Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies | proposals.app

posted 7 months ago

We are voting FOR this proposal.

From our perspective, it would be beneficial for the DAO to consider a model that functions on a recurring basis rather than relying on a single transfer, as @karpatkey suggested.

Quoted from karpatkey

We are voting FOR this proposal.

From our perspective, it would be beneficial for the DAO to consider a model that functions on a recurring basis rather than relying on a single transfer, as @karpatkey suggested.

Quoted from karpatkey

In fact, we would encourage the DAO to make this a recurring practice rather than a one-off transfer. Regularly channelling the ETH generated from Sequencer fees and Timeboost into ATMC would ensure that capital doesn’t accumulate unused and instead becomes part of a structured treasury management approach. Over time, this could both improve the DAO’s yield and align our treasury strategy more closely with ecosystem development goals.

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To make this effective, it is essential that any investment or treasury strategy be presented with full clarity on both risks and associated costs. This transparency is necessary not only for accountability but also for allowing delegates and tokenholders to understand what is being implemented and why. It would be helpful to know whether the team already has a structured plan for these funds.

Regarding yield, we agree with @0xDonPepe. The DAO should aim for returns that are competitive while still maintaining low risk exposure.

From a governance and security standpoint, we share cp0x’s concern:

Quoted from cp0x

DAO Loses Control

There’s no real role for the DAO in this scheme.

All decisions are approved solely by the OAT committee.

I don’t see how the DAO can influence these decisions in any meaningful way, which is why it’s so important to first know which strategies these funds will be allocated to, before transferring them. That’s a governance gap for such a large sum.

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We understand that full DAO level approval for every operational step can slow execution. However, there must be a balance so the process does not become closed off or almost self referential. For this proposal to move forward in a final form, we believe it requires a more explicit description of responsibilities, oversight, and safeguards.

We remain positive about the overall direction.

blockful from gov.blockful.eth

50.9K TOKEN

posted 7 months ago

We are voting FOR this proposal.

From our perspective, it would be beneficial for the DAO to consider a model that functions on a recurring basis rather than relying on a single transfer, as @karpatkey suggested.

Quoted from karpatkey

We are voting FOR this proposal.

From our perspective, it would be beneficial for the DAO to consider a model that functions on a recurring basis rather than relying on a single transfer, as @karpatkey suggested.

Quoted from karpatkey

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Regarding yield, we agree with @0xDonPepe. The DAO should aim for returns that are competitive while still maintaining low risk exposure.

From a governance and security standpoint, we share cp0x’s concern:

Quoted from cp0x

DAO Loses Control

There’s no real role for the DAO in this scheme.

All decisions are approved solely by the OAT committee.

jump to post →

We remain positive about the overall direction.

Thank you to the delegates who took time to join the Treasury Management call earlier today. The recording of the call can be accessed here. The proposal has been updated with the following langauge:

Quoted from Entropy

Given that the 8500 ETH requested represents a material portion of the non-ARB, unallocated treasury funds, capital preservation and long-term impact remain primary priorities. The following benchmarks guide Entropy’s allocation strategy:

ETH: stETH staking APY (currently ~2.56% based on 30D average)
RWAs: Avg APY of Largest Onchain U.S. Money Market Funds (currently ~4.11% based on 30d average)
Stables: USDC Supply APY (most liquid lending market on Arbitrum and currently ~4.54% 30D average)

Entropy recognizes and agrees with delegates that at certain times a deployment to support ecosystem growth should be prioritized over a pure yield strategy. Our team weighs growth opportunities against foregone yield based on a few factors:

Estimated Value of Growth: Does the estimated dollar-denominated value of the ecosystem opportunity directly outweigh the forgone yield. Elements that influence the estimated dollar-value of the opportunity include growth potential, broader ecosystem synergies, competitive landscape, and potential onchain fee impact.
Pricing the Opportunity Cost: Evaluating the opportunity cost for specific growth allocations based on the established benchmark rates. This involves looking at the expected yield and rewards, required deployment size, and time to deploy/remain allocated.
Comparative Effect on DAO Income: The opportunity cost is scaled based on its influence on the DAO’s total income. As Arbitrum’s total revenue increases, it allows for more opportunity to pursue growth. The percentage of Arbitrum DAO’s top-line revenue foregone for an opportunity is a factor in when a strategic deployment makes sense. An opportunity with more substantive impact as a percentage of total revenue has a higher required perceived value versus cost multiple to be deemed worthwhile.

