ARBITRUM RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT COLLECTIVE [V2]
Important Note: the sums voted on on Snapshot and requested via Tally are representative of the 12-month budget. In the immediate, only 50% of the budget voted in favour by the DAO will be used with the remaining 50% subject to utilisation via Snapshot vote as explained in the extension mechanics.
Update log:
A brief summary of the changes carried out include:
A call discussing the details and updates for ARDC v2 was held on 16-Oct-2024.
The Snapshot proposal for ARDC V2 was successfully passed on 24-Oct-2024.
Non-Constitutional
Defining ‘Arbitrum Research & Development Collective’ or ‘ARDC’: An alliance for combined action used to achieve a common goal in the best interests of the ArbitrumDAO in relation to research & development initiatives
TL;DR
In the first iteration of the ARDC, we experimented with the structure and the remuneration framework. In this regard, we adopted a DAOAdvocate role as inspired by the Arbitrum Coalition (Refer: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145). Also, we adopted the same seats as envisaged in Proposal: The Arbitrum Coalition the Arbitrum Coalition proposal ergo, Research, Risk and Security. In the first iteration of the ARDC, we had the pleasure of utilising the following service providers as elected by the ArbitrumDAO: Below a summary of the key deliverables and achievements of the ARDC have been provided: [Blockworks Research] STIP Analysis Case Study: GMX [Blockworks Research] STIP Analysis Case Study: JOJO [Blockworks Research] STIP Analysis: Concerns Regarding Possible Misconduct by Synapse with Respect to the Usage of ARB Incentives Allocated Through the STIP [Blockworks Research] STIP Bridge: Support Material for the Community [OpenZeppelin] Using Hedgey for Proposal Payment Vesting [Delphi Digital] Gaming Catalyst Program: SWOT Analysis [Delphi Digital] Gaming Catalyst Program - Compensation Structure Memo [Chaos Labs] STIP Risk Analysis — Case Study #1: Vertex Protocol [Chaos Labs] STIP Risk Analysis — Case Study #2: Silo Finance [Delphi Digital] BOLD Dispute Mechanism Summary & Comparisons [OpenZeppelin] Security Council Improvement Proposal [Blockworks Research] STIP Retroactive Analysis - Perp DEX Protocols Volume Report [Open Zeppelin] BOLD Security Analysis [Chaos Labs] STIP Risk Analysis — Case Study #3: Pendle Finance [Blockworks Research] STIP Retroactive Analysis – Spot DEX TVL [Blockworks Research] STIP Analysis of Operations and Incentive Mechanisms [Delphi Digital] Arbitrum DAO Treasury Research [OpenZeppelin] ETH Staking Options and Risks for the DAO [OpenZeppelin] Event Horizon Franchiser Contract Audit [Chaos Labs] STIP Analysis | Insights & Key Findings [Chaos Labs] Risk Analysis of Adjusting the Minimum Base Fee on Arbitrum [OpenZeppelin] ArbOS 31 “Bianca” Proposal Review [Blockworks Research] STIP Retroactive Analysis – Sequencer [Delphi Digital] Response to Arbitrum Staking Proposal [Blockworks Research] Treasury-Backed Vault Research [Open Zeppelin] Arbitrum Governor V2 Review [Open Zeppelin] Arbitrum Governor Upgrade Rollout & Timeline [Chaos Labs] Treasury Backed Vaults Risk Analysis [Open Zeppelin] Security Analysis of Arbitrum Staking Proposal [Delphi Digital] Follow Up - DAO Incomes Sources and the Path to Staking [Chaos Labs] Risk Analysis of Adjusting the minimum base fee on Arbitrum [Blockworks Research] Incentives Research Summary [Blockworks Research] Timeboost Revenue and LP Impact Analysis* [Delphi Digital] Transaction Ordering Policies & Value Accrual in L2s: Timeboost, OP PGA, Fastlane & OEV Network [Chaos Labs] Timeboost Risk Analysis [OpenZeppelin] Timeboost Security Analysis [OpenZeppelin] Arbitrum L2 Time Lock Delay Proposal Security Review [OpenZeppelin] RARI Multichain Governance Proposal Security Review [OpenZeppelin] Arbitrum daoURI Proposal Security Review [Blockworks Research] Retroactive LTIPP Analysis** [Delphi Digital] Incentives Programs in other protocols** [Chaos Labs] Treasury Management Risk Assessment** *Although Blockworks didn’t pick up this workstream specifically as a member of the ARDC, it has been included in the list since it was relevant to the Timeboost discussion and since it was published in the overall context of the work ARDC was doing on that front.
*These deliverables haven’t been published on the forum yet. Although the ARDC term has concluded, the engagement of the members will be officially regarded as ‘concluded’ upon publishing the final deliverables. As outlined in the Final Outcome Report prepared by the DAO Advocate, L2Beat, member performance should not be assessed solely by the number of deliverables completed. Each deliverable varies in complexity, making a simple tally an inadequate measure of contribution. For this reason, individual totals for each member were not compiled, as it would not provide an accurate comparison. Since the ARDC launched in April, several in-depth studies have been undertaken. A particular focus was attributed to the STIP program in individual protocols like GMX, JOJO, Vertex, Silo Finance and Pendle Finance. This included retroactive analyses on the impact of the STIP on trading volumes in perp DEX protocols, spot DEX and yield aggregator TVL, and sequencer revenue. These analyses provided valuable insights into the broader market impacts of the STIP incentives and their effectiveness in driving desired outcomes, resulting in an average
of 1,000,000 ARB being returned to the DAOs treasury. Significant concerns regarding Synapse’s handling of ARB incentives, leading to the withdrawal of Synapse’s application from the STIP Bridge. This incident highlights the importance of ongoing monitoring and transparency in the allocation and usage of incentives. Moreover, risk assessments were conducted across multiple initiatives, accompanied by several security evaluations. These included the BOLD proposal, Security Council improvements, Event Horizon contracts as well as an analysis of the Gaming Catalyst Program. This highlights the importance of post-rollout research as a critical tool for continuous improvement, allowing the DAO to learn from past experiences and refine its strategies. By systematically analyzing outcomes and identifying areas for enhancement, the DAO can build on successes, address challenges, and make increasingly informed decisions.
ARDC v1 Overview
This proposal builds upon the foundation established by the Arbitrum Research and Development Collective [V1], introducing a more efficient and structured framework. In ARDC [V2], proposed working members are required to specify their hourly rate in a separate application form, with the payment structure being refined to follow that of a retainer model. This will help to better align incentives given that four-fifths of the cap allocated per vertical for the initial six-month term is contingent upon actual project needs, ensuring that these payments are directly tied to usage. We are also pleased to announce that the Arbitrum Foundation will be undertaking an 'Observer' role in relation to the Supervisory Council to aid in streamlining ARDC efforts, communication and overall efficacy. Additionally, applicants must outline a scope of work for the ArbitrumDAO covering one-third of their total workload for the initial 6-month term, complete with clear deliverables and timelines. The remainder of their workload will serve as a flexible budget to address tasks on an "as-needed" basis, allowing providers to demonstrate their understanding of the ArbitrumDAO’s most pressing needs. The final decision on the work carried out by elected working members will ultimately rest with the Supervisory Council. While the proposed scope serves as an initial framework, the Council will oversee and adjust the workload on a case-by-case basis, prioritizing deliverables within each vertical and addressing any conflicts between pre-determined tasks and requests made by the ArbitrumDAO. Therefore, this proposed scope of work will not automatically apply after the election. This emphasizes the Council’s crucial role in maximizing the effectiveness of ARDC v2, aligning tasks with the DAO’s priorities, and ensuring smooth daily operations. The goal is for this structure to gradually incorporate an Optimistic Governance Module (OGM), giving the community the power to veto ARDC deliverables. Unlike traditional token-based governance, which requires a majority of affirmative votes for proposals to pass, Optimistic Governance enables proposals to pass automatically unless they meet a predefined threshold of objection votes. This approach minimizes bureaucratic overhead, facilitating more efficient decision-making for non-contentious proposals and fostering a more agile governance framework. It’s important to note that ARDC v2 does not depend on the OGM for implementation; however, once Tally deploys the OGM for the DAO, a proposal will be submitted to integrate it into the ARDC structure.
Summary
SUPERVISORY COUNCIL ROLE IN THE ARDC: DETAILED RESPONSIBILITIES AND IMPORTANCE The DAOAdvocate’s role was intended as a single designated entity responsible for guiding the ARDC’s efforts and acting as a mediator between the DAO and the ARDC. This is fundamentally about representing the DAO’s best interests, rather than the operational management of the coalition’s activities. These operational tasks, carried out by L2Beat included the establishing of communication channels and coordination among members, creating and maintaining a Notion page to document meeting minutes and track tasks through a kanban board, compliance and onboarding processes like KYC/KYB as well as regular updates and the maintenance of open communication channels among several others. In the revised structure of the ARDC, we propose establishing the Supervisory Council, a body elected by the DAO to ensure alignment with its strategic and operational priorities. The Supervisory Council will be better positioned to capture the full range of perspectives and needs of the DAO community, bringing a variety of skills and viewpoints to strategic discussions. At the same time, this Council will also be responsible for day-to-day management and coordination. This dual focus ensures that the ARDC’s activities are strategically sound while being operationally effective, closing the gap between high-level guidance and the actual execution of tasks. This structure will consist of three (3) individuals elected by the DAO for an initial six-month term, with the option to extend for an additional six months. Each member will receive a monthly compensation of 5,000 ARB throughout their tenure. As a result, the total compensation for the council over the initial six-month period will be 90,000 ARB, and, if extended, the total cost for a full year will amount to 180,000 ARB. At a current price of $0.52/ARB, the initial 6-month term would cost approximately $46,800. For context, the DAOAdvocate role for ARDC v1 was compensated with 50,000 ARB, which, at the current price of $1.70 would have equated to $85,000. This comparison underscores the cost-effectiveness of the ARDC v2. The Supervisory Council will operate at both macro and micro levels, ensuring comprehensive oversight, strategic alignment, and effective day-to-day operations. At the micro level, two (2) of the elected members will focus on communications and one (1) will focus on operations. By clearly defining these roles and their corresponding responsibilities, the Council is better positioned to attract the right talent to enhance ARDC visibility and improve communication with OffChain Labs and the Arbitrum Foundation. This approach aims to bridge the gap between the ARDC, the DAO, the Arbitrum Foundation, and OffChain Labs. [A] MACRO-LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES Strategic Oversight & Resource Management: Define overall strategic priorities for ARDC initiatives, conducting regular evaluations to ensure alignment with the DAO’s objectives. Intervene as necessary to realign projects with these priorities. Set guidelines for financial, human, and technical resource allocations, establishing frameworks that prioritize high-impact projects while allowing the micro-level team to handle daily resource distribution. Provide high-level budget oversight, ensuring resources are allocated according to strategic guidelines while empowering operations to manage day-to-day budget adherence. Representation of DAO Interests & Coordination: Serve as a central point of contact between ARDC members, the ArbitrumDAO, and external partners, ensuring the DAO’s strategic interests are reflected in ARDC decision-making. Organize periodic community consultations on major initiatives, delegating routine community engagement to the communications team. Ensure strategic topics and updates are shared with key stakeholders, including the Arbitrum community, OffChain Labs, and the Arbitrum Foundation. Conflict Resolution & Mediation: Mediate conflicts that have strategic implications for the ARDC or that arise between the ARDC and the DAO, ensuring resolutions uphold the DAO’s objectives. Provide a neutral platform for resolving disputes that may impact the ARDC’s alignment with DAO goals. [B] MICRO-LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES Communication Roles: Stakeholder Communication & Engagement: Communication Roles: Communication Strategy & Publication:: Operations Role: Internal Organisation & Financial Management:: Operations Role: Additional Operational Parameters:: Additionally, if a simple majority (2/3) of the Supervisory Council deem a member of the ARDC to have acted negligently, in bad faith, or contrary to the mandate/purposes of the ARDC as ratified by the ArbitrumDAO, the Supervisory Council will be obliged to submit a proposal via Snapshot to terminate such a member of the ARDC together with the necessary details that justify such termination. Following this, the Supervisory Council will have an ancillary obligation to submit a call for applications for the vacant ARDC seat. The decision as to who ought to take up the vacant seat will be determined by the ArbitrumDAO via the election mechanism stipulated in this Forum Post (for intra-ARDC elections, the same RFP-Based + Application election model will be utilised).
Supervisory Council
The Risk Member [Strictly Research & Analysis] The ideal Risk Member should possess strong quantitative skills to evaluate and manage risks across DeFi protocols, with sufficient expertise in modeling, simulations, and economic risk analysis. On an as-requested basis, they will assess protocol design, tokenomics, and governance mechanisms to ensure economic efficiency, incentivize usage, and safeguard systemic health. The role involves conducting thorough risk-focused research and applying modeling techniques to identify and mitigate potential threats. Additionally, the Risk Member will provide strategic guidance and data-driven insights to optimize risk management practices, supporting continuous monitoring, reporting, and informed decision-making to promote trust and sustainability in within the ArbitrumDAO. The Security Member [Strictly Research & Analysis] The Security member should ideally possess skills in specific static analysis bug detection targeting code updates and developing fuzzing capabilities to validate upgrade states. They should be proficient in visualizing the state of governance contracts, ensuring correct encoding of values, and providing educational materials and guidelines for reviewing upgrade procedures. Additionally, they should have expertise in identifying design flaws, and ensuring security and correctness properties in on-chain upgrade proposals. This role is crucial for preventing governance attacks and may involve building tools and educational materials to support proposal reviews. The Research Member [Strictly Research & Analysis] The Research member should ideally possess a range of skills, including the ability to conduct objective analysis and contribute to the design of various mechanisms such as sequencers, fraud proofs, and data availability solutions, with a strong emphasis on objective data-driven research. They should also be proficient in creating processes that incentivize active delegate participation, such as developing delegate incentives frameworks and hosting regular collaborative calls. Additionally, they should be skilled in content creation to promote the Arbitrum ecosystem’s growth. Moreover, the candidate should have a knack for producing impartial, data-driven research to aid delegates in making informed decisions and improving proposal quality. Excellent communication skills and the ability to manage interactions with DAO stakeholders and service providers are essential, along with the capacity to document ARDC activities and recommend solutions for any issues that arise, maintaining a governance process for continuity.
Risk, Security, Research
In the application form, working members must specify their hourly rate, incentivizing them to propose competitive rates to enhance their chances of selection. The maximum allowable hours for each term will be calculated by dividing the total applicable cap by the hourly rate, which will assist the Supervisory Council in budgeting and establishing a benchmark for future budget planning. Aligned with the principle that "incentives dictate outcomes," the Supervisory Council will oversee task approval, whether from proposed scopes of work by the working members or from incoming requests. The Council will evaluate each potential deliverable's cost-effectiveness based on the elected members' estimated time commitment and hourly rate. This process motivates working members to provide accurate time estimates, as overestimating could reduce their chances of being assigned the deliverable. To provide greater financial security for working members, one-fifth of the applicable cap relating to the initial six-month term will be paid upfront upon election. For example, if a working member’s rate is $100 per hour and the DAO-approved retainer cap is $1,000, they would have a maximum of 10 hours available. In this scenario, the member would receive an upfront payment of one-fifth of the cap ($200), covering the first 2 hours of work. The remaining portion of the cap will be contingent on actual work performed. This approach mitigates the risk of underutilization by tying the remaining four-fifths of the applicable cap ($800) to usage as required. Once the Supervisory Council identifies a deliverable, the Operations member will issue a Request for Quotation (RFQ) to the relevant working member, outlining the anticipated hours needed. Following delegate feedback, the amount to be paid upfront was updated from one-third to one-fifth of the applicable cap for the initial six-month term. This model ensures that: Following the completion of the initial one-fifth allocation, payment for subsequent work will be structured as follows: members will receive 50% of the quoted hours' payment before commencing each deliverable, with the remaining amount paid upon satisfactory completion. This phased payment structure promotes accountability and reinforces efficient, quality work.
Retainer Model
The ARDC election process is scheduled to begin 3 business days from the passing of the Snapshot proposal. A high-level overview of this process can be found in the diagram below. All ARDC members are expected to serve their term unless terminated by the ArbitrumDAO through Snapshot as stipulated in the Agreement regulating the ARDC [Further details below re. the Agreement & Defining provisions]. There will be four separate elections held: To minimize voter fatigue, the Supervisory Council elections will be conducted through a single, general election snapshot. Candidates will be required to specify their desired role in their application. For instance, if the top three elected candidates all apply for the Communication role, only the top two will be selected for that role. The third position will then be filled by the highest-ranking candidate who applied for the Operations role, ensuring a balanced allocation of roles within the Council. The following timeline governs an election process that starts at time T [‘T’ means the date that the Snapshot vote passes +3 days]: GOVERNING RULES While a joint application for each seat is permissible, an applicant may not apply as part of a joint application with other applicants & then proceed to apply as a Supervisory Council member or for another seat. The fees (hourly rate/s) in the respective elected member’s forum post application will apply once elected via Snapshot as per the Election Process. ELECTION STRUCTURE 1. Application Submission (T+14 business days): Anyone may submit an application on a dedicated page on the ArbitrumDAO Forums in conformity with the application template; 2. Proposal Review Period (7 business day period following end of Application Submission Period): This period will be utilised for delegates to be able to review each proposal as submitted by applicants. 3. Amendment Period (3 business day period following the end of the Proposal Review period whereby applicants may amend their application): Applicants may amend their applications in light of community feedback during this time period. 4. Member election (7 business day period following end of Amendment Period): A Snapshot with weighted voting will be put up per vertical including the list of all eligible candidates: The ArbitrumDAO may approve and implement a Non-Constitutional AIP to change the rules governing future ARDC elections, but the AIP process may not be used to intervene in an ongoing election. Furthermore, please find the election templates for the Supervisory Council and respective seats, designed to guide prospective applicants through the application process, as well as details regarding timelines on the published Notion site here. Interested applicants are encouraged to join the ARDC V2 Election chat on Telegram here.
Election Process

The ARDC will be regulated via an Agreement entered into by all elected ARDC Members with the Arbitrum Foundation serving as a counterparty to the Agreement. The Agreement will be made public & include, but will not be limited to the following provisions: Appointment & Termination: ARDC Members will be appointed via the forecited election process in accordance with ArbitrumDAO Consent by the Arbitrum Community. “Arbitrum Community” means those persons who have the right to propose and vote on proposals ergo, the token holders of the ARB token with the following contract address [0x912CE59144191C1204E64559FE8253a0e49E6548] from time to time visible at [$1.73 | Arbitrum (ARB) Token Tracker | Arbiscan 3]. ““ArbitrumDAO Consent” means a vote of the ArbitrumDAO Community in favour of a proposal satisfying the minimum requirements set forth at The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO | Arbitrum DAO - Governance docs 4 (as such minimum requirements set forth therein on the date hereof may be revised from time to time with ArbitrumDAO Consent) taken by any of the following means: CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROVISION: ARDC Members will be bound to act in absolute good faith, with utmost honesty, refraining from deriving unauthorized profits from their position & disclosing conflicts of interest. ARDC members should always disclose any potential or actual conflicts of interest to the Supervisory Council who will then proceed to mitigate the respective ARDC Member’s involvement in the task in relation to which such ARDC Member is conflicted. To sum up, all ARDC Members must declare the nature and extent of any interest, direct or indirect, which the ARDC Member is aware that she, he or it has in a proposed task at hand. MANDATE & PURPOSE OF THE ARDC: The ARDC members are pivotal in executing the purposes of the ARDC, ensuring that the activities thereof align with the ARDC’s objectives and the stipulations of ratified proposal. Here, it is also the role of the Supervisory Council, to see that this is actually being done and that activities within the ARDC will actually further or are in conformity with the purposes outlined in the ratified proposal. RECORD-KEEPING AND REPORTING: Comprehensive and precise record-keeping is imperative. The Supervisory Council will be required to maintain detailed accounts and documentation of the ARDC’s internal operational workflow together with meeting minutes taken by the Supervisory Council. Furthermore, periodic reporting is essential so as to keep the ArbitrumDAO updated re. Task-specific progress & internal ARDC Administration (such as which ARDC Member is working on which task & deadlines for the expected publication of tasks that fall in line with the purposes of the ARDC). DUTY OF IMPARTIALITY: ARDC Members will have an obligation to act in an impartial manner in relation to their tasks & workflow, ensuring that the ARDC is not compromised by personal interests or external influences. OBLIGATION OF RECUSAL: ARDC Members with a conflict of interest involving a project being reviewed by the ARDC should recuse themselves from participating in the evaluation and should vote Abstain if a proposal directly related to the ARDC is submitted. Additionally, ARDC members will abstain from commenting or voting on proposals made by any company that can be deemed a direct competitor. PROHIBITION OF SELF-DEALING: Participants should refrain from voting on sending funds to themselves or organizations where any portion of those funds is expected to flow to them, their other projects, or anyone they have a close personal or economic relationship. ETHICAL TRADING: Members are required to follow ethical trading standards in regard to ARB and any other relevant digital assets.
Checks & Balances
The ARDC’s mandate will be structured in two phases: If the DAO chooses not to extend the ARDC after the initial term, MSS will return the remaining USDC + ARB to the Treasury. There will be no subsequent OTC to buy back ARB with the USDC. The ARDC may seek to identify and complete other initiatives for the ArbitrumDAO & the wider Arbitrum Ecosystem, depending on the changing needs of such ecosystem, at the discretion of the Supervisory Council following consultation with the ArbitrumDAO via the necessary communication channels.
