for taking the initiative, but I'm still against this proposal.
Let's talk about delegation then. Those who received their racks and did not return anything - this is not entirely true - they returned their time and other resources to attract delegations to them. And they present their decisions to those who delegated to them. In the case of a delegation from the DAO, will the DAO have the right to withdraw its delegations if it considers a particular person to have voted incorrectly? Who will decide this?
1 & 2) We're hearing that 5m ARB is too small from several people now but hesitate to ask for more. What do you think would be an amount of ARB that would make more of an impact?
As far as transaction fees are concerned, when you vote through Event Horizon, you vote via Snapshot which is free. Event Horizon votes on chain and pays with the protocol's own ETH.
This point applies equally to all delegates. Large delegates can have tens of millions of dollars of voting power while spending $0. But that's okay, we want people who care a lot about the protocol to have influence. EH is no different than any other delegate, except we vote 100% of the time and have no voter fatigue. While a traditional delegate can't read every proposal forever, the EH delegation votes 100% of the time. But those who determine how the EH voter enfranchisement pool votes change every time but are always self selected for being those voters most interested in that particular proposal.
I may not have expressed myself quite correctly regarding the number of delegated tokens. The bottom line was what we want to achieve:
Thanks for the proposal @EventHorizonDAO I'd be interested in seeing the results of this trial in the ArbitrumDAO. Some questions:
a. Can you help us understand the rationale behind the 5M ARB ask? b. Do you have any suggestions on how the technical implementation for delegating ARB would look like? c. Would the community be starting a delegation thread and communicating rationale for it's votes? d. Would you apply for the delegate incentive program?
We appreciate the questions, as it draws attention to some areas needing further explanation:
a. Can you help us understand the rationale behind the 5M ARB ask?
We appreciate the questions, as it draws attention to some areas needing further explanation:
a. Can you help us understand the rationale behind the 5M ARB ask?
5M $ARB would make us the 23rd largest delegate. We initially requested 2m, but some delegates expressed concerns that if the delegation was too small to move the needle, there would be no point. Just recently @cp0x asked us to raise it again. Some delegates expressed interest in placing us as the 15th largest delegate (7.3m $ARB) as a sweet spot. We'll await further feedback before moving up from 5m.
b. Do you have any suggestions on how the technical implementation for delegating ARB would look like?
in a similar vain @cp0x asks:
[Function: delegate(address delegate) has only 1 parameter, so it’s impossible to distribute votes to more than 1 address.
the DAO would only have to delegate to one address, the EH address so that won't be an issue.
To answer @jengajojo's question (b) about the technical details: Fractional delegation isn't possible, and is one of the reasons why in Uniswap's successful retroactive delegation proposal they spun up a Franchiser contract. So mirroring our GovHack Arbitrum hackathon proposal we will amend this proposal with the technical details as follows:
In order to implement this proposal, it is required that we create a DAO-controlled Franchiser contract. The contract owner would be the DAO timelock and it would allow the DAO the power to delegate and undelegate tokens that it sends from the treasury to the Franchiser. We suggest that the Foundation aids in the creation of this contract in order to create an official and safe implementation, though we can likely fork the Trail of Bits audited Uniswap Labs implementation [github] of the same concept. If this proposal passes Snapshot, we request that the Foundation take the time to fork the contract and hire an auditor to check the implementation.
The contract has simple functions:
-Fund: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate to a single address
-FundMany: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate any amount to multiple addresses
-Recall: allows DAO to pull back funds from Franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from a single delegate.
-RecallMany: allows DAO to pull back funds from franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from multiple delegates.
It is worth noting that all tokens sent to the Franchiser will remain a part of the DAO’s balance sheet as it has full-control over the contract. The delegated tokens never leave the DAO’s ownership.
Forking and auditing this franchiser contract would be useful for Arbitrum's version of retroactive delegation (updated version to be posted shortly). Crucially, we view both this proposal (delegating to EH's retail enfranchisement pool) and the above retroactive delegation proposal (boosting active delegates in the 50k-1m ARB range) as two sides of the same coin of the community's call for creative ways to boost retail participation and governance decision making processes.
c. Would the community be starting a delegation thread and communicating rationale for its votes?
Given that the community is not 1 individual, this wouldn't be clear cut. Conversations would be public in our discord (we just yesterday spun up the infrastructure to have each meta-governance proposal get its own forum post in our Discord). We could explore in the future having a community representative aim to summarize these debates as the community grows.
d. Would you apply for the delegate incentive program?
We don't have any plans to, no.
A final point I want to add is how we view this proposal as fitting into the broader Arbitrum DAO strategy:
A good framing for this proposal is, EH serves as a sort of "delegate bootcamp" whereby small retail participants, enticed by a vote multiple, will finally come out of the woodwork to not only start voting, but to start debating these proposals to make their decision-making process more legible (h/t to @krst for this connection). Once reputation and a moderate delegation is built up, these delegates can get fed through the pipeline into the retroactive delegation program (50k-1m ARB). So both proposals aim to improve the leaky pipeline that is delegate onboarding. I hope this expansion of the overarching vision helps.
And one more technical nuance:
Function: delegate(address delegatee)
This function has only 1 parameter, so it's impossible to distribute votes to more than 1 address.
This is a great initiative, I'll support it. Empowering lower capital users with a voice can allow us to diversify our views.
As discussed with the EventHorizon team, a key point here will be how to identify and involve other people so that we can get out of our DAO-bubble.
This is a great initiative, I'll support it. Empowering lower capital users with a voice can allow us to diversify our views.
As discussed with the EventHorizon team, a key point here will be how to identify and involve other people so that we can get out of our DAO-bubble.
1 year seems also reasonable to decide if this initiative is worth continuing, I would expect the op to prepare a (bimonthly?) report on attendance, participation, analysis of votes etc
404 DAO will be voting FOR this delegation to Event Horizon, as we see this proposal as a great opportunity to explore the "3rd pillar of governance" as outlined by EH:
3rd pillar of governance, namely citizens (the other two being organizational and individual delegations)
Additionally, @krst brought up several interesting ideas in his comment back in March, and while we echo that EH does not necessary need to follow those examples, we do agree that this could be the first step for more interesting ideas to be built.
We have decided to support the Event Horizon proposal due to its potential to enhance inclusivity within the ArbitrumDAO.
Although our concerns align with those expressed by 404DAO, we wanted to focus particularly on the participation rate within the voter pool. It is crucial to ensure the engagement level is high and based on informed decision rather than noise for the purpose of incentives. The decision-making processes of these voter pass holders should as well align with Arbitrum's core values. Hence, we believe it is important to closely monitoring how this initiative evolves and impacts our ecosystem.
Overall we are excited about the idea of empowering underrepresented voices within the DAO. With the new adjustment on benchmark thresholds that would have to be met before the vesting of a given ARB allotment, we believe that this is a good starting point for the initiative.
It’s worth noting that cp0x is a signer for SpiralDAO, which has historically referenced metagovernance (albeit through very different , non-public good, practices). One might view this as a potential conflict of interests.
@cp0x, as a delegate, it would have been useful and relevant for you to have disclosed this at any point.
In any case, the below points stand on their own merit:
@Cp0x we have addressed the first two points multiple times already and point 3 is flagrantly incorrect, not what the proposal states, and not how the protocol functions.
We addressed this in several of our responses to you including here:
This point applies equally to all delegates. Large delegates can have tens of millions of dollars of voting power while spending $0. But that’s okay, we want people who care a lot about the protocol to have influence. EH is no different than any other delegate, except we vote 100% of the time and have no voter fatigue. While a traditional delegate can’t read every proposal forever, the EH delegation votes 100% of the time. But those who determine how the EH voter enfranchisement pool votes change every time but are always self selected for being those voters most interested in that particular proposal.