The timeline has also been updated to reflect the delayed pushed to Tally.

Camelot

12.5M TOKEN

posted 8 months ago

Camelot is voting Abstain for this proposal.

We agree the treasury should be put to work: assets sitting idle are a missed opportunity for the DAO. That said, an approach that is exclusively yield-oriented is, in our view, myopic. We were one of the few recipients of the last treasury allocation, which testifies to Camelot’s key role in the ecosystem. We were the only Arbitrum exclusive protocol to receive funds. While the other choices make sense on paper, they don’t necessarily favor the specific development of the chain or the teams that have been investing more heavily, in the past or currently, in our ecosystem with a particular focus on Arbitrum.

Camelot is voting Abstain for this proposal.

We also see a lot of confusion in how ATMC has evolved. In the first round the process was open (protocols could submit proposals, though few were selected). The process was fairly long with an open approach to proposals in terms of submission, but not in terms of discussion; the risk parameters the commission was looking for to decide on an allocation were not clear enough, and the end result was that we only had allocations in Lido-staked ETH, AAVE, Fluid, and Camelot, with our protocol being effectively 100% focused on Arbitrum. Note that this doesn’t mean that allocations can’t go to multi-chain ones, because we do understand how, for example, AAVE is the leading lending market on our chain, to name just one of the chosen protocols. But the end result of the previous round was quite underwhelming compared to the initial set of expectations.

We were hoping to have more clarity beforehand for this round. This doesn’t necessarily mean having a granular list at this moment, before the voting, but instead understanding what the outcome will be and what we can reasonably expect for our chains and protocols.

We think the goal of the DAO with its treasury should be to produce yield and foster growth. It doesn’t necessarily have to happen in this round, but setting a clear path ahead is necessary to avoid what seems like a partial plan, with some key decisions potentially taken at the last minute.

krst from delegate.l2beat.eth

10.0M TOKEN

posted 8 months ago

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and is based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

We voted AGAINST.

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and is based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

We voted AGAINST.

First, we agree that treasury assets should be allocated to generate yield and/or support ecosystem growth. However, we share other delegates’ view that the strategy remains unclear and that it is not evident how Entropy plans to utilize these assets. It is also surprising to see the underperformance of the allocations justified as “ecosystem support,” especially given that the opposite was emphasized during discussions around the previous allocation.

Furthermore, we echo other delegates’ concerns about Entropy’s lack of clear communication regarding allocations and the underlying strategy —both retrospectively and for this request. Even direct requests for additional information have gone unanswered (1, 2).

This lack of communication is concerning: the DAO lacks insight into the rationale behind key decisions. Entropy is not investing private assets; it is allocating DAO assets as a service provider to the DAO. The DAO should have full visibility into decision-making and strategy - both to provide feedback and to ensure continuity if responsibility is ever transferred to another provider. Currently, the DAO observes outcomes but not the strategy that produced them; if a new manager is appointed, we risk repeating the same mistakes.

In the past, we tentatively supported several programs and requested additional details after approval, but those details never materialized. Therefore, we are voting against this proposal.

However, we want to reiterate that this is not a vote against the idea of allocating idle funds, but rather a vote against this particular implementation proposal in the current context. We are happy to revisit our position and support similar proposals once communication with the DAO improves and more details on the strategy are provided.

Thank you to the delegates who took time to join the Treasury Management call earlier today. The recording of the call can be accessed here. The proposal has been updated with the following langauge:

Quoted from Entropy

ETH: stETH staking APY (currently ~2.56% based on 30D average)
RWAs: Avg APY of Largest Onchain U.S. Money Market Funds (currently ~4.11% based on 30d average)
Stables: USDC Supply APY (most liquid lending market on Arbitrum and currently ~4.54% 30D average)

Estimated Value of Growth: Does the estimated dollar-denominated value of the ecosystem opportunity directly outweigh the forgone yield. Elements that influence the estimated dollar-value of the opportunity include growth potential, broader ecosystem synergies, competitive landscape, and potential onchain fee impact.
Pricing the Opportunity Cost: Evaluating the opportunity cost for specific growth allocations based on the established benchmark rates. This involves looking at the expected yield and rewards, required deployment size, and time to deploy/remain allocated.
Comparative Effect on DAO Income: The opportunity cost is scaled based on its influence on the DAO’s total income. As Arbitrum’s total revenue increases, it allows for more opportunity to pursue growth. The percentage of Arbitrum DAO’s top-line revenue foregone for an opportunity is a factor in when a strategic deployment makes sense. An opportunity with more substantive impact as a percentage of total revenue has a higher required perceived value versus cost multiple to be deemed worthwhile.