Term
In the ARDC v1, the ARDC was funded with 1.76M ARB, which at a price of $1.7/ARB amounted to approximately $3.01M USD, inclusive of a bugger of around 30%. For the elected members at the time of the proposal, this would have amounted to: While the Final Outcome Report notes that the 'ROI' of ARDC V1 can't be objectively quantified, the return of over 1.0 million ARB to the DAO's Treasury demonstrates how ARDC can deliver tangible value. As ARDC V2 moves forward, this achievement underscores the potential for further benefits that, although not always predictable, can significantly enhance the DAO's financial position and overall impact. Due to the decrease in ARB's price, the total cost of ARDC V1 amounted to approximately $1.0M USD, which we've designated as the baseline for Option B below. The amounts for Option A and Option C are estimated to be around 20% higher and lower, respectively. In ARDC v1 funds were held in a 3/5 multi sig, however, for the ARDC v2, the multi-sig requested to manage the funds is within the Multi-Sig Support Service (MSS) established by Entropy Advisors. This adjustment will save the ARDC V2 30,000 ARB by reducing the need for five multi-signature signers. Costs 35,000 ARB to @Immutablelawyer as retroactive payment for the drafting, review and refinement of this proposal, as well as the managing of the election process itself and ensuring execution of all steps pre-commencement of the term. The 35,000 ARB will be delegated to the Immutablelawyer Tally profile for a minimum period of 90 days following receipt of funds. This increase is reflective of additional reviews, amendments, and hours allocated for refinement by our team. It is important to note that the applicable cap outlined below represents the maximum allowable amount that may be paid to prospective applicants in the application phase, ensuring that total spending does not exceed this limit. Thus, this is not a guaranteed amount to be paid, but rather the ceiling that cannot be surpassed. In response to feedback received, allocations associated with risk have been increased by 20%. Additionally, the figures provided below are based on a full 1-year term. Should a decision be made not to extend ARDC v2, the funded amount would be capped at a maximum of half the amounts shown. ARB Token Calculation To determine the ARB token amount, we used the 14-day Time-Weighted Average Price (TWAP) of ARB/USD, each as listed EOD UTC, until EOD on 27-Oct-2024 on CoinGecko, prior to the proposal being posted on Tally. This method ensures a fair and current valuation while mitigating short-term price volatility. A 20% buffer has been added to account for potential price fluctuations between proposal submission and execution, so in the case of ARB depreciation, the ARDC multi-sig under the Multi-Sig Service (MSS) is still able to satisfy payments. The remaining unused funds of this buffer will be returned to the Arbitrum DAO treasury. The Multi-Sig wallet established by the MSS can be found at the following address: arb1:0x8deBa81C874C68C27a09706CdEa50d4F727E0711 The total budget requested from the on-chain vote is ARB 3,982,602, calculated based on the time-weighted ARB price of $0.5574/ARB. Please find the Google sheet with the corresponding calculation of the TWAP ARB amount here. Upon receiving the ARB, we will convert 1.73M USDC worth of ARB. Payment distributions will be managed through Llama Pay to ensure a steady and transparent streaming of funds. Option A: Funded with 1.73M USDC + Council Option B: Funded with 2.09M USDC + Council Option C: Funded with 2.60M USDC + Council Option D: Abstain Option E: Do not fund the ARDC
Funding & Voting
The ARDC will utilize a Protocol-Owned Execution strategy on Aera to convert the program’s ARB into USDC for operational purposes, reducing counterparty price risk on OTC desks. The Protocol-Owned Execution strategy utilizes off-chain logic to monitor onchain liquidity and model the price impact of trading. The ARDC will use an Aera Vault, with Gauntlet as the guardian, to execute the conversion. Trade execution is scheduled and sized according to impact modeling and executed on Odos, or Bebop. Protocol-Owned Execution The Protocol-Owned Execution strategy uses off-chain logic to monitor onchain liquidity, model price impact, and plan the execution of active and passive trading. For ARB on the Arbitrum Chain, Gauntlet will swap out tokens using either Odos (DEX aggregator) or BeBop (self-execution solver). Passive execution uses concentrated ARB positions in an ARB/USDC pool (Odos supports projects such as Camelot, Uniswap V3, and more). The amount converted through this position is periodically claimed, and a new ARB position is set in the pool. These can be thought of as limit orders. Active and passive execution are used in tandem to maximize liquidity sourcing. Price impact modeling and gas cost determine the intraday trading schedule and size. Historical data is used to determine initial parameters. We continuously monitor slippage, intraday price impact, and medium-term price impact and adjust execution parameters if necessary. Intraday price impact is measured as the likelihood of observable price divergence in the hour after trading. The medium-term impact is measured as the effect of trade size on the divergence relative to a peer benchmark. The example chart shows rolling slippage for one of Aera’s Trade Execution Customers. The example chart shows the likelihood of intraday impact for one of Aera’s Trade Execution Customers. ARDC Vault Parameters Aera is an on-chain solution to optimize DAO funds autonomously. It addresses the common pain point of inactive treasury management, which often hinders a DAO’s ability to maintain its runway, cover liabilities, and benefit from market growth. Unlike traditional institutions that rely on agile managers for fund allocation, DAOs face unique challenges, including governance and incentive alignment with external managers. To address these, Aera offers a unified solution for efficiently and transparently managing on-chain treasuries, grants, and incentive funds through customizable vaults. Aera vaults can hold stablecoins, native tokens, and other cryptocurrencies, with their objective functions tailored to each DAO’s needs. Guardians leverage off-chain logic to automate rebalancing decisions, ensuring the vaults meet their objectives across various market scenarios and time horizons. You can read more about Aera here.
Fund Conversion (Aera)
Arb Conversion Strategy




About Aera
ARBITRUM RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT COLLECTIVE [V2]
Important Note: the sums voted on on Snapshot and requested via Tally are representative of the 12-month budget. In the immediate, only 50% of the budget voted in favour by the DAO will be used with the remaining 50% subject to utilisation via Snapshot vote as explained in the extension mechanics.
Update log:
A brief summary of the changes carried out include:
A call discussing the details and updates for ARDC v2 was held on 16-Oct-2024.
The Snapshot proposal for ARDC V2 was successfully passed on 24-Oct-2024.
Non-Constitutional
Defining ‘Arbitrum Research & Development Collective’ or ‘ARDC’: An alliance for combined action used to achieve a common goal in the best interests of the ArbitrumDAO in relation to research & development initiatives
TL;DR
In the first iteration of the ARDC, we experimented with the structure and the remuneration framework. In this regard, we adopted a DAOAdvocate role as inspired by the Arbitrum Coalition (Refer: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-the-arbitrum-coalition/19145). Also, we adopted the same seats as envisaged in Proposal: The Arbitrum Coalition the Arbitrum Coalition proposal ergo, Research, Risk and Security. In the first iteration of the ARDC, we had the pleasure of utilising the following service providers as elected by the ArbitrumDAO: Below a summary of the key deliverables and achievements of the ARDC have been provided: [Blockworks Research] STIP Analysis Case Study: GMX [Blockworks Research] STIP Analysis Case Study: JOJO [Blockworks Research] STIP Analysis: Concerns Regarding Possible Misconduct by Synapse with Respect to the Usage of ARB Incentives Allocated Through the STIP [Blockworks Research] STIP Bridge: Support Material for the Community [OpenZeppelin] Using Hedgey for Proposal Payment Vesting [Delphi Digital] Gaming Catalyst Program: SWOT Analysis [Delphi Digital] Gaming Catalyst Program - Compensation Structure Memo [Chaos Labs] STIP Risk Analysis — Case Study #1: Vertex Protocol [Chaos Labs] STIP Risk Analysis — Case Study #2: Silo Finance [Delphi Digital] BOLD Dispute Mechanism Summary & Comparisons [OpenZeppelin] Security Council Improvement Proposal [Blockworks Research] STIP Retroactive Analysis - Perp DEX Protocols Volume Report [Open Zeppelin] BOLD Security Analysis [Chaos Labs] STIP Risk Analysis — Case Study #3: Pendle Finance [Blockworks Research] STIP Retroactive Analysis – Spot DEX TVL [Blockworks Research] STIP Analysis of Operations and Incentive Mechanisms [Delphi Digital] Arbitrum DAO Treasury Research [OpenZeppelin] ETH Staking Options and Risks for the DAO [OpenZeppelin] Event Horizon Franchiser Contract Audit [Chaos Labs] STIP Analysis | Insights & Key Findings [Chaos Labs] Risk Analysis of Adjusting the Minimum Base Fee on Arbitrum [OpenZeppelin] ArbOS 31 “Bianca” Proposal Review [Blockworks Research] STIP Retroactive Analysis – Sequencer [Delphi Digital] Response to Arbitrum Staking Proposal [Blockworks Research] Treasury-Backed Vault Research [Open Zeppelin] Arbitrum Governor V2 Review [Open Zeppelin] Arbitrum Governor Upgrade Rollout & Timeline [Chaos Labs] Treasury Backed Vaults Risk Analysis [Open Zeppelin] Security Analysis of Arbitrum Staking Proposal [Delphi Digital] Follow Up - DAO Incomes Sources and the Path to Staking [Chaos Labs] Risk Analysis of Adjusting the minimum base fee on Arbitrum [Blockworks Research] Incentives Research Summary [Blockworks Research] Timeboost Revenue and LP Impact Analysis* [Delphi Digital] Transaction Ordering Policies & Value Accrual in L2s: Timeboost, OP PGA, Fastlane & OEV Network [Chaos Labs] Timeboost Risk Analysis [OpenZeppelin] Timeboost Security Analysis [OpenZeppelin] Arbitrum L2 Time Lock Delay Proposal Security Review [OpenZeppelin] RARI Multichain Governance Proposal Security Review [OpenZeppelin] Arbitrum daoURI Proposal Security Review [Blockworks Research] Retroactive LTIPP Analysis** [Delphi Digital] Incentives Programs in other protocols** [Chaos Labs] Treasury Management Risk Assessment** *Although Blockworks didn’t pick up this workstream specifically as a member of the ARDC, it has been included in the list since it was relevant to the Timeboost discussion and since it was published in the overall context of the work ARDC was doing on that front.
*These deliverables haven’t been published on the forum yet. Although the ARDC term has concluded, the engagement of the members will be officially regarded as ‘concluded’ upon publishing the final deliverables. As outlined in the Final Outcome Report prepared by the DAO Advocate, L2Beat, member performance should not be assessed solely by the number of deliverables completed. Each deliverable varies in complexity, making a simple tally an inadequate measure of contribution. For this reason, individual totals for each member were not compiled, as it would not provide an accurate comparison. Since the ARDC launched in April, several in-depth studies have been undertaken. A particular focus was attributed to the STIP program in individual protocols like GMX, JOJO, Vertex, Silo Finance and Pendle Finance. This included retroactive analyses on the impact of the STIP on trading volumes in perp DEX protocols, spot DEX and yield aggregator TVL, and sequencer revenue. These analyses provided valuable insights into the broader market impacts of the STIP incentives and their effectiveness in driving desired outcomes, resulting in an average
of 1,000,000 ARB being returned to the DAOs treasury. Significant concerns regarding Synapse’s handling of ARB incentives, leading to the withdrawal of Synapse’s application from the STIP Bridge. This incident highlights the importance of ongoing monitoring and transparency in the allocation and usage of incentives. Moreover, risk assessments were conducted across multiple initiatives, accompanied by several security evaluations. These included the BOLD proposal, Security Council improvements, Event Horizon contracts as well as an analysis of the Gaming Catalyst Program. This highlights the importance of post-rollout research as a critical tool for continuous improvement, allowing the DAO to learn from past experiences and refine its strategies. By systematically analyzing outcomes and identifying areas for enhancement, the DAO can build on successes, address challenges, and make increasingly informed decisions.
ARDC v1 Overview
This proposal builds upon the foundation established by the Arbitrum Research and Development Collective [V1], introducing a more efficient and structured framework. In ARDC [V2], proposed working members are required to specify their hourly rate in a separate application form, with the payment structure being refined to follow that of a retainer model. This will help to better align incentives given that four-fifths of the cap allocated per vertical for the initial six-month term is contingent upon actual project needs, ensuring that these payments are directly tied to usage. We are also pleased to announce that the Arbitrum Foundation will be undertaking an 'Observer' role in relation to the Supervisory Council to aid in streamlining ARDC efforts, communication and overall efficacy. Additionally, applicants must outline a scope of work for the ArbitrumDAO covering one-third of their total workload for the initial 6-month term, complete with clear deliverables and timelines. The remainder of their workload will serve as a flexible budget to address tasks on an "as-needed" basis, allowing providers to demonstrate their understanding of the ArbitrumDAO’s most pressing needs. The final decision on the work carried out by elected working members will ultimately rest with the Supervisory Council. While the proposed scope serves as an initial framework, the Council will oversee and adjust the workload on a case-by-case basis, prioritizing deliverables within each vertical and addressing any conflicts between pre-determined tasks and requests made by the ArbitrumDAO. Therefore, this proposed scope of work will not automatically apply after the election. This emphasizes the Council’s crucial role in maximizing the effectiveness of ARDC v2, aligning tasks with the DAO’s priorities, and ensuring smooth daily operations. The goal is for this structure to gradually incorporate an Optimistic Governance Module (OGM), giving the community the power to veto ARDC deliverables. Unlike traditional token-based governance, which requires a majority of affirmative votes for proposals to pass, Optimistic Governance enables proposals to pass automatically unless they meet a predefined threshold of objection votes. This approach minimizes bureaucratic overhead, facilitating more efficient decision-making for non-contentious proposals and fostering a more agile governance framework. It’s important to note that ARDC v2 does not depend on the OGM for implementation; however, once Tally deploys the OGM for the DAO, a proposal will be submitted to integrate it into the ARDC structure.
Summary
SUPERVISORY COUNCIL ROLE IN THE ARDC: DETAILED RESPONSIBILITIES AND IMPORTANCE The DAOAdvocate’s role was intended as a single designated entity responsible for guiding the ARDC’s efforts and acting as a mediator between the DAO and the ARDC. This is fundamentally about representing the DAO’s best interests, rather than the operational management of the coalition’s activities. These operational tasks, carried out by L2Beat included the establishing of communication channels and coordination among members, creating and maintaining a Notion page to document meeting minutes and track tasks through a kanban board, compliance and onboarding processes like KYC/KYB as well as regular updates and the maintenance of open communication channels among several others. In the revised structure of the ARDC, we propose establishing the Supervisory Council, a body elected by the DAO to ensure alignment with its strategic and operational priorities. The Supervisory Council will be better positioned to capture the full range of perspectives and needs of the DAO community, bringing a variety of skills and viewpoints to strategic discussions. At the same time, this Council will also be responsible for day-to-day management and coordination. This dual focus ensures that the ARDC’s activities are strategically sound while being operationally effective, closing the gap between high-level guidance and the actual execution of tasks. This structure will consist of three (3) individuals elected by the DAO for an initial six-month term, with the option to extend for an additional six months. Each member will receive a monthly compensation of 5,000 ARB throughout their tenure. As a result, the total compensation for the council over the initial six-month period will be 90,000 ARB, and, if extended, the total cost for a full year will amount to 180,000 ARB. At a current price of $0.52/ARB, the initial 6-month term would cost approximately $46,800. For context, the DAOAdvocate role for ARDC v1 was compensated with 50,000 ARB, which, at the current price of $1.70 would have equated to $85,000. This comparison underscores the cost-effectiveness of the ARDC v2. The Supervisory Council will operate at both macro and micro levels, ensuring comprehensive oversight, strategic alignment, and effective day-to-day operations. At the micro level, two (2) of the elected members will focus on communications and one (1) will focus on operations. By clearly defining these roles and their corresponding responsibilities, the Council is better positioned to attract the right talent to enhance ARDC visibility and improve communication with OffChain Labs and the Arbitrum Foundation. This approach aims to bridge the gap between the ARDC, the DAO, the Arbitrum Foundation, and OffChain Labs. [A] MACRO-LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES Strategic Oversight & Resource Management: Define overall strategic priorities for ARDC initiatives, conducting regular evaluations to ensure alignment with the DAO’s objectives. Intervene as necessary to realign projects with these priorities. Set guidelines for financial, human, and technical resource allocations, establishing frameworks that prioritize high-impact projects while allowing the micro-level team to handle daily resource distribution. Provide high-level budget oversight, ensuring resources are allocated according to strategic guidelines while empowering operations to manage day-to-day budget adherence. Representation of DAO Interests & Coordination: Serve as a central point of contact between ARDC members, the ArbitrumDAO, and external partners, ensuring the DAO’s strategic interests are reflected in ARDC decision-making. Organize periodic community consultations on major initiatives, delegating routine community engagement to the communications team. Ensure strategic topics and updates are shared with key stakeholders, including the Arbitrum community, OffChain Labs, and the Arbitrum Foundation. Conflict Resolution & Mediation: Mediate conflicts that have strategic implications for the ARDC or that arise between the ARDC and the DAO, ensuring resolutions uphold the DAO’s objectives. Provide a neutral platform for resolving disputes that may impact the ARDC’s alignment with DAO goals. [B] MICRO-LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES Communication Roles: Stakeholder Communication & Engagement: Communication Roles: Communication Strategy & Publication:: Operations Role: Internal Organisation & Financial Management:: Operations Role: Additional Operational Parameters:: Additionally, if a simple majority (2/3) of the Supervisory Council deem a member of the ARDC to have acted negligently, in bad faith, or contrary to the mandate/purposes of the ARDC as ratified by the ArbitrumDAO, the Supervisory Council will be obliged to submit a proposal via Snapshot to terminate such a member of the ARDC together with the necessary details that justify such termination. Following this, the Supervisory Council will have an ancillary obligation to submit a call for applications for the vacant ARDC seat. The decision as to who ought to take up the vacant seat will be determined by the ArbitrumDAO via the election mechanism stipulated in this Forum Post (for intra-ARDC elections, the same RFP-Based + Application election model will be utilised).
Supervisory Council
The Risk Member [Strictly Research & Analysis] The ideal Risk Member should possess strong quantitative skills to evaluate and manage risks across DeFi protocols, with sufficient expertise in modeling, simulations, and economic risk analysis. On an as-requested basis, they will assess protocol design, tokenomics, and governance mechanisms to ensure economic efficiency, incentivize usage, and safeguard systemic health. The role involves conducting thorough risk-focused research and applying modeling techniques to identify and mitigate potential threats. Additionally, the Risk Member will provide strategic guidance and data-driven insights to optimize risk management practices, supporting continuous monitoring, reporting, and informed decision-making to promote trust and sustainability in within the ArbitrumDAO. The Security Member [Strictly Research & Analysis] The Security member should ideally possess skills in specific static analysis bug detection targeting code updates and developing fuzzing capabilities to validate upgrade states. They should be proficient in visualizing the state of governance contracts, ensuring correct encoding of values, and providing educational materials and guidelines for reviewing upgrade procedures. Additionally, they should have expertise in identifying design flaws, and ensuring security and correctness properties in on-chain upgrade proposals. This role is crucial for preventing governance attacks and may involve building tools and educational materials to support proposal reviews. The Research Member [Strictly Research & Analysis] The Research member should ideally possess a range of skills, including the ability to conduct objective analysis and contribute to the design of various mechanisms such as sequencers, fraud proofs, and data availability solutions, with a strong emphasis on objective data-driven research. They should also be proficient in creating processes that incentivize active delegate participation, such as developing delegate incentives frameworks and hosting regular collaborative calls. Additionally, they should be skilled in content creation to promote the Arbitrum ecosystem’s growth. Moreover, the candidate should have a knack for producing impartial, data-driven research to aid delegates in making informed decisions and improving proposal quality. Excellent communication skills and the ability to manage interactions with DAO stakeholders and service providers are essential, along with the capacity to document ARDC activities and recommend solutions for any issues that arise, maintaining a governance process for continuity.
Risk, Security, Research
In the application form, working members must specify their hourly rate, incentivizing them to propose competitive rates to enhance their chances of selection. The maximum allowable hours for each term will be calculated by dividing the total applicable cap by the hourly rate, which will assist the Supervisory Council in budgeting and establishing a benchmark for future budget planning. Aligned with the principle that "incentives dictate outcomes," the Supervisory Council will oversee task approval, whether from proposed scopes of work by the working members or from incoming requests. The Council will evaluate each potential deliverable's cost-effectiveness based on the elected members' estimated time commitment and hourly rate. This process motivates working members to provide accurate time estimates, as overestimating could reduce their chances of being assigned the deliverable. To provide greater financial security for working members, one-fifth of the applicable cap relating to the initial six-month term will be paid upfront upon election. For example, if a working member’s rate is $100 per hour and the DAO-approved retainer cap is $1,000, they would have a maximum of 10 hours available. In this scenario, the member would receive an upfront payment of one-fifth of the cap ($200), covering the first 2 hours of work. The remaining portion of the cap will be contingent on actual work performed. This approach mitigates the risk of underutilization by tying the remaining four-fifths of the applicable cap ($800) to usage as required. Once the Supervisory Council identifies a deliverable, the Operations member will issue a Request for Quotation (RFQ) to the relevant working member, outlining the anticipated hours needed. Following delegate feedback, the amount to be paid upfront was updated from one-third to one-fifth of the applicable cap for the initial six-month term. This model ensures that: Following the completion of the initial one-fifth allocation, payment for subsequent work will be structured as follows: members will receive 50% of the quoted hours' payment before commencing each deliverable, with the remaining amount paid upon satisfactory completion. This phased payment structure promotes accountability and reinforces efficient, quality work.
Retainer Model
The ARDC election process is scheduled to begin 3 business days from the passing of the Snapshot proposal. A high-level overview of this process can be found in the diagram below. All ARDC members are expected to serve their term unless terminated by the ArbitrumDAO through Snapshot as stipulated in the Agreement regulating the ARDC [Further details below re. the Agreement & Defining provisions]. There will be four separate elections held: To minimize voter fatigue, the Supervisory Council elections will be conducted through a single, general election snapshot. Candidates will be required to specify their desired role in their application. For instance, if the top three elected candidates all apply for the Communication role, only the top two will be selected for that role. The third position will then be filled by the highest-ranking candidate who applied for the Operations role, ensuring a balanced allocation of roles within the Council. The following timeline governs an election process that starts at time T [‘T’ means the date that the Snapshot vote passes +3 days]: GOVERNING RULES While a joint application for each seat is permissible, an applicant may not apply as part of a joint application with other applicants & then proceed to apply as a Supervisory Council member or for another seat. The fees (hourly rate/s) in the respective elected member’s forum post application will apply once elected via Snapshot as per the Election Process. ELECTION STRUCTURE 1. Application Submission (T+14 business days): Anyone may submit an application on a dedicated page on the ArbitrumDAO Forums in conformity with the application template; 2. Proposal Review Period (7 business day period following end of Application Submission Period): This period will be utilised for delegates to be able to review each proposal as submitted by applicants. 3. Amendment Period (3 business day period following the end of the Proposal Review period whereby applicants may amend their application): Applicants may amend their applications in light of community feedback during this time period. 4. Member election (7 business day period following end of Amendment Period): A Snapshot with weighted voting will be put up per vertical including the list of all eligible candidates: The ArbitrumDAO may approve and implement a Non-Constitutional AIP to change the rules governing future ARDC elections, but the AIP process may not be used to intervene in an ongoing election. Furthermore, please find the election templates for the Supervisory Council and respective seats, designed to guide prospective applicants through the application process, as well as details regarding timelines on the published Notion site here. Interested applicants are encouraged to join the ARDC V2 Election chat on Telegram here.
Election Process

The ARDC will be regulated via an Agreement entered into by all elected ARDC Members with the Arbitrum Foundation serving as a counterparty to the Agreement. The Agreement will be made public & include, but will not be limited to the following provisions: Appointment & Termination: ARDC Members will be appointed via the forecited election process in accordance with ArbitrumDAO Consent by the Arbitrum Community. “Arbitrum Community” means those persons who have the right to propose and vote on proposals ergo, the token holders of the ARB token with the following contract address [0x912CE59144191C1204E64559FE8253a0e49E6548] from time to time visible at [$1.73 | Arbitrum (ARB) Token Tracker | Arbiscan 3]. ““ArbitrumDAO Consent” means a vote of the ArbitrumDAO Community in favour of a proposal satisfying the minimum requirements set forth at The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO | Arbitrum DAO - Governance docs 4 (as such minimum requirements set forth therein on the date hereof may be revised from time to time with ArbitrumDAO Consent) taken by any of the following means: CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROVISION: ARDC Members will be bound to act in absolute good faith, with utmost honesty, refraining from deriving unauthorized profits from their position & disclosing conflicts of interest. ARDC members should always disclose any potential or actual conflicts of interest to the Supervisory Council who will then proceed to mitigate the respective ARDC Member’s involvement in the task in relation to which such ARDC Member is conflicted. To sum up, all ARDC Members must declare the nature and extent of any interest, direct or indirect, which the ARDC Member is aware that she, he or it has in a proposed task at hand. MANDATE & PURPOSE OF THE ARDC: The ARDC members are pivotal in executing the purposes of the ARDC, ensuring that the activities thereof align with the ARDC’s objectives and the stipulations of ratified proposal. Here, it is also the role of the Supervisory Council, to see that this is actually being done and that activities within the ARDC will actually further or are in conformity with the purposes outlined in the ratified proposal. RECORD-KEEPING AND REPORTING: Comprehensive and precise record-keeping is imperative. The Supervisory Council will be required to maintain detailed accounts and documentation of the ARDC’s internal operational workflow together with meeting minutes taken by the Supervisory Council. Furthermore, periodic reporting is essential so as to keep the ArbitrumDAO updated re. Task-specific progress & internal ARDC Administration (such as which ARDC Member is working on which task & deadlines for the expected publication of tasks that fall in line with the purposes of the ARDC). DUTY OF IMPARTIALITY: ARDC Members will have an obligation to act in an impartial manner in relation to their tasks & workflow, ensuring that the ARDC is not compromised by personal interests or external influences. OBLIGATION OF RECUSAL: ARDC Members with a conflict of interest involving a project being reviewed by the ARDC should recuse themselves from participating in the evaluation and should vote Abstain if a proposal directly related to the ARDC is submitted. Additionally, ARDC members will abstain from commenting or voting on proposals made by any company that can be deemed a direct competitor. PROHIBITION OF SELF-DEALING: Participants should refrain from voting on sending funds to themselves or organizations where any portion of those funds is expected to flow to them, their other projects, or anyone they have a close personal or economic relationship. ETHICAL TRADING: Members are required to follow ethical trading standards in regard to ARB and any other relevant digital assets.