You then agreed here (despite strange framing):
Hello! Thanks for the detailed answers. In many ways, I now support your desire to gain control in other ways.
but also in the questions we asked you (and continue to ask) in our very first response:
We encourage all to reflect on the following questions: Do you believe that the optimal baseline authority of 99% of Arbitrum users should be $0?...”
A notion that access should be 100% gated by capital is foundationally oppositional to the nature of public goods. Which cp0x supports according to your own website
Our commitment to public good values is proven by continued support from people to our grants from Gitcoin Grants 4 up to the present, as well as awards in the Retroactive Public Goods Funding from Optimism
The nature of many (most?) public goods is rooted in affording access to opportunities absent capital. We believe it is hardly unfair to afford a modest sum of governance to the citizens of the arbitrum community, especially given anyone (including yourself) would have equal access.
We’ve addressed the scoping of the proposal several times. Another note, this is in contradiction with your first point. it is impossible for the pool to be both so large it is unfair and so small it doesn’t matter.
That said, we agree that forum participation is the most important part of a DAO's deliberation process. That does not mean that voting is irrelevant or not useful in many other ways. Participation is a pipeline. Event Horizon serves as a new contributor top of funnel as it gives new users an easy and seamless way to vote with meaningful authority, all in a unified front end. Once users get used to voicing their opinion in the forum of a vote, they can feel more comfortable starting to express longer, more in-depth opinions on the forum. This is the first step to getting people to contribute to discussion on the forum. Voter enfranchisement and forum participation are not mutually exclusive, they are self-reaffirming.
This is a fundamental misunderstanding both of Event Horizon and of crypto in general. Voter Pass NFT mints and DAO voting is permissionless: anyone can vote. We do not and cannot control who mints or votes. And if there was any "funny business" going on, that's what the oversight committee is for, a committee which has full veto power hardcoded in the form of the multi-sig implementation.
A public good is accessible to everyone. This ‘problem’ is what equalizes your first ‘problem’ if everyone can vote with their own authority and the pool, existing voters who have paid for their ARB aren’t ‘losing’ anything. They are able to vote with their existing delegation + the pool. Those without existing ARB would only vote with the pool.
@cp0x we respect your decision to vote against and have provided as much context as we can for you at this point. Feel free to reflect on the proposal and discourse above or maintain your current perspective!
Voted FOR this proposal as previously explained .
I believe the Event Horizon proposal is worth supporting for a few key reasons:
First, it represents a genuine attempt to get more Arbitrum token holders actively participating in governance. The implicit delegation model leverages game theory to incentivize participation in an innovative way. If successful, it could uncover some best practices that benefit Arbitrum's governance long-term.
I believe the Event Horizon proposal is worth supporting for a few key reasons:
First, it represents a genuine attempt to get more Arbitrum token holders actively participating in governance. The implicit delegation model leverages game theory to incentivize participation in an innovative way. If successful, it could uncover some best practices that benefit Arbitrum's governance long-term.
Second, Event Horizon has already demonstrated with other major protocols that they can deliver strong engagement metrics like 30%+ voter participation. So while this would be a new experiment for our ecosystem, the team has a track record we can evaluate.
Third, the oversight committee provides a safeguard to veto any delegated votes if issues arise. This helps mitigate potential risks as we test out this new approach.
Some thoughtful suggestions have come in to clarify aspects of the proposal. The majority of those have been addressed, so I believe this experiment is worth pursuing. No governance system is perfect, and we should embrace opportunities to creatively evolve ours. A 1-year trial of this model could provide valuable insights.
For these reasons, on behalf of the ARB holders who delegated their voting power to me, I support this proposal at the Snapshot stage.
We believe that Event Horizon has sufficiently incorporated feedback and the most recent version of this proposal is ready to be put up on Snapshot to gather more opinions from delegates.
Voting is scheduled to start at 5pm EST (April 16th) and can be found here.
...no ser I am not tbh
I’m not really sure why I am getting summoned by you ser every time there is a discussion on compensation
you are the ArbitrumDao paymaster ser :laughing:
I’m not really sure why I am getting summoned by you ser every time there is a discussion on compensation
you are the ArbitrumDao paymaster ser :laughing:
In this case i summoned you for the role you've played with LTIPP and to see whether their baselining against it made sense. I like the suggestion you provide of just giving the breakdown as 1k ARB per FTE rather than a lumpsum benchmarked against LTIPP which is indeed harder to understand here
First, I’d like to note that this is my personal opinion and not L2BEAT’s governance team.
I've discussed this idea with Event Horizon on a number of occasions, and below is a summary of my thoughts on the matter, which I'd like to add to the discussion.
First, I’d like to note that this is my personal opinion and not L2BEAT’s governance team.
I've discussed this idea with Event Horizon on a number of occasions, and below is a summary of my thoughts on the matter, which I'd like to add to the discussion.
First of all, I like all experimentation with governance systems. I think one of the best things about crypto governance is that we can experiment with decision-making at a meaningful scale and with meaningful stake.
At the same time, I also have a strong opinion that voting itself is not the essence of this decision-making, but only one step of it, mostly optional. It is a much broader process consisting of idea generation, spreading awareness, stimulating debate, building consensus, etc. Voting itself in crypto is quite simple and frictionless, my personal thesis is that governance problems stem from deficiencies in these other aspects, not from so-called "voter apathy" itself.
That’s why I don’t think that simply “giving a voice to retail holders en masse” in itself is going to positively impact governance in a meaningful way. I’am fully open to be proven wrong though. :)
Having said that, I think that what Event Horizon is proposing could be a good foundation on which to build further governance experiments.
For example I can imagine this pool to be used only for voting early as a signal. 5M votes is not big enough to swing most votes, but it would be enough to signal support if those votes were cast early, for example in the first 48 hours after the proposal is published (and if some quorum is not reached in those 48hrs the pool abstains and the opportunity is lost) . It incentivizes the proposer to raise awareness of people participating in that pool early on, at the same time people participating in the pool have incentive to pay attention to what’s happening cause if they don’t vote early they can’t vote at all.
Another example is a very interesting concept already utilized in Starknet as a Builders Council (https://governance.starknet.io/councils/builders'_council). This is a pool with huge voting power given to the elected Builders representatives from Starknet ecosystem. I personally treat it as a kind of a Builders Union that can effectively veto governance decisions if strongly disagress with it. Similar concept is being explored by Optimism with their Anticapture Commision (https://gov.optimism.io/t/anticapture-commission/6889).
Obviously what I have given above are just examples of what is possible. I'm not suggesting that this particular proposal should follow any of these routes, I just wanted to demonstrate that this is a valid experiment that has been tried in one form or another in other ecosystems, so we should not be afraid of it, but rather try to experiment with it ourselves.
What's most important to me (and what I think is currently missing from this proposal) are mechanisms that will accompany this voting pool to ensure that the community behind it is actively and meaningfully involved in governance. But I think we can safely start by agreeing to set up the pool and let Event Horizon expand and experiment with these mechanics later.
On the technical side I have three suggestions:
I'm not really sure why I am getting summoned by you ser every time there is a discussion on compensation.
Anyway.
Gonna provide a feedback on comp part, will provide a feedback on the proposal itself if/when it will go to vote.
In here we have a cost of 50k arb that should cover
I'm not really sure why I am getting summoned by you ser every time there is a discussion on compensation.
Anyway.
Gonna provide a feedback on comp part, will provide a feedback on the proposal itself if/when it will go to vote.
In here we have a cost of 50k arb that should cover
Am I correct?
We are basically talking of 50k/4/12 = 1k arb per month per member more or less. Or 240 arb per week. Which effectively is 13 times less a council member of ltip. Seems fair at first glance I guess. (also tbh the work of council member is pratically way higher in time terms compared to the 7.5 weeks mentioned, but every role with high responsabilities usually carries more time commitment than what was planned, and this is true not only in our dao and in life as well).