The timeline has also been updated to reflect the delayed pushed to Tally.

Camelot

12.5M TOKEN

posted 8 months ago

Camelot is voting Abstain for this proposal.

krst from delegate.l2beat.eth

10.0M TOKEN

posted 8 months ago

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and is based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

We voted AGAINST.

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and is based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

We voted AGAINST.

In the past, we tentatively supported several programs and requested additional details after approval, but those details never materialized. Therefore, we are voting against this proposal.

A number of the critiques raised here seem to focus on two points:

Past yield performance relative to simple staking benchmarks
A lack of granular allocation justification.

We believe both criticisms miss the mark and, in fact, run counter to the operational efficiency benefits that the ATMC structure was designed to deliver.

First, the yield history being cited stems from allocations that were made prior to the ATMC structure. Those allocations were heavily shaped by DAO input, with delegates explicitly requiring that Entropy prioritize ecosystem growth opportunities even when those choices came at the expense of yield and purposefully designed growth. It is not accurate to retroactively hold those outcomes against the current ATMC framework, which was created precisely to remove this type of slow, political, DAO-led allocation process.

Second, on the question of “why not just stake and earn more yield,” this frames treasury management as a false binary. In practice, yield and ecosystem growth are tradeoffs, and there are many cases where growth-aligned capital deployment through Protocol-Owned Liquidity makes far more sense than either pure staking or direct grants. For example: if a major lending market upgrade or exchange partnership earn product exclusively launching with Arbitrum requires ETH liquidity directed to a market in order to close, the DAO may be better served by deploying ETH directly at a modest APR rather than issuing a grant. The opportunity cost of 1–2% foregone yield is often far smaller than the cost of an incentive program to achieve the same result.

In terms of transparency around performance we have all of the funds tagged and tracked on a dashboard accessible to anyone (see here and here), provide regular updates on open DAO calls when appropriate, and have a dedicated thread on the forum where we post monthly updates and other relevant information to treasury management. Additionally, Entropy hosts bi-weekly office hours where anyone can join to ask questions on treasury management. We spend an exuberant amount of time each month simply providing information and remaining transparent, and as mentioned already, we cannot even move any funds without approval from the DAO-elected OAT and Arbitrum Foundation (custodian). We also scheduled a call for Thursday October 9th at 9am ET. Finally, we aim to do a better job in our reporting at segregating yield focused and growth focused allocation per the suggestions of Reverie. This is a great flag and will be addressed, our reporting will include as many details around justification as possible, though note at times NDA/private deal structures prevent it.

Finally, the governance structure itself already addresses the concern that decisions could be made unilaterally. The OAT, an elected body, serves as the check and balance. Entropy proposes allocations and will at times decide that the value of growth is worth lower risk-adjusted yield; the OAT reviews, approves, or rejects them. This is the mechanism through which the DAO retains oversight without dragging every operational decision back into a forum-level RFP debate.

In short, the ATMC was designed to (i) remove inefficiency, (ii) enable responsive treasury management, and (iii) balance yield and growth in a way that grants alone cannot. To vote on this proposal without analyzing the context of why the ATMC exists in the first place does Arbitrum a disservice, and foregoing yield in hopes of higher yield is net bad for the ARB token.

JoJo from jojothecow.eth

2.6M TOKEN

posted 8 months ago

Quoted from JoJo

in general in favour. With one caveat. We need to set expectation properly for this round.

Last time, plenty of builders reached out proposing their infra, vaults and product to put the assets at work. Most of them didn’t make it, and was later explained how the proposal goals was mostly to produce yield in a very safe and would say passive way from the DAO. I will just assume that this process won’t happen again, and we will rely on the consideration and decision of the committee.

Quoted from JoJo

in general in favour. With one caveat. We need to set expectation properly for this round.

I would personally prefer an allocation skewed toward ecosystem growth. Arbitrum is not only lending: is dexes, is automated vaults, is perps, and we we should be mindful of every aspect of it and of the key players of our chain, albeit I do understand how lending market are often time a very good primitive to start enhancing the capital available.