Checks & Balances
The ARDC’s mandate will be structured in two phases: If the DAO chooses not to extend the ARDC after the initial term, MSS will return the remaining USDC + ARB to the Treasury. There will be no subsequent OTC to buy back ARB with the USDC. The ARDC may seek to identify and complete other initiatives for the ArbitrumDAO & the wider Arbitrum Ecosystem, depending on the changing needs of such ecosystem, at the discretion of the Supervisory Council following consultation with the ArbitrumDAO via the necessary communication channels.
Term
In the ARDC v1, the ARDC was funded with 1.76M ARB, which at a price of $1.7/ARB amounted to approximately $3.01M USD, inclusive of a bugger of around 30%. For the elected members at the time of the proposal, this would have amounted to: While the Final Outcome Report notes that the 'ROI' of ARDC V1 can't be objectively quantified, the return of over 1.0 million ARB to the DAO's Treasury demonstrates how ARDC can deliver tangible value. As ARDC V2 moves forward, this achievement underscores the potential for further benefits that, although not always predictable, can significantly enhance the DAO's financial position and overall impact. Due to the decrease in ARB's price, the total cost of ARDC V1 amounted to approximately $1.0M USD, which we've designated as the baseline for Option B below. The amounts for Option A and Option C are estimated to be around 20% higher and lower, respectively. In ARDC v1 funds were held in a 3/5 multi sig, however, for the ARDC v2, the multi-sig requested to manage the funds is within the Multi-Sig Support Service (MSS) established by Entropy Advisors. This adjustment will save the ARDC V2 30,000 ARB by reducing the need for five multi-signature signers. Costs 35,000 ARB to @Immutablelawyer as retroactive payment for the drafting, review and refinement of this proposal, as well as the managing of the election process itself and ensuring execution of all steps pre-commencement of the term. The 35,000 ARB will be delegated to the Immutablelawyer Tally profile for a minimum period of 90 days following receipt of funds. This increase is reflective of additional reviews, amendments, and hours allocated for refinement by our team. It is important to note that the applicable cap outlined below represents the maximum allowable amount that may be paid to prospective applicants in the application phase, ensuring that total spending does not exceed this limit. Thus, this is not a guaranteed amount to be paid, but rather the ceiling that cannot be surpassed. In response to feedback received, allocations associated with risk have been increased by 20%. Additionally, the figures provided below are based on a full 1-year term. Should a decision be made not to extend ARDC v2, the funded amount would be capped at a maximum of half the amounts shown. ARB Token Calculation To determine the ARB token amount, we used the 14-day Time-Weighted Average Price (TWAP) of ARB/USD, each as listed EOD UTC, until EOD on 27-Oct-2024 on CoinGecko, prior to the proposal being posted on Tally. This method ensures a fair and current valuation while mitigating short-term price volatility. A 20% buffer has been added to account for potential price fluctuations between proposal submission and execution, so in the case of ARB depreciation, the ARDC multi-sig under the Multi-Sig Service (MSS) is still able to satisfy payments. The remaining unused funds of this buffer will be returned to the Arbitrum DAO treasury. The Multi-Sig wallet established by the MSS can be found at the following address: arb1:0x8deBa81C874C68C27a09706CdEa50d4F727E0711 The total budget requested from the on-chain vote is ARB 3,982,602, calculated based on the time-weighted ARB price of $0.5574/ARB. Please find the Google sheet with the corresponding calculation of the TWAP ARB amount here. Upon receiving the ARB, we will convert 1.73M USDC worth of ARB. Payment distributions will be managed through Llama Pay to ensure a steady and transparent streaming of funds. Option A: Funded with 1.73M USDC + Council Option B: Funded with 2.09M USDC + Council Option C: Funded with 2.60M USDC + Council Option D: Abstain Option E: Do not fund the ARDC
Funding & Voting
The ARDC will utilize a Protocol-Owned Execution strategy on Aera to convert the program’s ARB into USDC for operational purposes, reducing counterparty price risk on OTC desks. The Protocol-Owned Execution strategy utilizes off-chain logic to monitor onchain liquidity and model the price impact of trading. The ARDC will use an Aera Vault, with Gauntlet as the guardian, to execute the conversion. Trade execution is scheduled and sized according to impact modeling and executed on Odos, or Bebop. Protocol-Owned Execution The Protocol-Owned Execution strategy uses off-chain logic to monitor onchain liquidity, model price impact, and plan the execution of active and passive trading. For ARB on the Arbitrum Chain, Gauntlet will swap out tokens using either Odos (DEX aggregator) or BeBop (self-execution solver). Passive execution uses concentrated ARB positions in an ARB/USDC pool (Odos supports projects such as Camelot, Uniswap V3, and more). The amount converted through this position is periodically claimed, and a new ARB position is set in the pool. These can be thought of as limit orders. Active and passive execution are used in tandem to maximize liquidity sourcing. Price impact modeling and gas cost determine the intraday trading schedule and size. Historical data is used to determine initial parameters. We continuously monitor slippage, intraday price impact, and medium-term price impact and adjust execution parameters if necessary. Intraday price impact is measured as the likelihood of observable price divergence in the hour after trading. The medium-term impact is measured as the effect of trade size on the divergence relative to a peer benchmark. The example chart shows rolling slippage for one of Aera’s Trade Execution Customers. The example chart shows the likelihood of intraday impact for one of Aera’s Trade Execution Customers. ARDC Vault Parameters Aera is an on-chain solution to optimize DAO funds autonomously. It addresses the common pain point of inactive treasury management, which often hinders a DAO’s ability to maintain its runway, cover liabilities, and benefit from market growth. Unlike traditional institutions that rely on agile managers for fund allocation, DAOs face unique challenges, including governance and incentive alignment with external managers. To address these, Aera offers a unified solution for efficiently and transparently managing on-chain treasuries, grants, and incentive funds through customizable vaults. Aera vaults can hold stablecoins, native tokens, and other cryptocurrencies, with their objective functions tailored to each DAO’s needs. Guardians leverage off-chain logic to automate rebalancing decisions, ensuring the vaults meet their objectives across various market scenarios and time horizons. You can read more about Aera here.
Fund Conversion (Aera)
Arb Conversion Strategy




About Aera
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/100
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/100
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-51: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-51
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-51: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-51
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/95?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/94?u=ocandocrypto
maintaining our support from Snapshot
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/47?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/92?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/91?u=0xdonpepe
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/47?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/89?u=tekr0x.eth
While some value came out of the ARDC in the past, it’s not clear that it needs to be a permanent group. We’re not convinced this needs to be renewed. Separately, we’re also not in favor of the possibility of a 6-month term extension by a Snapshot confirmation – the term should be well defined, and any chance to be reelected should be contingent on facing challengers, rather than locking in incumbents. On grounds of an unhealthy electoral process on another extension, and just on our lukewarm feelings about the potential value to be delivered, we will vote Against. We fully expect this proposal to pass as-is, however, and wish the future members good luck and hope they prove us wrong.
Lacking a better structured alternative, this is viable
I feel this committee is not really needed at this time. Also, it doesn't make sense to approve this amount of spending without knowing who will be its beneficiaries since the elections will happen after the onchain vote. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/88?u=paulofonseca
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/87?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/43?u=ezr3al
Reasoning: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/86?u=tempetechie
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/49
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/83?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/37?u=bruce
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/81?u=pedrob
I am voting for. I think the Voting for the ARDC V2 proposal is a strategic move to strengthen ArbitrumDAO's research and development efforts while optimizing costs and enhancing governance. First, ARDC V2 builds on the success of V1, which returned over 1 million ARB to the DAO Treasury, demonstrating measurable value and efficiency. The introduction of a Supervisory Council adds structure, with dedicated roles in communication and operations that streamline day-to-day management and align activities with the DAO’s strategic goals. The new funding model is more cost-effective and aligns incentives by linking most payments to actual project needs, avoiding underutilization and ensuring that resources are used where they are most impactful. The Retainer Model also encourages competitive hourly rates and ensures payments are directly tied to deliverables, promoting accountability and cost-effectiveness.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/39?u=kuiclub Overall, this proposal can help to better manage and optimize the R&D process and deserves to be supported to support ARDC in achieving the above objectives In the area of transparent budgeting, the restructuring of the budget in the proposal is good, but the Oversight Committee should ensure that funds are used transparently to avoid overspending. At the same time, monitoring improvement: the introduction of the monitoring committee is a good idea to strengthen the management of the budget and projects, to ensure that each project advances on time and to avoid the waste of resources. Also retaining the payment model: this is useful to motivate members to be more focused and efficient, and also avoid useless work, efficiency will increase
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/40?u=duokongcrypto I think the adjusted scope of at-risk members is clearer, provides real value to the ecosystem, and is worth supporting. But as a general outsider’s view, I think a few points need attention 1. budget transparency: budget adjustments are good, but the oversight committee must ensure that every dollar is clearly spent to avoid waste. 2. Reduced roles: Eliminating unnecessary roles improves efficiency, but key positions must not be missing to avoid jeopardizing project progress. 3. Linking workload to remuneration: a flexible retention model is good, but it has to be ensured that there is someone to supervise it, so that no one can just get paid and not work, and the quality of work has to be kept up. The most important thing is the feedback mechanism, supervision mechanism. I see accountability mentioned in many reports.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/79?u=juanrah
Glad to see this proposal on on-chain vote! I shared my thoughts in the snapshot because I believe ongoing ARDC programs are crucial for strengthening our governance, security, and research. I also believe this will help Arbitrum have a professional financial management system.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/38?u=todayindefi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476/85?u=larva
While they haven’t gotten to the expert service provider network stage, I’ll give 6 more months with chosen providers. They did a lot and learned a lot in v1
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/69
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/68?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/67?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/66?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/65?u=winverse
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/64?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/60?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/59?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/57?u=0xtalvo.eth_mty
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/56?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/55?u=griff
I feel there is not enough pull from the DAO to justify this committee and the consequent high investment, especially given the history of the previous committee in the past 6 months. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/54?u=paulofonseca
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/50?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/49
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/47
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/45?u=maxlomu
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/44?u=0xdonpepe
N/A
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/43?u=ezr3al
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/41
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/40?u=duokongcrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/39?u=kuiclub
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/38?u=todayindefi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/37?u=bruce
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476/77?u=larva
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-51: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-51
The Event Horizon Community Voted to Support this Proposal ehARB-51: EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-51
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/95?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/94?u=ocandocrypto
maintaining our support from Snapshot
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/47?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/92?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/91?u=0xdonpepe
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/griff-green-delegate-communication-thread/25040/47?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/89?u=tekr0x.eth
While some value came out of the ARDC in the past, it’s not clear that it needs to be a permanent group. We’re not convinced this needs to be renewed. Separately, we’re also not in favor of the possibility of a 6-month term extension by a Snapshot confirmation – the term should be well defined, and any chance to be reelected should be contingent on facing challengers, rather than locking in incumbents. On grounds of an unhealthy electoral process on another extension, and just on our lukewarm feelings about the potential value to be delivered, we will vote Against. We fully expect this proposal to pass as-is, however, and wish the future members good luck and hope they prove us wrong.
Lacking a better structured alternative, this is viable
I feel this committee is not really needed at this time. Also, it doesn't make sense to approve this amount of spending without knowing who will be its beneficiaries since the elections will happen after the onchain vote. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/88?u=paulofonseca
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/87?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/43?u=ezr3al
Reasoning: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/86?u=tempetechie
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/49
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/83?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/37?u=bruce
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/81?u=pedrob
I am voting for. I think the Voting for the ARDC V2 proposal is a strategic move to strengthen ArbitrumDAO's research and development efforts while optimizing costs and enhancing governance. First, ARDC V2 builds on the success of V1, which returned over 1 million ARB to the DAO Treasury, demonstrating measurable value and efficiency. The introduction of a Supervisory Council adds structure, with dedicated roles in communication and operations that streamline day-to-day management and align activities with the DAO’s strategic goals. The new funding model is more cost-effective and aligns incentives by linking most payments to actual project needs, avoiding underutilization and ensuring that resources are used where they are most impactful. The Retainer Model also encourages competitive hourly rates and ensures payments are directly tied to deliverables, promoting accountability and cost-effectiveness.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/39?u=kuiclub Overall, this proposal can help to better manage and optimize the R&D process and deserves to be supported to support ARDC in achieving the above objectives In the area of transparent budgeting, the restructuring of the budget in the proposal is good, but the Oversight Committee should ensure that funds are used transparently to avoid overspending. At the same time, monitoring improvement: the introduction of the monitoring committee is a good idea to strengthen the management of the budget and projects, to ensure that each project advances on time and to avoid the waste of resources. Also retaining the payment model: this is useful to motivate members to be more focused and efficient, and also avoid useless work, efficiency will increase
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/40?u=duokongcrypto I think the adjusted scope of at-risk members is clearer, provides real value to the ecosystem, and is worth supporting. But as a general outsider’s view, I think a few points need attention 1. budget transparency: budget adjustments are good, but the oversight committee must ensure that every dollar is clearly spent to avoid waste. 2. Reduced roles: Eliminating unnecessary roles improves efficiency, but key positions must not be missing to avoid jeopardizing project progress. 3. Linking workload to remuneration: a flexible retention model is good, but it has to be ensured that there is someone to supervise it, so that no one can just get paid and not work, and the quality of work has to be kept up. The most important thing is the feedback mechanism, supervision mechanism. I see accountability mentioned in many reports.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/79?u=juanrah
Glad to see this proposal on on-chain vote! I shared my thoughts in the snapshot because I believe ongoing ARDC programs are crucial for strengthening our governance, security, and research. I also believe this will help Arbitrum have a professional financial management system.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/38?u=todayindefi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476/85?u=larva
While they haven’t gotten to the expert service provider network stage, I’ll give 6 more months with chosen providers. They did a lot and learned a lot in v1
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/69
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/68?u=ocandocrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/67?u=blockworksresearch
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/66?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/65?u=winverse
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/64?u=tane
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/60?u=castlecapital
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/59?u=mcfly
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/57?u=0xtalvo.eth_mty
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/56?u=0x_ultra
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/55?u=griff
I feel there is not enough pull from the DAO to justify this committee and the consequent high investment, especially given the history of the previous committee in the past 6 months. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/54?u=paulofonseca
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/50?u=tekr0x.eth
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/49
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/47
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/45?u=maxlomu
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/44?u=0xdonpepe
N/A
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/43?u=ezr3al
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/41
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/40?u=duokongcrypto
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/39?u=kuiclub
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/38?u=todayindefi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/37?u=bruce
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/larva-delegate-communication-thread/24476/77?u=larva
The LevelK Delegation is voting 100% to Abstain. We are abstaining because we need to do further research to understand the function of the ARDC. Here are some of the outstanding questions we are researching:
-How does the ARDC’s function differ from other entities within and outside the DAO? (ex. Entropy, AF, OCL) -As @DisruptionJoe brought up, is there a long term program that could be started that identifies and funds research?
The LevelK Delegation is voting 100% to Abstain. We are abstaining because we need to do further research to understand the function of the ARDC. Here are some of the outstanding questions we are researching:
-How does the ARDC’s function differ from other entities within and outside the DAO? (ex. Entropy, AF, OCL) -As @DisruptionJoe brought up, is there a long term program that could be started that identifies and funds research?
We will continue to do diligence on this issue and look forward to engaging the community regarding our questions.
LlamaRisk would like to apply for the Risk Member seat of the Arbitrum Research and Development Collective. We are a nonprofit DeFi risk firm with extensive experience as risk providers to high profile DAOs such as Curve and Aave.
Our area of expertise is well suited to the Risk Member position, with services ranging from:
LlamaRisk would like to apply for the Risk Member seat of the Arbitrum Research and Development Collective. We are a nonprofit DeFi risk firm with extensive experience as risk providers to high profile DAOs such as Curve and Aave.
Our area of expertise is well suited to the Risk Member position, with services ranging from:
We approach our work with a spirit of collaboration, which we will bring to our engagement with DAO delegates and the wider community, our fellow ARDC members, and the protocols that make up the Arbitrum ecosystem. After some discussion with DAO stakeholders, we believe we can offer timely, comprehensive risk analysis at a competitive price that meets the requirements of the ARDC.
We'd like to thank @ImmutableLawyer for putting the Collective together in the first place and for spearheading its second phase. We are excited to review the supplementary documents and submit a formal application for this Risk Member position in the near future.
We recognize and appreciate the value of ARDC provided for the Arbitrum ecosystem. The only thing is that we are not clear on the difference of the 3 budget options and what deliverables might change for them. Would be great that those details could be provided if possible.
The LevelK Delegation is voting 100% to Abstain. We are abstaining because we need to do further research to understand the function of the ARDC. Here are some of the outstanding questions we are researching:
-How does the ARDC’s function differ from other entities within and outside the DAO? (ex. Entropy, AF, OCL) -As @DisruptionJoe brought up, is there a long term program that could be started that identifies and funds research?
The LevelK Delegation is voting 100% to Abstain. We are abstaining because we need to do further research to understand the function of the ARDC. Here are some of the outstanding questions we are researching:
-How does the ARDC’s function differ from other entities within and outside the DAO? (ex. Entropy, AF, OCL) -As @DisruptionJoe brought up, is there a long term program that could be started that identifies and funds research?
We will continue to do diligence on this issue and look forward to engaging the community regarding our questions.
LlamaRisk would like to apply for the Risk Member seat of the Arbitrum Research and Development Collective. We are a nonprofit DeFi risk firm with extensive experience as risk providers to high profile DAOs such as Curve and Aave.
Our area of expertise is well suited to the Risk Member position, with services ranging from:
LlamaRisk would like to apply for the Risk Member seat of the Arbitrum Research and Development Collective. We are a nonprofit DeFi risk firm with extensive experience as risk providers to high profile DAOs such as Curve and Aave.
Our area of expertise is well suited to the Risk Member position, with services ranging from:
We approach our work with a spirit of collaboration, which we will bring to our engagement with DAO delegates and the wider community, our fellow ARDC members, and the protocols that make up the Arbitrum ecosystem. After some discussion with DAO stakeholders, we believe we can offer timely, comprehensive risk analysis at a competitive price that meets the requirements of the ARDC.
We'd like to thank @ImmutableLawyer for putting the Collective together in the first place and for spearheading its second phase. We are excited to review the supplementary documents and submit a formal application for this Risk Member position in the near future.
We recognize and appreciate the value of ARDC provided for the Arbitrum ecosystem. The only thing is that we are not clear on the difference of the 3 budget options and what deliverables might change for them. Would be great that those details could be provided if possible.
DeFiSafety would like to express interest in the Risk analysis aspect of this initiative. We have been doing analysis of DeFi protocols and chains for over four years. Our focus has been on quality, process and transparency. This is more important than ever today. If you look at the security incidents from the recent past many (close to half) are due to weak processes, known bugs or weak OpSec. DeFiSafety may be able to contribute to this aspect and other analysis of DeFi protocols.
To be clear: We are applying for the Risk Seat, which best uses our experience.
DeFiSafety would like to express interest in the Risk analysis aspect of this initiative. We have been doing analysis of DeFi protocols and chains for over four years. Our focus has been on quality, process and transparency. This is more important than ever today. If you look at the security incidents from the recent past many (close to half) are due to weak processes, known bugs or weak OpSec. DeFiSafety may be able to contribute to this aspect and other analysis of DeFi protocols.
To be clear: We are applying for the Risk Seat, which best uses our experience.
Having closely followed ARDC v1 from the sidelines, speaking frequently with Blockworks/Delphi, and understanding the value of this research, I support this proposal and would be keen for Messari's Protocol Services to contribute our efforts towards the DAO in the future.
Having closely followed ARDC v1 from the sidelines, speaking frequently with Blockworks/Delphi, and understanding the value of this research, I support this proposal and would be keen for Messari's Protocol Services to contribute our efforts towards the DAO in the future.
Thank you for putting forth this proposal, ImmutableLawyer.
Revelo Intel, a provider of in-depth, unbiased, and objective research, is well-suited for the research member role. We are formally applying for this role as we believe our expertise would be valuable to the Arbitrum DAO, its stakeholders, and the broader Arbitrum community.
Thank you for putting forth this proposal, ImmutableLawyer.
Revelo Intel, a provider of in-depth, unbiased, and objective research, is well-suited for the research member role. We are formally applying for this role as we believe our expertise would be valuable to the Arbitrum DAO, its stakeholders, and the broader Arbitrum community.
As a research firm, we extensively cover DeFi, with Arbitrum naturally being a focal point due to the number of notable projects and innovations occurring on the chain. We are keen to continue and expand our coverage in a more official capacity, dedicating additional resources to the areas highlighted in the proposal. Additionally, we can amplify the research findings across our distribution channels, ensuring that insights reach beyond the existing Arbitrum DAO and its community.
We also believe the broader role of the ARDC is crucial. Having multiple reputable entities contribute to research promotes accountability and generates actionable data that benefit the ecosystem.
Below, we have included examples of our research that demonstrate its depth and relevance to Arbitrum and its ecosystem:
The State of Arbitrum (in collaboration with Castle Capital) Arbitrum Breakdown (Diligence) Report Analyzing Economics of L2s 2023/2024 Annual Intel - Our View on Trends and Narratives Pendle Industry Intel (Narrative) Report Vertex Edge Industry Intel (Narrative) Report Pear Protocol Industry Intel (Narrative) Report
Similarly, we've prepared such works for protocols like GMX, Stryke, Premia, Magpie, Camelot, and others.
We are confident that our expertise and comprehensive research will provide valuable insights for the Arbitrum DAO and its ecosystem. By partnering with Revelo Intel, you will gain a trusted research provider dedicated to delivering objective, unbiased insights that serve as the educational backbone for both current and prospective users. We look forward to the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the future of Arbitrum.
Thank you for your consideration.
Putting the ARDC structure onchain enables DAO-controlled creation, selection, and management of roles and permissions, and creates a trust-minimized source of truth for said structure.
One piece of feedback we’d like to offer is that while we support the use of Hats Protocol, we would also suggest a slow implementation. In our experience there are still some limitations and a few small bugs to work out, though nothing that should prevent its use here. These are mostly around interoperability with other tools, such as not being able to use certain zodiac modules along with the signer gate or transaction simulations failing when they would actually execute properly. Haberdasher Labs have always been helpful with any issues however, and with their dedicated support we think this is a powerful tool the DAO can use here and potentially in other areas as well.