If what i mentioned above is correct, could be worth to just mention the specific figures (aka say 50k for 1y for 4 fte which translates in a monthly payment of 1040 arb per person). So is easier at first glance to understand the costs.
The final version of the proposal is as follows:
The final version of the proposal is as follows:
Event Horizon is a public good. It is a public-access metagovernance block. With the aim of enfranchising the tens of thousands of small voters, this proposal suggests we delegate (not grant) 7,000,000 ARB to a public access-voter block subject to a 1 year renewal. This delegation gets mobilized by Voter Pass and Gitcoin Pass holders functionally giving underrepresented DAO citizens multiplied voting power and therefore more incentive to express their voices. The Gitcoin DAO has recently passed a proposal supporting Event Horizon, thereby making our Citizen Enfranchisement pool the #6 delegate on Gitcoin.
We also request a grant of 50k ARB to help the team maintain this public good across this 1 year experiment in addition to retroactively awarding the team for the fully-functional product thus far built out of pocket for the Arbitrum community over the past several months.
Today, typical Arbitrum voter participation rate floats in the low single digits. However, there are thousands of individual voters who participate in each vote despite having effectively no meaningful say. They should be rewarded with a voice. Moreover, there are likely tens of thousands more incredibly talented community members who are very capable of adding to the collective cognition of the ecosystem, but simply lack the capital means to have a voice and are left discouraged from voting at all. Not voting when you only have, say, $500 worth of ARB doesn’t make sense, it’s a drop in the bucket. Sitting out governance proposals is, unfortunately, the rational decision but collectively makes everyone worse off. The strength of the DAO is directly related to the number of participants having their voices heard by the community. The governance platform and vote multiple that Event Horizon gives to these citizens incentivizes greater participation: our average participation rate is 30%.
Arbitrum Citizens interested in governance may mint a free, soul-bound Voter Pass which allows them to take part in mobilizing this voter enfranchisement pool subject to an additional Gitcoin Pass requirement to prevent sybil attacks to be implemented soon after delegation. As detailed further below, this model:
DAOs today rely exclusively on individuals and company entities to serve as network delegates. However, this isn’t the only option. While individual delegates certainly add incredible value to the Arbitrum Ecosystem, so would a governance allotment dedicated to the greater body of smaller citizen participants.
In this regard, Event Horizon slots into the Arbitrum ecosystem in a similar fashion to a standard delegate. However, rather than the block voting based on the decision of one individual, it votes with the collective cognition of hundreds of individual voter pass holders.
This serves two functions:
One of the greatest barriers to participation is a lack of voice due to lack of capital. Implicit delegation and public access governance changes this. Implicit Delegation is a model by which the full public governance block mobilizes in favor of the consensus of those who do vote, thereby implicitly delegating the authority of those who don’t vote to those who do.
When participation is low… each voter receives a larger slice of the public access pie. This means the fewer people there are voting, the more incentive there is for someone new to come and participate.
When participation is high… there are more voters splitting the same pie, however, citizen participation is high, which is a win for the ecosystem.
Implicit Delegation represents an effort to offer a new paradigm around means of influence. A shift from today’s entirely capital-centric to a more citizen-friendly, participation-centric model.
Where Direct Governance allocates influence along the lines of capital, and Explicit Delegation allocates influence along the lines of popularity (which often reflects capital), Implicit Delegation allocates influence to those who care most: people showing up to vote. Because the carrot is governance voice itself, implicit delegation attracts governance-interested citizens, not capital-interested citizens; more on that below.
Because the entirety of the block is always mobilized, those who are most vested are rewarded for their participation by having a larger share of the voting pie. In this regard, Event Horizon’s model leans into a systemic lack of participation to create a solution.
Delegation rationale
7,000,000 ARB would place the Event Horizon community as the 15th largest delegate. Based upon significant dialogue with existing Arbitrum delegates and stakeholders, we think this places a fair amount of power into the 3rd pillar of governance, namely citizens (the other two being organizational and individual delegations) without being large enough to flip any typical proposal.
This proposal reflects two of Arbitrum’s core mission values:
Grant rationale
We propose 25K Arbitrum as an initial grant sum as retroactive support for the product having already been built and operated within the Arbitrum ecosystem. This includes pass minting, automated proposal duplication, automated proposal passing, as well as a fully functional metagovernance UI and dashboard and associated server costs.
We will also have to pay for a Snapshot subscription which is $6k / year which will come out of the retroactive part of this grant.
Moving forward the continued sum of 25K ARB would be streamed to the Event Horizon treasury through a Hedgey streaming contract that can be revoked at any time so as to maintain the incentive for continued support. The expectation would be that the Event Horizon Team
While token rewards for participation hold legitimate merit and are an intuitive remedy for low turnout, it has limitations.
Added Thought Capital: in line with the notion above, there are likely thousands, of community members each holding both strong ideas and valuable contributions for the ecosystem, but simply lack enough voice to justify participation. Through Implicit Delegation, any community member of the Arbitrum ecosystem has an opportunity to have their voice heard, bringing thousands more minds and ideas to the surface.
Past Performance
The above is not just theory. The Event Horizon community is already active on Ethereum providing meta-governing public goods to Uniswap, AAVE, Compound, ShapeShift, and of course, Arbitrum. In fact, in several recent Uniswap votes, the Event Horizon community was the 10th largest voter in the Uniswap Ecosystem. Event Horizon has also recently voted as the 8th largest delegate in recent Aave votes. Gitcoin DAO just voted to make Event Horizon the 6th largest delegate in the DAO via delegation.
While there is still quite a gap between Event Horizon and the larger delegates in the larger DAOs, interestingly enough this position serves as a line of demarcation between individual delegates above, and citizens below. This dynamic does, however, highlight a call to action. Raise the long tail a bit, and bring in more voices. Sure, voting isn’t the full picture of DAO decision making, but it’s a great place to start. Individual, organization AND citizen delegations are all valuable and mutually inclusive, three symbiotic pillars for a strong ecosystem.
Since its inception just a few months ago, the Event Horizon protocol has processed nearly 2500 metagovernance proposals and placed over $23,000,000 of governance authority and enfranchisement directly into the hands of the citizen voter, a feat not seen anywhere else in the DAO space. This is $23,000,000 of voice amplification for the low-capital, high-conviction citizen which would never have been possible prior to the Event Horizon's product. Across all proposals for which the Event Horizon Community has participated, the community’s cumulative voter footprint is on pace to exceed $50,000,000.
Some more metrics worth highlighting:
Number of Meta-Proposals Passed ~250 Our community members have participated in and passed over 200 meta-governance proposals, each corresponding to Arbitrum or other DAO proposals.
Voter Participation: >30% Over thirty percent of our community members have participated in our meta-governance proposals. Some participants have voted as many as 63 times in under 5 months. Check out the latest info on our leaderboard: EventHorizon.vote/leaderboard
Average Authority Mobilized per Participating Passholder: >$130,000 (and counting) For the cost of $3 in gas, each participating passholder has mobilized an average of just over $100,000 in Uniswap and AAVE authority governance authority across all meta-governance proposals passed.
Average Authority Mobilized Multiple: >44,000x (and growing) The average pass holder minted their voter pass for ~$3 in gas. When compared to the $130,000 in average authority mobilized, each member has mobilized over 40,000x their gas cost of admission in blue-chip governance authority.
| Step 1 – Duplication: Once a delegation is established, Event Horizon begins automatically duplicating all base DAO (in this case Arbitrum) proposals within its own voting portal.
| Step 2 – Metagovernance: Retail voters may mint a free voter pass and begin voting to decide how the retail enfranchisement pool is mobilized in the base DAO proposal.
| Step 3 – Base DAO Voting: 24 hours prior to the closure of the base DAO proposal, the Event Horizon metagovernance proposal closes. Event Horizon then automatically pushes the consensus decision established by the retail community during the metagovernance proposal into the base DAO proposal.