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I did vote in favor, but my concerns did grow in the last couple of weeks.

Do we need to allocate the idle assets in the treasury? Of course. But we have to be clear on what the main purpose is.

In the last few days, delegates called for a more comprehensive call to discuss parameters such as yield, risk allocation and overarching goal of this program. The answer that we got, so far, is that previous iteration was more oriented toward growth of the ecosystem, and this one will be more oriented toward pure yield for the DAO.

I wholeheartly disagree with the statement above.

In the last season, allocation was toward AAVE, Lido Eth, Fluid, Camelot. The one from Camelot was suboptimal as allocation due to the passive nature of the deployer (the foundation) which, talking with the risk committee, would have not been able to manage the position in a more active way. The allocation in Fluid for sure helped the protocol bootstrap in Arbitrum and the Drip is continuing the job. That said, i hardly see how this could be defined as "oriented toward growth" of the chain" as others framed it.

I don't want to only point out to semantic. I think we need to be all on the same page of what

allocating toward growth really means
allocating toward yield really means
what are the risk/rewards of both choices.

So far former two points are, in my humble opinion, not properly laid out, the latter point is just not discussed at all.

I won't campaign against the current season, is not worth it, and it does bring benefits to the DAO. Reaching sustainability with a treasury that is concentrated in mostly one coin (arb) is a good goal.

I would invite Entropy, the Foundation and the delegates to reflect on the following point tho: does moving, for example, from a 2.6% net yield to a 3.2% net yield, bring us anything meaningful beside having on 8500 ETH a further 51 ETH so a further gain of $200,000 for us? In my opinion it does not.

There is a lot of underestimation about the second order effect of making the DAO the first customers of Arbitrum protocols. Any 0.x% more yield we could get on the ethereum we have will greatly be outpaced by any positive mindshare that changes how the ecosystem is perceived by participant; and it will reflect on our treasury because this is one of the multiple reasons why the price action of Arb as a coin has been lackluster compared to any benchmark. I am perfectly aware i am mentioning a rather complex topic, arb price action, that can't be reduced to a bullet list or a few sentences; but whoever is out there talking with users, and builders, know that we do have a perception problem in our ecosystem.

With my vote in favour I hope that we do indeed put the idle assets at work to produce yield as we should, but also that we start to properly frame the intent behind our action while having a more thoughtful and omni comprehensive scenarios of the choices at our disposal and what they means not only for us as a DAO but as ecosystem.

In the end, does it matte if we become a self sustainable DAO if no one is left in our chain beside us?

GFXlabs from gfxlabs.eth

8.4M TOKEN

posted 9 months ago

Quoted from Entropy

We acknowledge that the current positions’ blended performance figures are below the staking return rate of simply holding wstETH. However, as detailed in the governance post defining the goals and justification for those allocations, simply staking all of our ETH and not providing or bootstrapping any liquidity to native or migrating blue-chip protocols to spur ecosystem economic growth was at odds with the intent of the deployment.

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Quoted from Entropy

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Can you shed some light on how this works in practice? Specifically around:

How are we determining where to offer this below-market-rate capital?
What metrics are those recipient protocols/below-market-rate positions being evaluated upon?
What is success or failure defined as? Preferably this is determined ahead of time so there's no moving of goal posts.

For example, Fluid Lending on Arbitrum is pretty much up and to the right. Does that mean it's now graduated from needing this implicit subsidy?

Camelot is the inverse -- the TVL and volumes are flat while Uniswap and Fluid (DEX) are growing. Does that mean it's no longer worth providing the implicit subsidy since there's no noticeable impact from it beyond the forgone revenue?

In general, we would recommend governance funds avoid these types of positions. It feels unfocused and unproductive without some specific plan from the supported project. We'd much rather see, for example, targeted subsidies for those who move an LP or borrowing position from another chain than generic subsidies that benefit traders/borrowers/protocols that would have just done the same activities they're already doing.

In short, we'd like to see anything below the "risk free rate" for ETH staking be accompanied by a clear plan to alter behavior of specific users. After all, we don't need to provide subsidies to users who Arbitrum is already won -- it's the next marginal user that needs to be onboarded who should be targeted.

jameskbh from jameskbh.eth

4.74 TOKEN

posted 9 months ago

IMO, the core idea makes complete sense: put idle assets to work. I’d like to share a few options and suggestions for consideration, some of which I already mentioned in my comment on the DRIP recap post.