Thank you for putting forth this proposal, ImmutableLawyer.
Revelo Intel, a provider of in-depth, unbiased, and objective research, is well-suited for the research member role. We are formally applying for this role as we believe our expertise would be valuable to the Arbitrum DAO, its stakeholders, and the broader Arbitrum community.
Thank you for putting forth this proposal, ImmutableLawyer.
Revelo Intel, a provider of in-depth, unbiased, and objective research, is well-suited for the research member role. We are formally applying for this role as we believe our expertise would be valuable to the Arbitrum DAO, its stakeholders, and the broader Arbitrum community.
As a research firm, we extensively cover DeFi, with Arbitrum naturally being a focal point due to the number of notable projects and innovations occurring on the chain. We are keen to continue and expand our coverage in a more official capacity, dedicating additional resources to the areas highlighted in the proposal. Additionally, we can amplify the research findings across our distribution channels, ensuring that insights reach beyond the existing Arbitrum DAO and its community.
We also believe the broader role of the ARDC is crucial. Having multiple reputable entities contribute to research promotes accountability and generates actionable data that benefit the ecosystem.
Below, we have included examples of our research that demonstrate its depth and relevance to Arbitrum and its ecosystem:
The State of Arbitrum (in collaboration with Castle Capital) Arbitrum Breakdown (Diligence) Report Analyzing Economics of L2s 2023/2024 Annual Intel - Our View on Trends and Narratives Pendle Industry Intel (Narrative) Report Vertex Edge Industry Intel (Narrative) Report Pear Protocol Industry Intel (Narrative) Report
Similarly, we've prepared such works for protocols like GMX, Stryke, Premia, Magpie, Camelot, and others.
We are confident that our expertise and comprehensive research will provide valuable insights for the Arbitrum DAO and its ecosystem. By partnering with Revelo Intel, you will gain a trusted research provider dedicated to delivering objective, unbiased insights that serve as the educational backbone for both current and prospective users. We look forward to the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the future of Arbitrum.
Thank you for your consideration.
Putting the ARDC structure onchain enables DAO-controlled creation, selection, and management of roles and permissions, and creates a trust-minimized source of truth for said structure.
One piece of feedback we’d like to offer is that while we support the use of Hats Protocol, we would also suggest a slow implementation. In our experience there are still some limitations and a few small bugs to work out, though nothing that should prevent its use here. These are mostly around interoperability with other tools, such as not being able to use certain zodiac modules along with the signer gate or transaction simulations failing when they would actually execute properly. Haberdasher Labs have always been helpful with any issues however, and with their dedicated support we think this is a powerful tool the DAO can use here and potentially in other areas as well.
Putting the ARDC structure onchain enables DAO-controlled creation, selection, and management of roles and permissions, and creates a trust-minimized source of truth for said structure.
To paraphrase the proposal, here are some of the various ways in which the structure is both used and managed onchain:
One piece of feedback we’d like to offer is that while we support the use of Hats Protocol, we would also suggest a slow implementation. In our experience there are still some limitations and a few small bugs to work out, though nothing that should prevent its use here. These are mostly around interoperability with other tools, such as not being able to use certain zodiac modules along with the signer gate or transaction simulations failing when they would actually execute properly. Haberdasher Labs have always been helpful with any issues however, and with their dedicated support we think this is a powerful tool the DAO can use here and potentially in other areas as well.
Hello, Spencer here from Haberdasher Labs.
Included in the scope of this proposal, we will give dedicated hands-on support for implementation and 6 months following.
Regarding the HatsSignerGate HSG contracts:
Audited and Deployed before May 8, 2023, audit links in the repo README here: https://github.com/Hats-Protocol/hats-zodiac
Many organizations have already been using HSG for months, including TreasureDAO and Questbook
Yes, there is a restriction of including other Zodiac modules in the first version to keep the HatsSignerGate very secure, ie ensure that the signers cannot jailbreak the constraints. We have received other requests for a version that allows for other modules to be added to the same safe, and are available to work on a new version here when required.
Regarding transaction simulations in the Safe app:
The Safe app crafts the Tenderly simulation parameters without taking into account potential guards. Anytime there is a guard added to a Safe, the simulation will fail.
One way to work around this would be to simulate the transaction directly, ie as being executed by Safe rather than including Safe's own validation logic.
I expect that the Safe team did not design it this way in large part in order to support simulation of the multisends that are very common in Safe transactions. These require delegatecall, which to my knowledge is not supported by Tenderly's simulation API. If this were to change, Safe could add a simulation option that ignores guards.
Thanks for your thoughtful feedback. We're happy to answer any additional questions, and look forward to being a long-term partner to the ARDC and Arbitrum DAO in increasing role clarity and reducing operational overhead.
Thank you immutablelawyer for putting this proposal together. I am writing on behalf of DefiLlama Research to express our interest in the role of The Research Member. We will be following along as the proposal progresses and are keen to support the ARDC in their aforementioned goals.
Onchain voting for this proposal is ending within 24 hours:
[Vote on Tally: (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4/proposal/2448793548607195098)
* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]
Voting has ended!
===============
[(V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4/proposal/2448793548607195098)
### Final Votes
| **Category** | **Result** | **Details** |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| **Quorum reached** | ✅ | 134.84M of 120.74M |
| **Majority Support** | ✅ | |
| **For** | | 117.18M (83.6%) |
| **Against** | | 5.29M (3.8%) |
| **Abstain** | | 17.66M (12.6%) |
* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]
Gm, gm :sparkles:
The results are in for the (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective on-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1484
Putting the ARDC structure onchain enables DAO-controlled creation, selection, and management of roles and permissions, and creates a trust-minimized source of truth for said structure.
To paraphrase the proposal, here are some of the various ways in which the structure is both used and managed onchain:
One piece of feedback we’d like to offer is that while we support the use of Hats Protocol, we would also suggest a slow implementation. In our experience there are still some limitations and a few small bugs to work out, though nothing that should prevent its use here. These are mostly around interoperability with other tools, such as not being able to use certain zodiac modules along with the signer gate or transaction simulations failing when they would actually execute properly. Haberdasher Labs have always been helpful with any issues however, and with their dedicated support we think this is a powerful tool the DAO can use here and potentially in other areas as well.
Hello, Spencer here from Haberdasher Labs.
Included in the scope of this proposal, we will give dedicated hands-on support for implementation and 6 months following.
Regarding the HatsSignerGate HSG contracts:
Audited and Deployed before May 8, 2023, audit links in the repo README here: https://github.com/Hats-Protocol/hats-zodiac
Many organizations have already been using HSG for months, including TreasureDAO and Questbook
Yes, there is a restriction of including other Zodiac modules in the first version to keep the HatsSignerGate very secure, ie ensure that the signers cannot jailbreak the constraints. We have received other requests for a version that allows for other modules to be added to the same safe, and are available to work on a new version here when required.
Regarding transaction simulations in the Safe app:
The Safe app crafts the Tenderly simulation parameters without taking into account potential guards. Anytime there is a guard added to a Safe, the simulation will fail.
One way to work around this would be to simulate the transaction directly, ie as being executed by Safe rather than including Safe's own validation logic.
I expect that the Safe team did not design it this way in large part in order to support simulation of the multisends that are very common in Safe transactions. These require delegatecall, which to my knowledge is not supported by Tenderly's simulation API. If this were to change, Safe could add a simulation option that ignores guards.
Thanks for your thoughtful feedback. We're happy to answer any additional questions, and look forward to being a long-term partner to the ARDC and Arbitrum DAO in increasing role clarity and reducing operational overhead.
Thank you immutablelawyer for putting this proposal together. I am writing on behalf of DefiLlama Research to express our interest in the role of The Research Member. We will be following along as the proposal progresses and are keen to support the ARDC in their aforementioned goals.
Onchain voting for this proposal is ending within 24 hours:
[Vote on Tally: (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4/proposal/2448793548607195098)
* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]
Voting has ended!
===============
[(V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/eip155:42161:0x789fC99093B09aD01C34DC7251D0C89ce743e5a4/proposal/2448793548607195098)
### Final Votes
| **Category** | **Result** | **Details** |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| **Quorum reached** | ✅ | 134.84M of 120.74M |
| **Majority Support** | ✅ | |
| **For** | | 117.18M (83.6%) |
| **Against** | | 5.29M (3.8%) |
| **Abstain** | | 17.66M (12.6%) |
* * *
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]
Gm, gm :sparkles:
The results are in for the (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective on-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1484
Voting has started for this proposal! Vote on Tally: (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]
The results are in for the (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective off-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1471
Voting has started for this proposal! Vote on Tally: (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective
I am a bot. Questions? Contact [email protected]
The results are in for the (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective off-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1471
Thanks for the proposal.
What is the timeline for the Optimistic Governor Module? Is the commencement of an ARDC term 2 dependent on this module being live/audited/etc.?
Thanks for the proposal.
What is the timeline for the Optimistic Governor Module? Is the commencement of an ARDC term 2 dependent on this module being live/audited/etc.?
One piece of feedback we'd like to offer is that while we support the use of Hats Protocol, we would also suggest a slow implementation. In our experience there are still some limitations and a few small bugs to work out, though nothing that should prevent its use here. These are mostly around interoperability with other tools, such as not being able to use certain zodiac modules along with the signer gate or transaction simulations failing when they would actually execute properly. Haberdasher Labs have always been helpful with any issues however, and with their dedicated support we think this is a powerful tool the DAO can use here and potentially in other areas as well.
One piece of feedback we'd like to offer is that while we support the use of Hats Protocol, we would also suggest a slow implementation. In our experience there are still some limitations and a few small bugs to work out, though nothing that should prevent its use here. These are mostly around interoperability with other tools, such as not being able to use certain zodiac modules along with the signer gate or transaction simulations failing when they would actually execute properly. Haberdasher Labs have always been helpful with any issues however, and with their dedicated support we think this is a powerful tool the DAO can use here and potentially in other areas as well.
As part of my commitment to start voting as @web3citizenxyz contributor. This is our rational voting "FOR" on-chain.
We're voting in favor of this proposal to fund ARDC V2.
This implementation closely aligns with what was previously approved at the Snapshot stage and maintains consistency in the DAO's decision-making. ARDC has proven its value through V1, returning ARB to the DAO while delivering high-quality research deliverables.
We're voting in favor of this proposal to fund ARDC V2.
This implementation closely aligns with what was previously approved at the Snapshot stage and maintains consistency in the DAO's decision-making. ARDC has proven its value through V1, returning ARB to the DAO while delivering high-quality research deliverables.
ARDC's research and analysis are crucial for Arbitrum's governance and development, especially as the L2 landscape becomes more competitive. The funding level strikes the right balance between maintaining these capabilities and responsible treasury management.
Just voted FOR on Tally, for the same reasons I outlined during the temp-check: link to forum post.
将举行四次单独的选举:
为了最大限度地减少选民疲劳,监事会选举将通过单一的大选快照进行。候选人必须在申请中指定他们想要担任的职位。例如,如果排名前三的当选候选人都申请通讯职位,则只有排名前两位的候选人会被选中担任该职位。第三个职位将由申请运营职位的排名最高的候选人填补,以确保理事会内部职位的平衡分配。
I also cast my vote in favor on Tally with the same reason as temp-check. Forum post link
I voted "FOR" on Tally, looking forward to seeing the next term in place.
We vote FOR the proposal on Tally.
We maintain our opinions made at the Snapshot phase and continue to support the new term of the ARDC. The funding amount was lower than the one we voted for, but with the recent price appreciation, it's matched what we believe is the best.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After extensive discussion, both externally (with @ImmutableLawyer and other delegates) and internally, we decided to vote FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After extensive discussion, both externally (with @ImmutableLawyer and other delegates) and internally, we decided to vote FOR the proposal.
During the temp check, we tentatively supported the proposal while offering some feedback on points of concern that were taken into account. This led to the proposal being slightly revised before the onchain vote.
Specifically, we suggested that the upfront fee to service providers be reduced to avoid potentially spending money for services that would not be utilized. The retainer was reduced from 1/3 to 1/5 which we find to be more reasonable.
We also suggested that ‘delegate approvals’ were introduced, which would basically mean that the ARDC would only pick up a workstream after receiving approval from a number of delegates with over X amount of voting power (”X” was to be defined). While that wasn’t introduced, we believe that with the proper utilization of the Supervisory Council, and specifically the people handling communications, we can have very strong alignment between the DAO and the ARDC.
We expect that the ARDC will be overly communicative both between them and delegates, but also between them and Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs. The communications people should split the workload in a way that enables them to be very thorough with their communication.
One thing we want to see addressed as soon as possible is the clarification of whose responsibility it is to keep track of the hours that service providers put in toward a deliverable requested from the Supervisory Council. Right now, and to our understanding, it’s implied that it will be the responsibility of the operations lead of the Supervisory Council. We would like for that to be clarified and for the ARDC to clearly communicate who is responsible.
Lastly, we want to highlight that if the OpCo is set up during the ARDC’s tenure, we expect it to take ownership of the initiative and be responsible for its oversight. We think that in the event that happens, the Supervisory Council should work with the OpCo to figure out how to transition properly into the new structure.
Voted For: After being active in the DAO for almost a year, I have always seen work from ARDC as valuable. I also understand that this proposal, if approved, will secure another term with a great teams like L2Beat, Blockworks, and other to put efforts in to Arbitrum DAO. I have high expectations due to the size of the funds for this proposal (1.7M ARB). I expect a step up from V1 and to see even more effort put into it.
DAOplomats voted FOR this proposal on Tally.
We supported this proposal during the temp check and maintained our stance for the onchain vote.
As part of my commitment to start voting as @web3citizenxyz contributor. This is our rational voting "FOR" on-chain.
We're voting in favor of this proposal to fund ARDC V2.
This implementation closely aligns with what was previously approved at the Snapshot stage and maintains consistency in the DAO's decision-making. ARDC has proven its value through V1, returning ARB to the DAO while delivering high-quality research deliverables.
We're voting in favor of this proposal to fund ARDC V2.
This implementation closely aligns with what was previously approved at the Snapshot stage and maintains consistency in the DAO's decision-making. ARDC has proven its value through V1, returning ARB to the DAO while delivering high-quality research deliverables.
ARDC's research and analysis are crucial for Arbitrum's governance and development, especially as the L2 landscape becomes more competitive. The funding level strikes the right balance between maintaining these capabilities and responsible treasury management.
Just voted FOR on Tally, for the same reasons I outlined during the temp-check: link to forum post.
将举行四次单独的选举:
为了最大限度地减少选民疲劳,监事会选举将通过单一的大选快照进行。候选人必须在申请中指定他们想要担任的职位。例如,如果排名前三的当选候选人都申请通讯职位,则只有排名前两位的候选人会被选中担任该职位。第三个职位将由申请运营职位的排名最高的候选人填补,以确保理事会内部职位的平衡分配。
I also cast my vote in favor on Tally with the same reason as temp-check. Forum post link
I voted "FOR" on Tally, looking forward to seeing the next term in place.
We vote FOR the proposal on Tally.
We maintain our opinions made at the Snapshot phase and continue to support the new term of the ARDC. The funding amount was lower than the one we voted for, but with the recent price appreciation, it's matched what we believe is the best.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After extensive discussion, both externally (with @ImmutableLawyer and other delegates) and internally, we decided to vote FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After extensive discussion, both externally (with @ImmutableLawyer and other delegates) and internally, we decided to vote FOR the proposal.
During the temp check, we tentatively supported the proposal while offering some feedback on points of concern that were taken into account. This led to the proposal being slightly revised before the onchain vote.
Specifically, we suggested that the upfront fee to service providers be reduced to avoid potentially spending money for services that would not be utilized. The retainer was reduced from 1/3 to 1/5 which we find to be more reasonable.
We also suggested that ‘delegate approvals’ were introduced, which would basically mean that the ARDC would only pick up a workstream after receiving approval from a number of delegates with over X amount of voting power (”X” was to be defined). While that wasn’t introduced, we believe that with the proper utilization of the Supervisory Council, and specifically the people handling communications, we can have very strong alignment between the DAO and the ARDC.
We expect that the ARDC will be overly communicative both between them and delegates, but also between them and Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs. The communications people should split the workload in a way that enables them to be very thorough with their communication.
One thing we want to see addressed as soon as possible is the clarification of whose responsibility it is to keep track of the hours that service providers put in toward a deliverable requested from the Supervisory Council. Right now, and to our understanding, it’s implied that it will be the responsibility of the operations lead of the Supervisory Council. We would like for that to be clarified and for the ARDC to clearly communicate who is responsible.
Lastly, we want to highlight that if the OpCo is set up during the ARDC’s tenure, we expect it to take ownership of the initiative and be responsible for its oversight. We think that in the event that happens, the Supervisory Council should work with the OpCo to figure out how to transition properly into the new structure.
Voted For: After being active in the DAO for almost a year, I have always seen work from ARDC as valuable. I also understand that this proposal, if approved, will secure another term with a great teams like L2Beat, Blockworks, and other to put efforts in to Arbitrum DAO. I have high expectations due to the size of the funds for this proposal (1.7M ARB). I expect a step up from V1 and to see even more effort put into it.
DAOplomats voted FOR this proposal on Tally.
We supported this proposal during the temp check and maintained our stance for the onchain vote.
将举行四次单独的选举:
为了最大限度地减少选民疲劳,监事会选举将通过单一的大选快照进行。候选人必须在申请中指定他们想要担任的职位。例如,如果排名前三的当选候选人都申请通讯职位,则只有排名前两位的候选人会被选中担任该职位。第三个职位将由申请运营职位的排名最高的候选人填补,以确保理事会内部职位的平衡分配。
以下时间表控制着从时间 T 开始的选举过程['T'表示快照投票通过的日期 +3 天]:
管理规则
虽然允许每个席位联合提出申请,但申请人不得与其他申请人联合提出申请,然后再申请成为监事会成员或其他席位。
根据选举流程,通过快照当选后,将适用相应当选成员论坛帖子申请中的费用(小时费率)
Question: Does the reallocation process avoid potential conflicts or unfairness if multiple high vote candidates prefer the same position? Are the rules clearly stated? Suggestions: 1. Increase candidate transparency: - In elections, add detailed planning notes from candidates for each role so that the community is more aware of their capabilities and specific goals.
voting Against the current on-chain proposal because I feel this committee is not really needed at this time. Also, it doesn't make sense to approve this amount of spending without knowing who will be its beneficiaries since the elections will happen after the onchain vote.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
After reviewing the foundation established by ARDC in V1, we currently see no alternative that can fulfill its role as effectively. This continuation will undoubtedly strengthen ArbitrumDAO’s research and development efforts.
Rest our overall thoughts remain the same as expressed in our rationale during the Snapshot voting.
We are voting 100% for funding with 1.73M USDC + Council.
The ARDC addresses key areas of risk, security, and research for the DAO, which are crucial for its continued success. We’ve closely followed the research and security reports, and they have guided many of our decisions and votes.
At this time, we don’t see any other alternative that can fulfill the role of the ARDC as effectively. We hope to see more long-term reports focused on the growth and direction of the DAO.
Additionally, more clarity on who can request work, how requests are made, and the rationale behind approvals would be beneficial for the community.
I voted FOR this proposal on Tally, especially based on how well ARDC v1 performed with the STIP analysis. The proposed budget is the lowest among the choices that were listed in Snapshot, but I'm sure the DAO could provide some additional funds (through a new proposal) if the need for that will arise.
I voted FOR this proposal at the temp check and onchain stage. I think the first version of the ARDC was valuable in theory, but suffered from a lack of direction from the DAO. I am optimistic that this can be addressed in the next version by working more closely with the Foundation to map ARDC efforts to DAO initiatives.
For Tally: voted in favour (same reasons as temp-check)
Glad to see this proposal on on-chain vote! I shared my thoughts in the snapshot because I really believe ongoing ARDC programs are crucial for strengthening our governance, security, and research. I also believe this will help Arbitrum have a professional financial management system.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
We voted in favor during the temp check, and we note that modifications have been made in the final proposal on Tally that incorporate feedback provided by the community (both ours and other delegates’), making this proposal more robust than when we voted on it in Snapshot.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
We voted in favor during the temp check, and we note that modifications have been made in the final proposal on Tally that incorporate feedback provided by the community (both ours and other delegates’), making this proposal more robust than when we voted on it in Snapshot.
Voting in favor for the same reasons that I mentioned at the temperature check phase https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/56?u=immutablelawyer
I vote FOR this proposal in Tally, because as I said before, the value provided by the ARDC was huge.
I’m pleased with the immense value the ARDC delivered and with the service providers who remained engaged with the DAO.
Voted FOR: (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective
Vote: FOR
Type: Snapshot
Proposal link: Arbitrum Research & Development Collective (V2)
Voting Rationale Link: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147/34
=== COMMENTING ON PROPOSAL: ===
Voted FOR: (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective
Vote: FOR
Type: Snapshot
Proposal link: Arbitrum Research & Development Collective (V2)
Voting Rationale Link: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147/34
=== COMMENTING ON PROPOSAL: ===
This proposal to continue the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective (ARDC) with a 2.09M USDC budget and the establishment of a Supervisory Council aims to build on the foundation set by ARDC V1. Given the critical areas the ARDC addresses—risk, security, and research—its work provides essential support for the long-term health and growth of Arbitrum DAO. The previous version demonstrated the ARDC’s capacity to deliver high-impact deliverables, and the council’s introduction promises to create a more structured approach, improving oversight and communication.
Feedback has highlighted the importance of structured approvals and clear KPI monitoring to maximize value. By adopting a retainer model, this proposal ensures that capital is deployed efficiently, with a clear mechanism for oversight through the delegate approvals. Additionally, including two members in the Supervisory Council to focus on communication is a positive step towards bridging any engagement gaps with the broader DAO community.
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
Our team voted for the $1.73M funding option + council. We are appreciative of the work that the ARDC conducted during v1 and are therefore willing to continue allocating resources to their efforts. Ascertaining the amount of budget to allocate for the program is not the simplest task without delving deeper into details, so we chose the least expensive option. This was also in part motivated by the new retainer model. Ideally, a retainer leads to more prudent capital allocation, which could justify minimizing the overall required budget.
I won't comment on the previous risk member since we're managing elections and we don't want to instill bias (won't comment in favour or against). My reflections are overall very well-aligned w/those posed in Sinkas' report!
Interested parties may reach out to us on our dedicated telegram group here: https://t.me/+g4olHPPQiZtkYThk
Thanks @Immutablelawyer for the proposal.
I think the ARDC V2 is very clever and better than V1.
Thanks @Immutablelawyer for the proposal.
I think the ARDC V2 is very clever and better than V1.
Voting for the ARDC V2 proposal is a strategic move to strengthen ArbitrumDAO's research and development efforts while optimizing costs and enhancing governance. First, ARDC V2 builds on the success of V1, which returned over 1 million ARB to the DAO Treasury, demonstrating measurable value and efficiency. The introduction of a Supervisory Council adds structure, with dedicated roles in communication and operations that streamline day-to-day management and align activities with the DAO’s strategic goals.
The new funding model is more cost-effective and aligns incentives by linking most payments to actual project needs, avoiding underutilization and ensuring that resources are used where they are most impactful. The Retainer Model also encourages competitive hourly rates and ensures payments are directly tied to deliverables, promoting accountability and cost-effectiveness.
The ARDC enables the Arbitrum DAO to continue benefiting from expert guidance and it helps in improving operational efficiency, having aligned incentives, and ensuring that resources are used effectively. This initiative supports the DAO's mission to foster a secure, innovative, and sustainable ecosystem for its community.