The primary step to implementation would be the delegation and grant of ARB to the EventHorizonArbitrum.eth. This will be a multi-sig SAFE to allow for future evolution and decentralization. The initial structure will be a 1 of 2 wallet with one signature being the Event Horizon team / protocol which will automatically vote in support of the passholder consensus and the other will be a ⅗ signature maintained by the oversight committee members which could be used to veto discretionarily. The delegation will use the Franchiser contract explained below. After initial delegation from the DAO Event Horizon handles everything from there. Event Horizon will facilitate and maintain all elements of the pool from pass minting to metagovernance. Again, this delegation would not be a grant and funds would remain in the DAO-controlled wallet. Consider us a delegate + service provider like any of the other talented delegates and service providers currently supporting the Arbitrum ecosystem.
In order to implement this proposal, it is required that we create a DAO-controlled Franchiser contract. The contract owner would be the DAO timelock and it would allow the DAO the power to delegate and undelegate tokens that it sends from the treasury to the Franchiser. We suggest that the Foundation aids in the creation of this contract in order to create an official and safe implementation, though we can likely fork the Trail of Bits audited Uniswap Labs implementation [github] of the same concept. If this proposal passes Snapshot, we request that the Foundation take the time to fork the contract and hire an auditor to check the implementation.
The contract has simple functions:
Fund: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate to a single address
FundMany: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate any amount to multiple addresses
Recall: allows DAO to pull back funds from Franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from a single delegate.
RecallMany: allows DAO to pull back funds from franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from multiple delegates.
It is worth noting that all tokens sent to the Franchiser will remain a part of the DAO’s balance sheet as it has full-control over the contract. The delegated tokens never leave the DAO’s ownership.
Forking and auditing this franchiser contract would be useful for Arbitrum’s version of retroactive delegation (updated version to be posted shortly). Crucially, we view both this proposal (delegating to EH’s citizen enfranchisement pool) and the above retroactive delegation proposal (boosting active delegates in the 10k-1m ARB range) as two sides of the same coin of the community’s call for creative ways to boost citizen participation and governance decision making processes.
The Arbitrum Event Horizon Oversight Committee: A committee of 5 existing, notable delegates will be voted on by the Arbitrum community to be given the ability to guide the Event Horizon voting pool on matters of Arbitrum meta-governance. A simple 3/5 majority would allow this committee to veto the decisions of the voter pool within the 24 hours between the closing of the Event Horizon proposal, and the underlying DAO’s proposal.
Sybil Considerations: it is important to note that the delegated ARB is by a large margin a minority voter amount. Any potential risk of Sybil influence over the public-access block would under almost all conditions not amount to a sum of authority that would be capable of passing a vote absent incredibly significant broader support from other delegates and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem participants. E.g. a rogue vote is virtually impossible.
That being said, we will be implementing Gitcoin Passport requirements for Arbitrum metagovernance shortly after initial delegation to mitigate this risk.
Yes
No
Abstain
Thank you for sharing the final version of the proposal! I particularly like the framing around this not giving increased governance power to a small cohort of people but instead propping up many individual voices, the third pillar of arbitrum governance after protocols and large delegates. Here are some initial questions I have;
Is there a cut-off in delegation size for voters to get the event horizon boost? Could even a delegate with 5-10 million ARB mint the pass and influence the pool? Does amount of ARB matter at all in how Event Horizon votes or is it number of users only?
My second question is on the pass itself - I feel it greatly weakens the proposal by making it opt-in, rather than by default getting the boost. Since it's a one year pilot, I would personally prefer taking a snapshot of all the already active but small wallets on ARB and by default including those in the Event Horizon pool. If a later wallet wants to become part of the pool, they can undergo the verification checks you describe. I would also recommend checking out the latest in identity systems that don't require any user interaction, such as Trusta Labs and Gitcoins new Collusion Detection Model.
Regarding the compensation for implementation, those look fine to me. It is likely that @JoJo and others like @coinflip who were actually involved in LTIPP may have an issue with you baselining your pay against LTIPP and would prefer a ground up calculation of projected costs.
It’s exciting to see this idea getting feedback from other delegates! 404 DAO has talked numerous times with the Event Horizon team and we are aligned with their mission to increase participation in governance across the industry. Our team has also worked with Event Horizon at GovHack on a similar governance participation experiment inspired by the program Stable Labs presented in the Uniswap DAO. It is now in the RFC stage.
Luckily, Arbitrum DAO benefits from a passionate community and it has numerous active delegates. But like @krst said, one of the best things about crypto is the ability to meaningfully experiment with governance and we think this proposal is a great way to start one of those experiments with Arbitrum.
It’s exciting to see this idea getting feedback from other delegates! 404 DAO has talked numerous times with the Event Horizon team and we are aligned with their mission to increase participation in governance across the industry. Our team has also worked with Event Horizon at GovHack on a similar governance participation experiment inspired by the program Stable Labs presented in the Uniswap DAO. It is now in the RFC stage.
Luckily, Arbitrum DAO benefits from a passionate community and it has numerous active delegates. But like @krst said, one of the best things about crypto is the ability to meaningfully experiment with governance and we think this proposal is a great way to start one of those experiments with Arbitrum.
Before seeing this go to a snapshot vote, we’d like to see a few clarification and edits made to the proposal:
It was mentioned in a response that the oversight committee only has the power to overrule and vote Abstain. We agree with this direction and it's an important detail that should be added to the proposal. As well as just clarifying that the committee’s scope and powers only pertain to Arbitrum DAO votes, since Event Horizon is involved in several DAOs. Other responsibilities that we’d propose is notifying the DAO in the event that the delegation should be revoked and monitoring for any sybil activity or potential capture. If there are any other responsibilities or powers of the oversight committee, these should be added as well.
We would like clarification on if Gitcoin Passport will be used. Currently, the proposal is quite vague on whether this will be implemented. With mint passes being subsidized we do think it's important to include and would like to see details on how long it would take the Event Horizon team to implement this in the case of a successful vote.
We agree with @krst that this experiment should not be optimistically approved after 1 year but rather should return to a DAO vote to be continued. If it is successful and proper reporting/documentation is provided to the DAO, we anticipate it being extended easily.
The technical requirements for the DAO to delegate to Event Horizon should also be included in the proposal. As well as costs, timeline, and actions required from the Foundation. Mentioned in this response:
In order to implement this proposal, it is required that we create a DAO-controlled Franchiser contract.
While we are normally very supportive of milestone based proposals and KPIs, we’d like to better understand how easy/difficult increasing the delegation amount over time is for the DAO. Is this something that will require a vote after each milestone? If that is the case we’d recommend just starting out with the 5m delegation.
Lastly, we would like to see a more detailed timeline of events & steps required to make this happen. For example, if the snapshot vote for this goes up on March 25th; when will elections for the oversight committee start and how long is the application period? If possible we'd like to see the committee chosen before the onchain vote so that those details can be included, or at a minimum, chosen before the actual delegation takes place. This would likely add an additional 2 weeks before the onchain vote even goes live, and then another ~17 days before the delegation is actually executed. Given this, we’d also like to see an updated timeline for the KPI’s presented (depending on answer to number 5).
Looking forward to hopefully seeing these updates and any other suggestions from delegates! We appreciate the time and thought the Event Horizon team has put into this idea.
@Krst and @404DAO thank you both for your support and thorough feedback.
@krst We strongly agree that this is the foundation for broader evolution. A process we’re excited to kick off and will tap into your opinions for as we proceed ( if you’re willing of course ). This is in line with Event Horizon’s mission to improve governance both through and beyond our core tech.
A couple of questions:
@Krst and @404DAO thank you both for your support and thorough feedback.
@krst We strongly agree that this is the foundation for broader evolution. A process we’re excited to kick off and will tap into your opinions for as we proceed ( if you’re willing of course ). This is in line with Event Horizon’s mission to improve governance both through and beyond our core tech.
