In order to foster good governance participation in the ArbitrumDAO, this proposal puts forward the DAO Incentive Program, distinguishing between delegates, rewarded for their voting record and public rationale, and contributors, rewarded through a peer recognition program and "Nudge Seasons" to encourage positive governance actions. Since it serves as a continuation of, and builds upon learnings from the Delegate Incentive Program, we refer to it as DIP 2.0.
We propose a new incentive program for the ArbitrumDAO that separates out rewards for delegates and contributors:
A delegate can be a contributor, but we should not assume that a contributor must be a delegate.
The incentive reward paid to delegates will only focus on their voting record and making public the rationale behind their decision. On the other hand, for contributors, there will be two forms of rewards available:
We note the DAO incentive program should not replace a salary-like paid role or be sufficient to self-sustain an individual. However, it could be a stepping stone to enable parties to eventually find part time or full time work in the ecosystem. Most importantly, all payments should be viewed as a ‘thank you’ from others in the community.
To make the above work, we also propose introducing an Arbitrum Peer Assembly via a peer-to-peer vouching system. It requires existing members and/or AAEs to vouch for others to join before they are eligible for any payments, for delegates and/or contributors, in the DAO incentive program. The vouching system is designed to allow members to hold each other accountable and boost comradery among participants.
This program is designed to be objective and on a per-proposal basis. Any member of the Arbitrum Peer Assembly is eligible to receive a payment provided they:
Long-term program objectives are measured through the following key performance indicators:
The following metric will be used to track the cost-effectiveness of the program:
The cost-efficiency metric should find a fair cost per vote that encourages delegates to participate without overspending the budget. For example, if the incentive budget per proposal is $10,000 and if the program manager decides to incentivize up to 200,000,000 votes per proposal, then the dollar spent per vote cast is 0.00005.
| Proposal type | Incentive Budget | Payout Cap | Reward Distribution | Contributor Bonus |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| On-chain constitutional | 10,000 ARB | 700 ARB | Proportional to voting power | 1,000 ARB |
| On-chain funding transfer | 8,000 ARB | 500 ARB | Proportional to voting power | 1,000 ARB |
| Off-chain decision making | 8,000 ARB | 500 ARB | Proportional to voting power | 0 ARB |
| Off-chain temperature check (non-binding) | 3,000 ARB | 300 ARB | Quadratic relative to voting power | 0 ARB |
Table 1: A hypothetical illustration of incentive grant budget for delegate rewards
As seen in Table 1, the program manager, in agreement with the OpCo, is required to set out an incentive grant budget that is paid on a per-proposal basis:
The incentive grant budget for proposals that are published within a 3-month period must be shared at the start of every 3-month period by the program manager alongside an optional maximum cap for the entire period.
The intention is to provide delegates with predictability on the reward structure in the coming months while allowing the payout strategies to change over time. For example, as seen in Table 1, if an on-chain constitutional proposal is voted on by the DAO, then a 10k ARB incentive grant will be allocated for that specific proposal.
The program manager, in agreement with the OpCo, reserves the right to offer bespoke incentive grant budgets for specific proposals. For example, if the DAO is required to participate in several sub-proposals within a single initiative (like in the STIP), then all such proposals may fall within a single bespoke incentive budget. They may decide not to offer any reward in order to prevent potential abuse such as an avalanche of unnecessary proposals or decisions that are deemed very minor in nature (including cancelled proposals). If so, the rationale should be published prior or during the on-chain/off-chain proposal by the program manager.
The contributor bonus allows the proposal author to nominate contributors who made a meaningful impact on the proposal. This is not limited to posts on the forum, but any communication medium that enables the contributor to support the proposal author. The proposal author can name a handful of contributors alongside a short description on each contributor’s impact on the proposal. This is sent to the program manager, who will then publish it to the DAO. The bonus will be split between the named contributors. The contributor bonus is optional and it should be viewed as a small ‘thank you’ for making the proposal better.
Finally, the incentive budget should define a minimum voting power required to be eligible for delegate rewards. It will apply across all proposal types. This should be set to a reasonable value to help reduce the overhead of tracking rewards.
The program is designed to recognise contributors who have made meaningful contributions to the ArbitrumDAO or the wider ecosystem as acknowledged by their peers.
The contribution should be:
The program may reward recurring tasks, but it should be an exception. For example, if a contributor hosts a monthly call, this will not result in a payout being issued every month.
The program manager is expected to act as an ordering service:
The full final ranking will not be publicly released. Only the top N recommendations, where N is a program-defined threshold, will be published to the DAO. Each selected recommendation from the top N will receive a fixed payout.
Additionally, if there is an outstanding contribution, the program manager (with agreement from the OpCo), can issue a ‘special reward’ with a higher payout. These should be rare and generally a moment of great praise.
Initial Configuration for Peer Recognition Program.
For clarity, there is no obligation to publish exactly N recommendations every month. Only those deemed worthy of a reward should be published and in some months there may be none. If there are too many worthy contributions to fit within a single month, then the program manager can carry some over to future months, to ensure that eligible contributions are eventually recognized.
Every month, the program manager will request all members of the Arbitrum Peer Assembly, as well as AAEs, to submit their recommendations. It should be written in the following format:
Note, the recommendation should be concise and easy to digest as it will be published (alongside the reward) if it is chosen by the program manager. A participant can also submit a recommendation that covers their own actions.
The recommendation must be sent privately to the program manager. It is up to the recommender to ensure the program manager has acknowledged that it was indeed received by them.
For Example:
The program manager will collect and review all recommendations. It is their job to rank the recommendations according to a set of principles. For example:
Of course, we expect other considerations to arise over time and this list should not be viewed as exhaustive. The list simply helps set the tone on what it means for a contribution worthy of stature. An updated list of principles will be published to the DAO periodically to ensure everyone is aware of the criteria used to rank the recommendations.
The program is designed to nudge certain behaviours of participants that can positively impact the Arbitrum ecosystem through the offer of rewards.
In the previous iterations of the delegate incentive program, we witnessed delegates perform actions in order to earn rewards, such as leaving comments on the forum, joining governance calls, or voting early in Security Council elections.
The program manager, with agreement of the OpCo, can put together ‘nudge seasons’ where contributors are offered a reward for performing certain actions within a timeframe. The contributors can provide evidence to the program manager that they have completed the action, as specified by the program manager at the time of the nudge season being announced, and if evaluated by the program manager as doing so, they will then be eligible to receive a payment for doing it.
For example:
Anyone who is registered in the DAO incentive program’s Peer Assembly will be eligible as long as they adhere to the conditions of the nudge season. In the above example, whether or not they meet criteria can be proven by on-chain activity.
All ‘nudge seasons’ should be accompanied with a single KPI/metric that can be used to evaluate whether it was successful in nudging behaviour. The program manager should provide a small report with data that demonstrates if the KPI was achieved after the nudge season has concluded.
A nudge season can be broad and may cover activity within the Arbitrum ecosystem. This may include participation in governance, helping real-world events or amplifying announcements. What will be nudged is subjective in nature, but when it comes to evaluating whether the behaviour was nudged, that should remain as objective as possible.
The DAO Incentive Program introduces a new community where parties can only join if they are vouched by existing members and/or AAEs. The intention is to enable the DAO to hold each other accountable to their actions. All payments in the DAO incentive program are contingent upon joining this assembly.
We have picked the top 8 earners from the soon expiring Delegate Incentive Program from (January - August) 2025 to bootstrap the initial list of eligible members:
There are some special requirements for these members:
The intention to keep this list short is to make this process manageable and it should not be perceived as a special privilege.
Additionally, to aid the bootstrapping process, all registered members can offer multiple vouches until 50 members have registered in the program. Priority registration will be given to members who were previously registered in DIP v1.7. Once 50 members are registered, then all members will be restricted to 1 vouch per month.
A dedicated thread on the Arbitrum Forum should be created for the new member who wants to join:
Once a member receives enough vouches to join the assembly and assuming any compliance requirements are completed, the new member will then be considered a member of the program and will have the authority to make their own vouch for others to join. As is the case for the initial members, new members also cannot receive a vouch from someone who they directly vouched to join the program. Registration is only finalized once it is confirmed by the program manager on the relevant thread.
If a member wants to remove their vouch, then they will be required to reply on the same thread that it should be removed.
If a member has left the program for whatever reason (i.e., inactive), then the relevant forum thread will be locked.
The Program Manager is responsible for keeping track of all rewards for delegate voting, the peer recognition program, and the nudge seasons. It should be available on a public spreadsheet for all members to access.
For clarity, all records should be kept on a per calendar month basis, and payouts should be issued shortly after month’s end. When payouts are computed, the program manager should accurately keep track of total accrued rewards and total payouts, to ensure only the difference carries over to the next month.
All members already registered in the Arbitrum Peer Assembly will automatically accrue rewards. A member must earn at least $200 across the DAO incentive program before a payment is issued. The allocation will carry over to the next calendar month, but it will expire after 3 months if the threshold is not reached. This is simply to avoid sending dust transactions alongside the overhead in doing so.
Finally, non-members who have registered their intent to join the program via the Arbitrum Forum, can accrue rewards. They must complete the vouching and compliance process within the same calendar month that they submit their application to the program, in order to be officially registered into the assembly. If they fail to register by the month’s end, then they will forfeit any accrued rewards.
All members are required to adhere to the program’s terms and conditions which outline the expected behaviour of members and how they conduct themselves when interacting with others.
Additionally, there are some program-specific rules, that will be enforced:
For clarity, it will be the Program Manager’s responsibility, with the OpCo’s approval, to uphold the rules with the ability to suspend or ban members from the Arbitrum Peer Assembly. If there is disagreement with the enforcement, then an appeal can be made to the OpCo who will make the final decision.
The DAO Incentive Program’s goal is to activate delegates and contributors who will express their opinion through voting or participating in governance. The program will exclude platforms that enable non-human activity (i.e., AI agents) or enable token holders who sell their votes for short-term profits. Additionally, all organisations classified as an AAE and the Program Manager, will not be allowed to earn any payouts, but will have the power to offer vouches for new members.
The Arbitrum OpCo Foundation (“OpCo”) retains the authority to change any aspect of the program. Any major change to the program should be published publicly to notify members of the Arbitrum Peer Assembly.
Additionally, the OpCo are in charge of hiring (and terminating) the program manager with an appropriate service level agreement. It is expected that the program manager will handle the day-to-day operations, but rely on instructions from the OpCo when necessary.
The Arbitrum Foundation, with agreement of the OpCo, will facilitate the program from the get-go with the intention that everything is eventually handed over to the OpCo. We expect different aspects of the DAO incentive program to be handed over as the OpCo ramps up. For clarity, anything that states “OpCo” in this proposal will be handled by the Arbitrum Foundation from the onset.
The Delegate Incentive Program multisig is still holding approximately 7 million ARB. The DAO incentive program will absorb the entire budget for use in this program.
The OpCo will use this budget for:
Payouts related to the program, including the delegate rewards, the nudge seasons, and the peer recognition program, will be published to the DAO on a regular basis. For example, in relation to the delegate voting, the budget is allocated every 3 months and the payouts tracked on a per-month basis. This empowers the DAO to monitor how the budget is being used in real-time.
The program manager’s compensation and scope of work will be announced after it is negotiated by the OpCo. This will be periodically reviewed by the OpCo and any changes will be published to the DAO.
We do not expect miscellaneous costs to be substantial. An initial budget of $50k per year will be allocated. If the costs exceed this budget, then the OpCo’s OAT must approve and notify the DAO.
Finally, a transparency report will be prepared by the program manager and published every 6 months, to track total spend of the program alongside whether the key performance indicators and other relevant goals are being met.
The official start date will be announced after the proposal has passed and members have begun onboarding to the Arbitrum Peer Assembly. The intention is for the DAO Incentive Program to run for 1 year. If the OpCo, based on feedback from members of the Assembly, deems the program is running well, it may authorise the program to continue operating beyond 1 year. If not, any excess funds will be returned to the DAO Treasury.
The off-chain proposal was posted on October 23rd and requires a non-constitutional quorum for it to pass. Assuming all goes well, the intention is to begin the program by November 1st, 2025. If the timetable is delayed, for whatever reason, then we plan to still allocate a budget and retrospectively reward any votes that have occurred during the intermission.
In order to foster good governance participation in the ArbitrumDAO, this proposal puts forward the DAO Incentive Program, distinguishing between delegates, rewarded for their voting record and public rationale, and contributors, rewarded through a peer recognition program and "Nudge Seasons" to encourage positive governance actions. Since it serves as a continuation of, and builds upon learnings from the Delegate Incentive Program, we refer to it as DIP 2.0.
We propose a new incentive program for the ArbitrumDAO that separates out rewards for delegates and contributors:
A delegate can be a contributor, but we should not assume that a contributor must be a delegate.
The incentive reward paid to delegates will only focus on their voting record and making public the rationale behind their decision. On the other hand, for contributors, there will be two forms of rewards available:
We note the DAO incentive program should not replace a salary-like paid role or be sufficient to self-sustain an individual. However, it could be a stepping stone to enable parties to eventually find part time or full time work in the ecosystem. Most importantly, all payments should be viewed as a ‘thank you’ from others in the community.
To make the above work, we also propose introducing an Arbitrum Peer Assembly via a peer-to-peer vouching system. It requires existing members and/or AAEs to vouch for others to join before they are eligible for any payments, for delegates and/or contributors, in the DAO incentive program. The vouching system is designed to allow members to hold each other accountable and boost comradery among participants.
This program is designed to be objective and on a per-proposal basis. Any member of the Arbitrum Peer Assembly is eligible to receive a payment provided they:
Long-term program objectives are measured through the following key performance indicators:
The following metric will be used to track the cost-effectiveness of the program:
The cost-efficiency metric should find a fair cost per vote that encourages delegates to participate without overspending the budget. For example, if the incentive budget per proposal is $10,000 and if the program manager decides to incentivize up to 200,000,000 votes per proposal, then the dollar spent per vote cast is 0.00005.
| Proposal type | Incentive Budget | Payout Cap | Reward Distribution | Contributor Bonus |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| On-chain constitutional | 10,000 ARB | 700 ARB | Proportional to voting power | 1,000 ARB |
| On-chain funding transfer | 8,000 ARB | 500 ARB | Proportional to voting power | 1,000 ARB |
| Off-chain decision making | 8,000 ARB | 500 ARB | Proportional to voting power | 0 ARB |
| Off-chain temperature check (non-binding) | 3,000 ARB | 300 ARB | Quadratic relative to voting power | 0 ARB |
Table 1: A hypothetical illustration of incentive grant budget for delegate rewards
As seen in Table 1, the program manager, in agreement with the OpCo, is required to set out an incentive grant budget that is paid on a per-proposal basis:
The incentive grant budget for proposals that are published within a 3-month period must be shared at the start of every 3-month period by the program manager alongside an optional maximum cap for the entire period.
The intention is to provide delegates with predictability on the reward structure in the coming months while allowing the payout strategies to change over time. For example, as seen in Table 1, if an on-chain constitutional proposal is voted on by the DAO, then a 10k ARB incentive grant will be allocated for that specific proposal.
The program manager, in agreement with the OpCo, reserves the right to offer bespoke incentive grant budgets for specific proposals. For example, if the DAO is required to participate in several sub-proposals within a single initiative (like in the STIP), then all such proposals may fall within a single bespoke incentive budget. They may decide not to offer any reward in order to prevent potential abuse such as an avalanche of unnecessary proposals or decisions that are deemed very minor in nature (including cancelled proposals). If so, the rationale should be published prior or during the on-chain/off-chain proposal by the program manager.
The contributor bonus allows the proposal author to nominate contributors who made a meaningful impact on the proposal. This is not limited to posts on the forum, but any communication medium that enables the contributor to support the proposal author. The proposal author can name a handful of contributors alongside a short description on each contributor’s impact on the proposal. This is sent to the program manager, who will then publish it to the DAO. The bonus will be split between the named contributors. The contributor bonus is optional and it should be viewed as a small ‘thank you’ for making the proposal better.
Finally, the incentive budget should define a minimum voting power required to be eligible for delegate rewards. It will apply across all proposal types. This should be set to a reasonable value to help reduce the overhead of tracking rewards.
The program is designed to recognise contributors who have made meaningful contributions to the ArbitrumDAO or the wider ecosystem as acknowledged by their peers.
The contribution should be:
The program may reward recurring tasks, but it should be an exception. For example, if a contributor hosts a monthly call, this will not result in a payout being issued every month.
The program manager is expected to act as an ordering service:
The full final ranking will not be publicly released. Only the top N recommendations, where N is a program-defined threshold, will be published to the DAO. Each selected recommendation from the top N will receive a fixed payout.
Additionally, if there is an outstanding contribution, the program manager (with agreement from the OpCo), can issue a ‘special reward’ with a higher payout. These should be rare and generally a moment of great praise.
Initial Configuration for Peer Recognition Program.
For clarity, there is no obligation to publish exactly N recommendations every month. Only those deemed worthy of a reward should be published and in some months there may be none. If there are too many worthy contributions to fit within a single month, then the program manager can carry some over to future months, to ensure that eligible contributions are eventually recognized.
Every month, the program manager will request all members of the Arbitrum Peer Assembly, as well as AAEs, to submit their recommendations. It should be written in the following format:
Note, the recommendation should be concise and easy to digest as it will be published (alongside the reward) if it is chosen by the program manager. A participant can also submit a recommendation that covers their own actions.
The recommendation must be sent privately to the program manager. It is up to the recommender to ensure the program manager has acknowledged that it was indeed received by them.
For Example:
The program manager will collect and review all recommendations. It is their job to rank the recommendations according to a set of principles. For example:
Of course, we expect other considerations to arise over time and this list should not be viewed as exhaustive. The list simply helps set the tone on what it means for a contribution worthy of stature. An updated list of principles will be published to the DAO periodically to ensure everyone is aware of the criteria used to rank the recommendations.
The program is designed to nudge certain behaviours of participants that can positively impact the Arbitrum ecosystem through the offer of rewards.
In the previous iterations of the delegate incentive program, we witnessed delegates perform actions in order to earn rewards, such as leaving comments on the forum, joining governance calls, or voting early in Security Council elections.
The program manager, with agreement of the OpCo, can put together ‘nudge seasons’ where contributors are offered a reward for performing certain actions within a timeframe. The contributors can provide evidence to the program manager that they have completed the action, as specified by the program manager at the time of the nudge season being announced, and if evaluated by the program manager as doing so, they will then be eligible to receive a payment for doing it.
For example:
Anyone who is registered in the DAO incentive program’s Peer Assembly will be eligible as long as they adhere to the conditions of the nudge season. In the above example, whether or not they meet criteria can be proven by on-chain activity.
All ‘nudge seasons’ should be accompanied with a single KPI/metric that can be used to evaluate whether it was successful in nudging behaviour. The program manager should provide a small report with data that demonstrates if the KPI was achieved after the nudge season has concluded.