Voting FOR, as I believe having a dedicated research team is necessary for every organization. My rationale is that having this collective active will help in decision-making, strategic planning and resource optimization. I also believe it is necessary to have one in order to foster adaptability to change.
I vote FOR this proposal. I understand the concerns of some delegates about increasing or maintaining bureaucracy, however I think it is crucial for the DAO to have SP ready to perform quality security reports when the needs arise.
For Snapshot: supportive of the proposal and voted for 1.73MUSDC. ARDC has provided value in previous phaze. Voted in favour.
Voting 1.73M USDC + Council .
Blockworks Research will be ABSTAINING from this proposal.
While we don’t believe a vote from us could have been a violation of COI, we are erring on the side of caution and excited to possibly participate in ARDC V2. The V1 of the ARDC was clearly needed and overall provided a beneficial service to Arbitrum, which has allowed us to gauge the DAOs necessities and give the delegate base an idea of what is needed in terms of incentives, and other forms of management.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting 100% for funding with 1.73M USDC + Council.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting 100% for funding with 1.73M USDC + Council.
The ARDC addresses key areas of risk, security, and research for the DAO, which are crucial for its continued success. We've closely followed the research and security reports, and they have guided many of our decisions and votes.
At this time, we don't see any other alternative that can fulfill the role of the ARDC as effectively. We hope to see more long-term reports focused on the growth and direction of the DAO.
Additionally, more clarity on who can request work, how requests are made, and the rationale behind approvals would be beneficial for the community.
Are you satisfied with the current ARDC risk member? If so or if not, what could be improved? There are some entities that plan to apply for the ARDC risk role. What is the preferred medium for them to contact yourself or others with nuanced views on the ARDC?
将举行四次单独的选举:
为了最大限度地减少选民疲劳,监事会选举将通过单一的大选快照进行。候选人必须在申请中指定他们想要担任的职位。例如,如果排名前三的当选候选人都申请通讯职位,则只有排名前两位的候选人会被选中担任该职位。第三个职位将由申请运营职位的排名最高的候选人填补,以确保理事会内部职位的平衡分配。
以下时间表控制着从时间 T 开始的选举过程['T'表示快照投票通过的日期 +3 天]:
管理规则
虽然允许每个席位联合提出申请,但申请人不得与其他申请人联合提出申请,然后再申请成为监事会成员或其他席位。
根据选举流程,通过快照当选后,将适用相应当选成员论坛帖子申请中的费用(小时费率)
Question: Does the reallocation process avoid potential conflicts or unfairness if multiple high vote candidates prefer the same position? Are the rules clearly stated? Suggestions: 1. Increase candidate transparency: - In elections, add detailed planning notes from candidates for each role so that the community is more aware of their capabilities and specific goals.
voting Against the current on-chain proposal because I feel this committee is not really needed at this time. Also, it doesn't make sense to approve this amount of spending without knowing who will be its beneficiaries since the elections will happen after the onchain vote.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
After reviewing the foundation established by ARDC in V1, we currently see no alternative that can fulfill its role as effectively. This continuation will undoubtedly strengthen ArbitrumDAO’s research and development efforts.
Rest our overall thoughts remain the same as expressed in our rationale during the Snapshot voting.
We are voting 100% for funding with 1.73M USDC + Council.
The ARDC addresses key areas of risk, security, and research for the DAO, which are crucial for its continued success. We’ve closely followed the research and security reports, and they have guided many of our decisions and votes.
At this time, we don’t see any other alternative that can fulfill the role of the ARDC as effectively. We hope to see more long-term reports focused on the growth and direction of the DAO.
Additionally, more clarity on who can request work, how requests are made, and the rationale behind approvals would be beneficial for the community.
I voted FOR this proposal on Tally, especially based on how well ARDC v1 performed with the STIP analysis. The proposed budget is the lowest among the choices that were listed in Snapshot, but I'm sure the DAO could provide some additional funds (through a new proposal) if the need for that will arise.
I voted FOR this proposal at the temp check and onchain stage. I think the first version of the ARDC was valuable in theory, but suffered from a lack of direction from the DAO. I am optimistic that this can be addressed in the next version by working more closely with the Foundation to map ARDC efforts to DAO initiatives.
For Tally: voted in favour (same reasons as temp-check)
Glad to see this proposal on on-chain vote! I shared my thoughts in the snapshot because I really believe ongoing ARDC programs are crucial for strengthening our governance, security, and research. I also believe this will help Arbitrum have a professional financial management system.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
We voted in favor during the temp check, and we note that modifications have been made in the final proposal on Tally that incorporate feedback provided by the community (both ours and other delegates’), making this proposal more robust than when we voted on it in Snapshot.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
We voted in favor during the temp check, and we note that modifications have been made in the final proposal on Tally that incorporate feedback provided by the community (both ours and other delegates’), making this proposal more robust than when we voted on it in Snapshot.
Voting in favor for the same reasons that I mentioned at the temperature check phase https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-arbitrum-research-and-development-collective-term-2/26922/56?u=immutablelawyer
I vote FOR this proposal in Tally, because as I said before, the value provided by the ARDC was huge.
I’m pleased with the immense value the ARDC delivered and with the service providers who remained engaged with the DAO.
Voted FOR: (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective
Vote: FOR
Type: Snapshot
Proposal link: Arbitrum Research & Development Collective (V2)
Voting Rationale Link: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147/34
=== COMMENTING ON PROPOSAL: ===
Voted FOR: (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective
Vote: FOR
Type: Snapshot
Proposal link: Arbitrum Research & Development Collective (V2)
Voting Rationale Link: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/alex-lumley-savvy-dao-delegate-communication-thread/26147/34
=== COMMENTING ON PROPOSAL: ===
This proposal to continue the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective (ARDC) with a 2.09M USDC budget and the establishment of a Supervisory Council aims to build on the foundation set by ARDC V1. Given the critical areas the ARDC addresses—risk, security, and research—its work provides essential support for the long-term health and growth of Arbitrum DAO. The previous version demonstrated the ARDC’s capacity to deliver high-impact deliverables, and the council’s introduction promises to create a more structured approach, improving oversight and communication.
Feedback has highlighted the importance of structured approvals and clear KPI monitoring to maximize value. By adopting a retainer model, this proposal ensures that capital is deployed efficiently, with a clear mechanism for oversight through the delegate approvals. Additionally, including two members in the Supervisory Council to focus on communication is a positive step towards bridging any engagement gaps with the broader DAO community.
Below are the opinions of the UADP:
Our team voted for the $1.73M funding option + council. We are appreciative of the work that the ARDC conducted during v1 and are therefore willing to continue allocating resources to their efforts. Ascertaining the amount of budget to allocate for the program is not the simplest task without delving deeper into details, so we chose the least expensive option. This was also in part motivated by the new retainer model. Ideally, a retainer leads to more prudent capital allocation, which could justify minimizing the overall required budget.
I won't comment on the previous risk member since we're managing elections and we don't want to instill bias (won't comment in favour or against). My reflections are overall very well-aligned w/those posed in Sinkas' report!
Interested parties may reach out to us on our dedicated telegram group here: https://t.me/+g4olHPPQiZtkYThk
Thanks @Immutablelawyer for the proposal.
I think the ARDC V2 is very clever and better than V1.
Thanks @Immutablelawyer for the proposal.
I think the ARDC V2 is very clever and better than V1.
Voting for the ARDC V2 proposal is a strategic move to strengthen ArbitrumDAO's research and development efforts while optimizing costs and enhancing governance. First, ARDC V2 builds on the success of V1, which returned over 1 million ARB to the DAO Treasury, demonstrating measurable value and efficiency. The introduction of a Supervisory Council adds structure, with dedicated roles in communication and operations that streamline day-to-day management and align activities with the DAO’s strategic goals.
The new funding model is more cost-effective and aligns incentives by linking most payments to actual project needs, avoiding underutilization and ensuring that resources are used where they are most impactful. The Retainer Model also encourages competitive hourly rates and ensures payments are directly tied to deliverables, promoting accountability and cost-effectiveness.
The ARDC enables the Arbitrum DAO to continue benefiting from expert guidance and it helps in improving operational efficiency, having aligned incentives, and ensuring that resources are used effectively. This initiative supports the DAO's mission to foster a secure, innovative, and sustainable ecosystem for its community.
Voting FOR, as I believe having a dedicated research team is necessary for every organization. My rationale is that having this collective active will help in decision-making, strategic planning and resource optimization. I also believe it is necessary to have one in order to foster adaptability to change.
I vote FOR this proposal. I understand the concerns of some delegates about increasing or maintaining bureaucracy, however I think it is crucial for the DAO to have SP ready to perform quality security reports when the needs arise.
For Snapshot: supportive of the proposal and voted for 1.73MUSDC. ARDC has provided value in previous phaze. Voted in favour.
Voting 1.73M USDC + Council .
Blockworks Research will be ABSTAINING from this proposal.
While we don’t believe a vote from us could have been a violation of COI, we are erring on the side of caution and excited to possibly participate in ARDC V2. The V1 of the ARDC was clearly needed and overall provided a beneficial service to Arbitrum, which has allowed us to gauge the DAOs necessities and give the delegate base an idea of what is needed in terms of incentives, and other forms of management.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting 100% for funding with 1.73M USDC + Council.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting 100% for funding with 1.73M USDC + Council.
The ARDC addresses key areas of risk, security, and research for the DAO, which are crucial for its continued success. We've closely followed the research and security reports, and they have guided many of our decisions and votes.
At this time, we don't see any other alternative that can fulfill the role of the ARDC as effectively. We hope to see more long-term reports focused on the growth and direction of the DAO.
Additionally, more clarity on who can request work, how requests are made, and the rationale behind approvals would be beneficial for the community.
Are you satisfied with the current ARDC risk member? If so or if not, what could be improved? There are some entities that plan to apply for the ARDC risk role. What is the preferred medium for them to contact yourself or others with nuanced views on the ARDC?
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Fund with 1.73M USDC + Council” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We support the continuation of the ARDC as expressed in our previous comment. We are pleased that the feedback we provided has been considered.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Fund with 1.73M USDC + Council” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We support the continuation of the ARDC as expressed in our previous comment. We are pleased that the feedback we provided has been considered.
Also we opted for the most economical alternative because we believe that if the required work exceeds the approved compensation in any way, an additional budget can be allocated.
Building on what @krst mentioned, it might be beneficial to allocate payments for the two months of scheduled work by the applicants, with a residual budget set aside for "on-demand" content requested by the DAO which will be used to pay the SPs for their work as they deliver it. Given that the scope and depth of required research can vary, this approach would make it easier for the DAO to quantify exactly how much it is paying for each report in specific instead of just calculating an average.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After extensive consideration and internal deliberation, we’re voting FOR the proposal during temp-check and opting to vote for the 1,73M USDC budget. We want to note that our vote during temp-check doesn’t automatically translate to support during the onchain vote, which is contingent on some points being addressed (see below).
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After extensive consideration and internal deliberation, we’re voting FOR the proposal during temp-check and opting to vote for the 1,73M USDC budget. We want to note that our vote during temp-check doesn’t automatically translate to support during the onchain vote, which is contingent on some points being addressed (see below).
Upon reviewing the ‘performance’ of ARDC’s first term, we reflected on some things that could have been better, or that could be improved in the next iteration of the ARDC, such as the ARDC v2 proposal. See the final ARDC report here, and our view as Delegates -and not the DAO Advocate- here.
The main reason we’re against the concept ARDC at this time is that we believe the DAO isn’t in a position to leverage its potential to the fullest, as shown by the lack of engagement between delegates and the ARDC during the latter’s first term. Although the v2 proposal hopes to address that by introducing 2 members focused on communication in the Supervisory Council, we are skeptical of the effect such a solution will have, if any.
As things are in the DAO right now, we simply do not see a need for the ARDC or a demand for its services. With that in mind, we don’t see a reason to be spending over $1,000,000 on it. On the other hand, however, if and when the need does arise, it will be difficult to get something done without first having to go through the governance process to set up something like the ARDC. To us, the current proposal is more of a proactive step to respond to needs if and when they arise rather than a reactive solution to existing needs.
In an attempt to find a middle ground, we believe that the best solution is to earmark the funds for the ARDC to use, establish service providers and the Supervisory Council, and then only use them when a need arises.
Some things that we’d like to suggest and hopefully implement before an onchain vote are:
We hope to discuss and address some other minor details further, but the above 2 points are the most important to us right now.
We're voting in support of the Funded with 1.73M USDC option for ARDC v2.
ARDC's research and analysis are crucial for Arbitrum's governance and development, especially as the L2 landscape becomes more competitive. The 1.73M USDC level strikes the right balance between maintaining these capabilities and responsible treasury management.
Dear all,
Firstly, we'd like to thank everyone for their comments and feedback - it has been very useful for our team in creating an optimised Arbitrum Research & Development Collective for the ArbitrumDAO!
Some Updates hereunder:
Dear all,
Firstly, we'd like to thank everyone for their comments and feedback - it has been very useful for our team in creating an optimised Arbitrum Research & Development Collective for the ArbitrumDAO!
Some Updates hereunder:
Best Regards, Axis Advisory
I just cast my vote: Voted 100% in favor of the 1.73M USDC + Council option... the least financial risk among the suggested alternatives, enabling the DAO to evaluate the effectiveness of ARDC V2 before committing to larger budgets.
DAOplomats are voting FOR 1.73M USDC + Council.
The deliverables from the ARDC have come in handy several times, most recently, the TimeBoost research by Blockworks is helping the staking working group with its research. Thus, we would love to see the team delivering for another 12 months.
We vote 100% for Option B: "Funded with 2.09M + Council".
While there were some challenges reported by L2BEAT in this report, we believe that the ARDC members have provided valuable deliverables for the DAO. We acknowledge that it's difficult to quantify the value provided by them and hope it would be something the new program can address. Having an oversight council makes sense as well, and we're looking for Entropy to take its role as it feels one of their responsibilities.
We vote 100% for Option B: "Funded with 2.09M + Council".
While there were some challenges reported by L2BEAT in this report, we believe that the ARDC members have provided valuable deliverables for the DAO. We acknowledge that it's difficult to quantify the value provided by them and hope it would be something the new program can address. Having an oversight council makes sense as well, and we're looking for Entropy to take its role as it feels one of their responsibilities.
For the budget, considering the quotes provided by the actual members that have done the works, and according to the author's recommendation, we believe the Option B is the most balanced one to experiment with.
Entropy is supportive of renewing the ARDC for a 2nd term and will be posting a more thorough rationale on our delegate communication thread. However, before voting, our team would like to disclose a COI, as it is our intention to apply for the Supervisory Council. If elected, our team would waive payment.
After re-considering the updated proposal we have decided to vote FOR (Fund with 1.73M USDC + Council).
We believe that the ARDC v1 has done ample work to support delegates in their research and decision making and appreciate the improvements made in v2.
It is difficult for us to have a complete view of and opinion on the budget as it has note been linked to potential deliverables.
After re-considering the updated proposal we have decided to vote FOR (Fund with 1.73M USDC + Council).
We believe that the ARDC v1 has done ample work to support delegates in their research and decision making and appreciate the improvements made in v2.
It is difficult for us to have a complete view of and opinion on the budget as it has note been linked to potential deliverables.
We do still believe that there should be multiple Research members in order to provide a more rounded and holistic view of things that can sometimes be viewed through a number of lens (unlike security and risk).
I voted for 100% of Funded with 1.73M USDC + Council.
It is important to say that the work done by all team on Term1 was amazing. Term2 tries to build upon the learnings and I hope that the effectiveness (assessment of pain issues within the DAO with their deliverables) increases with the changes proposed.
I voted for the middle option, 2.09M USDC. I believe we need ongoing these ARDC programs to keep governance, security, and research stronger. I think this option will give us enough resources to make good progress without too overspending. Btw, I understand the basic differences between the three options, but if the author could share more details about each initiative and what results we can expect from them, it will easier to evaluate.
Voted for Funded with 2.09M (middle): I see no reason not to support this proposal. I think the work of ARDC has been valuable for the DAO and would like us to continue to support it. I also like the people involved in ARDC and would like to keep them working on the DAO. I picked the middle option because I believe that changes to some upfront payment is a big enough change. We will see how the term goes and then decide if we want to allocate even more funds upfront.
I think that ARDC did a great job during phase 1, providing high-quality performances and making meaningful contributions to the DAO. This is why I'm in favor of supporting its renewal for phase 2. Concerning the options, it was difficult to see what actually changed in terms of deliverables for each of the three. But I eventually decided to vote for option A.
Happy to be proven wrong with the value the ARDC has provided.
I was (and still am a little) very skeptical of giving such a wide spectrum of influence to the ARDC, but their research has been extremely helpful to validate proposals and I haven't seen any issues to be concerned about. I really also appreciate how streamlined this proposal became.
Happy to be proven wrong with the value the ARDC has provided.
I was (and still am a little) very skeptical of giving such a wide spectrum of influence to the ARDC, but their research has been extremely helpful to validate proposals and I haven't seen any issues to be concerned about. I really also appreciate how streamlined this proposal became.
Because we are trying to detox, I will vote 100% for the 1.73M, but I really appreciate the work that has been put into the ARDC to date.
voting Do not fund the ARDC on the current offchain proposal because I feel there is not enough pull from the DAO to justify this committee and the consequent high investment, especially given the history of the previous committee in the past 6 months.
I will vote in favor of this proposal in the tempcheck and choose the higher budget option (2.60M).
I'm pleased with the immense value the ARDC delivered and with the service providers who remained engaged with the DAO.
I will vote in favor of this proposal in the tempcheck and choose the higher budget option (2.60M).
I'm pleased with the immense value the ARDC delivered and with the service providers who remained engaged with the DAO.
I'm not entirely convinced about replacing the DAO Advocate with the Supervisory Council, but I echo L2BEAT reflections, so I'm also not opposed to a 6-month experiment to see how it works
I believe the key lies in this reflection, and it should be the primary focus of this new Council:
In future programs, it would be good to either have a precise mandate or make it clear that the mandate will be defined during the course of the program and have a process for clarifying it.
Lastly, thank you Joseph @Immutablelawyer , for the work on the proposal.
Im struggling to see the benefit of all the initiatives we are seeing right now growing in the DAO. Do we even have an overview anymore and know who is doing what and what is overlapping? We have Entropy, now the second round of ARDC, im not even sure what else there is, but i am sure there is something. Voting abstain, as im not fully against but think the DAO is really struggling to keep up with everything. Sometimes less is more.
Voted for the middle option based on @Immutablelawyer suggestion.
In the future I hope proposal authors negotiate the amounts and propose to the DAO, rather than having us vote. It's hard to dig into the budgetary implications of each choice and we would rather a paid person do the research on the numbers than each delegate voting
We appreciate the work that ARDC accomplished during phase 1, making valuable contributions to research, security, and risk for ArbitrumDAO. Based on their overall performance, we’re in favor of renewing the ARDC for another 6 months with the option A through the ARDC V2 Proposal, as we believe it is necessary for ArbitrumDAO to effectively manage its growing number of technical initiatives, especially those requiring smart contract implementation and risk assessment. The ARDC’s contributions to research and data analysis are crucial for the DAO to stay ahead and make informed decisions.
I will be voting to continue funding the ARDC. It has shown to provide value operationally, and the willingness to return funds to the DAO is appreciated.
I voted for Option B, as based on the funding explanation it is enough to fund the project based on the prior period. Voting for A I feel will limit the quality of applicants, but voting for C just feels like giving already established applicants a reason to increase price for no reason other then it being available.
I will be voting to continue funding the ARDC. It has shown to provide value operationally, and the willingness to return funds to the DAO is appreciated.
I voted for Option B, as based on the funding explanation it is enough to fund the project based on the prior period. Voting for A I feel will limit the quality of applicants, but voting for C just feels like giving already established applicants a reason to increase price for no reason other then it being available.
Edit to save space: For Tally, I will maintain my "Yes" vote for the reasons noted above. I trust the ARDC will continue to provide value for the DAO and look forward to what they come up with in the future!
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Fund with 1.73M USDC + Council” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We support the continuation of the ARDC as expressed in our previous comment. We are pleased that the feedback we provided has been considered.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Fund with 1.73M USDC + Council” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We support the continuation of the ARDC as expressed in our previous comment. We are pleased that the feedback we provided has been considered.
Also we opted for the most economical alternative because we believe that if the required work exceeds the approved compensation in any way, an additional budget can be allocated.
Building on what @krst mentioned, it might be beneficial to allocate payments for the two months of scheduled work by the applicants, with a residual budget set aside for "on-demand" content requested by the DAO which will be used to pay the SPs for their work as they deliver it. Given that the scope and depth of required research can vary, this approach would make it easier for the DAO to quantify exactly how much it is paying for each report in specific instead of just calculating an average.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After extensive consideration and internal deliberation, we’re voting FOR the proposal during temp-check and opting to vote for the 1,73M USDC budget. We want to note that our vote during temp-check doesn’t automatically translate to support during the onchain vote, which is contingent on some points being addressed (see below).
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After extensive consideration and internal deliberation, we’re voting FOR the proposal during temp-check and opting to vote for the 1,73M USDC budget. We want to note that our vote during temp-check doesn’t automatically translate to support during the onchain vote, which is contingent on some points being addressed (see below).
Upon reviewing the ‘performance’ of ARDC’s first term, we reflected on some things that could have been better, or that could be improved in the next iteration of the ARDC, such as the ARDC v2 proposal. See the final ARDC report here, and our view as Delegates -and not the DAO Advocate- here.
The main reason we’re against the concept ARDC at this time is that we believe the DAO isn’t in a position to leverage its potential to the fullest, as shown by the lack of engagement between delegates and the ARDC during the latter’s first term. Although the v2 proposal hopes to address that by introducing 2 members focused on communication in the Supervisory Council, we are skeptical of the effect such a solution will have, if any.
As things are in the DAO right now, we simply do not see a need for the ARDC or a demand for its services. With that in mind, we don’t see a reason to be spending over $1,000,000 on it. On the other hand, however, if and when the need does arise, it will be difficult to get something done without first having to go through the governance process to set up something like the ARDC. To us, the current proposal is more of a proactive step to respond to needs if and when they arise rather than a reactive solution to existing needs.
In an attempt to find a middle ground, we believe that the best solution is to earmark the funds for the ARDC to use, establish service providers and the Supervisory Council, and then only use them when a need arises.
Some things that we’d like to suggest and hopefully implement before an onchain vote are:
We hope to discuss and address some other minor details further, but the above 2 points are the most important to us right now.
We're voting in support of the Funded with 1.73M USDC option for ARDC v2.
ARDC's research and analysis are crucial for Arbitrum's governance and development, especially as the L2 landscape becomes more competitive. The 1.73M USDC level strikes the right balance between maintaining these capabilities and responsible treasury management.
Dear all,
Firstly, we'd like to thank everyone for their comments and feedback - it has been very useful for our team in creating an optimised Arbitrum Research & Development Collective for the ArbitrumDAO!
Some Updates hereunder:
Dear all,
Firstly, we'd like to thank everyone for their comments and feedback - it has been very useful for our team in creating an optimised Arbitrum Research & Development Collective for the ArbitrumDAO!
Some Updates hereunder:
Best Regards, Axis Advisory
I just cast my vote: Voted 100% in favor of the 1.73M USDC + Council option... the least financial risk among the suggested alternatives, enabling the DAO to evaluate the effectiveness of ARDC V2 before committing to larger budgets.
DAOplomats are voting FOR 1.73M USDC + Council.