A couple of questions:
I understand that the mechanism/protocol itself is supposed to be public good and is provided for free, but I want to make sure that there is an incentive for Event Horizon to keep working on it and experimenting with it on Arbitrum, so that it creates value for the DAO and does not just exist there.
While I’m not against larger pool size, I don’t think it’s necessary.
While we are normally very supportive of milestone based proposals and KPIs, we’d like to better understand how easy/difficult increasing the delegation amount over time is for the DAO. Is this something that will require a vote after each milestone? If that is the case we’d recommend just starting out with the 5m delegation.
I would prefer that this voting power not be optimistically extended beyond an initial period, at least not in the beginning. Rather, we should have a vote in a year from now if this experiment was meaningful.
We agree with @krst that this experiment should not be optimistically approved after 1 year but rather should return to a DAO vote to be continued. If it is successful and proper reporting/documentation is provided to the DAO, we anticipate it being extended easily.
@404DAO to address some of your additional comments not yet addressed in this post. Following your numbering of the comments:
Yes, flagging for revocation would be be a right of the council. While anyone could bring this up at any point in the DAO for a vote, it coming from the oversight committee would carry with it more social capital
Yes, we will add implementation specifics shortly. We are actively working with the Gitcoin team, so this is a confirmed consideration.
That can be added.
We would like the snapshot to pass first as it highlights to the candidates that this is a worthwhile proposal to submit their candidacy for. We believe that this election process could happen concurrently with the launch of the on-chain vote such that both are completed in roughly the same order, rather than staggered.
We appreciate the enthusiasm to think about every element of this proposal. We don't think this is the right place to discus the pros and cons of delegation as a governance mechanism in this and every DAO. We encourage you to start a new thread to get to unpack the best ways of thinking about delegation in general.
To answer your question as it pertains to Event Horizon: yes, the DAO can undelegate from us the same way any delegator can undelegate to an delegatee.
Thanks for taking the initiative, but I'm still against this proposal.
Let's talk about delegation then. Those who received their racks and did not return anything - this is not entirely true - they returned their time and other resources to attract delegations to them. And they present their decisions to those who delegated to them. In the case of a delegation from the DAO, will the DAO have the right to withdraw its delegations if it considers a particular person to have voted incorrectly? Who will decide this?
1 & 2) We're hearing that 5m ARB is too small from several people now but hesitate to ask for more. What do you think would be an amount of ARB that would make more of an impact?
As far as transaction fees are concerned, when you vote through Event Horizon, you vote via Snapshot which is free. Event Horizon votes on chain and pays with the protocol's own ETH.
This point applies equally to all delegates. Large delegates can have tens of millions of dollars of voting power while spending $0. But that's okay, we want people who care a lot about the protocol to have influence. EH is no different than any other delegate, except we vote 100% of the time and have no voter fatigue. While a traditional delegate can't read every proposal forever, the EH delegation votes 100% of the time. But those who determine how the EH voter enfranchisement pool votes change every time but are always self selected for being those voters most interested in that particular proposal.
I may not have expressed myself quite correctly regarding the number of delegated tokens. The bottom line was what we want to achieve:
Thanks for the proposal @EventHorizonDAO I'd be interested in seeing the results of this trial in the ArbitrumDAO. Some questions:
a. Can you help us understand the rationale behind the 5M ARB ask? b. Do you have any suggestions on how the technical implementation for delegating ARB would look like? c. Would the community be starting a delegation thread and communicating rationale for it's votes? d. Would you apply for the delegate incentive program?
We appreciate the questions, as it draws attention to some areas needing further explanation:
a. Can you help us understand the rationale behind the 5M ARB ask?
We appreciate the questions, as it draws attention to some areas needing further explanation:
a. Can you help us understand the rationale behind the 5M ARB ask?
5M $ARB would make us the 23rd largest delegate. We initially requested 2m, but some delegates expressed concerns that if the delegation was too small to move the needle, there would be no point. Just recently @cp0x asked us to raise it again. Some delegates expressed interest in placing us as the 15th largest delegate (7.3m $ARB) as a sweet spot. We'll await further feedback before moving up from 5m.
b. Do you have any suggestions on how the technical implementation for delegating ARB would look like?
in a similar vain @cp0x asks:
[Function: delegate(address delegate) has only 1 parameter, so it’s impossible to distribute votes to more than 1 address.
the DAO would only have to delegate to one address, the EH address so that won't be an issue.
To answer @jengajojo's question (b) about the technical details: Fractional delegation isn't possible, and is one of the reasons why in Uniswap's successful retroactive delegation proposal they spun up a Franchiser contract. So mirroring our GovHack Arbitrum hackathon proposal we will amend this proposal with the technical details as follows:
In order to implement this proposal, it is required that we create a DAO-controlled Franchiser contract. The contract owner would be the DAO timelock and it would allow the DAO the power to delegate and undelegate tokens that it sends from the treasury to the Franchiser. We suggest that the Foundation aids in the creation of this contract in order to create an official and safe implementation, though we can likely fork the Trail of Bits audited Uniswap Labs implementation [github] of the same concept. If this proposal passes Snapshot, we request that the Foundation take the time to fork the contract and hire an auditor to check the implementation.
The contract has simple functions:
-Fund: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate to a single address
-FundMany: allows the DAO to send tokens to contract and delegate any amount to multiple addresses
-Recall: allows DAO to pull back funds from Franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from a single delegate.
-RecallMany: allows DAO to pull back funds from franchiser effectively undelegating and returning tokens to treasury from multiple delegates.
It is worth noting that all tokens sent to the Franchiser will remain a part of the DAO’s balance sheet as it has full-control over the contract. The delegated tokens never leave the DAO’s ownership.
Forking and auditing this franchiser contract would be useful for Arbitrum's version of retroactive delegation (updated version to be posted shortly). Crucially, we view both this proposal (delegating to EH's retail enfranchisement pool) and the above retroactive delegation proposal (boosting active delegates in the 50k-1m ARB range) as two sides of the same coin of the community's call for creative ways to boost retail participation and governance decision making processes.
c. Would the community be starting a delegation thread and communicating rationale for its votes?
Given that the community is not 1 individual, this wouldn't be clear cut. Conversations would be public in our discord (we just yesterday spun up the infrastructure to have each meta-governance proposal get its own forum post in our Discord). We could explore in the future having a community representative aim to summarize these debates as the community grows.
d. Would you apply for the delegate incentive program?
We don't have any plans to, no.
A final point I want to add is how we view this proposal as fitting into the broader Arbitrum DAO strategy:
A good framing for this proposal is, EH serves as a sort of "delegate bootcamp" whereby small retail participants, enticed by a vote multiple, will finally come out of the woodwork to not only start voting, but to start debating these proposals to make their decision-making process more legible (h/t to @krst for this connection). Once reputation and a moderate delegation is built up, these delegates can get fed through the pipeline into the retroactive delegation program (50k-1m ARB). So both proposals aim to improve the leaky pipeline that is delegate onboarding. I hope this expansion of the overarching vision helps.
And one more technical nuance:
Function: delegate(address delegatee)
This function has only 1 parameter, so it's impossible to distribute votes to more than 1 address.
This is a great initiative, I'll support it. Empowering lower capital users with a voice can allow us to diversify our views.
As discussed with the EventHorizon team, a key point here will be how to identify and involve other people so that we can get out of our DAO-bubble.
This is a great initiative, I'll support it. Empowering lower capital users with a voice can allow us to diversify our views.
As discussed with the EventHorizon team, a key point here will be how to identify and involve other people so that we can get out of our DAO-bubble.