A nudge season can be broad and may cover activity within the Arbitrum ecosystem. This may include participation in governance, helping real-world events or amplifying announcements. What will be nudged is subjective in nature, but when it comes to evaluating whether the behaviour was nudged, that should remain as objective as possible.
The DAO Incentive Program introduces a new community where parties can only join if they are vouched by existing members and/or AAEs. The intention is to enable the DAO to hold each other accountable to their actions. All payments in the DAO incentive program are contingent upon joining this assembly.
We have picked the top 8 earners from the soon expiring Delegate Incentive Program from (January - August) 2025 to bootstrap the initial list of eligible members:
There are some special requirements for these members:
The intention to keep this list short is to make this process manageable and it should not be perceived as a special privilege.
Additionally, to aid the bootstrapping process, all registered members can offer multiple vouches until 50 members have registered in the program. Priority registration will be given to members who were previously registered in DIP v1.7. Once 50 members are registered, then all members will be restricted to 1 vouch per month.
A dedicated thread on the Arbitrum Forum should be created for the new member who wants to join:
Once a member receives enough vouches to join the assembly and assuming any compliance requirements are completed, the new member will then be considered a member of the program and will have the authority to make their own vouch for others to join. As is the case for the initial members, new members also cannot receive a vouch from someone who they directly vouched to join the program. Registration is only finalized once it is confirmed by the program manager on the relevant thread.
If a member wants to remove their vouch, then they will be required to reply on the same thread that it should be removed.
If a member has left the program for whatever reason (i.e., inactive), then the relevant forum thread will be locked.
The Program Manager is responsible for keeping track of all rewards for delegate voting, the peer recognition program, and the nudge seasons. It should be available on a public spreadsheet for all members to access.
For clarity, all records should be kept on a per calendar month basis, and payouts should be issued shortly after month’s end. When payouts are computed, the program manager should accurately keep track of total accrued rewards and total payouts, to ensure only the difference carries over to the next month.
All members already registered in the Arbitrum Peer Assembly will automatically accrue rewards. A member must earn at least $200 across the DAO incentive program before a payment is issued. The allocation will carry over to the next calendar month, but it will expire after 3 months if the threshold is not reached. This is simply to avoid sending dust transactions alongside the overhead in doing so.
Finally, non-members who have registered their intent to join the program via the Arbitrum Forum, can accrue rewards. They must complete the vouching and compliance process within the same calendar month that they submit their application to the program, in order to be officially registered into the assembly. If they fail to register by the month’s end, then they will forfeit any accrued rewards.
All members are required to adhere to the program’s terms and conditions which outline the expected behaviour of members and how they conduct themselves when interacting with others.
Additionally, there are some program-specific rules, that will be enforced:
For clarity, it will be the Program Manager’s responsibility, with the OpCo’s approval, to uphold the rules with the ability to suspend or ban members from the Arbitrum Peer Assembly. If there is disagreement with the enforcement, then an appeal can be made to the OpCo who will make the final decision.
The DAO Incentive Program’s goal is to activate delegates and contributors who will express their opinion through voting or participating in governance. The program will exclude platforms that enable non-human activity (i.e., AI agents) or enable token holders who sell their votes for short-term profits. Additionally, all organisations classified as an AAE and the Program Manager, will not be allowed to earn any payouts, but will have the power to offer vouches for new members.
The Arbitrum OpCo Foundation (“OpCo”) retains the authority to change any aspect of the program. Any major change to the program should be published publicly to notify members of the Arbitrum Peer Assembly.
Additionally, the OpCo are in charge of hiring (and terminating) the program manager with an appropriate service level agreement. It is expected that the program manager will handle the day-to-day operations, but rely on instructions from the OpCo when necessary.
The Arbitrum Foundation, with agreement of the OpCo, will facilitate the program from the get-go with the intention that everything is eventually handed over to the OpCo. We expect different aspects of the DAO incentive program to be handed over as the OpCo ramps up. For clarity, anything that states “OpCo” in this proposal will be handled by the Arbitrum Foundation from the onset.
The Delegate Incentive Program multisig is still holding approximately 7 million ARB. The DAO incentive program will absorb the entire budget for use in this program.
The OpCo will use this budget for:
Payouts related to the program, including the delegate rewards, the nudge seasons, and the peer recognition program, will be published to the DAO on a regular basis. For example, in relation to the delegate voting, the budget is allocated every 3 months and the payouts tracked on a per-month basis. This empowers the DAO to monitor how the budget is being used in real-time.
The program manager’s compensation and scope of work will be announced after it is negotiated by the OpCo. This will be periodically reviewed by the OpCo and any changes will be published to the DAO.
We do not expect miscellaneous costs to be substantial. An initial budget of $50k per year will be allocated. If the costs exceed this budget, then the OpCo’s OAT must approve and notify the DAO.
Finally, a transparency report will be prepared by the program manager and published every 6 months, to track total spend of the program alongside whether the key performance indicators and other relevant goals are being met.
The official start date will be announced after the proposal has passed and members have begun onboarding to the Arbitrum Peer Assembly. The intention is for the DAO Incentive Program to run for 1 year. If the OpCo, based on feedback from members of the Assembly, deems the program is running well, it may authorise the program to continue operating beyond 1 year. If not, any excess funds will be returned to the DAO Treasury.
The off-chain proposal was posted on October 23rd and requires a non-constitutional quorum for it to pass. Assuming all goes well, the intention is to begin the program by November 1st, 2025. If the timetable is delayed, for whatever reason, then we plan to still allocate a budget and retrospectively reward any votes that have occurred during the intermission.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/46
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/47?u=bob-rossi
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/46
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/47?u=bob-rossi
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/43
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-137): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-137
The Event Horizon Community voted AGAINST on this proposal (ehARB-137): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-137
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/39?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/38?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/23
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
Concerns over flawed incentive design https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/6?u=possumlabs
a delegate incentive program like the Arbitrum Triple Dip, collaboratively designed by the community, in the open, is the way to go. This proposal is the exact opposite of that.
a delegate incentive program, collaboratively designed by the community, in the open is the way to go. This proposal is the exact opposite of that.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/31
Democratising lobbyism, on-chain. Check out lobbyfi.xyz
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/43
The Event Horizon Community voted on this proposal (ehARB-137): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-137
The Event Horizon Community voted AGAINST on this proposal (ehARB-137): EventHorizon.vote/vote/arbitrum/ehARB-137
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/39?u=euphoria
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/38?u=griff
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/tekr0x-eth-delegate-communication-thread/24804/23
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/13794
Concerns over flawed incentive design https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/6?u=possumlabs
a delegate incentive program like the Arbitrum Triple Dip, collaboratively designed by the community, in the open, is the way to go. This proposal is the exact opposite of that.
a delegate incentive program, collaboratively designed by the community, in the open is the way to go. This proposal is the exact opposite of that.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/the-dao-incentive-program-dip-2-0/30080/31
We voted Against on this proposal.
Really appreciate the work of putting up the proposal. We are aligned with the direction of separating Delegates and contributors.
We voted Against on this proposal.
Really appreciate the work of putting up the proposal. We are aligned with the direction of separating Delegates and contributors.
There are many new roles introduced in the program, which complicates the process and rules for every party. One key concern here is that with so many extra efforts made, will it be significantly better results comparing to current DIP program? And if we want to give it a try, We didn’t see the end goal of the proposal either.
There are also some details in the proposal that we think could be concerns, mentioned by many delegates here:
Overall, we might support if the proposal could address these problems in the future.
We voted Against on this proposal.
Really appreciate the work of putting up the proposal. We are aligned with the direction of separating Delegates and contributors.
We voted Against on this proposal.
Really appreciate the work of putting up the proposal. We are aligned with the direction of separating Delegates and contributors.
There are many new roles introduced in the program, which complicates the process and rules for every party. One key concern here is that with so many extra efforts made, will it be significantly better results comparing to current DIP program? And if we want to give it a try, We didn’t see the end goal of the proposal either.
There are also some details in the proposal that we think could be concerns, mentioned by many delegates here:
Overall, we might support if the proposal could address these problems in the future.
This is a really good question that was not answered, to add on, I would like to voice my concerns for another things that has been mentioned by @PossumLabs , the criteria to qualify should not be determined by a peer reviewed aseembly and should instead be an open incentive that is made available to all voters of a proposal. It can be done on an opt-out or opt-in basis, but I think the overaching goal should be to not gatekeep the rewards and possibly create a walled garden of privillaged people where they would not admit more people into the group to protect their interests.
Thanks for hosting the call today to clarify , though as many other participants mentioned, there are still several questions to be resolved or clarified. However, we would be interested to applying for the role once the application is live.
This is a really good question that was not answered, to add on, I would like to voice my concerns for another things that has been mentioned by @PossumLabs , the criteria to qualify should not be determined by a peer reviewed aseembly and should instead be an open incentive that is made available to all voters of a proposal. It can be done on an opt-out or opt-in basis, but I think the overaching goal should be to not gatekeep the rewards and possibly create a walled garden of privillaged people where they would not admit more people into the group to protect their interests.
Thanks for hosting the call today to clarify , though as many other participants mentioned, there are still several questions to be resolved or clarified. However, we would be interested to applying for the role once the application is live.
Thank you for casting your votes and providing feedback. We are in the process of aggregating all feedback and reaching out to those who cast votes without providing feedback, in order to determine the next steps on how to progress with the DIP. This is a program at the heart of the DAO, so it will be a big focus for us over the coming days and weeks.
Thank you for casting your votes and providing feedback. We are in the process of aggregating all feedback and reaching out to those who cast votes without providing feedback, in order to determine the next steps on how to progress with the DIP. This is a program at the heart of the DAO, so it will be a big focus for us over the coming days and weeks.
@krst: TBH, I was also curious about this particular exclusion clause. especially since there are not that many contributors in the DAO who used to do lots of recurring calls in the past not tied to reporting of their own DAO-funded initiative. So, it feels rather precisely targeted. One thing that struggles me is that if those recurring calls were perceived as of such little or diminishing value (which can be deduced from the design of this mechanism), then why did no one say so earlier? Said contributors could just have stopped organising them.
The peer recognition program is focused on identifying contributions that help move the needle for Arbitrum. It isn’t restricted to the forum, calls, or the even the people recognised as regulars in the DAO. It is trying to target anyone who is going up and beyond to fight for Arbitrum. For example, I was asked, “If someone is is arguing for Arbitrum on another DAO forum that leads to a positive outcome, i.e., integrating Arbitrum , does that count in the program?” and my answer was “Yes, that is exactly what the program is trying to target.”
@krst: TBH, I was also curious about this particular exclusion clause. especially since there are not that many contributors in the DAO who used to do lots of recurring calls in the past not tied to reporting of their own DAO-funded initiative. So, it feels rather precisely targeted. One thing that struggles me is that if those recurring calls were perceived as of such little or diminishing value (which can be deduced from the design of this mechanism), then why did no one say so earlier? Said contributors could just have stopped organising them.
The peer recognition program is focused on identifying contributions that help move the needle for Arbitrum. It isn’t restricted to the forum, calls, or the even the people recognised as regulars in the DAO. It is trying to target anyone who is going up and beyond to fight for Arbitrum. For example, I was asked, “If someone is is arguing for Arbitrum on another DAO forum that leads to a positive outcome, i.e., integrating Arbitrum , does that count in the program?” and my answer was “Yes, that is exactly what the program is trying to target.”
Community calls, especially if it is around an initiative that is trying to drive something forward, can be recognised as a contribution.
But, if it is a long-standing and recurring community call, then we should find a proper way to compensate the people organising it and to review it periodically to make sure the recurring task is still needed. The intention being that they are properly supported and they do not need to rely on an ad-hoc contribution program to recognise that their work is indeed useful. With that in mind, it should not be seen as an exclusion clause.
Also, we took your earlier feedback, and allow people to self-submit contributions. So if someone is doing good work, and others have not yet seen it, they can still submit it themselves and have it evaluated alongside all other contributions. The goal here is for the program to capture as many meaningful contributions as possible and try to reward some of them every month.
@Saurabh: This version of the DIP focuses on a few delegates, making it more centralized. We would like to see more delegates involved, rather than focusing on just a selected few handful of delegates.
With governance activity significantly going down, capping the budget is also not a great idea, as it will likely lead to reduced participation both across the board and on the forum, which is not ideal.
Only one program, the ‘delegate reward’ is focused on delegates. It is fairly straight forward too.
As long as the delegate is:
Then, the delegate will be entitled to rewards.
If the program passes, we are hoping to see even more delegates sign up compared to the previous DIP, as the eligibility requirements are not complicated.
In regards to the pay cap per proposal, it is just to make sure a single delegate with significant VP does not absorb most of the allocated budget and there is still funds left over for other delegates with less VP.
The peer recognition program and nudge seasons is focused on people who may or may not have any voting power. So 2/3 of the programs are focused on contributors (not delegates). Hopefully enabling us to bring on more people who would not traditionally be involved because they do not have any voting power.
Thank you for the continued feedback on this proposal.
We have made some further, minor updates, as follows:
The recording of the The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0): Open Discussion #2 can be accessed here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/11_CYAfGuaQXe7Ra3cDUz2tMoq1IaATpG/view
You make a good point that constructive criticism can also be positive. Ultimately, whether something is positive is subjective and is up to the Peer Assembly members who vouch for one another.
Thank you for the feedback provided so far.
We have made some minor updates to the proposal, as follows:
Thank you for the feedback provided so far.
We have made some minor updates to the proposal, as follows:
We will provide further clarity on the Peer Assembly vouching system as well as further responses to the feedback received, in the coming days.
The recording of the The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0): Open Discussion #1 can be accessed here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1u8iNh4s6whgCXHcJ4hAZo7rhkM7__Brd/view
@krst: TBH, I was also curious about this particular exclusion clause. especially since there are not that many contributors in the DAO who used to do lots of recurring calls in the past not tied to reporting of their own DAO-funded initiative. So, it feels rather precisely targeted. One thing that struggles me is that if those recurring calls were perceived as of such little or diminishing value (which can be deduced from the design of this mechanism), then why did no one say so earlier? Said contributors could just have stopped organising them.
The peer recognition program is focused on identifying contributions that help move the needle for Arbitrum. It isn’t restricted to the forum, calls, or the even the people recognised as regulars in the DAO. It is trying to target anyone who is going up and beyond to fight for Arbitrum. For example, I was asked, “If someone is is arguing for Arbitrum on another DAO forum that leads to a positive outcome, i.e., integrating Arbitrum , does that count in the program?” and my answer was “Yes, that is exactly what the program is trying to target.”
@krst: TBH, I was also curious about this particular exclusion clause. especially since there are not that many contributors in the DAO who used to do lots of recurring calls in the past not tied to reporting of their own DAO-funded initiative. So, it feels rather precisely targeted. One thing that struggles me is that if those recurring calls were perceived as of such little or diminishing value (which can be deduced from the design of this mechanism), then why did no one say so earlier? Said contributors could just have stopped organising them.
The peer recognition program is focused on identifying contributions that help move the needle for Arbitrum. It isn’t restricted to the forum, calls, or the even the people recognised as regulars in the DAO. It is trying to target anyone who is going up and beyond to fight for Arbitrum. For example, I was asked, “If someone is is arguing for Arbitrum on another DAO forum that leads to a positive outcome, i.e., integrating Arbitrum , does that count in the program?” and my answer was “Yes, that is exactly what the program is trying to target.”
Community calls, especially if it is around an initiative that is trying to drive something forward, can be recognised as a contribution.
But, if it is a long-standing and recurring community call, then we should find a proper way to compensate the people organising it and to review it periodically to make sure the recurring task is still needed. The intention being that they are properly supported and they do not need to rely on an ad-hoc contribution program to recognise that their work is indeed useful. With that in mind, it should not be seen as an exclusion clause.
Also, we took your earlier feedback, and allow people to self-submit contributions. So if someone is doing good work, and others have not yet seen it, they can still submit it themselves and have it evaluated alongside all other contributions. The goal here is for the program to capture as many meaningful contributions as possible and try to reward some of them every month.
@Saurabh: This version of the DIP focuses on a few delegates, making it more centralized. We would like to see more delegates involved, rather than focusing on just a selected few handful of delegates.
With governance activity significantly going down, capping the budget is also not a great idea, as it will likely lead to reduced participation both across the board and on the forum, which is not ideal.
Only one program, the ‘delegate reward’ is focused on delegates. It is fairly straight forward too.
As long as the delegate is:
Then, the delegate will be entitled to rewards.
If the program passes, we are hoping to see even more delegates sign up compared to the previous DIP, as the eligibility requirements are not complicated.
In regards to the pay cap per proposal, it is just to make sure a single delegate with significant VP does not absorb most of the allocated budget and there is still funds left over for other delegates with less VP.
The peer recognition program and nudge seasons is focused on people who may or may not have any voting power. So 2/3 of the programs are focused on contributors (not delegates). Hopefully enabling us to bring on more people who would not traditionally be involved because they do not have any voting power.
Thank you for the continued feedback on this proposal.
We have made some further, minor updates, as follows:
The recording of the The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0): Open Discussion #2 can be accessed here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/11_CYAfGuaQXe7Ra3cDUz2tMoq1IaATpG/view
You make a good point that constructive criticism can also be positive. Ultimately, whether something is positive is subjective and is up to the Peer Assembly members who vouch for one another.
Thank you for the feedback provided so far.
We have made some minor updates to the proposal, as follows:
Thank you for the feedback provided so far.
We have made some minor updates to the proposal, as follows:
We will provide further clarity on the Peer Assembly vouching system as well as further responses to the feedback received, in the coming days.
The recording of the The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0): Open Discussion #1 can be accessed here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1u8iNh4s6whgCXHcJ4hAZo7rhkM7__Brd/view
You make a good point that constructive criticism can also be positive. Ultimately, whether something is positive is subjective and is up to the Peer Assembly members who vouch for one another.
Paying zero is not an ideal outcome, as it defeats the purpose of an incentive program. At the same time, overpaying should be avoided, as it does not represent good value for money. The optimal outcome is to find a balance—rewarding delegates fairly for their participation while keeping the program cost-effective and sustainable over the long term.
The program manager may adjust the budget with OpCo’s approval. Since the overall budget is set by the DAO, could you clarify why this extra step is needed?
Payments should ideally follow clear, consistent timelines. Could we define a fixed date for monthly payouts to avoid uncertainty?
The proposal mentions an initial budget of $50k per year. Could you clarify whether this is for the program manager only, or for the entire delegation program?
The DAO approves the program’s annual budget; however, the PM, with OpCo’s approval, determines the more detailed, season-based budgets.
As with the previous Delegate Incentive Program, variations may occur early on as new processes are introduced, trialed, and refined. Over time, we expect greater consistency to develop, particularly around payment schedules.
The $50k budget is designated for miscellaneous and operational expenses. The PM’s service fee is separate.
The proposal already contains principles on how recommendations can be ranked. The PM is responsible for ranking them, and the OpCo must approve the final rankings.