The deliverables from the ARDC have come in handy several times, most recently, the TimeBoost research by Blockworks is helping the staking working group with its research. Thus, we would love to see the team delivering for another 12 months.
We vote 100% for Option B: "Funded with 2.09M + Council".
While there were some challenges reported by L2BEAT in this report, we believe that the ARDC members have provided valuable deliverables for the DAO. We acknowledge that it's difficult to quantify the value provided by them and hope it would be something the new program can address. Having an oversight council makes sense as well, and we're looking for Entropy to take its role as it feels one of their responsibilities.
We vote 100% for Option B: "Funded with 2.09M + Council".
While there were some challenges reported by L2BEAT in this report, we believe that the ARDC members have provided valuable deliverables for the DAO. We acknowledge that it's difficult to quantify the value provided by them and hope it would be something the new program can address. Having an oversight council makes sense as well, and we're looking for Entropy to take its role as it feels one of their responsibilities.
For the budget, considering the quotes provided by the actual members that have done the works, and according to the author's recommendation, we believe the Option B is the most balanced one to experiment with.
Entropy is supportive of renewing the ARDC for a 2nd term and will be posting a more thorough rationale on our delegate communication thread. However, before voting, our team would like to disclose a COI, as it is our intention to apply for the Supervisory Council. If elected, our team would waive payment.
After re-considering the updated proposal we have decided to vote FOR (Fund with 1.73M USDC + Council).
We believe that the ARDC v1 has done ample work to support delegates in their research and decision making and appreciate the improvements made in v2.
It is difficult for us to have a complete view of and opinion on the budget as it has note been linked to potential deliverables.
After re-considering the updated proposal we have decided to vote FOR (Fund with 1.73M USDC + Council).
We believe that the ARDC v1 has done ample work to support delegates in their research and decision making and appreciate the improvements made in v2.
It is difficult for us to have a complete view of and opinion on the budget as it has note been linked to potential deliverables.
We do still believe that there should be multiple Research members in order to provide a more rounded and holistic view of things that can sometimes be viewed through a number of lens (unlike security and risk).
I voted for 100% of Funded with 1.73M USDC + Council.
It is important to say that the work done by all team on Term1 was amazing. Term2 tries to build upon the learnings and I hope that the effectiveness (assessment of pain issues within the DAO with their deliverables) increases with the changes proposed.
I voted for the middle option, 2.09M USDC. I believe we need ongoing these ARDC programs to keep governance, security, and research stronger. I think this option will give us enough resources to make good progress without too overspending. Btw, I understand the basic differences between the three options, but if the author could share more details about each initiative and what results we can expect from them, it will easier to evaluate.
Voted for Funded with 2.09M (middle): I see no reason not to support this proposal. I think the work of ARDC has been valuable for the DAO and would like us to continue to support it. I also like the people involved in ARDC and would like to keep them working on the DAO. I picked the middle option because I believe that changes to some upfront payment is a big enough change. We will see how the term goes and then decide if we want to allocate even more funds upfront.
I think that ARDC did a great job during phase 1, providing high-quality performances and making meaningful contributions to the DAO. This is why I'm in favor of supporting its renewal for phase 2. Concerning the options, it was difficult to see what actually changed in terms of deliverables for each of the three. But I eventually decided to vote for option A.
Happy to be proven wrong with the value the ARDC has provided.
I was (and still am a little) very skeptical of giving such a wide spectrum of influence to the ARDC, but their research has been extremely helpful to validate proposals and I haven't seen any issues to be concerned about. I really also appreciate how streamlined this proposal became.
Happy to be proven wrong with the value the ARDC has provided.
I was (and still am a little) very skeptical of giving such a wide spectrum of influence to the ARDC, but their research has been extremely helpful to validate proposals and I haven't seen any issues to be concerned about. I really also appreciate how streamlined this proposal became.
Because we are trying to detox, I will vote 100% for the 1.73M, but I really appreciate the work that has been put into the ARDC to date.
voting Do not fund the ARDC on the current offchain proposal because I feel there is not enough pull from the DAO to justify this committee and the consequent high investment, especially given the history of the previous committee in the past 6 months.
I will vote in favor of this proposal in the tempcheck and choose the higher budget option (2.60M).
I'm pleased with the immense value the ARDC delivered and with the service providers who remained engaged with the DAO.
I will vote in favor of this proposal in the tempcheck and choose the higher budget option (2.60M).
I'm pleased with the immense value the ARDC delivered and with the service providers who remained engaged with the DAO.
I'm not entirely convinced about replacing the DAO Advocate with the Supervisory Council, but I echo L2BEAT reflections, so I'm also not opposed to a 6-month experiment to see how it works
I believe the key lies in this reflection, and it should be the primary focus of this new Council:
In future programs, it would be good to either have a precise mandate or make it clear that the mandate will be defined during the course of the program and have a process for clarifying it.
Lastly, thank you Joseph @Immutablelawyer , for the work on the proposal.
Im struggling to see the benefit of all the initiatives we are seeing right now growing in the DAO. Do we even have an overview anymore and know who is doing what and what is overlapping? We have Entropy, now the second round of ARDC, im not even sure what else there is, but i am sure there is something. Voting abstain, as im not fully against but think the DAO is really struggling to keep up with everything. Sometimes less is more.
Voted for the middle option based on @Immutablelawyer suggestion.
In the future I hope proposal authors negotiate the amounts and propose to the DAO, rather than having us vote. It's hard to dig into the budgetary implications of each choice and we would rather a paid person do the research on the numbers than each delegate voting
We appreciate the work that ARDC accomplished during phase 1, making valuable contributions to research, security, and risk for ArbitrumDAO. Based on their overall performance, we’re in favor of renewing the ARDC for another 6 months with the option A through the ARDC V2 Proposal, as we believe it is necessary for ArbitrumDAO to effectively manage its growing number of technical initiatives, especially those requiring smart contract implementation and risk assessment. The ARDC’s contributions to research and data analysis are crucial for the DAO to stay ahead and make informed decisions.
I will be voting to continue funding the ARDC. It has shown to provide value operationally, and the willingness to return funds to the DAO is appreciated.
I voted for Option B, as based on the funding explanation it is enough to fund the project based on the prior period. Voting for A I feel will limit the quality of applicants, but voting for C just feels like giving already established applicants a reason to increase price for no reason other then it being available.
I will be voting to continue funding the ARDC. It has shown to provide value operationally, and the willingness to return funds to the DAO is appreciated.
I voted for Option B, as based on the funding explanation it is enough to fund the project based on the prior period. Voting for A I feel will limit the quality of applicants, but voting for C just feels like giving already established applicants a reason to increase price for no reason other then it being available.
Edit to save space: For Tally, I will maintain my "Yes" vote for the reasons noted above. I trust the ARDC will continue to provide value for the DAO and look forward to what they come up with in the future!
gm, in support of the initiative. Voted 100% in favor of the 1.73M USDC + Council option.
The activity of the ARDC has been very valuable for me as a delegate, and appreciate the improvements brought in from v1.
I look forward an opCO or similar structure that can better oversee these initiatives and increase their efficiency.
Just submitted my vote on Snapshot and went 100% with the $1.73M funding + Council. I felt the same way @EzR3aL did during this vote: with so many initiatives, it’s hard to follow who’s doing what and whether there’s any overlap. It’d be nice if someone could create a graphic summarizing everything we have going on. Anyway, I decided to support this proposal because of ARDC V1’s proven track record and because this lower budget encourages more efficient capital allocation.
We're Voting 100% for option A with a budget of $1.73 million USDC
We're Voting 100% for option A with a budget of $1.73 million USDC
Given the concerns about bureaucracy and the need to demonstrate clear value, a cautious approach to funding is recommended.
I voted for 100% of "Funded with 2.60M USDC + Council". This option was chosen to ensure ample resources for large-scale operations, providing the necessary budget for critical functions like risk, security, and research while maintaining robust oversight through the Supervisory Council.
First, the introduction of a retainer model for members seems like a positive step towards aligning incentives, but there is a risk that this could lead to inefficiencies if expectations regarding time and deliverables are not managed properly. I recommend implementing clear metrics to assess performance, which would strengthen accountability and maximize value for the DAO. Second, the inclusion of an Optimistic Governance Module is intriguing, but its implementation might require more clarity. How will bureaucratic bottlenecks be mitigated, and what will the veto process look like if proposals initially face no objections? I think this aspect needs more detail to ensure effectiveness in distributed governance environments.
Thank you @Immutablelawyer for the quick response. I fully understand that a clear accountability mechanism is essential, I just had some minor concerns before. You’re right, for the right people, this won’t be an issue. I will definitely support this proposal!
I am voting in favor.
I think we need for our DAO this collective. We spin up ton of initiatives, and some goes in parallel, are highly technical and/or require smart contract implementation. We need to be able to asses the risk and we can't make the responsability fall back on OCL. At the same time we need a data science unit; we need to crunch data and understand what is happening both in our world and in the rest of the crypto world.
I am voting in favor.
I think we need for our DAO this collective. We spin up ton of initiatives, and some goes in parallel, are highly technical and/or require smart contract implementation. We need to be able to asses the risk and we can't make the responsability fall back on OCL. At the same time we need a data science unit; we need to crunch data and understand what is happening both in our world and in the rest of the crypto world.
I don't have a very strong opinion on the budget. @Immutablelawyer I know it would be quite difficult, but maybe in future could be interesting to try and highlight the difference of amount of deliverable (or whatever kpi you deem fit) between budget A, B and C. I am pretty sure that 90% of users here who didn't work in an audit or research firm don't know the cost of bread. Because of this, I am going with the middle choice of 2.09M.
As a final thought, I hope that when we are going to have to renew this initiative in 6 months, we will have opco capable of internalize this whole structure. I really think we will need risk and data analyst, constantly, moving forward.
On a more general note, I support the council added on top, I really think analyzing the work can be a very complex task not suited just for a single advocate; the payroll structure (1/3 upfront, and the rest split 50/50 before/after deliverable) is for sure better in term of alignment. I also think it's more of a theoretical solution than anything, "hours" in crypto are what they are, they are easy to game (not saying anyone would do that) and are a not so meaningful measure compared to IRL jobs in which you just use a badge. But I understand the need to address some concern, and the need to at least try to find solutions.
Thanks for the hard work.
I think the adjusted scope of at-risk members is clearer, provides real value to the ecosystem, and is worth supporting. But as a general outsider's view, I think a few points need attention 1. budget transparency: budget adjustments are good, but the oversight committee must ensure that every dollar is clearly spent to avoid waste. 2. Reduced roles: Eliminating unnecessary roles improves efficiency, but key positions must not be missing to avoid jeopardizing project progress. 3. Linking workload to remuneration: a flexible retention model is good, but it has to be ensured that there is someone to supervise it, so that no one can just get paid and not work, and the quality of work has to be kept up. The most important thing is the feedback mechanism, supervision mechanism. I see accountability mentioned in many reports.
Thank you for your proposal. Overall, this proposal can help to better manage and optimize the R&D process and deserves to be supported to support ARDC in achieving the above objectives In the area of transparent budgeting, the restructuring of the budget in the proposal is good, but the Oversight Committee should ensure that funds are used transparently to avoid overspending. At the same time, monitoring improvement: the introduction of the monitoring committee is a good idea to strengthen the management of the budget and projects, to ensure that each project advances on time and to avoid the waste of resources. Also retaining the payment model: this is useful to motivate members to be more focused and efficient, and also avoid useless work, efficiency will increase
Hey @cp0x thanks for your feedback.
Feel free to take a look at the updated proposal as we have removed the Operations Lead and integrated his responsibilities within the Supervisory Council. To clarify, will not be “creating a whole committee, and then a supervisory board”, but rather there will simply be a Supervisory Council consisting of 3 members. The rationale for this streamlined approach and the updated operational framework is detailed in our response to SeedGov, Jojo, and Argonaut.
Hey @cp0x thanks for your feedback.
Feel free to take a look at the updated proposal as we have removed the Operations Lead and integrated his responsibilities within the Supervisory Council. To clarify, will not be “creating a whole committee, and then a supervisory board”, but rather there will simply be a Supervisory Council consisting of 3 members. The rationale for this streamlined approach and the updated operational framework is detailed in our response to SeedGov, Jojo, and Argonaut.
Additionally, the value of the ARDC is demonstrated by ARDC V1’s achievements: it delivered 43 distinct outputs, which, as outlined in the final outcome report, helped return over 1,000,000 ARB to the DAO’s treasury. This recovery effectively offset a significant portion of the ARDC’s costs, which averaged just over $1,000,000 USD.
As for the third point, we are currently having discussions on alternative payment methods.
Thanks for your feedback @jameskbh. Based on feedback received, we have decided to consolidate the responsibilities of the Operations Lead into the Supervisory Council. This combined responsibility for both high-level oversight and day-to-day management ensures a seamless transition from strategic guidance to task execution, reducing unnecessary bureaucracy.
Replacing the DAO Advocate with a three-member Supervisory Council allows the ARDC to benefit from a broader range of perspectives and skills, enhancing strategic decision-making. This Council is essential, as it will ultimately decide which deliverables to prioritize within each vertical, ensuring the ARDC’s resources are used effectively and addressing certain inefficiencies observed during ARDC V1.
Thank you @SEEDGov @JoJo @Argonaut for your feedback.
We have revised the proposal to clarify that working members (service providers) are expected to outline a two-month scope of work, representing one-third of their initial six-month term. This approach offers two key benefits:
Thank you @SEEDGov @JoJo @Argonaut for your feedback.
We have revised the proposal to clarify that working members (service providers) are expected to outline a two-month scope of work, representing one-third of their initial six-month term. This approach offers two key benefits:
We believe this is an ideal middle ground which ensures that sufficient flexibility is provided.
Furthermore, in ARDC V1, the initial funding was set at 1.76M ARB, which, at the then-current price of $1.70 per ARB, would have been approximately $3.01M USD, including a 30% buffer. Ultimately, ARDC V1’s average funding totalled over $1.0M USD. This amount is closely aligned with Option B, which proposes funding ARDC V2 with 1.05M USDC over a six-month term. Options A and C offer variations around this baseline, reflecting an increase or decrease of around 20%, respectively, allowing the ArbitrumDAO to make the final decision.
Please note that (i) the funding amounts in the updated proposal reflect costs projected over one year and (ii) these funding figures represent the maximum allowable amounts, setting a spending ceiling that cannot be exceeded, rather than a guaranteed payout. Based on feedback, we decided to also increase the allocation for the Risk Member by 20%.
Regarding lessons learned, we have incorporated these throughout the updated ARDC V2 framework. We believe that many of the key challenges identified have been addressed through the introduction of the Supervisory Council enabling a more structured and well-managed framework, revisions to the payment model, the ability to extend the ARDC for an additional six months pending approval through a Snapshot vote and the adoption of Aera to convert the program's ARB into USDC for operational purposes.
@SEEDGov as for funding the ARDC for 12 months, we received similar feedback from other members and have decided to take it on board and update the proposal accordingly. In summary, there will be 2 phases:
Phase 1 - Upon the passing of this proposal the first tranche of funding for 182 days (6 months) will be unlocked.
Phase 2 - At the end of the initial 6-month term, a Snapshot vote will be held offering the ArbitrumDAO the following options (i) extend the ARDC with the same working members (ii) extend the ARDC with a re-election of the working members (iii) do not extend the ARDC. If the DAO chooses to not extend the ARDC after the initial term, MSS will return the remaining funds in stablecoins back to the Treasury (i.e. there will be no subsequent OTC to buy back ARB).
Hey @Larva !
Thanks for your comment - appreciated as per usual ser
On the roles, albeit the numerous points that there are they can be summed up as follows:
Hey @Larva !
Thanks for your comment - appreciated as per usual ser
On the roles, albeit the numerous points that there are they can be summed up as follows:
Comms Members (2) - DAO Representation (Most importantly, as these are indeed DAO Representatives), routine engagement w/stakeholders, bi-weekly calls (an hour per two weeks), distributed ARDC work across DAO Socials, engage w/delegates, AF, OCL etc. on a continuous basis. All in all, ensuring that the ARDC work is granted optimal visibility to the DAO, AF, OCL, and the ecosystem in general.
Operations Member (1) - Monthly Report, Outcome report at the end of the term, facilitating the RFQ process and managing the notion page (the page is for the most part populated by SPs themselves, not by the council - council just makes sure this is up to date and maintains SP accountability).
All in all when you look at the work that actually needs to get done it's not substantial to the point where it wouldn't attract people - what we wanted is to attract the right people that (ideally) have experience in these roles for example.
We wanted to clearly outline certain responsibilities to avoid a situation where no ownership of tasks is taken (i.e. if the SC is generic, there might be issues w/members not taking ownership of certain tasks or expecting someone else to do it). It also ensures that we have someone to be held accountable for each role/responsibility.
Thank you for this proposal! First of all, we must acknowledge the achievements of the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [V1], which has made valuable contributions to Arbitrum DAO. I reviewed the latest revised version of the proposal, and many of the Delegates' suggestions have already been incorporated. However, before the Snapshot vote, I have one concern that I hope can be addressed.
The current proposal is very comprehensive, with detailed requirements that align well with Arbitrum DAO’s principles of transparency. However, my concern lies precisely in this—could all these rules and regulations discourage council members from actively participating? They would need to spend a significant amount of time and energy proving the work they’ve done, and this isn’t exactly a highly-paid role. Personally, if I were required to fill out numerous forms to prove my workload, I would find it frustrating, as I don’t enjoy working under rigid guidelines.
We are in favor of funding the team, but are a bit confused around the different options and the exact granularity with it. Some general questions:
Thank you @DefiLlama_Research for your interest in the role of the Research Member!
Hey @Vertex_Protocol following the feedback received we have opted to remove Hats Protocol given that several people felt that it was not necessary at this stage given the low amount of on-chain actions the ARDC has. However, we are looking to implement this once the Optimistic Governance Module is deployed by Tally.
After discussions with stakeholders and delegates, the DAO is clearly struggling to define a value proposition for the ARDC Risk Member, particularly after the last phase's deliverables. Gauntlet believes the Risk member could drive risk-conscious growth by helping Arbitrum stakeholders monitor DeFi ecosystem exposures, provide standards for asset listing, and parameterize various assets.
Arbitrum's diverse ecosystem is home to many successful protocols with varying complexity and interdependency. The Risk Member can serve stakeholders by standardizing the evaluation of DeFi risk at the ecosystem level. As such, we propose a scope adjustment of the ARDC Risk Member to incorporate the following:
Thank you @CastleCapital for your feedback and for expressing your interest in the role of the Research Member!
We believe that for the ARDC V2 holding an election for one member per vertical will result in a more efficient process given that an RFQ process for every request can be time-consuming and slow down the ARDC's ability to deliver timely insights. An elected representative per vertical streamlines this process, allowing for more consistent deliverables. Should the Supervisory Council deem a member of the ARDC to have acted negligently, in bad faith, or contrary to the mandate/purposes of the ARDC, with a simple majority (2/3) they will be able to terminate such a member and submit a call for applications for the vacant ARDC seat.
Hey @raam thanks for your feedback. We have updated the proposal to better clarify the dependency of the ARDC V2 on the Optimistic Governance Module (OGM). In summary, the ARDC v2 does not depend on the OGM for implementation; however, once Tally deploys the OGM for the DAO, a proposal will be submitted to integrate it into the ARDC structure.
gm, in support of the initiative. Voted 100% in favor of the 1.73M USDC + Council option.
The activity of the ARDC has been very valuable for me as a delegate, and appreciate the improvements brought in from v1.
I look forward an opCO or similar structure that can better oversee these initiatives and increase their efficiency.
Just submitted my vote on Snapshot and went 100% with the $1.73M funding + Council. I felt the same way @EzR3aL did during this vote: with so many initiatives, it’s hard to follow who’s doing what and whether there’s any overlap. It’d be nice if someone could create a graphic summarizing everything we have going on. Anyway, I decided to support this proposal because of ARDC V1’s proven track record and because this lower budget encourages more efficient capital allocation.
We're Voting 100% for option A with a budget of $1.73 million USDC
We're Voting 100% for option A with a budget of $1.73 million USDC
Given the concerns about bureaucracy and the need to demonstrate clear value, a cautious approach to funding is recommended.
I voted for 100% of "Funded with 2.60M USDC + Council". This option was chosen to ensure ample resources for large-scale operations, providing the necessary budget for critical functions like risk, security, and research while maintaining robust oversight through the Supervisory Council.
First, the introduction of a retainer model for members seems like a positive step towards aligning incentives, but there is a risk that this could lead to inefficiencies if expectations regarding time and deliverables are not managed properly. I recommend implementing clear metrics to assess performance, which would strengthen accountability and maximize value for the DAO. Second, the inclusion of an Optimistic Governance Module is intriguing, but its implementation might require more clarity. How will bureaucratic bottlenecks be mitigated, and what will the veto process look like if proposals initially face no objections? I think this aspect needs more detail to ensure effectiveness in distributed governance environments.
Thank you @Immutablelawyer for the quick response. I fully understand that a clear accountability mechanism is essential, I just had some minor concerns before. You’re right, for the right people, this won’t be an issue. I will definitely support this proposal!
I am voting in favor.
I think we need for our DAO this collective. We spin up ton of initiatives, and some goes in parallel, are highly technical and/or require smart contract implementation. We need to be able to asses the risk and we can't make the responsability fall back on OCL. At the same time we need a data science unit; we need to crunch data and understand what is happening both in our world and in the rest of the crypto world.
I am voting in favor.
I think we need for our DAO this collective. We spin up ton of initiatives, and some goes in parallel, are highly technical and/or require smart contract implementation. We need to be able to asses the risk and we can't make the responsability fall back on OCL. At the same time we need a data science unit; we need to crunch data and understand what is happening both in our world and in the rest of the crypto world.
I don't have a very strong opinion on the budget. @Immutablelawyer I know it would be quite difficult, but maybe in future could be interesting to try and highlight the difference of amount of deliverable (or whatever kpi you deem fit) between budget A, B and C. I am pretty sure that 90% of users here who didn't work in an audit or research firm don't know the cost of bread. Because of this, I am going with the middle choice of 2.09M.
As a final thought, I hope that when we are going to have to renew this initiative in 6 months, we will have opco capable of internalize this whole structure. I really think we will need risk and data analyst, constantly, moving forward.
On a more general note, I support the council added on top, I really think analyzing the work can be a very complex task not suited just for a single advocate; the payroll structure (1/3 upfront, and the rest split 50/50 before/after deliverable) is for sure better in term of alignment. I also think it's more of a theoretical solution than anything, "hours" in crypto are what they are, they are easy to game (not saying anyone would do that) and are a not so meaningful measure compared to IRL jobs in which you just use a badge. But I understand the need to address some concern, and the need to at least try to find solutions.
Thanks for the hard work.
I think the adjusted scope of at-risk members is clearer, provides real value to the ecosystem, and is worth supporting. But as a general outsider's view, I think a few points need attention 1. budget transparency: budget adjustments are good, but the oversight committee must ensure that every dollar is clearly spent to avoid waste. 2. Reduced roles: Eliminating unnecessary roles improves efficiency, but key positions must not be missing to avoid jeopardizing project progress. 3. Linking workload to remuneration: a flexible retention model is good, but it has to be ensured that there is someone to supervise it, so that no one can just get paid and not work, and the quality of work has to be kept up. The most important thing is the feedback mechanism, supervision mechanism. I see accountability mentioned in many reports.