1 year seems also reasonable to decide if this initiative is worth continuing, I would expect the op to prepare a (bimonthly?) report on attendance, participation, analysis of votes etc
Thanks for taking the initiative, but I'm still against this proposal.
cp0x vote AGAINST this proposal
Hello! Thanks for the detailed answers. In many ways, I now support your desire to gain control in other ways. I still have questions after your comment:
Welcome aboard :saluting_face:
Thank you for the feedback, mate!
1.) it’s important to note that this shouldn’t open any new process for standard delegations. Event Horizon isn’t a single delegate, nor even an institution, it’s tooling. It’s a protocol with automated structures already built and functioning to allow a large body of retail voters to collectively vote. To this end, we have to ask ourselves how much do we care about the long tail 99% of Arbitrum users and evaluate how we have calibrated the voice made available to them thus far.
Thank you for the feedback, mate!
1.) it’s important to note that this shouldn’t open any new process for standard delegations. Event Horizon isn’t a single delegate, nor even an institution, it’s tooling. It’s a protocol with automated structures already built and functioning to allow a large body of retail voters to collectively vote. To this end, we have to ask ourselves how much do we care about the long tail 99% of Arbitrum users and evaluate how we have calibrated the voice made available to them thus far.
2.) This serves a different function than an underrepresented delegates iniative.
A. It targets a much larger swath of individuals and retail voters. While the under rep. proposal offered delegation to five or so individuals. Event Horizon can scale to thousands of retailers.
B. It’s a strong avenue to attract new voters/future delegates. Where the under represented proposal exclusively targeted a handful of existing participants, voter enfranchisement pools are a perpetual pubic good and attractant for new entrants.
Both proposals have their merits, but when it comes to a dedicated pool with voting passes the number of vote participants is infinitely scalable, while a targeted under rep. initiative only captures a comparably small sum of existing (not new delegates)
We’re really interested in this idea of using the DAO to delegate more tokens into the active voting pool through community governance itself.
Have spoken with the Event Horizon team before on Uniswap related matters, I think this is definitely worth digging into. Personally, I think extrapolating this out and setting aside x million $ARB for underrepresented delegates is the operationally best move. Many delegates are in similar situations where they have lots of unique value add, yet with little to no delegation. However individual delegation posts seem unscalable, as if this passes, surely dozens of more underrepresented delegates will also attempt to go through governance.
We’re really interested in this idea of using the DAO to delegate more tokens into the active voting pool through community governance itself.
Have spoken with the Event Horizon team before on Uniswap related matters, I think this is definitely worth digging into. Personally, I think extrapolating this out and setting aside x million $ARB for underrepresented delegates is the operationally best move. Many delegates are in similar situations where they have lots of unique value add, yet with little to no delegation. However individual delegation posts seem unscalable, as if this passes, surely dozens of more underrepresented delegates will also attempt to go through governance.
A lot of this thought process is from the Stable Lab team’s Delegate to Underrepresented Delegates post that delegated a total 10m UNI to various active but underrepresented delegates. Tagging @Matt_StableLab from the Stable Lab team for thoughts? (I know Doo spearheaded the Uniswap post but couldn’t find his username here)
Would love to hear what people think?
We should underpin this discussion with the question of how much say does the retail community of Arbitrum deserve absent wealth or capital. If you believe the optimal native voting power is $0, then we may not come to an agreement. If we can agree that each member of this community should have some voice then it becomes a discussion of quantity
To your points:
We should underpin this discussion with the question of how much say does the retail community of Arbitrum deserve absent wealth or capital. If you believe the optimal native voting power is $0, then we may not come to an agreement. If we can agree that each member of this community should have some voice then it becomes a discussion of quantity
To your points:
- You can also, regardless of your financial capabilities, receive delegations from other users. Therefore, there is a way that does not involve delegation from the DAO itself.
While it's true that there is a way, that does not mean it is an efficient or the only way. This also isn’t an argument against a retail enfranchisement pool, both models can and should exist simultaneously.
The model you point to is status quo and has proven limited. Hardly any lower capital users participate. Back of the envelope calculations from 10 recent Snapshots shows an average voter participation rate of 2%. We don't know what is optimal but it certainly isn't 2%. Delegation does nothing to raise this figure.
We also have what we call ‘Satoshi Wallet’ delegations or delegations which have been placed long ago with an absent or inactive delegator. The wallet being delegated to is often inactive itself. This is complete entropy of governance potential. Through the EH model, delegation is mailable and 100% efficient/productive as EH votes 100% of the time.
It also adds unnecessarily high barriers for our community to explore the ideas of the majority of its members who are currently sidelined due to no meaningful say. Most people (despite potentially having great ideas) won't contribute as they have no voice. Having to win a delegation popularity contest in order to have their ideas surfaced is sub-optimal. Delegation, while crucial, in practice isn't a meritocracy. Further, under the current system, someone with $1m and no talent can buy and start voting in a serious way. In fact, in today's model, even a single misaligned moderately wealthy agent poses a greater potential risk than the totality of all retail voters within the EH voter enfranchisement pool.
We see our retail enfranchisement public good voter pool as complementary to boosting individual underrepresented delegates. We're simultaneously calling for an elevation of small to medium sized delegates in a parallel proposal we workshopped at the Arbitrum GovHack hackathon posted here.
Could you see how the EH vote gives smaller sums to many retail voices vs large sums to specific delegates? We view this as a slight boost to the little voices, and our GovHack proposal as a moderate boost to the medium sized voters. Both aim at elevating voices at all stages of the delegate pipeline.
Eg someone with $50 not voting at all today is encouraged to mint a free pass and start participating because they claim let’s say $10,000 of voice through the public enfranchisement pool. Their votes and thoughts allow them to stand out and qualify for an under represented delegation of 1m arb as an individual later on. At present the first step to meaningfully participating is so high it functions as a wall, not a stair step. We need to add progressive growth opportunities to effectively allow stair stepped onboarding from community member to meaningful vote participant. Our vision:
Forum —> Enfranchisement Pool —> Individual / Under Represented Delegation
Do you agree just because there is a single path today, this doesn’t mean there aren’t better or alternative paths?
- Delegation incentives are a good idea and can be considered separately from this proposal. In turn, I want to say that compensation only with voting rights is not suitable for everyone, since voting takes quite a lot of time for analysis and discussion, and there are also significant gas costs.
While it is true that some delegates may be justified in receiving monetary compensation, that doesn't mean that all voters should. Many are eager to just have a voice (we’re already seeing this).
So, while those seeking capital may not resonate with this opportunity, that doesn’t invalidate it for the many who are interested absent payment. In fact, those who are eager to have their voices heard in spite of not receiving capital, should be propped up.
We’d also argue those willing out of enthusiasm, not payment are some of the most ecosystem valuable. It also is significant to note that this adds participation directly, without inflationary rewards. This is also not mutually exclusive with alternative pay to vote model proposals.
Can you agree that just because some people require monetary compensation, that doesn’t mean all do?
- In order to be trusted with their votes, you must somehow earn a reputation - either with money, or with your useful activity for the community.
Regarding trust, the oversight committee ensures safe alignment by well respected already existing delegates who have earned their reputation. Put another way, delegates who have earned trust in your preferred way, will have oversight over the EH voter enfranchisement pool.
In general, fears of trust and alignment should be addressed with oversight, delegation scaling, and constitutional systems, not by a broad stroke fear of retail enfranchisement.
Would you agree that a single misaligned, moderately wealthy agent (unbound by any oversight committee) is a more significant risk than the total sum of the enfranchisement pool bound by an oversight committee?
We encourage all to reflect on the following questions:
To start, 404 DAO believes governance is most effective when it is equitable and representative.
The current state of most DAO governance, including Arbitrum’s, is top-heavy to major players. In an ideal state, governance is comprised of different parties who represent constituents of the ecosystem. With greater distribution of voting power, governance is more capture resistant and invites robust conversation among delegates.
To start, 404 DAO believes governance is most effective when it is equitable and representative.