This is something the DAO could consider in the future. For now, we want to avoid adding extra responsibility onto the Peer Assembly.
The answer to this on the call was that it was SeedGov, and regarding the salary, Raam clarified that they had not yet agreed on it (and it is unlikely that they will tell us this figure, since the salary will probably be from the Foundation, and not from DAO directly).
To clarify, once the PM’s agreement terms have been finalized, the scope and compensation will be shared with the DAO.
I don’t really understand why three vouchers after reaching 50 delegates is a problem in this system.
Thanks for the response!
I am not convinced that changing the budget every 3 months, or giving bespoke incentive grant budgets for specific votes, adds much value. Is the demand that elastic? vs giving voters confidence that the program will last for a certain period, there is a predictable compensation that justifies effort and it’s worth creating a habit of voting and explaining you rationale. Thinking about major delegates and protocols in particular.
Thanks for the response!
I am not convinced that changing the budget every 3 months, or giving bespoke incentive grant budgets for specific votes, adds much value. Is the demand that elastic? vs giving voters confidence that the program will last for a certain period, there is a predictable compensation that justifies effort and it’s worth creating a habit of voting and explaining you rationale. Thinking about major delegates and protocols in particular.
The upcoming vote for the AGV is a good example of where a bespoke incentive grant budget can be used. There will be two separate polls focused on the council compensation (i.e., increase pay of current council and/or increase pay for future councils). The polls focus on the same topic, but it is simply easier to measure the votes with seperate polls. In this case, the PM can decide to combine both polls into a single incentive grant as opposed to rewarding each vote with its own budget.
I do believe there is a need to periodically review the budget. For example, let’s say the budget is fixed upon passing the proposal. If the program is successful, and in 1 year’s time, there is more active voting power (400m active votes compared to 200m active votes), then everyone will earn approximately ~1/2 in 1 year’s time compared to today (in token denomination terms). It is predictable, but participants may argue it is no longer a reasonable incentive reward for their work.
So, in my opinion, it is desirable to periodically re-evaluate the budget based on the current set of active voters, the historical trend of active voting, and whether participants believe they are earning a reasonable incentive reward.
A generalist assembly tasked with constantly reviewing everyone’s contributions doesn’t seem like the most sustainable model for DAO evolution. I would encourage to think about ways to create specialization within the DAO, similar to what the early committees used to have.
This is exactly what the program tries to avoid.
I see the peer assembly as relying on the local view of participants as opposed to the global collective view such that it is a 1 of N system. For example, if @maxlomu observed @pedrob doing some outstanding work, then @maxlomu can simply make a submission to the program manager. Only @maxlomu, @pedrob and the program manager/opco is involved in that process. The intention is to make the process light weight for the contributors while trying to reward valuable work beyond what is available on the forum/public setting.
Someone sent the following question:
In the first cohort, only 8 delegates will be rewarded is that correct?
Someone sent the following question:
In the first cohort, only 8 delegates will be rewarded is that correct?
It is up to the initial 8 members of the peer assembly to help onboard others who want to join the program. Everyone is encouraged to create a thread on the forum and register their intent to join. Anyone who has started the registration process will also accure rewards during the period. Given it is the first month, it might be worth us adding extra flexibility around the timing – just to make sure everyone is onboarded in a timely manner and there is no last minute panic.
This means that incentives aren’t predictable, hence not reliable, and the PM - a centralized party - can decide arbitrarily how to incentivize governance activities to their liking and thereby influence participation. Problematic by design.
Further, large stakeholders are incentivized to participate in governance by their sheer size and value at risk already. In fact, there is an argument to be made to completely exclude anyone above a certain voting threshold from any reward scheme. We’re not proposing this, but it would be directionally consistent with the goal to incentivize widespread participation instead of consolidating influence and participation in a few hands. Instead, the proposal seeks to reward Delegates proportional to voting power which means most of the rewards flow to the top entities which don’t actually need it.
The PM discretion is only to prevent abuse as outlined in your original post. Additionally, this is why there are categories assigned for proposal types, to ensure different types are offered reasonable incentives. For large delegates, there is a payout cap, to set a limit on how much they can receive per vote and to make sure there is still an incentive grant remaining for others.
This means that incentives aren’t predictable, hence not reliable, and the PM - a centralized party - can decide arbitrarily how to incentivize governance activities to their liking and thereby influence participation. Problematic by design.
Further, large stakeholders are incentivized to participate in governance by their sheer size and value at risk already. In fact, there is an argument to be made to completely exclude anyone above a certain voting threshold from any reward scheme. We’re not proposing this, but it would be directionally consistent with the goal to incentivize widespread participation instead of consolidating influence and participation in a few hands. Instead, the proposal seeks to reward Delegates proportional to voting power which means most of the rewards flow to the top entities which don’t actually need it.
The PM discretion is only to prevent abuse as outlined in your original post. Additionally, this is why there are categories assigned for proposal types, to ensure different types are offered reasonable incentives. For large delegates, there is a payout cap, to set a limit on how much they can receive per vote and to make sure there is still an incentive grant remaining for others.
Making it mandatory to be part of the Assembly to receive any rewards is centralizing and incentivizes elbow rubbing since the only way to enter the Assembly is by recommendation. This is deadly in the context of governance since it increases consensus bias.
The only requirement is to pass compliance checks and get 3 vouches from other members of the assembly. It is a very basic reputation system. In the peer assembly, it doesn’t matter whether you are a delegate or a contributor. You are on equal standing as other peers in the group. Delegates are not superior to contributors and vice versa. They have different functionality in the DAO and in many cases people take on both roles.
Also, in relation to the program manager role. The OpCo is currently negotiating with @SEEDGov on the scope of work and compensation for taking on this task.
The reason it is not in the proposal is because 1) negotiation has not concluded, 2) program details are not finalised which will impact the scope of work that is agreed upon and 3) the program manager will not be enshrined by a DAO vote, but hireable and fireable by the OpCo.
As mentioned in the proposal, the scope of work and compensation, will be public once it is agreed upon by the OpCo.
Hi @PossumLabs,
Budget allocations that reward Delegates for voting on a per-proposal basis drives incentives towards creating as many (meaningless) proposals as possible to increase compensation.
Hi @PossumLabs,
Budget allocations that reward Delegates for voting on a per-proposal basis drives incentives towards creating as many (meaningless) proposals as possible to increase compensation.
This is why the program manager will have discretion on whether a proposal should be rewarded an incentive grant. i.e., if it is a minor decision or it doesn’t need a vote, then they will make a public post to clarify that no rewards will be issued. To avoid this type of abuse.
We suggest to restructure the Delegate compensation to a fixed monthly budget that is distributed according to objective rules that maintain meaningful incentives for small and medium sized Delegates. Keeping the involvement of small and medium Delegates is important to maintain diversity of opinions & perspectives.
To provide adequate incentives for small & medium Delegators to invest significant time in governance, we suggest the following incentive structure:
I think there are two things here. If someone is a small delegate, then by positively contributing in the DAO, it should hopefully catch the attention of token holders who will delegate to them, leading to them to grow in size over time and earn more from voting. We’ve already seen some delegate’s voting power grow in size due to their contribution & activity. Additionally, this is why the peer recognition system was proposed; to separate the task of voting and meaningful contributions in the DAO/ecosystem. If you are leaving killer feedback that is really shaping proposals, that should hopefully be picked up by the recognition system.
One potential shortcoming is the absence of a “complaints box”, i.e. some third party authority that manages and helps to resolve conflicts if the PM consistently dismisses contributions that the APA deems important.
There was increasing support in the DAO to cancel the DIP entirely because of the disputes that were being raised, every month, on how rewards were issued. The PM is only an ordering service and they must have agreement from the OpCo before any rankings are published and rewards issued. If people are unhappy with the contributions being rewarded, then the first task is just to chat with the OpCo and see if they can provide insight.
Is the last part to be understood that Delegate rewards are also contingent upon joining this assembly? They are part of the DAO incentive program after all.
This would contradict our initial understanding that Delegate incentives and Contributor incentives get a clear separation.
This is why we renamed it from Delegate Incentive Program to the DAO Incentive Program. It is made up of three mini programs (delegate voting, peer recognition, and nudge seasons) that targets delegates and/or contributors.They all fall under the same umbrella and the same assembly of people.
You make a good point that constructive criticism can also be positive. Ultimately, whether something is positive is subjective and is up to the Peer Assembly members who vouch for one another.
Paying zero is not an ideal outcome, as it defeats the purpose of an incentive program. At the same time, overpaying should be avoided, as it does not represent good value for money. The optimal outcome is to find a balance—rewarding delegates fairly for their participation while keeping the program cost-effective and sustainable over the long term.
The program manager may adjust the budget with OpCo’s approval. Since the overall budget is set by the DAO, could you clarify why this extra step is needed?
Payments should ideally follow clear, consistent timelines. Could we define a fixed date for monthly payouts to avoid uncertainty?
The proposal mentions an initial budget of $50k per year. Could you clarify whether this is for the program manager only, or for the entire delegation program?
The DAO approves the program’s annual budget; however, the PM, with OpCo’s approval, determines the more detailed, season-based budgets.
As with the previous Delegate Incentive Program, variations may occur early on as new processes are introduced, trialed, and refined. Over time, we expect greater consistency to develop, particularly around payment schedules.
The $50k budget is designated for miscellaneous and operational expenses. The PM’s service fee is separate.
The proposal already contains principles on how recommendations can be ranked. The PM is responsible for ranking them, and the OpCo must approve the final rankings.
This is something the DAO could consider in the future. For now, we want to avoid adding extra responsibility onto the Peer Assembly.
The answer to this on the call was that it was SeedGov, and regarding the salary, Raam clarified that they had not yet agreed on it (and it is unlikely that they will tell us this figure, since the salary will probably be from the Foundation, and not from DAO directly).
To clarify, once the PM’s agreement terms have been finalized, the scope and compensation will be shared with the DAO.
I don’t really understand why three vouchers after reaching 50 delegates is a problem in this system.
Thanks for the response!
I am not convinced that changing the budget every 3 months, or giving bespoke incentive grant budgets for specific votes, adds much value. Is the demand that elastic? vs giving voters confidence that the program will last for a certain period, there is a predictable compensation that justifies effort and it’s worth creating a habit of voting and explaining you rationale. Thinking about major delegates and protocols in particular.
Thanks for the response!
I am not convinced that changing the budget every 3 months, or giving bespoke incentive grant budgets for specific votes, adds much value. Is the demand that elastic? vs giving voters confidence that the program will last for a certain period, there is a predictable compensation that justifies effort and it’s worth creating a habit of voting and explaining you rationale. Thinking about major delegates and protocols in particular.
The upcoming vote for the AGV is a good example of where a bespoke incentive grant budget can be used. There will be two separate polls focused on the council compensation (i.e., increase pay of current council and/or increase pay for future councils). The polls focus on the same topic, but it is simply easier to measure the votes with seperate polls. In this case, the PM can decide to combine both polls into a single incentive grant as opposed to rewarding each vote with its own budget.
I do believe there is a need to periodically review the budget. For example, let’s say the budget is fixed upon passing the proposal. If the program is successful, and in 1 year’s time, there is more active voting power (400m active votes compared to 200m active votes), then everyone will earn approximately ~1/2 in 1 year’s time compared to today (in token denomination terms). It is predictable, but participants may argue it is no longer a reasonable incentive reward for their work.
So, in my opinion, it is desirable to periodically re-evaluate the budget based on the current set of active voters, the historical trend of active voting, and whether participants believe they are earning a reasonable incentive reward.
A generalist assembly tasked with constantly reviewing everyone’s contributions doesn’t seem like the most sustainable model for DAO evolution. I would encourage to think about ways to create specialization within the DAO, similar to what the early committees used to have.
This is exactly what the program tries to avoid.
I see the peer assembly as relying on the local view of participants as opposed to the global collective view such that it is a 1 of N system. For example, if @maxlomu observed @pedrob doing some outstanding work, then @maxlomu can simply make a submission to the program manager. Only @maxlomu, @pedrob and the program manager/opco is involved in that process. The intention is to make the process light weight for the contributors while trying to reward valuable work beyond what is available on the forum/public setting.
Someone sent the following question:
In the first cohort, only 8 delegates will be rewarded is that correct?
Someone sent the following question:
In the first cohort, only 8 delegates will be rewarded is that correct?
It is up to the initial 8 members of the peer assembly to help onboard others who want to join the program. Everyone is encouraged to create a thread on the forum and register their intent to join. Anyone who has started the registration process will also accure rewards during the period. Given it is the first month, it might be worth us adding extra flexibility around the timing – just to make sure everyone is onboarded in a timely manner and there is no last minute panic.
This means that incentives aren’t predictable, hence not reliable, and the PM - a centralized party - can decide arbitrarily how to incentivize governance activities to their liking and thereby influence participation. Problematic by design.
Further, large stakeholders are incentivized to participate in governance by their sheer size and value at risk already. In fact, there is an argument to be made to completely exclude anyone above a certain voting threshold from any reward scheme. We’re not proposing this, but it would be directionally consistent with the goal to incentivize widespread participation instead of consolidating influence and participation in a few hands. Instead, the proposal seeks to reward Delegates proportional to voting power which means most of the rewards flow to the top entities which don’t actually need it.
The PM discretion is only to prevent abuse as outlined in your original post. Additionally, this is why there are categories assigned for proposal types, to ensure different types are offered reasonable incentives. For large delegates, there is a payout cap, to set a limit on how much they can receive per vote and to make sure there is still an incentive grant remaining for others.
This means that incentives aren’t predictable, hence not reliable, and the PM - a centralized party - can decide arbitrarily how to incentivize governance activities to their liking and thereby influence participation. Problematic by design.
Further, large stakeholders are incentivized to participate in governance by their sheer size and value at risk already. In fact, there is an argument to be made to completely exclude anyone above a certain voting threshold from any reward scheme. We’re not proposing this, but it would be directionally consistent with the goal to incentivize widespread participation instead of consolidating influence and participation in a few hands. Instead, the proposal seeks to reward Delegates proportional to voting power which means most of the rewards flow to the top entities which don’t actually need it.
The PM discretion is only to prevent abuse as outlined in your original post. Additionally, this is why there are categories assigned for proposal types, to ensure different types are offered reasonable incentives. For large delegates, there is a payout cap, to set a limit on how much they can receive per vote and to make sure there is still an incentive grant remaining for others.
Making it mandatory to be part of the Assembly to receive any rewards is centralizing and incentivizes elbow rubbing since the only way to enter the Assembly is by recommendation. This is deadly in the context of governance since it increases consensus bias.
The only requirement is to pass compliance checks and get 3 vouches from other members of the assembly. It is a very basic reputation system. In the peer assembly, it doesn’t matter whether you are a delegate or a contributor. You are on equal standing as other peers in the group. Delegates are not superior to contributors and vice versa. They have different functionality in the DAO and in many cases people take on both roles.
Also, in relation to the program manager role. The OpCo is currently negotiating with @SEEDGov on the scope of work and compensation for taking on this task.
The reason it is not in the proposal is because 1) negotiation has not concluded, 2) program details are not finalised which will impact the scope of work that is agreed upon and 3) the program manager will not be enshrined by a DAO vote, but hireable and fireable by the OpCo.
As mentioned in the proposal, the scope of work and compensation, will be public once it is agreed upon by the OpCo.
Hi @PossumLabs,
Budget allocations that reward Delegates for voting on a per-proposal basis drives incentives towards creating as many (meaningless) proposals as possible to increase compensation.
Hi @PossumLabs,
Budget allocations that reward Delegates for voting on a per-proposal basis drives incentives towards creating as many (meaningless) proposals as possible to increase compensation.
This is why the program manager will have discretion on whether a proposal should be rewarded an incentive grant. i.e., if it is a minor decision or it doesn’t need a vote, then they will make a public post to clarify that no rewards will be issued. To avoid this type of abuse.
We suggest to restructure the Delegate compensation to a fixed monthly budget that is distributed according to objective rules that maintain meaningful incentives for small and medium sized Delegates. Keeping the involvement of small and medium Delegates is important to maintain diversity of opinions & perspectives.
To provide adequate incentives for small & medium Delegators to invest significant time in governance, we suggest the following incentive structure:
I think there are two things here. If someone is a small delegate, then by positively contributing in the DAO, it should hopefully catch the attention of token holders who will delegate to them, leading to them to grow in size over time and earn more from voting. We’ve already seen some delegate’s voting power grow in size due to their contribution & activity. Additionally, this is why the peer recognition system was proposed; to separate the task of voting and meaningful contributions in the DAO/ecosystem. If you are leaving killer feedback that is really shaping proposals, that should hopefully be picked up by the recognition system.
One potential shortcoming is the absence of a “complaints box”, i.e. some third party authority that manages and helps to resolve conflicts if the PM consistently dismisses contributions that the APA deems important.
There was increasing support in the DAO to cancel the DIP entirely because of the disputes that were being raised, every month, on how rewards were issued. The PM is only an ordering service and they must have agreement from the OpCo before any rankings are published and rewards issued. If people are unhappy with the contributions being rewarded, then the first task is just to chat with the OpCo and see if they can provide insight.
Is the last part to be understood that Delegate rewards are also contingent upon joining this assembly? They are part of the DAO incentive program after all.
This would contradict our initial understanding that Delegate incentives and Contributor incentives get a clear separation.
This is why we renamed it from Delegate Incentive Program to the DAO Incentive Program. It is made up of three mini programs (delegate voting, peer recognition, and nudge seasons) that targets delegates and/or contributors.They all fall under the same umbrella and the same assembly of people.
Just gonna throw it there while travelling, and is something we discussed also yesterday in the call.
There is the ground for either
Just gonna throw it there while travelling, and is something we discussed also yesterday in the call.
There is the ground for either
Main concern i have: both Seed and other actors have put a lot of effort in include old, dormant delegates in the new voting system. This work will just be wasted with no continuity.
Open to suggestions here.
We’ll reiterate that we don’t feel this is the highest priority, particularly with the lack of clear objective. A simple plan, even if it overpays for now, would be preferable to doing many more calls on a complex plan.
We would much rather see delegate and Foundation efforts put towards creating a plan to stabilize Arbitrum finances, as well as an updated business plan.
voting Against on this offchain vote because a delegate incentive program like the Arbitrum Triple Dip, collaboratively designed by the community, in the open, is the way to go. This proposal is the exact opposite of that.
I believe it would be more appropriate to split this program into two parts:
I believe it would be more appropriate to split this program into two parts:
And only put the first part to a vote, which, by general agreement, is objective and non-controversial, and can also be implemented completely automatically. This way, we will maintain a quorum, and we will discuss the issue of active delegates until we reach a consensus.
Hey everyone,
We decided to abstain from voting on this proposal — not only because we were the potential Program Managers in discussions for this proposed DIP, but also because, judging by the voting trends, we anticipated that our vote would not change the final outcome.