Thank you for your proposal. Overall, this proposal can help to better manage and optimize the R&D process and deserves to be supported to support ARDC in achieving the above objectives In the area of transparent budgeting, the restructuring of the budget in the proposal is good, but the Oversight Committee should ensure that funds are used transparently to avoid overspending. At the same time, monitoring improvement: the introduction of the monitoring committee is a good idea to strengthen the management of the budget and projects, to ensure that each project advances on time and to avoid the waste of resources. Also retaining the payment model: this is useful to motivate members to be more focused and efficient, and also avoid useless work, efficiency will increase
Hey @cp0x thanks for your feedback.
Feel free to take a look at the updated proposal as we have removed the Operations Lead and integrated his responsibilities within the Supervisory Council. To clarify, will not be “creating a whole committee, and then a supervisory board”, but rather there will simply be a Supervisory Council consisting of 3 members. The rationale for this streamlined approach and the updated operational framework is detailed in our response to SeedGov, Jojo, and Argonaut.
Hey @cp0x thanks for your feedback.
Feel free to take a look at the updated proposal as we have removed the Operations Lead and integrated his responsibilities within the Supervisory Council. To clarify, will not be “creating a whole committee, and then a supervisory board”, but rather there will simply be a Supervisory Council consisting of 3 members. The rationale for this streamlined approach and the updated operational framework is detailed in our response to SeedGov, Jojo, and Argonaut.
Additionally, the value of the ARDC is demonstrated by ARDC V1’s achievements: it delivered 43 distinct outputs, which, as outlined in the final outcome report, helped return over 1,000,000 ARB to the DAO’s treasury. This recovery effectively offset a significant portion of the ARDC’s costs, which averaged just over $1,000,000 USD.
As for the third point, we are currently having discussions on alternative payment methods.
Thanks for your feedback @jameskbh. Based on feedback received, we have decided to consolidate the responsibilities of the Operations Lead into the Supervisory Council. This combined responsibility for both high-level oversight and day-to-day management ensures a seamless transition from strategic guidance to task execution, reducing unnecessary bureaucracy.
Replacing the DAO Advocate with a three-member Supervisory Council allows the ARDC to benefit from a broader range of perspectives and skills, enhancing strategic decision-making. This Council is essential, as it will ultimately decide which deliverables to prioritize within each vertical, ensuring the ARDC’s resources are used effectively and addressing certain inefficiencies observed during ARDC V1.
Thank you @SEEDGov @JoJo @Argonaut for your feedback.
We have revised the proposal to clarify that working members (service providers) are expected to outline a two-month scope of work, representing one-third of their initial six-month term. This approach offers two key benefits:
Thank you @SEEDGov @JoJo @Argonaut for your feedback.
We have revised the proposal to clarify that working members (service providers) are expected to outline a two-month scope of work, representing one-third of their initial six-month term. This approach offers two key benefits:
We believe this is an ideal middle ground which ensures that sufficient flexibility is provided.
Furthermore, in ARDC V1, the initial funding was set at 1.76M ARB, which, at the then-current price of $1.70 per ARB, would have been approximately $3.01M USD, including a 30% buffer. Ultimately, ARDC V1’s average funding totalled over $1.0M USD. This amount is closely aligned with Option B, which proposes funding ARDC V2 with 1.05M USDC over a six-month term. Options A and C offer variations around this baseline, reflecting an increase or decrease of around 20%, respectively, allowing the ArbitrumDAO to make the final decision.
Please note that (i) the funding amounts in the updated proposal reflect costs projected over one year and (ii) these funding figures represent the maximum allowable amounts, setting a spending ceiling that cannot be exceeded, rather than a guaranteed payout. Based on feedback, we decided to also increase the allocation for the Risk Member by 20%.
Regarding lessons learned, we have incorporated these throughout the updated ARDC V2 framework. We believe that many of the key challenges identified have been addressed through the introduction of the Supervisory Council enabling a more structured and well-managed framework, revisions to the payment model, the ability to extend the ARDC for an additional six months pending approval through a Snapshot vote and the adoption of Aera to convert the program's ARB into USDC for operational purposes.
@SEEDGov as for funding the ARDC for 12 months, we received similar feedback from other members and have decided to take it on board and update the proposal accordingly. In summary, there will be 2 phases:
Phase 1 - Upon the passing of this proposal the first tranche of funding for 182 days (6 months) will be unlocked.
Phase 2 - At the end of the initial 6-month term, a Snapshot vote will be held offering the ArbitrumDAO the following options (i) extend the ARDC with the same working members (ii) extend the ARDC with a re-election of the working members (iii) do not extend the ARDC. If the DAO chooses to not extend the ARDC after the initial term, MSS will return the remaining funds in stablecoins back to the Treasury (i.e. there will be no subsequent OTC to buy back ARB).
Hey @Larva !
Thanks for your comment - appreciated as per usual ser
On the roles, albeit the numerous points that there are they can be summed up as follows:
Hey @Larva !
Thanks for your comment - appreciated as per usual ser
On the roles, albeit the numerous points that there are they can be summed up as follows:
Comms Members (2) - DAO Representation (Most importantly, as these are indeed DAO Representatives), routine engagement w/stakeholders, bi-weekly calls (an hour per two weeks), distributed ARDC work across DAO Socials, engage w/delegates, AF, OCL etc. on a continuous basis. All in all, ensuring that the ARDC work is granted optimal visibility to the DAO, AF, OCL, and the ecosystem in general.
Operations Member (1) - Monthly Report, Outcome report at the end of the term, facilitating the RFQ process and managing the notion page (the page is for the most part populated by SPs themselves, not by the council - council just makes sure this is up to date and maintains SP accountability).
All in all when you look at the work that actually needs to get done it's not substantial to the point where it wouldn't attract people - what we wanted is to attract the right people that (ideally) have experience in these roles for example.
We wanted to clearly outline certain responsibilities to avoid a situation where no ownership of tasks is taken (i.e. if the SC is generic, there might be issues w/members not taking ownership of certain tasks or expecting someone else to do it). It also ensures that we have someone to be held accountable for each role/responsibility.
Thank you for this proposal! First of all, we must acknowledge the achievements of the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [V1], which has made valuable contributions to Arbitrum DAO. I reviewed the latest revised version of the proposal, and many of the Delegates' suggestions have already been incorporated. However, before the Snapshot vote, I have one concern that I hope can be addressed.
The current proposal is very comprehensive, with detailed requirements that align well with Arbitrum DAO’s principles of transparency. However, my concern lies precisely in this—could all these rules and regulations discourage council members from actively participating? They would need to spend a significant amount of time and energy proving the work they’ve done, and this isn’t exactly a highly-paid role. Personally, if I were required to fill out numerous forms to prove my workload, I would find it frustrating, as I don’t enjoy working under rigid guidelines.
We are in favor of funding the team, but are a bit confused around the different options and the exact granularity with it. Some general questions:
Thank you @DefiLlama_Research for your interest in the role of the Research Member!
Hey @Vertex_Protocol following the feedback received we have opted to remove Hats Protocol given that several people felt that it was not necessary at this stage given the low amount of on-chain actions the ARDC has. However, we are looking to implement this once the Optimistic Governance Module is deployed by Tally.
After discussions with stakeholders and delegates, the DAO is clearly struggling to define a value proposition for the ARDC Risk Member, particularly after the last phase's deliverables. Gauntlet believes the Risk member could drive risk-conscious growth by helping Arbitrum stakeholders monitor DeFi ecosystem exposures, provide standards for asset listing, and parameterize various assets.
Arbitrum's diverse ecosystem is home to many successful protocols with varying complexity and interdependency. The Risk Member can serve stakeholders by standardizing the evaluation of DeFi risk at the ecosystem level. As such, we propose a scope adjustment of the ARDC Risk Member to incorporate the following:
Thank you @CastleCapital for your feedback and for expressing your interest in the role of the Research Member!
We believe that for the ARDC V2 holding an election for one member per vertical will result in a more efficient process given that an RFQ process for every request can be time-consuming and slow down the ARDC's ability to deliver timely insights. An elected representative per vertical streamlines this process, allowing for more consistent deliverables. Should the Supervisory Council deem a member of the ARDC to have acted negligently, in bad faith, or contrary to the mandate/purposes of the ARDC, with a simple majority (2/3) they will be able to terminate such a member and submit a call for applications for the vacant ARDC seat.
Hey @raam thanks for your feedback. We have updated the proposal to better clarify the dependency of the ARDC V2 on the Optimistic Governance Module (OGM). In summary, the ARDC v2 does not depend on the OGM for implementation; however, once Tally deploys the OGM for the DAO, a proposal will be submitted to integrate it into the ARDC structure.
Thanks for your feedback @jameskbh. Based on feedback received, we have decided to consolidate the responsibilities of the Operations Lead into the Supervisory Council. This combined responsibility for both high-level oversight and day-to-day management ensures a seamless transition from strategic guidance to task execution, reducing unnecessary bureaucracy.
Replacing the DAO Advocate with a three-member Supervisory Council allows the ARDC to benefit from a broader range of perspectives and skills, enhancing strategic decision-making. This Council is essential, as it will ultimately decide which deliverables to prioritize within each vertical, ensuring the ARDC’s resources are used effectively and addressing certain inefficiencies observed during ARDC V1.
Moreover, after considering your feedback, along with input from other members, we have decided to remove Hats Protocol from the proposal.
As for the setup of Aera Vaults, this alternative is preferred as it grants the DAO an avenue to convert funds in a low-impact manner and reduce the counterparty price risk on OTC desks (i.e. if the DAO OTC’s through an OTC Desk, there is no guarantee that that OTC desk will not proceed to dump that allocation in a low-impact manner). Through Aera’s protocol-owner-execution strategy, we actually get to have low-impact transperant (and on-chain verifiable) solution for fund conversion that guarantees that we convert ARB in a sensible manner. You can see the images attached for further details on how this is done.
Finally, as for the scope of work, we have updated the wording of the proposal to reflect the fact that working members (service providers) are to outline a scope of work covering two months of their term (1/3rd of the workload given their initial 6-month term). The value-add of this is two-fold (i) the proposed scope of work will reflect the working members understanding of the most pressing needs within the Arbitrum DAO, which will add any layer of consideration as to them being elected for the role (ii) the ultimate decision as to the work to be carried out (which deliverables are to be prioritised per vertical) will be the responsibility of the Supervisory Council. Therefore, the proposed scope of work acts as a buffer until requests are made, and the decision as to whether this work is to be carried out will lie with the Supervisory Council (it will not automatically apply following their election). This emphasises the importance of the Supervisory Council in ensuring an effective ARDC V2.
We are in favor of funding the team, but are a bit confused around the different options and the exact granularity with it. Some general questions:
Overall, the supervisory council seems pretty useful, but we're not convinced the three of them is best for this, and might just introduce unneeded overhead and expenses.
After discussions with stakeholders and delegates, the DAO is clearly struggling to define a value proposition for the ARDC Risk Member, particularly after the last phase's deliverables. Gauntlet believes the Risk member could drive risk-conscious growth by helping Arbitrum stakeholders monitor DeFi ecosystem exposures, provide standards for asset listing, and parameterize various assets.
Arbitrum's diverse ecosystem is home to many successful protocols with varying complexity and interdependency. The Risk Member can serve stakeholders by standardizing the evaluation of DeFi risk at the ecosystem level. As such, we propose a scope adjustment of the ARDC Risk Member to incorporate the following:
We hope re-purposing the Risk Member's scope demonstrates improved value and deliverables for Arbitrum delegates and protocols.
Additional Reading:
Thank you @CastleCapital for your feedback and for expressing your interest in the role of the Research Member!
We believe that for the ARDC V2 holding an election for one member per vertical will result in a more efficient process given that an RFQ process for every request can be time-consuming and slow down the ARDC's ability to deliver timely insights. An elected representative per vertical streamlines this process, allowing for more consistent deliverables. Should the Supervisory Council deem a member of the ARDC to have acted negligently, in bad faith, or contrary to the mandate/purposes of the ARDC, with a simple majority (2/3) they will be able to terminate such a member and submit a call for applications for the vacant ARDC seat.
Additionally, while we understand the desire to have greater visibility for the reports and data carried out, this information is already being published publicly on the forum itself, and thus, any parties interested enough can access such information. We have also updated the Operational Parameters section to include more detail and transparency concerning the monthly report as well as the outcome report to be prepared at the end of the initial 6-month term.
Thank you @ReveloIntel for your interest in the role of the Research Member!
Thank you @BlockworksResearch for your interest in the role of the Research Member and for the contributions made in the ARDC V1.
Thanks for your reply!
Don't get me wrong, I'm bullish on having everything we can onchain. But in this case, I don't see the point yet. The ARDC mandate does not require any on-chain actions to be executed by its members:
It does not control any funds, the MSS will handle this part.

All elections are handled by snapshot/Tally (ARDC members, Council members, if any, etc)
Thanks for your reply!
Don't get me wrong, I'm bullish on having everything we can onchain. But in this case, I don't see the point yet. The ARDC mandate does not require any on-chain actions to be executed by its members:
It does not control any funds, the MSS will handle this part.

All elections are handled by snapshot/Tally (ARDC members, Council members, if any, etc)
Basically, there is no need to create an on-chain role for any of its participants. It will be a structure without any proper reason to be.
Thank you for the feedback, @karpatkey. While the ARDC’s alignment with the DAO's goals should indeed be part of its core structure, we believe it’s crucial to reinforce this alignment explicitly. The Supervisory Council is intended to guarantee independent oversight, providing an extra layer of accountability and expertise where needed. Compared to the DAO Advocate, this Council will be better positioned to capture a full range of perspectives, bringing in a variety of skills and viewpoints to strategic discussions.
Additionally, we have also included the roles previously falling under the Operations Lead into the remit of the Supervisory Council. By also being responsible for day-to-day management and coordination, this dual focus helps to close the gap between high-level guidance and the actual execution of tasks.
In the ARDC [V2], service providers will be required to outline the scope of work for the first two months of their tenure, including specific deliverables and timelines, which will be incorporated into the election template to be released separately
In the ARDC [V2], service providers will be required to outline the scope of work for the first two months of their tenure, including specific deliverables and timelines, which will be incorporated into the election template to be released separately
There are tons of details here. Some folks are already dissecting some stuff.
My main question is one: as @SEEDGov specified, most reports were from impromptu questions from the dao. This, indirectly, show the shortfall we have in properly forecasting that, after an initiative, we will need some data and a report about it to at least understand what happened. ANd so my guess is that this will get better over time.
But, in your experience, has the amount of external request from the dao changed the plan of the SP involved? Has it made the workload on their shoulder higher than what was initially expected? Or was a wait and trigger type of situation and so they were underutilized?
Because we will need to make space for request from the dao; at the same time we can't have the SPs idle waiting for the dao to ask for specific reports.
I guess the best outcome is for SPs to lay down their scope, and at the same time define a workload amount that they can take from external requests. A sort of hourly budget that could be spend inside the dao, the moment in which any entity requests either a specific report, or just the support of a data science unit for an initiative that need one and doesn't necessarily need to source one due to ARDC being live.
Hello everyone, thank you for your engagement with this proposal! We appreciate all the valuable feedback we've received and have incorporated it into the updated ARDC v2 proposal. Please note that a call is scheduled for next Tuesday to discuss the proposal in detail, followed by the Snapshot vote, which will take place on Friday.
Firstly, we appreciate the effort behind this proposal to improve the ARDC's structure and operations. We share the concerns expressed by other community members regarding the increase in the number of roles and the potential addition of bureaucracy. That said, we fully support extending the ARDC for an additional six months and recognize the value it has generated.
We celebrate the use of the Hats protocol to encode roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms on-chain. We're looking forward to seeing the results of this experiment.
Firstly, we appreciate the effort behind this proposal to improve the ARDC's structure and operations. We share the concerns expressed by other community members regarding the increase in the number of roles and the potential addition of bureaucracy. That said, we fully support extending the ARDC for an additional six months and recognize the value it has generated.
We celebrate the use of the Hats protocol to encode roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms on-chain. We're looking forward to seeing the results of this experiment.
Is it possible to achieve the desired oversight and operational efficiency without adding new roles? Perhaps existing roles can be readjusted or consolidated to cover these functions, thereby avoiding unnecessary bureaucracy.
The funding options present significant financial commitments. It would be helpful to see a more detailed budget breakdown or justification for the proposed amounts and the differences among the three presented options.
Considering the feedback above, we have prepared a Notion form to streamline and structure responses. You can access the form and share your insights here - https://noteforms.com/forms/arbitrum-research-development-collective-maopru
The ARDC has proven to be a positive addition to the DAO by presenting much-needed data on DAO governance and proposal effectiveness.
We welcome V2 as an improvement on the previous version. In fact, we support closer collaboration and the presence of the ARDC within proposals to ensure there is no information asymmetry and that, when needed, proposals are accompanied (and supported) by data from inception.
The ARDC has proven to be a positive addition to the DAO by presenting much-needed data on DAO governance and proposal effectiveness.
We welcome V2 as an improvement on the previous version. In fact, we support closer collaboration and the presence of the ARDC within proposals to ensure there is no information asymmetry and that, when needed, proposals are accompanied (and supported) by data from inception.
As part of this process, we believe that the ARDC should also be open to participation from wider actor ecosystems (e.g., there should, in our opinion, be more than one service provider member for each vertical, especially research) to support its broader mandate—either a group of three members with different niches or an RFQ process per research job.
In particular, as a research collective Castle expresses its interest in becoming a Research member.
Last but not least, while we believe that participants in the ARDC have fulfilled their mandate with honor, we believe that the reports and data produced need better visibility. A large part of this should involve including plans for marketing and communication to ensure that the insights found are known and easily accessible so they can be better turned into actionable improvements.
Due to the above, we do not support Term 2 for ARDC in the current form.
This is a wonderful report, but I don't understand why this committee should be continued?
I have read the entire report carefully and this is what I realized:
This is a wonderful report, but I don't understand why this committee should be continued?
I have read the entire report carefully and this is what I realized:
All groups and committees are created for a specific purpose. That is, the purpose must first appear, and I see that we are trying to come up with work for the existing committee.
I see a lot of work on analyzing various protocols and proposals, some of which are very important and necessary (everything that concerns information security, of course). But these tasks appear rarely and irregularly, and we do not know whether there will be a need for this work. However, to create a whole committee, and then a supervisory board (by the way, who will monitor that the supervisory board does something? This can lead to absurdity).
Research is necessary for some complex proposal that most delegates will not be able to analyze due to its specificity (a lot of code, complex formulas, etc.). In this case, the author of the proposal simply needs to budget some amount for this research. But there is no need to create and support a large structure for work that may not appear. This is a large financial burden without obvious advantages for the DAO.
I think that DAO should support research work exactly when it is needed for some proposal. Or tell me the arguments in favor of this proposal, I can't see them.
Thanks for the detailed proposal. As it is a heavy and complex structure it is natural that some items are not clear enough to us, as delegates, so here are my questions regarding this new iteration:
Why is it needed to split the DAO Advocate role in two? While it is understandable that the operational workload may be heavy, it seems only an addition of layers and bureaucracy. The first iteration held calls where the interested parties could check the current state, and several reports also provided enough information to give the DAO the relevant information. There was an specific request/suggestion for the proposol to be structured this way?
Why it is necessary to use the Hats Protocol? Which on-chain actions will be performed that require this structure? Reading the proposal, it seems only a representation of the structure on-chain, with no relevant usage.
Hey all. Thanks for a well formatted proposal. I'm very happy with most of the research done in V1. However, I do believe that the initial proposal was to get the service providers the delegates needed immediately without doing the work of creating a legitimate Expert Service Provider network.
During M1A, Thank ARB commissioned a Firestarter grant to Blockscience to lay down the unbiased needs for Arbitrum DAO to start an Expert Service Provider Network.
Hi @Immutablelawyer
Thank you for drafting this proposal.
From SEEDGov we recognize the value provided by most of the researches delivered by ARDC, on more than one occasion we have read them to better inform ourselves before making decisions such as the case of Timeboost and the proposal to develop the ARB staking.
Thank you, @Immutablelawyer, for putting this proposal forward.
We acknowledge the ARDC’s valuable contributions in its first term and generally support its renewal. However, we have concerns about the growing number of roles and entities within ArbitrumDAO. The increase in councils, working groups, and independent bodies seems to introduce unnecessary bureaucracy and overlapping responsibilities, potentially complicating governance.
Thank you, @Immutablelawyer, for putting this proposal forward.
We acknowledge the ARDC’s valuable contributions in its first term and generally support its renewal. However, we have concerns about the growing number of roles and entities within ArbitrumDAO. The increase in councils, working groups, and independent bodies seems to introduce unnecessary bureaucracy and overlapping responsibilities, potentially complicating governance.
Regarding this proposal, we question the need for a Supervisory Council. The stated goals—aligning ARDC with DAO interests and ensuring initiatives stay on track—should be fundamental to the ARDC’s structure, without requiring an additional layer of oversight.
Looking ahead, we also see the risk of overlapping roles between ARDC, @Entropy , and the Arbitrum Foundation. While we value the work of these entities, clearer definitions of ARDC's scope are essential to avoid redundancy and ensure effective collaboration or independent contribution to the DAO.
We appreciate ImmutableLawyer for developing this proposal. Blockworks Research will apply for the role of The Research Member. We are keen to follow this proposal and its discussion.
For additional context, we participated in the ARDC v1.0, and have provided many deliverables to the DAO, for those unfamiliar, here’s a list:
We appreciate ImmutableLawyer for developing this proposal. Blockworks Research will apply for the role of The Research Member. We are keen to follow this proposal and its discussion.
For additional context, we participated in the ARDC v1.0, and have provided many deliverables to the DAO, for those unfamiliar, here’s a list:
STIP Retroactive Analysis – Sequencer Revenue STIP Retroactive Analysis – Yield Aggregators TVL STIP Analysis of Operations and Incentive Mechanisms STIP Retroactive Analysis – Spot DEX TVL STIP Retroactive Analysis – Perp DEX Volume STIP-Bridge (Extended Deadline Applicants) – Support Material for the Community STIP-Bridge – Support Material for the Community Short-form Case Study – JOJO Short-form Case Study – GMX Treasury-Backed Vaults Analysis Timeboost Revenue and LP Impact Analysis
As active delegates, we’ve consistently gone above and beyond, playing a foundational role in the DAO’s development from its inception. Through conversations and with major stakeholders and other delegates, we’ve identified key areas for development and research moving forward and have clear plans to aid the DAO. At the same time, we are and will be at the DAO's aid for continued research requests in this next term. As value-add contributors, our work in ARDCv1 was instrumental in shaping many of the discussions central to the DAO today. For example, our evidence of fund misuse with Synapse and Furucombo helped save the DAO approximately $1M, while ongoing work on future incentive structures continues to drive meaningful progress.
In summary, we are happy to continue our relationship with Arbitrum, in both its community and its DAO.
Thanks for your feedback @jameskbh. Based on feedback received, we have decided to consolidate the responsibilities of the Operations Lead into the Supervisory Council. This combined responsibility for both high-level oversight and day-to-day management ensures a seamless transition from strategic guidance to task execution, reducing unnecessary bureaucracy.
Replacing the DAO Advocate with a three-member Supervisory Council allows the ARDC to benefit from a broader range of perspectives and skills, enhancing strategic decision-making. This Council is essential, as it will ultimately decide which deliverables to prioritize within each vertical, ensuring the ARDC’s resources are used effectively and addressing certain inefficiencies observed during ARDC V1.
Moreover, after considering your feedback, along with input from other members, we have decided to remove Hats Protocol from the proposal.