The current state of most DAO governance, including Arbitrum’s, is top-heavy to major players. In an ideal state, governance is comprised of different parties who represent constituents of the ecosystem. With greater distribution of voting power, governance is more capture resistant and invites robust conversation among delegates.
This is an interesting attempt at rectifying some of these pain points for everyday users and small token holders.
However, the litmus test for any meta-governance proposal should be inherently stronger than a typical proposal (IE: something like a STIP or other growth oriented proposals) because it is seeking ongoing authority rather than just incremental resources. STIPs can be experiments of scaled risk and measured consequence, but setting precedent around granting governance authority is closer to pandora's box. Therefore, we believe any system or body pursuing individually granted authority (rather than earning or acquiring that authority naturally) should be expected to meet a few base level expectations at the root of the proposal. In its current state the proposal lacks some of these, specifically:
1. Earned Reliability
The applicant should be willing to demonstrate a track record in their decision-making capabilities and should be willing to earn the trust and goodwill of the network over multiple decisions. We would like to see a vesting schedule proposed by Event Horizon that demonstrates a timeline or milestone structure where delegated ARB can be earned, rather than granted completely up front.
2. Verifiable Capability
Any specific team applying should be capable of demonstrating their unique capability to build this system, and specifically their ability to overcome broadly understood risks and obstacles. An immediate example is how Sybil attacks will be prevented, which we do not see in the proposal or defined in the product specs on the website. There is potential for more. We would like to see more focus in this proposal on these fundamental risks.
3. Responsible Stewardship
Any applicant, especially when lacking a history in Arbitrum governance, should be expected to demonstrate a net positive impact from its decision-making coordination, to the welfare and benefit of the broader network generally, and demonstrate a 'no conflict of interest' in their decisions and process. While we realize this is not entirely possible preemptively, we would like to see as a part of this proposal, a plan for how to effectively measure this overtime and repercussions if performance either falls short or measurements are not made.
With these few principles in mind, it is not difficult to imagine adjustments that would address these considerations without abandoning the core concept of the proposal.
We think such revisions and discussions would be the appropriate next step for this concept.
This is great. I am quite in support of this proposal.
The proposal is interesting, but unfortunately I cannot support it. Let's go through the points. 1.
Grants a clear and significant voice to retail voters regardless of their financial means
The proposal is interesting, but unfortunately I cannot support it. Let's go through the points. 1.
Grants a clear and significant voice to retail voters regardless of their financial means
Incentives participation with additional governance authority, not inflationary rewards
Incentives participants interested in governance itself, not financial gain
Okay, this may be a tangent, but bear with me. "Quadratic Delegation" For every individual who you get to redelegate to an event horizon pool, arbitrum dao matches in a quadratic manner. Karma has some good metrics on voter history, so seems like its pretty sybil resistant if they were active in the past, plus your gitcoin passport implementation. Maybe I'm overcomplicating things, but the idea of 20 people with 2500 arb banding together to get over the 50k threshold, then using a platform like EH to place votes and share delegate incentives excites me.
I am going to write up some thoughts on scholarship this weekend, after I think that through, I'll come back with more ideas I'm sure.
Okay, this may be a tangent, but bear with me. "Quadratic Delegation" For every individual who you get to redelegate to an event horizon pool, arbitrum dao matches in a quadratic manner. Karma has some good metrics on voter history, so seems like its pretty sybil resistant if they were active in the past, plus your gitcoin passport implementation. Maybe I'm overcomplicating things, but the idea of 20 people with 2500 arb banding together to get over the 50k threshold, then using a platform like EH to place votes and share delegate incentives excites me.
I am going to write up some thoughts on scholarship this weekend, after I think that through, I'll come back with more ideas I'm sure.
Also you use the term "retail" but I don't think that is the proper term in this setting, maybe citizen or individual are better fitting.
Nonetheless I am supportive of setting up a program to get more people involved in governance with enough delegation to give proposals a fighting chance, and this is a step in that direction, I really want to see more guilds or cohorts start banding together from all avenues of web3.
Thanks for taking the initiative, but I'm still against this proposal.
cp0x vote AGAINST this proposal
Hello! Thanks for the detailed answers. In many ways, I now support your desire to gain control in other ways. I still have questions after your comment:
Welcome aboard :saluting_face:
Thank you for the feedback, mate!
1.) it’s important to note that this shouldn’t open any new process for standard delegations. Event Horizon isn’t a single delegate, nor even an institution, it’s tooling. It’s a protocol with automated structures already built and functioning to allow a large body of retail voters to collectively vote. To this end, we have to ask ourselves how much do we care about the long tail 99% of Arbitrum users and evaluate how we have calibrated the voice made available to them thus far.
Thank you for the feedback, mate!
1.) it’s important to note that this shouldn’t open any new process for standard delegations. Event Horizon isn’t a single delegate, nor even an institution, it’s tooling. It’s a protocol with automated structures already built and functioning to allow a large body of retail voters to collectively vote. To this end, we have to ask ourselves how much do we care about the long tail 99% of Arbitrum users and evaluate how we have calibrated the voice made available to them thus far.
2.) This serves a different function than an underrepresented delegates iniative.
A. It targets a much larger swath of individuals and retail voters. While the under rep. proposal offered delegation to five or so individuals. Event Horizon can scale to thousands of retailers.
B. It’s a strong avenue to attract new voters/future delegates. Where the under represented proposal exclusively targeted a handful of existing participants, voter enfranchisement pools are a perpetual pubic good and attractant for new entrants.
Both proposals have their merits, but when it comes to a dedicated pool with voting passes the number of vote participants is infinitely scalable, while a targeted under rep. initiative only captures a comparably small sum of existing (not new delegates)
We’re really interested in this idea of using the DAO to delegate more tokens into the active voting pool through community governance itself.
Have spoken with the Event Horizon team before on Uniswap related matters, I think this is definitely worth digging into. Personally, I think extrapolating this out and setting aside x million $ARB for underrepresented delegates is the operationally best move. Many delegates are in similar situations where they have lots of unique value add, yet with little to no delegation. However individual delegation posts seem unscalable, as if this passes, surely dozens of more underrepresented delegates will also attempt to go through governance.
We’re really interested in this idea of using the DAO to delegate more tokens into the active voting pool through community governance itself.
Have spoken with the Event Horizon team before on Uniswap related matters, I think this is definitely worth digging into. Personally, I think extrapolating this out and setting aside x million $ARB for underrepresented delegates is the operationally best move. Many delegates are in similar situations where they have lots of unique value add, yet with little to no delegation. However individual delegation posts seem unscalable, as if this passes, surely dozens of more underrepresented delegates will also attempt to go through governance.
A lot of this thought process is from the Stable Lab team’s Delegate to Underrepresented Delegates post that delegated a total 10m UNI to various active but underrepresented delegates. Tagging @Matt_StableLab from the Stable Lab team for thoughts? (I know Doo spearheaded the Uniswap post but couldn’t find his username here)
Would love to hear what people think?
We should underpin this discussion with the question of how much say does the retail community of Arbitrum deserve absent wealth or capital. If you believe the optimal native voting power is $0, then we may not come to an agreement. If we can agree that each member of this community should have some voice then it becomes a discussion of quantity
To your points:
We should underpin this discussion with the question of how much say does the retail community of Arbitrum deserve absent wealth or capital. If you believe the optimal native voting power is $0, then we may not come to an agreement. If we can agree that each member of this community should have some voice then it becomes a discussion of quantity
To your points:
- You can also, regardless of your financial capabilities, receive delegations from other users. Therefore, there is a way that does not involve delegation from the DAO itself.
While it's true that there is a way, that does not mean it is an efficient or the only way. This also isn’t an argument against a retail enfranchisement pool, both models can and should exist simultaneously.
The model you point to is status quo and has proven limited. Hardly any lower capital users participate. Back of the envelope calculations from 10 recent Snapshots shows an average voter participation rate of 2%. We don't know what is optimal but it certainly isn't 2%. Delegation does nothing to raise this figure.