Hey everyone,
We decided to abstain from voting on this proposal — not only because we were the potential Program Managers in discussions for this proposed DIP, but also because, judging by the voting trends, we anticipated that our vote would not change the final outcome.
That said, we would like to sincerely thank the Arbitrum Foundation for not only publishing this proposal but also for the follow-up process that included three governance calls specifically dedicated to the DIP 2.0 discussion. These efforts clearly demonstrate the importance that the Foundation assigns to this program, as also reflected in this comment.
Having worked on previous iterations of the DAO Incentive Program for nearly two years, we would like to share some reflections from that experience.
Initially, we prepared our own draft and shared it with the Foundation and other stakeholders. At a later stage, the Foundation expressed the view that this AAE should take ownership of the new program and develop its own draft, partially based on similar principles to ours. We then offered our full collaboration and feedback on the Foundation’s version, always maintaining our willingness to continue managing the program given our deep understanding of its design and operational challenges.
While this new DIP shares some similarities with our early draft, there are also substantial differences worth noting:
Denomination of incentives: We agree with the majority of delegates that incentives should be denominated in USD rather than ARB. This not only ensures predictability, given the volatility of ARB, but also maintains consistency between the contributors’ and voters’ incentive buckets.
On the Arbitrum Peer Assembly (APA): Our original idea of an APA was meant exclusively for contributors. Delegates meeting specific VP or participation thresholds were not required to join the APA to earn rewards for voting. Their participation as contributors would remain optional. Requiring large stakeholders to participate in the APA — seeking and granting vouches — adds a layer of responsibility and bureaucracy that may discourage involvement from those with limited time. Moreover, unifying both the delegate and contributor incentives under one framework was one of the main flaws of earlier versions. As reflected in the delegates’ feedback, there is a broad consensus that the Delegate Incentive Program and the Contributor Incentive Program should remain separated.
On rationales as a mandatory condition: We understand the intent behind requiring voting rationales; however, we believe this should remain optional — perhaps incentivized as a bonus rather than a baseline requirement. Many delegates prefer to focus their efforts on voting itself, and making rationales compulsory could unintentionally discourage participation in both the program and DAO activities. This principle inspired the successful introduction of Tier X in version 1.7.
Complexity of the APA mechanism: While we were prepared to handle the added complexity from a PM standpoint, we understand why delegates found the APA concept confusing and burdensome. Its purpose — preventing sybils and unnecessary noise while building a reputation layer — remains valuable, and if it is removed from the next iteration, an alternative mechanism should be designed to address those same issues.
Budget transparency: One major issue repeatedly raised was that neither the incentives budget nor PM compensation were detailed at the time of voting. This effectively meant delegates were being asked to approve a program without clarity on future spending — something akin to signing a blank check.
Centralized vs. decentralized review: The DAO must eventually decide whether contributor incentives should be assessed via centralized or decentralized review. Based on our experience and recent feedback, many large stakeholders are reluctant to spend time voting on contributor-level incentives, even if done annually. In our view, centralized review by a qualified service provider remains the most effective and consistent approach — not perfect, but more reliable in terms of accountability and expertise.
On the issue of delegated Voting Power: While several delegates raised valid concerns about the program not addressing the amount of delegated VP, there is still no clear consensus on how such a mechanism should work. In our view, there could be room to reward top-performing delegates with VP delegated from the treasury, but this should only happen with broad DAO consensus.
Program goals: We respectfully disagree with the notion that the program lacks clear objectives. Many of them — particularly those related to voting incentives — are well defined, and the AF’s examples, along with precedents from past Bonus Points allocations, set strong behavioral expectations. The “nudge seasons” also serve as an effective soft-alignment tool (e.g., amplifying DRIP announcements, encouraging quality SC nominees, etc.). From our standpoint, the Contributors Program should act as the primary entry point for new participants in Arbitrum DAO — a space where contributors can be rewarded for diverse efforts, from volunteering at IRL events to testing apps or organizing initiatives. While this scope is intentionally broad, it ensures inclusivity and fosters long-term engagement.
We would like to express our concern about the lack of continuity of the DIP and the potential negative effects this could have on DAO participation — especially regarding voting incentives.
In our view, the most pressing issue is ensuring that delegates remain incentivized to continue voting and engaging with DAO proposals.
This program is one of the cornerstones of Arbitrum DAO governance, and a discontinuation could undermine outreach efforts from DIP 1.7 that successfully attracted new large delegates. So far, these efforts have resulted in more than 25 million ARB in VP from new DIP Participants, whose continued engagement could be at risk if the DAO fails to maintain a proper incentive framework.
For this reason, we believe the DAO should first prioritize establishing continuity for delegate incentives and, once that is in place, take the time necessary to reach consensus on how to structure the contributors’ incentive framework.
I will be voting ‘against’ for this proposal. While there are some things I do like, I cannot fully support the proposal as it stands.
Like:
I will be voting ‘against’ for this proposal. While there are some things I do like, I cannot fully support the proposal as it stands.
Like:
Dislike
My only add would be I actually disagree with other delegates on seprating this out. i see why, but I think this should be a combined project as proposed. I think seperating it out will just lead to potential overhead or long-term mis-alignmnet of goals. Since at its core the idea is to incentive DAO activity. Although if I mis-interpreted and the real goal is just to have 2 separate temp checks into one tally vote that makes sense
We are voting FOR the new DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0), as it represents a thoughtful evolution of the previous Delegate Incentive Program.
This new framework strikes a much better balance between objectivity, accountability, and community recognition, setting a clear foundation for long-term, healthy governance participation within the ArbitrumDAO.
We are voting FOR the new DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0), as it represents a thoughtful evolution of the previous Delegate Incentive Program.
This new framework strikes a much better balance between objectivity, accountability, and community recognition, setting a clear foundation for long-term, healthy governance participation within the ArbitrumDAO.
The previous incentive model focused almost exclusively on delegates, which was an important first step but limited in scope. DIP 2.0 expands this structure into two complementary pillars — delegates and contributors — ensuring that both governance participation and broader ecosystem engagement are recognized.
This distinction is key to building a more vibrant DAO:
The introduction of the Peer Recognition Program is one of the strongest aspects of this proposal.
By letting peers nominate and recognize valuable work within the DAO, the system promotes social validation, merit-based recognition, and positive reinforcement - rather than purely quantitative participation.
It formalizes what many DAOs struggle to do informally: highlight people who contribute meaningfully, even if they’re not major token holders or delegates. This helps strengthen community cohesion and makes the ArbitrumDAO more inclusive and resilient.
The Nudge Season concept is equally powerful.
Rewarding specific behaviors that the DAO wants to encourage - such as voting early, joining calls, or helping with off-chain coordination - is a pragmatic and adaptive approach to shaping governance culture.
This proposal is a well-structured continuation of the DIP framework — not a radical change, but a refinement built on real lessons learned.
It incentivizes participation, collaboration, and recognition, aligning the DAO’s culture with the long-term success of Arbitrum’s ecosystem.
A suggestion for Arbitrum, given the difficulty in reaching a consensus on the DIP, would be to temporarily pause the program. This would allow the DAO to observe its impact on participation and security, so that a new DIP could be designed based on those insights.
I voted against this proposal in the current form, and I support most of the improvement suggestions shared by other participants. I would like to add an special focus on protocols that are currently actively engaging in governance as there is a monetary incentive to do so (The X tier introduced in the last iterations of the current program). As other pointed out, the proposed incentive is probably too low for the to bother to continue, and we may lose VP because of that.
gm, I voted with a feeble ABSTAIN here.
I am supportive of the general direction (I think Delegates and Contributors should have different roles while they can sit in the same program).
As I have expressed before, and on the lines of @krst, the peer voting system feels like an overkill for this stage: I would keep it as a long term evolution while in the short term we can identify
gm, I voted with a feeble ABSTAIN here.
I am supportive of the general direction (I think Delegates and Contributors should have different roles while they can sit in the same program).
As I have expressed before, and on the lines of @krst, the peer voting system feels like an overkill for this stage: I would keep it as a long term evolution while in the short term we can identify
What we expect contributors to do: creating categories, ares, umbrellas of initiatives would help to attract people saying "hey I have this skill --> I can contribute". A good example I bumped into recently was this form from the Localism.Fund initiative. It says "We need this this and this, to be able to do A B and C: indicate where do you excel.
a leaner way to recognize these people (I'm actually not against the current more centralized system where 1 PM is proactively scouting for everything going on, something that majority of delegates will struggle with)
Thanks
Thank you for the proposal!
Unfortunately, we keep getting caught up in this topic, as I’ve mentioned several times before. It’s also clear that incentives would naturally increase participation, which in turn supports the maintenance of a truly decentralized DAO.
@Griff made a solid point, which was also discussed in today’s (10 / 29) call, along with potential additions.
Thanks for the summary – I agree with much of it, but I'd like to address some controversial points:
Just gonna throw it there while travelling, and is something we discussed also yesterday in the call.
There is the ground for either
Just gonna throw it there while travelling, and is something we discussed also yesterday in the call.
There is the ground for either
Main concern i have: both Seed and other actors have put a lot of effort in include old, dormant delegates in the new voting system. This work will just be wasted with no continuity.
Open to suggestions here.
We’ll reiterate that we don’t feel this is the highest priority, particularly with the lack of clear objective. A simple plan, even if it overpays for now, would be preferable to doing many more calls on a complex plan.
We would much rather see delegate and Foundation efforts put towards creating a plan to stabilize Arbitrum finances, as well as an updated business plan.
voting Against on this offchain vote because a delegate incentive program like the Arbitrum Triple Dip, collaboratively designed by the community, in the open, is the way to go. This proposal is the exact opposite of that.
I believe it would be more appropriate to split this program into two parts:
I believe it would be more appropriate to split this program into two parts:
And only put the first part to a vote, which, by general agreement, is objective and non-controversial, and can also be implemented completely automatically. This way, we will maintain a quorum, and we will discuss the issue of active delegates until we reach a consensus.
Hey everyone,
We decided to abstain from voting on this proposal — not only because we were the potential Program Managers in discussions for this proposed DIP, but also because, judging by the voting trends, we anticipated that our vote would not change the final outcome.
Hey everyone,
We decided to abstain from voting on this proposal — not only because we were the potential Program Managers in discussions for this proposed DIP, but also because, judging by the voting trends, we anticipated that our vote would not change the final outcome.
That said, we would like to sincerely thank the Arbitrum Foundation for not only publishing this proposal but also for the follow-up process that included three governance calls specifically dedicated to the DIP 2.0 discussion. These efforts clearly demonstrate the importance that the Foundation assigns to this program, as also reflected in this comment.
Having worked on previous iterations of the DAO Incentive Program for nearly two years, we would like to share some reflections from that experience.
Initially, we prepared our own draft and shared it with the Foundation and other stakeholders. At a later stage, the Foundation expressed the view that this AAE should take ownership of the new program and develop its own draft, partially based on similar principles to ours. We then offered our full collaboration and feedback on the Foundation’s version, always maintaining our willingness to continue managing the program given our deep understanding of its design and operational challenges.
While this new DIP shares some similarities with our early draft, there are also substantial differences worth noting:
Denomination of incentives: We agree with the majority of delegates that incentives should be denominated in USD rather than ARB. This not only ensures predictability, given the volatility of ARB, but also maintains consistency between the contributors’ and voters’ incentive buckets.
On the Arbitrum Peer Assembly (APA): Our original idea of an APA was meant exclusively for contributors. Delegates meeting specific VP or participation thresholds were not required to join the APA to earn rewards for voting. Their participation as contributors would remain optional. Requiring large stakeholders to participate in the APA — seeking and granting vouches — adds a layer of responsibility and bureaucracy that may discourage involvement from those with limited time. Moreover, unifying both the delegate and contributor incentives under one framework was one of the main flaws of earlier versions. As reflected in the delegates’ feedback, there is a broad consensus that the Delegate Incentive Program and the Contributor Incentive Program should remain separated.
On rationales as a mandatory condition: We understand the intent behind requiring voting rationales; however, we believe this should remain optional — perhaps incentivized as a bonus rather than a baseline requirement. Many delegates prefer to focus their efforts on voting itself, and making rationales compulsory could unintentionally discourage participation in both the program and DAO activities. This principle inspired the successful introduction of Tier X in version 1.7.
Complexity of the APA mechanism: While we were prepared to handle the added complexity from a PM standpoint, we understand why delegates found the APA concept confusing and burdensome. Its purpose — preventing sybils and unnecessary noise while building a reputation layer — remains valuable, and if it is removed from the next iteration, an alternative mechanism should be designed to address those same issues.
Budget transparency: One major issue repeatedly raised was that neither the incentives budget nor PM compensation were detailed at the time of voting. This effectively meant delegates were being asked to approve a program without clarity on future spending — something akin to signing a blank check.
Centralized vs. decentralized review: The DAO must eventually decide whether contributor incentives should be assessed via centralized or decentralized review. Based on our experience and recent feedback, many large stakeholders are reluctant to spend time voting on contributor-level incentives, even if done annually. In our view, centralized review by a qualified service provider remains the most effective and consistent approach — not perfect, but more reliable in terms of accountability and expertise.
On the issue of delegated Voting Power: While several delegates raised valid concerns about the program not addressing the amount of delegated VP, there is still no clear consensus on how such a mechanism should work. In our view, there could be room to reward top-performing delegates with VP delegated from the treasury, but this should only happen with broad DAO consensus.
Program goals: We respectfully disagree with the notion that the program lacks clear objectives. Many of them — particularly those related to voting incentives — are well defined, and the AF’s examples, along with precedents from past Bonus Points allocations, set strong behavioral expectations. The “nudge seasons” also serve as an effective soft-alignment tool (e.g., amplifying DRIP announcements, encouraging quality SC nominees, etc.). From our standpoint, the Contributors Program should act as the primary entry point for new participants in Arbitrum DAO — a space where contributors can be rewarded for diverse efforts, from volunteering at IRL events to testing apps or organizing initiatives. While this scope is intentionally broad, it ensures inclusivity and fosters long-term engagement.
We would like to express our concern about the lack of continuity of the DIP and the potential negative effects this could have on DAO participation — especially regarding voting incentives.
In our view, the most pressing issue is ensuring that delegates remain incentivized to continue voting and engaging with DAO proposals.
This program is one of the cornerstones of Arbitrum DAO governance, and a discontinuation could undermine outreach efforts from DIP 1.7 that successfully attracted new large delegates. So far, these efforts have resulted in more than 25 million ARB in VP from new DIP Participants, whose continued engagement could be at risk if the DAO fails to maintain a proper incentive framework.
For this reason, we believe the DAO should first prioritize establishing continuity for delegate incentives and, once that is in place, take the time necessary to reach consensus on how to structure the contributors’ incentive framework.
I will be voting ‘against’ for this proposal. While there are some things I do like, I cannot fully support the proposal as it stands.
Like:
I will be voting ‘against’ for this proposal. While there are some things I do like, I cannot fully support the proposal as it stands.
Like:
Dislike
My only add would be I actually disagree with other delegates on seprating this out. i see why, but I think this should be a combined project as proposed. I think seperating it out will just lead to potential overhead or long-term mis-alignmnet of goals. Since at its core the idea is to incentive DAO activity. Although if I mis-interpreted and the real goal is just to have 2 separate temp checks into one tally vote that makes sense
We are voting FOR the new DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0), as it represents a thoughtful evolution of the previous Delegate Incentive Program.
This new framework strikes a much better balance between objectivity, accountability, and community recognition, setting a clear foundation for long-term, healthy governance participation within the ArbitrumDAO.
We are voting FOR the new DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0), as it represents a thoughtful evolution of the previous Delegate Incentive Program.
This new framework strikes a much better balance between objectivity, accountability, and community recognition, setting a clear foundation for long-term, healthy governance participation within the ArbitrumDAO.
The previous incentive model focused almost exclusively on delegates, which was an important first step but limited in scope. DIP 2.0 expands this structure into two complementary pillars — delegates and contributors — ensuring that both governance participation and broader ecosystem engagement are recognized.
This distinction is key to building a more vibrant DAO:
The introduction of the Peer Recognition Program is one of the strongest aspects of this proposal.
By letting peers nominate and recognize valuable work within the DAO, the system promotes social validation, merit-based recognition, and positive reinforcement - rather than purely quantitative participation.
It formalizes what many DAOs struggle to do informally: highlight people who contribute meaningfully, even if they’re not major token holders or delegates. This helps strengthen community cohesion and makes the ArbitrumDAO more inclusive and resilient.
The Nudge Season concept is equally powerful.
Rewarding specific behaviors that the DAO wants to encourage - such as voting early, joining calls, or helping with off-chain coordination - is a pragmatic and adaptive approach to shaping governance culture.
This proposal is a well-structured continuation of the DIP framework — not a radical change, but a refinement built on real lessons learned.
It incentivizes participation, collaboration, and recognition, aligning the DAO’s culture with the long-term success of Arbitrum’s ecosystem.
A suggestion for Arbitrum, given the difficulty in reaching a consensus on the DIP, would be to temporarily pause the program. This would allow the DAO to observe its impact on participation and security, so that a new DIP could be designed based on those insights.
I voted against this proposal in the current form, and I support most of the improvement suggestions shared by other participants. I would like to add an special focus on protocols that are currently actively engaging in governance as there is a monetary incentive to do so (The X tier introduced in the last iterations of the current program). As other pointed out, the proposed incentive is probably too low for the to bother to continue, and we may lose VP because of that.
gm, I voted with a feeble ABSTAIN here.
I am supportive of the general direction (I think Delegates and Contributors should have different roles while they can sit in the same program).
As I have expressed before, and on the lines of @krst, the peer voting system feels like an overkill for this stage: I would keep it as a long term evolution while in the short term we can identify
gm, I voted with a feeble ABSTAIN here.
I am supportive of the general direction (I think Delegates and Contributors should have different roles while they can sit in the same program).
As I have expressed before, and on the lines of @krst, the peer voting system feels like an overkill for this stage: I would keep it as a long term evolution while in the short term we can identify
What we expect contributors to do: creating categories, ares, umbrellas of initiatives would help to attract people saying "hey I have this skill --> I can contribute". A good example I bumped into recently was this form from the Localism.Fund initiative. It says "We need this this and this, to be able to do A B and C: indicate where do you excel.
a leaner way to recognize these people (I'm actually not against the current more centralized system where 1 PM is proactively scouting for everything going on, something that majority of delegates will struggle with)
Thanks
Thank you for the proposal!
Unfortunately, we keep getting caught up in this topic, as I’ve mentioned several times before. It’s also clear that incentives would naturally increase participation, which in turn supports the maintenance of a truly decentralized DAO.
@Griff made a solid point, which was also discussed in today’s (10 / 29) call, along with potential additions.
Thanks for the summary – I agree with much of it, but I'd like to address some controversial points:
Thank you for the proposal!
Unfortunately, we keep getting caught up in this topic, as I’ve mentioned several times before. It’s also clear that incentives would naturally increase participation, which in turn supports the maintenance of a truly decentralized DAO.