Consider solutions like Balancer boosted pools (LPs deposited into Aave), which enhance the impact of assets within the ecosystem.
Expanding beyond lending/DEXes could set the stage for future DRIP seasons. If liquidity in these verticals is already reinforced, it becomes easier to accommodate new demand. Additionally, if funds from lending/looping are redirected to other verticals, liquidity becomes stickier.

Consider solutions like Balancer boosted pools (LPs deposited into Aave), which enhance the impact of assets within the ecosystem.
Expanding beyond lending/DEXes could set the stage for future DRIP seasons. If liquidity in these verticals is already reinforced, it becomes easier to accommodate new demand. Additionally, if funds from lending/looping are redirected to other verticals, liquidity becomes stickier.

Quoted from Entropy

Given that the 8500 ETH requested represents a material portion of the non-ARB, unallocated treasury funds, capital preservation and long-term impact remain primary priorities. Future proposals could consider allocating a smaller amount of ETH to newer and novel protocols requiring bootstrapped liquidity support.

Reserve a small percentage (up to 20%) of the current requested amount to support new protocols and/or other verticals. This would demonstrate stronger alignment with item 2 of the mandate ("Supporting growth in the Arbitrum ecosystem, particularly within DeFi"). It seems that there is no strong reason to postpone it (this item is related to my previous comment in the DRIP post).

karpatkey

153.8K TOKEN

posted 9 months ago

We are supportive of this proposal to transfer the ETH accrued from Sequencer fees and Timeboost into ATMC’s treasury strategies. Right now, these assets are sitting idle, and we believe they could be put to much better use. By moving them into active management, the DAO can strengthen its long-term financial sustainability while also creating opportunities to support ecosystem growth, particularly within Arbitrum’s DeFi.

In fact, we would encourage the DAO to make this a recurring practice rather than a one-off transfer. Regularly channelling the ETH generated from Sequencer fees and Timeboost into ATMC would ensure that capital doesn’t accumulate unused and instead becomes part of a structured treasury management approach. Over time, this could both improve the DAO's yield and align our treasury strategy more closely with ecosystem development goals.

The key consideration will be ensuring that any chosen strategies are transparent in their risk profile and cost structure so the DAO can make informed decisions. Overall, we think this is a positive step forward and strongly support it.

TodayInDeFi from tidresearch.eth

1.0M TOKEN

posted 9 months ago

Hi this is Brook from TiD Research, and we are supportive of this proposal.

While the projected yields from deploying 8,500 ETH may appear modest compared to passive staking, we feel the lower return is reasonable given the broader ecosystem benefits — especially in connection with the ongoing DRIP program.

Hi this is Brook from TiD Research, and we are supportive of this proposal.

As we highlighted in our earlier comment on DRIP, the lack of sufficient swap liquidity has been the biggest blocker to TVL growth from leveraged yield-bearing stablecoin and ETH LST/LRT loops. Volatile slippage and meaningful price impact (e.g., >2% to unwind $100k positions) discourage larger users and weaken the amplifying effect of efficient capital use. With deeper liquidity, every $1 of inflow could potentially scale into $10 of TVL through loops — but this requires users to move in and out efficiently. Deploying treasury ETH into liquidity-supportive strategies directly addresses this bottleneck.

Quoted from TodayInDeFi

That said, one thing we’ve noticed is that since LP activity isn’t directly incentivized, most trades still route through existing liquidity (mainly Uniswap and Fluid). Liquidity is growing, but not always fast enough to keep up with demand for leverage. In practice, swaps up to ~$100k–200k are fine, but around ~$300k we start seeing noticeable price impact, and at ~$500k execution can sometimes become difficult. For example, a trader farming with ~$10k at 10x leverage can comfortably enter and exit positions, but bigger strategies quickly run into constraints. We see a similar pattern across some stables and ETH LRTs.

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It’s also worth remembering that, as outlined in the original Treasury Management V1.2 mandate, the treasury was never designed to chase the highest possible yield. The objectives are to (1) generate low-risk yield on otherwise idle ETH and (2) spur ecosystem growth. From that perspective, even modest returns are justified if the deployment helps strengthen market structure and unlock DRIP’s full potential.