We also have what we call ‘Satoshi Wallet’ delegations or delegations which have been placed long ago with an absent or inactive delegator. The wallet being delegated to is often inactive itself. This is complete entropy of governance potential. Through the EH model, delegation is mailable and 100% efficient/productive as EH votes 100% of the time.
It also adds unnecessarily high barriers for our community to explore the ideas of the majority of its members who are currently sidelined due to no meaningful say. Most people (despite potentially having great ideas) won't contribute as they have no voice. Having to win a delegation popularity contest in order to have their ideas surfaced is sub-optimal. Delegation, while crucial, in practice isn't a meritocracy. Further, under the current system, someone with $1m and no talent can buy and start voting in a serious way. In fact, in today's model, even a single misaligned moderately wealthy agent poses a greater potential risk than the totality of all retail voters within the EH voter enfranchisement pool.
We see our retail enfranchisement public good voter pool as complementary to boosting individual underrepresented delegates. We're simultaneously calling for an elevation of small to medium sized delegates in a parallel proposal we workshopped at the Arbitrum GovHack hackathon posted here.
Could you see how the EH vote gives smaller sums to many retail voices vs large sums to specific delegates? We view this as a slight boost to the little voices, and our GovHack proposal as a moderate boost to the medium sized voters. Both aim at elevating voices at all stages of the delegate pipeline.
Eg someone with $50 not voting at all today is encouraged to mint a free pass and start participating because they claim let’s say $10,000 of voice through the public enfranchisement pool. Their votes and thoughts allow them to stand out and qualify for an under represented delegation of 1m arb as an individual later on. At present the first step to meaningfully participating is so high it functions as a wall, not a stair step. We need to add progressive growth opportunities to effectively allow stair stepped onboarding from community member to meaningful vote participant. Our vision:
Forum —> Enfranchisement Pool —> Individual / Under Represented Delegation
Do you agree just because there is a single path today, this doesn’t mean there aren’t better or alternative paths?
- Delegation incentives are a good idea and can be considered separately from this proposal. In turn, I want to say that compensation only with voting rights is not suitable for everyone, since voting takes quite a lot of time for analysis and discussion, and there are also significant gas costs.
While it is true that some delegates may be justified in receiving monetary compensation, that doesn't mean that all voters should. Many are eager to just have a voice (we’re already seeing this).
So, while those seeking capital may not resonate with this opportunity, that doesn’t invalidate it for the many who are interested absent payment. In fact, those who are eager to have their voices heard in spite of not receiving capital, should be propped up.
We’d also argue those willing out of enthusiasm, not payment are some of the most ecosystem valuable. It also is significant to note that this adds participation directly, without inflationary rewards. This is also not mutually exclusive with alternative pay to vote model proposals.
Can you agree that just because some people require monetary compensation, that doesn’t mean all do?
- In order to be trusted with their votes, you must somehow earn a reputation - either with money, or with your useful activity for the community.
Regarding trust, the oversight committee ensures safe alignment by well respected already existing delegates who have earned their reputation. Put another way, delegates who have earned trust in your preferred way, will have oversight over the EH voter enfranchisement pool.
In general, fears of trust and alignment should be addressed with oversight, delegation scaling, and constitutional systems, not by a broad stroke fear of retail enfranchisement.
Would you agree that a single misaligned, moderately wealthy agent (unbound by any oversight committee) is a more significant risk than the total sum of the enfranchisement pool bound by an oversight committee?
We encourage all to reflect on the following questions:
To start, 404 DAO believes governance is most effective when it is equitable and representative.
The current state of most DAO governance, including Arbitrum’s, is top-heavy to major players. In an ideal state, governance is comprised of different parties who represent constituents of the ecosystem. With greater distribution of voting power, governance is more capture resistant and invites robust conversation among delegates.
To start, 404 DAO believes governance is most effective when it is equitable and representative.
The current state of most DAO governance, including Arbitrum’s, is top-heavy to major players. In an ideal state, governance is comprised of different parties who represent constituents of the ecosystem. With greater distribution of voting power, governance is more capture resistant and invites robust conversation among delegates.
This is an interesting attempt at rectifying some of these pain points for everyday users and small token holders.
However, the litmus test for any meta-governance proposal should be inherently stronger than a typical proposal (IE: something like a STIP or other growth oriented proposals) because it is seeking ongoing authority rather than just incremental resources. STIPs can be experiments of scaled risk and measured consequence, but setting precedent around granting governance authority is closer to pandora's box. Therefore, we believe any system or body pursuing individually granted authority (rather than earning or acquiring that authority naturally) should be expected to meet a few base level expectations at the root of the proposal. In its current state the proposal lacks some of these, specifically:
1. Earned Reliability
The applicant should be willing to demonstrate a track record in their decision-making capabilities and should be willing to earn the trust and goodwill of the network over multiple decisions. We would like to see a vesting schedule proposed by Event Horizon that demonstrates a timeline or milestone structure where delegated ARB can be earned, rather than granted completely up front.
2. Verifiable Capability
Any specific team applying should be capable of demonstrating their unique capability to build this system, and specifically their ability to overcome broadly understood risks and obstacles. An immediate example is how Sybil attacks will be prevented, which we do not see in the proposal or defined in the product specs on the website. There is potential for more. We would like to see more focus in this proposal on these fundamental risks.
3. Responsible Stewardship
Any applicant, especially when lacking a history in Arbitrum governance, should be expected to demonstrate a net positive impact from its decision-making coordination, to the welfare and benefit of the broader network generally, and demonstrate a 'no conflict of interest' in their decisions and process. While we realize this is not entirely possible preemptively, we would like to see as a part of this proposal, a plan for how to effectively measure this overtime and repercussions if performance either falls short or measurements are not made.
With these few principles in mind, it is not difficult to imagine adjustments that would address these considerations without abandoning the core concept of the proposal.
We think such revisions and discussions would be the appropriate next step for this concept.
This is great. I am quite in support of this proposal.
The proposal is interesting, but unfortunately I cannot support it. Let's go through the points. 1.
Grants a clear and significant voice to retail voters regardless of their financial means
The proposal is interesting, but unfortunately I cannot support it. Let's go through the points. 1.
Grants a clear and significant voice to retail voters regardless of their financial means
Incentives participation with additional governance authority, not inflationary rewards
Incentives participants interested in governance itself, not financial gain
Okay, this may be a tangent, but bear with me. "Quadratic Delegation" For every individual who you get to redelegate to an event horizon pool, arbitrum dao matches in a quadratic manner. Karma has some good metrics on voter history, so seems like its pretty sybil resistant if they were active in the past, plus your gitcoin passport implementation. Maybe I'm overcomplicating things, but the idea of 20 people with 2500 arb banding together to get over the 50k threshold, then using a platform like EH to place votes and share delegate incentives excites me.
I am going to write up some thoughts on scholarship this weekend, after I think that through, I'll come back with more ideas I'm sure.
Okay, this may be a tangent, but bear with me. "Quadratic Delegation" For every individual who you get to redelegate to an event horizon pool, arbitrum dao matches in a quadratic manner. Karma has some good metrics on voter history, so seems like its pretty sybil resistant if they were active in the past, plus your gitcoin passport implementation. Maybe I'm overcomplicating things, but the idea of 20 people with 2500 arb banding together to get over the 50k threshold, then using a platform like EH to place votes and share delegate incentives excites me.
I am going to write up some thoughts on scholarship this weekend, after I think that through, I'll come back with more ideas I'm sure.
Also you use the term "retail" but I don't think that is the proper term in this setting, maybe citizen or individual are better fitting.
Nonetheless I am supportive of setting up a program to get more people involved in governance with enough delegation to give proposals a fighting chance, and this is a step in that direction, I really want to see more guilds or cohorts start banding together from all avenues of web3.