@Griff made a solid point, which was also discussed in today’s (10 / 29) call, along with potential additions.
However, when evaluating this proposal, there are clear weaknesses, several of which were correctly highlighted by @krst, with the most important being the lack of clarity on what the DAO actually expects from its delegates. Only then will delegates be able to know what to do, how to meet the DAO’s goals, and how to drive increased productivity and capital efficiency for the DAO.
To sum up, I’m voting Against, and I genuinely hope we can find a way to move past this issue once and for all.
Thanks for the summary – I agree with much of it, but I'd like to address some controversial points:
I believe this is a necessary step to ensure that delegates aren't just voting for rewards, but understand what they're voting for and why. If someone voted, they have a few minutes to write a justification.
Actually, the question is a bit different – is the review objective or not. This problem could be solved by decentralization, but that's just one solution. Initially, in DIP 1.0 there was no such problem when only objective factors were used for evaluation.
Perhaps everyone understands this differently, but for me, goals are specific values for specific parameters that can be objectively assessed. I would appreciate it if you could write down these specific values – in that case, we can discuss them. For example, increasing engagement isn't a goal – it's an intention or a desired effect
I agree. It seems futile to always reward novelty over sustained growth. Perhaps there can be a separate compensation program for people who perform administrative tasks?
We appreciate the intent behind DIP 2.0 to evolve delegate incentives and clarify the distinction between them and contributors. However, we’re voting Against in its current form.
Our concerns are objectively, structurally, and economically oriented:
We appreciate the intent behind DIP 2.0 to evolve delegate incentives and clarify the distinction between them and contributors. However, we’re voting Against in its current form.
Our concerns are objectively, structurally, and economically oriented:
I’m voting against this proposal. I really appreciate all the work that has been done to come up with this proposal, including new and fresh solutions like the Assembly or the Nudge Season. However, I don’t think that this version represents a sustainable structure.
Firstly, this arrives at a moment when DAO governance has been slowing down for several months already. There are fewer proposals, and among those, very few have meaningful impact. The current DIP should acknowledge this reality rather than creating additional layers of complexity and restrictions. What’s needed now is a program designed to invite more users, energize delegate participation, and lower barriers, not one that makes things more difficult and less accessible.
I’m voting against this proposal. I really appreciate all the work that has been done to come up with this proposal, including new and fresh solutions like the Assembly or the Nudge Season. However, I don’t think that this version represents a sustainable structure.
Firstly, this arrives at a moment when DAO governance has been slowing down for several months already. There are fewer proposals, and among those, very few have meaningful impact. The current DIP should acknowledge this reality rather than creating additional layers of complexity and restrictions. What’s needed now is a program designed to invite more users, energize delegate participation, and lower barriers, not one that makes things more difficult and less accessible.
To me, the proposal’s mechanisms for vouching and peer assembly actually risk making the DAO more closed. While these instruments could improve accountability in theory, in practice they tend to exclude new contributors and reinforce decision-making among a smaller group. Several delegates have commented that this kind of structure can create echo chambers, and I agree with them. There’s a danger the Peer Assembly becomes a self-reinforcing feedback loop instead of an open, evolving space.
Another concern is subjectivity, which remains central in the program. Earlier versions of the incentive program faced strong criticism due to subjective judgments and selective rewards. DIP 2.0 has not fundamentally resolved this. Reward distribution would still depend on discretionary decisions, leaving room for bias and disputes over fairness.
Fundamentally, as @krst pointed out, it seems we lack alignment on what the program’s goals even are. Without clear consensus, the proposal tries to address multiple aims at once, resulting in scattered solutions. I think our priority should be agreeing on shared objectives first, before deciding on any kind of incentive structure. Only after clear goals are defined should we move on to design details.
I will continue participating in these discussions and try to think about concrete alternatives, not just criticize. My vote against is a call for a more pragmatic, context-aware design that deals directly with the DAO’s present situation, rather than hopes or ideals. The current version risks rewarding the wrong behaviors and discouraging the right ones, and in my view, it misses the opportunity to truly revitalize governance engagement
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
We want to begin by acknowledging the effort and thought behind this proposal. The team included lessons from the Delegate Incentive Program and attempted to create a clearer distinction between delegates and contributors through a more structured framework. The intent to improve accountability, encourage transparency, and expand recognition to contributors is nice and directionally positive for the DAO.
However, after reviewing the proposal and reflecting on our experience across all previous DIPs, we believe that this version of DIP, while well-intentioned, would benefit from deeper alignment with the DAO’s long-term direction before being implemented. Our vote against is not a rejection of the idea itself, but a call to refine and unify approaches for the benefit of the entire ecosystem.
The separation between delegates and contributors is a natural and much-needed evolution, as it acknowledges that meaningful governance participation takes different forms. However, the current structure may benefit from a better balance between operational efficiency and community autonomy. For incentive programs to scale sustainably, decision-making authority should ideally be distributed across transparent, peer-validated processes rather than concentrated in administrative functions.
The introduction of the Peer Assembly and vouching system raises further questions about accessibility and fairness. By design, it creates a permissioned layer around participation, one that relies on social consensus rather than open criteria. Over time, such systems tend to consolidate influence around a smaller inner circle, reducing the openness that has defined Arbitrum’s governance to date. While accountability is essential, we must ensure that inclusion and decentralization remain foundational to any incentive framework adopted by the DAO.
It’s also important to recognize the broader context of where the DAO stands today. Arbitrum has reached a stage where governance experimentation has multiplied, from various incentive programs to multiple DIP revisions. This experimentation is healthy, but at this point, the DAO would benefit from more convergence rather than fragmentation. Currently, there are two active proposals: DIP 2.0 and the Triple Dip, both addressing the same fundamental challenge of delegate incentives.
This parallel effort represents more than just creative diversity; it reflects a coordination gap. Instead of working together toward a unified system, we now have two competing frameworks, both of which have strong ideas but separate execution paths. This is not the DAO at its best. The real strength of Arbitrum’s governance has always come from open debate followed by collective alignment, even among differing perspectives. A joint framework, one that combines the operational clarity of DIP 2.0 with the decentralized logic and automation of the Triple Dip, would deliver far more value than either in isolation.
I'm voting against this proposal.
Don't get me wrong, I really like the experiment with the social graph concept and most of the details proposed, and I don't think its a problem if it's ARB denominated. But I would love it if the Foundation worked with Paulo to find the best proposal out of the two approaches. This vote failing is an opportunity to gather more feedback on the proposal and collaborate rather than compete.
I'm voting against this proposal.
Don't get me wrong, I really like the experiment with the social graph concept and most of the details proposed, and I don't think its a problem if it's ARB denominated. But I would love it if the Foundation worked with Paulo to find the best proposal out of the two approaches. This vote failing is an opportunity to gather more feedback on the proposal and collaborate rather than compete.
I think the AAEs should look to foster community led efforts whenever possible. I appreciate a lot of things about Paulo's proposal, if we could integrate some of the best aspects of his proposal (e.g. the coordinape-esque feedback) we could better live up to our DAO nature.
Of course, the AF has a better perspective for designing this proposal. But if the community is already building toward something similar, I believe it would be better for the AF to support and collab with the community than to compete… At least in this circumstance.
As a side note, I would LOVE to see a way for DIP participation to result in ARB Delegation increases.. This is a nearly cost free way for rewarding Delegates, while also helping us fight the quorum issues that we have been fighting.
Thank you @SEEDGov for sharing your reflections. We want to begin by recognizing your hard work as well as the commitment the Arbitrum Foundation has made toward building a sustainable delegate incentive program. The program has evolved significantly through extensive discussion and iteration, and we are confident that the next version of the DIP will be more focused and better aligned with the DAO’s needs.
That said, we want to emphasize that competitive rewards for delegates are essential for the long-term health of governance. Incentivizing consistent and meaningful participation is not a bonus; it is foundational to ensuring informed decision-making, accountability, and diversity of opinions and ideas.
Thank you @SEEDGov for sharing your reflections. We want to begin by recognizing your hard work as well as the commitment the Arbitrum Foundation has made toward building a sustainable delegate incentive program. The program has evolved significantly through extensive discussion and iteration, and we are confident that the next version of the DIP will be more focused and better aligned with the DAO’s needs.
That said, we want to emphasize that competitive rewards for delegates are essential for the long-term health of governance. Incentivizing consistent and meaningful participation is not a bonus; it is foundational to ensuring informed decision-making, accountability, and diversity of opinions and ideas.
Looking ahead, we hope the next iteration of the DIP focuses on clarity and simplicity while preserving the nuance necessary for Arbitrum’s governance. Echoing a point raised in yesterday’s Governance and Reporting Call, the SOS process could be closely linked to the redesign of the program. Aligning these initiatives could also serve as a catalyst to restart the SOS process.
There is currently ~7M ARB remaining in the DIP multisig. During this transition period and in the spirit of continuity, as mentioned in yesterday’s GRC call, one of the most valuable activities to incentivize is the co-design process itself. If the DIP program is at the heart of the DAO, as the Foundation shared in their comment, then its next phase must be shaped collaboratively by governance participants.
I support incentivizing governance, but not in this shape. DIP 2.0 reintroduces subjectivity, adds gatekeeping, and centralizes discretion in OpCo/PM, while leaving compensation, evaluation, and appeals insufficiently transparent or decentralized. I’m voting AGAINST and would favor a simpler, more transparent framework, one that keeps incentives open to all active delegates, relies on public and verifiable scoring, defines its KPIs up front, and anchors accountability directly to the DAO.
I voted against
Here are the main points in short:
I voted against
Here are the main points in short:
We believe that this program is not moving in the direction of openness for delegates, whom it claims to attract, but instead toward centralization of power and backroom decision-making. We hope that the Arbitrum will listen to the voices of active delegates—the very people this system is designed to attract.
Community calls, especially if it is around an initiative that is trying to drive something forward, can be recognised as a contribution.
Community calls, especially if it is around an initiative that is trying to drive something forward, can be recognised as a contribution.
In my opinion (which you can obviously disagree with), community calls are most certainly a contribution and a valuable one. For example, the monthly governance calls that I started hosting at the inception of the DAO were in my opinion valuable and helped drive many initiatives forward. The fact that they've been taken over by OpCo kind of proves my point. Also other recurring calls that we used to host such as Incentive DETOX calls or SOS calls were in my opinion (that you can obviously disagree with) quite valuable even if they couldn't unleash the full potential due to lack of support. Community calls can drive debate, allow for low-barrier engagement from broader community and can break silos if properly facilitated. They're powerful tools and in my opinion (again, as above) should be encouraged, not discouraged.
But, if it is a long-standing and recurring community call, then we should find a proper way to compensate the people organising it and to review it periodically to make sure the recurring task is still needed. The intention being that they are properly supported and they do not need to rely on an ad-hoc contribution program to recognise that their work is indeed useful. With that in mind, it should not be seen as an exclusion clause.
If that was the intention, it should have been stated like that. Currently, the proposal only states that recurring contributions such as monthly calls, should not be rewarded.
Voting against DIP 2.0.
I support incentives for DAO work, nobody should grind for free. But this proposal bundles delegates and contributors into one program under the Peer Assembly, which muddles things. I’d support a clean separation between lower time commit responsibilities like voting, and deeper contributor responsibilites.
Voting against DIP 2.0.
I support incentives for DAO work, nobody should grind for free. But this proposal bundles delegates and contributors into one program under the Peer Assembly, which muddles things. I’d support a clean separation between lower time commit responsibilities like voting, and deeper contributor responsibilites.
Vouching is an interesting experiment, but tying everything together risks complexity and gameability. Central eval by PM/OpCo makes sense for efficiency, but without clearer budgets and metrics, it's harder to back.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in its current form.
We reviewed this proposal in parallel with the Triple Dip proposal, and unfortunately, in our opinion, neither is worth supporting at this point.
I am voting abstain.
There are a few things that don’t convince me about this proposal.
I am voting abstain.
There are a few things that don’t convince me about this proposal.
The main thing is the structure of a single proposal for both delegates and contributors. Even though DIP 2.0 distinguishes between the two, they should live under the same umbrella. These are very different dynamics: former is highly programmatic, and the latter is more subjective. We should have two separate programs with distinct oversight and metrics.
The second painpoint is the denomination risk (ARB vs stables). Budgets and payouts are set in ARB, and the pool comes from ARB. That introduces high volatility but, above all, poor predictability for participants, especially if we’re closer to a top than a bottom in the market, and one could argue that this could be the case for the current one. In a severe bear market, payouts could become trivial, in the order of 30-50 dollar for constitutional proposals, relative to the intended incentive level. Yes, PM/OpCo can adjust quarterly, but that’s still reactive and limited by an ARB budget.
The third point is about payout sizing and predictability. I’m personally neutral on the mechanics (proportional vs quadratic, and VP/total VP etc). There are many ways to do it. The real issue is predictability when payouts are ARB denominated. Over a 1 year program, ARB drawdowns could reduce the effective payout to levels that won’t move the needle, particularly for delegates with meaningful VP. While quarterly reviews helps, having USD denominated targets would better stabilize incentives. As a secondary note, this lack of predictability might just kill the effort of the last few months made by SeedGov and the community itself to gather high VP but previously dormant delegates that might find themself not wanting to partake in voting.
On the Peer Assembly gating I’m neutral. But a gate for delegate rewards can exclude high-VP delegates from payouts and may create unintended secondary effects. I understand the intent, and I can think about lobbigy for example which we have historically wanted to be excluded by DIP rewards (not judging on the merit here just stating facts), but I’m not sure if there are other tradeoffs.
I would suggest the following adjustments
I am abstaining to still show support, some elements are imho worth saving such as nudge seasons, and there is a clear intent to try and fix previous things of DIP perceived by the broad community as either unfair or worth changing; that said, we are not hitting the proper target here, which is incentivising voting power on important proposals.
TBH, I was also curious about this particular exclusion clause. especially since there are not that many contributors in the DAO who used to do lots of recurring calls in the past not tied to reporting of their own DAO-funded initiative. So, it feels rather precisely targeted. One thing that struggles me is that if those recurring calls were perceived as of such little or diminishing value (which can be deduced from the design of this mechanism), then why did no one say so earlier? Said contributors could just have stopped organising them.
Added clarification that once the first 50 members have been onboarded to the Peer Assembly, vouches will be restricted to one per member per month
Overall, we believe the proposed DIP 2.0 program effectively identifies and addresses the key areas that required improvement in the previous version of the initiative — particularly the subjectivity of the scoring system and the need to separate the evaluation frameworks for different participant types. We would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of @paulofonseca , whose analysis, feedback and suggestions were instrumental in identifying several of these issues and in pushing for an improved iteration of the program.
We see notable similarities between the Triple DIP and DIP 2.0 approaches — especially in the introduction of a peer-review component, which we believe is a major enhancement. The peer-review mechanism in DIP 2.0, in particular, seems more scalable and balanced, as it integrates both peer and community feedback without creating an excessive workload for delegates and contributors. We also support the decision to leverage the Arbitrum OpCo within the program’s structure. Given OpCo’s core mission of operationalising the DAO and improving the efficiency of its initiatives, its involvement in the DIP framework seems like a natural and effective fit.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
This version of the DIP focuses on a few delegates, making it more centralized. We would like to see more delegates involved, rather than focusing on just a selected few handful of delegates.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
This version of the DIP focuses on a few delegates, making it more centralized. We would like to see more delegates involved, rather than focusing on just a selected few handful of delegates.
With governance activity significantly going down, capping the budget is also not a great idea, as it will likely lead to reduced participation both across the board and on the forum, which is not ideal.
We would like to recommend keeping the incentives similar to the last DIP such as tier-based incentives for delegates while working on improving the review mechanism.
Thank you to the Arbitrum Foundation for publishing this long-awaited proposal. This marks an important step forward for the DAO as it begins to distinguish between delegates and contributors. In particular, starting to define contributor responsibilities is essential to ensure that contributors are focused on impactful work aligned with the DAO’s goals, guided and legitimized by the OpCo, which should hold strategic context.
While the program’s budget is below market (as seen in comparative data across DAO delegate reward programs), we recognize that this is intentional. The program is designed as a stepping stone toward more sustainable part-time or full-time work within existing or future Arbitrum-Aligned Entities (AAEs).
We want to thank the Arbitrum Foundation for its thoughtful work in evolving the incentive framework. The clear distinction between delegates and contributors, and especially the introduction of the Arbitrum Peer Assembly, are crucial steps toward building a more robust and engaged governance community. It's a strong, pragmatic step forward.
While the Program Manager role is a necessary and pragmatic way to launch this program, we believe it's important to acknowledge the core challenge of subjectivity, which was a significant pain point in past incentive programs. We believe that relying on a single source of truth for contribution evaluation, while effective initially, may not be ideal as the DAO continues to scale. To ensure fairness, the DAO should proactively chart a path toward more scalable, objective, and community-driven evaluation mechanisms.
Just want to clarify that, as I understand it currently at least, in the Arbitrum Foundation DIP 2.0 proposal, the Peer Assembly is just a method to define the membership in the program, and not a way for peers to evaluate other peers contributions to the DAO. Additionally, anybody can submit their (or others) contributions privately to the Program Manager for them to centrally review and evaluate. So in this proposal, the evaluation of contributions is still centralized and therefore biased and subjective to the Program Manager's opinion, just like in DIP 1.5/6/7. Furthermore, there will be no recourse or transparency into those decisions since the Program Manager will not be required to explain why those 5 contributions were the chosen ones to be compensated in that month.
The answer to this on the call was that it was SeedGov, and regarding the salary, Raam clarified that they had not yet agreed on it (and it is unlikely that they will tell us this figure, since the salary will probably be from the Foundation, and not from DAO directly).
Thank you for the proposal!
Unfortunately, we keep getting caught up in this topic, as I’ve mentioned several times before. It’s also clear that incentives would naturally increase participation, which in turn supports the maintenance of a truly decentralized DAO.
@Griff made a solid point, which was also discussed in today’s (10 / 29) call, along with potential additions.
However, when evaluating this proposal, there are clear weaknesses, several of which were correctly highlighted by @krst, with the most important being the lack of clarity on what the DAO actually expects from its delegates. Only then will delegates be able to know what to do, how to meet the DAO’s goals, and how to drive increased productivity and capital efficiency for the DAO.
To sum up, I’m voting Against, and I genuinely hope we can find a way to move past this issue once and for all.
Thanks for the summary – I agree with much of it, but I'd like to address some controversial points:
I believe this is a necessary step to ensure that delegates aren't just voting for rewards, but understand what they're voting for and why. If someone voted, they have a few minutes to write a justification.
Actually, the question is a bit different – is the review objective or not. This problem could be solved by decentralization, but that's just one solution. Initially, in DIP 1.0 there was no such problem when only objective factors were used for evaluation.
Perhaps everyone understands this differently, but for me, goals are specific values for specific parameters that can be objectively assessed. I would appreciate it if you could write down these specific values – in that case, we can discuss them. For example, increasing engagement isn't a goal – it's an intention or a desired effect
I agree. It seems futile to always reward novelty over sustained growth. Perhaps there can be a separate compensation program for people who perform administrative tasks?