Quoted from Entropy

As highlighted in the original Treasury Management V1.2 proposal, the purpose of the Growth Management Committee (GMC) was to provide a path for the Arbitrum Foundation to deploy 7,500 ETH from the DAO’s treasury to achieve 2 things:

Generate low-risk yield on otherwise idle ETH
Spur ecosystem growth

Moreover, given this is the DAO’s first tranche of funds, we really wanted to ensure the DAO starts with a really strong and stable foundation, while securing key partnerships from the very beginning. Thus, we focused on selecting extremely high quality partners with low risk strategies that allowed the DAO’s funds to maximize its reach and impact within the Arbitrum ecosystem.

We’re glad to see Entropy take into account some of the suggestions we’ve shared both on GRC and in private discussions — particularly around aligning Treasury management with DRIP by providing protocol-owned liquidity. This approach helps achieve sustainable, low-risk yield for the treasury while also improving DEX liquidity on target assets.

Given that DRIP is already underway, we believe ensuring its success is especially important at this stage. It may not be realistic for the DAO to launch another incentive program of this scale in the near future, and the timing now feels critical: both stablecoin and ETH DeFi markets are booming, and Arbitrum has a unique opportunity to capture market share. The yield difference between strategies may only be 2–3%, but the upside in TVL growth and ecosystem stickiness from a successful DRIP could be much more significant.

We believe this is less about giving up yield or losing money, but more about recognizing that sacrificing a few percentage points in yield to support DRIP and lay a solid foundation for ecosystem growth can be the right priority for the DAO. In this sense, the proposal is well-aligned with the treasury’s mandate: it preserves capital, generates sustainable ETH-denominated returns, and, importantly, helps address the liquidity constraint that currently limits DRIP’s impact.

A number of the critiques raised here seem to focus on two points:

Past yield performance relative to simple staking benchmarks
A lack of granular allocation justification.

We believe both criticisms miss the mark and, in fact, run counter to the operational efficiency benefits that the ATMC structure was designed to deliver.

JoJo from jojothecow.eth

2.6M TOKEN

posted 8 months ago

Quoted from JoJo

in general in favour. With one caveat. We need to set expectation properly for this round.

Quoted from JoJo

in general in favour. With one caveat. We need to set expectation properly for this round.

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I did vote in favor, but my concerns did grow in the last couple of weeks.

Do we need to allocate the idle assets in the treasury? Of course. But we have to be clear on what the main purpose is.

I wholeheartly disagree with the statement above.

I don't want to only point out to semantic. I think we need to be all on the same page of what

allocating toward growth really means
allocating toward yield really means
what are the risk/rewards of both choices.

So far former two points are, in my humble opinion, not properly laid out, the latter point is just not discussed at all.

In the end, does it matte if we become a self sustainable DAO if no one is left in our chain beside us?

GFXlabs from gfxlabs.eth

8.4M TOKEN

posted 9 months ago

Quoted from Entropy

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Quoted from Entropy

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Can you shed some light on how this works in practice? Specifically around:

How are we determining where to offer this below-market-rate capital?
What metrics are those recipient protocols/below-market-rate positions being evaluated upon?
What is success or failure defined as? Preferably this is determined ahead of time so there's no moving of goal posts.

For example, Fluid Lending on Arbitrum is pretty much up and to the right. Does that mean it's now graduated from needing this implicit subsidy?

jameskbh from jameskbh.eth

4.74 TOKEN

posted 9 months ago

Consider solutions like Balancer boosted pools (LPs deposited into Aave), which enhance the impact of assets within the ecosystem.
Expanding beyond lending/DEXes could set the stage for future DRIP seasons. If liquidity in these verticals is already reinforced, it becomes easier to accommodate new demand. Additionally, if funds from lending/looping are redirected to other verticals, liquidity becomes stickier.

Consider solutions like Balancer boosted pools (LPs deposited into Aave), which enhance the impact of assets within the ecosystem.
Expanding beyond lending/DEXes could set the stage for future DRIP seasons. If liquidity in these verticals is already reinforced, it becomes easier to accommodate new demand. Additionally, if funds from lending/looping are redirected to other verticals, liquidity becomes stickier.

Quoted from Entropy

Given that the 8500 ETH requested represents a material portion of the non-ARB, unallocated treasury funds, capital preservation and long-term impact remain primary priorities. Future proposals could consider allocating a smaller amount of ETH to newer and novel protocols requiring bootstrapped liquidity support.