As for the setup of Aera Vaults, this alternative is preferred as it grants the DAO an avenue to convert funds in a low-impact manner and reduce the counterparty price risk on OTC desks (i.e. if the DAO OTC’s through an OTC Desk, there is no guarantee that that OTC desk will not proceed to dump that allocation in a low-impact manner). Through Aera’s protocol-owner-execution strategy, we actually get to have low-impact transperant (and on-chain verifiable) solution for fund conversion that guarantees that we convert ARB in a sensible manner. You can see the images attached for further details on how this is done.
Finally, as for the scope of work, we have updated the wording of the proposal to reflect the fact that working members (service providers) are to outline a scope of work covering two months of their term (1/3rd of the workload given their initial 6-month term). The value-add of this is two-fold (i) the proposed scope of work will reflect the working members understanding of the most pressing needs within the Arbitrum DAO, which will add any layer of consideration as to them being elected for the role (ii) the ultimate decision as to the work to be carried out (which deliverables are to be prioritised per vertical) will be the responsibility of the Supervisory Council. Therefore, the proposed scope of work acts as a buffer until requests are made, and the decision as to whether this work is to be carried out will lie with the Supervisory Council (it will not automatically apply following their election). This emphasises the importance of the Supervisory Council in ensuring an effective ARDC V2.
We are in favor of funding the team, but are a bit confused around the different options and the exact granularity with it. Some general questions:
Overall, the supervisory council seems pretty useful, but we're not convinced the three of them is best for this, and might just introduce unneeded overhead and expenses.
After discussions with stakeholders and delegates, the DAO is clearly struggling to define a value proposition for the ARDC Risk Member, particularly after the last phase's deliverables. Gauntlet believes the Risk member could drive risk-conscious growth by helping Arbitrum stakeholders monitor DeFi ecosystem exposures, provide standards for asset listing, and parameterize various assets.
Arbitrum's diverse ecosystem is home to many successful protocols with varying complexity and interdependency. The Risk Member can serve stakeholders by standardizing the evaluation of DeFi risk at the ecosystem level. As such, we propose a scope adjustment of the ARDC Risk Member to incorporate the following:
We hope re-purposing the Risk Member's scope demonstrates improved value and deliverables for Arbitrum delegates and protocols.
Additional Reading:
Thank you @CastleCapital for your feedback and for expressing your interest in the role of the Research Member!
We believe that for the ARDC V2 holding an election for one member per vertical will result in a more efficient process given that an RFQ process for every request can be time-consuming and slow down the ARDC's ability to deliver timely insights. An elected representative per vertical streamlines this process, allowing for more consistent deliverables. Should the Supervisory Council deem a member of the ARDC to have acted negligently, in bad faith, or contrary to the mandate/purposes of the ARDC, with a simple majority (2/3) they will be able to terminate such a member and submit a call for applications for the vacant ARDC seat.
Additionally, while we understand the desire to have greater visibility for the reports and data carried out, this information is already being published publicly on the forum itself, and thus, any parties interested enough can access such information. We have also updated the Operational Parameters section to include more detail and transparency concerning the monthly report as well as the outcome report to be prepared at the end of the initial 6-month term.
Thank you @ReveloIntel for your interest in the role of the Research Member!
Thank you @BlockworksResearch for your interest in the role of the Research Member and for the contributions made in the ARDC V1.
Thanks for your reply!
Don't get me wrong, I'm bullish on having everything we can onchain. But in this case, I don't see the point yet. The ARDC mandate does not require any on-chain actions to be executed by its members:
It does not control any funds, the MSS will handle this part.

All elections are handled by snapshot/Tally (ARDC members, Council members, if any, etc)
Thanks for your reply!
Don't get me wrong, I'm bullish on having everything we can onchain. But in this case, I don't see the point yet. The ARDC mandate does not require any on-chain actions to be executed by its members:
It does not control any funds, the MSS will handle this part.

All elections are handled by snapshot/Tally (ARDC members, Council members, if any, etc)
Basically, there is no need to create an on-chain role for any of its participants. It will be a structure without any proper reason to be.
Thank you for the feedback, @karpatkey. While the ARDC’s alignment with the DAO's goals should indeed be part of its core structure, we believe it’s crucial to reinforce this alignment explicitly. The Supervisory Council is intended to guarantee independent oversight, providing an extra layer of accountability and expertise where needed. Compared to the DAO Advocate, this Council will be better positioned to capture a full range of perspectives, bringing in a variety of skills and viewpoints to strategic discussions.
Additionally, we have also included the roles previously falling under the Operations Lead into the remit of the Supervisory Council. By also being responsible for day-to-day management and coordination, this dual focus helps to close the gap between high-level guidance and the actual execution of tasks.
In the ARDC [V2], service providers will be required to outline the scope of work for the first two months of their tenure, including specific deliverables and timelines, which will be incorporated into the election template to be released separately
In the ARDC [V2], service providers will be required to outline the scope of work for the first two months of their tenure, including specific deliverables and timelines, which will be incorporated into the election template to be released separately
There are tons of details here. Some folks are already dissecting some stuff.
My main question is one: as @SEEDGov specified, most reports were from impromptu questions from the dao. This, indirectly, show the shortfall we have in properly forecasting that, after an initiative, we will need some data and a report about it to at least understand what happened. ANd so my guess is that this will get better over time.
But, in your experience, has the amount of external request from the dao changed the plan of the SP involved? Has it made the workload on their shoulder higher than what was initially expected? Or was a wait and trigger type of situation and so they were underutilized?
Because we will need to make space for request from the dao; at the same time we can't have the SPs idle waiting for the dao to ask for specific reports.
I guess the best outcome is for SPs to lay down their scope, and at the same time define a workload amount that they can take from external requests. A sort of hourly budget that could be spend inside the dao, the moment in which any entity requests either a specific report, or just the support of a data science unit for an initiative that need one and doesn't necessarily need to source one due to ARDC being live.
Hello everyone, thank you for your engagement with this proposal! We appreciate all the valuable feedback we've received and have incorporated it into the updated ARDC v2 proposal. Please note that a call is scheduled for next Tuesday to discuss the proposal in detail, followed by the Snapshot vote, which will take place on Friday.
Firstly, we appreciate the effort behind this proposal to improve the ARDC's structure and operations. We share the concerns expressed by other community members regarding the increase in the number of roles and the potential addition of bureaucracy. That said, we fully support extending the ARDC for an additional six months and recognize the value it has generated.
We celebrate the use of the Hats protocol to encode roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms on-chain. We're looking forward to seeing the results of this experiment.
Firstly, we appreciate the effort behind this proposal to improve the ARDC's structure and operations. We share the concerns expressed by other community members regarding the increase in the number of roles and the potential addition of bureaucracy. That said, we fully support extending the ARDC for an additional six months and recognize the value it has generated.
We celebrate the use of the Hats protocol to encode roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms on-chain. We're looking forward to seeing the results of this experiment.
Is it possible to achieve the desired oversight and operational efficiency without adding new roles? Perhaps existing roles can be readjusted or consolidated to cover these functions, thereby avoiding unnecessary bureaucracy.
The funding options present significant financial commitments. It would be helpful to see a more detailed budget breakdown or justification for the proposed amounts and the differences among the three presented options.
Considering the feedback above, we have prepared a Notion form to streamline and structure responses. You can access the form and share your insights here - https://noteforms.com/forms/arbitrum-research-development-collective-maopru
The ARDC has proven to be a positive addition to the DAO by presenting much-needed data on DAO governance and proposal effectiveness.
We welcome V2 as an improvement on the previous version. In fact, we support closer collaboration and the presence of the ARDC within proposals to ensure there is no information asymmetry and that, when needed, proposals are accompanied (and supported) by data from inception.
The ARDC has proven to be a positive addition to the DAO by presenting much-needed data on DAO governance and proposal effectiveness.
We welcome V2 as an improvement on the previous version. In fact, we support closer collaboration and the presence of the ARDC within proposals to ensure there is no information asymmetry and that, when needed, proposals are accompanied (and supported) by data from inception.
As part of this process, we believe that the ARDC should also be open to participation from wider actor ecosystems (e.g., there should, in our opinion, be more than one service provider member for each vertical, especially research) to support its broader mandate—either a group of three members with different niches or an RFQ process per research job.
In particular, as a research collective Castle expresses its interest in becoming a Research member.
Last but not least, while we believe that participants in the ARDC have fulfilled their mandate with honor, we believe that the reports and data produced need better visibility. A large part of this should involve including plans for marketing and communication to ensure that the insights found are known and easily accessible so they can be better turned into actionable improvements.
Due to the above, we do not support Term 2 for ARDC in the current form.
This is a wonderful report, but I don't understand why this committee should be continued?
I have read the entire report carefully and this is what I realized:
This is a wonderful report, but I don't understand why this committee should be continued?
I have read the entire report carefully and this is what I realized:
All groups and committees are created for a specific purpose. That is, the purpose must first appear, and I see that we are trying to come up with work for the existing committee.
I see a lot of work on analyzing various protocols and proposals, some of which are very important and necessary (everything that concerns information security, of course). But these tasks appear rarely and irregularly, and we do not know whether there will be a need for this work. However, to create a whole committee, and then a supervisory board (by the way, who will monitor that the supervisory board does something? This can lead to absurdity).
Research is necessary for some complex proposal that most delegates will not be able to analyze due to its specificity (a lot of code, complex formulas, etc.). In this case, the author of the proposal simply needs to budget some amount for this research. But there is no need to create and support a large structure for work that may not appear. This is a large financial burden without obvious advantages for the DAO.
I think that DAO should support research work exactly when it is needed for some proposal. Or tell me the arguments in favor of this proposal, I can't see them.
Thanks for the detailed proposal. As it is a heavy and complex structure it is natural that some items are not clear enough to us, as delegates, so here are my questions regarding this new iteration:
Why is it needed to split the DAO Advocate role in two? While it is understandable that the operational workload may be heavy, it seems only an addition of layers and bureaucracy. The first iteration held calls where the interested parties could check the current state, and several reports also provided enough information to give the DAO the relevant information. There was an specific request/suggestion for the proposol to be structured this way?
Why it is necessary to use the Hats Protocol? Which on-chain actions will be performed that require this structure? Reading the proposal, it seems only a representation of the structure on-chain, with no relevant usage.
Hey all. Thanks for a well formatted proposal. I'm very happy with most of the research done in V1. However, I do believe that the initial proposal was to get the service providers the delegates needed immediately without doing the work of creating a legitimate Expert Service Provider network.
During M1A, Thank ARB commissioned a Firestarter grant to Blockscience to lay down the unbiased needs for Arbitrum DAO to start an Expert Service Provider Network.
Hi @Immutablelawyer
Thank you for drafting this proposal.
From SEEDGov we recognize the value provided by most of the researches delivered by ARDC, on more than one occasion we have read them to better inform ourselves before making decisions such as the case of Timeboost and the proposal to develop the ARB staking.
Thank you, @Immutablelawyer, for putting this proposal forward.
We acknowledge the ARDC’s valuable contributions in its first term and generally support its renewal. However, we have concerns about the growing number of roles and entities within ArbitrumDAO. The increase in councils, working groups, and independent bodies seems to introduce unnecessary bureaucracy and overlapping responsibilities, potentially complicating governance.
Thank you, @Immutablelawyer, for putting this proposal forward.
We acknowledge the ARDC’s valuable contributions in its first term and generally support its renewal. However, we have concerns about the growing number of roles and entities within ArbitrumDAO. The increase in councils, working groups, and independent bodies seems to introduce unnecessary bureaucracy and overlapping responsibilities, potentially complicating governance.
Regarding this proposal, we question the need for a Supervisory Council. The stated goals—aligning ARDC with DAO interests and ensuring initiatives stay on track—should be fundamental to the ARDC’s structure, without requiring an additional layer of oversight.
Looking ahead, we also see the risk of overlapping roles between ARDC, @Entropy , and the Arbitrum Foundation. While we value the work of these entities, clearer definitions of ARDC's scope are essential to avoid redundancy and ensure effective collaboration or independent contribution to the DAO.
We appreciate ImmutableLawyer for developing this proposal. Blockworks Research will apply for the role of The Research Member. We are keen to follow this proposal and its discussion.
For additional context, we participated in the ARDC v1.0, and have provided many deliverables to the DAO, for those unfamiliar, here’s a list:
We appreciate ImmutableLawyer for developing this proposal. Blockworks Research will apply for the role of The Research Member. We are keen to follow this proposal and its discussion.
For additional context, we participated in the ARDC v1.0, and have provided many deliverables to the DAO, for those unfamiliar, here’s a list:
STIP Retroactive Analysis – Sequencer Revenue STIP Retroactive Analysis – Yield Aggregators TVL STIP Analysis of Operations and Incentive Mechanisms STIP Retroactive Analysis – Spot DEX TVL STIP Retroactive Analysis – Perp DEX Volume STIP-Bridge (Extended Deadline Applicants) – Support Material for the Community STIP-Bridge – Support Material for the Community Short-form Case Study – JOJO Short-form Case Study – GMX Treasury-Backed Vaults Analysis Timeboost Revenue and LP Impact Analysis
As active delegates, we’ve consistently gone above and beyond, playing a foundational role in the DAO’s development from its inception. Through conversations and with major stakeholders and other delegates, we’ve identified key areas for development and research moving forward and have clear plans to aid the DAO. At the same time, we are and will be at the DAO's aid for continued research requests in this next term. As value-add contributors, our work in ARDCv1 was instrumental in shaping many of the discussions central to the DAO today. For example, our evidence of fund misuse with Synapse and Furucombo helped save the DAO approximately $1M, while ongoing work on future incentive structures continues to drive meaningful progress.
In summary, we are happy to continue our relationship with Arbitrum, in both its community and its DAO.
Thanks for the detailed proposal. As it is a heavy and complex structure it is natural that some items are not clear enough to us, as delegates, so here are my questions regarding this new iteration:
Why is it needed to split the DAO Advocate role in two? While it is understandable that the operational workload may be heavy, it seems only an addition of layers and bureaucracy. The first iteration held calls where the interested parties could check the current state, and several reports also provided enough information to give the DAO the relevant information. There was an specific request/suggestion for the proposol to be structured this way?
Why it is necessary to use the Hats Protocol? Which on-chain actions will be performed that require this structure? Reading the proposal, it seems only a representation of the structure on-chain, with no relevant usage.
The ARDC will utilize a Protocol-Owned Execution strategy on Aera to convert the program’s ARB into USDC for operational purposes
service providers will be required to outline the scope of work for the first two months of their tenure, including specific deliverables and timelines, which will be incorporated into the election template to be released separately.
TL,DR: The added structure (Hats Protocol, Supervisory Council, Aera Vaults) seems to add little value to the proposal objective. Can you clarify these items better?
Hey all. Thanks for a well formatted proposal. I'm very happy with most of the research done in V1. However, I do believe that the initial proposal was to get the service providers the delegates needed immediately without doing the work of creating a legitimate Expert Service Provider network.
During M1A, Thank ARB commissioned a Firestarter grant to Blockscience to lay down the unbiased needs for Arbitrum DAO to start an Expert Service Provider Network.
To constitute a program for Arbitrum DAO targeting funding for ongoing activities that pursue long-term goals. The purpose of the Expert Service Provider Network is to ensure Arbitrum DAO has access to expert services that are:
And that adequately aligns incentives - including accountability mechanisms - between Arbitrum DAO and potential expert service providers.
You can find the Executive Summary below. You can find the full report via this link: https://block.science/images/ArbitrumExpertServiceProviderNetworkProgramDevelopment.pdf
I'm currently seeing both the ADPC and the ARDC applying for second term funding in the "band-aid" model where the core work to build the Expert Service Provider Network hasn't been done or proposed. I'd much rather see that work done.
I'm not opposed to one more season with the locked-in vendors, but I would definitely prefer to see the open network created. Especially after funding Blockscience to do such high quality work providing the pathway to success.
Hi @Immutablelawyer
Thank you for drafting this proposal.
From SEEDGov we recognize the value provided by most of the researches delivered by ARDC, on more than one occasion we have read them to better inform ourselves before making decisions such as the case of Timeboost and the proposal to develop the ARB staking.
For this reason, we would like to offer some feedback and pose a few questions before the proposal moves to Snapshot.
In the ARDC [V2], service providers will be required to outline the scope of work for the first two months of their tenure, including specific deliverables and timelines, which will be incorporated into the election template to be released separately
Considering that many of the reports were requested by community members in the context of emerging proposals, we believe this aspect may be challenging for both the applicant and the delegate to assess during voting. What kind of deliverables should we prioritize within each vertical? How should we handle spontaneous requests from the DAO when there is a conflict between predetermined work and these new demands?
We understand the need for a general framework to guide the work, but we also believe there should be room for flexibility to accommodate the DAO’s evolving needs.
We suggest considering the possibility of funding the ARDC for 12 months instead of 6. With the growing number of committees, working groups, and elected positions within the DAO, and given that the ARDC has already undergone an “experimental” phase and has a supervisory committee that can request the removal of negligent members, we believe a 12-month funding period would be more beneficial. This would provide greater predictability, stability, and, importantly, help reduce the electoral burden on the DAO.
The Supervisory Council will involve the election of three (3) individuals who will be elected by the DAO. These elected individuals will serve on the Supervisory Council for a term of six (6) months. Each member will receive a monthly compensation of 3,000 ARB for the duration of their term. The total cost for compensating the entire council over the six-month period will be 54,000 ARB.
Having said the above, we would like to clarify that while we share the concern about over-bureaucratization raised by @karpatkey, we believe that the low cost of the committee and its usefulness within the designed structure justify its existence.
Security: 330,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Research: 330,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Risk: 170,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Council: 54,000 ARB
Operations Lead: 60,000ARB
Security: 400,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Research: 400,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Risk: 205,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Council: 54,000 ARB
Operations Lead: 60,000ARB
Security: 500,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Research: 500,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Risk: 250,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Council: 54,000 ARB
Operations Lead: 60,000ARB
What would be the criteria for selecting one of the three budget options? Have there been any inputs from previous members or potential new service providers?
One thing we notice missing in this proposal is more detail on the lessons learned from the first iteration. While we understand that part of this is reflected in the separation of the DAO Advocate into the Supervisory Council and the Operations Lead, we wonder if other areas could be improved based on the first iteration.
This question arises because, with the experience gained from the first six months, we likely have a clearer understanding of what to expect in the second iteration. Additionally, it would be beneficial to establish some KPIs to help assess whether the ARDC has met expectations (beyond the number of reports, for example). Valuable metrics could include the time taken to issue reports, the frequency with which they are referenced in discussions, etc.
Thanks for the detailed proposal. As it is a heavy and complex structure it is natural that some items are not clear enough to us, as delegates, so here are my questions regarding this new iteration:
Why is it needed to split the DAO Advocate role in two? While it is understandable that the operational workload may be heavy, it seems only an addition of layers and bureaucracy. The first iteration held calls where the interested parties could check the current state, and several reports also provided enough information to give the DAO the relevant information. There was an specific request/suggestion for the proposol to be structured this way?
Why it is necessary to use the Hats Protocol? Which on-chain actions will be performed that require this structure? Reading the proposal, it seems only a representation of the structure on-chain, with no relevant usage.
The ARDC will utilize a Protocol-Owned Execution strategy on Aera to convert the program’s ARB into USDC for operational purposes
service providers will be required to outline the scope of work for the first two months of their tenure, including specific deliverables and timelines, which will be incorporated into the election template to be released separately.
TL,DR: The added structure (Hats Protocol, Supervisory Council, Aera Vaults) seems to add little value to the proposal objective. Can you clarify these items better?
Hey all. Thanks for a well formatted proposal. I'm very happy with most of the research done in V1. However, I do believe that the initial proposal was to get the service providers the delegates needed immediately without doing the work of creating a legitimate Expert Service Provider network.
During M1A, Thank ARB commissioned a Firestarter grant to Blockscience to lay down the unbiased needs for Arbitrum DAO to start an Expert Service Provider Network.
To constitute a program for Arbitrum DAO targeting funding for ongoing activities that pursue long-term goals. The purpose of the Expert Service Provider Network is to ensure Arbitrum DAO has access to expert services that are:
And that adequately aligns incentives - including accountability mechanisms - between Arbitrum DAO and potential expert service providers.
You can find the Executive Summary below. You can find the full report via this link: https://block.science/images/ArbitrumExpertServiceProviderNetworkProgramDevelopment.pdf
I'm currently seeing both the ADPC and the ARDC applying for second term funding in the "band-aid" model where the core work to build the Expert Service Provider Network hasn't been done or proposed. I'd much rather see that work done.
I'm not opposed to one more season with the locked-in vendors, but I would definitely prefer to see the open network created. Especially after funding Blockscience to do such high quality work providing the pathway to success.
Hi @Immutablelawyer
Thank you for drafting this proposal.
From SEEDGov we recognize the value provided by most of the researches delivered by ARDC, on more than one occasion we have read them to better inform ourselves before making decisions such as the case of Timeboost and the proposal to develop the ARB staking.
For this reason, we would like to offer some feedback and pose a few questions before the proposal moves to Snapshot.
In the ARDC [V2], service providers will be required to outline the scope of work for the first two months of their tenure, including specific deliverables and timelines, which will be incorporated into the election template to be released separately
Considering that many of the reports were requested by community members in the context of emerging proposals, we believe this aspect may be challenging for both the applicant and the delegate to assess during voting. What kind of deliverables should we prioritize within each vertical? How should we handle spontaneous requests from the DAO when there is a conflict between predetermined work and these new demands?
We understand the need for a general framework to guide the work, but we also believe there should be room for flexibility to accommodate the DAO’s evolving needs.
We suggest considering the possibility of funding the ARDC for 12 months instead of 6. With the growing number of committees, working groups, and elected positions within the DAO, and given that the ARDC has already undergone an “experimental” phase and has a supervisory committee that can request the removal of negligent members, we believe a 12-month funding period would be more beneficial. This would provide greater predictability, stability, and, importantly, help reduce the electoral burden on the DAO.
The Supervisory Council will involve the election of three (3) individuals who will be elected by the DAO. These elected individuals will serve on the Supervisory Council for a term of six (6) months. Each member will receive a monthly compensation of 3,000 ARB for the duration of their term. The total cost for compensating the entire council over the six-month period will be 54,000 ARB.
Having said the above, we would like to clarify that while we share the concern about over-bureaucratization raised by @karpatkey, we believe that the low cost of the committee and its usefulness within the designed structure justify its existence.
Security: 330,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Research: 330,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Risk: 170,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Council: 54,000 ARB
Operations Lead: 60,000ARB
Security: 400,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Research: 400,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Risk: 205,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Council: 54,000 ARB
Operations Lead: 60,000ARB
Security: 500,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Research: 500,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Risk: 250,000 USDC (Applicable Cap)
Council: 54,000 ARB
Operations Lead: 60,000ARB
What would be the criteria for selecting one of the three budget options? Have there been any inputs from previous members or potential new service providers?
One thing we notice missing in this proposal is more detail on the lessons learned from the first iteration. While we understand that part of this is reflected in the separation of the DAO Advocate into the Supervisory Council and the Operations Lead, we wonder if other areas could be improved based on the first iteration.
This question arises because, with the experience gained from the first six months, we likely have a clearer understanding of what to expect in the second iteration. Additionally, it would be beneficial to establish some KPIs to help assess whether the ARDC has met expectations (beyond the number of reports, for example). Valuable metrics could include the time taken to issue reports, the frequency with which they are referenced in discussions, etc.