We appreciate the intent behind DIP 2.0 to evolve delegate incentives and clarify the distinction between them and contributors. However, we’re voting Against in its current form.
Our concerns are objectively, structurally, and economically oriented:
We appreciate the intent behind DIP 2.0 to evolve delegate incentives and clarify the distinction between them and contributors. However, we’re voting Against in its current form.
Our concerns are objectively, structurally, and economically oriented:
I’m voting against this proposal. I really appreciate all the work that has been done to come up with this proposal, including new and fresh solutions like the Assembly or the Nudge Season. However, I don’t think that this version represents a sustainable structure.
Firstly, this arrives at a moment when DAO governance has been slowing down for several months already. There are fewer proposals, and among those, very few have meaningful impact. The current DIP should acknowledge this reality rather than creating additional layers of complexity and restrictions. What’s needed now is a program designed to invite more users, energize delegate participation, and lower barriers, not one that makes things more difficult and less accessible.
I’m voting against this proposal. I really appreciate all the work that has been done to come up with this proposal, including new and fresh solutions like the Assembly or the Nudge Season. However, I don’t think that this version represents a sustainable structure.
Firstly, this arrives at a moment when DAO governance has been slowing down for several months already. There are fewer proposals, and among those, very few have meaningful impact. The current DIP should acknowledge this reality rather than creating additional layers of complexity and restrictions. What’s needed now is a program designed to invite more users, energize delegate participation, and lower barriers, not one that makes things more difficult and less accessible.
To me, the proposal’s mechanisms for vouching and peer assembly actually risk making the DAO more closed. While these instruments could improve accountability in theory, in practice they tend to exclude new contributors and reinforce decision-making among a smaller group. Several delegates have commented that this kind of structure can create echo chambers, and I agree with them. There’s a danger the Peer Assembly becomes a self-reinforcing feedback loop instead of an open, evolving space.
Another concern is subjectivity, which remains central in the program. Earlier versions of the incentive program faced strong criticism due to subjective judgments and selective rewards. DIP 2.0 has not fundamentally resolved this. Reward distribution would still depend on discretionary decisions, leaving room for bias and disputes over fairness.
Fundamentally, as @krst pointed out, it seems we lack alignment on what the program’s goals even are. Without clear consensus, the proposal tries to address multiple aims at once, resulting in scattered solutions. I think our priority should be agreeing on shared objectives first, before deciding on any kind of incentive structure. Only after clear goals are defined should we move on to design details.
I will continue participating in these discussions and try to think about concrete alternatives, not just criticize. My vote against is a call for a more pragmatic, context-aware design that deals directly with the DAO’s present situation, rather than hopes or ideals. The current version risks rewarding the wrong behaviors and discouraging the right ones, and in my view, it misses the opportunity to truly revitalize governance engagement
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
We want to begin by acknowledging the effort and thought behind this proposal. The team included lessons from the Delegate Incentive Program and attempted to create a clearer distinction between delegates and contributors through a more structured framework. The intent to improve accountability, encourage transparency, and expand recognition to contributors is nice and directionally positive for the DAO.
However, after reviewing the proposal and reflecting on our experience across all previous DIPs, we believe that this version of DIP, while well-intentioned, would benefit from deeper alignment with the DAO’s long-term direction before being implemented. Our vote against is not a rejection of the idea itself, but a call to refine and unify approaches for the benefit of the entire ecosystem.
The separation between delegates and contributors is a natural and much-needed evolution, as it acknowledges that meaningful governance participation takes different forms. However, the current structure may benefit from a better balance between operational efficiency and community autonomy. For incentive programs to scale sustainably, decision-making authority should ideally be distributed across transparent, peer-validated processes rather than concentrated in administrative functions.
The introduction of the Peer Assembly and vouching system raises further questions about accessibility and fairness. By design, it creates a permissioned layer around participation, one that relies on social consensus rather than open criteria. Over time, such systems tend to consolidate influence around a smaller inner circle, reducing the openness that has defined Arbitrum’s governance to date. While accountability is essential, we must ensure that inclusion and decentralization remain foundational to any incentive framework adopted by the DAO.
It’s also important to recognize the broader context of where the DAO stands today. Arbitrum has reached a stage where governance experimentation has multiplied, from various incentive programs to multiple DIP revisions. This experimentation is healthy, but at this point, the DAO would benefit from more convergence rather than fragmentation. Currently, there are two active proposals: DIP 2.0 and the Triple Dip, both addressing the same fundamental challenge of delegate incentives.
This parallel effort represents more than just creative diversity; it reflects a coordination gap. Instead of working together toward a unified system, we now have two competing frameworks, both of which have strong ideas but separate execution paths. This is not the DAO at its best. The real strength of Arbitrum’s governance has always come from open debate followed by collective alignment, even among differing perspectives. A joint framework, one that combines the operational clarity of DIP 2.0 with the decentralized logic and automation of the Triple Dip, would deliver far more value than either in isolation.
I'm voting against this proposal.
Don't get me wrong, I really like the experiment with the social graph concept and most of the details proposed, and I don't think its a problem if it's ARB denominated. But I would love it if the Foundation worked with Paulo to find the best proposal out of the two approaches. This vote failing is an opportunity to gather more feedback on the proposal and collaborate rather than compete.
I'm voting against this proposal.
Don't get me wrong, I really like the experiment with the social graph concept and most of the details proposed, and I don't think its a problem if it's ARB denominated. But I would love it if the Foundation worked with Paulo to find the best proposal out of the two approaches. This vote failing is an opportunity to gather more feedback on the proposal and collaborate rather than compete.
I think the AAEs should look to foster community led efforts whenever possible. I appreciate a lot of things about Paulo's proposal, if we could integrate some of the best aspects of his proposal (e.g. the coordinape-esque feedback) we could better live up to our DAO nature.
Of course, the AF has a better perspective for designing this proposal. But if the community is already building toward something similar, I believe it would be better for the AF to support and collab with the community than to compete… At least in this circumstance.
As a side note, I would LOVE to see a way for DIP participation to result in ARB Delegation increases.. This is a nearly cost free way for rewarding Delegates, while also helping us fight the quorum issues that we have been fighting.
Thank you @SEEDGov for sharing your reflections. We want to begin by recognizing your hard work as well as the commitment the Arbitrum Foundation has made toward building a sustainable delegate incentive program. The program has evolved significantly through extensive discussion and iteration, and we are confident that the next version of the DIP will be more focused and better aligned with the DAO’s needs.
That said, we want to emphasize that competitive rewards for delegates are essential for the long-term health of governance. Incentivizing consistent and meaningful participation is not a bonus; it is foundational to ensuring informed decision-making, accountability, and diversity of opinions and ideas.
Thank you @SEEDGov for sharing your reflections. We want to begin by recognizing your hard work as well as the commitment the Arbitrum Foundation has made toward building a sustainable delegate incentive program. The program has evolved significantly through extensive discussion and iteration, and we are confident that the next version of the DIP will be more focused and better aligned with the DAO’s needs.
That said, we want to emphasize that competitive rewards for delegates are essential for the long-term health of governance. Incentivizing consistent and meaningful participation is not a bonus; it is foundational to ensuring informed decision-making, accountability, and diversity of opinions and ideas.
Looking ahead, we hope the next iteration of the DIP focuses on clarity and simplicity while preserving the nuance necessary for Arbitrum’s governance. Echoing a point raised in yesterday’s Governance and Reporting Call, the SOS process could be closely linked to the redesign of the program. Aligning these initiatives could also serve as a catalyst to restart the SOS process.
There is currently ~7M ARB remaining in the DIP multisig. During this transition period and in the spirit of continuity, as mentioned in yesterday’s GRC call, one of the most valuable activities to incentivize is the co-design process itself. If the DIP program is at the heart of the DAO, as the Foundation shared in their comment, then its next phase must be shaped collaboratively by governance participants.
I support incentivizing governance, but not in this shape. DIP 2.0 reintroduces subjectivity, adds gatekeeping, and centralizes discretion in OpCo/PM, while leaving compensation, evaluation, and appeals insufficiently transparent or decentralized. I’m voting AGAINST and would favor a simpler, more transparent framework, one that keeps incentives open to all active delegates, relies on public and verifiable scoring, defines its KPIs up front, and anchors accountability directly to the DAO.
I voted against
Here are the main points in short:
I voted against
Here are the main points in short:
We believe that this program is not moving in the direction of openness for delegates, whom it claims to attract, but instead toward centralization of power and backroom decision-making. We hope that the Arbitrum will listen to the voices of active delegates—the very people this system is designed to attract.
Community calls, especially if it is around an initiative that is trying to drive something forward, can be recognised as a contribution.
Community calls, especially if it is around an initiative that is trying to drive something forward, can be recognised as a contribution.
In my opinion (which you can obviously disagree with), community calls are most certainly a contribution and a valuable one. For example, the monthly governance calls that I started hosting at the inception of the DAO were in my opinion valuable and helped drive many initiatives forward. The fact that they've been taken over by OpCo kind of proves my point. Also other recurring calls that we used to host such as Incentive DETOX calls or SOS calls were in my opinion (that you can obviously disagree with) quite valuable even if they couldn't unleash the full potential due to lack of support. Community calls can drive debate, allow for low-barrier engagement from broader community and can break silos if properly facilitated. They're powerful tools and in my opinion (again, as above) should be encouraged, not discouraged.
But, if it is a long-standing and recurring community call, then we should find a proper way to compensate the people organising it and to review it periodically to make sure the recurring task is still needed. The intention being that they are properly supported and they do not need to rely on an ad-hoc contribution program to recognise that their work is indeed useful. With that in mind, it should not be seen as an exclusion clause.
If that was the intention, it should have been stated like that. Currently, the proposal only states that recurring contributions such as monthly calls, should not be rewarded.
Voting against DIP 2.0.
I support incentives for DAO work, nobody should grind for free. But this proposal bundles delegates and contributors into one program under the Peer Assembly, which muddles things. I’d support a clean separation between lower time commit responsibilities like voting, and deeper contributor responsibilites.
Voting against DIP 2.0.
I support incentives for DAO work, nobody should grind for free. But this proposal bundles delegates and contributors into one program under the Peer Assembly, which muddles things. I’d support a clean separation between lower time commit responsibilities like voting, and deeper contributor responsibilites.
Vouching is an interesting experiment, but tying everything together risks complexity and gameability. Central eval by PM/OpCo makes sense for efficiency, but without clearer budgets and metrics, it's harder to back.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in its current form.
We reviewed this proposal in parallel with the Triple Dip proposal, and unfortunately, in our opinion, neither is worth supporting at this point.
I am voting abstain.
There are a few things that don’t convince me about this proposal.
I am voting abstain.
There are a few things that don’t convince me about this proposal.
The main thing is the structure of a single proposal for both delegates and contributors. Even though DIP 2.0 distinguishes between the two, they should live under the same umbrella. These are very different dynamics: former is highly programmatic, and the latter is more subjective. We should have two separate programs with distinct oversight and metrics.
The second painpoint is the denomination risk (ARB vs stables). Budgets and payouts are set in ARB, and the pool comes from ARB. That introduces high volatility but, above all, poor predictability for participants, especially if we’re closer to a top than a bottom in the market, and one could argue that this could be the case for the current one. In a severe bear market, payouts could become trivial, in the order of 30-50 dollar for constitutional proposals, relative to the intended incentive level. Yes, PM/OpCo can adjust quarterly, but that’s still reactive and limited by an ARB budget.
The third point is about payout sizing and predictability. I’m personally neutral on the mechanics (proportional vs quadratic, and VP/total VP etc). There are many ways to do it. The real issue is predictability when payouts are ARB denominated. Over a 1 year program, ARB drawdowns could reduce the effective payout to levels that won’t move the needle, particularly for delegates with meaningful VP. While quarterly reviews helps, having USD denominated targets would better stabilize incentives. As a secondary note, this lack of predictability might just kill the effort of the last few months made by SeedGov and the community itself to gather high VP but previously dormant delegates that might find themself not wanting to partake in voting.
On the Peer Assembly gating I’m neutral. But a gate for delegate rewards can exclude high-VP delegates from payouts and may create unintended secondary effects. I understand the intent, and I can think about lobbigy for example which we have historically wanted to be excluded by DIP rewards (not judging on the merit here just stating facts), but I’m not sure if there are other tradeoffs.
I would suggest the following adjustments
I am abstaining to still show support, some elements are imho worth saving such as nudge seasons, and there is a clear intent to try and fix previous things of DIP perceived by the broad community as either unfair or worth changing; that said, we are not hitting the proper target here, which is incentivising voting power on important proposals.
TBH, I was also curious about this particular exclusion clause. especially since there are not that many contributors in the DAO who used to do lots of recurring calls in the past not tied to reporting of their own DAO-funded initiative. So, it feels rather precisely targeted. One thing that struggles me is that if those recurring calls were perceived as of such little or diminishing value (which can be deduced from the design of this mechanism), then why did no one say so earlier? Said contributors could just have stopped organising them.
Added clarification that once the first 50 members have been onboarded to the Peer Assembly, vouches will be restricted to one per member per month
Overall, we believe the proposed DIP 2.0 program effectively identifies and addresses the key areas that required improvement in the previous version of the initiative — particularly the subjectivity of the scoring system and the need to separate the evaluation frameworks for different participant types. We would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of @paulofonseca , whose analysis, feedback and suggestions were instrumental in identifying several of these issues and in pushing for an improved iteration of the program.
We see notable similarities between the Triple DIP and DIP 2.0 approaches — especially in the introduction of a peer-review component, which we believe is a major enhancement. The peer-review mechanism in DIP 2.0, in particular, seems more scalable and balanced, as it integrates both peer and community feedback without creating an excessive workload for delegates and contributors. We also support the decision to leverage the Arbitrum OpCo within the program’s structure. Given OpCo’s core mission of operationalising the DAO and improving the efficiency of its initiatives, its involvement in the DIP framework seems like a natural and effective fit.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
This version of the DIP focuses on a few delegates, making it more centralized. We would like to see more delegates involved, rather than focusing on just a selected few handful of delegates.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
This version of the DIP focuses on a few delegates, making it more centralized. We would like to see more delegates involved, rather than focusing on just a selected few handful of delegates.
With governance activity significantly going down, capping the budget is also not a great idea, as it will likely lead to reduced participation both across the board and on the forum, which is not ideal.
We would like to recommend keeping the incentives similar to the last DIP such as tier-based incentives for delegates while working on improving the review mechanism.
Thank you to the Arbitrum Foundation for publishing this long-awaited proposal. This marks an important step forward for the DAO as it begins to distinguish between delegates and contributors. In particular, starting to define contributor responsibilities is essential to ensure that contributors are focused on impactful work aligned with the DAO’s goals, guided and legitimized by the OpCo, which should hold strategic context.
While the program’s budget is below market (as seen in comparative data across DAO delegate reward programs), we recognize that this is intentional. The program is designed as a stepping stone toward more sustainable part-time or full-time work within existing or future Arbitrum-Aligned Entities (AAEs).
We want to thank the Arbitrum Foundation for its thoughtful work in evolving the incentive framework. The clear distinction between delegates and contributors, and especially the introduction of the Arbitrum Peer Assembly, are crucial steps toward building a more robust and engaged governance community. It's a strong, pragmatic step forward.
While the Program Manager role is a necessary and pragmatic way to launch this program, we believe it's important to acknowledge the core challenge of subjectivity, which was a significant pain point in past incentive programs. We believe that relying on a single source of truth for contribution evaluation, while effective initially, may not be ideal as the DAO continues to scale. To ensure fairness, the DAO should proactively chart a path toward more scalable, objective, and community-driven evaluation mechanisms.
Just want to clarify that, as I understand it currently at least, in the Arbitrum Foundation DIP 2.0 proposal, the Peer Assembly is just a method to define the membership in the program, and not a way for peers to evaluate other peers contributions to the DAO. Additionally, anybody can submit their (or others) contributions privately to the Program Manager for them to centrally review and evaluate. So in this proposal, the evaluation of contributions is still centralized and therefore biased and subjective to the Program Manager's opinion, just like in DIP 1.5/6/7. Furthermore, there will be no recourse or transparency into those decisions since the Program Manager will not be required to explain why those 5 contributions were the chosen ones to be compensated in that month.
The answer to this on the call was that it was SeedGov, and regarding the salary, Raam clarified that they had not yet agreed on it (and it is unlikely that they will tell us this figure, since the salary will probably be from the Foundation, and not from DAO directly).
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in its current form.
We reviewed this proposal in parallel with the Triple Dip proposal, and unfortunately, in our opinion, neither is worth supporting at this point.
Our main concern here is the same as with Triple Dip - this proposal doesn’t even attempt to answer the core question: What valuable contributions are we looking for in the DAO? What is the role of delegates and contributors, and what is actually expected of them?
Are delegates meant to act merely as notaries of decisions made by AAEs? Are contributors simply “fans” who promote tweets, attend events, and contribute to the vibes - but don’t necessarily help drive initiatives within the DAO? If that’s indeed the expectation, that’s fine, but it should be stated clearly. But this would mark a shift from what the DAO used to represent - and from where, in our view, most of its past successes originated.
Without a clear understanding of our end goals, it’s difficult to support an incentive program that’s meant to help achieve them. This proposal doesn’t outline such goals; instead, it references the OpCo as the entity that defines and understands them. At this point, it seems delegates are expected to simply trust that process without sufficient clarity on how those goals are established.
Beyond that high-level concern, we also have issues with some of the mechanisms proposed:
There are additional technical details we find problematic, but going through them one by one doesn’t seem productive here.
However, one example worth mentioning is the recurring contributions exclusion clause, which seems to specifically target our past contributions - even citing monthly calls as an example of activities not eligible for rewards. To be clear, we don’t mind; we’ve never done this work for rewards but to bring value to the ecosystem, we’ve started those calls way before the DIP program. Still, we disagree with the spirit of this clause. Furthermore, if those contributions were not considered valuable, it would have been more natural (and civil) to communicate that directly before designing an incentive mechanism to exclude them.
Finally, we would like to repeat the statement we made in the Triple Drip proposal, as we find it important overall in context of those two proposals being voted on almost in parallel:
This DAO once thrived because we could debate - passionately, even heatedly - while still adding value to the ecosystem. Sadly, that spirit of collaboration and constructive dialogue feels lost. And that’s a loss for all of us.
Added clarification that once the first 50 members have been onboarded to the Peer Assembly, vouches will be restricted to one per member per month
I don't really understand why three vouchers after reaching 50 delegates is a problem in this system.
After all, these vouchers go to the delegates trusted by the other delegate who is responsible for them. There are also no issues with payouts, since five delegates can receive payments.
Overall, we believe the proposed DIP 2.0 program effectively identifies and addresses the key areas that required improvement in the previous version of the initiative — particularly the subjectivity of the scoring system and the need to separate the evaluation frameworks for different participant types. We would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of @paulofonseca , whose analysis, feedback and suggestions were instrumental in identifying several of these issues and in pushing for an improved iteration of the program.
We see notable similarities between the Triple DIP and DIP 2.0 approaches — especially in the introduction of a peer-review component, which we believe is a major enhancement. The peer-review mechanism in DIP 2.0, in particular, seems more scalable and balanced, as it integrates both peer and community feedback without creating an excessive workload for delegates and contributors. We also support the decision to leverage the Arbitrum OpCo within the program’s structure. Given OpCo’s core mission of operationalising the DAO and improving the efficiency of its initiatives, its involvement in the DIP framework seems like a natural and effective fit.
While some implementation details still need to be refined, we view DIP 2.0 as a clear and streamlined step in the right direction.
One point we’d like to emphasise concerns the selection of the Program Manager. We agree that OpCo should have the discretion to choose the individual or entity it deems best suited for the role. However, given the importance of this position within the program, we encourage OpCo to publish a rationale explaining the selection process and decision — to ensure transparency and community confidence.
Thank you to the Arbitrum Foundation for publishing this long-awaited proposal. This marks an important step forward for the DAO as it begins to distinguish between delegates and contributors. In particular, starting to define contributor responsibilities is essential to ensure that contributors are focused on impactful work aligned with the DAO’s goals, guided and legitimized by the OpCo, which should hold strategic context.
While the program’s budget is below market (as seen in comparative data across DAO delegate reward programs), we recognize that this is intentional. The program is designed as a stepping stone toward more sustainable part-time or full-time work within existing or future Arbitrum-Aligned Entities (AAEs).
That said, we strongly encourage the proposal authors to reconsider denominating the budget in USD rather than ARB. The existing DIP program is USD-denominated, which establishes consistency and predictability. Although a USD-denominated system introduces additional operational overhead, this should remain within the remit of the Program Manager—or later transition to the forthcoming OpCo finance hire.
We want to thank the Arbitrum Foundation for its thoughtful work in evolving the incentive framework. The clear distinction between delegates and contributors, and especially the introduction of the Arbitrum Peer Assembly, are crucial steps toward building a more robust and engaged governance community. It's a strong, pragmatic step forward.
While the Program Manager role is a necessary and pragmatic way to launch this program, we believe it's important to acknowledge the core challenge of subjectivity, which was a significant pain point in past incentive programs. We believe that relying on a single source of truth for contribution evaluation, while effective initially, may not be ideal as the DAO continues to scale. To ensure fairness, the DAO should proactively chart a path toward more scalable, objective, and community-driven evaluation mechanisms.
Looking ahead, we see the Peer Assembly as the most exciting part of this proposal - not just for what it is, but for what it can become. As the Assembly matures, it creates the perfect foundation for these more decentralized mechanisms. We believe a system like our Peer Recognition Score could add significant value here. We understand that a culture of active peer recognition is a prerequisite, and the Assembly is the ideal incubator for that culture. Once established, we envision a pilot program where a peer-based evaluation model could complement the Program Manager’s work. This hybrid approach would reduce subjectivity and decentralize the rewards process, making it more resilient and reflective of the community's collective wisdom.
Building on that, we can also strengthen the Assembly itself by bringing its core functions on-chain. By leveraging a tool like the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS), the vouching process could become a transparent, permissionless on-chain action. Each vouch would be a verifiable (and revocable) attestation, creating a permanent, composable record of trust. This would elevate the Assembly from a forum-based group into a true piece of on-chain social infrastructure, making it even more valuable to the Arbitrum ecosystem.
This approach has proven effective in other ecosystems. For instance, the OP Delegate Dynamic Attestation uses a similar dynamic attestation model to create a verifiable onchain group for top delegates, which the Optimism Foundation now uses in its approval logic. Having been involved in that effort, we are confident a similar direction would bring immense value to the Peer Assembly. To that end, we would be keen to contribute our expertise by helping design and build the necessary open-source tooling, such as a dynamic Peer Assembly attestation and a platform for transparent vouching and real-time tracking of its members.
Just want to clarify that, as I understand it currently at least, in the Arbitrum Foundation DIP 2.0 proposal, the Peer Assembly is just a method to define the membership in the program, and not a way for peers to evaluate other peers contributions to the DAO. Additionally, anybody can submit their (or others) contributions privately to the Program Manager for them to centrally review and evaluate. So in this proposal, the evaluation of contributions is still centralized and therefore biased and subjective to the Program Manager's opinion, just like in DIP 1.5/6/7. Furthermore, there will be no recourse or transparency into those decisions since the Program Manager will not be required to explain why those 5 contributions were the chosen ones to be compensated in that month.
However, in the Arbitrum Triple Dip (Delegate Incentive Program) proposal I've put forward and recently updated, only the Third Dip method requires delegates enrolled in the program to review and evaluate (through a contributor evaluation vote like this one) the other peers contributions, every 3 months. From the result of that quarterly vote, the Third Dip payouts will be computed and distributed. The payment for the First and Second Dip will be automatic and algorithmically computed following the rules and parameters proposed and eventually approved.
We agree with the principle of distinguishing between voting activity and other forms of contribution when allocating rewards. This separation rightly acknowledges that governance participation goes beyond casting votes and includes broader ecosystem engagement. The peer-review structure for contributors also appears well thought out and not overly burdensome, which makes it a sensible mechanism for recognizing meaningful input without adding unnecessary operational friction.
That said, at the current compensation level for contributors, most active forum participants would likely withdraw over time.
We agree with the principle of distinguishing between voting activity and other forms of contribution when allocating rewards. This separation rightly acknowledges that governance participation goes beyond casting votes and includes broader ecosystem engagement. The peer-review structure for contributors also appears well thought out and not overly burdensome, which makes it a sensible mechanism for recognizing meaningful input without adding unnecessary operational friction.
That said, at the current compensation level for contributors, most active forum participants would likely withdraw over time.
The system completely disincentivizes small and medium Delegates to participate and to invest significant time & energy into the governance process.
In a scenario where delegation is vibrant, it is reasonable to expect that consistent, high-quality engagement across the forum and other venues would be properly recognized, leading to increased delegation and higher rewards within this proposed model. Indeed, players such as entropy have experienced measurable growth in voting power through that dynamic.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao/29996#p-73888-consistent-total-delegated-voting-power-4 However, aside from these limited cases, it remains difficult for small- and mid-sized delegates to attract sufficient delegation. Under the current reward scale, many of these contributors would struggle to sustain their efforts long enough to reach a self-supporting level of delegation, and the DAO risks losing the participants who have added value at the community level.
The reason it is not in the proposal is because 1) negotiation has not concluded, 2) program details are not finalised which will impact the scope of work that is agreed upon and 3) the program manager will not be enshrined by a DAO vote, but hireable and fireable by the OpCo.
The reason it is not in the proposal is because 1) negotiation has not concluded, 2) program details are not finalised which will impact the scope of work that is agreed upon and 3) the program manager will not be enshrined by a DAO vote, but hireable and fireable by the OpCo.
As mentioned in the proposal, the scope of work and compensation, will be public once it is agreed upon by the OpCo.
Didn't the OpCo hired an unnamed Program Manager already, that is actually starting today? Maybe that person could manage this DIP (instead of @SEEDGov), if it's approved, or whatever version of the next DIP if it's eventually approved and needs OpCo support.
EDIT: The new Program Manager of OpCo is @Sinkas https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/opco-hiring-announcements/29943/3?u=paulofonseca
Thanks AF for putting this forward.
I like the division between delegates and contributors, and I think together with the upcoming revamp of Firestarter program it can help to attract innovators and proactive members back to the DAO.
Sharing a couple of thoughts below:
Voting incentives
Thanks AF for putting this forward.
I like the division between delegates and contributors, and I think together with the upcoming revamp of Firestarter program it can help to attract innovators and proactive members back to the DAO.
Sharing a couple of thoughts below:
Voting incentives
I understand the perspective behind rewarding based on actual voting acitivity. However, the risk here is that we end up with 0 debates and iterations before the actual voting, which is what instead a healthy system should aim for.
I am not convinced that changing the budget every 3 months, or giving bespoke incentive grant budgets for specific votes, adds much value. Is the demand that elastic? vs giving voters confidence that the program will last for a certain period, there is a predictable compensation that justifies effort and it's worth creating a habit of voting and explaining you rationale. Thinking about major delegates and protocols in particular.
Peer Recognition Program
I like the principle and I understand where it's coming from. The goal is reduce the perception of bias that a centralized manager can create with their decision. Peer reviews is also a dynamic that other DAOs like Yearn (via their Coordinape tool) has experiment with over the years. Would be curious to know their learnings.
I wonder if, in the case of the Arbitrum DAO, it's too idealistic at this stage. It depends heavily on people spending time reviewing others’ work (likely unpaid) which may not scale well. A generalist assembly tasked with constantly reviewing everyone’s contributions doesn’t seem like the most sustainable model for DAO evolution. I would encourage to think about ways to create specialization within the DAO, similar to what the early committees used to have.
The only requirement is to pass compliance checks and get 3 vouches from other members of the assembly. It is a very basic reputation system. In the peer assembly, it doesn’t matter whether you are a delegate or a contributor.
I think this is a reasonable requirement for anybody willing to receive rewards from the DAO, and after the initial onboarding phase where activity will be intense, I’d expect the process to stabilize naturally.
Overall I am supported of the dirction of the DIP, provided the implementation remains simple and the incentive structure predictable.
Thank you for the clarifications.
In this case, all incentives of this proposal are mechanistically flawed if the goal is increased & widespread governance participation.
If the goal is to create a bonus reward structure and increase power of entrenched parties, it’s a great proposal!
Let’s dissect:
Thank you for the clarifications.
In this case, all incentives of this proposal are mechanistically flawed if the goal is increased & widespread governance participation.
If the goal is to create a bonus reward structure and increase power of entrenched parties, it’s a great proposal!
Let’s dissect:
This means that incentives aren’t predictable, hence not reliable, and the PM - a centralized party - can decide arbitrarily how to incentivize governance activities to their liking and thereby influence participation. Problematic by design.
Further, large stakeholders are incentivized to participate in governance by their sheer size and value at risk already. In fact, there is an argument to be made to completely exclude anyone above a certain voting threshold from any reward scheme. We’re not proposing this, but it would be directionally consistent with the goal to incentivize widespread participation instead of consolidating influence and participation in a few hands. Instead, the proposal seeks to reward Delegates proportional to voting power which means most of the rewards flow to the top entities which don’t actually need it.
The system completely disincentivizes small and medium Delegates to participate and to invest significant time & energy into the governance process.
Making it mandatory to be part of the Assembly to receive any rewards is centralizing and incentivizes elbow rubbing since the only way to enter the Assembly is by recommendation. This is deadly in the context of governance since it increases consensus bias.
If this condition would only apply to contributors, it would be more acceptable since these candidates are probably more connected to other contributors anyways, the review process of contributor quality is also more involved, and it doesn’t influence governance decision making in any form.
We cannot deduct any logical reason, nor see a reason given in the proposal, why Delegate rewards should be connected in any form to Contributor rewards. These are separate topics and it was already a critique of the previous DIP that it got mixed up too much. (For the record, this is also a major critique we’d have on the proposal of @paulofonseca. Two groups with different tasks & focus should be incentivized independently a priori. )
We’re quite busy finishing development and preparing the launch of our upcoming DeFi protocol - on Arbitrum - but we’ll try to find the time to craft a comprehensive counterproposal with the goal to foster broader governance participation and attractive rewards for contributors that advance the ecosystem.
In our opinion, the above proposal offers a solid foundation for DIP improvements but falls short in every single incentive design decision and needs a complete overhaul.
Thank you for taking the initiative on an improved DIP.
The stated intentions seem to address several pain points of past iterations, specifically:
Thank you for taking the initiative on an improved DIP.
The stated intentions seem to address several pain points of past iterations, specifically:
We agree with the general intentions but have some concerns and suggestions on the incentive design of the program.
In our opinion, Delegates should be compensated based on their voting participation and transparency irrespective of exogenous factors such as the number of proposals in a given month. Often, proposals don’t even make it to snapshot or tally because of forum discourse - as it should. The proposed structure nudges governance participants to be less involved in the early stage of proposals because generating more proposals is financially beneficial even if they are rejected.
We suggest to restructure the Delegate compensation to a fixed monthly budget that is distributed according to objective rules that maintain meaningful incentives for small and medium sized Delegates. Keeping the involvement of small and medium Delegates is important to maintain diversity of opinions & perspectives.
To provide adequate incentives for small & medium Delegators to invest significant time in governance, we suggest the following incentive structure:
With the help of eligibility criteria 2 and the disqualification criteria Sybils are discouraged, which addresses the core issue of quadratic voting/compensation.
One potential shortcoming is the absence of a “complaints box”, i.e. some third party authority that manages and helps to resolve conflicts if the PM consistently dismisses contributions that the APA deems important.
Of course, in the last instance the DAO itself is the arbiter, but a faster, more direct way of conflict resolution could be useful. Given that this situation is - hopefully - unlikely to occur, the conflict mediator could be a single person or a very small group with adequately limited overhead budget. Again, these conflicts should happen rarely but foresight in structuring checks and balances will be appreciated by those who eventually need it.
Is the last part to be understood that Delegate rewards are also contingent upon joining this assembly? They are part of the DAO incentive program after all.
This would contradict our initial understanding that Delegate incentives and Contributor incentives get a clear separation. If joining the APA is a requirement for Delegate incentives, the closed loop nature of the APA is quite relevant because it affects a much larger group of people & entities, and it affects the core governance process by gatekeeping governance incentives.
In our understanding, the APA’s purpose is to scout for valuable contributions and to propose related Contributor rewards.
There appears to be no good reason to make Delegate incentives dependent on being part of the Arbitrum Peer Assembly.
Could you please clarify the intention of the proposal?
Firstly, thank you for the completely revised delegation program – this is certainly progress, as the previous program had clearly reached a dead end.
However, since the program has been completely overhauled, there are many questions about it. Please consider these questions not as a criticism of the program, but as a way to understand what needs to be improved or how it will work in general.
Firstly, thank you for the completely revised delegation program – this is certainly progress, as the previous program had clearly reached a dead end.
However, since the program has been completely overhauled, there are many questions about it. Please consider these questions not as a criticism of the program, but as a way to understand what needs to be improved or how it will work in general.
1. Contributor definition The term “positively supports” could benefit from clarification. Constructive criticism can also be positive, especially if it helps identify issues or improve the DAO. Could you clarify how “positive” will be assessed, and who determines it?
2. Incentives vs. salary I agree that the program should not replace a full-time salary. At the same time, delegates spend a meaningful amount of time (20–30 hours per month), and incentives should reasonably reflect this effort. Could we aim for rewards that are competitive with market standards?
3. Assembly System The proposed assembly mechanism could unintentionally create barriers for new participants. It might be helpful to clarify why a delegate should need to be part of a “club” in order to access rewards. And there are many questions in this part:
4. Long-term Goals
5. Dollar Spent per Vote Cast It may not be accurate to include all delegates in this metric, since many already vote consistently regardless of incentives. Would it make sense to count only delegates who are active participants in the program (e.g., those who applied)? Do you want this parameter to be the defining factor for the delegation system? If so, the question is: is the best outcome - not spending a single dollar on voting - what will the program strive for?
6. Non-voting Contributions The proposal focuses mainly on voting. However, many valuable contributions happen before votes – including technical discussions and analysis. Could these also be recognized, so that the DAO doesn’t unintentionally devalue important types of work?
7. Recurring Tasks The draft suggests that recurring tasks should rarely be rewarded. Could you clarify the reasoning? For example, if someone organizes useful community calls each month, that seems like an ongoing valuable contribution. Why should it be treated as diminishing over time?
8. Budget and Payments
9. Oversight of the Program Manager Just as delegates are evaluated, the program manager’s work should also be subject to transparent assessment, with clear criteria tied to compensation. Otherwise, without feedback, it may lead to the same results as the previous program.
10. Transparency of Recommendations Under this design, only the program manager would see recommendations, which raises concerns about subjectivity. Previously, assessments were visible to all, ensuring accountability. Could we keep evaluations transparent, so that rewards are based on usefulness rather than loyalty? This would also help safeguard Arbitrum’s reputation: constructive criticism may look negative in the short term but is valuable for long-term improvements.
11. Nudge Season This was a great initiative – simple, transparent, and effective. It seems like a strong model for increasing delegate participation, and I support such efforts
Overall, I think the program has many promising aspects, but also some areas that would benefit from clearer definitions, stronger transparency, and measurable goals. I hope these comments are helpful, and I’d be glad to continue the discussion.
Hello! I have a few questions:
While it is understandable that measures are being taken to ensure a reduction in the quorum (in absolute numbers), making the voting part of this proposal contingent on joining the Peer Assembly will likely have a significant impact on participation in the votes. My suggestion is to make this component similar to the current DIP.
Hello! I have a few questions:
While it is understandable that measures are being taken to ensure a reduction in the quorum (in absolute numbers), making the voting part of this proposal contingent on joining the Peer Assembly will likely have a significant impact on participation in the votes. My suggestion is to make this component similar to the current DIP.
Historically, there have been numerous delays in this process (not due to the fault of those applying). How will this issue be addressed if it occurs in this program?
Finally, non-members who have registered their intent to join the program via the Arbitrum Forum, can accrue rewards. They must complete the vouching and compliance process within the same calendar month that they submit their application to the program, in order to be officially registered into the assembly. If they fail to register by the month’s end, then they will forfeit any accrued rewards.
who is going to be the Program Manager? why doesn’t it specify on the proposal who is going to be Program Manager? how much is the Program Manager going to be paid?
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting AGAINST this proposal in its current form.
We reviewed this proposal in parallel with the Triple Dip proposal, and unfortunately, in our opinion, neither is worth supporting at this point.
Our main concern here is the same as with Triple Dip - this proposal doesn’t even attempt to answer the core question: What valuable contributions are we looking for in the DAO? What is the role of delegates and contributors, and what is actually expected of them?
Are delegates meant to act merely as notaries of decisions made by AAEs? Are contributors simply “fans” who promote tweets, attend events, and contribute to the vibes - but don’t necessarily help drive initiatives within the DAO? If that’s indeed the expectation, that’s fine, but it should be stated clearly. But this would mark a shift from what the DAO used to represent - and from where, in our view, most of its past successes originated.
Without a clear understanding of our end goals, it’s difficult to support an incentive program that’s meant to help achieve them. This proposal doesn’t outline such goals; instead, it references the OpCo as the entity that defines and understands them. At this point, it seems delegates are expected to simply trust that process without sufficient clarity on how those goals are established.
Beyond that high-level concern, we also have issues with some of the mechanisms proposed:
There are additional technical details we find problematic, but going through them one by one doesn’t seem productive here.
However, one example worth mentioning is the recurring contributions exclusion clause, which seems to specifically target our past contributions - even citing monthly calls as an example of activities not eligible for rewards. To be clear, we don’t mind; we’ve never done this work for rewards but to bring value to the ecosystem, we’ve started those calls way before the DIP program. Still, we disagree with the spirit of this clause. Furthermore, if those contributions were not considered valuable, it would have been more natural (and civil) to communicate that directly before designing an incentive mechanism to exclude them.
Finally, we would like to repeat the statement we made in the Triple Drip proposal, as we find it important overall in context of those two proposals being voted on almost in parallel:
This DAO once thrived because we could debate - passionately, even heatedly - while still adding value to the ecosystem. Sadly, that spirit of collaboration and constructive dialogue feels lost. And that’s a loss for all of us.
Added clarification that once the first 50 members have been onboarded to the Peer Assembly, vouches will be restricted to one per member per month
I don't really understand why three vouchers after reaching 50 delegates is a problem in this system.
After all, these vouchers go to the delegates trusted by the other delegate who is responsible for them. There are also no issues with payouts, since five delegates can receive payments.
Overall, we believe the proposed DIP 2.0 program effectively identifies and addresses the key areas that required improvement in the previous version of the initiative — particularly the subjectivity of the scoring system and the need to separate the evaluation frameworks for different participant types. We would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of @paulofonseca , whose analysis, feedback and suggestions were instrumental in identifying several of these issues and in pushing for an improved iteration of the program.
We see notable similarities between the Triple DIP and DIP 2.0 approaches — especially in the introduction of a peer-review component, which we believe is a major enhancement. The peer-review mechanism in DIP 2.0, in particular, seems more scalable and balanced, as it integrates both peer and community feedback without creating an excessive workload for delegates and contributors. We also support the decision to leverage the Arbitrum OpCo within the program’s structure. Given OpCo’s core mission of operationalising the DAO and improving the efficiency of its initiatives, its involvement in the DIP framework seems like a natural and effective fit.
While some implementation details still need to be refined, we view DIP 2.0 as a clear and streamlined step in the right direction.
One point we’d like to emphasise concerns the selection of the Program Manager. We agree that OpCo should have the discretion to choose the individual or entity it deems best suited for the role. However, given the importance of this position within the program, we encourage OpCo to publish a rationale explaining the selection process and decision — to ensure transparency and community confidence.
Thank you to the Arbitrum Foundation for publishing this long-awaited proposal. This marks an important step forward for the DAO as it begins to distinguish between delegates and contributors. In particular, starting to define contributor responsibilities is essential to ensure that contributors are focused on impactful work aligned with the DAO’s goals, guided and legitimized by the OpCo, which should hold strategic context.
While the program’s budget is below market (as seen in comparative data across DAO delegate reward programs), we recognize that this is intentional. The program is designed as a stepping stone toward more sustainable part-time or full-time work within existing or future Arbitrum-Aligned Entities (AAEs).
That said, we strongly encourage the proposal authors to reconsider denominating the budget in USD rather than ARB. The existing DIP program is USD-denominated, which establishes consistency and predictability. Although a USD-denominated system introduces additional operational overhead, this should remain within the remit of the Program Manager—or later transition to the forthcoming OpCo finance hire.
We want to thank the Arbitrum Foundation for its thoughtful work in evolving the incentive framework. The clear distinction between delegates and contributors, and especially the introduction of the Arbitrum Peer Assembly, are crucial steps toward building a more robust and engaged governance community. It's a strong, pragmatic step forward.
While the Program Manager role is a necessary and pragmatic way to launch this program, we believe it's important to acknowledge the core challenge of subjectivity, which was a significant pain point in past incentive programs. We believe that relying on a single source of truth for contribution evaluation, while effective initially, may not be ideal as the DAO continues to scale. To ensure fairness, the DAO should proactively chart a path toward more scalable, objective, and community-driven evaluation mechanisms.
Looking ahead, we see the Peer Assembly as the most exciting part of this proposal - not just for what it is, but for what it can become. As the Assembly matures, it creates the perfect foundation for these more decentralized mechanisms. We believe a system like our Peer Recognition Score could add significant value here. We understand that a culture of active peer recognition is a prerequisite, and the Assembly is the ideal incubator for that culture. Once established, we envision a pilot program where a peer-based evaluation model could complement the Program Manager’s work. This hybrid approach would reduce subjectivity and decentralize the rewards process, making it more resilient and reflective of the community's collective wisdom.
Building on that, we can also strengthen the Assembly itself by bringing its core functions on-chain. By leveraging a tool like the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS), the vouching process could become a transparent, permissionless on-chain action. Each vouch would be a verifiable (and revocable) attestation, creating a permanent, composable record of trust. This would elevate the Assembly from a forum-based group into a true piece of on-chain social infrastructure, making it even more valuable to the Arbitrum ecosystem.
This approach has proven effective in other ecosystems. For instance, the OP Delegate Dynamic Attestation uses a similar dynamic attestation model to create a verifiable onchain group for top delegates, which the Optimism Foundation now uses in its approval logic. Having been involved in that effort, we are confident a similar direction would bring immense value to the Peer Assembly. To that end, we would be keen to contribute our expertise by helping design and build the necessary open-source tooling, such as a dynamic Peer Assembly attestation and a platform for transparent vouching and real-time tracking of its members.
Just want to clarify that, as I understand it currently at least, in the Arbitrum Foundation DIP 2.0 proposal, the Peer Assembly is just a method to define the membership in the program, and not a way for peers to evaluate other peers contributions to the DAO. Additionally, anybody can submit their (or others) contributions privately to the Program Manager for them to centrally review and evaluate. So in this proposal, the evaluation of contributions is still centralized and therefore biased and subjective to the Program Manager's opinion, just like in DIP 1.5/6/7. Furthermore, there will be no recourse or transparency into those decisions since the Program Manager will not be required to explain why those 5 contributions were the chosen ones to be compensated in that month.
However, in the Arbitrum Triple Dip (Delegate Incentive Program) proposal I've put forward and recently updated, only the Third Dip method requires delegates enrolled in the program to review and evaluate (through a contributor evaluation vote like this one) the other peers contributions, every 3 months. From the result of that quarterly vote, the Third Dip payouts will be computed and distributed. The payment for the First and Second Dip will be automatic and algorithmically computed following the rules and parameters proposed and eventually approved.
We agree with the principle of distinguishing between voting activity and other forms of contribution when allocating rewards. This separation rightly acknowledges that governance participation goes beyond casting votes and includes broader ecosystem engagement. The peer-review structure for contributors also appears well thought out and not overly burdensome, which makes it a sensible mechanism for recognizing meaningful input without adding unnecessary operational friction.
That said, at the current compensation level for contributors, most active forum participants would likely withdraw over time.
We agree with the principle of distinguishing between voting activity and other forms of contribution when allocating rewards. This separation rightly acknowledges that governance participation goes beyond casting votes and includes broader ecosystem engagement. The peer-review structure for contributors also appears well thought out and not overly burdensome, which makes it a sensible mechanism for recognizing meaningful input without adding unnecessary operational friction.
That said, at the current compensation level for contributors, most active forum participants would likely withdraw over time.
The system completely disincentivizes small and medium Delegates to participate and to invest significant time & energy into the governance process.
In a scenario where delegation is vibrant, it is reasonable to expect that consistent, high-quality engagement across the forum and other venues would be properly recognized, leading to increased delegation and higher rewards within this proposed model. Indeed, players such as entropy have experienced measurable growth in voting power through that dynamic.
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/dvp-quorum-for-arbitrumdao/29996#p-73888-consistent-total-delegated-voting-power-4 However, aside from these limited cases, it remains difficult for small- and mid-sized delegates to attract sufficient delegation. Under the current reward scale, many of these contributors would struggle to sustain their efforts long enough to reach a self-supporting level of delegation, and the DAO risks losing the participants who have added value at the community level.
The reason it is not in the proposal is because 1) negotiation has not concluded, 2) program details are not finalised which will impact the scope of work that is agreed upon and 3) the program manager will not be enshrined by a DAO vote, but hireable and fireable by the OpCo.
The reason it is not in the proposal is because 1) negotiation has not concluded, 2) program details are not finalised which will impact the scope of work that is agreed upon and 3) the program manager will not be enshrined by a DAO vote, but hireable and fireable by the OpCo.
As mentioned in the proposal, the scope of work and compensation, will be public once it is agreed upon by the OpCo.
Didn't the OpCo hired an unnamed Program Manager already, that is actually starting today? Maybe that person could manage this DIP (instead of @SEEDGov), if it's approved, or whatever version of the next DIP if it's eventually approved and needs OpCo support.
EDIT: The new Program Manager of OpCo is @Sinkas https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/opco-hiring-announcements/29943/3?u=paulofonseca
Thanks AF for putting this forward.
I like the division between delegates and contributors, and I think together with the upcoming revamp of Firestarter program it can help to attract innovators and proactive members back to the DAO.
Sharing a couple of thoughts below:
Voting incentives
Thanks AF for putting this forward.
I like the division between delegates and contributors, and I think together with the upcoming revamp of Firestarter program it can help to attract innovators and proactive members back to the DAO.
Sharing a couple of thoughts below:
Voting incentives
I understand the perspective behind rewarding based on actual voting acitivity. However, the risk here is that we end up with 0 debates and iterations before the actual voting, which is what instead a healthy system should aim for.
I am not convinced that changing the budget every 3 months, or giving bespoke incentive grant budgets for specific votes, adds much value. Is the demand that elastic? vs giving voters confidence that the program will last for a certain period, there is a predictable compensation that justifies effort and it's worth creating a habit of voting and explaining you rationale. Thinking about major delegates and protocols in particular.
Peer Recognition Program
I like the principle and I understand where it's coming from. The goal is reduce the perception of bias that a centralized manager can create with their decision. Peer reviews is also a dynamic that other DAOs like Yearn (via their Coordinape tool) has experiment with over the years. Would be curious to know their learnings.
I wonder if, in the case of the Arbitrum DAO, it's too idealistic at this stage. It depends heavily on people spending time reviewing others’ work (likely unpaid) which may not scale well. A generalist assembly tasked with constantly reviewing everyone’s contributions doesn’t seem like the most sustainable model for DAO evolution. I would encourage to think about ways to create specialization within the DAO, similar to what the early committees used to have.
The only requirement is to pass compliance checks and get 3 vouches from other members of the assembly. It is a very basic reputation system. In the peer assembly, it doesn’t matter whether you are a delegate or a contributor.
I think this is a reasonable requirement for anybody willing to receive rewards from the DAO, and after the initial onboarding phase where activity will be intense, I’d expect the process to stabilize naturally.
Overall I am supported of the dirction of the DIP, provided the implementation remains simple and the incentive structure predictable.
Thank you for the clarifications.
In this case, all incentives of this proposal are mechanistically flawed if the goal is increased & widespread governance participation.
If the goal is to create a bonus reward structure and increase power of entrenched parties, it’s a great proposal!
Let’s dissect:
Thank you for the clarifications.
In this case, all incentives of this proposal are mechanistically flawed if the goal is increased & widespread governance participation.
If the goal is to create a bonus reward structure and increase power of entrenched parties, it’s a great proposal!
Let’s dissect:
This means that incentives aren’t predictable, hence not reliable, and the PM - a centralized party - can decide arbitrarily how to incentivize governance activities to their liking and thereby influence participation. Problematic by design.
Further, large stakeholders are incentivized to participate in governance by their sheer size and value at risk already. In fact, there is an argument to be made to completely exclude anyone above a certain voting threshold from any reward scheme. We’re not proposing this, but it would be directionally consistent with the goal to incentivize widespread participation instead of consolidating influence and participation in a few hands. Instead, the proposal seeks to reward Delegates proportional to voting power which means most of the rewards flow to the top entities which don’t actually need it.
The system completely disincentivizes small and medium Delegates to participate and to invest significant time & energy into the governance process.
Making it mandatory to be part of the Assembly to receive any rewards is centralizing and incentivizes elbow rubbing since the only way to enter the Assembly is by recommendation. This is deadly in the context of governance since it increases consensus bias.
If this condition would only apply to contributors, it would be more acceptable since these candidates are probably more connected to other contributors anyways, the review process of contributor quality is also more involved, and it doesn’t influence governance decision making in any form.
We cannot deduct any logical reason, nor see a reason given in the proposal, why Delegate rewards should be connected in any form to Contributor rewards. These are separate topics and it was already a critique of the previous DIP that it got mixed up too much. (For the record, this is also a major critique we’d have on the proposal of @paulofonseca. Two groups with different tasks & focus should be incentivized independently a priori. )
We’re quite busy finishing development and preparing the launch of our upcoming DeFi protocol - on Arbitrum - but we’ll try to find the time to craft a comprehensive counterproposal with the goal to foster broader governance participation and attractive rewards for contributors that advance the ecosystem.
In our opinion, the above proposal offers a solid foundation for DIP improvements but falls short in every single incentive design decision and needs a complete overhaul.
Thank you for taking the initiative on an improved DIP.
The stated intentions seem to address several pain points of past iterations, specifically:
Thank you for taking the initiative on an improved DIP.
The stated intentions seem to address several pain points of past iterations, specifically:
We agree with the general intentions but have some concerns and suggestions on the incentive design of the program.
In our opinion, Delegates should be compensated based on their voting participation and transparency irrespective of exogenous factors such as the number of proposals in a given month. Often, proposals don’t even make it to snapshot or tally because of forum discourse - as it should. The proposed structure nudges governance participants to be less involved in the early stage of proposals because generating more proposals is financially beneficial even if they are rejected.
We suggest to restructure the Delegate compensation to a fixed monthly budget that is distributed according to objective rules that maintain meaningful incentives for small and medium sized Delegates. Keeping the involvement of small and medium Delegates is important to maintain diversity of opinions & perspectives.
To provide adequate incentives for small & medium Delegators to invest significant time in governance, we suggest the following incentive structure:
With the help of eligibility criteria 2 and the disqualification criteria Sybils are discouraged, which addresses the core issue of quadratic voting/compensation.
One potential shortcoming is the absence of a “complaints box”, i.e. some third party authority that manages and helps to resolve conflicts if the PM consistently dismisses contributions that the APA deems important.
Of course, in the last instance the DAO itself is the arbiter, but a faster, more direct way of conflict resolution could be useful. Given that this situation is - hopefully - unlikely to occur, the conflict mediator could be a single person or a very small group with adequately limited overhead budget. Again, these conflicts should happen rarely but foresight in structuring checks and balances will be appreciated by those who eventually need it.
Is the last part to be understood that Delegate rewards are also contingent upon joining this assembly? They are part of the DAO incentive program after all.
This would contradict our initial understanding that Delegate incentives and Contributor incentives get a clear separation. If joining the APA is a requirement for Delegate incentives, the closed loop nature of the APA is quite relevant because it affects a much larger group of people & entities, and it affects the core governance process by gatekeeping governance incentives.
In our understanding, the APA’s purpose is to scout for valuable contributions and to propose related Contributor rewards.
There appears to be no good reason to make Delegate incentives dependent on being part of the Arbitrum Peer Assembly.
Could you please clarify the intention of the proposal?
Firstly, thank you for the completely revised delegation program – this is certainly progress, as the previous program had clearly reached a dead end.
However, since the program has been completely overhauled, there are many questions about it. Please consider these questions not as a criticism of the program, but as a way to understand what needs to be improved or how it will work in general.
Firstly, thank you for the completely revised delegation program – this is certainly progress, as the previous program had clearly reached a dead end.
However, since the program has been completely overhauled, there are many questions about it. Please consider these questions not as a criticism of the program, but as a way to understand what needs to be improved or how it will work in general.
1. Contributor definition The term “positively supports” could benefit from clarification. Constructive criticism can also be positive, especially if it helps identify issues or improve the DAO. Could you clarify how “positive” will be assessed, and who determines it?
2. Incentives vs. salary I agree that the program should not replace a full-time salary. At the same time, delegates spend a meaningful amount of time (20–30 hours per month), and incentives should reasonably reflect this effort. Could we aim for rewards that are competitive with market standards?
3. Assembly System The proposed assembly mechanism could unintentionally create barriers for new participants. It might be helpful to clarify why a delegate should need to be part of a “club” in order to access rewards. And there are many questions in this part:
4. Long-term Goals
5. Dollar Spent per Vote Cast It may not be accurate to include all delegates in this metric, since many already vote consistently regardless of incentives. Would it make sense to count only delegates who are active participants in the program (e.g., those who applied)? Do you want this parameter to be the defining factor for the delegation system? If so, the question is: is the best outcome - not spending a single dollar on voting - what will the program strive for?
6. Non-voting Contributions The proposal focuses mainly on voting. However, many valuable contributions happen before votes – including technical discussions and analysis. Could these also be recognized, so that the DAO doesn’t unintentionally devalue important types of work?
7. Recurring Tasks The draft suggests that recurring tasks should rarely be rewarded. Could you clarify the reasoning? For example, if someone organizes useful community calls each month, that seems like an ongoing valuable contribution. Why should it be treated as diminishing over time?
8. Budget and Payments
9. Oversight of the Program Manager Just as delegates are evaluated, the program manager’s work should also be subject to transparent assessment, with clear criteria tied to compensation. Otherwise, without feedback, it may lead to the same results as the previous program.
10. Transparency of Recommendations Under this design, only the program manager would see recommendations, which raises concerns about subjectivity. Previously, assessments were visible to all, ensuring accountability. Could we keep evaluations transparent, so that rewards are based on usefulness rather than loyalty? This would also help safeguard Arbitrum’s reputation: constructive criticism may look negative in the short term but is valuable for long-term improvements.
11. Nudge Season This was a great initiative – simple, transparent, and effective. It seems like a strong model for increasing delegate participation, and I support such efforts
Overall, I think the program has many promising aspects, but also some areas that would benefit from clearer definitions, stronger transparency, and measurable goals. I hope these comments are helpful, and I’d be glad to continue the discussion.
Hello! I have a few questions:
While it is understandable that measures are being taken to ensure a reduction in the quorum (in absolute numbers), making the voting part of this proposal contingent on joining the Peer Assembly will likely have a significant impact on participation in the votes. My suggestion is to make this component similar to the current DIP.
Hello! I have a few questions:
While it is understandable that measures are being taken to ensure a reduction in the quorum (in absolute numbers), making the voting part of this proposal contingent on joining the Peer Assembly will likely have a significant impact on participation in the votes. My suggestion is to make this component similar to the current DIP.
Historically, there have been numerous delays in this process (not due to the fault of those applying). How will this issue be addressed if it occurs in this program?
Finally, non-members who have registered their intent to join the program via the Arbitrum Forum, can accrue rewards. They must complete the vouching and compliance process within the same calendar month that they submit their application to the program, in order to be officially registered into the assembly. If they fail to register by the month’s end, then they will forfeit any accrued rewards.
who is going to be the Program Manager? why doesn’t it specify on the proposal who is going to be Program Manager? how much is the Program Manager going to be paid?