Reserve a small percentage (up to 20%) of the current requested amount to support new protocols and/or other verticals. This would demonstrate stronger alignment with item 2 of the mandate ("Supporting growth in the Arbitrum ecosystem, particularly within DeFi"). It seems that there is no strong reason to postpone it (this item is related to my previous comment in the DRIP post).

karpatkey

153.8K TOKEN

posted 9 months ago

In fact, we would encourage the DAO to make this a recurring practice rather than a one-off transfer. Regularly channelling the ETH generated from Sequencer fees and Timeboost into ATMC would ensure that capital doesn’t accumulate unused and instead becomes part of a structured treasury management approach. Over time, this could both improve the DAO's yield and align our treasury strategy more closely with ecosystem development goals.

TodayInDeFi from tidresearch.eth

1.0M TOKEN

posted 9 months ago

Hi this is Brook from TiD Research, and we are supportive of this proposal.

Quoted from TodayInDeFi

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Quoted from Entropy

Generate low-risk yield on otherwise idle ETH
Spur ecosystem growth

Quoted from GFXlabs

Isn’t this underperforming just passively staking the ETH? Eyeballing yields from May to now, it looks like it’s equal to Rocket Pool and less than Lido, neither of which require active management or movement out of the treasury.

Can we get a breakdown of the costs (inclusive of fees and operating expenses) along with risk profiles to get what appears to be an equal or lower return to just staking the ETH?

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Performance attribution can best be explained and seen by looking at the current ETH-denominated allocations here (pictured below) and by looking at the monthly updates. All yields displayed and referenced in both are net yields, with the exception of gas and bridging costs, which at this scale are considered de minimis and excluded.

image|690x106

It’s also worth noting that although some of the allocations are providing lower yield than a simple staked ETH LST strategy, this was not an unintended consequence of past allocation decisions, but expected. In the governance post regarding the deployment of these funds, we anticipated that the Fluid ETH deployment would provide “1-2% native ETH yield,” and so far, performance is in line with expectations. Fluid’s growth on Arbitrum has been impressive, and this is a key example of return on investment that is slightly less tangible when looking at treasury return figures, but highly beneficial for the broader Arbitrum DeFi ecosystem.

To answer some of the general questions raised by @Jonezee @JoJo @karpatkey @jameskbh

We are not requesting the entirety of the ETH accumulated in the treasury to be transferred over as we believe it is responsible to leave a “buffer quantity” of ETH for any unexpected DAO needs or any future treasury management proposals with differing goals from this one.
As mentioned in the proposal, no open RFP process will occur for this tranche so expectations are properly managed regarding goals and intent of the deployed capital. The committee will primarily focus on and account for factors such as yield sustainability, protocol and economic risk, ecosystem impact, liquidity, etc. when evaluating allocations.
The proposed high-level strategy and goal enables the committee to deploy ETH outside of just lending/DEX LP opportunities. We agree all viable strategies should be considered and our list of potential categories was not collectively exhaustive.

Quoted from GFXlabs

Can we get a breakdown of the costs (inclusive of fees and operating expenses) along with risk profiles to get what appears to be an equal or lower return to just staking the ETH?

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To answer some of the general questions raised by @Jonezee @JoJo @karpatkey @jameskbh

We are not requesting the entirety of the ETH accumulated in the treasury to be transferred over as we believe it is responsible to leave a “buffer quantity” of ETH for any unexpected DAO needs or any future treasury management proposals with differing goals from this one.
As mentioned in the proposal, no open RFP process will occur for this tranche so expectations are properly managed regarding goals and intent of the deployed capital. The committee will primarily focus on and account for factors such as yield sustainability, protocol and economic risk, ecosystem impact, liquidity, etc. when evaluating allocations.
The proposed high-level strategy and goal enables the committee to deploy ETH outside of just lending/DEX LP opportunities. We agree all viable strategies should be considered and our list of potential categories was not collectively exhaustive.

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Non-Constitutional

Summary

Motivation / Rationale

Specifications

Timeline

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Non-Constitutional

Summary

Motivation / Rationale

Specifications

Timeline

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Non-Constitutional

Summary

Motivation / Rationale

Specifications

Timeline

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Non-Constitutional

Summary

Motivation / Rationale

Specifications

Timeline

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies